KOL - 10v1
KOL - 10v1
KOL - 10v1
Poststructuralism
Katerina Kolozova
The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Philosophy
Edited by Kim Q. Hall and Ásta
This chapter offers an account of central issues and themes in feminist philosophical en
gagements with poststructuralism, reflection on examples of important contributions to
this discussion, a discussion of the extent to which feminist work has engaged and cri
tiqued the mainstream of the field, and feminist poststructuralist theorizations of the sub
ject, identity, and culture. It also offers a critical genealogy of the epistemological para
digm poststrustructuralism has come to represent, in search of its continuities and breaks
from its foundations furnished by French structuralism, psychoanalysis and tangential
links with Marxian critical theory. It argues that the anglophone appropriations of struc
turalism in postmodern context, as it would have been termed in the French academe,
have veered away from the original and purely formal conceptualization of the subject by
resorting to what might be called, in Marxian terminology, identity centered reifications.
This chapter puts forward the claim that poststructuralist discourse and the neoliberal
discourse of individual and social mobility, transformativity and the concomitant procla
mation of “the death of ideology” (and history) have established numerous and mutually
opportune discursive and ideological correspondences.
POSTSTRUCTURALISM in its intellectually most potent forms has been heralded primari
ly by feminist philosophers. Judith Butler, Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway, and Drucilla
Cornell are just a few of the most influential feminist theorists whose work has often been
associated with French feminist and poststructuralist philosophers, such as Julia Kristeva,
Hélène Cixous, and Luce Irigaray. Nonetheless, this association should be taken with cau
tion, because in spite of the fact that Kristeva’s, Irigaray’s, and Cixous’ work have be
come important (if not foundational) elements of feminist poststructuralism, they them
selves have been persistent in expressing reservations toward poststructuralism (as a dis
tinct method from structuralism) and/or feminism.
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The writings of Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida; the
feminist receptions of Jacques Lacan present in the works of Julia Kristeva and Hélène
Cixous; and the unique critique of speculative reason proffered by Luce Irigaray consti
tute the corpus of indispensable texts grounding the school of thought called “poststruc
turalism.” Feminist poststructuralist critiques of the subject, identity, and culture have
made significant contributions to both poststructuralism and feminism. While the found
ing figures that will be referred to in this chapter are mostly male, it is important to
stress that poststructuralism has to a great extent consolidated its epistemic project
thanks to the contributions of feminist philosophers. Indeed, the academic prestige that
poststructuralism enjoys today can be attributed to the force of feminist philosophical
work in the field. By first focusing on some of the founding figures to present a brief ge
nealogy of ideas taken to be poststructuralist, the connections with the main features of
some central feminist poststructuralist contributions will become more readily apparent.
The feminist poststructuralist concept of gender as a discursive construct rejects the no
tion of sexual difference as a given, as a fixed meaning or “essence” and, as will be dis
cussed later, has led to the development of a more general critique of “essentialism.” To
presume that there is an immutable essence of gender (or sex) outside the world of lan
guage implies the possibility of an independent idea “living a life of its own” in a world of
ideas or immutable truths—something not unlike Plato’s world of ideas. By way of Der
ridean deconstruction, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Foucauldian theorization of the (p. 100)
subject, and other means of radicalization in philosophy’s linguistic turn, poststructural
ism demonstrates the radical constructedness of identities and the discursive or linguistic
determination of the political. In short, the corollary of poststructuralism is that power is
discourse (and vice versa), and therefore epistemes (i.e., scientific paradigms) are dis
course and political power too.
The absence of essence implies the absence of unity for the subject, insofar as it has been
declared multiple, transformative, and productively unstable. The instability, nomadism,
and mobility celebrated by poststructuralism are constitutive of subjectivity, whether col
lective or individual, and are contingent upon culture as the discursive conditioning par
excellence. Poststructuralists have abandoned universalizing meta-narratives of history,
class, and other central categories of classical political theories and Marxism in the same
way that grand or master narratives have been replaced by small and personal ones, as
Jean-François Lyotard (1984) recommends. One could say that the feminist maxim “The
personal is political” is also a central principle of poststructuralist moral and political phi
losophy. Thus, the epistemic shift poststructuralism brought forth has also been a politi
cal shift, and the entanglement of the two categories, that is, of epistemology and the po
litical (enmeshed in the moral), seems to be constitutive of poststructuralism. The central
themes of consideration for feminist poststructuralism have become the subject, identity,
and culture. Culture has replaced the classical categories of society, politics, and history
by way of fusing them into a single concept (i.e., culture). Always already individually
subjectivized, culture has become the central political category in feminist poststructural
ism as the result of the endorsement of Lyotard’s axiom that the grand narratives are re
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placed by the small and personal ones. Gender is contingent on—or rather conditioned by
—culture and its inevitable subjectivization (Butler 1990, 273–80; 1993).
When looked at with rigor that focuses on epistemological matters rather than thematic
preoccupations, it is not an easy task to establish a difference between poststructuralism
(p. 101) and structuralism. The fact that the term originated in the academic institutions
of the United States and was never really accepted in France, where all of its major au
thorities were active at the time of its growing intellectual influence, is indicative. Histori
cally speaking, it is perhaps most accurate to characterize the school of thought called
“poststructuralism” as the product of transatlantic reception of French structuralism de
signed for the postmodern politico-economic era. I am referring here not only to the theo
ry of postmodernism and its academic influence but also to a certain philosophy that per
vaded and justified the processes of neoliberal globalization and resonated with the argu
ments and the vocabulary of the postmodern debate.
It is, in fact, the proliferation of academic commentaries on the works of French struc
turalists during the postmodern era that marked the beginning of the field of poststruc
turalism. It is not easy to determine an exact date of a beginning of an intellectual era,
but if we are to choose a particular moment of origin I would say postmodernism begins
with the publication of Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition in 1979. Post
modernism has coincided with the rise and the reign of neoliberal globalization. Conse
quently, we can claim that in 2020 we are still living in the “postmodern condition.” In
short, we call postmodern an era that consists of a particular political economy, civiliza
tional and technological transformations defining of it, whereas the epistemic paradigm
that supports the era in question is what we call here poststructuralism. The notion of
poststructuralism is, nonetheless, neither self-explanatory nor univocal. Michel Foucault
famously remarked, “As far as I can tell the problem underpinning what is called struc
turalism has, to the greatest extent, been that of the subject and its reproduction [re
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monte]. I fail to see what the common problem of those called postmodernists and post
structuralists is” (1994, 1266, my translation).
Deleuzian ontology is, perhaps, best suited for an ideological justification of the global
digital age and the accompanying form of capitalism. Combined with other forms of radi
calization of structuralism that have served as the foundation of poststructuralism, the
Deleuzian critique of philosophy has furnished an intellectual basis for post-1990s global
capitalism. “Rhizomaticity,” a procedure of deconstruction or radicalization of the struc
turalist premise in French philosophy as conceived by Deleuze and Guattari, correspond
ed with the globally promulgated modes of organization, such as networks, platforms, and
horizontality; the multinational expansion of capital transcending the boundaries of na
tion-states or enacting “deterritorialisation”; and the liberation of the finance industry
from the constraints of the “arborescent” real economy. Since the 1990s, abstraction has
ruled independently from the territorial or the physical, in spite of the fact that, accord
ing to Deleuze and Guattari, it originates in concrete acts of signification. Abstraction as
conceived by Deleuze and Guattari constitutes a “machine,” that is, an automaton of sig
nification abstracted from the material that is purportedly independent from physicality
and is self-sufficient, even though it is engendered by material acts (Deleuze and Guattari
[1980] 1987, 148). The ontology of the rhizome acts and presents itself as a politics of
emancipation (15, 21 ff.). After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in Europe, rhizomatic ex
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pansion of neoliberal capitalism and global “democratization” has been marked by an ex
uberance of optimism concerning its liberating potential.
Following Deleuze and Guattari, the transformation of structures into rhizomes results in
networks of traces of power understood in a Nietzschean and Spinozian vitalist sense.
There remains some materiality, but its laws of abstraction become reified into “differ
ences,” “unilateral affirmations,” and structures dissolving into fluxes where matter prac
tically disappears through attenuation, transformed into a translucent web whose con
necting dots of signification are the only reality that matters. I am referring here to the
Marxian concept of reification in which abstraction (of a social relation) is substituted
with a material reality that is supposed to embody it, similar to the notion of fetishism in
the creation of money and commodity—“turning an abstraction into a thing” (Marx [1887]
1956, chap. 1 sect. 4).
Once the structure is canceled, what remains is the potentiality of matter and sign. This is
essentially a nihilist position: the emptied space of the vanishing concept (and of matter
too) is glaring. The rhizome seems to be endowed with the inherent possibility for the au
to-accelerating work of the “abstract machines” of capital, communication, and pleasure.
Similarly to Braidotti, and, in fact, preceding her work on the topic of posthumanism, in
“A Cyborg Manifesto,” Donna Haraway advocates a posthumanist world, one that has left
behind the ruins of the Oedipal triad and that also relies on the strong affinity between
the machine and the animal (1991, 150–52). An anthropomorphic expectation at the cen
ter of the account of the self and its context, of subject and discourse, can initiate a phan
tasm of origin, birth, authorship, and demiurgic creation. However, the origin is name
less; there is no father, no mother, no Oedipal triad; and the human is but a cyborg, a hy
brid of biology and signification, that is, of technology as signification, pure artificiality
enmeshed in physicality that does not produce a binary but rather endless multiplicity
(153). Haraway’s metaphor of the cyborg marked the birth of posthumanism. If we look at
the epistemic origins of posthumanist and cyber-feminist argumentation, it becomes clear
that they are neither anti-physicalist nor anti-humanist but rather nonanthropomorphic
and nonanthropocentric in their explanation of how self and society interact. These ideas
are indebted to poststructuralism.
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By insisting on the relevance of physicality and sexual difference, Braidotti retains a cer
tain continuity with second-wave feminism. By recourse to the Marxist and socialist com
mitment to materiality and by putting forward the argument about women’s impossibility
of attaining the image of the human, Haraway simultaneously remains conservative by
sticking to the materialist legacy of second-wave feminism while propelling the concept of
the subject into the unknown of radical posthumanism or inhumanism (Haraway 1992).
Foucault’s analysis of the subject as an instantiation and effect of discourse qua political
power is the result of taking the structuralist method to the level of the pure abstraction
or full formalization of the argument: the subject is determined and effected by society as
signifying structure. Society is but a signifying chain, a language in its own right—it is
discourse, and the subject is simply the effect of the discursive process of subjectiviza
tion. Both Foucault and those feminist theorists who have appropriated his concept of the
subject (e.g., Judith Butler) have been accused of determinism precisely because of the
argument that discourse (or language) determines the subject. In other words, some femi
nists contend that reducing the subject to an effect of discourse deprives the subject of
agency (see Seyla Benhabib’s “Feminism and Postmodernism” in Benhabib et al. 1995,
17–35). Nonetheless, the argument that the subject is a discursive construct should not
be understood as a position in favor of fiction at the expense of the real. The conditioning
constrictions of the ruling discourse and the formative delimitations of the signifying uni
verse we inhabit constitute the real in a Lacanian sense (Kolozova 2014, 79–98). The limit
itself is the productive real that is outside signification but nonetheless engenders it (Cor
nell 1992). In “Speech and Phenomena” (1973) and Of Grammatology (1976), Jacques
Derrida takes the linguistic argument to its extreme by explaining that the voice of the
philosopher and his text are indistinguishable from one another in terms of their “authen
ticity” or realness—all is trace, artifice of signification; all transcendence is language; and
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language is in fact text, the craft of signification. Nonetheless, this reality is no less real
and, moreover, no less material.
We must not forget that Foucault subscribed to the structuralist method according to
which there is no primacy between the structure and its elements and there is no “doer
behind the deed” (Butler [1990] 2006, 195), just as there is no hierarchy between individ
ual phonemes and the structure of signification in linguistics: each element creates the
structure just as much as the structure determines the element. The materially deter
mined possibilities of the interaction of individual elements create a finite system of signi
fication, which in turn delineates the possibilities of individual action or the margin of
agency. As an effect of discursive power, the subject is a dynamic rather than static, a
temporal (becoming) rather than spatial category. Structuralism has served poststruc
turalism in its critical investigations of subjectivization within a culture, within capitalist
society, and, especially for feminist poststructuralism, within the patriarchal signifying
automaton of gendering.
less number of identities. In Gender Trouble ([1990] 2006) and Bodies That Matter (1993),
Butler further elaborates Foucault’s philosophical proposal, but she also seems to prompt
a couple of other consequences that are critical for the aforementioned processes of cul
turalization of the political. As Butler argues, the subject is an effect of discourse infused
with heteronormative power. Discourse as norm is underpinned by the norm and normali
ty of heterosexuality. Norm or normality is inherent to culture, argues Butler, and, there
fore, heteronormativity too. Moreover, culture is what conditions gender and heteronor
mativity ([1990] 2006). Foucault, however, writes of structural and institutional biopoliti
cal violence that is always already subjectivized but never referred to as “cultural”—it is
sociopolitical, military, economic, and embedded in robust structures of governance
(1997, 73–79). In Foucault, these structures are neither reduced nor reducible to culture.
Butler, however, resorts to the notion of culture as one that would either encompass or re
place that of biopolitical governance.
Butler’s critical strike against the axis of normativity introduced fractal fissures into the
feminist theorizing of the early 1990s. In spite of the stated difference concerning the
question of culture, Butler built on and expanded Foucauldian concepts of power, resis
tance, and subjectivity to critique the subject of feminism as theory and political move
ment.
Anti-essentialism is not only a theory but also a political stance against the discursive
hegemony of gendered essences, including that of woman. In Gender Trouble and in a
number of her other works, Butler argues in favor of the subject as an effect of sliding
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along the structure of signification, incessantly mobile and transformable. There are no
traits of character and innate rules of behavior that determine gender. While the under
standing of agency as a matter of individual volition tends to be taken as constitutive of
identity in general and gender identity in particular, gender has no essence (Butler [1990]
2006, 22–46, 89–96, 270–82).
To perform or choose to subvert society’s dominant rules about gender or sexuality, But
ler argues, is to materialize gender, to bring it into being. This claim does not intimate
some hidden truth about gender that has been obfuscated by performance but rather
points to the fact that gender is the effect of an act or a series of acts, a performance.
Butler’s claim also underscores the contingent nature of gender and gender identity. It is
contingent on culture and its norms. Considering that culture is subject to historical
transformations, as Butler argues to be the case,1 the “repertoire of performances” is
subject to continuous change. We can, therefore, infer that one subverts the norm not on
ly by defying it but also by reinventing the norm itself instead of merely reversing it (be
cause, in the latter case, one remains within the same structure, albeit inverted).
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(p. 107) In conclusion, poststructuralism has brought forth an effective and irreversible
overhaul of the traditional philosophical metaphysics insidiously present in the treatment
of femininity and masculinity as givens (i.e., in transcending the problem of essentializa
tion). The premise that gender is a socio-linguistic (or discursive) construct is something
that the emerging strands of feminist philosophy should retain as an epistemic step for
ward and away from philosophical atavisms. However, poststructuralism has been chal
lenged by the new forms of feminist realism in ways that require adequate responses,
such as: how are we to conceive materialism and universalism without regressing to mod
ern and premodern philosophy and its self-sufficient detachment from political reality? To
address the stated questions and reinvigorate its discussions, poststructuralism ought to
resort to a constructive dialogue with the aforementioned emerging forms of feminist re
alism and materialism.
References
Benhabib, Seyla, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser. 1995. Feminist Con
tentions: A Philosophical Exchange. London: Routledge.
Butler, Judith. 1990. “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenome
nology and Feminist Theory.” In Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and The
atre, edited by Sue-Ellen Case, 270–82. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex.’ London and
New York: Routledge.
Butler, Judith. (1990; 1999) 2006. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Iden
tity. London and New York: Routledge.
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of Signs. Translated by David B. Allison. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
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ed by Paul Rabinow, 73–79. New York: New Press.
Haraway, Donna. 1985. “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Fem
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Haraway, Donna. 1991. “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Femi
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Notes:
(1) Elaborated in the Preface to the 1999 edition of Gender Trouble (Butler 1999, 4–5).
Katerina Kolozova
Katerina Kolozova is Senior Researcher and Full Professor at the Institute of Social
Sciences and Humanities, Skopje. She is also a Professor of Philosophy of Law at the
doctoral school of the University American College, Skopje. At the Faculty of Media
and Communications-Belgrade, she teaches contemporary political philosophy. Kolo
zova was a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Rhetoric at the University of Cali
fornia-Berkeley in 2009 (program of Critical Theory), and a Columbia University NY-
SIPA Visiting Scholar at its Paris Global Centre in 2019. She is a member of the
board of directors of the New Centre for Research and Practice, Seattle, Washington.
Kolozova is the first codirector and founder of the Regional Network for Gender and
Women’s Studies in Southeast Europe (2004–). She is the author of Cut of the Real:
Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy (Columbia University Press, 2014) and
Capitalism’s Holocaust of Animals: A Non-Marxist Critique of Capital, Philosophy and
Patriarchy (Bloomsbury Academic, 2019) and a number of articles including “Subjec
tivity without Physicality: Machine, Body and the Signifying Automaton” in the jour
nal Subjectivity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
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