LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR SPACE

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

Yu Takeuchi

Degree of Master of Laws

Institute of Air and Space Law, Faculty of Law

McGill University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
October, 2014

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

degree of Master of Laws.

Copyright Yu Takeuchi, 2014, All rights reserved.

The views expressed in this thesis are solely those of the author in his personal
capacity, and do not in any way represent those of the organization to which the
author belongs or any other entity of the Japanese Government.

i
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor

Ram Jakhu, for his invaluable and warm support, patience, and deep insight. I could
not have finished this work without his tireless advice. I would also like to thank
all of my capable classmates from the Institute for their friendship and
encouragement, as well as all the staff members of the Institute, faculty, and
university for their support. My special appreciations go to Kuan-Wei (David) Chen
for his helpful comments throughout the thesis and Rachel Pachoud for her
translation of the French Abstract. It is also necessary to acknowledge Professor
Setsuko Aoki of Keio University of Japan, who is also an alumnus of the Institute,
for encouraging me to pursue this degree. I would like to take this opportunity to
offer my deepest gratitude to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and
its people for sending me and giving me the opportunity to study at McGill.
Last, but not least, I must mention my family. I thank my parents for their faith in
letting me study abroad and their support back in Japan during my stay in Montreal.
I would also like to thank my wife for coming with me all the way to Canada for
her first time living abroad, supporting and providing distractions during our stay.

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ............................................................................................ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................ v
RÉSUMÉ ................................................................................................................ vi
ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................... vii
Chapter1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2 Responses and Challenges Confronting the International Community ................. 9
2.1 Technical Responding Efforts ....................................................................................... 9
2.1.1 Space Debris Mitigation Technologies .................................................................... 9
2.1.2 Space Situational Awareness and Collision Avoidance Technologies ...................... 10
2.2 Regulatory Response Efforts ....................................................................................... 13
2.2.1 Legally Binding Regulations ................................................................................ 13
2.2.2 Non-Legally Binding Regulations ........................................................................ 18
2.2.3 Problems in the Current Systems .......................................................................... 24
Chapter 3 International Regime for Space Traffic Management ........................................ 27
3.1 The Proposed Concept of STM and its Contemporary Evaluation .................................. 28
3.2 Necessity and Admissibility of the International Regime of STM................................... 33
3.2.1 Roles of the STM Regime.................................................................................... 33
3.2.2 Necessity to Establish the STM Regime ................................................................ 35
3.2.3 Admissibility of STM Regime in International Law ............................................... 36
3.2.3.1 Air Traffic Management Regime .............................................................. 37
3.2.3.2 Maritime Traffic Management Regime ...................................................... 42
3.2.4 Preventive Controlling Norms of the Outer Space Treaty ....................................... 44
3.3 Existing Trajectory to STM Regime ............................................................................ 45
3.3.1 Nexus of LTSSA, ICOC and GGE – Existing Trajectory toward STM .................... 45
3.3.2 Possible next steps .............................................................................................. 48
Chapter 4 Re-capturing International Space Law for Space Traffic Management .............. 50
4.1 Space Traffic Rules .................................................................................................... 50
4.2 Fair and Effective SSA Information and Data Sharing ................................................... 52
4.3 Relativized Delimitation of Outer Space ...................................................................... 56
4.4 Scope of Space Object for STM .................................................................................. 59
4.4.1 Definition and Scope of Space Object ................................................................... 59
4.4.2 Procedure for Relinquishment of Rights on Space Debris ....................................... 63
4.4.3 Regulating Suborbital Spaceflight ........................................................................ 64
4.5 State Responsibility and Liability in STM .................................................................... 65

iii
 4.5.1 Encourage National Implementation ..................................................................... 65
4.5.2 Responsible State for STM .................................................................................. 67
4.5.3 Fairness of the Current International Liability System ............................................ 68
4.5.4 Validation and Liability of SSA Data .................................................................... 71
Chapter 5 Establishment of the New International Regime for STM .................................. 74
5.1 Subject Matters .......................................................................................................... 74
5.2 Measures to Control the Regime ................................................................................. 75
5.3 Space Actors ............................................................................................................. 75
5.4 Other Necessary Political issues for installation of STM regime..................................... 79
5.4.1 Ideal Regulatory Organization .............................................................................. 79
5.4.2 Cost Allocation ................................................................................................... 80
5.4.3 Political Momentum ............................................................................................ 80
Chapter 6 Conclusion......................................................................................................... 82
LIST OF REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 84

iv
 ABSTRACT

The current "congested, contested, and competing" situation of outer space

increases collision risks in space operations. The efforts of technology development
to solve this situation have been well-developed, but regulatory issues still remain
as challenges. Namely, the UN space treaties are not well-implemented into
national legislation, the political will for new international legislation is
consistently lacking, and the well-developed soft laws remain too abstract to
resolve the problem. Hence, this thesis proposes to establish a new international
regime for Space Traffic Management (STM), with a demonstration of its
admissibility within the current international legal regime. Today, several
initiatives show existing trajectory in the international community that can
gradually turn the STM regime into reality. The core proposal is the establishment
of the Space Traffic Rules, with a parallel thought of the Air Traffic Rules, and fair
regulation for Space Situational Awareness data sharing. This thesis also discusses
the problems of the current international space law in terms of re-capturing it into
the context of STM: involving the delimitation of outer space, the scope of the
definition of space objects, and the space responsibility and liability.

v
 RÉSUMÉ

Un espace extra-atmosphérique congestionné, concurrentiel et en proie à des

différends, tel qu'il est actuellement, augmente les risques de collision lors des
opérations spatiales. Les efforts de développement technologique pour remédier à
cette situation ont connu une belle progression, mais des problèmes de
réglementation restent à résoudre. Ainsi, les traités des Nations Unies relatifs à
l'espace ne sont pas correctement retranscrits en droit interne, la volonté politique
d'élaborer de nouveaux traités est inexistante, et les mesures non-contraignantes
appropriées demeurent trop abstraites pour solutionner les problèmes. Par
conséquent, ce mémoire propose de créer un nouveau régime international pour la
gestion du trafic spatial [STM (Space Traffic Management)], en démontrant sa
faisabilité dans le cadre du régime juridique international actuel. À ce jour,
plusieurs initiatives, nées au sein de la communauté internationale, indiquent la voie
qui pourrait progressivement transformer le régime de STM en réalité. La
principale proposition porte sur la mise en place d'une règlementation du trafic
spatial, faisant écho à celle du trafic aérien, ainsi que sur des règles équitables
régissant le partage de données de SSA. Ce mémoire traite également les problèmes
actuels du droit spatial international et la manière de promouvoir celui-ci dans le
cadre de la STM, s'agissant notamment de la délimitation de l'espace extra-
atmosphérique, de la définition des objets spatiaux, et de la responsabilité des États.

vi
 ACRONYMS

ASAT Anti-Satellite (weapon)

ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
ESA European Space Agency
EU European Union
CD Conference on Disarmament
CSLA Commercial Space Launch Act (US)
CSM Conjunction Summary Message
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FIR Flight Information Region
FSOA French Space Operations Act
GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit
GGE Group of Governmental Experts
IAA International Academy of Astronautics
IADC Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ International Court of Justice
IMO International Maritime Organization
ISON International Scientific Optical Network
ISS International Space Station
ITU International Telecommunication Union
JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
JSPOC Joint Space Operation Center
ICOC International Code of Conduct for Space Activities
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LSC Legal Subcommittee
LTSSA Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities
MTM Maritime Traffic Management
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

vii
SARPs International Standards and Recommended Practices
SSA Space Situational Awareness
SDA Space Data Association Limited
SSN Space Surveillance Network
STM Space Traffic Management
STSC Scientific and Technical Subcommittee
TCBM Transparency and Confidence Building Measures
TT&C Telecommunication, Tracking and Command
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCOPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNOOSA United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
VTS Vessel Traffic Services

viii
 Chapter 1
Introduction

Transportation has always been part of the dreams and dynamic powers in the history
of human beings. All roads led to Rome in the Roman Empire, the development of modern
America was connected to the construction of railroads, 1 and aviation revolutionary
changed economic circumstances.2 Transportation to space started with the first launch of
Sputnik in 1957 under the space race of the United States (US) and the former Soviet
Union. During the last couple of decades, usable orbits within outer space have become
congested by the increase of space activities and the domination policies by sovereign
States over outer space. The increasing number of space actors raised the amount of space
vehicles, as well as space debris.3 Calculations show that the amount of space debris large
enough to affect satellite missions in usable orbits includes more than one hundred million
pieces. The anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test conducted by China in 2007 heavily
impacted space security as well as its environment, and was an example of the non-
transparent nature of Chinese space policy.4 The first collision between large satellites,
which occurred in 2009, also generated similar amounts of space debris.5 The scientific
scenario known as Kessler Syndrome illustrates how possible space debris growth is
generated as fragments from random collisions rapidly create additional hazards. Based on
the current volume of space debris, the catastrophic reality of unusable space could become
real in a couple of decades if we do not start reducing space debris and controlling space

1
Paul Stephen Dempsey & Laurence E. Gesell, Public Policy and the Regulation of
Commercial Aviation (Chandler: Coast Aire Publications, 2013) at 131-172.
2
Ibid at 48-63.
3
Cesar Jaramillo, ed, Space Security Index 2013, 10th ed (Waterloo, Canada: Project
Ploughshares, 2013) at 23-30.
4
"Concern over China's missile test", BBC News (19 January 2007) online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>.
5
"Russian and US Satellites Collide", BBC News (12 February 2009) online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

1
activities.6 In other words, we have almost reached the critical limit for the sustainable
development of outer space. The status of laws governing outer space, however, remains
at its original inception in the 1960s and 1970s when the UN space treaties were adopted.
The international community is attempting to supplement the old system by adopting
various “soft laws”. However, to date, there is no single rule with a binding legal obligation
to regulate the movement of objects in outer space.
The purpose of this thesis is to propose a consolidated set of rules for the establishment
of an appropriate and practical space traffic management international regime. 7 The
concept of Space Traffic Management (STM) was first proposed by American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics in the early 1990s, and formalized in a report by International
Academy of Astronautics (IAA) in 2006.8 Although the report mainly showed technical
necessity and feasibility, the whole proposal also introduced a new regulatory perspective
as a necessity of STM regarding current space activities. Following the IAA STM Report
and previous relevant studies, this thesis will further describe the legal aspects and tackle
some potential legal challenges behind the implementation of STM. As a result, it will lead
the way for a new regulatory regime, and hopefully provide solution to the current
contested and congested nature of space activities.9
This thesis will use a theoretical approach and a comparative approach. The theoretical
approach involves developing the form of the STM regulatory regime as a legal theory and
obligation. This would include theoretical discussions of current concepts of international

6
Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, "Collision Frequency of Artificial
Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt" (1978) 83:A6 Journal of Geophysical Research:
Space Physics 2637.
7
International regime is defined as “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given
area of international relations”: Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983) at 2.
8
Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Petr Lála & Corinne Contant-Jorgenson, Cosmic Study on Space
Traffic Management (Paris: International Academy of Astronautics (IAA), 2006)
[Schrogl, Lála & Contant-Jorgenson, “IAA STM Report”].
9
For defining STM, this thesis uses the definition of the IAA STM Report: “the set of
technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into outer space, operations
in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free from physical or radio-frequency
interference.” (Ibid at 10.).

2
space law, the establishment of the legal regulatory regime of STM, and the addressing of
potential legal challenges to the implementation and use of STM. The comparative
approach involves comparing and contrasting similar regimes of traffic management used
today in other fields, such as maritime and aviation. The most affordable and practical
system used today is Air Traffic Management (ATM) over aviation: therefore, a
comparison of potential STM regime and the existing ATM regime will be conducted.
In the last half-century’s history of space activities, the configurations of these
activities have changed and new issues have actualized while technology developed.
Currently, outer space is becoming increasingly "congested, contested, and
competitive".10 By a concrete description of these three circumstances of outer space, the
remaining pages of this chapter will illustrate the actual problems lying in the current
circumstances of space operations for illuminating the exacerbating practical problems of
space operations. This description will also serve to provide an overview of actual space
activities as a subject matter of the topic throughout this thesis.
In the early 21st Century, human beings experienced several major events regarding
space activities. Most of them, especially the collision events occurred on the spacecraft
were becoming observable by virtue of technological advancement.11 This advancement of
technology has also brought new political and legal issues in the international community,
which will be discussed below. The number of space objects has been growing constantly
from the beginning of the space age, and it was recognized as a universal problem around
the 1990s.12 Despite global recognition by the space community, a major accident occurred
in 2009, which established a historical case.
In February 2009, the Iridium 33 satellite belonging to the private American company
Iridium Satellite, and the Cosmos 2251 satellite belonging to the Russian military, collided

10
US Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National
Security Space Strategy (Unclassified Summary) (2011) [US National Security Space
Strategy].
11
Jaramillo, ed, supra note 3 at 23-30.
12
US National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], "Monthly Number of
Cataloged Objects in Earth Orbit by Object Type", Orbital Debris Quarterly News (15
January 2014) 10 online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
<http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>, [NASA, “Debris by Object Type”].

3
at an altitude of about 800 km above Siberia. 13 It is reported that Cosmos 2251 had
terminated its function and Iridium 33 was in operation at the time of collision. Statistics
show that more than 3,000 pieces of space debris were created because of this collision.14
This incident made a huge impact on the space community, since it was the first time it had
happened among the major satellites. It served as one of the driving forces of the US space
debris policy, such as the legislation to authorize the government to share space situational
awareness (SSA) data with private entities and foreign governments in 2009. President
Obama’s space policy accelerates international cooperation in this area and the US
government is positively promoting SSA sharing. 15 Despite these efforts, the actual
situation has already become serious enough that a slight modification of a single policy
cannot make drastic change.

Observations show that the amount of total catalogued debris counted around 17,000
pieces in 2013, and roughly 23,000 pieces of those 10 cm or larger are being tracked.16
These numbers can be seen as a warning sign, if the behavior of international space actors
in the near future continues as it is today. The famous scientific simulation pinpointed, in
1978, that if human beings continued space activities without space debris mitigation,
fragments from random collisions between pieces of space debris might trigger hazardous
populations of space debris around the year 2000.17 However, human beings successfully
managed to refrain from loosely generating space debris by establishing certain rules for
mitigating it. Currently, the speed of our approach to the deadlocked situation is slower
than it was 30 years ago, though it has not been stopped and will eventually reach an
unsustainable situation.

13
BBC News, supra note 5.
14
NASA, “Debris by Object Type”, supra note 12.
15
Davis Florick & Col. Lina Cashin, "Space Situational Awareness Sharing for the 21st
Century", Space News (27 May 2013) online: Space News
<http://www.spacenews.com>.
16
NASA, “Debris by Object Type”, supra note 12; Jaramillo, ed, supra note 3 at 24-25.
17
Donald J. Kessler et al, "The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space
Operations", (Paper delivered at the 33rd Annual American Astronautical Society
Guidance and Control Conference, Breckenridge, Colorado, 6-10 February 2010) at 1-2,
[unpublished].

4
 Although this hazardous situation is still a prophetical study, actual risks are becoming
obvious. It is reported that the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), which provides
the most globally opened sources for tracked and catalogued space objects through its SSA
sharing program 18 , currently issues approximately 20-30 emergency notifications per
day.19 In 2013, NASA reported that 29 collision avoidance maneuvers were conducted by
the US operators 20 , France reported 19 maneuvers 21 , and the European Space Agency
(ESA) reported 17 maneuvers.22 The International Space Station (ISS), which is the only
human outer space resident program to date, was also obligated to conduct collision
avoidance maneuvers 18 times from 1999 to March 2014.23 It should also be reminded that
the congestion of outer space is not limited to a certain orbit but endangers both low Earth
orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) as the same situation.

Thus, not only would the existing space activities suffer from the deteriorating outer
space environment, but the emerging ones may suffer as well. It may also endanger the
lives in spacecrafts, as the Hollywood film “Gravity” produced in 2013 vividly attracted

18
Courtland B. McLeod, "Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Sharing", (Technical
Presentation delivered at the 49th session of the UNCOPUOS STSC, UN Office in
Vienna, 14 February 2012), online: United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
[OOSA] <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
19
John W. Raymond, “Strategic Partnerships in Space,” (Presentation delivered at the
2nd International Symposium on Sustainable Space Development and Utilization for
Humankind, Tokyo, 28 February-1 March 2013), online: Japan Space Forum
<http://www.jsforum.or.jp> at 12; Jaramillo, ed, supra note 3 at 26-27.
20
Mark Matney, “USA Space Debris Environment, Operations, and Modeling Updates”,
(Technical Presentation delivered at the 51st session of the UNCOPUOS STSC, UN
Office in Vienna, 14 February 2014), online: OOSA <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
21
Fernand Alby, “Overview on 2013 Space Debris Activities in France”, (Technical
Presentation delivered at the 51st session of the UNCOPUOS STSC, UN Office in
Vienna, 11 February 2014), online: OOSA <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
22
Heiner Klinkrad, “Space Debris Mitigation Activities at ESA in 2013”, (Technical
Presentation delivered at the 51st session of the UNCOPUOS STSC, UN Office in
Vienna, 14 February 2014), online: OOSA <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
23
NASA, "International Space Station Maneuvers Twice to Avoid Tracked Debris",
Orbital Debris Quarterly News (15 April 2014) 1, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program
Office <http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>.

5
public attention to the problem.24 Emerging activities, such as Chinese human spaceflights,
suborbital spaceflights25, or micro-satellite activities26 will also suffer from, and may create
further space debris, if the space community does not take further steps against the
congestion of the outer space.
The current outer space situation is also evaluated as an increasingly contested area:
that is to say, the man-made threats to deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy space
assets.27 The ASAT test conducted by China in January 2007 shocked the international
community by highlighting the threats against space security and space operations. The test
resulted in the destruction of the still-functioning Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) weather satellite
in polar orbit by adding more than 3,000 pieces of space debris.28 Although the ASAT test
was not a newly developed technology at that time, as it had been conducted by the US and
the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, the two States had refrained from conducting
physical tests. The Chinese test was the first kinetic-kill test conducted by a third country
rather than the US and Russia.29 The test was significant in terms of security balance of the
region. One can also say that the Chinese test placed the international community onto a
slippery slope towards space weaponization.30

24
Denise Chow, "Clean Up Space Junk or Risk Real-Life 'Gravity' Disaster, Lawmakers
Say", Space.com (9 May 2014) online: Space.com <http://www.space.com>.
25
In this thesis, “suborbital spaceflight” is used as the definition of “the launch of an
object or objects into outer space without that object or such objects completing one or
more orbits around the earth.” (Peter van Fenema, "Suborbital Flights and ICAO" (2005)
30:6 Air and Space Law 396 at 396.); Jaramillo, ed, supra note 3 at 58-60.
26
NASA, "Small Satellite Possibly Hit by Even Smaller Object", Orbital Debris
Quarterly News (15 April 2014) 1, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
<http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>.
27
US National Security Space Strategy, supra note 10 at 3.
28
BBC News, supra note 4.
29
Michael C. Mineiro, "FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty" (2008) 34 Journal of Space Law
321 at 341.
30
Theresa Hitchens, "Debris, Traffic Management, and Weaponization: Opportunities for
and Challenges to Cooperation in Space" (2008) 14 Brown Journal of World Affairs 173.
[Hitchens, “Debris, Traffic Management and Weaponization”]; for security aspects of the
ASAT test c.f. Setsuko Aoki, "’Space Traffic Management’for the Prevention of
Weaponization of Outer Space" (2008) 51 Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space 154.

6
 China has also continuously exhibited its ASAT ability in 2013, but only caused
massive space debris generation from its first test of 2007.31 The contamination from 2007
test is still recording as the worst one, as nearly 90% of the space debris remaining from
the test.32 The FY-1C destruction became a tragedy, because its interception was at the
altitude of around 850 km: the middle of the useful altitude for low Earth orbit (LEO).33
According to a recent report, the space debris generated by this test is distributed widely
throughout the useful orbit of 500 km to 1,500 km. 34 This data shows that the kinetic
destruction by ASAT creates a massive exacerbation of the outer space environment, to
end up with the unsustainability of space activities.
In February 2008, the United States destroyed the USA-193 satellite, a defunct
national security satellite, by a missile launched by a navy warship. The announced purpose
of this operation was to disperse the 453 kg or highly toxic hydrazine fuel remaining in the
satellite harmlessly. The missile hit the satellite approximately 247 km over the Pacific
Ocean, nearly all of the debris was burned up within 24-48 hours from the impact, and the
remaining debris would re-enter the atmosphere within 40 days, according to the US
Department of Defense.35 Despite the official statements of the US Government, several
views indicate that this test was an ASAT test reflecting the Chinese FY-1C test. 36
Whatever the case may be, the escalation of ASAT tests may incur kinetic-kill in the useful
orbits, ending up with generations of space debris similarly to the FY-1C case.

31
Bill Gertz, "China Launches Three ASAT Satellites", The Washington Free Beacon
(26 August 2013), online: The Washington Free Beacon <http://freebeacon.com>.
32
NASA, "Chinese Debris Reaches New Milestone", Orbital Debris Quarterly News (15
October 2010) 3, online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
<http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov> at 2-3.
33
NASA, "Chinese Anti-satellite Test Creates Most Severe Orbital Debris Cloud in
History", Orbital Debris Quarterly News (15 April 2007) 2, online: NASA Orbital Debris
Program Office <www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>.
34
NASA, “Debris by Object Type”, supra note 12 at 3.
35
US Department of Defense, News Release, “DoD Succeeds In Intercepting Non-
Functioning Satellite” 20 February 2008, Release no 0139-08, online: US Department of
Defense <http://www.defense.gov>.
36
“US spy satellite plan 'a cover'”, BBC News (17 February 2008), online: BBC
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/>; Brian Wingfield, "A New Space Race?", Forbes (21 February
2008), online: Forbes <http://www.forbes.com>.

7
 The technology and business development competition in outer space activities is
going far beyond that among the superpowers in the Cold War age. The number of actors
conducting space activities is dramatically increasing and the manufacturing of spacecrafts
is gradually being transferred to many countries, although independent launch capability is
still dominated by 11 countries.37 It is reported that the US, Russia, Europe, China, Japan,
India, South Korea, and a multinational provider called Sea Launch conducted 81 orbital
launches in total in 2013: 23 of them were commercial, which is a three-launch increase
from the previous year.38 The space industry has grown up to a US$300 billion market.39
The dilemma confronted by the space community involves designing policies and
regulations in order to maintain sustainable space activities without restricting this growing
industrial competitiveness.

37
US National Security Space Strategy, supra note 10 at 2-3; Jaramillo, ed, supra note 3
at 45. With successful launch of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 14th
December 2012 ("North Korea Launches First Satellite into Orbit", Spacenews (14
December 2012), online: Spacenews <http://www.spacenews.com>) and the Republic of
Korea in January 30th 2013 ("S. Korea Successfully Launches Naro Space Rocket",
Spacenews (30 January 2013), online: Spacenews <http://www.spacenews.com>).
38
US Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, Commercial Space Transportation 2013 Year in Review, (Washington
D.C., 2014), online: FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation
<http://www.faa.gov/go/ast>.
39
Futron Corporation, Futron's 2014 Space Competitiveness Index (Executive Summary),
(Bethesda: Futron, 2014), online: Futron Corporation <http://www.futron.com>.

8
 Chapter 2
Responses and Challenges Confronting the International Community

In order to de-escalate the congested, contested, and competed situation of outer space
and maintain sustainable space activities, the international community has made several
technical and regulatory efforts. This Chapter will briefly describe these efforts as the basis
of the analysis for the necessity of STM Regime, since the efforts which have been taken
by the international community are capricious and not enough for solving the situation.
2.1 Technical Responding Efforts
2.1.1 Space Debris Mitigation Technologies
In order to assure sustainable space activities in the future, the space-faring nations
have extended their space agencies’ research and technology for space debris mitigation.
Currently, space agencies which have obtained launch capabilities have voluntarily
established their standards for space debris mitigation in order to reflect their spacecraft
and mission design.40 Although the space agencies tailor the standards for each mission for
technical reasons, these standards are generally kept in conformity in practice. 41 These

40
NASA, “Process for Limiting Orbital Debris”, NASA-STD-8719.14, 28 August 2007;
ESA Director General’s Office, “Space Debris Mitigation for Agency Projects”,
ESA/ADMIN/IPOL(2008)2, 1 April 2008; JAXA, “Space Debris Mitigation Standard”,
JAXA-JMR-003A, October 2003 (updated to JAXA-JMR-003B at 1 February 2011);
ESA, “European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation (Issue 1.0)”, 28 June
2004; Russian Federation, “National Standard of the Russian Federation, General
Requirements on Space Systems for the Mitigation of Human Produced Near Earth Space
Pollution”, 2009. France enacted in its Technical Regulations (Arrêté du 31 mars 2011
relatif à la réglementation technique en application du décret n° 2009-643 du 9 juin 2009
relatif aux autorisations délivrées en application de la loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008
relative aux opérations spatiales, JO, 31 May 2011, 9415, art 21.3).
41
Uwe Wirt, “UN-Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines – National Implementation
Mechanism” (Technical Presentation delivered at the 48th COPUOS LSC, UN Office in
Vienna, 23 March-3 April 2009), online: United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
[OOSA] <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>; Ulrike Bohlmann, “Requirements on Space
Debris Mitigation for ESA Projects” (Technical Presentation delivered at the 48th
COPUOS LSC, UN Office in Vienna, 23 March-3 April 2009), online: United Nations
Office of Outer Space Affairs [OOSA] <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>; Masahiko Sato,
“Space Debris Mitigation Mechanisms” ), online: United Nations Office of Outer Space
Affairs [OOSA] <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>

9
efforts by space agencies have contributed to spacecraft design meant to reduce the
dissemination of objects during their missions, and also to protect the spacecraft itself from
collisions by space debris. A technology used to shield the spacecraft, especially the human
flight vehicle, from a collision of space debris less than 10 cm in diameter was applied to
the ISS and other human flight equipment. 42 It has also made improvements on the
detection and observation technologies. The Canadian Department of National Defense has
developed a satellite-based space debris observation system called Sapphire, which is
combined with the ground observation system and contributes to the US surveillance
network of USSTRATCOM. 43 The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) has
developed a Micro-debris Sensor embarking on spacecrafts, formed by a thin film with
striped electrical wire. This sensor can detect collisions of tiny debris less than 1 cm in
diameter by counting the number of breaking wires.44 The observation of tiny debris is
essential since these are not large enough to detect from ground-based observation in spite
of the fact that even these types of debris may cause malfunction or loss of the spacecraft.45
2.1.2 Space Situational Awareness and Collision Avoidance Technologies
Observation capability has been considered the most essential part of space debris
mitigation, since it is the unique measure to obtain information regarding the situation
happening in outer space. The major observation capability was developed by military
entities in order to observe and protect their own space assets. These activities, generally
called space situational awareness (SSA), are being conducted by the Joint Space Operation
Center (JSPOC) of USSTRATCOM as well as several military entities of the other States.46

42
Eric L. Christiansen, "Design and Performance Equations for Advanced Meteoroid and
Debris Shields" (1993) 14:1-4 International Journal of Impact Engineering 145; Kumi
Nitta et al., "Response of a Aluminum Honeycomb Subjected to Hypervelocity Impacts"
(2013) 58 Procedia Engineering 709.
43
Max Paris, "Canadian Forces put their 1st satellite in orbit", CBC News (25 February
2013) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>.
44
Toshiya Hanada, “Research Topics for Asia-Pacific Regional Collaboration in the Area
of Orbital Debris Issues”, (Presentation delivered at the Workshop on the Protection of
Space Environment sponsored by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Kuala Lumpur,
12 December 2012), online: MOFA <http://www.mofa.go.jp> at 25.
45
Akira Kato, "JAXA Strategic Plan for Space Debris-Related R&D" (2012) 26:2
Journal of Space Technology and Science 18 at 19.
46
McLeod, supra note 18.

10
The Russian Federation maintains the similar ability of International Scientific Optical
Network (ISON), but its open availability of information is still limited47. It is known that
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan maintain some abilities, but most of their
details are not disclosed.48 The operators of the spacecraft mostly use the data published in
the JSPOC website “Space-Track”49, dedicated to the SSA services. JSPOC processes the
data observed from its Space Surveillance Network (SSN) and provides it through three
types of SSA services such as basic, advanced, and emergency notifications.50 In order to
use the basic services, the only requirement for the operator is to register its name,
affiliation, and purposes of data use, and agree with the User Agreement through the Space-
Track web site. The registered operator can find historical and current satellite data, as well
as decay and re-entry data in the website, with no cost or obligation to provide information
in exchange. The registered operator can request further detailed information from JSPOC
for a specific object, and may communicate with them on a case-by-case basis.51 JSPOC
provides emergency notifications in case of a detected possible collision. This notification
is provided spontaneously by JSPOC based on their own calculations transformed into
Conjunction Summary Messages (CSM), directly provided to the spacecraft operator to the
extent possible.52 However, the notifications are based on JSPOC’s knowledge from their
observations and it may reach the wrong operator or end up lost the operator, since there is
no measure for JSPOC to assure the corresponding operator of the respective observed
object. The advanced services of their SSA services may complement this ambiguity since

47
Russian Academy of Sciences Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics,
"International Scientific Optical Network (ISON) activities on highly elliptical orbit
(HEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) observations and analysis in 2013", (Technical
Presentation delivered at the 49th session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee,
UN Office in Vienna, 13 February 2014), online: United Nations Office of Outer Space
Affairs [OOSA] <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
48
US Strategic Command Public Affairs, Press Release, "USSTRATCOM Signs Fifth
Data Sharing Agreement", 27 January 2014, online: USSTRATCOM
<http://www.stratcom.mil>; See also B. de Montluc, "SSA: Where Does Europe Stand
Now?" (2012) 28:3 Space Policy 199 at 201.
49
JSPOC, Space-Track, online: JSPOC <https://www.space-track.org>.
50
McLeod, supra note 18.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.

11
they requires entering into an agreement with the operators and providing advanced data
of conjunction assessment, data providing supports in the events of launch, deorbit, reentry,
re-orbit, collision avoidance maneuver, or in some off-nominal cases.53
USSTRATCOM announced that five governmental agreements and more than 30
commercial agreements have already been signed. 54 The operators using the data from
these services usually calculate and predict the potential collision risks of their own space
assets and other space objects.55 Since the SSA data contains some calculation margin, the
operators can also use their own operational data to increase accuracy.56 In the case of a
predicted collision, based on the CSM data from JSPOC, the operator conducts conjunction
assessment in multiple layers to evaluate the reliability of the predicted collision.57 This
task requires one to two days of “concentrated” work, since additional fuel consumption
needs to be minimized.58

Currently, there is no specific unified method for collision avoidance, but the way to
control it normally involves ascending or descending the altitude by accelerating or
decreasing the speed of the spacecraft.59 In many cases, there are constraints among the
other operational factors of the spacecraft for avoidance maneuver, and often, the decision
should be made with limited options within a short time frame.60 It is expected that the

53
Ibid.
54
Ibid; USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, supra note 48.
55
Kaneaki Narita, “Space Operations: Risk Mitigation Experience from Collision”
(Presentation delivered at the Space Environment Protection Workshop sponsored by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2012), online:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp>; Ikumi Matsuda, Chikako
Hirose & Nobuo Kudo, "The JAXA Conjunction Assessment Process", (Paper delivered
at the SpaceOps 2010 Conference, Huntsville, 25-30 April 2010) at 2-3.
56
Duane Bird, "Sharing Space Situational Awareness Data", (Paper delivered at the 2010
Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies Conference, Maui, 14-17
September 2010).
57
Matsuda, Hirose & Kudo, supra note 55 at 2; Lauri Kraft Newman, "The NASA
Robotic Conjunction Assessment Process: Overview and Operational Experiences"
(2010) 66:7-8 Acta Astronautica 1253 at 1254-1255.
58
Narita, supra note 55.
59
Matsuda, Hirose & Kudo, supra note 55 at 4.
60
Newman, supra note 57 at 1256-1257.

12
SSA data’s accuracy from JSPOC would improve through data sharing agreements, and
the advanced services would provide more accurate data to the operators. Improving the
infrastructures of JSPOC is also expected.61
Among all the efforts to mitigate newly generated space debris, it has been reported
that a catastrophic collision will remain a possibility every five to ten years, mainly
between altitudes of 700 km and 1,000 km, even if any new launches are suspended.62 The
only way to prevent this situation is to remove certain pieces of major space debris from
the peripheral orbits. A development race for these technologies has already started, and
various types of missions have been proposed.63 It will take a few more years until these
technologies step up to practical use, but it is only a matter of time before we experience
that era.
2.2 Regulatory Response Efforts
2.2.1 Legally Binding Regulations
The principal legal regime at the international level was established in the 1960s, with
the adoption of the first international treaty for outer space activities. The Outer Space
Treaty, 64 in accordance with the international law including the Charter of the United
Nations65, established the principle that the exploration and use of outer space, including

61
Bird, supra note 56.
62
J. C. Liou & N. L. Johnson, "Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris" (2006) 311:5759
Science 340.
63
Kentaro Iki, Satomi Kawamoto & Yoshiki Morino, "Experiments and Numerical
Simulations of an Electrodynamic Tether Deployment from a Spool-type Reel Using
Thrusters" (2014) 94:1 Acta Astronautica 318; Christophe Bonnal, Jean-Marc Ruault &
Marie-Christine Desjean, "Active Debris Removal: Recent Progress and Current Trends"
(2013) 85 Acta Astronautica 51; L. T. DeLuca et al., "Active Space Debris Removal by a
Hybrid Propulsion Module" (2013) 91 Acta Astronautica 20; Vladimir Aslanov & Vadim
Yudintsev, "Dynamics of Large Space Debris Removal Using Tethered Space Tug"
(2013) 91 Acta Astronautica 149.
64
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 610
UNTS 205, 18 UST 2410, TIAS No 6347, 6 ILM 386 (entered into force 10 October
1967) [Outer Space Treaty].
65
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, 59 Stat. 1031, 145
UKTS805, 24 UST 2225, TIAS No 7739 (entered into force 24 October 1945) [UN
Charter].

13
the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for all States 66 , and no claim of
appropriation by any State would be acceptable.67 However, the freedom of outer space is
limited in some aspects in the Treaty.

Specifically, in terms of the sustainable use of space, Articles VI and VII govern the
responsibility of the contracting States.68 At this point, the difference between the term
“responsibility” employed in Article VI and the term “liability” employed in Article VII,
must be recognized. The basic understanding of “responsibility” should be recognized as a
broader concept than “liability”, which is included in the previous term.69 “Responsibility”
signifies the answerability for conduct aligned with certain legal norms. “Liability”, on the
other hand, is created by a breach of applicable legal norms which damage another State,
and requires reparation to the damaged State.70 Noting this differentiation is important,
since in the equally authentic Treaty languages other than English, the same word is
employed the two different concepts: for example, the Chinese text uses “責任”, French
uses “responsabilité”, and Spanish uses “responsabilidad” in both articles.71 Considering
this differentiation of the concepts, it is natural to read Article VI as the general statement
for responsibility in space activities, and Article VII as the detailed provisions of liability.
Article VIII should also be considered as a detailed provision for the registration of space
objects as a part of the responsibility of State.72

Consequently, it is widely understood that the States Parties in general retain

responsibility over whatever the space activities may be conducting in their jurisdiction,
and are required to maintain “authorization and continuing supervision” for non-
governmental activities (Article VI). As one of the breakdowns, the international liability

66
Outer Space Treaty, art I.
67
Ibid, art II.
68
Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Cologne Commentary on
Space Law Vol I Outer Space Treaty (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009) at 104.
69
Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at
598-620. [Cheng, “International Space Law”]
70
Ibid at 615-616.
71
Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd & Schrogl, supra note 68 at 104.
72
Ibid at 115-116.

14
for damages should be imposed upon the launching State (Article VII). The other
breakdown is that the State of registry should retain “jurisdiction and control” over such
space objects (Article VIII). The detailed rules for liability and registration were
established into the Liability Convention73 and Registration Convention, respectively.74
The liability is imposed on the launching States as a fault liability for in-orbit damages and
absolute liability for ground damages75. One of the launching States is required to register
the space object launched into outer space on its national registry and notify the UN
Secretary-General for international registration. 76 The State of registry is expected to
exercise jurisdiction and control over that particular space object. Consequently, Article
VII of the Outer Space Treaty, together with the Liability Convention, established a
launching-State-centric liability system with “authorization and continuing supervision”,
and Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, together with the Registration Convention,
established a launching-State-based “jurisdiction and control” system over space objects.
Obviously, international law is only applicable to the State, and thus relies on national
legislation for the manner of “authorization and continuing supervision” or “jurisdiction
and control”.77
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty established the obligation of the States Parties to
explore and use outer space “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other
States Parties” and “avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the
environment of the Earth”. This signifies that a State must conduct space activities with
the standard performance of care, attention, and observance. This provision requires the
State to prove that every possible measure to prevent harmful acts was conducted.78 The
motivation to draft this article came from a historic fact related to the experiment contracted

73
Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29
March 1972, 961 UNTS 187; 24 UST 2389; 10 ILM 965 (1971) (entered into force 1
September 1972) [Liability Convention].
74
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 6 June 1975, 28
UST 695, 1023 UNTS 15 (entry into force 15 September 1976) [Registration
Convention].
75
Liability Convention, arts II-III.
76
Registration Convention, arts II,IV
77
Outer Space Treaty, arts VI,VIII.
78
Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd & Schrogl, supra note 68 at 175-176.

15
by the US Air Force with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory,
named Project West Ford. The project placed millions of small needles into orbit in order
to create a widely scattered belt for long-range communication of military services.79 It
was heavily criticized by the astronomical science community. The International
Astronomical Union (IAU) adopted a resolution to appeal to the governments “launching
space experiments which could possibly affect astronomical research to consult with the
IAU before undertaking such experiments and to refrain from launching until it is
established beyond doubt that no damage will be done to astronautical research.”80 As a
result, the International Council of Scientific Unions Committee on Space Research
established the Consultative Group of Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments.81
The draft for Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty was submitted by the Soviet Union in
1962 to UNCOPUOS, following this historical context.82 This provision is also remarkable
as this is the only article in this Treaty to require consultation among the States Parties.
The third sentence of this article requires the Contracting States to spontaneously consult
in advance with the States potentially suffering from harmful interference. The Article also
provides a corresponding right of the potentially affected States to request a consultation
regarding the concerning activity. In concert with rights and obligations, Article IX forms
a mutual consultation mechanism for the potentially harmful interfering space activities.83
However, to date, it is regrettable that this mechanism was employed in very few cases,
and most of them do not specifically disclose whether or not a State actually applied the
mechanism. The most recent potentially applicable case was the ASAT test from China,
conducted intermittently since 2007. The ASAT test is an activity which may cause
harmful interference to the other States’ space activities by colliding with other satellites
or deploying space debris, as it did in the 2007 test. China violated Article IX by conducting
the ASAT test without any international consultation, or even provision of the test

79
Delbert R. Terrill Jr, The Air Force Role in Developing International Outer Space Law
(Alabama: Air University Press, 1999) at 63-68.
80
Ibid at 65.
81
Mineiro, supra note 29 at 328.
82
Ibid.
83
See also Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd & Schrogl, supra note 68 at 179-181.

16
information to any other State. 84 The other space-faring nations, especially the partner
States of the ISS such as the US, Europe, and Japan, publicly expressed their concerns
about the test, and it is reported that they officially required a sound explanation regarding
the test from the Chinese government.85 Although those can be recognized as requests for
ex-posto facto consultation under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, there are no
specifications for the exercise of this right under the Outer Space Treaty.86 There was no
report that the Chinese government had conducted ex-posto facto consultations in the test
either. It is also remarkable that while the only two other States had also conducted the
ASAT test in the past, the US and Russia had not conducted any consultation with the other
States. Mineiro pinpoints that these practices may establish a custom to extinguish ASAT
from the necessary consultation prescribed under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty.87
A previous case seems to be a proper use of this consultation mechanism. The Soviet
Union’s military satellite, Cosmos 954, equipped with nuclear power sources, crashed into
Canadian territory in 1978.88 At the time of the crash, the Canadian government officially
expressed its surprise to the USSR government at their failure to give “notice of the
possible re-entry of the satellite in the region of Canada”.89 This can be seen as a claim
influenced by Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, since it presupposes a notification to
Canada from the USSR. Both States continued their consultation through diplomatic
channels, mainly the USSR’s Embassy in Ottawa, and concluded with a payment of
C$3,000,000 to Canada from the Soviet Union. This conclusion was agreed to by both
governments in 1981 as part of a protocol.90 In this case, it seems that the consultation
mechanism worked fairly well for the ex posto facto consultation, but neither State ever

84
Mineiro, supra note 29 at 341-345.
85
Theresa Hitchens, “US-Sino Relations in Space: From ‘War of Words’ to Cold War in
Space?” (2007) 3:1 China Security 12 at 23 [Hitchens, “US-Sino Relations”].
86
C.f. Japan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Press Conference, 19 January 2007 (Japanese),
online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp>.
87
Mineiro, supra note 29 at 340-354.
88
Gus W. Weiss, "The Life and Death of COSMOS 954" (1978) 22:Spring, Studies in
Intelligence.
89
“Statement of Claim” in Protocol in respect of the claim for damages caused by the
Satellite "Cosmos 954", Canada and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2 April 1981,
1470 UNTS 269.
90
Ibid.

17
mentioned the exercise of this right under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty.
Furthermore, the consultation before the accident was ignored again.
To date, there is no international law directly regulating space activities in terms of
sustainable use of outer space, such as the prohibition of deploying space debris or the
proper procedure for collision avoidance. More likely, it seems that the international
legislation of binding instruments to regulate space activities has been carefully avoided
“almost as an anathema” 91 , especially those which regulate the use of nuclear power
sources and space debris mitigation.
2.2.2 Non-Legally Binding Regulations
Because of the above situation of international law, the international community has
made multiple efforts to formulate worldwide consensus in order to maintain the
sustainability of space activities by non-legally binding instruments.
Based on several discussions regarding the issues of space debris in the late 1980s, the
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) was founded in 1993 by the
space agencies of Europe, Japan, Russia, and the US.92 Currently, space agencies from 12
States around the world participate as members but four of the States maintaining
independent launch capability are still non-members.93 Although IADC’s main mission is
to exchange information, facilitate and review cooperative opportunities, and identify
debris mitigation options,94 it has moved towards establishing the Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines in 2007.95 These were the first documents in the international sphere which
accumulated the space debris mitigation practices of space agencies.96 The Guidelines were

91
Setsuko Aoki, "The Function of 'Soft Law' in the Development of International Space
Law" in Irmgard Marboe, ed., Soft Law in Outer Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012) 57 at 73
[Aoki, “Function of Soft Law”].
92
George M. Levin & Walter D. Flury, "Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee (IADC)", (Technical Presentation delivered at the 34th Session of of the
UNCOPUOS STSC, UN Office in Vienna, February 1997), online: IADC
<http://www.iadc-online.org>.
93
IADC, Member Agencies, online: IADC <http://www.iadc-online.org/>.
94
IADC, Terms of Reference for the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC), IADC-93-01 (rev.11.2), (1993), s 1,3.
95
IADC, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01 Revision 1 (2007)
[IADC Debris Guidelines].
96
Kato, supra note 45 at 24.

18
presented to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC0 of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) in 2002 as a draft, and
endorsed in 2007 within the Report of UNCOPUOS to the 62nd Session of the UN General
Assembly (UNGA) as its Annex. The Guidelines extracted the essence of the IADC Debris
Guidelines and became known as the UNCOPUOS Debris Guidelines.97 This transfer was
necessary since the IADC Debris Guidelines, formulated as a technical de facto standard
by the space agencies, had to be recognized by the sovereign States as a common
recognized standard for space debris mitigation among worldwide space activities.
Although it is inconceivable that the UNCOPUOS Debris Guidelines hold a legally binding
effect, the importance of its endorsement at the UNGA level has been repeatedly
recognized.98
Concerned about the ambiguity of the term “launching State” in the context of the
common use of outer space, the Legal Subcommittee (LSC) of UNCOPUOS started its
consideration of the Application of the Concept of the ‘Launching State’ in 2000, and
resulted as a UNGA Resolution in 2004.99 The significant recommendation stated by the
Resolution was to recommend the States to consider the legislation of national laws to
implement the authorization and continuing supervision of activities in outer space. 100
Harmonizing and increasing the consistency of national space legislation with international
law was also recommended.101 Aside from them, a consensus was reached only to repeat
the description of the UN Space Treaties, although the discussion for drafting this issue

97
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGAOR, 62nd Sess, Supp 20, UN
Doc A/62/20 (2007) at 47 [COPUOS Debris Guidelines].
98
Marco Ferrazzani, "Soft Law in Space Activities" in Irmgard Marboe, ed, Soft Law in
Outer Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012) 99 at 108; Irmgard Marboe, "The Importance of
Guidelines and Codes of Conduct for Liability of States and Private Actors" in Irmgard
Marboe, ed, Soft Law in Outer Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012) 119 at 139-143; Gerardine
Meishan Goh, "Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet Development
of International Space Law;" (2008-2009) 87:3 Nebraska Law Review 725.
99
Application of the concept of the "launching State", GA Res 59/115, UNGAOR, 59th
Sess, UN Doc A/RES/59/115 (2004) [Concept of Launching States]; Aoki, “Function of
Soft Law”, supra note 91 at 63-65.
100
Concept of Launching States, Ibid, s 1.
101
Ibid, s 4.

19
brought together the various perspectives of the Member States. 102 Nevertheless, this
resolution can be recognized as a soft law meant to harmonize national laws, since there
was no international common understanding pinpointing the necessity for the national
legislation of space activities before this resolution.103
Another effort conducted in UNCOPUOS-LSC from 2004 to 2007 was to identify the
necessary elements in practice to register under the Registration Convention. This
consideration was based on the drastically deteriorated condition of space object
registration in the post-Cold War years.104 This recommendation to enhance the practice of
the registration of space objects was adopted in 2007 as the UNGA Resolution.105 The
Resolution recommends “harmonization of practices” such as the contents of information
being provided to the UN Secretary-General, prior consultation among potential launching
States for the qualification of the State of registry in case of a joint launch, encouraging
national operators to register nationally, as well as encouraging the States to notify the UN
Secretary-General of additional information regarding operational changes.106
The latest effort was taken from 2009 to 2013, and resulted in the Recommendations
on National Legislation for Space Activities of the UNGA.107 The current international
consensus involved in the preliminary understanding of the necessary elements to be
implemented in national legislation appearing in these Recommendations the concretion of
the concept of “authority and continuing supervision” can be recognized. It provides
recommendation for the “national regulatory frameworks”, which are similar to the many
laws of space-faring nations, but together with certain possible additional provisions. It is
anticipated that the national regulations will be further elaborated in line with the

102
Yu Takeuchi, "Challenges of International Space Law for Managing Space Traffic”
(in Japanese) (2014) 55 Kuho (Journal of Air Law) 1 at 6 [Takeuchi, “Challenges”];
Aoki, “Function of Soft Law”, supra note 91 at 64.
103
Aoki, Ibid at 64-65.
104
Ibid at 65.
105
Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international
intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects, GA Res 62/101,
UNGAOR, 62nd Sess, UN Doc A/RES/62/101 (2007).
106
Ibid, ss 2-4.
107
Recommendations on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use
of outer space, GA Res 68/74, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/68/74, (2013)
[Recommendations on national legislation].

20
Recommendations, and thus, the international community will reach a common
understanding on the authorization and continuing supervision of Article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty at an early date. As one of its preliminary steps, further elaboration of these
Recommendations is expected, since its current version is entirely focused on notional
descriptions.
The efforts in UNCOPUOS can also be seen in the STSC. Starting in 2010, the STSC
has considered the agenda of “Long-term sustainability of outer space activities” (LTSSA)
proposed by the French delegation.108 This agenda intends to examine the measures that
could enhance the long-term sustainability of space activities, as well as prepare a set of
voluntary guidelines focused on practical measures. 109 It established a plan within its
Working Group to generate the guidelines applicable on a voluntary basis by space actors,
including States, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, in order
to reduce the risks to the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.110 The Working
Group formed four Expert Groups, and brought the experts of the Member States together
to identify the issues and draft the guidelines. The Expert Groups are respectively dedicated
to “Sustainable space utilization supporting sustainable development on Earth”, “Space
debris, space operations and tools to support collaborative space situational awareness”,
“Space weather”, and “Regulatory regimes and guidance for actors in the space arena”.111
The Expert Groups generated the consolidated proposed guidelines respectively and
submitted their works through the Chair of the Working Group at the STSC’s 51st Session
in February 2014.112 It seemed that the Working Group did not reach a consensus on the
proposed guidelines in this session, so a decision was made to continue its consideration

108
International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, GA Res 64/86,
UNGAOR, 64th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/64/86 (2010), Operative Paragraph [OP] 10.
109
Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGAOR, 66th Sess,
Sup No 20, UN Doc A/66/20 (2012), Annex II, OP 4.
110
Ibid, OP 12-13.
111
Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its forty-eighth session,
UNCOPUOSOR, 54th Sess, UN Doc A/AC.105/987, Annex IV, OP 8-9.
112
Chair of the Working Group, Proposal by the Chair of the Working Group on the
Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities for the consolidation of the set of draft
guidelines on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, UNCOPUOSOR, 57th
Sess, UN Doc A/AC.105/2014/CRP.5 (2014) [LTSSA Proposed draft consolidated
guidelines].

21
by extending its mandate for one year until 2015.113 The proposed guidelines consist of 33
guidelines on various topics including policy, regulatory, technology, international
cooperation, and management.114 It is remarkable that the guidelines for both the regulatory
and technological sides especially address the ideal rules for the maintenance of sustainable
space activities from the view of practical procedures, although they remain in abstract
descriptions. As the result of this work, the guidelines are expected to be implemented in
each Member State through their national legislation.115
The European Union (EU) published the “Draft Code of Conduct on Outer Space
Activities” in 2008 as the European response to the UN General Assembly’s inquiry.116
The EU conducted initial consultations with key third countries based on this draft with the
intention to initiate a worldwide negotiation to establish an international code of conduct
for the maintenance of sustainable space activities. Following the initial consultations, in
2012, the US, Australia, and Japan announced that the basic idea should be supported,
subject to several modifications on the EU draft, and entered into the international
consultation of the “Draft International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities”
(ICOC).117 The EU convened two rounds of multilateral Open-ended Consultations in Kiev
in May 2013 and in Bangkok in November 2013. The consultations were both attended by
some 140 participants from 61 countries, and the third round of consultations was held in
Luxembourg in May 2014. 118 The EU made efforts to reflect comments from the

113
Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its fifty-first session,
UNCOPUOSSTSCOR, 51st Sess, UN Doc A/AC.105/1065 (2014), OP 233.11.
114
LTSSA proposed draft consolidated guidelines, supra note 112.
115
Ibid, OP 25.
116
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, GA Res
61/75, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, UN Doc A/RES/61/75 (2006).
117
US Secretary of State, Press Release, “International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities”, 17 January 2012, online: US Department of State <http://www.state.gov>;
Australia, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Media Release, “Australia joins the fight against
space junk”, 18 January 2012, online: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au>; Japan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Press
Conference, 25 January 2012, online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
<http://www.mofa.go.jp>.
118
European External Action Service [EEAS], “The EU leads a multilateral initiative on
an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” (June 2014), online: EEAS
<http://eeas.europa.eu>.

22
consultations of participating States by publishing multiple amendments to the draft as the
latest version disclosed on March 31, 2014.119 It must be noted that the ICOC intends to
address not only civil space activities, but also security-related ones to complement existing
international space laws. 120 This is remarkable, since the international community had
reached a deadlock when discussing the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) (former Committee on Disarmament) in the 1980s.

One of the EU’s intentions to raise ICOC outside of the framework of CD was to break
away from this chain and begin a worldwide discussion for the sustainability of space
activities. 121 Based on the compliance of existing international laws 122 , ICOC mainly
addresses the measures for safety operations and space debris mitigation123, notification of
events in outer space activities124, information sharing in operations125, and consultation
mechanism. 126 It is expected that the future ICOC shall be followed up by concrete
“bottom-up” guidelines that could appear as a result of LTSSA.127 To date, despite the
advantages of the ICOC, opinions are still divided between promoting its subscription
among the States, or being rather skeptical of the idea.128 The other major space powers,
Russia, China, and India, do not show their support for discussion and even seem to feel
uncomfortable mainly with the forming of the consultation.129 Since the consultation is

119
Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 31 March 2014,
online: EEAS <http://eeas.europa.eu> [ICOC].
120
Ibid, preamble paragraph 10, s 2-4.
121
Wolfgang Rathgeber, Nina-Louisa Remuss & Kai-Uwe Schrogl, "Space security and
the European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities" [2009]:4 UNIDIR
Disarmament Forum 33 at 33-34.
122
ICOC, supra note 119, s 3.
123
Ibid, s 4.
124
Ibid, s 5.
125
Ibid, s 6.
126
Ibid, s 7.
127
Rathgeber, Remuss & Schrogl, supra note 121 at 35.
128
Michael Krepon, "Weak Arguments Against A Space Code Of Conduct", Stimson
Center (17 January 2012), online: Stimson Center <http://www.stimson.org/spotlight>.
129
Kazuto Suzuki, "Regulatory Power of the EU in Maintaining Security in Space:
Politics beyond Normative Power", (Paper delivered at the European Union Studies
Association (EUSA) 13th Biennial Conference, Baltimore, 9-11 May 2013); Rajeswari
Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras, eds, Awaiting Launch: Perspectives on the Draft

23
conducted in an official closed meeting, it is not possible to learn much about its details.
However, it seems that there are still more consultations required in order to reach
consensus on the proposed Code.
Another approach, though a UN-based one, had already reached its initial goal for a
similar purpose. The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and
Confidence-Building Measures (TCBM) in Outer Space Activities was an advisory group
of 15 selected experts to the UN Secretary-General, formed by a resolution of the First
Committee of the UNGA. 130 The GGE chaired by Victor Vasiliev, Deputy Permanent
Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN in Geneva, concluded its final report
in July 2013.131 The Report presents substantive TCBMs useful for maintaining sustainable
space activities as well as recommendations to the States for their voluntary consideration
and implementation, including the exchange of various types of information about national
space policies and activities (including major military expenditures in outer space), mutual
risk reduction notifications, and mutual visits of experts from national space facilities. The
criteria for developing TCBMs was also discussed and recommended to establish
coordination between the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the UN Office for Outer
Space Affairs (UNOOSA), and other appropriate UN entities. The Report also includes a
proposal for coordination and consultative mechanisms for further interaction between the
space actors.132
2.2.3 Problems in the Current Systems
Consequently, the legally binding principles governing space activities remain as those
of the UN Space Treaties.133 This is the result of the efforts of the international community,

ICOC for Outer Space Activities (New Deli: Observer Research Foundation, 2014) at
133-198.
130
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, UN Res
65/68, UNGAOR, 65th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/65/68 (2011).
131
Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-
Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, UN Doc A/68/189,
(2013) [GGE Report].
132
Ibid.
133
Outer Space Treaty; Liability Convention; Registration Convention; Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, 22 April 1968, 672 UNTS 119, 19 UST 7570, TIAS No 6599, 7 ILM
151(entry into force 3 December 1968) [Rescue Agreement]; Agreement Governing the

24
which recognizes the gap between the lex lata and the lex ferenda as a quick remedy for
the maintenance of sustainable space activities. In other words, huge efforts have been
made to address the issues involved in making the world purse sustainable space activities
without new international legislation. This is because of the deadlock of legislative
activities in the existing negotiation organizations resulting from the US’ clear opposition
to the development of a new legal regime infringing its current rights to conduct space
activities. 134 To date, soft laws 135 have promoted international cooperation for mutual
understanding, addressed the problem, or suggested the development of a new regime,136
but soft laws have not been able to play a more effective role, such as providing a common
interpretation of the treaties. In other words, despite the significant development of
activities in outer space, the international legal system regulating these activities remains
as it was when it was originally adopted in the 1960s. Space-faring nations have been
continuously reluctant to make a legally binding modification to the current structure of
international space law, since space activities are conducted without inexpedience to date.
It is safe to say that soft laws partially serve to promote international cooperation, but their
weakness is obvious. Overall, it is no exaggeration to say that currently, there is no
international regime addressing sustainable space activities linked to STM established so

Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 5 December 1979, 1363
UNTS 3 (entry into force 11 July 1984) [Moon Agreement].
134
Rathgeber, Remuss & Schrogl, supra note 121 at 34; The US continuously took a
policy to reject international treaties for possibilities to limit its freedom of action after
clearly stating in the Bush administration’s space policy (National Space Policy of the
United States of America, (2006)). Hitchens, “Debris, Traffic Management and
Weaponization”, supra note 30 at 178; The Obama administration’s space policy
(National Space Policy of the United States of America, (2010)) does not specifically
pinpoint the objection but it seems no sign of relaxation indication to date.
135
Soft laws are the “instruments that might purport to specify standards of conduct, but
do not emanate from the traditional ‘sources’ of public international law”: Steven
Freeland, "The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public International Law and its Relevance to the
International Legal Regulation of Outer Space" in Irmgard Marboe, ed, Soft Law in Outer
Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012) 9 at 19. Various discussion on soft law are in Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance" (2000) 54:3
International Organization 421.
136
Aoki, “Function of Soft Law”, supra note 91 at 57-86.

25
far. Even if there are some elements in some parts of international law or soft laws, they
are spread too far apart to be easily ignored or overseen.
Problems lie in the States as well. The national legislations are crucial for the
advancement of the concrete regulation of international law because the international rules
in detail should be consistent with the state practices, which are reflected in national
legislations. However, it is also true that the lack of common understanding in the
international rules may emanate States’ hesitation to implement these rules internally.
States will further hesitate to implement these international rules with their originally
additional detailed rules, because ruling in detail may deteriorate the competitiveness of its
own industry. Therefore, this could be a controversial question, with its cause and effect.
Soft laws generally play a role in the eventual formulation of common understanding of
international laws, which they have also done in the area of international space law.137
Although soft laws do not retain legal effects in public international law, it may be possible
to constitute one of the essences of customary international law.138
Consequently, the emerging functions of soft law have enriched the international
sphere’s discussions139, but the implementing national legislations by the States are still
inadequate.

137
Freeland, supra note 135.
138
Ibid at 22-23; Cheng, “International Space Law”, supra note 69 at 136-149.
139
Aoki, “Function of Soft Law”, supra note 91.

26
 Chapter 3
International Regime for Space Traffic Management

With the series of problems in current international space law pinpointed in the
previous chapter, it can be said that the issues are spread out in various areas of the current
international space law and soft law, despite their compromising functions, and only work
partially. To date, it has become inevitable to establish a new regime to regulate space
activities in a comprehensive manner. STM is the most reasonable concept to recognize
the improvement of space activities as being unified. There is no intention to do away with
all existing legal regimes and replace them with the proposed STM regime, since the
complexity of international activities is typically structured by multiple overlapping
international regimes. 140 However, looking at the sequences of the issues arising from
modern space activities without an effective solution from the old-fashioned UN space
treaties regime, it is crucial to tackle the disposition of the current regulatory regimes. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the necessary cutting edge of today’s space activities is
the concept of “traffic”, with analogies in maritime and aviation traffic management.
Together with this concept, it will bring certain order into the current chaotic circumstances
of outer space. Furthermore, the international community is already en route to accepting
the STM regime, as mentioned below. Therefore, this thesis argues to introduce the
international regime for STM.
In this Chapter, the concept of STM, which was proposed to date, will be introduced,
together with some contemporary evaluations. Subsequently, the necessity and
admissibility of an international regime for STM will be presented to follow the current
problems of space operation pointed out in the previous Chapter. This Chapter will
conclude by illuminating the international community’s current trend, and implicate the
development towards the proposed STM regime.

140
Xavier LW Liao, “Regime Complex of Space Activities” (Paper delivered at the The
2nd Manfred Lachs International Conference on Space Governance, Montreal, McGill
University Institute of Air and Space Law, 29 May 2014) [unpublished].

27
3.1 The Proposed Concept of STM and its Contemporary Evaluation
The current international regime for space activities is based on the UN space treaties
and relevant soft laws.141 However, STM is a new concept that has not appeared yet in the
current regime. The IAA STM Report published in 2006, as the first comprehensive study
and proposal of the STM concept, provides in its set of recommended regulations in a
section titled the “Outline of a Comprehensive Space Traffic Management Regime” (the
Outline).142 These provide multiple insights, which are still paving the way towards an
STM regime. An international inter-governmental agreement including provisions for
liability and the basic principles of STM is suggested, together with a flexible annex part
in addition to the UN space treaties. As well, the topics to be considered for regulatory
aspects are enumerated 143 . These topics are divided into four parts: (1) Securing the
Information Needs, (2) Notification System, (3) Traffic Management, and (4)
Organization.144 Although the crucial part is the third one, this section reviews all four parts
and outlines the necessary set of rules to be established.
In the first and second parts, the Outline deals with information, data sharing, and
notification.

1. Securing the Information Needs

• Defines necessary data (on trajectories as well as radio frequencies).
• Sets provision for the data (sources, governmental as well as private,
including financing).
• Establishes a database and distribution mechanisms for data (format of the
database, access to data on request, collision warning as a service).
• Establishes an information service on space weather.
2. Notification System
• Sets pre-launch notification with better parameters than Registration
Convention as well as other provisions (e.g. ITU and proposed UNIDROIT
Protocol).

141
See generally Irmgard Marboe, ed, Soft Law in Outer Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012).
142
Schrogl, Lála & Contant-Jorgenson, “IAA STM Report”, supra note 8 at 90-92.
143
Ibid at 91-92.
144
Ibid.

28
 • Provides information on the end of active/operational lifetime of space
objects.
• Provides pre-notification of orbital maneuvers and active de-orbiting
(communication rules and cooperation provisions).145

Despite the Outline holding its reservation to “[d]efine necessary data” as an open
action in its first part, one can assume it argues that the STM regime requires a worldwide,
unified and reliable mechanism to gather and share necessary data and information on a
non-discriminatory basis. In order to conform these elements to a set of rules, the following
rules are necessary to be implemented: Information and data gathering procedure,
including its obligatory nature together with the liability for failing to gather information
and data; Information and data sharing procedure, including its obligatory natures together
with the liability caused by the shared information or data; and Legal status of the shared
information and data, including the admissibility of evidence for in-orbit accidents.
The third part of the Outline provides the necessary topics for the traffic management
of space activities.

3. Traffic Management
• Provides traffic management rules based on the use of the database for
the purpose of collision avoidance, including:
- Safety provisions for launches
- Safety provisions for human spaceflight (including space tourism)
- Zoning (selection of orbits)
- Right of way rules for in-orbit phase(s)
- Prioritization with regard to maneuver
- Specific provisions for GEO (harmonized with ITU rules)
- Specific rules for LEO satellite constellations
- Debris mitigation mechanisms
- Safety provisions for re-entries
- Environmental provisions (pollution of the
atmosphere/troposphere, etc.).

145
Ibid at 91.

29
 • Clarifies "space objects", including legal distinction between valuable
objects and valueless space debris.
• Clarifies "fault" or liability in case of damage caused in outer space
with regard to the implications of traffic rules.
• Sets delimitation for the launch phase and clarifies the concept of
"launching State".
• Provides a framework and main features for national licensing
regimes (including insurance provisions), which implement the
provisions of the agreement.
• Sets forth an enforcement mechanism (e.g. renouncement of access to
information) and dispute settlement.
• Clarifies institutionalized interlinks with ICAO, ITU and other
relevant organizations.146

Some of these requirements have already been partially implemented in current space
activities. Safety provisions for launches, human spaceflight, re-entries, and protecting the
environment have already been provided by the respective launching States’ authorities.147
The safety regulations for space tourism have been developing in the US by the FAA
pushed by the current circumstances of the rapid growth of related industries.148 The only
absence is an international unified rule for these activities. However, the efforts to
harmonize these rules have already been started by an inter-agency conference body, the
Trilateral Safety and Mission Assurance Conference (TRISMAC), based on the

146
Ibid.
147
C.f. Commercial Space Launch Act, 51 USC §509 (1984) [CSLA]; 14 CFR §1214
(1958); Law Concerning Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, Law No 161 of 2002;
JAXA Standard Rules for Launching Space Objects (in Japanese), Rule No 15-37, 2003,
online: JAXA <http://www.jaxa.jp/about/disclosure/data/k_37.pdf>; Loi no 2008-518 du
3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, JO, 4 June 2008, 9169 [FSOA]; Décret n°
2009-643 du 9 juin 2009 relatif aux autorisations délivrées en application de la loi n°
2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, JO, 11 June 2009, 9406, art 1
[French Authorization Decree].
148
Jeff Foust, "Balancing safety and cost in commercial human spaceflight", The Space
Review (February 10, 2014) online: The Space Review
<http://www.thespacereview.com>.

30
participation of the ESA, JAXA, and NASA.149 Debris mitigation mechanisms have been
developed by the IADC and UNCOPUOS. The framework for national licensing regimes,
which the Outline suggests to include in the STM regime, has been discussed in the report
of the Recommendations of National Legislation.150
On the other hand, the zoning of orbits, right-of-way rules for in-orbit operations,
prioritization rules for maneuvers, and specific rules for respective orbits proposed in the
Outline151 have not yet been established in the international forum to date. The Outline also
pinpoints that the terms “space objects”, “fault” or “liability”, and “launching State”
together with the delimitation of the launch phase should be clarified further from their
stipulations in the UN space treaties. Furthermore, setting an enforcement mechanism,
including dispute settlement mechanism, as well as clarifying institutionalized interlinks
regarding the implementation of the regime, are included in the proposed outline of the
Report. These are the operation-focused core topics for STM to be seriously considered
from a legal perspective.

What the IAA STM Report has provided here are a starting point and a further legal
elaboration based on the comprehensive picture of space operations. To help this process,
the Report suggests several possible first steps to improve the situation in space traffic.152
These steps include the regulatory issues that require further elaboration to establish the
STM regime. To date, the evaluation of the regimes which existed at that time is almost
complete, although certain updates are still required.

The Report firstly requests that the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the IADC
be endorsed by UNCOPUOS as a “UN legal document”, 153 which has already been
accomplished as the UNCOPUOS Debris Guidelines in 2007. For the SSA and collision
avoidance measures, it encourages the establishment of common data policy and

149
JAXA Safety and Mission Assurance Department, TRISMAC 2012, online: JAXA
<http://sma.jaxa.jp/TRISMAC2012/index.html>.
150
Recommendations on national legislation, supra note 107.
151
Schrogl, Lála & Contant-Jorgenson, “IAA STM Report”, supra note 8 at 91-92.
152
Ibid at 92.
153
Ibid.

31
infrastructures among the States retaining SSA capabilities.154 These steps are being taken
gradually by the States, but this is not sufficient. 155 The IAA STM Report has also
recommended establishing enforcement and checking mechanisms, resulting in obligatory
notification/registration and provision of unified sets of data.156 This has not been achieved
yet, though discussions on its necessity have started. The Report suggests that the legal
definition of space debris should be determined in order to reach legal measures towards
the treatment of space debris,157 because its removal is unavoidable to achieve STM.
Furthermore, the Report indicates nine regulatory issues that need to be studied further,
and only one of them can be considered accomplished to date. Four of them are in the
process of being considered in some fora, and the other four have not even reached their
starting point. The issue which has been accomplished is the study on the relationship of
the concept of notification of launches in international space law and the Hague Code of
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).158 This issue was elaborated in the
world, and appeared in the ICOC consideration process as the principal nature to be
inspired.159 It is also recognized as the existing TCBM, effective for space activities in the
GGE Report.160
The prioritization of space activities, the identification of the data transfer procedure
of dual-use data, the acceptance of the industries’ voices by governments, and the
appropriate connection with CD161 are issues that have been addressed by one or multiple
initiatives of ICOC, LTSSA, or GGE, but have not been concretely stated in their outputs
to date. Merging the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) registration and the
UN registration system, identifying the expectations of military users, establishing
technical regulations as binding instruments, and maintaining a level playing field while

154
Schrogl, Lála & Contant-Jorgenson, “IAA STM Report”, supra note 8 at 92.
155
See chapter 2 section 2.1.2 above.
156
Schrogl, Lála & Contant-Jorgenson, “IAA STM Report”, supra note 8 at 92.
157
Ibid.
158
Ibid at 90.
159
Steven A Mirmina, "Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a
Legally Binding Instrument" (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 649 at
654-657.
160
GGE Report, supra note 131, OP 29.
161
Schrogl, Lála & Contant-Jorgenson, “IAA STM Report”, supra note 8 at 92.

32
avoiding “flags of convenience”162 are issues which are not even on the table yet. The
issues identified by the IAA STM Report have served, and will continue to serve, as the
guiding light for the achievement of the STM regime. However, these issues are stated as
disorderly and developed haphazardly. Therefore, it is necessary to reorganize them
systematically and in order of affordability to achieve them for practical use. By doing so,
a realistic step towards the STM regime can be provided.
It is also necessary to note, at this point, that the report of International Space
University conducted a thorough research and elaborated certain points that IAA STM
Report identified. Namely its "Space Traffic Rules" provides a valuable series of
technically well-considered rules for implementing STM Regime.163 On the other hand, its
legal consideration for constituting the STM concept as a regime needs to be reinforced.164

3.2 Necessity and Admissibility of the International Regime of STM

3.2.1 Roles of the STM Regime
The actual condition of the application of the UN space treaties, illustrated in the
previous chapter, is proving to be inadequate as a legal solution for the problems occurring
in space operations. Turning a blind eye over this status quo is putting strain on the outer
space environment and reducing the possibility of conducting sustainable space activities
in our future. To overcome this situation, it is crucial to recapture the entire flow of space
activities as “traffic”.
The concept of outer space “traffic” has not been properly addressed until now, and
space activities have gradually accumulated operational problems. The problems
themselves did not occur from the lack of the concept of “traffic”, but one of the reasons
that the international community is not able to produce a breakthrough to these problems
is the lack of the concept of “traffic”.
From a legal point of view, there is obviously no international legal instrument
regarding the STM regime to date. Some of the peripheral regimes, such as the ATM

162
Ibid.
163
International Space University, Space Traffic Management (Beijing: International
Space University (ISU), 2007) at 17-41.
164
Ibid at 17.

33
regime for air traffic or the maritime traffic management (MTM] regime, address space
activities in terms of regulating some specific cases related to the regulation of their
primary subject matter. It is part of the nominal operation of ATM for the launch operator
to provide the competent agency of aviation controlling the respective air space with
relevant information in order to issue an international notice to airmen (NOTAM) to vacate
the ascending and descending area of the launch vehicle.165 NOTAM is a rule described in
the Chicago Convention,166 which signifies that the space activities are partially regulated
by the ATM regime in order to maintain its own purpose. Likewise, in the MTM, coastal
States respectively issue the Notice to Mariners.167
Developing an original traffic management system solely for outer space will involve
greater complexity basis than currently exists for existing traffic management regimes
governing air traffic and maritime navigation. An original traffic management system will
allow a further technology development by seeking better regulating measures. Partial
regulation of the other traffic management systems relies on the purposes of the entire
regime itself. The principal purpose of aviation regulation is, of course, the smooth
progress of air traffic. It could contain the safety of space activities, but is only subject to
the contribution to aviation safety. Aviation regulation is ultimately for aviation only, no
matter what may be regulated instead. Therefore, we cannot expect to establish a rule in
order to contribute solely to space activity. Space activities contain multiple dimensions
that cannot directly apply to aviation regulation, such as the nature of maneuver for the
object or the area or planet to be explored. The environment is very different as well. In
micro-gravity conditions, every object orbits in a certain trajectory in a certain speed.
Otherwise, it would be pulled towards the planet by gravity and fall to the ground. Relying
solely on the other peripheral regulations would result in an ill-assorted regulatory system,
which is unwholesome for the entirety of space activities.

165
14 CFR 91.143 (2004).
166
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295, ICAO
Doc 7300/6 (entered into force 4 April 1947), Annex 15 chapter 5 [Chicago Convention].
167
US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Notice to Mariners, online: USNGA
<http://.msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.Portal>; Canadian Coast Guard, Notice to Mariners,
online: Canadian Coast Guard <http://www.notmar.go.ca>.

34
 Moreover, with regards to the regulation of space traffic, the FAA has currently
mentioned several times that space was initially regulated in terms of maintaining the safety
of aviation.168 It should be said to date that the FAA is dedicated by its mandate to ensure
aviation safety. 169 Naturally, they should take space traffic into consideration, simply
because it could become a threat to aviation safety. It is no exaggeration to say that space
traffic can be seen as no more than an unwelcome interruption passing through airspace.
In this vein, it should be noted that the FAA pursued an anomalous track as a civil aviation
authority, since the US Congress decided to expand its mandate to regulate commercial
space transportation in 1984.170 This is because the FAA has become the pioneer aviation
agency dealing with space activity issues within their own aviation mandate. Expectations
for similar treatment in the aviation agencies of the other States should be considered
relatively low. Thus, even if the FAA treats space activities as beneficial for aviation, we
cannot expect other agencies to deal with or regulate space activities outside the context of
aviation.
3.2.2 Necessity to Establish the STM Regime
The current deadlocked situation needs a breakthrough. For a regulatory breakthrough,
there is an urge to make a self-standing regulation, which would allow the operators to
work in a safe manner by themselves. STM is the key concept which encompasses overall
space activities as “flowing traffic”. Under the concept of STM will space activities will
not be recognized discretely, but as integrated and mutually independent factors as they are
in reality. The STM regime can also be the ultimate type of TCBM. Take the example of
ASAT tests, and the resultant creation of space debris, which will pose incredible
challenges to future space traffic. Space debris is and will be increased by ASAT tests. As
well, ASAT tests will encourage ASAT technology development for the other countries,

168
Frank Morring Jr., "Space Traffic Control An Issue For NextGen", Aviation Week (10
February 2014), online: Aviation Week <http://aviationweek.com/>.
169
14 CFR Chapter 1 (1966); See also Daniel P. Murray, "The FAA's Current Approach
to Integrating Commercial Space Operations into the National Airspace System" in Ram
S. Jakhu & Kuan-Wei (David) Chen, eds., Regulation of Emerging Modes of Aerospace
Transportation (Montreal: McGill University Center for Research in Air and Space Law,
2014) at 169-184.
170
51 USC §509 (1984); 14 CFR §1214 (1992).

35
which are trying to balance their own powers. Thus, without TCBM, this ASAT
development race will result in the further pollution of the space environment. STM will
promote the accountability of each State’s space activities, while sharing information for
controlling traffic. Challenges will remain on how to organize the information exchange
regarding national security assets, but it would certainly increase TCBM for space
activities.171

The rationale for establishing a new STM regime should be clearly determined as
outlined by the following three points:
First, a unified basic rule to allow traffic flow in outer space is essential in order to
achieve effective and safe spacecraft operations. The lack of an STM regime allows
discrete rules of operations, and results in operator hesitations and miscommunications in
making accurate decisions. 172 The rule may start from a very fundamental level and
gradually build up with the international community’s mutual consensus.
Second, unified basic STM rules are necessary to shape the basis of liability. Since the
sovereign States are the governors of today’s international community, it is necessary to
elaborate liability rules to strengthen legal control over the States by ex-posto facto
regulation. This expands the compliance with international law in the international
community.
Third, it is necessary to expect a “regulatory big bang” instead of “piecemeal
engineering” in order to solve current problems occurring in international space law.173
The establishment of an STM regime will enable the conduct of safe and sustainable
operation rules in outer space.
3.2.3 Admissibility of STM Regime in International Law

171
See also Jana Robinson, "Transparency and confidence-building measures for space
security" (2011) 27:1 Space Policy 27; Peter Martinez et al, "Criteria for developing and
testing Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) for outer space
activities" (2014) 30:2 Space Policy 91.
172
William H. Ailor, "Space Traffic Management: Implementations and Implications"
(2006) 58:5 Acta Astronautica 279.
173
Kai-Uwe Schrogl, "Space Traffic Management: The New Comprehensive Approach
for Regulating the Use of Outer Space - Results from the 2006 IAA Cosmic Study"
(2008) 62:2–3 Acta Astronautica 272.

36
 Although the regime guided by the concept of STM can be considered a part of soft
law for the present date because of political reasons, there is theoretically no exaggeration
or inaccuracy to take an approach of giving the regime a legal status in the international
legal system in the near future. Obviously, the regime will work only with voluntary
compliance of States under its soft law format. Together with hard law, on the other hand,
it may gain legal enforceability regarding what the hard law regulates, so that it ensures the
operability of the regime. The format whether the regime contains hard law or not reflects
to the degree of enforceability. On reflection, it does not affect the function or the existence
of the regime to the international community. The regime may start from a combination of
pure soft laws and gradually sublimate by shifting its parts to hard law. Hence, no one
should stand on the assumption that the current international political situation is
horizonless for a STM regime.
Since the other traffic management regulations for maritime or aviation consist of sets
of legally binding and non-legally binding instruments, STM can exist as a set of both rules
as well. In this regard, it is beneficial to use the practices of MTM and ATM as peripheral
references. Both management areas have a point in common that the basic principles of the
whole structure of each regulating area are prescribed by an international treaty in order to
assure a solid platform on which the entire regimes can stand.
3.2.3.1 Air Traffic Management Regime
The basic framework of ATM was established by the Chicago Convention of 1944,
and that of the sea was established by the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea of 1982.174
The Chicago Convention created the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and
assigns the State of registry to take primary responsibility for the safety and security of
their registered aircrafts under certain harmonized circumstances of the Convention
prescriptions.175 It ensures a certain level of safety for the aircraft,176 of skill for the flight

174
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS
396, 21 ILM 1261 (entered into force on 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS].
175
Chicago Convention, arts 17-21.
176
Ibid, arts 31 and 33.

37
crew,177 as well as unified radio equipment178 and journey logbooks.179 The Convention
expects that the details of these flying conditions will be enforced by the State of
registration, subject to the International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
adopted by the ICAO Council.180 The ICAO Council designates SARPs as the Annexes of
the Chicago Convention for convenience, and the SARPs will become effective within
three months unless the majority of States notify their disapproval within this period.181
The SARPs provide international standards to harmonize the technical levels of necessary
elements in order to reach a unified safety level for global aviation.182
The basic legal infrastructure for air navigation is established by Article 22 of the
Chicago Convention, and Article 28 delegates the SARPs for detailed technical issues in
reaching the purpose of Article 22. Article 68 prescribes the rights of States in designating
the routes and airports for international services within its territory, and Article 12 provides
the uniformity of domestic rules to SARPs to the greatest extent possible, while at the same
time designating that the rules over the high seas shall be established exclusively by
ICAO.183 Article 15 requires the States to conform the navigation facility conditions in
those airports, and in reflection of these, Annex 2 (Rules of the Air), Annex 6 (Operation
of Aircraft, International Commercial Transport), Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services), and
Annex 15 (Aeronautical Information Services) establish the technical standards for unified
international operations.

The legality of SARPs is controversial, since its compliance relies on each State and
lacks binding sanctions. It is uncertain if the uniformity assumed by SARPs is achieved in
the domestic legislation of each State, since the majority of States do not respect the
procedure of disapproval notification because of unknown reasons, including lack of

177
Ibid, arts 32-33.
178
Ibid, art 30.
179
Ibid, art 34.
180
Ibid, art 37, annexes.
181
Ibid, arts 54(1) and90.
182
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Public International Air Law (Montreal: McGill University,
2008) at 65-74 [Dempsey, “Air Law”].
183
“Air Law”, ibid at 80.

38
understanding.184 As a matter of form, SARPs should be considered soft laws because of
their recommended nature. Also, the understanding of impracticability to comply or differ
with the domestic practices of any States will be respected more than SARPs, even though
they appear as Annexes of the Chicago Convention.185 However, by focusing on the aspect
of the implicit sanctions arising as a result of the non-compliance of SARPs, it is widely
understood that SARPs need to be considered as a part of hard law “whatever de jure ‘soft
law’ attributes SARPs may have”.186 International standardized measures for air navigation
is one of the significant areas established by SARPs.187 It is widely understood that the
ultimate responsibility of air navigation is held by each State through issuing any special
law or regulations, even if many States shift towards privatizing air navigation services.188

Since the SARPs are recognized as a part of hard law, it is safe to say that the basis of
ATM rules are established as legally binding instruments, in spite of the vast amounts of
other documents issued by ICAO regarding the research and recommendations on safety.
The documents adopted in the Council but not recognized as annexes of the Chicago
Convention do not formally consist of hard law, but serve as a de facto standard for the
comprehension of SARPs or the Convention itself.189 It is remarkable that the regime for
ATM is established based on the Chicago Convention and detailed by SARPs, which have
the nature of quasi-legally binding instruments,190 and surrounded by the other soft law
documents produced in ICAO, which serves as a supplement to hard law.
The vital elements for the regime were all described and maintained in SARPs. The
ATM system is based on the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of air space

184
Ibid at 75-80.
185
Ibid at 75-80; Chicago Convention, art 38.
186
“Air Law”, ibid at 79.
187
Chicago Convention, art 37(c).
188
Ibid, art 22; Dempsey, “Air Law”, supra note 182 at 171-205.
189
For example the Council of ICAO adopt ICAO’s policies signifying the way of
comprehensions of SARPs (ICAO, ICAO's Policies on Charges for Airports and Air
Navigation Services, ICAO Doc 9082, 9th ed, (2012) [ICAO’s Policies on Charges];
ICAO, 2013–2028 Global Air Navigation Plan, ICAO Doc 9750-AN/963, 4th ed,
(2013)).
190
Michael Milde, "The International Civil Aviation Organization: After 50 Years and
Beyond" [1996] Australian International Law Journal 60.

39
above the territory of each State. 191 Reflecting this principle, the Chicago Convention
established seven classes of air space by the different types of air traffic services (ATS)
provided, and set Flight Information Region (FIR) as the basic system, which is solely for
the purpose of providing information. The air space over the entire globe is categorized as
part of a FIR, and the provision of basic information for flight safety in this area is given
to the designated State as a responsibility. A FIR is typically designated based on the
territory of each sovereign State, and designations to some States include the area over the
high seas.192 For instance, the US, Portugal, Canada, and the United Kingdom share the
responsibilities involving providing information over the North Atlantic Ocean, while
Russia, Japan, and the US share those over the Pacific Ocean. Some States in Africa or
South America have formed regional navigation organizations to jointly provide services
in the area, while most States in the other regions provide these services individually.193
The distinguishing aspect of ATS is that only the States retain the responsibility to
provide each service, even though States may privatize the service provision itself. 194
ICAO established recommended principles for these services to charge costs based on a
service fee by the providing States.195 The Chicago Convention also regulates that the fees
or charges shall not be imposed solely for the right of transit over the territory or entry into
it, and these charges should have a non-discriminatory basis between national and foreign
aircrafts. 196 Several recommendations, such as the charges, should not be imposed to
discourage the use of facilities and services necessary for safety, no double charges should
ever be imposed, and only reasonable charges related to the cost of facilities used should
be imposed.197 Only a single fee should be charged, based on the distance flown in the
service-providing air space and the weight of the aircraft, which is an objective criterion
used in imposing a non-discriminatory charge.198 Any changes in the charges should be

191
Chicago Convention, art 1.
192
Ibid, annex 11,15.
193
Walter Schwenk & Rüdiger Schwenk, Aspects of International Co-operation in Air
Traffic Management (The Hague; Boston; Cambridge: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) at 39-41.
194
Dempsey, “Air Law”, supra note 182 at 172-175, 179-186.
195
ICAO's Policies on Charges, supra note 189 ss I.2-I.3.
196
Chicago Convention, art 15.
197
ICAO's Policies on Charges, supra note 189, s III.6.
198
Dempsey, “Air Law”, supra note 182 at 179.

40
based on the agreement between the service provider and users, and if they do not agree,
the user should have the right to appeal the charge to an independent body.199
The Rules of the Air are established under the belief that air travel must be safe and
efficient.200 The visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules (IFR) are set up as the
unified basic way of flying, applicable without exceptions over the high seas. It is also the
standard way of flying in the territorial air space, unless otherwise regulated by the
respective State. 201 The distinction of using IFR or VFR is made mainly by the
classification of the air space and meteorological conditions. Most airlines, especially long-
distance flights such as international flights, are flown by IFR. 202 Flying by IFR is
obligatory depending on the ATS, and must follow the air routes respectively designated
by each State. International flights will provide a flight plan in advance so that they can
enter into foreign airspace and conduct transportation services, as the States of registry are
mutually agreed upon in advance with bilateral agreements.203 Primary responsibility to
avoid a collision is imposed on the pilot by using the necessary support from the on-board
instruments and the ATS services from the ground.204 Right-of-way rules are also described
in the Rules of the Air: when two aircrafts are on the collision course at the same altitude,
the aircraft on the right has the right of way, the exception being that aeroplanes must give
way to airships, gliders, balloons, and aircrafts towing objects. An overtaken aircraft has
the right of way, and the overtaking aircraft must remain in the clear by turning to the right.
When two aircrafts approach each other head-on, they must both change direction by
turning right.205 In aviation, these unified rules provide the safety of operations. The only
exception in the application of these rules is for State aircrafts, which are excluded the
application of the Chicago Convention.206

199
ICAO's Policies on Charges, supra note 189, ss I.17-I.22.
200
Dempsey, “Air Law”, supra note 182 at 209.
201
Chicago Convention, annex 2.
202
Dempsey, “Air Law”, supra note 182 at 209-210.
203
Ibid at 517-522, 523-581.
204
Chicago Convention, arts 5-6.
205
Ibid, annex 2, s 3.2.2.
206
Chicago Convention, art 3.

41
 Nonetheless, the Convention requires the States to have “due regard for the safety of
navigation of civil aircraft” when regulating their State aircraft.207 The most critical point
elicited from this provision should be recognized as the obligation of the State to establish
the norms for achieving communicative interface between civil and state aircrafts.208 This
includes not only the on-board communication instruments among civil aircrafts, state
aircrafts, and ATS authorities, but also those of the civil and state air authorities.209 The
importance of the hybrid coordination of air space by civil air space authority should also
be recognized.210 Furthermore, it is important to add that ICAO continues its daily efforts
in collaborating and harmonizing the technologies as well as regulatory standards, to
increase the safety of operations by issuing documents other than SARPs.211
Nonetheless, in aviation, State aircrafts carrying objects of a sensitive nature, such as
an aircraft used in a classified mission or test, would fly in the military-restricted air space.
Although reaching to a common understanding regarding the “due regard” of Article 3(d)
of the Chicago Convention is important at this point, it is hard to imagine a real issue
happening in the current circumstances in which most State aircrafts equip compatible
communication equipment while civil and state aviation authorities maintain contact with
each other. The implication of this issue may be harder for space activities, since no
restricted space exists in outer space and most military satellite operators are reluctant to
identify themselves.
3.2.3.2 Maritime Traffic Management Regime
In the field of the sea, the development of traffic regulations is relatively slow.
UNCLOS regulates the jurisdiction over ships on the basis of the flagship principle,212 but

207
Ibid, art 3(d).
208
Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, "Military Aircraft and International Law:
Chicago Opus 3" (2000) 66 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 885 at 912-930.
209
Ibid.
210
Ibid. at 921-922.
211
ICAO, Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept, ICAO Doc 9854,
AN/458, 1st ed, (2005). (An overall concept of ICAO for ATM.); Procedures for Air
Navigation Services [PANS]: PANS - Air Traffic Management (ATM), ICAO Doc 4444,
(2007); PANS – Aircraft Operations (OPS), ICAO Doc 8168, (2006); PANS – ICAO
Abbreviations and Codes (ABC), ICAO Doc 8400, (2010); PANS-Training (TRG),
ICAO Doc 9868, (2006).
212
UNCLOS, arts 92(1), 97(1).

42
relies on coastal States regarding the regulations, including navigation safety using shore-
based navigation systems.213 The Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) are rather regulated as the
accumulation of the national port authorities without the harmonization of governmental
international organizations. 214 For ships, different from aircrafts, the liability-related
responsibilities all lie on the Master of vessels.215 It is true that international conventions
such as the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,216
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 217 and the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,218
have implemented international regulations for traffic management at sea. However, it is
even fair to say that this area consists of a much significant mixture of hard law and soft
law compared to the area of ATM, and therefore, a unified rule is required.219 The VTS
was initiated in 1968 on the Recommendation of the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), followed by the guidelines of International Maritime
Organization (IMO) in 1985. 220 These Guidelines do not describe the liability or
responsibility issues, but only the operational procedures and planning for the VTS.221
Currently, the 1997 revised version of the Guidelines222 is the internationally recognized

213
Gesa Praetorius et al, "Learning Lessons in Resilient Traffic Management: A Cross-
domain Study of Vessel Traffic Service and Air Traffic Control", in Dick de Waard et al,
eds, Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society [HFES] Europe
Chapter Conference, Toulouse, 2012 (HFES Europe Chapter, 2012) at 277-288.
214
Ibid; International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse
Authorities, IALA Vessel Traffic Services Manual, 5th ed (Saint Germain en Laye: 2012).
[IALA VTS Manual]
215
Praetorius et al, supra note 213 at 278-279.
216
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 20
October 1972, 1050 UNTS 16.
217
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, 1184 UNTS
2.
218
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers, 7 July 1978, 1361 UNTS 2.
219
Fulko van Westrenen & Gesa Praetorius, "Maritime Traffic Management: a Need for
Central Coordination?" (2014) 16:1 Cognition, Technology & Work 59.
220
IMO, Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Res A.578(14) (1985).
221
IALA VTS Manual, supra note 214 at 17.
222
IMO, Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Res A.857(20) (1997).

43
source policy for the VTS.223 Further development of the Guidelines is being considered
in the IMO, in consultation with related organizations such as the IALA and five other
international non-governmental institutions. 224 Basically, VTS is conducted by each
coastal State in accordance with the Guidelines of IMO and the IALA VTS Manual under
the authority of UNCLOS.
Along the lines of MTM and ATM, the necessary rules for realizing STM should
consist of a combination of hard law and soft law. Despite the fact that the major space-
faring nations are disinclined to making more hard law , this thesis does not argue that hard
law must be placed as the first priority for an STM regime. On the contrary, the initial
structure of the STM regime may be established as a series of soft laws without a legally
binding nature. The international community is also pointing in that direction, as described
in the next section. However, it should also be noted that some of the previsions of current
international space law may require revisions sooner or later.
3.2.4 Preventive Controlling Norms of the Outer Space Treaty
A connection for admissibility of STM regime also exists in the Outer Space Treaty.
Article IX of this Treaty can be considered the basic principle for protection of the space
environment. It can be said that avoiding harmful contamination and adverse changes in
Earth’s environment are the preventive controlling norms in conducting space activities.
Obviously, these abstract norms are open to interpretation in today’s circumstances
because of the lack of concrete regulations when it comes to implementing them.

There have been few discussions of applying the “precautionary principle”225 of the
environmental law to outer space.226 This notion seems reasonable, but no State has ever
recognized the applicability of this principle to outer space. Moreover, there is no norm
preventing the maintenance of sustainable space activities: that is to say, a norm for the

223
IALA VTS Manual, supra note 214 at 17.
224
Ibid at 18-21.
225
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNGAOR, (1992), Principle 15.
226
Paul B Larsen, "Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon" (2006) 71
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 295. Larsen argues the legal basis of applying the
principle to the Moon based on the general acceptance of the principle by Article V and
IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which is slightly out of the context of this thesis.

44
control of space activities, as traffic control is lacking. In order to prevent a collision in
orbit, it is necessary to consider an operational rule, which regulates the direction or altitude
of collision avoidance, an avoidance maneuver procedure, procedures for communication
with other operators, or collision-avoidance prediction calculation. Currently, these kinds
of rules do not exist for space activities.
3.3 Existing Trajectory to STM Regime
The necessity for an international regime shall be accompanied by the admissibility of
the international sphere. Legal admissibility will be discussed in the following Chapter,
but this section will shed some light on the movement of the international community
towards discussing the way to maintain sustainable space activities. Thus, it can be seen as
an emerging process for the political admissibility of the STM regime.
3.3.1 Nexus of LTSSA, ICOC and GGE – Existing Trajectory toward STM
Several approaches have already been initiated towards the establishment of an STM
regime, but the term STM itself has been carefully avoided since it is still too ambiguous
for official use in international governmental discussions. The worst case scenario for the
governments involves the circumstances that would allow an ever-changing definition of
the term STM, resulting in political conflicts among space-faring nations. The concept is
still only a concept for now, and there is no way stabilizing its meanings rather than be
defined by the lawmakers. However, many initiatives show that it is not an exaggeration
to say that the international community has already proceeded toward establishing the STM
regime. These initiatives are ICOC, LTSSA, and GGE.
ICOC, LTSSA, and GGE can be politically seen as competitive initiatives for the new
governance of space activities. It is true that there are some ways in which the US, Europe,
and Russia are acting out a leadership struggle for their power of influence in governing
space activities.227 However, even when looking at the contents of the three documents
closely, one can observe the process of comprehensive norm formation for the maintenance
of sustainable space activities: the road towards an STM regime.228

Takeuchi, “Challenges”, supra note 102 at 8-9.

227
228
Yu Takeuchi, "Space Traffic Management as a Guiding Principle of the International
Regime of Sustainable Space Activities" (2011) 4:2 Journal of East Asia and

45
 ICOC and LTSSA, which are both initiatives from Europe, initially considered that
ICOC should be a document meant for building up political commitments, and that LTSSA
should be a bottom-up technical recommendation corresponding to ICOC.229 During their
respective international considerations in a different forum, it is unclear if these goals are
still achievable, but it is still clear that the contents considered in these documents will
serve for space operations and traffic control.
The GGE Report was the first initiative to reach a conclusion in this context. Its
swiftness was probably due to its nature as a small expert panel. The significance of this
group is that the initiative was taken by the First Committee of the UNGA dealing with
disarmament issues, which is neither UNCOPUOS nor CD, but the reporting body of CD.
Therefore, its report included a significant recommendation coming from traditional
measures of TCBM: promoting voluntary visits to launch sites and control centers, and
demonstrations of space and rocket technologies. 230 The other TCBMs included in the
recommendations are similar to those in the drafts of ICOC and LTSSA. Namely, the
information exchange on national space policies and space activities, including orbital
parameters, possible conjunctions, planned launches and natural space hazards, and
notifications for reducing risks, are almost the same issues discussed in the ICOC and
LTSSA.231

Therefore, at least in terms of content, the situation is still the same as when the
discussion regarding sustainable space activities began. Namely, most of the topics can be
seen in the latest version of ICOC: Compliance and promotion of the existing regulations,
Measures for operation safety and space debris mitigation, Notification in space operation,
Information sharing, Consultation mechanism, and Management mechanism of the Code

International Law 319. [Takeuchi, “STM Guiding Principle”] (Described the STM
regime’s parallel development with the sustainable development regime.)
229
Rathgeber, Remuss & Schrogl, supra note 121 at 35.
230
GGE Report, supra note 131, OP 46-48.
231
Ibid, OP 37-45; LTSSA Proposed draft consolidated guidelines, supra note 112,
Guidelines 6,20-21,23-30; ICOC, supra note 119, ss 4-6.

46
among the subscribing States.232 It is remarkable that the Code includes the establishment
of TCBMs as one of the four purposes.233 In its General Principles, it is also declared that
preventing outer space from becoming an area of conflict should be taken into
234
consideration. This can be recognized in its successful involvement of the
recommendation made by GGE. It also signifies the separate establishment of
“internationally accepted practices, operating procedures, technical standards and policies
associated with the long-term sustainability of outer space activities”235, especially for the
safe conduct of outer space activities with LTSSA in mind.
ICOC will become a comprehensive and abstract representation of the political will of
the States if it attracts the subscription of the majority of the international community. It
implies that LTSSA would become its technical guidelines for the implementation of the
Code, and therefore, the maintenance of sustainable space activities would be able to reach
into the technical operative level, with political consensus to do so. The latest revised
version of the LTSSA, which does not seem to be harmonized with ICOC yet, intends to
recommend the adoption of national regulatory frameworks to exercise appropriate
jurisdiction and control,236 operational safety rules such as collecting and sharing space
debris monitoring information,237 or performing conjunction assessments during the orbital
phases of controlled flights.238 The topics in LTSSA almost fully correspond to those of
ICOC, except the issue of TCBMs, which can only be found in the ICOC and GGE.
Whatever ulterior motives the States participating in the considerations may have, it is
safe to say that the three initiatives discuss the common purpose of establishing
international, non-legally binding guidelines for the maintenance of sustainable space
activities. Three prominent elements involve all three initiatives sharing their core
contents: commonly implementing the existing rules in every State, establishing rules for
safe operation of the spacecraft, and establishing a procedure for collecting and sharing

232
ICOC, ibid, ss 4-8.
233
Ibid, s 1.3.
234
Ibid, s 2.
235
Ibid.
236
LTSSA Proposed draft consolidated guidelines, supra note 112, Guideline 9.
237
Ibid, Guideline 21.
238
Ibid, Guideline 25.

47
SSA data. The three elements required in the three initiatives correspond to the current
problems in space operations described in Chapter 2 of this thesis as their solutions.
Furthermore, recalling the definition of STM such as “the set of technical and regulatory
provisions for promoting safe access into outer space...”239 it can be said that the elements
being currently discussed in the international community by the three initiatives are
encouraging the establishment of an international regime for STM.
3.3.2 Possible next steps
It is always a daunting task to anticipate the movements of international politics since
there is a fine line dividing anticipation and prognostication: it is not only logic that
dominates politics. Considering the possible presumption from the moves regarding the
STM regime described above, there is no doubt about the existence of international
consensus for the general necessity of norms when it comes to the maintenance of
sustainable space activities. It should be said that the question is only about timing. The
contentions to start the discussions still exist in the forum where the rule-making and
detailing level of the norms must take place, but these contentions do not actually exist in
the context of the regime.
The next possible steps following the ICOC, LTSSA, and GGE should not be to
establish new contentions to attract attention, but to deepen the established guidelines and
make efforts to unify the corresponding political top-down commitments and bottom-up
technical guidelines, if both of them reach a consensus. Therefore, it can be predicted that
this STM regime will be the central component of discussion in the maintenance of
sustainable space activities, since this will be the only comprehensive regime used to
achieve safe and sustainable space operations in the next few decades. Also, it is not an
enigmatic opinion to say that the next legally binding treaty regulating space activities
would appear in this regime. It is, of course, necessary to consider the constrained political
environment. This will be described in the last Chapter since it is not the lawyers, but the
States, who establish international law.240

Schrogl, Lála & Contant-Jorgenson, “IAA STM Report”, supra note 8 at 10.
239
240
Bin Cheng, "The Legal Status of Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of
Outer Space and Definition of Peaceful Use" (1983) 11 Journal of Space Law 89 at 97
[Cheng, “Legal Status”].

48
49
 Chapter 4
Re-capturing International Space Law for Space Traffic Management

For the sound implementation of an international STM regime, this regime needs to
be established in the scope of international law in order to locate the rules within the
necessary rights and obligations of State sovereignty. In order to reach this purpose, it is
necessary to analyze its legality within the entire framework of the international legal
system. Although the major space-faring nations are currently skeptical about new treaties
involved in legally binding international space law, it is crucial to analyze the legality of
STM and its possible position in the system, in order to facilitate turning a non-legally
binding soft law into a legal principle in the near future.
At this stage, the major part of the STM regime can be achieved by the re-interpretation
of the UN space treaties or building international consensus with soft laws. Some may end
up considering amendments of the existing treaties. This Chapter conducts an analysis to
re-capture the current international space law in the context of STM by discussing each
individual point. The first two points are the new proposal for the establishment of Space
Traffic Rules as necessary norms essential to an STM regime (4.1) and a new concept and
structure for fair and effective SSA information and data sharing (4.2). The latter three
points are a re-interpretation of the UN space treaties: the delimitation issue of outer space
(4.3), the re-consideration of the scope of space objects (4.4), and the way of thinking for
State responsibility (4.5).
4.1 Space Traffic Rules
Traffic rules for space operations should be considered the central topic for an STM
regime, since the rules regulating traffic will be the most direct rules used to manage the
traffic activities. Furthermore, there is no single rule for managing space traffic to date, and
this is the only radically new proposal in this thesis.
Establishing rules for space traffic should first start with the “Rules of Space” akin to
the thinking and conceptualization behind “Rules of the Air”.241 Rules of Space, as the
operational rules for space traffic, should cover the basic methodologies to launch, orbit,

241
Chicago Convention, annex 2.

50
re-orbit, and de-orbit space traffic to and from outer space. It should be emphasized that
providing the highest standard among the States is not effective, and should not be
recognized as the purpose of this kind of regulation. Despite this, the most important point
is to establish a unified manner of common recognition among all space actors, so that the
safety measures can also be included. This method can also be seen in the “Rules of the
Air”.242
The second traffic rule must be the “Rules of Collision Avoidance”. Since the collision
avoidance procedures have already been implemented by the majority of the operators
using SSA data provided by JSPOC, only the recognition and sharing of these procedures
as a standardized manner is required. In traffic rules, it is efficient to break down these
measures into nominal rules and emergency rules in order to tolerate the emergency
collision avoidance procedures, in case the operators do not have enough time to
communicate with each other for a nominal maneuver. The contents of the nominal rules
will almost have the same manner of the current practices of the operators, but the
unification of the operating manner and the recognition of the unified rules are the key of
these rules. Since the operators know that all the other operators operate their spacecraft
under a unified rule, they would be much more confident in their own calculations, in
communicating their predicted collision partners, and in making decisions about their
maneuvers.

The emergency rules should be, for instance, that the spacecraft recognizing another
space object coming in the direction of its own movement in a certain short distance needs
to perform a maneuver in a certain direction and speed in a certain pre-supposed condition.
The emergency rules would become applicable in cases when the operator could not expect
a possible collision by a predicted calculation based on SSA data, or expect the other
object’s maneuver in a certain amount of hours in advance. These timeframes, in space
operations, should be considered as being last-minute, since space objects need to maintain
their speed in orbit and need to move a certain amount of minutes before the expected

242
Paul B Larsen, The Regulation of Air Traffic Control Liability by International
Convention (LLM Thesis, McGill University Institute of Air and Space Law, 1965) at 8-9
[unpublished].

51
movement subject to their limited propulsion. In cases of the other possible colliding object
being space debris, there is no choice but to apply emergency rules.
It is also essential for the STM regime to establish standard measures that include the
technologies to be utilized for STM. Namely, these are the communication measures for
collision avoidance and the methods of orbital calculation and maneuver, including the
treatment of their calculation margins. It would become possible to introduce a device for
collision avoidance in the future, similarly to the Airborne Collision Avoidance System
(ACAS) in aviation.243 Differing from aviation, of course, the system would mostly alert
the operators in the ground control stations, and a handful of manned spacecrafts.
The necessary traffic rules for an STM regime consist of: Rules of the space; Rules of
collision avoidance; Rules for Data Sharing Center; and Communication and technology
standards.
4.2 Fair and Effective SSA Information and Data Sharing
At this point, it is unavoidable to consider how to achieve fair and effective sharing of
SSA information and data, since SSA is the only measure to date which recognizes the
situation in outer space.244 In order to settle the political challenges and assure the provision
of unified SSA information and data to spacecraft or space object operators globally,245 it
is necessary to consider the establishment of an international clearinghouse for data and
information sharing. In order to implement this clearinghouse, it is crucial to set an
effective and transparent operation for it.246 The ATM realizes the provisions of ATS from
States by dividing airspace into multiple FIRs. However, the nature of space activities does
not allow for the same manner, since the satellites in LEO make one round of the Earth in
about 90 minutes. They may pass over a country in a few seconds, so controlling these
movements by the same concept as FIRs would not be realistic. Furthermore, the concept
of FIRs works under the mutual recognition of every State having “complete and exclusive

243
Chicago Convention, annex 2, s 3.2.
244
See also Schrogl, Lála & Contant-Jorgenson, “IAA STM Report”, supra note 8 at 91.
245
See section 3.1 above.
246
Paul B Larsen, "Outer Space Traffic Management: Space Situational Awareness
Requires Transparency" (2008) 51 Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Law of Outer
Space 338.

52
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”247, which has never been recognized for
248
outer space. Therefore, it is legally and operationally reasonable to locate a
clearinghouse as the central data provider for STM, instead of requiring each State to
directly provide information for space operations.
Only for descriptive purposes, this clearinghouse will be called “Data Sharing Center”
in this thesis without any other implications. The Data Sharing Center will channel the
responsibilities for information and data provision, gather observation data from the SSA
entities and operation data from the operators, as well as neutralize the information and
data by shadowing, eliminating, or anonymizing sensitive information and data upon the
requests of data providers.249 The main objective of the Data Sharing Center is to provide
necessary and sufficient information and data for safety operation to the operators of space
traffic. In order to ensure fairness and prevent free riders from using the Data Sharing
Center, it should be co-founded by all space object operators, who would share its eligible
costs. The integral role of this system is to standardize the data and information utilized for
space traffic for the clearinghouse, and thus, the reliability of the operators amongst each
other can be reinforced.
On the other hand, it should not be assumed that the State would be free from any
obligations regarding data and information sharing. Under current technical availability,
only the respective militaries of the US and Russia could provide comprehensive data and
information for SSA. Nonetheless, the other States, such as Australia, China, France,
Germany, or Japan would have limited ability for SSA250, so the entire world would have
no choice but to depend on the two major space powers for comprehensive data. However,
the observation data of the other States would complement that of the US and Russia, and
so data from these States could be used for data calibration as well. The orbital information
from the space operators would increase the accuracy of the observed data’s orbital
information: the observation can only be done as passive monitoring, but the operators
could track their own satellites by a combination of passive and active tracking. Therefore,

247
Chicago Convention, art 1.
248
Outer Space Treaty, art 2.
249
The issue of responsibility and liability will be discussed in subsection 4.5 below.
250
USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, supra note 48.

53
it is worth it to impose obligations on all the States to provide useful STM data to the Data
Sharing Center, allowing the States to conduct a self-screening process to cast aside their
security concerns.251 The data provision from the States may start from voluntary basis
provision but it has to become a legal obligation eventually to achieve constant data
gathering with equal basis among all of States in space operation. The obligations to the
States can be grounded by the Article X of the Outer Space Treaty, which requires
promotion of international cooperation to observe the space objects upon request of other
States. Although the Article’s second sentence leaves the detailed arrangement to the other
international agreements, this provision can be seen as the legal basis for SSA Data Sharing
Center. Actually, the Soviet Union was conducting its bilateral space object observation
cooperation based on this provision from 1966.252 Admittedly, a new international treaty
is needed for imposing the aforementioned obligations to States.
The Space Data Association Limited (SDA) founded by the three major worldwide
satellite operators, Inmarsat, Intelsat and SES can be seen as a leading model of SSA Data
Sharing Center. SDA, a not-for-profit private company with limited guaranty and
incorporated in the Isle of Man, operate a system for sharing real-time operational data for
collision avoidance of the members’ satellite. 253 SDA is gradually expanding its
participation and in 2012 the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and NASA were joined.254 It should be seen that the necessity of this type of

251
A similar approach is taken by ICAO requesting the States to provide “any potential
risks to civil aviation in their airspace”, which mainly gathered by intelligence
capabilities: ICAO, News Release, “ICAO Clarifies State Responsibilities Arising from
Conflict Zones” (24 July 2014) online: ICAO <http://www.icao.int>; ICAO, International
Air Transport Association (IATA), Airports Council International (ACI) and Civil Air
Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), “Joint Statement on Risks to Civil Aviation
Arising from Conflict Zones”(29 July 2014) online: ICAO <http://www.icao.int>.
252
Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd & Schrogl, supra note 68 at 188.
253
Richard DalBello & Michael Mendelson, "Private Risk Management in Orbital
Operations: Inter-Operator Liability and the Space Data Association" (2011) 60 German
Journal of Air and Space Law 218.
254
Space Data Association Limited (SDA), Press Release, “Space Data Association:
NOAA to Participate in the SDA”, 22 May 2012, online: SDA <http://www.space-
data.org>; Space Data Association Limited (SDA), Press Release, “Space Data
Association: NASA to Participate in the SDA”, 8 August 2012, online: SDA
<http://www.space-data.org>.

54
international data center is widely recognized by both commercial and civil governmental
operators. Those data should also be gathered in the Data Sharing Center for enhancing the
accuracy of its outputs. Since these data is focusing on the operational satellites of the
respective entity, it is expected to be precise only with the data of certain satellite but
nothing with the others such as non-operational satellites, which are the majority of space
object to date. Those data must be relied on observation and those abilities are concentrated
on the governmental sides. On the other hand, it is also necessary to remind that the data
from commercial operators should also be treated in a similar fashion of those from the
governmental entities, including the anonymity, neutralization of data, and liability.

As a consequence, it is reasonable to consider two possible issues regarding the Data

Sharing Center. One is that a State may show low motivation to provide data based due to
national security considerations. National security concern is the fundamental inherent
instinctive State behavior, which is impossible to negate by any unassured reasons. 255
Therefore, there is nothing to do but leave the decision regarding national security issues
in the hands of each State.256 The purpose of the Data Sharing Center should be exclusively
for traffic management and the extent of gathering data, and information should be as
restricted as possible in order to allow the State to select information to be provided.

The second issue is that the State would willing to differentiate data sharing with
certain countries from the multilateral data provision and increase bilateral data sharing
aside from the Data Sharing Center. Besides all of this, promoting bilateral SSA data
sharing cooperation is a situation to be welcomed. Although unified information and data
sharing are indispensable for STM, cooperation with advanced information and data
beyond the generally shared information would aid progress in the safety of space traffic.
Bilateral cooperation would also eventually raise the level of multi-lateral cooperation,
since it is simpler for a State to share certain information with a State with which it has
strong relations under a bilateral cooperation and expand the same level of cooperation to

255
Hedly Bull, The Anarchical Society, 3rd ed (New York: Columbia University Press,
1977); UN Charter, art 51.
256
See also Cheng, “Legal Status”, supra note 240 at 97.

55
other States with which it has a weaker relationship if desired. The expansion of bilateral
cooperation could be a step for multilateral cooperation but would not impair the purpose
of the Data Sharing Center unless the States ignore the minimum level of information
sharing to the Center critical to STM. Therefore, it is essential to include in the STM regime
the minimum requirements involving providing data to the Data Sharing Center for the
maintenance of safety operations, but excluding the factors to withhold the States from
conducting a bilateral SSA cooperation aside from the data provision to the Center.
It is also definitely possible to try setting a detailed regulatory circumscription to the
State in the STM regime for their provision of data and information in order to prevent
States from holding off their provision of information. However, it is in the nature of the
international community’s current system that the voluntary motivation of the State is
always stronger than any other compulsory regulations. The international regulations
without authentic agreements from the States would be easily nullified by the States.257
Though the liability against the damage occurred by the Data Sharing Center will be
discussed in the section 4.5.4 below, it is necessary to provide several rationale that SSA
Data Sharing Center could be accepted by the States. Besides the demands from the
industries and civil space operators reflected to the development of SDA, data sharing
cooperation is less costly than continuously taking the risk of environment deterioration by
space debris. Another collision in the orbit will not only increase the number of space debris
but also may increase the future operation cost by possible expansion of insurance premium
and additional risk assessment measures. The security leak concern of sensitive
information may be prevented by introducing a mechanism such as assigning liaison
officers from the intelligence or military entity to the Center.
4.3 Relativized Delimitation of Outer Space
The delimitation of “outer space” is an issue which has been discussed in the
UNCOPUOS-LSC for more than half of the century. Most of the space-faring nations have
set forth to give priority neither to the functionalist nor the spatialistspatialist approach: it
is given to the “wait-and-see” approach.258 This attitude is followed by the other space-

257
See also Bull, supra note 255 at 122-155.
258
Cheng, “Legal Status”, supra note 240 at 92-95.

56
faring nations, and the issue is still on the agenda of UNCOPUOS-LSC today. In
considering the sustainability of space activities, therefore, the aerial scope of the existing
legal regime is still ambiguous. This ambiguity does not bring practical problems at this
moment, but remains the fundamental problem in regulating space activities, especially in
the issue of to what extent the UN space treaties govern space activities. This problem will
occur at some point in the near future because the development of space activities is
approaching a crucial point, which will appear in marginal events.

The demarcation of applicable air law and space law is crucial for suborbital
spaceflight because its nature of operation straddles both air and outer space.259 In planning
active space debris removal, it is necessary to identify the applicable space law and relevant
air law, which may be affected by safety considerations. In controlling space activities,
such as a satellite or launch vehicle as systematic traffic, the regulation should identify
whether the applicable law should be air law, space law, or both, and to what extent.
It should be said that the time has come to go forward in terms of the developing
variation of space activities.260 But, at the same time, the changed circumstances of the
activities have relativized the delimitation issue itself. Namely, considering the current
practices of space activities to date, it is realistic to understand that outer space is a hybrid
meaning of spatialist and functionalist approaches.
The merit of the spatialist approach involves differentiating air space from outer space
with a clear-cut edge. Since this approach would establish a delimitation line between both
types of space, defining the applicable law based on the area would be easier, despite the
activity’s nature. It would also be useful to classify military activity within the regulation
of one area or the other. Several exemptions are also required in military activities, so
taking the spatialist approach would allow their consideration within at least one of the
regulation areas. Moreover, the spatialist approach would allow specifying the applicable
law just based on the area of its activities, whatever nature the object or activity may retain.
It is the easier way to address the objective indication.

259
Vernon Nase, "Delimitation and the Suborbital Passenger: Time to End Prevarication"
(2012) 77 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 747.
260
Ibid.

57
 The functionalist approach, on the other hand, would require close observation of the
activity’s function in order to identify whether the activity should be regulated by air law
or space law. Therefore, it might be problematic to recognize that an activity falls under a
certain category of law only from its external form. In terms of traffic management, it
seems beneficial to have an identifiable external form to allow the regulator to easily
identify the applicable rule of the object. However, the physical nature of spacecraft
maneuver differs from that of aircrafts or vessels. It is impossible to gain visual images of
a spacecraft during its flight in outer space. This differs greatly from the assumption to
prioritize visual contact in aircrafts, vessels, or automobiles. Almost all spacecrafts are
operated by positioning data, the transmitted GPS data from the satellite itself, the radar
observation data from certain ground observation stations, and SSA data. Therefore,
identifiability plays only a minor role in the delimitation of space activities. In fact, the
functionalist approach is more reasonable, since space objects will be functionally
identified by their telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) or operational capabilities.
Another rationale used to argue that the functionalist approach is more well-suited for
application than the spatialist approach is that the functionalist approach may have the
flexibility of allowing any other category of spacecraft or space activities within space
regulations. For example, JAXA is currently developing a
Super Low Altitude Test Satellite (SLATS), which flies at a relatively low altitude of 200-
300km in order to advance the high-resolution Earth observation sensor technology.261
This altitude is comparatively lower than the orbiting altitude of a normal satellite, which
is around 600-800km, while the International Space Station orbit is around 400km. One
should easily imagine that the spatialist approach can face another challenge to its criteria
in the very near future. It is no exaggeration to say that the altitudes of space activities are
gradually relativized, and thus, the criteria of the spatialist approach are gradually
becoming vague. The functionalist approach has the advantage in contemporary space

261
Keizo Nakagawa, "R&D of JAXA Satellite Application Mission", (Presentation
delivered at the 26th Microelectronics Workshop, Tsukuba, 24 October 2013)
[unpublished].

58
activities, but moreover, it is also reasonable to say that being a spatialist or a functionalist
does not affect the STM regime in practice.
4.4 Scope of Space Object for STM
Considering the premise that the result of outer space delimitation would not affect the
scope of the STM regime, the definition of a space object would be the sole integral
definition for the STM used to settle its scope. Obviously, the scope of the STM regime
has not yet been defined. Therefore, the issue involves whether it should be defined as
being in the same scope as space objects, or if it establishes some other category.
4.4.1 Definition and Scope of Space Object
International space law has always faced the constant pressure involved with the
absence of a clear definition of “space object”. Its only definition in current international
space law is “[t]he term of ‘space object’ includes component parts of a space object as
well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof”. 262 Literally, space objects are the only
regulatory materials subject to the Liability Convention and Registration Convention, as
well as Article VII and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, while Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty only regulates the “activities in outer space”. The provision of the definition of space
object in the Liability and Registration Convention reinforces this notion. However,
considering the way to comprehend these three Articles of the Outer Space Treaty aligned
with their ordinary context, 263 Articles VII and VIII can be understood as the detailed
prescriptions for State liability of damage and for the registration of space objects,
respectively. In turn, Article VI should be understood as stating the general responsibility
of the State for space activities. Consequently, the object falling under the definition of
“space object” will become the international responsibility of the launching State
shouldered with the duty of authorization and continuing supervision, as well as retained
jurisdiction and control by the State of registry. Therefore, it can be said that the subject
matter designated by “space object” is a dedicated description for the liability and
registration systems, which are only a part of international space law. There is no doubt
that the two systems were important and both considered to be crucial at the time of drafting

262
Liability Convention, art 1(d); Registration Convention, art 1(b).
263
See section 3.2.3.1 above.

59
of the UN space treaties. However, regulating other aspects such as the sustainable use of
outer space, whether or not the concept of “space object” can be used as subject matter still
remains ambiguous.
Aside from this fundamental issue, there are also some cases in which the concept of
“space object” falls under ambiguity of application. It is obvious that the satellite, launch
vehicle, and trans-orbital vehicle, including rovers on the surface of celestial bodies, fall
into the definition of “space object”. The controversial objects are space debris and
suborbital spacecraft, which may fall outside of the definition. Nonetheless, the
prescription of the Liability and Registration Convention on the definition of “space
object” obviously expresses that space debris is included under the definition of “space
object”. This signifies that space debris should be recognized under the “authorization and
continuing supervision” by the appropriate State, the damages occurred as a result of space
debris should be liable to the launching State of that debris, and the “jurisdiction and
control” over it are on the State of registry. As a result, it is clear at this point that space
debris is not an issue of the definition of space object, but an issue of controlling its
measures or determining the appropriate State in control, which will be discussed in the
next subsection.
The case of suborbital spacecraft is much more complicated. A suborbital spacecraft,
differing from space debris, cannot be settled spontaneously under the definition of space
object because it can be both an aircraft and a space object at the same time. International
air law defines “aircraft” as “[a]ny machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from
the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.”264 It
also defines “aeroplane” as being included in the aircraft category as “[a] power-driven
heavier-than-air-aircraft, deriving its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on
surfaces which remain fixed under given conditions of flight.”265 Space Ship One sparked
the epoch-making movement of suborbital spaceflight business development by winning
the Ansari X Prize in 2004.266 Taking its configuration as the example, the majority of the

264
Chicago Convention, annex 7, chapter 1.
265
Ibid.
266
"SpaceShipOne rockets to success", BBC News (7 October 2005) online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.

60
suborbital spacecraft under development have a similar concept: the suborbital spacecraft
takes off from and lands on a runway, similarly to an aircraft. It ascends into air space using
jet propulsion in a similar way to the aircraft, and ignites the rocket propulsion system or
separates the space flight module along with it to ascend further. After reaching an altitude
of around 100 km to perform “space tourism”, it descends back down to an altitude where
it becomes possible to fly in aerodynamic reactions and come back to the ground as a
glider.267 Therefore, suborbital spacecraft have a reason to meet the definition of aircraft
and aeroplane. Reflecting this controversy, ICAO has warned that suborbital spacecrafts
should be regulated under international air law, at least when they share the same
international air space of other aircrafts conducting international operations. 268 This
observation is an inevitable conclusion from the safety point of view of aviation
operation.269 It is easy to imagine that the ICAO limits its own mentioning in international
air space, simply because national air space is outside of ICAO’s mandate.270 It is obvious
that the nature of safety consideration does not differ from national air space and
international air space. Since suborbital spacecraft retain a high potential to pass through
air space more frequently than launch vehicles, dodging each case by letting them pass
through a special national air space dedicated to them will easily face the limit.271 It was a
self-explanatory conclusion for the aviation community that ICAO called for international
regulation for suborbital spacecraft under air law. The ambiguity of the definition of “space
object” emanates difficulties, not only for space law because of its applicability to

267
Concept of Suborbital Flights: Information from the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), UNCOPUOSLSCOR, 49th Sess, UN Doc
A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.9, (2010), s 1.3 [ICAO’s Concept].
268
Ibid.
269
See also Ram S. Jakhu, Tommaso Sgobba & Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Need for an
Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space, ICAO for Space? (Vienna:
Springer-Verlag, 2012).
270
ICAO’s Concept, supra note 267.
271
See also Murray, supra note 169. Although it seems still affordable to date to let them
use dedicated national air space: John M. Falker, Engineering and Policy Analysis of
Strategic and Tactical Options for Future Aerospace Traffic Management (Ph. D. in
Aerospace Engineering and Policy Analysis Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2002) [unpublished].

61
suborbital spacecraft, but also for the demarcation of air law and space law to be applied
to suborbital spacecraft.
From the STM viewpoint, it is practical to disconnect the subject matter of STM from
space objects and focus on “space traffic”, since the primary purpose of the STM regime
is to regulate traffic in outer space in order to maintain safe and sustainable space activities.
The status of “space object” functions in terms of the liability regime under the current
international space law. Therefore, the STM regime can exist as a parallel regime of the
existing liability regime of international space law. Nonetheless, the result of interference
to a space “object” can be subject to the liability regime, interference to space “traffic” may
not be subject to the liability regime unless specified to do so in the STM regime.
“Space traffic” needs to be defined as manageable traffic flow located outside of air
traffic control. Literally, the flow of ballistic missiles is not manageable even under
international air law, and therefore may be excluded from the subject matter of “space
traffic”. Ballistic missiles are generally justified under international space law by un-
categorizing as space objects, with the reason that they do not “orbit” the Earth. 272
However, if suborbital spacecrafts are categorized as space objects, the justification of
ballistic missiles becomes inconsistent. This is because the suborbital spacecraft follows a
similar trajectory to that of the ballistic missile in terms of its altitude transition. When the
suborbital spacecraft was developed to travel to other continents for transportation
purposes, it had exactly the same behavior. 273 However, in order to deepen the
understanding on the categorization of suborbital spaceflight or ballistic missile under the
UN space treaties, a slight stretch of the definition of “space object” is needed anyway
because there is essentially no precise definition in existence yet.
From the parallel thought involving the distinction between state and civil aircrafts, it
is also possible to distinguish the security used spacecraft from the civil spacecraft based
on the States’ concerns regarding intelligence satellites. At this point, it is inevitable to

272
Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd & Schrogl, supra note 68 at 79.
273
Milton L Smith, "Legal Implications of a Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense"
(1985) 15 California Western International Law Journal 52 at 69-75.

62
establish regulations for due regards to the safety of the other civil spacecrafts like in air
law, which is understood as a legal obligation from the Chicago Convention to the State.274
4.4.2 Procedure for Relinquishment of Rights on Space Debris
The crucial points for the scope of space objects in terms of STM are the demarcation
between an operational space object and a non-operational space object, as well as the
procedure for relinquish the rights over non-operational one. From the stand point of the
space operators, all space objects are targets for collision avoidance, but avoiding non-
operational objects is given a higher priority since there is no chance that they could move
by themselves to avoiding the collision. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a measure to
allow the operators to identify whether the object is an operational removable spacecraft
or just space debris. Furthermore, it is inevitable to consider removing space debris in the
near future.

From this viewpoint, a procedure to relinquish rights over abandoned satellites or

upper stages of launch vehicles should be established in order to allow their collection or
abolishment in order to reduce space debris.275 A new rule used in identifying operational
and non-operational space objects and procedures for relinquish the rights over them
should be determined by the STM regime.276 This new rule should identify the condition
and procedure of relinquishment of the State’s rights, as well as the removing measures by
ensuring international transparency over using proper technology. However, relinquish the
rights over space debris is a double-edged sword: it means the suspension of “jurisdiction
and control” of Article VIII from the Outer Space Treaty, as well as a waiver of the
launching State’s international responsibilities from Article VI, since obligations are
always inextricably linked to relative rights. Therefore, the regime should ensure that the
relinquishing of jurisdiction and control by the State should be extremely confined in
certain conditions. It should also be considered that micro-satellites, which do not maintain
abilities for maneuver, must be treated as similar as non-functional satellites in the context

274
Chicago Convention, art 15.
275
Brian Weeden, "Overview of the Legal and Policy Challenges of Orbital Debris
Removal" (2011) 27:1 Space Policy 38.
276
Ibid at 40.

63
of safety operation. Since these satellites are still functional, it may cause conflicts among
the respective operators. However, leaving these micro-satellites out of the regulation may
cause further deployment of space debris in near future.
4.4.3 Regulating Suborbital Spaceflight
From an STM viewpoint, it is also important to recognize suborbital spacecraft as
traffic, since they are potential traffic for STM, showing behavior similar to that of launch
vehicles until re-entry. The registration and licensing regimes for suborbital spacecraft are
necessary for vehicle identification, determination of liability, and safety operation.277 As
“[a] comprehensive and uniform legal regime that specifically envisages the complete
launch and return journey of private individuals should be preferred”,278 there is no reason
to prevent the application of both regimes of international air law and space law. Since the
suborbital spacecraft used for space tourism is a hybrid type which should be regulated in
both ways, there are only two options: establishing a new category for regulation, or
regulating it by applying all of the existing applicable regulations. It is, of course, more
desirable to establish a new category rather than to forcibly regulate through a set of
existing regulations, but the current political circumstances do not allow a new
establishment of legal regulation. Therefore, at this stage, the only contemporary choice is
to apply multiple applicable regulations. The definition of aircraft in international air law
signifies that it would only be applicable to when the suborbital spacecraft flies as an
aircraft. The regulation of international space law can be applied outside of these scopes,
regardless of the delimitation of air space and outer space.
Either way, in terms of traffic management, the hybrid-type suborbital spacecraft
should be entitled under the regulation of air traffic as well as space traffic. As a desperate
measure without establishing a new legal category, it is beneficial to regulate it as an
aircraft while it is being operated as an aircraft or aeroplane, and as a space object when it
does not fall under either of these categories. It is also beneficial to allow the international

277
Zhao Yun, "Legal Regime for Space Tourism: Creating Legal Certainty in Outer
Space" (2009) 74 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 959 at 974-978.
278
Steven Freeland, "Up, up and ... Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its
Impact on the International Law of Outer Space" (2005-2006) 6:1 Chicago Journal of
International Law 1 at 9; See also Jakhu, Sgobba & Dempsey, supra note 269 at 119-139.

64
regime for outer space, including the STM regime, to be applicable to the suborbital
spacecraft in such a manner in order to reduce the area of lacunae of law.
4.5 State Responsibility and Liability in STM
4.5.1 Encourage National Implementation
The liability system is the key legal element for ex-posto facto control, and if the
system becomes non-functional, this could create an anarchical situation. Since legal
enforcement measures are impossible to anticipate, the liability system should also be
considered as a measure for compliance reinforcement of the regime. The current liability
system of international space law established fault-based liability for in-orbit damages and
absolute liability for ground damages 279 . The liability system in the international legal
sphere is quite obvious. The problem is in their national implementation phase, which is
the breakdown of the international liability system for the actual operators in each
jurisdiction. The domestic implementation of the liability system is necessary because the
non-governmental entities, which are the increasing number of actors conducting space
activities in this decade, are not subject to liability under international law.280 It is the State
that retains the possibility to be seen as liable for damage inflicted by a non-governmental
space activity. In other words, the international liability of the State needs to be
implemented domestically as a liability against a private entity in order to bridge the two
different legal layers.

The establishment of a license system taken in some space-faring nations is one of the
implementing measures. The license systems of the US and France, which can be
recognized as those representing the current space-faring nations, include liability
procedures in case of an accident. Both of them establish absolute liability to the operators
with the obligatory purchase of insurance or equivalent funding for third-party
compensation, with a certain ceiling amount of liability and set State coverage systems for
the amount exceeding this ceiling.281 Both systems also embrace channeling liability to

279
Liability Convention, arts 2-3.
280
Outer Space Treaty, art VI.
281
51 USC §50914, 50915 (1984); FSOA, arts 14-17. See also Daisuke Saisho, "Liability
Risk Sharing Regime of the Bill of Japan's Legislation on Space Activities and Its

65
operators. Nonetheless, even if the French Space Operations Act (FSOA) designates the
launch operator and satellite operator as the actors obtaining absolute liability,282 the US
Commercial Launch Act of 1984 (CSLA) addresses only the launch and reentry licensee,
which does not include satellite operators.283 The problem is that there are few States which
have established a comprehensive license system, and this kind of gaps may create lacunae
of the law when the activity falls under lack of jurisdiction to be regulated.284 The existing
systems in national law address compensation to the States when the State suffers from the
licensed activities, together with the compensation rules to the victims. The States
legislating these provisions in their national law will be able to seek compensation from
commercial operators in case international compensation is made by the State. It is
foreseeable that a State may end up in a situation of being unable to compensate the real
liable operator for damage caused by a non-governmental space activity and put pressure
on public finance because of the legislation failure of domestic compensation.285 This is
especially true for States such as Canada, Germany, or Japan: they are categorized as space-
faring nations and the fact that they have not legislated such a regulation to date might be
problematic.
A further precise discussion on the Recommendations in the international fora for
enhancing a common understanding is further required. In the field of aviation, a unified
regime for civil liability was established as the Warsaw Convention 286 in 1929, and

Comparison with the US and French Law" (2011) 55 Proceedings of the Colloquium on
the Law of Outer Space 107.
282
FSOA, arts 1.4, 1.5.
283
51 USC §50914 (1984).
284
Apart from the US and France, the States establishing similar provisions are Belgium
(Loi du 17 septembre 2005 relative aux activité de lancement, d’opération de vol ou de
guidage d’objets spatiaux, 15 January 2014), art 15, Republic of Korea (Compensation
for Aerospace Damage Guarantee Act, Act No 8852, 29 February 2008), art 3, and
Netherlands (Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry of
Space Objects, 6 June 2013), art 12, for example.
285
Atsuyo Ito, Legal Aspects of Satellite Remote Sensing (Leiden; Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2011) at 283-298.
286
Convention for the Unification of certain Rules relating to International Carriage by
Air, 12 October 1929, 49 Stat 3000; 137 LNTS 11 (entered into force 13 February 1933)
[Warsaw Convention].

66
amended as the Montreal Convention 287 in 1999. The effort of this legislation was
rewarded adequately through multi-layered international discussions based on a common
understanding of the rules. Notably, the development of further interpretations of the
international rules is conducted through litigations in various jurisdictions, but always
based on the Montreal Convention.288 In STM, the establishment of a unified civil liability
regime similar to the Montreal Convention should be considered as an effective solution.
4.5.2 Responsible State for STM
It is worth it to examine the applicable scope of the State responsible for “jurisdiction
and control” over a space activity.289 Notably, the “authority and continuing supervision”
is promulgated as the responsibility of the “appropriate State Party”, which shall be
understood as the respective State in the jurisdiction of the relevant activity.290 On the other
hand, the subject of the State retaining the “jurisdiction and control” over the space object
is the “State Party ... on whose registry ... is carried”291: that is, the State of registry. At this
point, there is a gap between the State exercising the jurisdiction and control, and the State
authorizing and supervising the activity. For example, if satellite communication company
A’ in State A contracts with launch operator B’ from State B to launch its Satellite, there
could be a gap if these actors did not consult in advance and if State B was not aware
regarding the launch of B’. This situation may sometimes happen for micro-satellites, or if
State B is a novice in space activities. In current practice, it is a manageable case since
State A would normally consult with State B regarding the space object’s registration in
accordance with Article II.2 of the Registration Convention. However, a problem could
occur if State B transfers the satellite’s operation to State C after having operated it for

287
Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, 28 May 1999, 2242 UNTS 309; S Treaty Doc No 106-45 (2000) (entered into
force 4 November 2003) [Montreal Convention].
288
George N Tompkins, "The Continuing Development of Montreal Convention 1999
Jurisprudence" (2010) 35:6 Air and Space Law 433; George N Tompkins, "The
Continuing Development of Montreal Convention 1999 Jurisprudence" (2012) 37:3 Air
and Space Law 259.
289
Outer Space Treaty, art VIII.
290
Ibid, art VI.
291
Ibid, art VIII.

67
several years. Since the State of registry is assumed only to be the launching State292, how
can State C, as a newly appeared State, exercise its jurisdiction and control over the
satellite?293
No other actors other than the sovereign States can play a major role in the
international sphere. The “launching State” is considered the subjective actor for the
identification of the liable State causing the damage. 294 Despite the importance of the
concept, it creates some ambiguities when it comes to determining which State should be
liable. The current issues regarding the concept of the launching State are its mismatch
with the role of operating States, and poor bilateral coordination among the launching
States. The liability system of the UN space treaties does not seem to consider that the
operation of a spacecraft could be conducted in a different State than the launching State.
However, understanding the “authorization and continuing supervision” as dynamic rights
and obligations, and “jurisdiction and control” as static rights and obligations, it is also
possible to understand that the active role for space objects is deemed to be the
responsibility of the appropriate States, rather than that of the launching States.
Consequently, the jurisdiction retained by the State of registry, which is one of the
launching States, would be questioned only in the case of relinquishment of rights over
space debris, as proposed in section 4.4.2 above.

In other STM regime cases, it should be the appropriate States retaining responsibility
as “authority and continuous supervision”. Therefore, there is no need for the STM regime
to focus on the launching State, but there is a need to entail certain responsibilities to the
appropriate States.
4.5.3 Fairness of the Current International Liability System

292
Registration Convention, art II.1.
293
Setsuko Aoki, "Satellite Ownership Transfers and the Liability of the Launching
States” (in Japanese) (2013) 54 Kuho (Journal of Air Law) 1; Report of the Chair of the
Working Group on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, UNCOPUOS LSCOR, 53rd Sess, UN Doc A/AC.105/942 Annex III,
(2010), para 8.
294
Liability Convention; Registration Convention, arts 2, 4.

68
 Aside from the establishment of a common understanding of the national liability
system, it is also necessary to question the international system itself, something which the
fairness in current times when it comes to maintaining a fault liability system for orbital
damages as Article III of the Liability Convention regulates.295 As the case of Cosmos-
Iridium pointed out, the possibility of identifying the circumstances of a collision in outer
space is relatively low because it is difficult to collect objective data, and the potential risk
of in-orbit accidents damaging daily activities on the ground gradually rises.296

We must recall that the basis of differed liability requirements provided in the Liability
Convention exists because of the need for the particular protection of third parties on the
ground from damage caused by ultra-hazardous activities.297 In-orbit damage is considered
a fault liability only by a corollary of this necessity. Therefore, in current circumstances,
the possibility of third parties suffering from damage caused by space activities is
increasing, so the rationale to distinguish the requirements of liability for damage caused
by space activities in whatever locus is relativized. 298 It is also remarkable that the
difference was stated only in the Liability Convention, but not in the Outer Space Treaty,
which is considered the basis of the UN space treaties’ framework.

The problem lying here is whether the liability for ground damage should be
considered fault liability, or if that for in-orbit damage should be considered absolute
liability. With the purpose of assuring the implementation of the STM regime, and
considering the difficulty to pinpoint the faulty event in outer space, it is reasonable to
argue that the liability arising from outer space activities should be integrated into absolute
liability, regardless of the locus of the event. Obviously, premises to incorporate this novice
liability regime and the treatment for the amount above the insurance ceiling level should

295
Takeuchi, “Challenges”, supra note 102 at 10-12.
296
Ram S. Jakhu, "Iridium Cosmos Collision and Its Implications for Space Operations"
in Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al., eds., Yearbook on Space Policy 2008/2009 (Vienna: Springer
Vienna, 2010) 254-275. [Jakhu, “Iridium Cosmos Collision”].
297
James Crawford et al, The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 505-512.
298
Takeuchi, “Challenges”, supra note 102 at 10-12.

69
reach a common understanding internationally. States may agree with this new liability
system in the future since it will increase the protection of victims and facilitate conflict
resolution procedure.

A similar issue has already been discussed in aviation, starting from the first stage of
the international discussions of aviation law, and has recently been run into a proposed
convention at ICAO.299 The Rome Convention300 of 1952 designated strict liability to the
operator of the aircraft against third-party damage, and this concept has taken over.301 Since
that time, the international community has unsuccessfully continued the “’guesswork’
unsubstantiated by any economic data or statistics”302 to determine the final limitation of
the liability amount. The imbalance appeared in 1999 when the States accepted the de facto
unlimited liability of the airlines for the damage inflicted on passengers, but the lack of
major accidents with a third party’s casualties on ground means this issues has remained a
low priority.303

After the 9/11 tragedy in 2001, the discussions regarding liability against third-party
damage were reactivated, and the Unlawful Interference Convention304 and General Risk
Convention305 were developed in ICAO, which currently waiting for entry into force with
sufficient ratifications. No one can predict whether these conventions will enter into force
or not, but this should be considered one of the possible regime types that isolate extreme

299
Michael Milde, "Liability for Damage Caused by Aircraft on the Surface-Past and
Current Efforts to Unify the Law" (2008) 57 German Journal of Air and Space Law 532
at 532-533.
300
Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, 7
October 1952, ICAO Doc. 7364; 310 UNTS 182 (entered into force 4 February 1958)
[Rome Convention].
301
Milde, supra note 299.
302
Ibid at 544.
303
Ibid at 545.
304
Convention on Compensation for Damage to Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of
Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft, 2 May 2009, ICAO Doc 9920 (not yet in force)
[Unlawful Interference Convention].
305
Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties, 2 May
2009, ICAO Doc 9919 (not yet in force) [General Risks Convention].

70
cases from the general risks and establish dual standards for liability regarding third-party
damage.
4.5.4 Validation and Liability of SSA Data
Another problem in the current liability system is the absence of verification measures
in proving liability in cases of in-orbit accidents. The case of the Cosmos-Iridium collision
provided a most suitable example to illuminate this problem. This accident in 2009 clearly
showed the difficulty of identifying the fact happening in outer space as legal evidence.
Aside from this, there has been no official reaction until now of either the US or Russia
seeking compensation against each other regarding the damage arising from the accident
based on any international law. In case of one of the State parties being willing to seek
compensation based on the Liability Convention, one would have to claim its compensation
not later than one year from the date of the damage or the identification of the launching
State.306 Therefore, it can be said that there is no possibility to seek compensation based on
the Liability Convention remaining at this stage. Given this perspective, it might be
unrealistic to review this case regarding its liability under the provisions of international
space law, but this rare case must have taught a lesson.

Under the current liability system, in-orbit damage is regulated as a fault liability. In
order to acknowledge the fault of the other party in case of an in-orbit accident, it is normal
for the State making the accusation of damage to need to collect evidence with a causal
connection between the action of the perpetrating State and the damage itself.307 Applying
this procedure, it becomes complicated to identify the liable side in the collision for the
Cosmos-Iridium accident. SSA data may serve as objective information in a technical
matter.

However, considering the circumstance that the operations of the comprehensive SSA
systems are currently conducted by military entities of the limited space-faring nations, it
is questionable from the view of transparency and fairness for this data to be used directly

306
Liability Convention, art 10.1.
307
James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012) at 542-543 [Crawford, "Brownlie's International Law"].

71
as evidence for a legal solution for the accident. Essentially, there have been no witnesses
who could provide legal evidence for accidents in outer space yet.308
Another rather legal procedural problem when it comes to using current SSA data for
evidence of on-orbit accidents is the problem of burden of proof in an international tribunal.
The principle of onus probandi actor incumbit is basically considered the due process
followed in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the majority of international
tribunals.309 As described above, in cases where the technically neutral data is the SSA
data, which is considered politically biased whatever the fact may be, the damaged State
has no way to retain accurate data other than by the telemetry, tracking, and control
(TT&C) data of the operator itself. It should therefore be presumed that there is no chance
for the damaged State to collect and present enough evidence like the operated side of the
relevant spacecraft.310
The liability for indirect damage is essential in order to keep a comprehensive ex-posto
facto control system for an STM regime. Notably, the liability dealing with the information
and data of space objects needs to be considered in addition to the current system, since
they are the only means to visualize the situation in outer space and indispensable to
proving factual accuracy in case of accidents. Therefore, establishing the liability system
for information and data procedures is essential in order to implement the STM regime.311

The liability for SSA information and data procedures can be divided into three parts:
namely, gathering, provision, and utilization. At this point, it should be recalled that the
SSA Data Sharing Center would also play a crucial role to assure the uniformity of the

308
Jakhu, “Iridium Cosmos Collision”, supra note 296 at 259-260; Setsuko Aoki, "The
Implications of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision: A State with "Genuine Link"
Matters, not a Launching State” (in Japanese) (2011) 110:2 Kokusaiho Gaiko Zassi
(Journal of International Law and Diplomacy) 157 [Aoki, “Implications of Collision”].
309
Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Evidence in International Litigation (Leiden;
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) at 61-74.
310
Jakhu, “Iridium Cosmos Collision”, supra note 296 at 255-260; Aoki. “Implications of
Collision”, supra note 308 at 172-181.
311
At this point, Ito elucidates the liability for remote sensing data and satellite based
navigation data and it can be said the same thing for the SSA data since its data
distribution are conducting in the nearly same scheme. (Ito, supra note 285 at 244-298.)

72
information and data in terms of making this data available for the basis of compensation.
This conception needs to have its fairness widely guaranteed among the States of space
operations, and legal liability to be channeled to the data providers for the operators of
space objects is fundamental in this regard.312 Liability of the damages occurring on the
basis of space operations could not only be considered the liabilities to in-orbit operations,
but also the damages caused on the ground because of satellite malfunctioning during an
in-orbit accident. SSA data also contributes to the calculation of space debris re-entry
events by providing a predicted re-entry point, even though pinpointing the precise spot is
impossible under current technology.313

Concerning the huge potential of being held liable for the data-providing failure,
negative effects to the information and data providers are easily presumable. If this liability
is imposed solely on the SSA entities, they will simply refrain from providing information
and data, which will lead to a lack of swiftness and inclusiveness of the information and
data-providing services. A single benefit cannot be provided by this circumstance to the
entire operation of space objects, since the SSA entities are the sole entities available to
observe the situation of space objects. This discussion refers back to the necessity of the
Data Sharing Center of section 4.2.

312
See section 4.2 above.
313
Carmen Pardini & Luciano Anselmo, "Reentry predictions of three massive
uncontrolled spacecraft", (Paper delivered at the 23rd International Symposium on Space
Flight Dynamics, Pasadena, 29 October-2 November 2012).

73
 Chapter 5
Establishment of the New International Regime for STM

Following the examination of the possible set of rules provided by the IAA STM
Report and the legal analysis on the existing issues in the above chapter, this chapter
summarizes the author’s proposal as the recommended set of rules for the STM
international regime. Recalling the negotiation history of the Outer Space Treaty, it was
started by the discussion for the adoption of an UNGA resolution without legally binding
effect,314 however the resolution later became the basis of international space law. The
history of the international STM regime could also have begun with soft laws.
In order for an international regime to work efficiently, it should define its subject
matter as appropriate as can be manageable, describe reasonable control measures, and
address each actor’s roles workably and effectively. The proposal will follow this structure
for the sake of comprehensiveness.
5.1 Subject Matters
Designating the subject matters is essential for the international regime, since it frames
the scope of objectives to be regulated by the regime. Without an exact scope of the subject
matters, the regime could easily be incapacitated or abused by simply pointing out the
ambiguity of the scope.
Current international space law designates the material subject matter in two ways.
The first one is the exploration and use of “outer space” 315 , and the other is “space
object”.316
An STM regime, considering its purpose, does not need to stick to the definition of
space object, but apply to overall “space traffic”. Space traffic includes all kinds of
spacecrafts, space debris, and suborbital spacecrafts during its uncontrolled stage by air
law. Although an STM regime has an affinity for the functional definition of outer space,
it can stand on either the spatialist or functionalist definition of outer space. The STM

314
Cheng, “International Space Law”, supra note 69 at 125-149.
315
Outer Space Treaty, art I.
316
Ibid, art VIII; Liability Convention, art I(d); Registration Convention, art I(b).

74
regime’s legal authority would generally fall under the definition of “authorization and
continuous supervision” (Article VI, Outer Space Treaty), and thus, the appropriate States
would retain responsibility over the regime. Nonetheless, it can be formed only by soft
laws until the political situation allows the new international legislation. In addition,
because of the “jurisdiction and control” over the spacecraft remaining in the launching
States, the procedure to relinquish the rights of obligations over space debris must be
determined.
5.2 Measures to Control the Regime
The control measures to ensure the regime’s compliance is made up of ex-posto facto
control measures, which are the liability system and consulting mechanisms, and
preventive control measures. Nevertheless, consulting mechanisms can play both roles,
since they can contain the mechanism to case prevention or remedy.
The major issue of the STM regime involves establishing the preventive control
mechanism of Space Traffic Rules and the SSA Data Sharing Center (tentative name). It is
necessary to establish Space Traffic Rules, consisting of Rules of space, Rules of collision
avoidance, Standard measures of communications and calculations, and technology
standards as the key rules of the STM regime. The fundamental functions of SSA data
sharing to sustain the regime would be brought together in the Data Sharing Center, jointly
funded by the operators, exclusively for the promotion of safety operations by the
spacecraft operators, and the Center would channel the liability caused by the provided
data. This liability has to be considered as one of the additional legislation, since it may be
pursued by the data users. Although the liability system plays an important role to retain
compliance with the regime, it may consider a separate regime. The liability arising from
activities in the STM regime, such as in-orbit collisions or the failure of data provision,
would fall under the current liability regime.
Several aspects would become incompatible to the nature of the current space liability
system. The fairness of the current liability system should be questioned, since the damage
resulting from the implementation of STM would arise equally in orbit and on the ground.
5.3 Space Actors
It is more than clear that the central actor in the sphere of international law is the
sovereign State. No actor other than the State is able to establish international law, to

75
become a regulator, or to implement regulations domestically.317 Therefore, it is illogical
to question who should play the central role in promoting an international regime. Even if
the international community is going to experiencing a further less State-centric era for
space activities, it is only the States that can create and apply the law.
However, it is by no means free from a question of on which stage should the topic of
an international regime of space activities be discussed.
From 1959, UNCOPUOS has taken the primary role for information exchange in space
activities, as well as the legislation of UN space treaties. After the adoption of the Moon
Agreement and its failure to attract the ratification of the major space-faring nations,
UNCOPUOS entered into an era of complimentary responses by soft laws, since it could
not reach the adoption of binding international treaties.318 This situation is the reason which
has pointed out the weakening of UNCOPUOS. It has always been hoped that the
international community would find a way to reorganize the international treaty-making
function back to the main stage, which has never been done until now.319

Starting in the 1980s, CD has deliberated the prevention of an arms race in outer space
(PAROS), which immediately faced the adverse effect of the consensus adoption system
and ended in an endless loop of political games involving continuously declining the
adoption of PAROS as the agenda item. 320 From 2002, China and Russia have been
proposing to prevent the deployment of weapons and the use of force in outer space, and
have turned to the draft treaty to prevent the positioning of weapons in outer space (PPWT)
in 2008. This proposal has not reached the start of its negotiations because of the US’
constant opposition.321 Some experts have analyzed this situation as a political show from
China to gain an excuse to developing ASAT322, but whatever the motivation may have

317
Crawford, “Brownlie’s International Law”, supra note 307 at 48-111; Cheng,
“International Space Law”, supra note 240.
318
Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd & Schrogl, supra note 68 at 16-17.
319
Ibid.
320
Robinson, supra note 171 at 30-31; Rathgeber, Remuss & Schrogl, supra note 121.
321
Mischa Hansel, "The USA and Arms Control in Space: An IR Analysis" (2010) 26:2
Space Policy 91; Hitchens,”US-Sino Relations”, supra note 85.
322
Hansel, ibid.

76
been, it again exposed the deadlocked situation of treaty-making in CD similar to
UNCOPUOS. Therefore, the EU moved to an ad-hoc consultation forum to consider the
ICOC. The problem that could be raised here is whether UNCOPUOS and CD have lost
their ability to produce international law. If so, which international mechanism should be
embraced to negotiate and reach international consensus to maintain sustainable space
activities? At this point, the internal study of ICAO regarding its possibility to regulate
suborbital flight concludes that it should be the ICAO’s task in the near future to regulate
these activities323. A few experts have also argued with this view.324
The existing international organizations dealing with the international adjustment of
space activities have been experiencing stagnation following the reluctance of the major
space powers to promote international legislation in this area. However, it should be
recognized that UNCOPUOS is continuing its efforts to have the norms of UN space
treaties emerge, though most of them end with an abstract result. The efforts themselves
are going in the right direction, and it should be known that even just forming these abstract
results requires struggles.325 The obstacles are the consensus system and ad-hoc working
system in implementing both UNCOPUOS and CD. The consensus system, which is
employed in UNCOPUOS and CD for its adoption from the agenda item to the output
products, was the established system from the beginning of these international
conferences.326 However, the number of applying consensus systems has been diminishing
among international organizations.327

323
ICAO’s Concept, supra note 267.
324
Dempsey, “Air Law”, supra note 182 at 761; Zhao, supra note 277; Jakhu, Sgobba &
Dempsey, supra note 269.
325
Recommendations on national legislation (supra note 107) required two years after
the adoption of the Report of the Working Group only for modifying final wordings and
submitting to the UNGA as its draft resolution even the contents were essentially the
same. The author served as a part of Japanese delegation to UNCOPUOS from 2010 to
2013 and obliged to let his colleagues spending the whole two weeks term of the LSC
and eight days of UNCOPUOS by himself in total to reach consensus on a proposal of
one year agenda of “General exchange of information on non-legally binding United
Nations instruments on outer space” in 2013. (C.f. Report of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGAOR, COPUOS 56th Sess, 2013, OP 252).
326
Cheng, “International Space Law”, supra note 69 at 128.
327
Most of the committee and GA of the UN apply the single majority procedure and the
Security Council takes a specified majority procedure. (Rules of Procedure of the

77
 In order to advance the discussion in UNCOPUOS and CD, it is necessary to shift
from the complete consensus system to at least a partial one: for instance, applying the
single majority for the procedural matters. Otherwise, it is clear that these international
conference bodies will eventually lose their substance. The working systems of these
conferences follow the ad-hoc and time-targeted systems. In other words, for the sake of
achieving a certain result in an effective timeframe, it is usual to adopt an agenda item with
a timeframe of one to four years and form a working group for detailed consideration. All
the work advancement relies on the delegations, and most of them use their best efforts to
maintain the time frame. However, since the delegations meet only one to three times a
year, and most of their portfolio is not dedicated solely to space affairs but to science
diplomacy in general, it is difficult to make major progress in every single agenda item.

The conference bodies making rapid progress generally retain more resources and
professional staff. For instance, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 1,142
professional staff members in six departments. 328 ICAO has 536 professional staff
members in five bureaus.329 OOSA, serving as the secretariat of UNCOPUOS, has only
two sections and around 23 staff members.330 This cannot be promising when it comes to
conducting consecutive professional work to fully support the delegations. In order to
extend UNOOSA’s tasks to promote the STM regime, its drastic augmentation is
imperative. More expert staff members dealing with the substantial issues of the
deliberation in UNCOPUOS would be required, inter-sessional activities would be more

General Assembly, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/520/Rev 17, (2007); Provisional Rules of

Procedure of the Security Council, UNOR, UN Doc S/96/Rev 7, (1982)) The World
Trade Organization embraces the negative consensus procedure for adopting the case for
its Dispute Settlement Body. (Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Doc WT/DSB/RC/1 (96-5267),
(1996)).
328
IAEA, Personnel Staffing of the Agency’s Committee, IAEA, Report of the Director
General, IAEA Doc GOV/2013/34-GC(57)/14, (2013).
329
ICAO, Budget of the Organization 2014 – 2015 – 2016, ICAO Doc 10030, 38th
Assembly, (2013), Exhibit 1.
330
Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, UN
Doc A/68/6 (Sect. 6), (2014).

78
active, and the substantive cooperation with delegation and UNOOSA could become more
frequent.
5.4 Other Necessary Political issues for installation of STM regime
Before concluding this thesis, it is necessary to mention several political issues as
challenges being confronted in establishing the STM regime. As Milde states, “[a]cademic
perfection is of little relevance if it is not in harmony with the political will of states and if
it does not respond to a sense of priority and the necessity for international action.”331
5.4.1 Ideal Regulatory Organization
The voices allowing ICAO to regulate space traffic, or at least suborbital spacecraft,
seem to be becoming loud among academia.332 The primary concern of these voices is the
issue of aviation safety. Shedding light only on the aspects of safety, there is no logical
doubt for ICAO to regulate suborbital spacecraft while there are flights in air space.
However, the hesitation is rather based on political issues. Namely, the portfolio conflicts
of international officials and financial problems are what needs to be solved.

As described in Section 5.3, it is no exaggeration to say that OOSA is currently dealing

with overwhelming tasks in its small office. In order to impose some additional functions
for STM, or regulatory matters, the current secretariat needs to be reinforced 20 fold,
reaching that of ICAO. This funding issue would be a daunting task to mention to the
international community. If ICAO became involved in the STM regime, it may eventually
become involved not only for the aviation safety aspect of the suborbital spaceflight, but
also for the other STM aspects, such as managing entire space traffic. One should be
reminded that regulating suborbital spaceflight is mere entrance of the regulation of entire
STM regime. This is because space law and air law are both applicable to suborbital
spacecraft at the same time. Starting regulating from one side will require regulation of the
other side accordingly. While arguing that ICAO should take the role of “regulating
suborbital spaceflight”, it should be together with future prospects. Obviously, since ICAO

331
Milde, supra note 190 at 66.
332
Jakhu, Sgobba & Dempsey, supra note 269; Nase, supra note 259; Melanie Walker,
"Suborbital Space Tourism Flights: An Overview of Some Regulatory Issues at the
Interface of Air and Space Law" (2007) 33 Journal of Space Law 375.

79
does not retain authority to regulate suborbital spaceflight outside of the definition of
aircraft under the current Chicago Convention, review on it will be required at that time.
Furthermore, space activities experts for the secretariat have to be recruited for serving the
professional works. It should be reminded that this would be an overwhelming project. It
is also said that the ITU may also be a candidate for ruling international organization for
STM regime.333 The author doubt it since the ITU is an international organization dealing
with telecommunication and radio frequency. It is true that radio frequency is indispensable
for space activity but it is only a measure for space activity and not the space activity itself.
The regulatory organization of STM regime should be the one with the entire picture of
space activities.
5.4.2 Cost Allocation
An STM regime requires certain costs, such as that to operate the Data Sharing Center,
continuous negotiations to implement the rules, and daily operations to prepare and report
for the support of these governmental negotiations. These costs will be absorbed by the
State sovereignty as beneficiaries, which is the same as the other international regimes’
systems. Obviously, the operating costs will continue increasing.

The ICOC intends to shape a Central Point of Contact as its secretariat function, though
the details have not been decided yet.334 Aside from these institutional costs, when it comes
to accomplishing the main purpose of the STM regime as to ensure the safety of space
operations, an equal cost allocation system should be embraced among the States, for the
additional costs of the Data Sharing Center. At this point, the process of the aviation
navigation cost allocation system should be further examined for comparative research on
this topic. This issue should be carefully examined including the questions whether the
differences or equality of developed countries and developing countries or the cost
allocation plan from the beginning to the future.
5.4.3 Political Momentum

333
ITU, “Supervisory Authority of the future international registration system for Space
Assets” (2014) online: ITU < http://www.itu.int/>.
334
ICOC, supra note 119, s 9.

80
 The topics raised by the STM regime are closely related to the security issues of the
major space powers. Since the STM regime intends to regulate all spacecraft, including
their security capabilities, promoting the establishment should be based on careful attention
to the international security circumstances, which is, of course, does not only relate to space
issues.

Based on this consideration, today is certainly not the right time to promote it, due to
other security issues. Issues involved in Ukraine and the East and South China Seas are
casting a shadow on international security circumstances. The movement of the US
administration in this half-decade reacting to the continuing development of the Chinese
ASAT ability can be seen as a touchstone. The Chinese ASAT ability development evolved
from the US’ disregard of the Chinese reaction to the US’ domination as a space power.
Because of the US’ continuous denial of the existence of an arms race in outer space, China
has reinforced its concern, which ended up in developing ASAT capability.335 After the
Chinese physical capability was demonstrated, the issue became whether the US would
start to find a compromise with China or maintain a hard line. It is therefore not a mystery
if the US also admits to proposing the discussion of the STM regime in order to solve their
compromised approach towards China. Their policy of turning towards being an active
partner regarding ICOC shows its possibility in the near future. Certain senior officials
have expressed their views signifying the same direction.336

335
Hitchens, “US-Sino Relations”, supra note 85.
336
Frank A. Rose, Press Release, "Remarks made at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace" (24 July 2013) online: US Department of State
<http://www.state.gov>.

81
 Chapter 6
Conclusion

The congested, contested and competing situation in outer space has been bringing
humankind to a heavy challenge since the beginning of space activities. The international
community’s efforts are fairly well-related to the performance of technology development,
but less for the regulatory aspect. Introducing the concept of STM is not a mere trend, but
a rare catalyst for regulatory evolution to confront the challenge. This thesis, following the
historical milestone known as the IAA STM Report, demonstrated the necessity and
admissibility to locate the STM concept as an international regime together with the
reinterpretation of current international space law.
The three reasons of the necessity to establish STM regime are: a unified basic rule for
STM is essential for effective and safe space operations, the unified rule will also serves as
the basis of liability, which eventually works as ex-posto facto regulation against States,
and the regime as “regulatory big bang” is necessary for solving the current situation.
Guided by the traffic management regime of the air and maritime, STM regime can start
its establishment from a set of soft laws and elaborate their certain rules toward hard laws
in near future. Space Traffic Rules and the SSA Data Sharing Center are the two core
mechanisms that must be newly established for STM regime. Without these two functions
the regime will not achieve its purpose. As premises for establishing the regime, several
points of international space treaties must be re-interpreted. STM regime must not be
subject to “space objects” but a new concept of “space traffic”, including suborbital
spacecraft, and it should not be considered that the launching State is solely responsible for
the regime rules but all of the appropriate States would be so. A procedure for relinquish
the rights on space debris is necessary to allow space debris removal. The liability system
continues to regulate the States as a parallel regime of the STM regime, although the current
differentiation of liability criteria against in-orbit and ground damages should be
questioned its fairness under the current circumstances that space technologies are
familiarized in our daily lives.
The power to establish the international regime is undoubtedly held by the States:
hence, putting these proposals into practice depends on the political will of these States,

82
especially the space-faring nations. However, several demerits described in this thesis show
that the States, which are the major players in space activities, will also suffer damage if
the STM regime is not put into function. The starting point can be settled within arm’s
reach from the current political situation, but the goal should be ambitious, especially
considering the total harm potentially involved in the failure to act. We must realize that
no other policy is as harmful as continuing the current unsustainable space activities, which
jeopardize the outer space environment, because it could mean ruining our entire proud
history of space development.

83
 LIST OF REFERENCES

LEGISLATION: INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 5
December 1979, 1363 UNTS 3 (entry into force 11 July 1984).
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched Into Outer Space, 22 April 1968, 672 UNTS 119, 19 UST 7570,
TIAS No 6599, 7 ILM 151 (entered into force 3 December 1968).
Application of the concept of the "launching State", GA Res 59/115, UNGAOR, 59th
Sess, UN Doc A/RES/59/115 (2004).
Chair of the Working Group, Proposal by the Chair of the Working Group on the Long-
term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities for the consolidation of the set of draft
guidelines on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities,
UNCOPUOSOR, 57th Sess, UN Doc A/AC.105/2014/CRP.5 (2014).
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, 59 Stat. 1031, 145
UKTS805, 24 UST 2225, TIAS No 7739 (entered into force 24 October 1945).
Concept of Suborbital Flights: Information from the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), UNCOPUOS, Legal Subcommittee, 49th Sess,
A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.9, (2010).
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, 12 October 1929, 49 Stat 3000; 137 LNTS 11 (entered into force 13 February
1933).
Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties, 2 May
2009, ICAO Doc 9919 (not yet in force).
Convention on Compensation for Damage to Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of
Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft, 2 May 2009, ICAO Doc 9920 (not yet in
force).
Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, 7
October 1952, ICAO Doc. 7364; 310 UNTS 182 (entered into force 4 February
1958).

84
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295, ICAO Doc
7300/6 (entered into force 4 April 1947).
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 March
1972, 961 UNTS 187; 24 UST 2389; 10 ILM 965 (1971) (entered into force 1
September 1972).
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 6 June 1975, 28 UST
695, 1023 UNTS 15 (entry into force 15 September 1976).
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 20 October
1972, 1050 UNTS 16.
Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 31 March 2014.
Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Res A.578(14) (1985).
Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Res A.857(20) (1997).
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), IADC Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01 Revision 1 (2007).
――――, Terms of Reference for the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee (IADC), IADC-93-01 (rev.11.2), (1993).
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, 1184 UNTS 2.
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, 7 July 1978, 1361 UNTS 2.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Global Air Traffic Management
Operational Concept, ICAO Doc 9854, AN/458, 1st ed, (2005).
――――, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) - Air Traffic Management
(ATM), ICAO Doc 4444, (2007).
――――, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) – Aircraft Operations (OPS),
ICAO Doc 8168, (2006).
――――, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) – ICAO Abreviations and
Codes (ABC), ICAO Doc 8400, (2010).
――――, Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)-Training (TRG), ICAO Doc
9868, (2006).
――――, Budget of the Organization 2014 – 2015 – 2016, ICAO Doc 10030, 38th
Assembly, (2013).

85
――――, 2013–2028 Global Air Navigation Plan, ICAO Doc 9750-AN/963, 4th ed,
(2013).
――――, ICAO's Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services, ICAO
Doc 9082, 9th ed, (2012).
International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, GA Res 64/86, UNGAOR,
64th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/64/86 (2010).
Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by
Air, 28 May 1999, 2242 UNTS 309; S Treaty Doc No 106-45 (2000) (entered into
force 4 November 2003).
Personnel Staffing of the Agency’s Committee, IAEA, Report of the Director General,
GOV/2013/34-GC(57)/14, (2013).
Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, A/68/6
(Sect. 6), (2014).
Protocol in respect of the claim for damages caused by the Satellite "Cosmos 954",
Canada and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2 April 1981, 1470 UNTS 269.
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, UNOR S/96/Rev 7, (1982).
Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international
intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects, GA Res 62/101,
UNGAOR, 62nd Sess, UN Doc A/RES/62/101 (2007).
Recommendations on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space, GA Res 68/74, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/68/74, (2013).
Report of the Chair of the Working Group on National Legislation Relevant to the
Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space, UNCOPUOSLSCOR, 53rd Sess, UN
Doc A/AC.105/942 Annex III, (2010).
Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, Sup
No20, UN Doc A/68/20 (2013).
Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGAOR, 67th Sess, Sup
No 20, UN Doc A/67/20 (2012).
Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures in Outer Space Activities, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, UN Doc A/68/189,
(2013).

86
Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its forty-eighth session,
UNCOPUOSOR, 54th Sess, UN Doc A/AC.105/987.
Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its fifty-first session,
UNCOPUOSSTSCOR, 51st Sess, UN Doc A/AC.105/1065 (2014).
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNGAOR, (1992).
Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, WTO WT/DSB/RC/1 (96-5267), (1996).
Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, UNGAOR A/520/Rev 17, (2007).
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGAOR, Res 62/217, (2007).
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, GA Res 61/75,
UNGAOR, 61st Sess, UN Doc A/RES/61/75 (2006).
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, UN Res 65/68,
UNGAOR, 65th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/65/68 (2011).
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 610
UNTS 205, 18 UST 2410, TIAS No 6347, 6 ILM 386 (entered into force on 10
October 1967).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 21 ILM 1261
(entered into force on 16 November 1994).

LEGISLATION: DOMESTIC DOCUMENTS

Belgium, Loi du 17 septembre 2005 relative aux activité de lancement, d’opération de

vol ou de guidage d’objets spatiaux, 15 January 2014.
European Space Agency (ESA), “European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation
(Issue 1.0)”, 28 June 2004.
――――, Director General’s Office, “Space Debris Mitigation for Agency Projects”,
ESA/ADMIN/IPOL(2008)2, 1 April 2008.
France, Loi no 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, JO, 4 June
2008, 9169.

87
――――, Décret n° 2009-643 du 9 juin 2009 relatif aux autorisations délivrées en
application de la loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales,
JO, 11 June 2009, 9406.
――――, Arrêté du 31 mars 2011 relatif à la réglementation technique en application
du décret n° 2009-643 du 9 juin 2009 relatif aux autorisations délivrées en
application de la loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales,
JO, 31 May 2011, 9415.
Japan, Law Concerning Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, Law No 161 of 2002.
――――, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), “Space Debris Mitigation
Standard”, JAXA-JMR-003A, October 2003 (updated to JAXA-JMR-003B at 1
February 2011).
――――, JAXA, JAXA Standard Rules for Launching Space Objects (in Japanese), Rule
No 15-37, 2003 <http://www.jaxa.jp/about/disclosure/data/k_37.pdf>.
Netherlands, Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry of
Space Objects, 6 June 2013.
Republic of Korea, Compensation for Aerospace Damage Guarantee Act, Act No 8852,
29 February 2008.
Russian Federation, “National Standard of the Russian Federation, General Requirements
on Space Systems fo the Mitigation of Human Producted Near Earth Space
Pollution”, 2009.
United States of America (US), Commercial Space Launch Act, 51 USC §509 (1984).
――――, 14 CFR §1214 (1958).
――――, 14 CFR Chapter 1 (1966)
――――, 14 CFR 91.143 (2004).
――――, National Space Policy of the United States of America, (2006).
――――, National Space Policy of the United States of America, (2010)
――――, Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National
IntelligenceNational Security Space Strategy (Unclassified Summary), (2011).
――――, “Process for Limiting Orbital Debris”, NASA-STD-8719.14, 28 August 2007.

88
 SECONDARY MATERIALS: MONOGRAPHS

Amerasinghe, Chittharanjan Felix, Evidence in International Litigation (Leiden; Boston:

Martinus Nijhoff, 2005).
Bull, Hedly, The Anarchical Society, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1977).
Cheng, Bin, Studies in International Space Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
Crawford, James, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
――――, et al, The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
Dempsey, Paul Stephen, Public International Air Law (Montreal: McGill University,
2008).
Dempsey, Paul Stephen & Laurence E. Gesell, Public Policy and the Regulation of
Commercial Aviation (Chandler: Coast Aire Publications, 2013).
Falker, John M, Engineering and Policy Analysis of Strategic and Tactical Options for
Future Aerospace Traffic Management (Ph. D. in Aerospace Engineering and
Policy Analysis Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002)
[unpublished].
Hobe, Stephan, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Cologne Commentary on
Space Law Vol I Outer Space Treaty (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009).
Ito, Atsuyo, Legal aspects of satellite remote sensing (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff,
2011).
Jakhu, Ram S., Tommaso Sgobba & Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Need for an Integrated
Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space, ICAO for Space? (Vienna: Springer-
Verlag, 2012).
Jaramillo, Cesar, ed, Space Security Index 2013, 10th ed. (Waterloo, Canada: Project
Ploughshares, 2013).
Krasner, Stephen D., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
Marboe, Irmgard, ed, Soft Law in Outer Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012).

89
Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai & Daniel A. Porras, eds, Awaiting Launch: Perspectives on
the Draft ICOC for Outer Space Activities (New Deli: Observer Research
Foundation, 2014).
Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Petr Lála & Corinne Contant-Jorgenson, Cosmic Study on Space
Traffic Management (Paris: International Academy of Astronautics (IAA), 2006).
Schwenk, Walter & Rüdiger Schwenk, Aspects of International Co-operation in Air
Traffic Management (The Hague; Boston; Cambridge: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997).

SECONDARY MATERIALS: ARTICLES

Abbott, Kenneth W. & Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance"
(2000) 54:3 International Organization 421.
Ailor, William H., "Space traffic management: Implementations and implications" (2006)
58:5 Acta Astronautica 279.
Aoki, Setsuko, "The Function of 'Soft Law' in the Development of International Space
Law" in Irmgard Marboe, ed, Soft Law in Outer Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012) 57.
――――, "The Implications of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision : A State with
‘Genuine Link’ Matters, not a Launching State" (in Japanese) (2011) 110:2
Kokusaiho Gaiko Zassi (Journal of International Law and Diplomacy) 157.
――――, "Satellite Ownership Transfers and the Liability of the Launching States” (in
Japanese) (2013) 54 Kuho (Journal of Air Law) 1.
――――, "‘Space Traffic Management’ for the Prevention of Weaponization of Outer
Space" (2008) 51 Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 154.
Aslanov, Vladimir & Vadim Yudintsev, "Dynamics of Large Space Debris Removal
Using Tethered Space Tug" (2013) 91 Acta Astronautica 149.
Bird, Duane, "Sharing Space Situational Awareness Data", (Paper delivered at the 2010
Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies Conference, Maui,
14-17 September 2010).
Bonnal, Christophe, Jean-Marc Ruault & Marie-Christine Desjean, "Active Debris
Removal: Recent Progress and Current Trends" (2013) 85 Acta Astronautica 51.

90
Bourbonniere, Michel & Louis Haeck, "Military Aircraft and International Law: Chicago
Opus 3" (2000) 66 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 885.
Cheng, Bin, "The Legal Status of Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of Outer
Space and Definition of Peaceful Use" (1983) 11 Journal of Space Law 89.
Christiansen, Eric L., "Design and Performance Equations for Advanced Meteoroid and
Debris Shields" (1993) 14:1-4 International Journal of Impact Engineering 145.
DalBello, Richard & Michael Mendelson, "Private Risk Management in Orbital
Operations: Inter-Operator Liability and the Space Data Association" (2011) 60
German Journal of Air and Space Law 218.
de Montluc, B., "SSA: Where Does Europe Stand Now?" (2012) 28:3 Space Policy 199.
DeLuca, L. T. et al., "Active space debris removal by a hybrid propulsion module"
(2013) 91 Acta Astronautica 20.
Ferrazzani, Marco, "Soft Law in Space Activities" in Irmgard Marboe, ed., Soft Law in
Outer Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012) 99.
Freeland, Steven, "The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public International Law and its Relevance
to the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space" in Irmgard Marboe, ed., Soft
Law in Outer Space (Vienna: Heribert, 2012) 9.
――――, "Up, up and ... Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its Impact on the
International Law of Outer Space" (2005-2006) 6:1 Chicago Journal of
International Law 1.
Goh, Gerardine Meishan, "Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet
Development of International Space Law;" (2008-2009) 87:3 Nebraska Law
Review 725.
Hansel, Mischa, "The USA and Arms Control in Space: An IR Analysis" (2010) 26:2
Space Policy 91.
Hitchens, Theresa, "Debris, Traffic Management, and Weaponization: Opportunities for
and Challenges to Cooperation in Space" (2008) 14 Brown Journal of World
Affairs 173.
――――, "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From ‘War of Words’ to Cold War in Space?"
(2007) 3:1 China Security 12.

91
International Space University, Space Traffic Management (Beijing: International Space
University (ISU), 2007).
Iki, Kentaro, Satomi Kawamoto & Yoshiki Morino, "Experiments and Numerical
Simulations of an Electrodynamic Tether Deployment from a Spool-type Reel
Using Thrusters" (2014) 94:1 Acta Astronautica 318.
Jakhu, Ram S., "Iridium Cosmos Collision and Its Implications for Space Operations" in
Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al, eds, Yearbook on Space Policy 2008/2009 (Vienna:
Springer Vienna, 2010) 254-275.
Kato, Akira, "JAXA Strategic Plan for Space Debris-Related R&D" (2012) 26:2 The
Journal of Space Technology and Science 18.
Kessler, Donald J & Burton G Cour-Palais, "Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites:
The Creation of a Debris Belt" (1978) 83:A6 Journal of Geophysical Research:
Space Physics 2637.
――――, et al, "The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space Operations",
(Paper delivered at the 33rd Annual American Astraunotical Society Guidance and
Control Conference, Breckenridge, Colorado, 6 -10 February 2010) [unpublished].
Larsen, Paul B., "Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon" (2006) 71
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 295.
――――, "Outer Space Traffic Management: Space Situational Awareness Requires
Transparency" (2008) 51 Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Law of Outer
Space 338.
――――, The Regulation of Air Traffic Control Liability by International Convention
(LLM Thesis, McGill University Institute of Air and Space Law, 1965)
[unpublished].
Liao, Xavier L.W., "Regime Complex of Space Activities", (Paper delivered at the The
2nd Manfred Lachs International Conference on Space Governance, Montreal,
McGill University Institute of Air and Space Law, 29 May 2014) [unpublished].
Liou, J. C. & N. L. Johnson, "Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris" (2006) 311:5759
Science 340.

92
Marboe, Irmgard, "The Importance of Guidelines and Codes of Conduct for Liability of
States and Private Actors" in Irmgard Marboe, ed., Soft Law in Outer Space
(Vienna: Heribert, 2012) 119.
Martinez, Peter et al, "Criteria for developing and testing Transparency and Confidence-
Building Measures (TCBMs) for outer space activities" (2014) 30:2 Space Policy
91.
Matsuda, Ikumi, Chikako Hirose & Nobuo Kudo, "The JAXA Conjunction Assessment
Process",(Paper delivered at the SpaceOps 2010 Conference, Huntsville, 25-30
April 2010).
Milde, Michael, "The International Civil Aviation Organization: After 50 Years and
Beyond" [1996] Australian International Law Journal 60.
――――, "Liability for Damage Caused by Aircraft on the Surface-Past and Current
Efforts to Unify the Law" (2008) 57 German Journal of Air and Space Law 532.
Mineiro, Michael C., "FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty" (2008) 34 Journal of Space
Law 321.
Mirmina, Steven A, "Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a
Legally Binding Instrument" (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 649.
Murray, Daniel P., "The FAA's Current Approach to Integrating Commercial Space
Operations into the National Airspace System" in Ram S. Jakhu & Kuan-Wei
(David) Chen, eds., Regulation of Emerging Modes of Aerospace Transportation
(Montreal: McGill University Center for Research in Air and Space Law, 2014)
169.
Nase, Vernon, "Delimitation and the Suborbital Passenger: Time to End Prevarication"
(2012) 77 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 747.
Newman, Lauri Kraft, "The NASA Robotic Conjunction Assessment Process: Overview
and Operational Experiences" (2010) 66:7-8 Acta Astronautica 1253.
Nitta, Kumi et al, "Response of a Aluminum Honeycomb Subjected to Hypervelocity
Impacts" (2013) 58 Procedia Engineering 709.

93
Pardini, Carmen & Luciano Anselmo, "Reentry predictions of three massive uncontrolled
spacecraft", (Paper delivered at the 23rd International Symposium on Space Flight
Dynamics, Pasadena, 29 October-2 November 2012).
Praetorius, Gesa et al, "Learning Lessons in Resilient Traffic Management: A Cross-
domain Study of Vessel Traffic Service and Air Traffic Control" in Dick de Waard
et al, eds., Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society [HFES]
Europe Chapter Conference, Toulouse, 2012 (HFES Europe Chapter, 2012) 277.
Rathgeber, Wolfgang, Nina-Louisa Remuss & Kai-Uwe Schrogl, "Space security and the
European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities" (2009):4 UNIDIR
Disarmament Forum "A safer space environment?" 33.
Robinson, Jana, "Transparency and confidence-building measures for space security"
(2011) 27:1 Space Policy 27.
Saisho, Daisuke, "Liability Risk Sharing Regime of the Bill of Japan's Legislation on
Space Activities and Its Comparison with the US and French Law" (2011) 55
Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 107.
Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, "Space traffic management: The new comprehensive approach for
regulating the use of outer space-Results from the 2006 IAA cosmic study" (2008)
62:2-3 Acta Astronautica 272.
Smith, Milton L, "Legal Implications of a Space-Based Ballistic Missle Defense" (1985)
15 California Western International Law Journal 52.
Suzuki, Kazuto, "Regulatory Power of the EU in Maintaining Security in Space: Politics
beyond Normative Power", (Paper delivered at the European Union Studies
Association (EUSA) 13th Biennial Conference, Baltimore, 9-11 May 2013).
Takeuchi, Yu, "Challenges of International Space Law for Managing Space Traffic” (in
Japanese) (2014) 55 Kuho (Journal of Air Law) 1.
――――, "Space Traffic Management as a Guiding Principle of the International
Regime of Sustainable Space Activities" (2011) 4:2 Journal of East Asia and
International Law 319.
Terrill, Delbert R. Jr, The Air Force Role in Developing International Outer Space Law
(Alabama: Air University Press, 1999).

94
Tompkins, George N, "The Continuing Development of Montreal Convention 1999
Jurisprudence" (2012) 37:3 Air and Space Law 259.
――――, "The Continuing Development of Montreal Convention 1999 Jurisprudence"
(2010) 35:6 Air and Space Law 433.
Walker, Melanie, "Suborbital Space Tourism Flights: An Overview of Some Regulatory
Issues at the Interface of Air and Space Law" (2007) 33 Journal of Space Law 375.
Weeden, Brian, "Overview of the Legal and Policy Challenges of Orbital Debris
Removal" (2011) 27:1 Space Policy 38.
Weiss, Gus W., "The Life and Death of COSMOS 954" (1978) 22:Spring, Studies in
Intelligence.
van Fenema, Peter, "Suborbital Flights and ICAO" (2005) 30:6 Air and Space Law 396.
van Westrenen, Fulko & Gesa Praetorius, "Maritime traffic management: a need for
central coordination?" (2014) 16:1 Cognition, Technology & Work 59.
Zhao, Yun, "Legal Regime for Space Tourism: Creating Legal Certainty in Outer Space"
(2009) 74 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 959.

OTHERS
Alby, Fernand, “Overview on 2013 Space Debris Activities in France”, (Technical
Presentation delivered at the 51st session of the UNCOPUOS STSC, UN Office in
Vienna, 11 February 2014), online: OOSA <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
Australia, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Media Release, “Australia joins the fight against
space junk”, 18 January 2012, online: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au>.
Bohlmann, Ulrike, “Requirements on Space Debris Mitigation for ESA Projects”
(Technical Presentation delivered at the 48th session of the UNCOPUOS LSC, UN
Office in Vienna, 23 March-3 April, 2009), online: OOSA
<http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
Canadian Coast Guard, Notice to Mariners, online: Canadian Coast Guard
<http://www.notmar.go.ca>.
"Concern over China's missile test", BBC News (19 January 2007) online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

95
Chow, Denise, "Clean Up Space Junk or Risk Real-Life 'Gravity' Disaster, Lawmakers
Say", Space.com (9 May 2014) online: Space.com <http://www.space.com>.
European External Action Service (EEAS), “The EU leads a multilateral initiative on an
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” (June 2014), online:
EEAS <http://eeas.europa.eu>.
Foust, Jeff, "Balancing safety and cost in commercial human spaceflight", Space Review
(February 10, 2014) online: Space Review <http://www.thespacereview.com>.
Florick, Davis & Col. Lina Cashin, "Space Situational Awareness Sharing for the 21st
Century", Space News (27 May 2013) online: Space News
<http://www.spacenews.com>.
Futron Corporation, Futron's 2014 Space Competitiveness Index (Executive Summary)
(Bethesda: Futron Corporation, 2014).
Gertz, Bill, "China Launches Three ASAT Satellites", Washington Free Beacon (26
August 2013) online: Washington Free Beacon <http://freebeacon.com>.
Hanada, Toshiya, "Research Topics for Asia-Pacific Regional Collaboration in the Area
of Orbital Debris Issues", (Presentation delivered at the Workshop on the
Protection of Space Environment sponsored by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2012), online: MOFA
<http://www.mofa.go.jp>.
Inter-Agency Space Debris Cordination Committee (IADC), online: <http://www.iadc-
online.org>.
International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities, IALA
Vessel Traffic Services Manual, 5th ed. (Saint Germain en Laye: 2012).
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), News Release, “ICAO Clarifies State
Responsibilities Arising from Conflict Zones” (24 July 2014) online: ICAO
<http://www.icao.int>.
ICAO, International Air Transport Association (IATA), Airports Council International
(ACI) and Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), “Joint Statement
on Risks to Civil Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones”(29 July 2014) online:
ICAO <http://www.icao.int>.

96
International Telecommunication Union, “Supervisory Authority of the future
international registration system for Space Assets” (2014) online: ITU <
http://www.itu.int/>.
Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, online: <http://www.mofa.go.jp>.
――――, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Press Conference, 25 January 2012, online:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp>.
――――, JAXA Safety and Mission Assurance Department, TRISMAC 2012, online:
JAXA <http://sma.jaxa.jp/TRISMAC2012/index.html>.
Klinkrad, Heiner, “Space Debris Mitigation Activities at ESA in 2013”, (Technical
Presentation delivered at the 51st session of the UNCOPUOS STSC, UN Office in
Vienna, 14 February 2014), online: OOSA <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
Krepon, Michael, "Weak Arguments Against A Space Code Of Conduct", Stimson
Center (17 January 2012) online: Stimson Center
<http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/>.
Levin, George M. & Walter D. Flury, "Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee (IADC)", (Technical Presentation delivered at the 34th Session of of the
UNCOPUOS STSC, UN Office in Vienna, February 1997), online: IADC
<http://www.iadc-online.org>.
Matney, Mark, “USA Space Debris Environment, Operations, and Modeling Updates”,
(Technical Presentation delivered at the 51st session of the UNCOPUOS STSC,
UN Office in Vienna, 14 February 2014), online: OOSA
<http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
McLeod, Courtland B., "Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Sharing", (Technical
Presentation delivered at the 49th session of the UNCOPUOS STSC, UN Office in
Vienna, 14 February 2012), online: United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
[OOSA] <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
Morring, Frank Jr., "Space Traffic Control An Issue For NextGen", Aviation Week (10
February 2014) online: Aviation Week <http://aviationweek.com/>.
Nakagawa, Keizo, "R&D of JAXA Satellite Application Mission", (Presentation
delivered at the 26th Microelectronics Workshop, Tsukuba, 24 October 2013)
[unpublished].

97
Narita, Kaneaki, "Space Operations: Risk Mitigation Experience from Collision",
(Presentation delivered at the Space Environment Protection Workshop sponsored
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2012),
online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp>.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), "Chinese Anti-satellite Test
Creates Most Severe Orbital Debris Cloud in History", Orbital Debris Quarterly
News (15 April 2007) 2online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
<http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>.
――――, "Chinese Debris Reaches New Milestone", Orbital Debris Quarterly News
(15 October 2010) 3online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
<http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>.
――――, "International Space Station Maneuvers Twice to Avoid Tracked Debris",
Orbital Debris Quarterly News (15 April 2014) 1online: NASA Orbital Debris
Program Office <http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>.
――――, "Monthly Number of Cataloged Objects in Earth Orbit by Object Type",
Orbital Debris Quarterly News (15 January 2014) 10online: NASA Orbital Debris
Program Office <http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>.
――――, "Small Satellite Possibly Hit by Even Smaller Object", Orbital Debris
Quarterly News (15 April 2014) 1online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
<http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov>.
”North Korea Launches First Satellite into Orbit", Spacenews (14 December 2012)
online: Spacenews <http://www.spacenews.com>.
Paris, Max, "Canadian Forces put their 1st satellite in orbit", CBC News (25 February
2013) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>.
Raymond, John W., “Strategic Partnerships in Space,” (Presentation delivered at the 2nd
International Symposium on Sustainable Space Development and Utilization for
Humankind, Tokyo, 28 February-1 March 2013), online: Japan Space Forum
<http://www.jsforum.or.jp>.
Rose, Frank A., Press Release, "Remarks made at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace" (24 July 2013) online: US Department of State
<http://www.state.gov>.

98
Russian Academy of Sciences Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics, "International
Scientific Optical Network (ISON) activities on highly elliptical orbit (HEO) and
geosynchronous orbit (GEO) observations and analysis in 2013", (Technical
Presentation delivered at the 49th session of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee, UN Office in Vienna, 13 February 2014), online: United Nations
Office of Outer Space Affairs [OOSA] <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
"Russian and US Satellites Collide", BBC News (12 February 2009) online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>.
Sato, Masahiko, “Space Debris Mitigation Mechanisms” (Technical Presentation
delivered at the 48th session of the UNCOPUOS LSC, UN Office in Vienna, 23
March-3 April, 2009), online: OOSA <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.
"S. Korea Successfully Launches Naro Space Rocket", Spacenews (30 January 2013)
online: Spacenews <http://www.spacenews.com>)
Space Data Association Limited (SDA), Press Release, “Space Data Association: NASA
to Participate in the SDA”, 8 August 2012, online: SDA <http://www.space-
data.org>.
――――, Press Release, “Space Data Association: NOAA to Participate in the SDA”,
22 May 2012, online: SDA <http://www.space-data.org>.
"SpaceShipOne rockets to success", BBC News (7 October 2005) online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>.
US Department of Defense, News Release, “DoD Succeeds In Intercepting Non-
Functioning Satellite” 20 February 2008, Release no 0139-08, online: US
Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov>.
US Federal Aviation Administration, Commercial Space Transportation 2013 Year in
Review (Washington D. C.: 2014).
US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Notice to Mariners, online: USNGA
<http://.msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.Portal>.
US Secretary of State, Press Release, “International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities”, 17 January 2012, online: US Department of State
<http://www.state.gov>.

99
“US spy satellite plan 'a cover'”, BBC News (17 February 2008) online: BBC
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>.
US Strategic Command Public Affairs, Press Release, "USSTRATCOM Signs Fifth Data
Sharing Agreement", 27 January 2014, online: USSTRATCOM
<http://www.stratcom.mil>.
Wingfield, Brian, "A New Space Race?", Forbes (21 February 2008) online: Forbes
<http://www.forbes.com/>.
Wirt, Uwe, “UN-Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines – National Implementation
Mechanism” (Technical Presentation delivered at the 48th COPUOS LSC, UN
Office in Vienna, 23 March-3 April 2009), online: OOSA
<http://www.oosa.unvienna.org>.

100