The Globalization of World Politics An Introduction To International Relations 9Th Edition John Baylis Full Chapter

The Globalization of World Politics: An
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Brief contents
Preface .............................................................................................................................................................................................. xv
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
New to this edition ..................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
Guide to using this book ........................................................................................................................................................xviii
List of case studies ........................................................................................................................................................................ xx
About the contributors ............................................................................................................................................................. xxii
World map ................................................................................................................................................................................... xxiv
Part One International relations in a global era
1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics ............................. 5

patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
2 Globalization and global politics ...........................................................................19
anthony mcgrew
Part Two The historical context
3 The rise of modern international order ..............................................................39

george lawson
4 International history of the twentieth century .................................................54
len scott
5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order? ..............................70
michael cox
6 Rising powers and the emerging global order ..................................................85
andrew hurrell
Part Three Theories of world politics
7 Liberal internationalism ........................................................................................ 103

tim dunne
8 Marxist theories of international relations ..................................................... 116
stephen hobden · richard wyn jones
9 Realism ........................................................................................................................ 132
or rosenboim
10 Feminism .................................................................................................................... 147
helen m. kinsella
11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches ......................................................... 162
meera sabaratnam
12 Poststructuralism ..................................................................................................... 179
lene hansen
13 Social constructivism .............................................................................................. 194
michael barnett
viii Brief contents
Part Four Structures and processes
14 War and world politics ........................................................................................... 213

tarak barkawi
15 International and global security ....................................................................... 228
john baylis
16 Global political economy ...................................................................................... 244
nicola phillips
17 Gender ........................................................................................................................ 260
paul kirby
18 Race in world politics ............................................................................................. 276
robbie shilliam
19 International law ..................................................................................................... 293
christian reus-smit
20 International organizations in world politics ................................................. 308
susan park
21 The United Nations ................................................................................................. 323
devon e. a. curtis · paul taylor
22 NGOs in world politics ........................................................................................... 339
jutta joachim
23 Regionalism in international affairs .................................................................. 355
edward best · thomas christiansen
Part Five International issues
24 Environmental issues ............................................................................................. 377

john vogler
25 Global health ............................................................................................................. 394
sophie harman
26 Refugees and forced migration ........................................................................... 409
ariadna estévez
27 Poverty, hunger, and development ................................................................... 425
tony evans
28 Global trade and global finance ......................................................................... 441
matthew watson
29 Terrorism and globalization ................................................................................. 456
james d. kiras
30 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ............................................... 473
sheena chestnut greitens
31 Nationalism, national self-determination, and international relations .488
john breuilly
32 Human rights ............................................................................................................ 505
ratna kapur
33 Humanitarian intervention in world politics ................................................. 521
alex j. bellamy · nicholas j. wheeler
Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................................................537
References ....................................................................................................................................................................................559
Index ..............................................................................................................................................................................................597
Detailed contents
Preface .............................................................................................................................................................................................. xv
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
New to this edition ..................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
Guide to using this book ........................................................................................................................................................xviii
List of case studies ........................................................................................................................................................................ xx
About the contributors ............................................................................................................................................................. xxii
World map ................................................................................................................................................................................... xxiv
Part One International relations in a global era
1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics ................................................. 5

1.1 From international politics to world politics 6
1.2 The study of International Relations 7
1.3 Theories of world politics 8
1.4 Theories and globalization 14
1.5 Globalization: myth or reality? 15
2 Globalization and global politics ...............................................................................................19

2.1 Introduction 20
2.2 Making sense of globalization 20
2.3 The crisis of globalization and the liberal world order 27
2.4 Globalization and the transformation of world politics 30
2.5 Conclusion 33
Part Two The historical context
3 The rise of modern international order ..................................................................................39

3.1 Introduction 40
3.2 Historical international orders 40
3.3 How did modern international order emerge? 43
3.4 The consequences of the global transformation 47
3.5 Conclusion 52
4 International history of the twentieth century .....................................................................54

4.1 Introduction 55
4.2 Modern total war 55
4.3 End of empire 57
4.4 Cold war 59
4.5 Conclusion 67
5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order? ..................................................70
5.1 Introduction: the cold war and after 71
5.2 The United States: exploiting the unipolar ‘moment’ 71
5.3 After the USSR: Yeltsin to Putin 72
x Detailed contents
5.4 Europe: rise and decline? 74

5.5 China in a new Asian century? 76
5.6 A new Global South 77
5.7 The Middle East in turmoil: 9/11, the Arab Spring, and after 79
5.8 From Obama to Trump to Biden 80
5.9 Conclusion: beyond the liberal world order? 82
6 Rising powers and the emerging global order ......................................................................85

6.1 Introduction 86
6.2 The post-cold war order 86
6.3 The US order under challenge 87
6.4 Three questions about the power of rising powers 90
6.5 Debating the impact of rising powers on international relations 93
6.6 Beyond the BRICS: emerging powers in the twenty-first century 95
6.7 Conclusion 98
Part Three Theories of world politics
7 Liberal internationalism ............................................................................................................ 103

7.1 Introduction and context 104
7.2 Founding ideas of nineteenth-century liberal internationalism 105
7.3 Internationalism and institutionalism: peace through law 107
7.4 The challenges confronting liberal internationalism 109
7.5 Conclusion: incomplete, but indispensable, internationalism 112
8 Marxist theories of international relations .......................................................................... 116

8.1 Introduction 117
8.2 The essential elements of Marxist theories of world politics 119
8.3 Marx internationalized: from imperialism to world-systems theory 121
8.4 Gramscianism 123
8.5 Critical theory 125
8.6 New Marxism 127
8.7 Conclusion 129
9 Realism ............................................................................................................................................ 132

9.2 Fundamental ideas 133
9.3 Realism in historical perspective 136
9.4 Geopolitics 139
9.5 Multiple realisms? 140
9.6 Conclusion 145
10 Feminism ........................................................................................................................................ 147

10.2 What is feminism? 148
10.3 What is feminist International Relations theory? 152
10.4 Gender and power 154
Detailed contents xi
10.5 Four feminist International Relations theories 155
10.6 Conclusion 160
11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches ............................................................................. 162

11.2 What are postcolonial and decolonial approaches? 163
11.3 Where did postcolonial and decolonial ideas come from? 166
11.4 What are the main ideas underpinning postcolonial and
decolonial thought? 169
11.5 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches to studying world politics 172
11.6 Decolonization: the struggle continues? 175
11.7 Conclusion 176
12 Poststructuralism ......................................................................................................................... 179

12.2 Studying the social world 180
12.3 Poststructuralism as a political philosophy 181
12.4 Deconstructing state sovereignty 186
12.5 Identity and foreign policy 189
12.6 Conclusion 192
13 Social constructivism .................................................................................................................. 194

13.2 The rise of constructivism 195
13.3 Constructivism 197
13.4 Constructivism and global change 203
13.5 Conclusion 207
Part Four Structures and processes
14 War and world politics ............................................................................................................... 213

14.2 Defining war 215
14.3 War: international and global 216
14.4 Clausewitz’s philosophy of war 219
14.5 War, state, and society in the West 221
14.6 War, state, and society in the Global South 224
14.7 Conclusion 226
15 International and global security ........................................................................................... 228

15.2 What is security? 229
15.3 The traditional approach to national security 231
15.4 Alternative approaches 232
15.5 Globalization and the ‘return of geopolitics’ 235
15.6 Globalization and the future of world order 239
15.7 Conclusion 241
xii Detailed contents
16 Global political economy .......................................................................................................... 244

16.2 Approaches to IPE 246
16.3 What drives globalization? 248
16.4 Who wins and who loses from globalization? 253
16.5 The future of globalization 257
16.6 Conclusion 258
17 Gender ............................................................................................................................................. 260

17.2 Sex and gender in international perspective 261
17.3 Global gender relations 263
17.4 Gendering global politics 265
17.5 Gendering global security 268
17.6 Gendering the global economy 271
17.7 Conclusion 274
18 Race in world politics ................................................................................................................. 276

18.2 Histories of race in world politics 277
18.3 Thinking through race 283
18.4 Contemporary manifestations of race in world politics 286
18.5 Conclusion 290
19 International law .......................................................................................................................... 293

19.2 Order and institutions 294
19.3 The modern institution of international law 295
19.4 From international to supranational law? 300
19.5 The laws of war 302
19.6 Theoretical approaches to international law 303
19.7 Conclusion 305
20 International organizations in world politics ..................................................................... 308

20.2 What are international organizations? 309
20.3 Why are international organizations important? 313
20.4 Why do states create IOs? 314
20.5 How can we analyse IO behaviour? 319
20.6 Conclusion 320
21 The United Nations ..................................................................................................................... 323

21.2 A brief history of the United Nations and its principal organs 325
21.3 The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace
and security 329
21.4 The United Nations and economic and social questions 334
21.5 Conclusion 336
Detailed contents xiii
22 NGOs in world politics ............................................................................................................... 339
22.2 What are NGOs? 341
22.3 The growing importance of TNGOs 348
22.4 Conclusion 353
23 Regionalism in international affairs ....................................................................................... 355

23.2 Regional cooperation and regional integration 357
23.3 Regional cooperation in a global context 361
23.4 The process of European integration 367
23.5 Conclusion 371
Part Five International issues
24 Environmental issues .................................................................................................................. 377

24.2 Environmental issues on the international agenda: a brief history 379
24.3 The functions of international environmental cooperation 382
24.4 Climate change 386
24.5 The environment and International Relations theory 390
24.6 Conclusion 392
25 Global health ................................................................................................................................. 394

25.1 Introduction: why did health become a global issue? 395
25.2 Global health governance 396
25.3 Health financing and vertical and horizontal approaches to global health 400
25.4 Global health security 401
25.5 Medicalization of security 404
25.6 Conclusion 406
26 Refugees and forced migration ............................................................................................... 409

26.2 Concept production and the politics of international protection 411
26.3 Types of forced migration 414
26.4 The international refugee regime and institutionalized racism 421
26.5 Conclusion 423
27 Poverty, hunger, and development ........................................................................................ 425

27.2 Poverty 426
27.3 Hunger 429
27.4 Development 431
27.5 Conclusion 438
28 Global trade and global finance .............................................................................................. 441

28.2 The globalization of trade and finance 443
xiv Detailed contents
28.3 The regulation of global trade 446

28.4 The regulation of global finance 450
28.5 Conclusion 453
29 Terrorism and globalization ..................................................................................................... 456

29.2 Definitions 457
29.3 Terrorism: from transnational to global phenomenon (1968–2001) 459
29.4 Terrorism: the impact of globalization 460
29.5 Globalization, technology, and terrorism 463
29.6 Combating terrorism 468
29.7 Conclusion 470
30 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction .................................................................... 473

30.2 WMD technology and its spread 474
30.3 Theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation 480
30.4 Evolution of non-proliferation efforts 483
30.5 Conclusion 486
31 Nationalism, national self-determination, and international relations ..................... 488

31.2 Nationalism, nation-states, and global politics 489
31.3 The changing meanings of NSD since 1918 495
31.4 Conclusion 501
32 Human rights ................................................................................................................................. 505

32.2 The global human rights structure 506
32.3 The core assumptions on which human rights are based 510
32.4 Doing human rights advocacy 515
32.5 Conclusion 518
33 Humanitarian intervention in world politics ...................................................................... 521

33.2 The case for humanitarian intervention 522
33.3 The case against humanitarian intervention 524
33.4 The 1990s: a golden era of humanitarian activism? 526
33.5 The responsibility to protect (R2P) 528
33.6 Conclusion 534
Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................................................537
References ....................................................................................................................................................................................559
Index ..............................................................................................................................................................................................597
Preface
In this new edition of The Globalization of World Politics we have followed a similar format and struc-
ture to previous editions, but we have added one new chapter and one chapter has been completely
rewritten by a new author. We believe these additions make this already popular and successful book
even better. A new chapter on global health by Sophie Harman has been included because of the con-
temporary importance of the Covid-19 pandemic and its effects on international relations. The chap-
ter on realism by Or Rosenboim provides a new perspective on this important theoretical approach
to the subject. All the other chapters have been updated to reflect the feedback we have received from
students around the world, comments from teachers and scholars of International Relations, and the
extremely detailed reviews of the eighth edition commissioned by Oxford University Press. Together,
all these comments have helped us to identify additional areas that should be covered. We have also
updated the learning features, including dozens of brand new case studies and many new suggestions
for further reading.
Praise for The Globalization of World Politics

‘The new chapter 25 on Health is a timely, comprehensive introduction to a complex issue of highest
importance, well-written and with impressive empirical evidence’
(Associate Professor Jens Ladefoged Mortenson, University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
‘After several decades, this textbook is still the most relevant and essential undergraduate textbook there
is in International Relations globally. I consider it to be an organic and constantly evolving source of
knowledge and reflection about and within globalization simultaneously. It is simply the pillar stone of
the IR undergraduate classroom globally today’
(Senior Lecturer Erika Svedberg, Malmo University)
‘A comprehensive, well-written, up-to-date introduction to IR and the historical and theoretical

approaches that shape our world’
(Teacher Anna-Karin Eriksson, Linnaeus University, Sweden)
‘The Bible of International Relations’

(Lecturer Maria Panayiotou, London Metropolitan University, UK)
‘The best book for teaching IR to undergraduate students, whether they are total newcomers to the subject
or have a good level of prior knowledge’
(Programme Director Ian Finlayson, European School of Economics, UK)
‘An excellent introductory and foundational text for understanding IR in a global era. It is
well-structured, comprehensive, and written in an accessible manner’
(Visiting Lecturer Annapurna Menon, University of Westminster, UK)
Acknowledgements
Producing an edited book is always a collective enterprise. But it is not only the editors and authors
who make it happen. We make substantial revisions to every new edition of this book based on the
numerous reviews we receive on the previous one. We are extremely grateful to all those who sent to
us or Oxford University Press their comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the eighth edition
and our plans for this ninth edition of the book. Very many of the changes are the result of review-
ers’ recommendations. Once again, we would also like to thank our excellent contributors for being
so willing to respond to our detailed requests for revisions, and sometimes major rewrites, to their
chapters. Many of these authors have been involved with this book since the very first edition, and
we are extremely grateful for their continued commitment and dedication to International Relations
pedagogy.
Here we would also like to make a special acknowledgement and extend our greatest thanks to
our editorial assistant on this edition, Dr Danielle Cohen. With efficiency, deep conscientiousness,
patience, and humour, as in the past, she has done an excellent job working with the contributors and
the editors to ensure deadlines were met and all tasks completed on time. The book is much better
because of her hard work.
The editors would also like to thank the editorial and production team at Oxford University Press,
especially Katie Staal and Sarah Iles, who have provided us with encouragement and enormous pa-
tience in guiding us through the production process. They have been a pleasure to work with.
John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens
The publishers would be pleased to clear permission with any copyright holders that we have inad-
vertently failed, or been unable, to contact.
New to this edition
The ninth edition has been rigorously updated following extensive reviewer feedback. Key changes
include:
• New Chapter 9 on realism by Or Rosenboim
• New Chapter 25 on global health by Sophie Harman
• Expanded coverage of non-Western approaches, particularly perspectives from the Global South,
is woven throughout the chapters to ensure you appreciate the importance of viewing interna-
tional relations from representative and varied perspectives
• Updated International Relations theory chapters reflect a more contextualized and historical per-
spective, allowing you to gain a thorough, nuanced understanding of the historical and political
context in which these approaches emerged
Guide to using this book
The ninth edition of The Globalization of World Politics provides a rich multimedia experi-
ence in which the text’s unrivalled coverage is supplemented by features and resources that
help you to navigate the text and contextualize your understanding, supporting develop-
ment of the essential knowledge and skills you need to underpin your International Rela-
tions (IR) studies.
Outlined here are the key features and resources in the book and its online resources to
help you understand international relations.
www.oup.com/he/baylis-globalization9e
Consolidate your understanding

Self-test questions, mapped to each section of the book, provide extensive opportunities to
check your understanding. Each chapter’s flashcard glossary and concluding review ques-
tions offer further ways to test your knowledge. Lists of Key Points throughout the text
sum up the most important arguments, acting as a useful revision tool, and provide an
at-a-glance overview of the issues raised in each chapter. Watch the online author videos to
see top scholars analysing current issues and exploring IR theories and concepts in more
depth.
Develop critical thinking skills

Each chapter opens with provocative framing questions to stimulate thought and de-
bate on the subject area. In each chapter you will find an opposing opinions feature
with accompanying questions, which will help you evaluate theory and facilitate critical
and reflective debate on contemporary policy challenges, from campaigns to decolonize
the curriculum to debates over whether global health security aims to protect powerful
states or people. Access the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle the
questions. An online interactive timeline accompanies the IR theory chapters to help
you fully understand how the discipline has developed.
Connect IR theory and practice

Two engaging and relevant case studies in every chapter illustrate how ideas, concepts, and
issues are manifested in the real world. Each case study is followed by questions to encour-
age you to apply theory to current and evolving global events. In addition, you will also find,
in the online resources, extended IR case studies, which encourage you to apply theories to
current and evolving global events.
Finally, develop your negotiation and problem-solving skills, and apply IR theory to
practice, by exploring the online international relations simulations.
• IR Simulation: Keeping the Peace
• IR Simulation: Negotiating the Lisbon Protocol
• IR Simulation: Negotiating with China
• IR Simulation: Stopping an Epidemic

Guide to using this book xix
Read more widely

Annotated recommendations for further reading at the end of each chapter help you fa-
miliarize yourself with the key academic literature and suggest how you can explore your
interest in a particular aspect of IR. Web links are provided to deepen your understanding
of key topics and allow you to explore different voices and opinions.
Resources for lecturers
www.oup.com/he/baylis-globalization9e
Adopting lecturers can access the following online resources:
• Additional case studies to use in class discussions to contextualize and deepen theoreti-
cal understanding
• Customizable PowerPoint® slides, arranged by chapter, for use in lectures or as handouts

to support efficient, effective teaching preparation
• A fully customizable test bank containing ready-made assessments with which to test
your students’ understanding of key concepts
• Question bank of short-answer and essay questions encourages critical reflection on

core issues and themes in each chapter
• All author videos for you to share with your students

• All figures and tables from the book available to download
List of case studies
Case Study 2.1 Global food security: ceding sovereignty�� 22

Case Study 2.2 Multicentric globalization�� 28
Case Study 3.1 The dual character of international law�� 50

Case Study 3.2 Imperialism in China�� 51
Case Study 4.1 Fidel Castro�� 62

Case Study 4.2 The city of Berlin 1945–89�� 63
Case Study 5.1 Russia and the West: a ‘new cold war’?�� 74
Case Study 5.2 Populism, globalization, and the end of the liberal order?�� 81
Case Study 6.1 The BRICS�� 88

Case Study 6.2 Brazil�� 89
Case Study 7.1 The rise and fall of the ‘indispensable nation’��108
Case Study 7.2 Sovereignty as responsibility: an African concept��113
Case Study 8.1 The capitalist development of Communist China��117

Case Study 8.2 The global Covid-19 pandemic��118
Case Study 9.1 Kautilya’s realist thought��137

Case Study 9.2 Russia’s annexation of Crimea��144
Case Study 10.1 Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom�� 151
Case Study 10.2 The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan��158
Case Study 11.1 Imperial wars after decolonization? Rethinking Vietnam��165

Case Study 11.2 Indigenous peoples between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’��173
Case Study 12.1 Discourses, images, and the victory of the Taliban regime��182
Case Study 12.2 Covid-19, state sovereignty, and vaccines��188
Case Study 13.1 Social construction of refugees and the contemporary migration crisis��201
Case Study 13.2 ‘Victims’��205
Case Study 14.1 What’s global about the global war on terror?��217
Case Study 14.2 War and society: Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United States��218
Case Study 15.1 Insecurity in the post-cold war world: the Nagorno-Karabakh War��236
Case Study 15.2 Growing tensions in the South and East China Seas��237
Case Study 16.1 Global value chains (GVCs) and global development��251
Case Study 16.2 Globalization and child labour��256
Case Study 17.1 The Kurdish Yekîneyên Parastine Jin (Women’s Protection Units)�� 268
Case Study 17.2 Neo-slavery and care labour in Asia��273
List of case studies xxi
Case Study 18.1 Race, caste, and Dalits��282

Case Study 18.2 Ecofascism��285
Case Study 19.1 Is international law an expression of Western dominance?�� 297

Case Study 19.2 Non-Western agency in the development of international human rights law��298
Case Study 20.1 Africa’s premier financial institution: the African Development Bank�� 311
Case Study 20.2 ‘Non-liberal’ IOs: the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation��321
Case Study 21.1 The UN and conflict in Syria��324

Case Study 21.2 UN peacekeeping in the Congo��330
Case Study 22.1 Friends of the Earth vs. Royal Dutch Shell: NGOs and climate change litigation�� 341
Case Study 22.2 #BlackLivesMatter: the rise of a global movement��346
Case Study 23.1 Mercosur: great potential, unfulfilled ambition��362

Case Study 23.2 Regionalism in Southeast Asia: beyond intergovernmentalism?��365
Case Study 24.1 The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)��388

Case Study 24.2 The geopolitics of Arctic climate change��391
Case Study 25.1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1308��398

Case Study 25.2 Covid-19 vaccines and intellectual property rights��405
Case Study 26.1 Covid-19 and asylum processing: the demise of the deterrence model?�� 412
Case Study 26.2 Forced migration, criminal/state violence, and corporations: Venezuela�� 419
Case Study 27.1 The state of the world’s children��431

Case Study 27.2 The Ugandan family��436
Case Study 28.1 The Covid-19 vaccination programme and global economic recovery��445
Case Study 28.2 Biden’s proposed global minimum corporate tax rate��453
Case Study 29.1 Activities of the so-called Islamic State in the Philippines and Mozambique, 2017–present��462
Case Study 29.2 The 6 January ‘Insurrection’��466
Case Study 30.1 North Korea’s nuclear programme��477

Case Study 30.2 Iran’s nuclear programme��478
Case Study 31.1 Germany��493

Case Study 31.2 Yugoslavia��496
Case Study 31.3 India��498
Case Study 31.4 Nationalisms in South Africa, not South African nationalism��499
Case Study 32.1 The Islamic headscarf ban��513

Case Study 32.2 Same-sex or queer relationships, LGBTQ rights, and colonial laws��514
Case Study 33.1 Myanmar: barriers to intervention��525

Case Study 33.2 The role of Middle Eastern governments in Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011)��531
About the contributors
Tarak Barkawi is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Michael Barnett is University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George
Washington University.
John Baylis is Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations and a former Pro-Vice-
Chancellor at Swansea University.
Alex J. Bellamy is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for
the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland.
Edward Best is Senior Expert at the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, and
Senior Fellow of Maastricht University.
John Breuilly is Emeritus Professor of Nationalism and Ethnicity, London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Thomas Christiansen is Professor of Political Science and European Integration at Luiss University
in Rome, Italy.
Michael Cox is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the London School of Economics
and Political Science and Founding Director of LSE IDEAS.
Devon E. A. Curtis is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at
the University of Cambridge.
Tim Dunne is Provost and Senior Vice-President at the University of Surrey, and Honorary Professor
of International Relations at the University of Queensland.
Ariadna Estévez is a Professor at the Centre for Research on North America, the National
Autonomous University of Mexico.
Tony Evans was Professor of Global Politics at the University of Southampton.
Sheena Chestnut Greitens is Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs,
University of Texas at Austin and Director of UT’s Asia Policy Program.
Lene Hansen is Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen.
Sophie Harman is Professor of International Politics at Queen Mary University of London.
Stephen Hobden is Reader in International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences,

University of East London.
Andrew Hurrell is Montague Burton Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Oxford
University and an Einstein Visiting Fellow in Berlin.
Jutta Joachim is Associate Professor of Global Security Governance at Radboud University,
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
Ratna Kapur is Professor of International Law, School of Law, Queen Mary University of London
and Senior Faculty, Institute of Global Law and Policy, Harvard Law School.
Helen M. Kinsella is Associate Professor of Political Science and Law and Affiliate Faculty in
Department of Gender, Women and Sexuality Studies, the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public
About the contributors xxiii
Affairs, the Human Rights Center, and the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change
at the University of Minnesota-Minneapolis.
James D. Kiras is Professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama.
Paul Kirby is Associate Professorial Research Fellow at the Centre for Women, Peace and Security at
the London School of Economics and Political Science.
George Lawson is Professor of International Relations in the Coral Bell School at the Australian
National University.
Anthony McGrew is Distinguished Professor in Global Public Policy at Shanghai University,
Shanghai.
Patricia Owens is Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford.
Susan Park is Professor of Global Governance at the University of Sydney.
Nicola Phillips is a Professor of Political Economy and the Provost of the University of Melbourne.
Christian Reus-Smit is Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia and Professor of
International Relations at the University of Queensland.
Or Rosenboim is Senior Lecturer and Director of the Centre for Modern History at the Department
of International Politics at City, University of London.
Meera Sabaratnam is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London.
Len Scott is Emeritus Professor of International History and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth
University.
Robbie Shilliam is Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University.
Sir Steve Smith is former Vice-Chancellor and Professor of International Politics at the University
of Exeter.
Paul Taylor is Emeritus Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and
Political Science.
John Vogler is Professorial Research Fellow in International Relations at the University of Keele,
UK.
Matthew Watson is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Warwick and was a UK
Economic and Social Research Council Professorial Fellow from 2013 to 2019.
Nicholas J. Wheeler is Professor of International Relations at the University of Birmingham and
Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the British-American Security Information Council (BASIC).
Richard Wyn Jones is Professor and Director of Cardiff University’s Wales Governance and Dean
of Public Affairs.
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Part One
International relations
in a global era
In this part of the book, we introduce you to how Second, we go into much more detail on the
this book makes sense of international relations in a dynamics, complexities, and contradictions of con-
global era. We have two main goals in this part. temporary globalization. What is globalization, and
First, we want to provide you with a context in what are its main engines and drivers? How should
which to read the different chapters that follow. We we understand the contemporary crisis of globaliza-
do this by explaining why the main title of this book tion and its implications for the current world order?
refers to ‘world politics’ rather than ‘international pol- Are we entering a world of ‘deglobalization’ or ‘reglo-
itics’; giving you a short history of the study and disci- balization’? Making sense of these questions is essen-
pline of International Relations; and providing a very tial to understanding world politics in the twenty-first
brief introduction to the main theoretical approaches century. We hope that these two chapters provide a
to the study of International Relations, including how powerful entry point into what follows in the rest of
each conceives of globalization. the book.
dennisvdw/Getty Images
Chapter 1
Introduction: from
international politics to
world politics
patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
Reader’s Guide We will begin by discussing the various terms

used to describe world politics and the academic
This book provides a comprehensive overview of discipline—International Relations (IR)—that has led
world politics in a global era. The term most often the way in thinking about world politics. We then
used to explain world politics in the contemporary look at the main ways in which global politics has
period—‘globalization’—is controversial. There is con- been explained. Our aim is not to put forward one
siderable dispute over what it means to talk of ‘glo- view of how to think about world politics somehow
balization’, whether this implies that the main features agreed by the editors, let alone by all the contributors
of contemporary world politics are different from to this book. There is no such agreement. Rather, we
those of the past, and whether much of the world is want to provide a context in which to read the chap-
experiencing a backlash against ‘neoliberal globaliza- ters that follow. This means offering a variety of views.
tion’. The concept can be most simply used to refer to For example, the main theoretical accounts of world
the process of increasing interconnectedness among politics all see globalization differently. Some treat it
societies such that events in one part of the world as a temporary phase in human history; others see
increasingly have effects on peoples and societies it as the latest manifestation of the growth of global
far away. On this view, a globalized world is one in capitalism; yet others see it as representing a funda-
which political, economic, cultural, and social events mental transformation of world politics that requires
become more and more interconnected, and also new ways of understanding. The different editors and
one in which they have more impact. For others, ‘glo- contributors to this book hold no single agreed view;
balization’ is the ideology associated with the current they represent all the views just mentioned. Thus, they
phase of the world economy—neoliberal capitalism— would each have a different take, for example, on why
which has most shaped world politics since the late powerful states cannot agree on how to tackle global
1970s. In this introduction we explain how we pro- climate change, why wealthy states hoarded vac-
pose to deal with the concept of globalization in this cines during the Covid-19 pandemic, why a majority
book, and we offer some arguments both for and of British people voted to leave the European Union,
against seeing it as an important new development the significance of the 2007–8 global financial crisis,
in world politics. whether the Western-led world order is in terminal
6 patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
decline, why Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, or the that define the twenty-first century; and the sig-
causes and significance of economic, gendered, and nificance of the rise of non-Western powers in con-
racialized inequality in world politics. temporary world politics after a period of Western
There are three main aims of this book: dominance. Part Three gives a detailed account of
• to offer an overview of world politics in a global era; each of the main theories of world politics—liberal
internationalism, realism, Marxism, constructiv-
• to summarize the main approaches to understand-
ism, poststructuralism, postcolonial and decolo-
ing contemporary world politics; and
nial approaches, and feminism. In Part Four we look
• crete
to provide the material necessary to develop a con-
understanding of the main structures and
at the main structures and processes that do most to
shape the central contours of contemporary world
issues defining world politics today. politics, such as global political economy, interna-
In Part Two we will examine the very important histor- tional security, war, gender, and racial hierarchy.
ical background to the contemporary world, includ- Then in Part Five of the book we deal with some of
ing: the rise of the modern international order; the the main policy issues in the globalized world, such
major crises of international relations that defined as global health, poverty, human rights, refugees,
the twentieth century; more recent developments and the environmental crisis.
1.1 From international politics to world politics

Why does the main title of this book refer to ‘world be as important as what states and other political
politics’ rather than ‘international politics’ or ‘inter- actors do. Hence, we prefer to use the more expansive
national relations’? These are the traditional terms term ‘world politics’, with the important proviso that
used to describe the kinds of structures and pro- we do not want you to defi ne ‘politics’ too narrowly.
cesses covered in this book, such as the causes of war Many contributors to this volume also understand
and peace or the global economy and its inequali- politics very broadly.
ties. Indeed, the discipline that studies these issues is Consider, for example, the distinction between
nearly always called International Relations. We will ‘politics’ and ‘economics’. Clearly, a great deal of power
say more about this discipline shortly. The point here accrues to the group that can persuade others that the
is that we believe the phrase ‘world politics’ is more existing distribution of wealth and resources is ‘simply’
inclusive than either of the alternative terms ‘interna- an economic or ‘private’ question rather than a political
tional relations’ or ‘international politics’. It is meant or ‘public’ issue. Indeed, the very distinction between
to signal that in this book we are interested in a very ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ has a history and is open to
wide set of actors and political relations in the world, dispute. According to Oxfam, 82 per cent of the world’s
and not only those among nation-states (as implied global wealth is held by 1 per cent of its population; the
by ‘international relations’ or ‘international politics’). world’s richest 27 people possess the same wealth as its
It is not that relations between states are unimport- poorest 50 per cent—3.8 billion people. And the global
ant; far from it. They are fundamental to contem- wealth gap increases every year. The world’s ten richest
porary world politics. But we are also interested in men doubled their wealth during the pandemic. The
relations among institutions and organizations that point here is that we want you to think about politics
may or may not be states. For example, this book will very broadly because many of the chapters in this book
introduce you to the significance of multinational will describe as ‘political’ features of the contemporary
corporations , transnational terrorist groups, social world that you may not have previously thought of in
classes, and non-governmental organizations that way. Our focus is on the political and power rela-
(NGOs) such as human rights groups. We also think tions, broadly defined, that characterize the contempo-
that relations among multinational corporations, rary world. Many will be between states, but many—and
governments , or international organizations can perhaps most—will not.
Chapter 1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics 7
1.2 The study of International Relations
As you will discover in reading this book, International discipline of International Relations is relatively
Relations (IR) is an incredibly exciting and diverse field recent. This history also partly accounts for some of
of study. It is exciting because it addresses the most the issues just described. Consider how the history of
pressing problems shaping the lives of everyone on the the discipline of IR is itself contested. One of the most
planet: the global environmental catastrophe, pandem- influential accounts of its history is that the academic
ics, matters of war and peace, the organization of the discipline was formed in 1919 when the Department of
global economy, the causes and consequences of global International Politics was established at the University
inequality, to name just a few of the most obvious. The of Wales, Aberystwyth (now Aberystwyth University).
key concepts that organize debate in the field are also The emphasis in this version of the story is that the
some of the most contentious: power, violence, sover- Department of International Politics was founded after
eignty, states, empire, genocide, intervention, inequal- the horrors of the First World War to help prevent a
ity, justice, and democracy. future war. If scholars could find the causes of war, then
The field is highly diverse, organized into various they could put forward solutions to help politicians pre-
subfields and specialisms, including international his- vent wars from breaking out. According to this view,
tory, international security, international political econ- the discipline of IR was—or should be—marked by
omy, international law, and international organizations. such a commitment to changing the world; the task of
Scholars of International Relations also often work with academic study should be one of making the world a
regional specialisms, focusing on Latin America, East better place.
Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa, or North America. Others have challenged this story as a foundation
International Relations is also highly interdisciplin- myth for a field with a much darker history, situating
ary, drawing on theoretical and methodological tradi- the emergence of IR somewhat earlier in the history of
tions from fields as diverse as History, Law, Political colonial administration and the study of imperialism
Science, Geography, Sociology, Anthropology, Gender (Long and Schmidt 2005; Vitalis 2015). For example, the
Studies, and Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies. In first journal in the field was called the Journal of Race
Britain, historians were most influential in the earliest Development, first published in 1910, and which is now
decades of the organized study of international rela- the influential US-based publication known as Foreign
tions (Hall 2012). In more recent years, especially after Affairs. The beginning of the twentieth century was
the end of the Second World War, and especially in the not only a period of world war, but also one of empire,
United States, Political Science has tended to have the theft of land, and belief in racial supremacy—that is,
greatest influence on the discipline of International maintaining and justifying white supremacy in world
Relations. This tended to narrow the range of accept- politics. In the United States, African-American schol-
able approaches to the study of IR, and also led to an ars interested in studying race and world politics were
excessive focus on US foreign policy, to the detriment systematically marginalized from the emerging disci-
of non-Western history and theories of world politics. pline of IR (Vitalis 2015). However, situating the history
However, both inside and outside the United States, of the field in this context gives a very different gloss
scholars have started to pay much more attention to to the role of academic International Relations today,
how and why IR has neglected non-Western histories which exists in a context of international hierarchy
and experiences, and have begun to rectify this (Tickner and the continuing significance of race and racism in
and Wæver 2009). In doing so, they have increasingly world politics, as discussed later in this book. Indeed,
moved the field away from Eurocentric approaches to even more recently scholars have started to decentre
world politics, and begun to take seriously the project the origin story of International Relations, pointing to
of developing a Global IR (Acharya 2014b). its multiple origins around the world (Davis, Thakur,
and Vale 2020; Thakur and Smith 2021).
Watch the video on the online resources to see the
The point to note here is that there are important
author explain the move away from a Eurocentric
debates about how academic knowledge is produced,
approach to world politics.
the global political contexts in which academic dis-
People have tried to make sense of world politics for ciplines are formed, and some of the enduring lega-
centuries. However, the formation of the academic cies of this history. Another important example is how
histories of international thought and the discipline of and for how we should think about world politics today.
International Relations almost entirely exclude women Indeed, you should keep in mind that the main theories
thinkers and founders of the discipline (for an exception, of world politics did not arise from nowhere. They were
see Ashworth 2014). Women in the past thought and developed by intellectuals and practitioners in specific
wrote a great deal about international politics (Sluga and circumstances for very concrete and political reasons.
James 2016), but this work has yet to be fully recovered International theories have histories too (Knutsen 1997;
and analysed (but see Owens and Rietzler 2021; Owens Keene 2005; Ashworth 2014).
et al. 2022). Knowledge about world politics—and the
Watch the video on the online resources to see the
academic subjects that you study at university—also has
author discuss why women have been excluded
a history and a politics. This history is relevant for the
from the discipline of IR.
identity of the academic field of International Relations
1.3 Theories of world politics

The basic problem facing anyone who tries to under- only way you can decide which of the millions of pos-
stand contemporary world politics is that there is so sible facts matter is by adhering to some simplifying
much material to look at that it is difficult to know device. Theory is such a device. Note also that you may
which things matter and which do not. Where on not be aware of your theory. It may just be the view of or
earth would you start if you wanted to explain the even ideology about the world that you inherited from
most important political processes? How, for exam- your family, social class, peer groups, or the media. It
ple, would you explain the failures of climate change may just seem common sense to you and not at all com-
negotiations, the struggles over poor countries’ access plicated. But in such a case your theoretical assump-
to vaccines, ‘Brexit’ from the EU, or the 9/11 attacks? tions are just implicit rather than explicit. We prefer
Why are thousands of migrants from North Africa to try to be as explicit as possible when thinking about
seeking to make the extremely dangerous voyage across world politics.
the Mediterranean Sea to the European Union? Why Of course, many proponents of particular theo-
does the United States support Israel in its conflict with ries also claim to see the world the way it ‘really is’.
Palestinians in the occupied territories? As you will Consider the International Relations theory known
learn, there are very different responses to these ques- as ‘realism’. The ‘real’ world as seen by realists is not
tions, and there seems no easy way of arriving at defini- a very pleasant place. According to their view, human
tive answers to them. beings are at best selfish and domineering, and proba-
Whether you are aware of it or not, whenever you are bly much worse. Liberal notions about the perfectibility
faced with questions like these you have to turn not only of human beings and the possibility of a fundamental
to the study of history, though that is absolutely essen- transformation of world politics away from conflict and
tial, but also to theories. Theory is a kind of simplify- towards peace are far-fetched from a realist perspec-
ing device that allows you to decide which historical or tive. Indeed, realists have often had the upper hand in
contemporary facts and events matter more than others debates about the nature of world politics because their
when trying to develop an understanding of the world. views seem to accord more with common sense. We will
A good analogy is using sunglasses with different- say more about realism in a moment. The point here is
coloured lenses: put on the red pair and the world looks to question whether such a realist view is as neutral as
red; put on the yellow pair and it looks yellow. The world it seems commonsensical. After all, if we teach world
is not any different; it just looks different. So it is with politics to generations of students and tell them that
theories. Shortly, we will summarize the main theoreti- people are selfish, then does this not become common
cal views that have dominated the study of world poli- sense? And when they go to work in the media, univer-
tics so that you will get an idea of which ‘colours’ they sities, for governments, international organizations, or
paint world politics. But before we do, please note that the military, do they not simply repeat what they have
we do not think theory is an option: you cannot say that been taught and act accordingly? Might realism simply
you do not want to bother with theory, all you want to be the ideology of powerful states, interested in protect-
do is to look at the ‘facts’. This is impossible, since the ing the status quo? What is the history of realism and
what does this history tell us about its claims about how Therefore, there can be no such thing as one ‘national
the world ‘really is’? For now, we would like to keep the interest ’ since it merely represents the result of what-
issue open and simply point out that we are not con- ever societal preferences or bureaucratic organizations
vinced that realism is as objective, timeless, or non- dominate the domestic decision-making process. In
normative as it is often portrayed. relations among states, liberals stress the possibilities
What is certainly true is that realism has been one of for cooperation; the key issue becomes devising inter-
the dominant ways in the West of explaining world pol- national institutions in which economic and political
itics over the last 150 years. But it is not the only theory cooperation can be best achieved.
of international relations, nor the one most closely asso- The picture of world politics that arises from the lib-
ciated with the earliest academic study of international eral view is of a complex system of bargaining among
relations. We will now summarize the principal assump- many different types of actors. Military force is still
tions underlying the main rivals as theories of world important, but the liberal agenda is not as restricted
politics: liberal internationalism, realism, Marxism, as the realist one of relations between great powers.
constructivism, poststructuralism, postcolonial and Liberals see national interests in more than just mili-
decolonial approaches, and feminism. These theories tary terms, and stress the importance of economic,
will be discussed in much more detail in Part Three environmental, and technological issues. Order in
of this book; although we do not go into much depth world politics emerges from the interactions among
about them here, we want to give you a flavour of their many layers of governing arrangements, comprising
main themes as we also want to say something about laws, agreed norms, international regimes, and insti-
how each thinks about globalization. tutional rules to manage the global capitalist economy.
Fundamentally, liberals do not think that sovereignty is
Watch the video on the online resources to see
as important in practice as realists believe. States may
the author explain how and why IR theory is
be legally sovereign, but in practice they have to negoti-
valuable.
ate with all sorts of other public and private actors, with
the result that their freedom to act as they might wish is
1.3.1 Liberal internationalism
seriously curtailed. Interdependence between states is
Liberal internationalism developed after the First a critically important feature of world politics.
World War, in a period defined by competing but unsta-
ble empires, class conflict, women’s suffrage, and exper-
1.3.2 Realism
iments in international organization (Sluga and Clavin
2017). As you will later learn, there are many kinds of Realists have a different view of world politics and, like
‘liberalism’. But the main themes that run through lib- liberals, claim a long tradition. However, it is highly
eral thought are that human beings and societies can be contested whether realists can actually claim a lineage
improved, that capitalism is the best way of organizing all the way back to ancient Greece, or whether real-
the economy, that representative democracy is neces- ism is an invented intellectual tradition for cold war
sary for liberal improvement, and that ideas—not just American foreign policy needs. Either way, there are
material power—matter. Behind all this lies a belief in many variants of something called ‘realism’. But in
progress, modelled on the achievements of liberal capi- general, for realists, the main actors on the world stage
talist societies in the West. Hence, liberals reject the are the most powerful states, which are legally sover-
realist notion that war is the natural condition of world eign actors. Sovereignty means that there is no actor
politics. They also question the idea that the state is the above the state that can compel it to act in specific ways.
main actor on the world political stage, although they According to this view, other actors such as multina-
do not deny that it is important. They see individuals, tional corporations or international organizations have
multinational corporations, transnational actors, and to work within the framework of inter-state relations
international organizations as central actors in some set by the most powerful states. As for what propels
issue-areas of world politics. Liberals tend to think of states to act as they do, many realists see human nature
the state not as a unitary or united actor, but as made up as centrally important, and they view human nature
of individuals and their collective societal preferences as rather selfish. As a result, world politics (or, more
and interests. They also think of the state as comprised accurately for realists, international politics) represents
of a set of bureaucracies, each with its own interests. a struggle for power among states, with each trying to
maximize its national interest. Such order as exists in To this degree, social constructivism strongly overlaps
world politics is the result of the workings of a mecha- with liberalism and can even be seen as providing the
nism known as the balance of power, whereby states social theory underpinnings of liberal political theories
act so as to prevent any one state from dominating. of world politics. In the words of one of the most influ-
Thus, world politics is all about bargaining and alli- ential constructivist theorists, Alexander Wendt, even
ances, with diplomacy a key mechanism for balancing the self-help international system portrayed by real-
various national interests. But finally, the most impor- ists is something that we make and remake: ‘anarchy
tant tool available for implementing states’ foreign is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). Therefore, the
policies is military force. Ultimately, since there is no world that realists portray as ‘natural’ or ‘given’ is in
sovereign body above the states that make up the inter- fact far more open to change, and constructivists think
national political system, world politics is a self-help that self-help is only one possible response to the anar-
system in which states must rely on their own military chical structure of world politics. Indeed, not only is
resources to achieve their ends. Often these ends can the structure of world politics amenable to change, but
be achieved through cooperation, but the potential for so also are the identities and interests that neorealism
conflict is ever-present. or neoliberalism take as given. The seemingly ‘natural’
Since the 1980s, an important variant of realism structures, processes, identities, and interests of world
has developed, known as neorealism. This approach politics could in fact be different from what they cur-
stresses the importance of the structure of the interna- rently are. Note, however, that social constructivism is
tional system in affecting the behaviour of all states. not a theory of world politics in itself. It is an approach
Thus, during the cold war two main powers dominated to the philosophy of social science with implications for
the international system, and this gave rise to certain the kinds of arguments that can be made about world
rules of behaviour; now that the cold war has ended, the politics. Constructivists need to marry their approach
structure of world politics is said to be moving towards to another political theory of world politics, such as
multipolarity (after a phase of unipolarity), which for realism, feminism, but usually liberalism, to actually
neorealists will involve very different rules of the game. make substantive claims.
Realism, liberalism, and social constructivism are
the dominant approaches in the most influential loca-
1.3.3 Social constructivism
tion for IR scholarship, which is currently the United
Social constructivism is a relatively new approach States. But by no means should realism, liberalism, and
in International Relations, one that developed in the social constructivism be considered the only compel-
United States in the late 1980s and has been becom- ling theories or the only approaches with large num-
ing increasingly influential since the mid-1990s. The bers of adherents. On the contrary, outside the United
approach arose out of a set of events in world politics, States these theories are often considered to be far
notably the disintegration of the Soviet empire, as sym- too narrow and thus unconvincing. We now turn to
bolized most dramatically by the fall of the Berlin Wall some other approaches that are highly critical of these
in 1989. These events indicated that human agency had three approaches and move beyond them in quite far-
a much greater potential role in world politics than reaching ways.
implied by realism or liberalism. But the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of social constructivism are much
1.3.4 Marxist theories
older; they relate to a series of social-scientific and phil-
osophical works that dispute the notion that the ‘social The fourth main theoretical position we want to mention
world’ is external to the people who live in it, and is not is Marxism, also known as historical materialism, which
easily changed. To different degrees, realism and liber- immediately gives you a clue as to its main assumptions.
alism stress the regularities and ‘certainties’ of political But first we want to point out a paradox about Marxism.
life (although liberalism is somewhat less adamant). On the one hand, Marxist theory has been incred-
By contrast, constructivism argues that we make and ibly influential historically, inspiring socialist revolu-
remake the social world so there is much more of a role tions around the world, including during the process of
for human agency than realism and liberalism allow. decolonization, and also in the recent global uprisings in
These approaches underestimate the possibilities for response to the 2007 global financial crisis. On the other
human progress and for the betterment of people’s lives. hand, it has been less influential in the discipline of IR
than either realism or liberalism, and has less in com- was probably as popular a theoretical approach as any
mon with either realism or liberalism than they do with discussed in this book, and it overlaps with several of
each other. Indeed, from a Marxist perspective, both them. Part of the difficulty, however, is precisely defin-
realism and liberalism serve the class and imperial inter- ing poststructuralism, which is also sometimes referred
ests of the most powerful actors in world politics to the to as postmodernism. This is in addition to the fact, of
detriment of most of the rest of the world. course, that there are substantial theoretical differences
For Marxist theory, the most important feature of within its various strands. One useful definition is by
world politics is that it takes place in a highly unequal Jean-François Lyotard (1984: xxiv): ‘Simplifying to the
capitalist world economy. In this world economy the extreme, I define post-modern as incredulity towards
most important actors are not states but classes, and metanarratives’. ‘Incredulity’ simply means scepticism;
the behaviour of all other actors is ultimately explicable ‘metanarrative’ means any theory that asserts it has clear
by class forces. Thus states, multinational corporations, foundations for making knowledge claims and involves
and even international organizations represent the a foundational epistemology. You do not need to
dominant class interest in the world economic system. worry too much about what this means right now. It is
Marxist theorists differ over how much leeway actors explained in more detail in the chapter on poststructur-
such as states have, but all Marxists agree that the alism (see Ch. 12), and we say a little more about these
world economy severely constrains states’ freedom of meta-theory questions in Section 1.3.8. Put simply, to
manoeuvre, especially that of poorer and weaker states. have a foundational epistemology is to think that all
Rather than an arena of conflict among national inter- truth claims about the world can be judged true or false
ests or with many different issue-areas, Marxist theo- (epistemology is how we can claim to know something).
rists conceive of world politics as the setting in which Poststructuralism is essentially concerned with dis-
class conflicts are played out. In the branch of Marxism trusting and exposing any account of human life that
known as world systems theory, the key feature of the claims to have direct access to ‘the truth’. Thus realism,
international economy is the division of the world into liberalism, social constructivism, and Marxism are all
a wealthy capitalist core, a semi-periphery, and an suspect from a poststructuralist perspective because
exploited periphery integrated into the economy in its they claim to have uncovered some fundamental truth
provision of natural resources and labour made cheap. about the world. Michel Foucault, an important influ-
Of course, in the semi-periphery and even the periph- ence on poststructuralists, was opposed to the notion
ery there exist wealthy pockets that are tied into the that knowledge is immune from the workings of power.
capitalist world economy, while even in the core area Instead, and in common with Marxism, he argued that
there are exploited economic areas. But what matters is power produces knowledge. All power requires knowl-
the dominance of the power not of states but of global edge and all knowledge relies on and reinforces existing
capitalism, and it is capitalist forces, including capital- power relations. Thus there is no such thing as ‘truth’
ist crises, that ultimately determine the main political existing outside of power. Truth is not something
patterns in world politics. Sovereignty is not nearly as external to social settings, but is instead part of them.
important for Marxist theorists as for realists since it Poststructuralist international theorists have used
refers to political and legal matters, whereas the most this insight to examine the ‘truths’ of International
important feature of world politics for Marxist theo- Relations theory, to see how the concepts that dominate
rists is the degree of economic autonomy, and here they the discipline are in fact highly contingent on specific
see all states as having to play by the rules of the inter- power relations. Poststructuralism takes apart the very
national capitalist economy. concepts and methods of our thinking, examining the
conditions under which we are able to theorize about
world politics in the first place.
1.3.5 Poststructuralism
Poststructuralism has been a particularly influential
1.3.6 Postcolonial and decolonial
theoretical development throughout the humanities and
social sciences in the last 30 years. It reached interna-
approaches
tional theory in the mid-1980s, but it can only be said Postcolonialism has been an important approach in
to have really arrived in the last few years of the twen- cultural studies, literary theory, and anthropology for
tieth century. Indeed, for a time poststructuralism some time, and has a long and distinguished pedigree.
In recent years, more and more scholars studying inter- far-reaching ways. In 1903, W. E. B. DuBois famously
national politics are drawing on ideas from other disci- argued that the problem of the twentieth century would
plines, including postcolonialism, especially those that be the problem of the ‘colour-line’. How will transna-
expose the Eurocentric character of IR. It is noteworthy tional racism continue to shape global politics in the
that all the major theories we have discussed so far— twenty-first century?
realism, liberalism, Marxism, social constructivism,
and poststructuralism—emerged in Europe in response
1.3.7 Feminism
to specific European problems, including imperialism.
They are all ‘Eurocentric’. Postcolonial scholars ques- Feminists were among the earliest and most influential
tion whether Eurocentric theories can really purport to writers on international politics in the period during
explain world politics, its historical relation to empire which the academic discipline of International Relations
and colonialism, or world politics as it relates to the emerged (Ashworth 2011; Owens et al. 2022). But, as
lives of most people on the planet. It is more likely that noted earlier, this tradition of international theory
these Eurocentric approaches help to continue and jus- was marginalized from the discipline of International
tify the military and economic subordination of the Relations after the Second World War until the 1980s.
Global South by powerful Western interests. This pro- The first and most important thing to note about femi-
cess is known as ‘neocolonialism’. nism itself is that there is no one feminist theory: there
Postcolonialism has also become more popular in are many kinds of feminisms. However, the different
IR since the 9/11 attacks, which encouraged people to approaches are united by their focus on the construc-
try to understand how the histories of the West and tion of differences between ‘women’ and ‘men’ in the
the Global South have always been intertwined. For context of hierarchy and power and the highly contin-
example, the identities of the colonized and coloniz- gent understandings of masculinity and femininity that
ers are constantly in flux and mutually constituted. these power relations produce. Indeed, the very catego-
Postcolonial scholars argue that the dominant theories of ‘women’ and ‘men’, and the concepts of mas-
ries, especially realism and liberalism, are not neutral culinity and femininity, are highly contested in much
in terms of race, gender, and class, but have helped feminist research. Some feminist theories assume natu-
secure the domination of the Western world over the ral and biological (i.e. sex) differences between men and
Global South. At the same time, traditional Marxism women. Some do not. However, all the most interest-
did not pay sufficient attention to the way that racial ing work in this field analyses how gender both affects
and gendered identities and power relations were cen- world politics and is an effect of world politics; in other
tral to upholding class power. Decolonial scholarship, words, how different concepts (such as the state, war, or
which comes out of and is closely linked to postcolo- sovereignty) are gendered and, in turn, how this gen-
nialism, then proceeds to think about how to ‘decol- dering of concepts can have differential consequences
onize’ the dominant theories and ways of knowing. for ‘men’ and ‘women’.
Thus, an important claim of postcolonial and decolo- Some feminists look at the ways in which women
nial approaches is that global hierarchies of subordina- are excluded from power and prevented from playing a
tion and control, past and present, are made possible full part in political activity. They examine how women
through the historical construction and combination have been restricted to roles critically important for
of racial, gendered, class, and national differences and the functioning of things (such as reproductive econo-
hierarchies. As other chapters in this volume suggest, mies) but that are not usually deemed to be important
IR has been slightly more comfortable with issues for theories of world politics. Other feminists argue
of class and gender. But the issue of race was almost that the cause of women’s inequality is in the capital-
entirely ignored from the end of the Second World War ist system – that overthrowing capitalism is the neces-
until quite recently. This occurred even though at the sary route for the achievement of the equal treatment of
turn of the twentieth century international relations women. ‘Standpoint feminists’ identify how women, as
explicitly meant ‘race relations’ since a large propor- a particular class by virtue of their sex rather than eco-
tion of international relations research focused on the nomic standing (although the two are related), possess
administration of colonies (Vitalis 2015). As shown a unique perspective—or standpoint—on world poli-
in Chapter 18, race and racism continue to shape the tics as a result of their subordination. For example, in
contemporary theory and practice of world politics in an important essay, J. Ann Tickner (1988) reformulated
the famous ‘six principles of political realism’ devel- between explanatory and constitutive theories. An
oped by the ‘godfather’ of realism, Hans J. Morgenthau. explanatory theory is one that sees the world as some-
Tickner showed how the seemingly ‘objective’ rules of thing external to our theories of it. In contrast, a con-
realism reflect hegemonic ‘masculine’ values and defi- stitutive theory is one that thinks our theories actually
nitions of reality. As a riposte, she reformulated these help construct the world. In a very obvious way our
same rules taking women’s experiences as the starting theories about the world shape how we act, and thereby
point. make those theories self-confirming. For example, if we
Postcolonial and decolonial feminists work at the think individuals are naturally aggressive then we are
intersection of class, race, and gender on a global scale, likely to adopt a different posture towards them than
and especially analyse the gendered effects of trans- if we think they are naturally peaceful. However, you
national culture and the unequal division of labour in should not regard this claim as self-evidently true, since
the global political economy. From this perspective, it it assumes that our ability to think and reason makes
is not good enough to simply demand (as some liberal us able to determine our choices (i.e. that we have free
feminists do) that men and women should have equal will rather than having our ‘choices’ predetermined).
rights in a Western-style democracy. Such a move What if our human nature is such that we desire certain
ignores the way in which poor women of colour in the things ‘naturally’, and that our language and seemingly
Global South remain subordinated by the global eco- ‘free choices’ are simply rationalizations for our needs?
nomic system—a system that liberal feminists were too The point is that there is a genuine debate between those
slow to challenge in a systematic way. who think of the social world as like the natural world,
and those theories that see our language and concepts
as helping to create that reality. Theories claiming the
1.3.8 Some meta-theoretical questions
natural and social worlds are the same are known as
For most of the twentieth century, realism, liberalism, naturalist (Hollis and Smith 1990).
and Marxism tended to be the main theories used to In IR, realist and liberal theories tend to be explana-
understand world politics, with constructivism, femi- tory, with the task of theory being to report on a world
nism, and poststructuralism becoming increasingly that is external to our theories. Their concern is to
influential from the mid-1990s and postcolonialism uncover regularities in human behaviour and thereby
gaining some influence since the 2000s. explain the social world in much the same way as a nat-
While it is clear that each of these theories focuses ural scientist might explain the physical world. By con-
on different aspects of world politics, each is saying trast, nearly all the approaches developed in the last 30
more than this. Each view is claiming that it is picking years or so tend to be constitutive theories. Here theory
out the most important features of world politics and is not external to the things it is trying to explain, and
that it offers a better account than rival theories. Thus, instead may construct how we think about the world.
the different approaches are really in competition with Or, to put it another way, our theories define what we
one another. While you can certainly choose among see as the external world. Thus, the very concepts we
them and combine some aspects of some of the theories use to think about the world help to make that world
(see, for example, Marxism, feminism, and postcolo- what it is.
nialism), it is not always so easy to add bits from one to The foundational/anti-foundational distinction
the others. For example, if you are a Marxist then you refers to the simple-sounding issue of whether our
think that state behaviour is ultimately determined by beliefs about the world can be tested or evaluated
class forces. But realists and liberals do not think that against any neutral or objective procedures. This is a
class affects state behaviour in any significant way. In distinction central to the branch of the philosophy of
other words, these theories are really competing ver- social science known as epistemology (the study of how
sions of what world politics is like rather than partial we can claim to know something). A foundationalist
pictures of it. They do not agree on what the ‘it’ is. position is one that thinks that all truth claims (about
One way to think about this is in relation to meta- some feature of the world) can be judged true or false.
theoretical questions (questions above any particu- An anti-foundationalist thinks that truth claims can-
lar theory). Such terms can be a little unsettling, but not be judged in this way, since there are never neutral
they are merely convenient words for discussing fairly grounds for doing so. Instead each theory will define
straightforward ideas. First consider the distinction what counts as the facts, and so there will be no neutral
position available to adjudicate between rival claims. anti-foundational. The point at this stage is not to con-
Think, for example, of a Marxist and a liberal arguing struct some checklist, nor to get you thinking yet about
about the ‘true’ state of the economy. Foundationalists the epistemological differences among these theories.
look for ‘meta-theoretical’ (above any particular theory) Rather we want to draw your attention to the important
grounds for choosing between truth claims. In con- impact of these assumptions about the nature of knowl-
trast, anti-foundationalists think that there are no such edge on the theories you will be learning about. The
positions available; the belief itself is simply a reflection last 30 years have seen these underlying assumptions
of an adherence to a particular view of epistemology. brought more into the open. The most important effect
Most of the contemporary approaches to interna- of this has been to undermine realism’s and liberalism’s
tional theory are much less wedded to foundationalism claims to be delivering the truth.
than were the traditional theories. Thus, poststructural- We have offered a very rough representation of how
ism, postcolonialism, and some feminist theory would various International Relations theories can be catego-
tend towards anti-foundationalism, whereas neoreal- rized. This is misleading in some respects since there are
ism and neoliberalism would tend towards foundation- quite different versions of the main theories and some
alism. Interestingly, social constructivism wishes to of these are less foundationalist than others. So the clas-
portray itself as occupying the middle ground. On the sifications are broadly illustrative of the theoretical land-
whole, and as a rough guide, explanatory theories tend scape and are best considered a useful starting point for
to be foundational while constitutive theories tend to be thinking about the differences among theories.
1.4 Theories and globalization

No International Relations theory has all the answers • For realists, the picture looks very different. For them,
when it comes to explaining world politics in a global globalization—however its advocates define it—does
era. In fact, each sees ‘globalization’ differently. We do not alter the most significant feature of world poli-
not want to tell you which theory seems best, since the tics, namely the territorial division of the world into
purpose of this book is to give you a variety of lenses nation-states. While the increased interconnected-
through which to look at world politics. All we will do is ness among economies and societies might make
say a few words about how each theory responds to the them more dependent on one another, the same can-
debate about ‘globalization’. We will then say something not be said about the state system. Here, powerful
about the possible rise of globalization and offer some states retain sovereignty, and globalization does not
ideas on its strengths and weaknesses as a description of render obsolete the struggle for political power among
contemporary world politics. those states. Nor does it undermine the importance of
the threat of the use of force or the importance of the
• For liberals, globalization is the end product of a long- balance of power. Globalization may affect our social,
running, progressive transformation of world politics. economic, and cultural lives, but it does not transcend
Liberals are particularly interested in the revolution the international political system of states. For exam-
in economy, technology, and communications repre- ple, we might think of the decision of the British peo-
sented by globalization. This increased interconnect- ple to leave the European Union, or the way wealthy
edness among societies, which is economically and states hoarded Covid-19 vaccines, as a demonstration
technologically led, results in a very different pattern of of the enduring significance of national sovereignty.
world political relations from that which came before. • For constructivist theorists, globalization tends to be
States are no longer such central actors. In their place presented as an external force acting on states, which
are numerous actors of differing importance depend- leaders often argue is a reality that they cannot chal-
ing on the issue concerned. The world looks more like lenge. For constructivists, this is a very political act, since
a cobweb of relations than like the state model of real- it underestimates the ability of changing social norms
ism or the class model of Marxist theory. For example, and the identity of actors to challenge and shape global-
from this perspective, the British vote to exit from the ization, and instead allows leaders to duck responsibility
EU was a foolish and very expensive decision to reject by blaming ‘the way the world is’. Instead, constructiv-
political and economic integration. ists think that we can mould globalization in a variety
of ways, notably because it offers us very real chances, persistence of colonial forms of power in the global-
for example, to create cross-national human rights and ized world. For example, the level of economic and
social movements aided by modern technological military control of Western interests in the Global
forms of communication such as the internet. South is in many ways greater now than it was under
• For Marxists, globalization is a sham, and the recent direct colonial control—a form of ‘neo’-colonialism
backlash against ‘globalization’ is evidence of this. that is compatible with neoliberal capitalism. So,
From a historical perspective, it is nothing particularly although the era of formal colonial imposition by
new, and is really only the latest stage in the develop- force of arms is largely over, an important starting
ment of international capitalism: neoliberalism. It does point for postcolonial scholarship is the issue of vast
not mark a qualitative shift in world politics, nor does inequality on a global scale, the forms of globalizing
it render all our existing theories and concepts redun- power that make this systematic inequality possible,
dant. Above all, globalization is a Western-led capitalist and the continued domination of subaltern peoples,
phenomenon that simply furthers the development of those classes dominated under hegemony such as
global capitalism, in a neoliberal vein. Neoliberalism is poor rural women in the Global South.
less a variant of liberal internationalism, though there • Each of the different branches of feminist scholar-
are links, than the effort to deregulate global capitalism ship responds differently to the question of global-
for the benefit of the rich. Rather than make the world ization, but they all address and debate the effects it
more alike, neoliberal globalization further deepens the has on gendered forms of power. Liberal feminists,
existing divides between the core, the semi-periphery, as is to be expected, are most positive and hopeful
and the periphery. about globalization, viewing it as a way to incorpo-
• For poststructuralists, ‘globalization’ does not rate more women into the liberal capitalist politi-
exist out there in the world. It is a discourse. cal and economic system that has benefited many
Poststructuralists are sceptical of the grand claims women in the West. Others are much more scepti-
made by realists, liberals, and Marxists about the cal, pointing to the negative effects of neoliberalism
nature of globalization, and they argue that any and economic globalization on the global wealth
claims about the meaning of so-called ‘globaliza- gap, which has a disproportionately negative effect
tion’ make sense only in the context of a specific dis- on women of colour. From a feminist perspective, to
course that itself is a product of power. These various really assess the significance, causes, and effects of
regimes of truth about globalization reflect the ways globalization requires concrete analysis of the lived
in which both power and truth develop together in experiences of men and women, showing how seem-
a mutually sustaining relationship throughout his- ingly gender-neutral issues are highly gendered,
tory. The way to uncover the workings of power reinforcing relations of power and other forms of
behind the discourse of ‘globalization’ is to under- gender injustice.
take a detailed historical analysis of how the prac-
By the end of the book, we hope you will work out
tices and statements about globalization are ‘true’
which of these approaches (if any) best explain not only
only within specific discourses.
‘globalization’, but world politics in general. The central
• Postcolonial and decolonial scholarship on global-
point here is that the main theories see globalization
ization is similar to much Marxist thought in that
differently because they have a prior view of what is
it highlights the important degree of continuity and
most important in world politics.
1.5 Globalization: myth or reality?

This book offers an overview of world politics in a graphic example since it allows us to sit at home and
global era. But what does it mean to speak of a ‘global have instant communication with people around
era’? Societies today are affected both more exten- the world, including during the Covid-19 pandemic.
sively and more deeply by events in other societies. Email and social media such as TikTok, Facebook,
The world seems to be ‘shrinking’, and people are and Twitter have also transformed communications
increasingly aware of this. The internet is one very and hence how we come to know about world politics.
But these are only the most obvious examples. Others common culture, a good deal of it emanating
would include: pandemics such as Covid-19, pollu- from Hollywood.
tion and climate change, global supply chains and • A global polity is emerging, with transnational
global newspapers, international social movements social and political movements and the beginnings
such as Black Lives Matter, Amnesty International, of a transfer of allegiance from the state to sub-state,
or Greenpeace, global franchises such as McDonald’s, transnational, and international bodies.
Coca-Cola, and Apple. Have these developments • A cosmopolitan culture is developing, especially
really changed the nature of world politics? The around the issue of climate change. People are
debate about globalization is not just the claim that beginning to ‘think globally and act locally’.
the world has changed, but whether the changes are
However, just as there are powerful reasons for see-
qualitative and not merely quantitative. Has a ‘new’
ing globalization as a new stage in world politics, often
world political system really emerged as a result of
allied to the view that globalization is progressive—that
these processes?
it improves people’s lives—there are also arguments
Our final task in this introduction is to offer you a
that suggest the opposite. Some of the main ones are:
summary of the main arguments for and against glo-
balization as a distinct new phase in world politics. • Globalization is merely a buzzword to denote the
We do not expect you to decide where you stand on latest phase of global capitalism: neoliberalism. In a
the issue at this stage, but we think we should give you very powerful critique of globalization theory, Paul
some of the main arguments to keep in mind as you Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996) argue that one
read the rest of this book. Because the arguments for effect of the globalization thesis is that it makes it
globalization as a new phase of world politics are most appear as if national governments are powerless in
effectively summarized in Chapter 2, we will spend the face of global economic trends. This paralyses
more time on the criticisms. The main arguments in government attempts to subject global economic
favour are: forces to control and regulation. Arguing that most
globalization theory lacks historical depth, Hirst
• The pace of economic transformation is so great and Thompson suggest that it paints the current
that it has created a new world politics. States are juncture as more unusual, and also as more firmly
less and less like closed units and they cannot con- entrenched, than it is. Current trends may well be
trol their own economies under global capitalism. reversible and the more extreme versions of global-
The world economy is more interdependent than ization are ‘a myth’. Hirst and Thompson support
ever, with cross-border trade and financial flows this claim with five main conclusions from their
ever expanding. study of the contemporary world economy (Hirst
• Communications have fundamentally revolution- and Thompson 1996: 2–3). First, the present interna-
ized the way we deal with the rest of the world. We tionalized economy is not unique in history. In some
now live in a world where events in one location can respects, it is less open than the international econ-
be immediately observed on the other side of the omy between 1870 and 1914. Second, ‘genuinely’
world. Electronic communications alter our notions transnational companies are relatively rare; most
of the social groups we live in. are national companies trading internationally.
• A risk culture is emerging, with people realizing Third, there is no shift of finance and capital from
both that the main risks they face are global (pollu- the richest to the poorest countries. Overseas direct
tion and climate change, Covid-19, HIV/AIDS) and investment continues to be highly concentrated in
that individual states are unable to deal with these the richest states. Fourth, the world economy is not
problems. Time and space seem to be collapsing. global; rather trade, investment, and financial flows
Our old ideas of geographical space and of chrono- are concentrated in and among different blocs—
logical time are undermined by the speed of mod- Europe, North America, China, and Japan. Finally,
ern communications and media, as well as by new if they coordinated policies, this group of blocs
infectious diseases. could regulate global economic markets and forces.
• There is now, more than ever before, a global Hirst and Thompson offer a very powerful critique
culture, so that most urban areas resemble of one of the main planks of the globalization thesis:
one another. Much of the urban world shares a that the global economy is something beyond our
control. This view both misleads us and prevents us raises crucial questions of censorship and prevent-
from developing policies to control national econ- ing access to certain kinds of material, including
omies. All too often we are told that our economy those trading in the sexual exploitation of children.
must obey ‘the global market’, with enormous con- • Turning to so-called global governance, the main
sequences for social spending and social justice. Is worry here is about responsibility. To whom are
this a myth? the transnational social movements responsible
• Another obvious objection is that globalization is and democratically accountable? If IBM or Shell
very uneven in its effects. At times it sounds very becomes more and more powerful in the world, then
much like a Western theory applicable only to this raises the issues of accountability and demo-
a small part of humankind. If 40 per cent of the cratic control. One of the arguments for ‘Brexit’ was
world’s population is not connected to the inter- that EU decision-making is undemocratic and unac-
net, then we are in danger of overestimating both countable. Most of the emerging powerful actors in a
the extent and the depth of globalization. Some globalized world are not accountable to democratic
have argued that we are now in a period of so- publics. This argument also applies to seemingly
called ‘deglobalization’, of diminishing support for ‘good’ global actors such as Amnesty International
greater interdependence, as witnessed with Brexit, and Greenpeace.
the US election of Donald Trump, Russia’s invasion We hope that these arguments for and against the
of Ukraine, and rising populist parties in Europe dominant way of representing globalization will cause
and the United States. you to think deeply about the utility of the concept of
globalization. The chapters that follow do not take a
Watch the video on the online resources to see common stance for or against. We end by posing some
the author discuss if we are now in a period of questions that we would like you to keep in mind as you
‘deglobalization’. read the remaining chapters:
• A related objection is that globalization may well • Is globalization a new phenomenon in world politics?
be simply the latest stage of Western imperialism. • Which International Relations theory best explains
It is the old modernization theory in a new guise. globalization?
The forces that are being globalized are conveniently • Is globalization a positive or a negative development?
those found in the Western world. What about non- • Is neoliberal globalization merely the latest stage of
capitalist development?
Western experiences and values? Where do they fit
into this emerging global world? The worry is that • Does globalization make the state obsolete?
they do not fit in at all, and what is being celebrated • Does globalization make the world more or less
democratic?
in globalization is the triumph of a Western world-
view, at the expense of others. • Is globalization merely Western imperialism in a
new guise?
• There are very many losers as the world becomes
• Does globalization make war more or less likely?
more ‘globalized’. Globalization only represents the
supposed ‘success’ of neoliberal capitalism in an
• In what ways is war a globalizing force in itself?
economically divided world. Perhaps one outcome
• Do you think that the vote for Brexit or the spread
of Covid-19 represent a major new challenge to
is that neoliberal globalization allows the more effi-
globalization?
cient exploitation of poorer nations, and segments
of richer ones, all in the name of economic ‘open- We hope that this introduction and the chapters
ness’. The technologies accompanying globalization that follow help you to answer these questions, and
are technologies that benefit the richest economies that this book provides you with a good overview of
in the world, and allow their interests to override the politics of the contemporary world. Whether or
those of local communities. Not only is globaliza- not you conclude that globalization is a new phase
tion imperialist, it is also exploitative. in world politics, whether you think it is a positive
• Not all globalized forces are necessarily ‘good’. or a negative development, or that it does not really
Globalization makes it easier for drug cartels and exist at all, we leave to you to decide. But we think
terrorists to operate, and the internet’s anarchy it is important to conclude this chapter by stressing
that how we think about politics in the global era racialized, economic, and political spaces we occupy.
will reflect not merely the theories we accept, but World politics suddenly becomes very personal: how
also our own positions in the world. In this sense, does your economic position, your ethnicity, race,
how we respond to world events may itself be ulti- gender, culture, or religion determine what global-
mately dependent on the social, cultural, gendered, ization means to you?
Further Reading
On the history of the academic field of International Relations, see L. M. Ashworth (2014), A History
of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations
(London: Routledge); R. Vitalis (2015), White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American
International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); A. Acharya and B. Buzan (2019), The
Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press); A. E. Davis, V. Thakur, and P. C. J. Vale (2020), The Imperial Discipline:
Race and the Founding of International Relations (London: Pluto Press).
On the history of international political thought and international theories more generally, see
E. Keene (2005), International Political Thought: An Historical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity);
D. Armitage (2013), Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press); and P. Owens and K. Rietzler (2021), Women’s International Thought: A New
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
There are several good introductory guides to the globalization debate. On the intellectual
origins of ‘globalism’, see O. Rosenboim (2017), The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World
Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Comprehensive discussions are found in A. McGrew and D. Held (2007), Globalization Theory:
Approaches and Controversies (Cambridge: Polity Press) and F. J. Lechner and J. Boli (eds) (2014),
The Globalization Reader (Oxford: Blackwell). Also see C. el-Ojeili and P. Hayden (2006), Critical
Theories of Globalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
C. Enloe (2016), Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link, 2nd edn (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield) is a good analysis from a leading feminist of the connections between
globalization and various forms of violence.
We also point you to other books in the Rowman & Littlefield series on globalization edited by
M. B. Steger and T. Carver, in particular J. Agnew (2017), Globalization and Sovereignty: Beyond the
Territorial Trap, 2nd edn; V. M. Moghadam (2020), Globalization and Social Movements, 3rd edn;
and M. E. Hawkesworth (2018), Globalization and Feminist Activism, 2nd edn.
Excellent critiques of the globalization thesis are J. Rosenberg (2002), The Follies of Globalization
Theory (London: Verso); D. Held and A. McGrew (2007), Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond
the Great Divide, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press); B. K. Gills (ed.) (2002), Globalization and the
Politics of Resistance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); B. K. Gills and W. R. Thompson (eds)
(2006), Globalization and Global History (London: Routledge); J. E. Stiglitz (2017), Globalization and
its Discontents Revisited: The Era of Trump (London: Penguin); L. Weiss (1998), The Myth of the
Powerless State (Cambridge: Polity Press); and P. Hirst and G. Thompson (1999), Globalization in
Question, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
Chapter 2
Globalization and
global politics
anthony mcgrew
Framing Questions
● What is globalization?
● Does globalization still matter?
● What does globalization add to our understanding of contemporary world politics?
Reader’s Guide Globalization is a complex and contradictory pro-

cess, so not surprisingly has always been the sub-
Globalization is a concept which refers to the ject of great controversy. One of the most debated
widening, deepening, and acceleration of world- issues of our times is whether globalization is in
wide connectivity or interconnectedness. Popular retreat (‘deglobalization’) or undergoing a renais-
metaphors portray it in vivid terms as a ‘shrinking sance (‘reglobalization’). Either way, globalization
world’, a ‘networked world’, or a ‘global village’. will continue to matter profoundly to the study and
Indeed, both the Covid-19 pandemic and climate practice of twenty-first century world politics. This
change are indicative of just how deeply enmeshed chapter explores the complexities and contradic-
the fate of communities and societies across the tions of contemporary globalization and considers
world has become, not to mention how globaliza- why it is essential to comprehending and explaining
tion simultaneously unifies and divides the world. world politics.
20 anthony mcgrew
2.1 Introduction Box 2.1 Histories of globalization
Globalization, as with war, has been central to the for- Many histories of globalization reflect a Western-centric
perspective eliding globalization with the rise of the West to
mation of the modern world system and world poli-
global domination. The history of globalization is thus often
tics (Bayly 2004, 2018; Osterhammel 2014). Although described in terms of successive waves of Western expansion:
a recent concept, it represents neither a novel nor a beginning with the so-called ‘age of discovery’ (1450–1850),
solely Western phenomenon: global connectivity has continuing to the late nineteenth century Belle Epoque (1850–
a long history and diverse origins, from the Great Silk 1914) or Pax Britannica, then to Pax Americana (1945–89), and
finally reaching the most recent phase of post-cold war neolib-
Road and ‘ancient globalization’ to ‘oriental globaliza-
eral globalization (1990–2008).
tion’ (globalization from the East) (Bayly 2018; Hobson However, new global histories seek to correct this parti-
2021) (see Box 2.1). ality by drawing upon a global analysis (see Chs 3 and 11).
This chapter is organized into three parts. Section They draw attention to the ‘multicultural origins’ of globaliza-
2.2 is concerned with making sense of globalization, explaining how it has always been a multicentric rather
tion by addressing several primary questions: What than a Western-centric process, thus critiquing the ‘rise of the
West’ narrative (Conrad 2016; Hobson 2021; Pieterse 2012;
is globalization? What are its dominant features?
Sharman 2019).
How is it best conceptualized and defined? Section
2.3 examines the current predicament of global-
ization (often referred to as the ‘crisis of globaliza-
tion’) and its implications for world order and world understanding of twenty-first-century global affairs.
politics. Section 2.4 considers the contributions of Section 2.5 concludes with brief reflections on the
globalization scholarship to advancing a critical three core framing questions.
2.2 Making sense of globalization

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century the (at the time) the ironic headline: ‘(Communist) China
world experienced major global crises, namely the 2008 comes to the “rescue of global capitalism”’.
global financial crisis (GFC), the Covid-19 pandemic, Before the eruption of the GFC, economic global-
and, latterly, the war in Ukraine. These have had conse- ization (measured by global flows of capital, trade,
quences worldwide revealing the unprecedented scale and production) reached historic levels. At its peak
and depth of global integration since the end of the cold in 2007, global flows of capital, goods, and services
war. Indeed, globalization is integral to the functioning were estimated at a staggering 53 per cent of world
of modern economies, societies, and their institutions. economic activity (GDP) (McKinsey Global Institute
Universities, for instance, are literally global institu- 2016). Global economic integration had intensified and
tions, from the recruitment of students to the dissemi- expanded to embrace most of the world’s population as
nation of academic research. the emerging economies of China, Brazil, India, and
others were incorporated into a 24-hour global capital-
ist economy. Following the GFC, the pace of economic
2.2.1 Mapping globalization
globalization slowed dramatically, prompting much
In today’s global economy, the fate and fortunes of commentary about the end of globalization or ‘ deglo-
entire nations, communities, and households across balization’. Although global economic flows partially
the world are bound together through complex webs of recovered, the period since the GFC has been one of
global trade, finance, digital, and production networks. economic ‘slowbalization’: well below peak 2007 lev-
Such is the integration of the world economy that no els (as a share of world GDP), though for the most part
national economy can insulate itself from the work- at levels similar to or above those at the beginning of
ings of global markets, as the GFC demonstrated to this century (Altman and Bastian 2021; WTO 2021b;
such disastrous effect (see Ch. 16). A global crash was Lund et al. 2019). Subsequently, the Covid-19 pan-
only averted through coordinated action by the world’s demic had a hugely disruptive economic impact, with
major economies at the 2009 G20 summit prompting global trade only beginning from late 2021 to recover
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics 21
to pre-Covid-19 levels, while global financial flows
Box 2.2 The engines of globalization
remain subdued (WTO 2021a; UNCTAD 2021c)—a
partial recovery, however, which appeared to lose much Explanations of globalization tend to focus on three interre-
momentum following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine lated factors: technics (technological change and social organ-
(Ruta 2022). ization); economics (markets and capitalism); and politics
(power, interests, and institutions).
Every single working day, turnover on the world’s
money markets averages a startling $6.5 trillion, • Technics—central to any account of globalization, since an
integrated global system depends upon an advanced
slightly more than the combined annual (2021) GDP of
communications and transport infrastructure.
the UK and France. Few governments today have the
resources to resist global market speculation against • Economics—crucial as technology is, so too is
globalization’s specifically economic logic. Capitalism’s
their national currency without significant domes- insatiable demand for new markets and profits leads
tic economic consequences (see Ch. 28). Moreover, inevitably to the globalization of economic activity.
many transnational corporations have turnovers which
exceed the GDP of many countries. Collectively they
• Politics—shorthand for ideologies, interests, and power,
politics constitutes the third logic of globalization. If
account for over 33 per cent of world output, control technology provides the physical infrastructure of
global production networks which account for 30 per globalization, politics provides its normative and
regulatory infrastructure.
cent of world trade, and are primary sources of inter-
national investment in manufacturing and services
(UNCTAD 2018). They have enormous influence over
the location and distribution of productive, economic, Box 2.3 Digital globalization
and technological power, not to mention where they
Digital technologies are transforming globalization, with
declare their profits and pay their tax. Indeed, they
profound consequences in all domains from the cultural to
confound the traditional distinction between the the military. But it is in the economy that its impact is so
international and the domestic economy: the German visible. The fusing of robotics, artificial intelligence, super-
automotive company BMW is the top exporter of auto- computing, and advanced communications technologies
mobiles from the US. BMW’s largest manufacturing (the fourth Industrial Revolution) is disrupting the services
plant is in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and, together sector which is now the dominant sector in many econo-
mies. Work, rather than production, is being globalized. Just
with other German-owned car plants located in the US,
as in the 1990s, when production was outsourced across
accounts for the majority of American car exports to the globe, in the 2020s, services work, from marketing to
China. engineering design to telemedicine and accountancy, can
Contemporary globalization is intimately associated be globalized as it can be done from anywhere by workers
with the revolutions in modern transport and commu- with the relevant skills. This teleworking or ‘virtual offshor-
ing’ is now big business and growing rapidly with major
nication technologies, from jet transport and contain-
implications for employment. This ‘globotics upheaval’, as
erization to mobile phones and the internet (see Box Richard Baldwin labels it, is driving a new phase of eco-
2.2). Digitalization is revolutionizing worldwide com- nomic globalization with major implications for developing
munications through relatively cheap, instantaneous, economies.
round-the-clock global communication and informa- Digital technologies are also transforming global trade.
tion flows. Moreover, it is transforming all aspects of Consider the case of SpeedOutfitters in Elkhart, Indiana.
Run by motorcycle enthusiast Travis Baird, it started as a
globalization and has accelerated because of the Covid-
traditional retail store named Baird Motorcycles, before
19 pandemic (see Box 2.3) (UNCTAD 2021a). Global expanding to include online sales. Some 41 per cent of
data flows are increasing exponentially, while the digi- SpeedOutfitters’ total sales are now outside the United
tal population has expanded from over 1 billion users States in 131 different countries. This business is not unique;
to 4.66 billion (59.5 per cent of the world’s population), 97 per cent of eBay sellers export. Global e-commerce is
growing rapidly and is worth well over $1 trillion. This is
with the majority in Asia (Statista 2021a).
more decentred—more the preserve of small companies,
Although simultaneously widening the global rather than huge corporations. In 2020, partly because of
digital divide (UNCTAD 2021a), global communica- the Covid-19 pandemic, small UK companies on Amazon
tion infrastructures have made it possible to man- Marketplace exported a record £3.5 billion of merchandise,
age not only just-in-time production networks across a 20 per cent increase compared to 2019.
continents, but also to organize and mobilize like- Sources: Baldwin 2019; McKinsey Global Institute 2019;
UNCTAD 2021a; van der Marel 2021
minded people across the globe in virtual real time
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Comme à ce nigaud soutenant sa thèse un autre nigaud objectait :
« Mais comment ? Ce livre que vous tenez à la main, c’est donc une
idée ? » Et l’autre : « Je soutiens que ce n’est qu’une idée ; car qu’y
a-t-il de plus…? etc. » Je les aurais laissés à Molière.
L’Esprit n’aurait été que vengeur. Mais j’avais besoin d’esprit, car
je supportais difficilement les passions. L’oracle heureusement
m’éclaira. « Il n’y a point de connaissance subjective ». J’avais
maintenant de quoi penser. Je pouvais entrer dans la critique de
Kant, malgré les pièges tendus autour par la philosophie d’Institut, et
marcher du fameux théorème de l’Analytique au quatrième
Paralogisme, qui sont les pierres milliaires de l’Esprit. D’autant que
l’oracle jetait d’autres lumières : « La sensation est un abstrait » ; et
d’autres pour rire un peu : « Monsieur Ribot fait de la physiologie a
priori », non moins perçantes. Là-dessus j’écrirais des volumes. Mais
je veux présenter ces vérités à l’état naissant ; car autrement je
devrais ici retrouver ces discussions préliminaires qui n’avançaient
point, et qui revenaient toujours à demander d’un auteur médiocre :
« Que veut-il dire ? » Mais quel intérêt ? Le Maître était faible dans la
discussion et fort dans la conclusion ; et c’est pourquoi la rédaction
de nos cours, que j’avais entreprise autrefois comme un monument
de piété, ne m’a pas paru mériter l’attention des philosophes. Je
ferai mieux connaître l’Homme par ces détours et digressions
auxquels je m’abandonne, et cette manière indirecte et errante
donnera une idée assez exacte de ces leçons surchargées,
confuses, interminables, propres à scandaliser le Pédant.
Ce détour était pour arriver au Pédant. Je nommerai ainsi l’auteur
de manuels réputés en ce temps-là, et qui n’étaient ni meilleurs ni
pires que ceux d’aujourd’hui. Cette philosophie d’Institut, dont je
parlais, laisse encore quelques trous pour respirer ; le manuel n’en
laisse jamais. Ces divisions, ces querelles, ces solutions n’ont
réellement point de sens. Donnez-moi le meilleur manuel de ce
temps-ci ; réellement je n’y comprends rien. En ce temps-là donc, les
éditeurs firent entrer dans notre classe un bon nombre de manuels
du Pédant. Lagneau le sut et, sans autre commentaire, les fit mettre
sous clef. Trois mois après environ, nous vîmes arriver, muni des
pouvoirs de l’Inspection Générale, le Pédant lui-même, et je
considérai avec curiosité la scène qui allait suivre. Elle fut assez
belle. Le Professeur rendait aux élèves une composition sur ce
sujet : « Montrer qu’on ne peut être assuré de rien tant qu’on n’est
pas assuré de l’existence de Dieu. » Le lecteur reconnaîtra ici l’idée
que je rappelais tout à l’heure. Sur quoi le Pédant fit ce préambule,
que c’étaient là sans doute de hautes questions, mais qu’enfin ces
jeunes gens n’étaient peut-être pas en âge de les bien saisir, et qu’il
désirait que M. le Professeur fît expliquer celle-là par un des élèves.
Nous regardions cependant la tête puissante, qui demeurait
immobile et inclinée ; mais de sombres nuées s’assemblaient autour.
Un des élèves, choisi parmi les nouveaux, fut prié de répondre ; et je
vois encore cette jeune tête qui imitait l’autre et se chargeait de
nuages ; mais il ne dit rien. Il fut demandé par le Pédant si M. le
Professeur n’en désignerait pas un autre. Même jeu. Encore un
autre. Même jeu. Sur quoi le Pédant, faisant remarquer que ce
silence justifiait les doutes qu’il avait exprimés tout à l’heure, et la
crainte que l’enseignement du Professeur ne passât bien au-dessus
des élèves, demanda si M. le Professeur voudrait bien à son tour
expliquer comment il entendait que la question fût traitée. Les veines
se gonflèrent un peu plus sur le puissant crâne, mais j’affirme qu’il
n’en sortit pas d’autre signe. Ce fut un silence admirable. Après quoi
d’un ton léger soudainement Lagneau me pria de donner les
explications nécessaires. C’était lâcher le chien sur le visiteur. Je fus
un peu insolent, je le crains, mais brillant comme il fallait. Ce
souvenir me pénètre encore d’une joie délirante. Le Pédant s’en alla
sans répliquer. J’ai su que le jour même Lagneau lui écrivit
demandant un poste dans un collège. J’ai lu la réponse, qui n’était
point d’un sot, abondait en éloges, nommait Lagneau membre de la
commission des livres scolaires, et laissait espérer encore d’autres
faveurs.
Il faut dire que le célèbre Jules Lachelier fut toujours favorable à
Jules Lagneau, qui fut au nombre de ses élèves, à ce point même
que cette faveur s’étendit plus tard jusque sur les fidèles disciples du
maître. Nécessairement j’aurai à comparer, sous le rapport des
doctrines, ces deux hommes éminents. Cela fait trembler. Mais ce
livre enferme bien d’autres difficultés. Pour gagner du temps avec
moi-même, je veux dire une autre histoire assez comique, et qui
concerne encore le Pédant. Cette même année, l’Académie des
Sciences Morales et Politiques ayant mis au concours un exposé de
la philosophie de Spinoza, il y eut deux mémoires sur les rangs dont
on disait qu’ils se partageraient le prix. J’ai lu ces deux mémoires
depuis trop longtemps pour en parler ; Lagneau ne m’en a jamais
rien dit. Comme le prix était ainsi décerné en rumeur, un troisième
larron se jugea assez recommandé pour figurer aussi au partage, et
il rédigea son mémoire un peu vite, ayant coutume de donner plus
de temps à solliciter qu’à réfléchir. Le prix fut donc partagé en trois.
Par un hasard, ce troisième mémoire fut envoyé par le Pédant lui-
même à Jules Lagneau, promu comme j’ai dit aux fonctions de
critique officiel ; ce livre lui arrivant avec un mot de courtoisie, il
répondit au Pédant, après avoir coupé les pages, je cite de mémoire,
mais je réponds de ma mémoire pour le principal : « Je vous
adresserai bientôt un rapport détaillé ; mais un rapide examen m’a
déjà assez instruit. C’est d’une sottise qui désarme l’indignation. » La
réponse arriva promptement : « C’est par erreur, répondit le Pédant,
que ce livre vous a été envoyé ; il est déjà aux mains de M. X…, et je
vous prie de vous épargner la fatigue d’un examen plus
approfondi. » Et de rire.
Lagneau était de Metz ; il fut enfermé à Metz pendant le siège ; et

c’est là qu’il eut le spectacle d’une foule qui venait tous les jours à la
même heure voir dans les vitres d’une vieille maison l’armée de la
délivrance. Il nous l’a conté plus d’une fois. Le philosophe, si jeune
qu’il fût, ne pouvait être ici que spectateur ; car il n’y avait point de
vraisemblance, ni d’autres données que des irisations rouges et
bleues sur de vieux carreaux de vitre. Mais il ne se peut point,
comme dit l’autre, que l’homme n’ait pas de passions. Bien des
années après, Lagneau se hérissait encore en présence de
l’ennemi, et l’on m’a conté qu’un professeur allemand ayant désiré
entendre une de ses leçons, Lagneau ne put prendre sur lui de
parler. Ce récit m’étonna. Je n’approuvais pas davantage une autre
passion vingt fois exprimée devant moi et dans les termes les plus
vifs. Lagneau avait un fort préjugé contre les Juifs. J’objectai un jour
Spinoza et Jésus-Christ, ce qui le fit rire. Jules Lemaître était son
grand ami. D’après tout cela pris ensemble, je me suis demandé ce
qui serait arrivé au cours du procès Dreyfus si Lagneau avait vécu
jusque-là. Quelquefois je l’imagine renfermé dans un silence
farouche ; d’autres fois se jetant sans précaution, et tout entier, dans
le chemin de la justice. Mais il y a une chose dont je suis sûr, c’est
qu’il n’aurait nullement approuvé en aucun cas les passions
politiques qui m’y jetèrent moi-même, non plus que cette
collaboration suivie aux petits journaux qui date de ce temps-là. Non
plus, je le crains, ce que j’ai écrit de la guerre et de la paix. De mon
côté je n’aimerais guère entendre ce qui sera dit solennellement à
Metz quand on honorera sa mémoire dans la maison où il est né.
J’ai connu de sombres méditations sur la route de Metz, entre
Rambucourt et Flirey ; c’était pendant l’hiver de 1914 ; mais apaisons
ces tristes pensées qui sont à peine des pensées.
Apaisons. Mais si je recule aussi devant les seules pensées qui

aient fait en moi une espèce de drame, que dirai-je ? L’opposition
que je sentais en ce temps-là, et que j’ai depuis développée, peut
donner encore une idée du puissant esprit qui ne put, et de bien loin,
me modeler à son image. D’autant qu’il se peut bien que cette
contradiction, qui semble de nature, soit des idées dans le fond, et
qu’elle habitât en cet homme, et qu’elle ait fait en lui cet état violent
dont les lettres que l’on a pu recueillir donnent quelque idée. Mais il
faut revenir à l’homme, et donc aux histoires d’écolier, car mon
expérience ici fut d’un écolier.
J’avais étudié les éléments de la géométrie et de l’algèbre, sans
aucune peine, et avec un plein succès. A vrai dire je ne vis jamais
dans les problèmes, et surtout dans ceux de la géométrie
élémentaire, comme constructions de triangles ou lieux
géométriques, qu’une difficulté de rhétorique, que j’eus toujours
plaisir à surmonter. L’ordre, l’économie, et l’art de tout ramener à la
fin, comme dans la fugue, me donnèrent alors la première idée du
style. Autrement, ces choses ne m’intéressaient pas trop, et il me
semble que j’en appris assez pour mon salut, comme dirait quelque
Pascalien. Les autres exercices scolaires étaient de singerie. Mais
maintenant, éveillé pleinement par le spectacle de cette pensée,
dans le feu et la fumée de cette forge, je montais d’un degré ; je
m’attaquais à des problèmes tout vifs, donnés par la nature elle-
même ; et il me semblait, cette idée ne m’a point trompé, que j’étais
en mesure d’y proposer des démonstrations invincibles sans jamais
me détourner de l’apparence, ni m’écarter du commun langage. Car
il m’était demandé seulement de dire ce que je pensais, comme je le
pensais, sans aller jamais au delà, sans chercher derrière, sans
voyages ni aventures d’aucune sorte. Telle est l’expression en creux
si je puis dire, de cette forte idée qui s’offrait à moi en relief, et à
laquelle le maître revenait toujours, disant qu’il s’agissait de
retrouver toute la pensée dans la moindre de nos pensées, et enfin
d’expliquer en quoi elle était une Pensée. Cette majuscule plaisait ;
mais je n’en fis jamais un réel usage ; ce n’était à mes yeux qu’une
politesse. Et si quelque trait me distingua aussitôt de mes
condisciples, qui certes ne vénéraient pas le Maître moins que moi,
c’est bien ce trait-là. Jamais je n’eus l’idée de quelque objet d’accès
difficile, et caché comme dans des nuages, comme un Sinaï où il
faudrait aller, et d’où il faudrait revenir portant les Tables de la Loi.
Nul mystère à mes yeux, soit dans la variété de la nature, soit dans
les profondeurs de l’âme. Nul passage, nul saut périlleux, entre mes
faibles pensées et la pensée absolue. Au contraire je me trouvai
aussitôt affermi et pour toute une vie sur mon terrain propre, n’ayant
à résoudre jamais que cette seule question : Qu’est-ce que je pense
réellement dans mes pensées les plus naturelles ? On voit ici la
Rhétorique revenir ; car mes pensées sont des pensées, mais
d’abord très mal exprimées ; et bref, je n’eus jamais à débrouiller au
monde que ceci, qui à vrai dire n’est pas peu : Qu’est-ce que je
pense dans chaque concept, comme Espace, Temps, Cause,
Liberté, Nécessité, Force, Droit ? L’idée même de chercher plus
avant et en quelque sorte au dehors (mais voici un exemple : Qu’est-
ce que je pense quand je dis au dehors ?), cette idée-là ne m’est
jamais venue. Je dirais bien aujourd’hui que, du moment que je
pense correctement, je pense absolument. En quoi j’étais et je suis
encore irréligieux, mais dogmatiquement, ce qui peut passer pour
neuf. Le plus étonnant ici, c’est que je n’ai jamais réfléchi au
système de mon Maître sans retrouver aussitôt cette même idée ;
mais c’est la plus cachée aussi ; c’est en Spinoza qu’on peut
l’apprendre ; j’aurai à revenir encore plus d’une fois là-dessus. On ne
se sauve point aisément de Spinoza, mais je m’en suis sauvé, sans
le nier jamais, en le prenant ainsi, et j’ose dire en surface seulement,
occupé seulement de redresser la phrase célèbre : « Ma maison
s’est envolée dans la poule de mon voisin », et autres fautes de
rhétorique. Il me revient à ce sujet un souvenir d’écolier encore, et
bien mince ; mais je fais argent de tout, n’ayant que peu de matière.
Comme Lagneau me parlait au sujet d’un camarade plus jeune, et
que j’ai toujours aimé, plein d’élan et de feu, enfin tel qu’on se
représente le jeune philosophe en ses premières effusions, le Maître
trouva à dire, après un éloge de cœur, que ce garçon manquait de
rhétorique. Le son de cette parole m’étonna. J’en ai vu depuis les
suites, et comment, après avoir trop espéré, on revient à l’Idolâtrie,
c’est-à-dire à prendre les discours mal faits comme ils sont et
l’Apparence comme elle n’est point. Nous ne sommes pas si loin de
la route de Metz ; car plus d’un y est entré avec gloire, mais moi j’en
suis encore à regarder cette route sinistre, m’attachant à bien
penser, à complètement penser cette simple question : « Que
faisais-tu là ? »
On naît homme de troupe. L’homme de troupe creuse où on le
met. Je n’oublierai jamais cette première dissertation où j’écrivis
uniquement ce que je voulais écrire, et exactement ce que je
pensais, sans rien de confus, sans rien d’ambitieux, sans aucune
trace d’imitation ni de flatterie. « Quelles seraient, demandait le
Maître, les impressions d’un aveugle-né à qui une double opération
rendrait successivement, à quelques jours d’intervalle, l’usage des
deux yeux ? » Quelque sot ne manquerait pas de dire qu’il faut ici
faire l’enquête, interroger l’aveugle-né ou le médecin. Or, si quelque
chose me fut évident après trois mois d’attention aux discours
toujours assurés, quoique toujours tâtonnants, que j’entendais sur
ces questions-là, c’est que l’opinion de l’aveugle ou du médecin ne
peut qu’ajouter quelques formules mal venues à celles que l’on
entend ou que l’on lit communément là-dessus, par exemple que les
objets sont vus d’abord sur un même plan, ce que l’on arrive à faire
dire à l’aveugle, ou que les objets doivent d’abord paraître
renversés, ce que l’on n’arrive point pourtant à lui faire dire. C’est
mon affaire, il me semble, de deviner ces fantastiques témoignages,
et même de les trouver au naturel dans mes pensées immédiates,
ou plutôt dans l’expression qui m’en vient d’abord. Les mots
permettent tout et les maisons s’envolent. Quand je vis se présenter
ces impossibilités, et donc ces nécessités, dans nos connaissances
les plus naturelles et les moins travaillées, qu’il faudrait nommer
l’apparence de l’apparence, j’eus un monde devant moi, un travail
sans fin, et une allégresse admirable. Je suis le même encore, et
dans ce travail encore ; et cette attitude m’a valu en toute rencontre
le mépris plus ou moins déguisé, et quelquefois la colère, de tous les
Importants sans exception. C’est ce qu’ils appellent juger sans
vouloir s’informer. Je leur pardonne, et j’espère qu’ils seront quelque
jour battus et contents. Toutefois cela ne m’inquiète guère. Mais que
j’aie saisi le commencement et comme l’esquisse de ce mouvement
dans le seul homme que j’aie vénéré, cela ne peut point aller sans
quelque examen des causes. Après des années de méditation là-
dessus, et celles-là non sans tristesse, j’aperçois que tous les
problèmes de la pratique, et exactement de la politique, sont ici
rassemblés. Il faut, en d’autres termes, que ces pages enferment
aussi les aveux d’un radical impénitent.
Devant mon papier blanc, je ne vis pas si loin. Je m’appliquai
seulement à dire à l’aveugle, en langage correct, ce qu’il aurait voulu
dire mal. Mais quel besoin d’entendre l’aveugle ? N’apprenons-nous
pas à voir à chaque instant ? Pour mieux dire, c’était une expression
du Maître, et il me plaît ici de l’emprunter, voir n’est-il pas à chaque
moment explorer comme fait l’aveugle ? Il n’y a point là de difficulté,
si ce n’est le manque de courage, qui nous porte à aller chercher
d’abord quelque nouvelle relation là-dessus. Je me souviens que
j’eus seulement peine à décrire, au moins par approche, ce que voit
un homme qui ne sait pas encore ce qu’il voit ; car il faut qu’il y ait
quelque affection d’abord, sans lieu ni forme, qui serait mieux
nommée sentiment que sensation ; encore eus-je bien soin de dire
que cette première affection ne peut jamais être sentie que par
souvenir et retour, enfin par comparaison avec un premier essai de
représentation. Ce travail est Bergsonien ; j’indique ici en même
temps, comme l’apercevra le lecteur attentif, comment le moment
Bergsonien est nécessairement dépassé de toutes les façons. Bref
je fus content de moi pour la première fois, hors des mathématiques.
Le Maître dit seulement que c’était bien, et je n’eus pas le premier
rang. Sans doute craignit-il une redoutable facilité, et trop peu de
respect aussi à l’égard des sottises que l’on lit partout. La première
place était occupée, et fortement, par un garçon au large front qui a
fini par douter de tout et de lui-même. Il admirait par dessus tout
Bouvard et Pécuchet, et je gagnai un moment cette maladie. Sans
doute aperçut-il trop d’erreurs à redresser, et prit-il le parti de
s’accommoder à la sottise régnante selon le mode de l’ironie ; cela
mène fort loin. Et voilà une idée qui ne me vint jamais. Au contraire,
puisque je voyais que, dans des questions si simples, le savoir ne
préservait pas de l’absurde, tout m’était clair, et je devinais des maux
incroyables seulement dus à l’infatuation, à l’imitation, au faux
respect. Ce vif mouvement et ce départ sans précaution durent
effrayer le Maître, pour des raisons dont j’ai déjà fait paraître
quelques-unes, et qui sont de morale et de politique.
Lagneau avait la sévérité du saint, mais il ignorait nos existences
aventureuses. Il était seulement en défiance de ce que nous
pouvions faire, laissés à notre seul caprice, et il n’avait pas tort. Il
n’est pas une de nos actions qui ne l’eût indigné ; et sous ce rapport
le garçon dont je parlais, si attentif aux respects de forme, ne valait
pas mieux que moi. Mais ce n’était pas une raison de ne pas vénérer
et craindre le Maître. Aujourd’hui, encore bien mieux qu’en ce temps-
là, j’aperçois comment la doctrine de la Liberté porte celle du Devoir.
Comme je ne me pardonne pas aisément de manquer de courage
dans la spéculation théorique, je voudrais bien aussi n’avoir jamais
été lâche dans le sentiment ni dans l’action. Ainsi, les vertus dont le
Maître donnait l’exemple, je puis les enseigner sans aucune
hypocrisie. Ma piété serait donc sans aucun mélange, si je n’avais
cru discerner en ce Maître de Liberté une disposition étonnante à
confondre les écarts de la vie privée et les hardis jugements de la
vie politique comme résultant d’un même fond de diabolique révolte.
Descartes fait voir partout la même prudence.
Quand Jules bachelier m’écrivait : « Je vous conjure de ne point
vous mêler de politique », je n’en étais pas surpris. Au regard de ce
théologien, l’ordre politique ne pouvait apparaître que comme une
suite de l’ordre universel. Qu’il y eût des pouvoirs, c’était comme une
disposition impénétrable de notre monde humain ; que ces pouvoirs
pussent être aveuglés, c’était un compte entre les hommes
providentiels et la providence elle-même. Toute résistance, et même
toute critique publique, était alors considérée comme l’effet des
désirs et des passions, désordre dans l’État et désordre dans
l’individu. Le devoir d’obéir, et, d’une certaine manière, juste autant
que les opinions sont des actions, le devoir de respecter, rentrait
ainsi dans le devoir envers soi, ce qui n’empêchait nullement ce
grand Administrateur, comme on sait, de gouverner énergiquement
selon sa conscience, selon sa part de pouvoir, et selon la place qu’il
occupait dans l’ordre humain. Je ne trouve pas ici de difficulté.
Chacun fait son métier d’homme, et le reste aux Dieux, comme
Marc-Aurèle aurait dit.
Que Lagneau réglât l’ordinaire de ses actions et toutes ses
pensées politiques selon de tels principes, c’est ce qui paraîtra
évident d’après ses lettres, et j’en puis témoigner d’après cette
crainte qu’il montrait toujours, qu’on ne prît le pouvoir de penser pour
le droit d’oser tout dire. Mais on verra dans la suite que l’idée d’une
existence respectable ou, pour parler autrement, d’un Dieu objet,
n’avait pu tenir dans ses pensées. On a vu déjà dans ses actions,
dès que son propre jugement l’éclairait assez, une méthode qui
pouvait faire scandale, et qui fit scandale en effet. La chose jugée
n’était rien à ses yeux. Petit exemple, je le répète, mais qui n’était
pas petit pour l’écolier. Il est impossible que devant cette conscience
scrupuleuse le problème des pouvoirs ne se soit pas posé. Cet
homme voulait être religieux, et, dans un sens profond, il l’était. Mais
ayant jugé une fois les pouvoirs réguliers, les ayant condamnés et
redressés, pouvait-il promettre une obéissance sans condition, bien
plus une obéissance d’esprit sans condition, comme pourtant il me
paraît qu’il a toujours voulu faire, à l’égard de l’ensemble des
pouvoirs divinisés en quelque sorte sous le nom de la Patrie ?
Nous voici encore une fois sur la route de Metz. Lui-même, un
demi-siècle plus tôt, comme j’ai dit, s’est évadé de Metz et a
combattu en volontaire dans l’armée de Faidherbe ; ces rencontres
réchauffent le cœur. Ici donc, et quant à l’action, nous étions
d’accord et la Grande Ombre était contente. Mais c’est moi qui par
réflexion n’étais pas content. Car cette volonté de croire et en vérité
d’adorer, quels que fussent les chefs, et en prenant la haute politique
comme un mystère impénétrable au commun, c’était bien clairement
à mes yeux la cause responsable de ce massacre machinal auquel
je participais. Or j’admets qu’il faut finalement obéir ; mais qu’il faille
encore plier ses pensées, et approuver pleinement ce que l’on fait,
c’est ce que je ne puis recevoir. Et j’eus dans ces nuits sinistres plus
d’un débat avec la Grande Ombre. J’allai jusqu’au reproche, il me
semble. J’évoquais cette anecdote du professeur prussien, envers
qui il avait manqué au devoir homérique de l’hospitalité. Je me disais
et je lui disais : « Quel exemple pour moi d’une folie adorée ! Toutes
les passions reviennent ici. Quoi ? Mon devoir le plus clair n’est-il
pas maintenant d’aimer à tout risque cet ennemi aveuglé qui à toute
minute cherche à me nuire ? Ce n’est pas dix ans après que je dois
pardonner, mais c’est tout de suite. Quand je ne le pourrais pas, je
sais que je le devrais. Ce sont des hommes ; et, s’ils l’oublient, c’est
à moi de m’en souvenir. Tout m’y invite et jusqu’aux anciennes
traditions de la chevalerie, mal soutenues pourtant par l’idée
théologique du jugement de Dieu. » Dans le fait je reconnaissais
bien le Fanatisme, quoique la religion fût autre. Sur ce coupant, il me
semble qu’on ne peut rester. Dès que l’on pense, il faut tomber d’un
côté ou de l’autre. Ou bien revenir au Dieu objet, ou bien examiner
tout. En ce second parti, nous sommes à l’ouvrage sur le bord du
temps, et en grande incertitude, non pas de ce que nous devons
penser, mais de ce qui sera, sans autre ressource que d’expliquer
tout ce qu’on pourra à soi-même et aux autres, et devant la menace
de l’ignorance et des passions, qui donnent si vite à la liberté un
hideux visage. Mais en quoi la guerre est-elle moins hideuse ? En
n’importe quel cortège révolutionnaire on retrouvera ce mélange de
courage et de colère, cette exaltation et cet avilissement, ces idées
sublimes et cette misanthropie. Avouez seulement que le plus
redoutable cortège, le plus enivré, le plus convulsif, est un petit mal
à côté de ce fossé fulminant et saignant qui dévorait chaque jour des
milliers de victimes. Que les pouvoirs soient absous de ce crime, et
que les chefs de révolte ne soient pas absous de l’autre, voilà qui
suppose un choix absolu concernant l’existence donnée, et une
sorte de sauvage préférence pour l’ordre de fait, quel qu’il puisse
être. Or quand l’esprit a repoussé de croire à l’existence comme à
un absolu, il faut se résoudre, tout au moins, à penser pour le mieux
et à tout dire, et enfin à tuer la formule creuse dès qu’elle paraît.
Sauver cette puissance de penser, ne la soumettre à rien, ne la
déshonorer par aucun genre d’ivresse, n’est-ce point la morale, ô
mon Maître ? Et si je n’ai pu la suivre toujours, est-ce une raison
pour que, d’enthousiasme, j’y manque en ce cas-là ? Ou bien est-ce
ma punition ? N’ai-je plus le droit de tenir ici pour la pensée, quand
je l’ai trahie tant de fois ? Je fais les demandes et les réponses. Et il
le faut bien.
Tel serait peut-être le dernier mot de cet homme bon et
redoutable. Peut-être viendrait-il à me rappeler que la morale n’a pas
pour première fin de juger les autres, mais plutôt de se contrôler soi.
Et qu’enfin c’est le fond de l’injustice si l’on exige paix et justice des
autres en n’apportant au fond commun que mauvaise foi, fantaisie et
guerre. Il me terrasserait ainsi, je le vois bien ; il me condamnerait à
faire la guerre. Aussi l’ai-je faite, et je ne dis pas que je n’aie pas
mérité de la faire. Mais dois-je adorer pourtant le diable et sa
fourche ?
Je veux pousser encore un peu plus loin ces amères pensées.
J’y reconnais ce gris de la justice, sans agrément, mais sans
confusion aucune, que j’ai imaginé dans cette grande prairie où
Platon nous invite à choisir notre paquet. On peut choisir, mais non
dans le paquet. J’ai mis quelque temps à bien entendre cette fable.
Cela ne veut point dire que tout soit fatal, et que l’on choisisse des
tranches d’avenir, seulement assemblées par la nécessité
extérieure. Cela c’est l’image et l’écorce ; le choix en image ne serait
point un choix ; tout serait mécanique, et on aurait quelque raison
d’accuser Dieu. Mais je ne l’entends pas ainsi ; car ce n’est pas par
une nécessité extérieure que le tyran se cache de chambre en
chambre, sans pourtant pouvoir dormir. Ce n’est pas par hasard
qu’un mensonge marque de mensonge beaucoup de nos pensées,
et peut-être toutes. Ce n’est pas par hasard que le souvenir de la
colère est colère encore, et que paresse est une raison de paresse,
ironie, d’ironie, et ainsi du reste. Si nos fautes revenaient sur nous
avec leur même visage, ce serait encore un avantage, comme
Platon dit, car c’est pénitence ; mais qui ne voit que le châtiment
serait une récompense ? La justice va plus loin, et toujours par des
pensées, non point par des prisons. Quand Platon veut nous dire
que le paquet est fait et qu’il faut le prendre tout, il entend dans le
fond qu’une pensée est toute la pensée ; il nie l’extérieur, et un genre
de suite qui a la forme de l’extérieur.
Je reviens à la guerre. Il est clair que celui qui nie la guerre et la
refuse veut diviser le paquet. Prendre permission pour d’autres
fautes, et la refuser pour celle-là. Mener la vie comme une guerre, et
faire ce qui plaît, on se jette sur ce paquet-là ; on y trouve guerre
enfin à découvert, et l’une des causes que l’on voit le mieux est que
le chef a gouverné comme le fantassin a vécu ; il est bien plaisant
d’accuser le chef. J’apercevais des liens de ce genre dans les
Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz, œuvre de fer. Chacun admirera que
les devoirs d’une charge d’église, toujours présents, toujours suivis,
qu’une piété éclairée et même profonde dans les grandes choses, et
le serment tenu de se décider toujours selon le bien de l’état, que
tout cela se termine naturellement à violence et révolte, et toujours à
des situations telles que « le mieux qu’on y puisse faire est encore
un mal ». Mais il faut regarder à une vie déréglée absolument. De
plus près encore, regardons à ce mépris pour les femmes, qui réduit
l’amour à un jeu sans conséquence ; la riposte est voulue ; on la joue
soi-même, par cette politique d’orgueil, de vengeance, ou seulement
d’humeur, que les femmes mènent selon les passions, et qui
traverse continuellement les meilleurs desseins. Il serait commode
d’attendre que mademoiselle de Chevreuse, madame sa mère et les
autres, rendissent justice contre injustice ; mais elles rendent
injustice et folie, et c’est la justice de Minos, Eaque et Rhadamante.
Je comprends un peu mieux d’après cela ces femmes si
promptement durcies au feu de la guerre, si légères à parler, à
chanter, à célébrer. J’y vis toujours comme une vengeance, mais
bien au-dessus de tout projet ; ce n’est que la dureté masculine
renvoyée à ses œuvres, la guerre paraissant alors, non point du tout
comme la punition de cette autre guerre contre les faibles, et de tout
ce mépris, mais plutôt comme une sorte d’excuse et de justification,
par une nécessité d’obéir auprès de laquelle celle où se trouvent les
femmes n’est presque que douceur. La tendresse était comme
délivrée et rendue ; l’amour baisait ces mains sanglantes. L’Amour
trouvait à être selon une certaine justice qu’il exige toujours. Cet
exemple en éclaire d’autres, quoique le détail nous passe. J’ai
souvent remarqué, et non sans impatience, un mélange étonnant,
dans mes rudes compagnons, de révolte et d’enthousiasme, je dirais
presque de pitié, comme si d’un côté ils réprouvaient, et comme si,
de l’autre, ils reconnaissaient une destinée enfin égale, enfin
commune, des pensées en clair, un accord des volontés seulement
tardif, après cette paix énigmatique. D’où j’arrive à comprendre les
sévères pages où Lagneau a défini le devoir pratique à l’égard du
prochain. Scandale à mes yeux, scandale à nos yeux, que l’amour
ne doive jamais emprunter le détour politique. Et pourtant, qu’est-ce
que le détour politique, sinon un essai de recevoir plus qu’on ne
donne, et enfin d’assurer la paix sans que chacun y sacrifie autre
chose que ce à quoi il ne tient pas ? « Vivons en paix, voulez-vous ?
Mais sans rien changer. » D’où, par cette réflexion, une charité
hautaine, j’entends qui jure de ne point changer l’ordre, parce que
l’ordre, tel quel, n’est que l’exacte expression de ce qui manque en
nos actions réelles. Et si cet ordre est médiocre de toutes façons et
terrible à un moment, par son inhumaine structure, ce n’est que
notre faute exactement renvoyée. Et, comme dit la Voix, Dieu est
innocent. Voilà le tour que je puis faire à l’intérieur de la Sévérité.
Pour le dehors je m’y heurte comme à une porte de fer ; mais la
porte n’est pas fermée.
Saint-Simon le duc connut à la Trappe de Rancé un monsieur de
Saint-Louis qui y faisait retraite après un long service de guerre. Cet
homme s’était crevé un œil d’un coup de houssine, en corrigeant un
cheval. Cette image est digne de Platon. Il n’est pas un homme de
guerre sur qui la guerre pèse comme un crime ; mais je crois plutôt
qu’elle équilibre cette contemplation sans paroles par le juste rapport
des fautes à la punition. « C’est toi qui l’as voulu. » J’ai dit que le
Maître ne traitait point de Morale. Mais il nous lisait Platon comme
une Bible, et souvent La République, où, à mesure que l’on
approche de la fin, et par cette implication des caractères et des
constitutions, par le tableau final de la tyrannie, se règle peu à peu le
compte de l’homme par la Somme intégrale de ses pensées
d’aventure. Le Maître estimait sans doute que c’était bien assez si
nous savions lire, et aussi qu’il faut apprendre à lire en considérant
d’abord l’encrier, le morceau de craie et le cheval de bois. Il y a du
secret dans toutes les grandes âmes, et ce qui est le plus secret est,
par le jeu des passions, ce que nous voudrions savoir d’abord. D’où
cet amour qui refuse pitié. Je ne puis expliquer mieux les nuages
toujours circulant autour de ce front sublime. Et ce n’est pas trop dire
que dire qu’il fuyait et haïssait le clair. Clarum per obscurius, ce fut
sa devise. Car la clarté est comme un refus. Mais la Pensée est
justement le refus du refus. Ici je revois son visage et son geste.
Assurément je ne me trompe pas d’un cheveu. Mais aussi ce visage
est sans doute le seul signe auquel j’aie fait réellement attention.
Il n’est presque point de natures supérieures où l’on ne trouve ce
geste de refus devant ceux qui espèrent changer le dedans par le
dehors ; je citerai Kant et je citerai Proudhon, si différents d’ailleurs,
mais d’accord contre ceux qui ne savent pas bien obéir. Deux effets
de l’action morale, et de l’union pour l’action morale. D’un côté se
rassemblent des cœurs pleins de pitié et des esprits qui cherchent
preuve, sans aucune disposition à adorer cet ordre terrible qui fait
voir l’inégalité, la raison d’état et la guerre comme des faces de
Méduse. Mais de l’autre un petit nombre d’hommes austères, plus
rigoureux encore sur la preuve, plus profondément inventeurs ;
souvent un seul, qui avec une pureté et un scrupule constant de
justice dans sa vie privée, se place à l’égard des pouvoirs dans une
situation qui produit les mêmes effets que la crainte. Platon n’aimait
point trop le peuple en cortège, ni ces ânes, comme il dit, qui portent
si librement la tête. En Gœthe, le même esprit condamnait Fichte.
« Quand ce serait mon propre fils », disait-il. Ce genre d’homme est
inexorable. Ils perdent sentiment et sont comme des pierres dès
qu’ils entrevoient, et ils entrevoient de fort loin, une cohue
d’ignorants qui demandent justice. Ces Maîtres craignent une guerre
d’esclaves. Je soupçonne que l’expérience des passions en eux-
mêmes, et des cohues de l’âme en ces renversements, les font
indulgents d’une certaine manière, mais sévères aussi, à l’égard de
tout mouvement anarchique. Il se peut aussi que l’Esprit leur fasse
peur, par la liberté infinie qu’ils y trouvent, car l’Esprit peut nier tout,
et c’est la démarche propre de toute pensée de se réfugier d’abord
en ce centre de négation, comme Descartes le fait voir à tous les
moments de sa réforme. On comprendra assez que Lagneau avait
touché ce point d’indifférence d’où l’on revient, et même y retournait
toujours ; dans ce mouvement de la réflexion, il n’était que bonté et
grâce, en ce monde d’écoliers, fermé à la politique, ouvert au
monde ; c’était le moment de l’incrédulité et de l’innocence. Il est vrai
aussi que cette enfance du monde n’est possible un moment que
par l’ordre sévère autour. L’autre mouvement, qui fermait la porte,
avait la dureté militaire. Il y avait de la violence dans ces soudains
changements. Violence contre violence, en lui-même d’abord,
comme Platon l’a tant de fois rappelé. La justice n’est point aimable,
mais plutôt redoutable, quand elle commence par le redressement
de soi par soi. Je ne puis comprendre autrement le drame que je
veux appeler physiologique, et qui fatiguait jusqu’à l’épuisement ce
corps vigoureux. J’ai su qu’il avait prédit quelque chose me
concernant. « C’est une violence, dit-il, qui se tournera contre elle-
même. » C’était trop d’honneur. Mais cela donne vue sur cette
puissante nature et sur les flux et reflux de ce sang vif qui colorait
ses lèvres de vermillon pur ; ce signe ne trompe guère.
On verra, d’après ses lettres, qu’il n’était nullement socialiste ; on
devinera même qu’il ne recevait point qu’un homme raisonnable pût
l’être. Cela arrête net ; aussi j’ai voulu, en disant ici tout ce que j’ai
pu saisir de cet homme, préparer le lecteur à ce passage, faute de
quoi l’Académicien y croirait reconnaître sa faiblesse et l’adorer, et
l’autre parti la maudire. La privation n’est rien ; mais de la force
pensante aussi il faut s’arranger au mieux.
Le socialisme est profondément une politique ; en quoi il
s’oppose directement à l’esprit chrétien, qui enferme un mépris à
l’égard de toute politique. Et le fond de la politique est de modifier les
situations, en vue de changer les pensées. Sous quelque forme
qu’on la prenne, dans le cabinet d’un ministre ou dans le grenier
d’un révolutionnaire, toujours elle s’en prend au rapport extérieur ;
cette vue définit entièrement la faveur, qui prétend ramener les
mécontents et y réussit souvent. C’est misanthropie ; car l’esprit est
digne d’être crossé, c’est son droit propre. On voit que la charité
s’entend en deux sens ; et le commun langage le fait bien voir, par
ceci que le plus beau mot peut-être et le plus fort se trouve être
aussi bien le plus faible et le plus avili. Il y a une charité revêche et
comme janséniste ; l’autre est de faveur, et voudrait récolter
sagesse. L’esprit chrétien va tout à la première, qui honore esprit,
courage, volonté, vertu, une même vertu sous ces noms, et qui
n’honore rien d’autre. Je dis esprit chrétien, je dirais aussi bien esprit
stoïcien. Marc-Aurèle laisse chacun à sa place, bonne ou mauvaise,
parce qu’il n’y fait point de différence. Cela est hautain. On
retrouvera ce ton dans les Simples Notes ; mais cela est hautain,
pour les deux, par une idée de l’égalité qui méprise les différences
au lieu de les effacer. Cette vertu est ce qui sauve la guerre où,
comme a dit quelqu’un, l’inégalité est la loi, entendez que la justice
n’y est point du tout dans la rencontre ni dans l’extérieur, mais
uniquement dans une fière simplicité que l’on rencontre quelquefois.
J’ai connu un héros janséniste parfait en ce genre, et à qui il était
impossible de ne pas obéir, par ceci qu’être au-dessus ou au-
dessous n’était point de plus d’importance à ses yeux que pour les
pierres d’un mur. Le pouvoir ainsi gouverné gouverne sans faiblesse.
Ici l’homme répond à l’homme ; et l’on ne va point chercher quelque
égalité de géométrie ou de latin ; cela même instruit. Nous ne
sommes point quittes à l’égard d’une inégalité si belle ; et, pour ma
part, je ne démêle pas sans peine en mes sentiments les plus forts
une égale disposition à la révolte et à l’obéissance.
L’autre charité n’est que flatteuse, dans le sens où Platon le dit
de la rhétorique en son Gorgias. « Donnons-leur trois francs
cinquante », disait un homme d’État assez cynique devant les
gémissements des femmes, au temps où les hommes étaient au
péril. La Raison peut reprendre cette idée et en faire système. Le
système est que tout homme est capable de s’éveiller en esprit
jusqu’à être enfin respectable, mais qu’il faut commencer par
changer la condition extérieure, en adoucissant cet excès de travail,
d’esclavage et de malheur qui hébète l’esprit. Hugo a pensé cette
idée avec force, et l’autre idée aussi, sans pouvoir les joindre.
Toujours est-il que l’essence du socialisme est de subordonner la
vertu aux situations, comme il éclate dans les conceptions de Karl
Marx. Cette idée de regarder d’abord aux droits, et au droit étonnant
d’exister, qui est le principe de tous, est bien une idée, et ainsi va fort
loin. C’est la même chose que de diviniser l’objet, c’est un
Spinozisme mal entendu, et c’est peut-être le Spinozisme. En ce
travail où il faut que je devine presque tout, on me pardonnera ces
détours souterrains, d’où j’arrive à quelques lumières. On trouvera,
dans un article de critique de Lagneau sur une traduction du Court
Traité, une note étonnante sur la Bible, et qui m’éclaire certains traits
du Maître. La note est injuste à première vue, car la terrible religion
de Job ne laisse à l’homme que patience au travail et résignation
héroïque ; et l’on ne peut pas dire que le bonheur soit proposé ici
comme fin. Mais le regard de Lagneau lisait plus loin que le nôtre ; et
sans doute apercevait-il que ce culte presque fanatique de
l’immense existence telle quelle devait conduire à une recherche du
bonheur, en vérité sans espérance, et au fond mécanique, comme
les travaux des fourmis. L’esprit n’étant pas fait pour cela, et portant
mieux tout malheur que la négation de lui-même, peut-être tenons-
nous ici par les causes la colère communiste, et ce paradoxe de
fonder l’extrême paix sur l’extrême guerre. Les socialistes voudraient
bien rester entre deux ; mais leur principe les force, qui est de
changer d’abord la maison, en vue de changer l’habitant. Cela
revient à attendre la justice autour pour être juste. On verra plus loin
que toute la philosophie de Lagneau vise à subordonner
l’Entendement au Jugement. Or c’est une vue d’entendement à
proprement parler de changer l’objet selon la règle, afin de trouver à
appliquer la règle ; au lieu que le Jugement s’exerce sur la situation
maintenant perçue et fait ordre de tout. « Quand l’eau courbe un
bâton, ma raison le redresse », tel est le dernier mot de
l’entendement ; au lieu que le Jugement ne redresse point du tout le
bâton, mais le pense courbé selon le vrai, c’est-à-dire selon l’eau et
selon l’œil, et ainsi pense encore mieux. Bref, au regard d’une
philosophie qui veut penser droitement dans la perception même, et
non point au-dessus ni au delà, ce n’est point demain ou dans dix
ans que l’esprit s’éveillera. Le rêve n’est que de paresse, et la vérité
du rêve c’est la perception. Dieu de chaque moment, tel est le
Jugement ; et il ne demande point que l’objet soit autre ; non, mais
que la pensée soit autre. Sur cette surface du présent, seule à nous,
se tient donc cet Esprit incorruptible, qui n’attend point et qui
n’espère point, assez occupé de passer du chaos à l’ordre, comme à
tout réveil il faut faire. D’où je comprends encore mieux ce geste des
mains, que j’essaie encore d’imiter en mes meilleures réflexions, et
qui refuse de prendre. Aider, c’est donner la main ; mais la confiance
entraînera les deux. Voilà à peu près tout ce que je sais dire de ce
refus de politique. Ainsi me voilà en cette bordure, me défendant d’y
trop croire, et de m’y jeter ; mais il n’est pas défendu d’y regarder.
Lagneau ne traitait jamais de Morale. Sans doute se défiait-il des

passions ; mais je ne crois point du tout qu’il eût été en ces matières
hésitant ou indulgent. Bien plutôt je le vois terriblement clairvoyant et
sévère. Mais quoi ? Nous étions des enfants, et il ne nous
connaissait guère. Dans les circonstances rares où je l’ai vu agir,
dans d’autres qu’on m’a rapportées, il était prompt, hardi, et sans
ménagement pour lui-même. Peut-être estimait-il que la morale en
discours est trop facile. Peut-être aussi était-il naturellement retenu
par d’autres leçons qui se présentent d’elles-mêmes les premières,
et qui l’occupaient toute l’année. Toujours est-il qu’il n’a jamais traité
devant moi que de la Perception et du Jugement. L’inévitable
préambule sur la Méthode de la Psychologie ne faisait que préparer
ces deux leçons principales. Je sais que dans la suite il lui arriva de
traiter de l’existence de Dieu ; j’ai supposé longtemps qu’il n’y avait
eu que le titre de changé ; je ne me trompais guère. Je ne me fie, à
la rigueur, qu’à mes propres souvenirs. Toutes les heures sérieuses
de ma vie ont été occupées à répondre à cette question : « Que
pensait-il ? Que voulait-il dire ? » Il n’y a pas longtemps je revenais à
une formule que j’ai entendue plus d’une fois : « Retrouver dans une
de nos pensées toute la pensée », et je buttais là comme autrefois.
Je ne me plains point de cette lenteur d’esprit ; c’est lui qui m’apprit à
mépriser mes fragiles constructions. Toujours est-il que j’avais assez
de lui pour méditer cent ans. Un ami plus jeune que moi m’avait
entretenu plus d’une fois de cette leçon fameuse, où le Maître allait à
conclure, je résume comme je l’entendis de cet ami, à conclure que
Dieu ne peut être dit exister, puisqu’exister c’est être pris dans le
texte de l’expérience. Nouveau thème pour des méditations
difficiles ; j’y retrouvai un Cartésianisme poussé à bout, et qui certes
n’avait rien de Spinoza ; car, ce que j’ai toujours remarqué en
Spinoza, c’est que l’Immense Existence s’y offre la première, dans
son Idée, il est vrai, et donc tout entière en chaque rencontre, mais
enfin d’abord existence, et de là essence, et finalement pensée, d’où
une liberté murée. J’oserais presque dire que les premières
démonstrations de Spinoza vont plutôt de l’existence à l’essence, au
rebours de Descartes. Mais je prends ce commentaire à mon
compte ; je n’en veux point charger le Maître ; on voit seulement par
quel détour j’essayais de deviner l’essence qui passe l’existence. Au
reste je ne poussais pas bien loin par là, et même j’aurais choisi de
ne rien dire là-dessus si, quelque temps après que j’eus commencé
d’écrire ces mémoires, je n’avais reçu une visite mémorable. Nous
avions annoncé notre projet de rassembler les écrits de Lagneau ;
cette nouvelle avait couru. La réputation où est encore Lagneau,
après une courte vie et si peu de bruit, est quelque chose de
miraculeux, et qui fait honneur à l’espèce. Bref je vis arriver chez moi
un homme de forte structure, à tête chevaline (Diogène disait à
Platon : « Bonjour, cheval ») et de rustique simplicité. Il portait une
valise bourrée de papiers, d’où je vis sortir les leçons déjà connues,
par lui rédigées, à ma grande honte, comme je n’avais su faire, et
enfin les précieux cahiers portant au titre « De l’existence de Dieu ».
Cet homme, que je surnommai aussitôt l’Homme de Dieu, avait été
pêcheur de morue dans sa jeunesse, et puis marin long-courrier,
ensuite étudiant, et, sur la trentaine, élève de Lagneau, justement
après moi ; finalement laboureur et éleveur de bœufs en cette
Normandie, notre commun berceau. Ceux qui ont connu Jules
Lachelier, Normand lui-même, pourront se faire une idée de cette
tête à forte mâchoire, de cette structure tassée et osseuse, de cette
méditation sculpturale d’où remonte le regard bleu, mouvement de
retour et de réveil à ce monde-ci. Lagneau était autre, et, à ce qu’il
me semble, interrogeait l’objet toujours. Imaginez donc cet autre
sage, assis contre sa haie normande, tirant ses cahiers de sa poche,
et trouvant là le dernier mot sur sa destinée, enfin ce qu’il avait
vainement cherché autour du monde, comme il m’a dit. Je me
retrouvai au temps de Solon. L’amitié fut prompte, par ceci de
commun que nous n’avions ni l’un ni l’autre jamais craint ni respecté
aucun être au monde à l’exception de notre commun Maître. Je lus
donc les pages sublimes. La marque y était, mais aussi quelque
chose d’abstrait et de désertique, qui n’était point dans mes
souvenirs d’écolier. Un autre genre d’écolier, un autre genre aussi de
sérieux, avait-il rabattu tous les ornements sur ce pierreux chemin ?
ou bien le Maître sentait-il qu’il était temps de finir ? Ou bien
l’attention dévorante de ce nouveau disciple, qui attendait toujours le
dernier mot, avait-elle insensiblement tiré l’analyse hors de ce
monde jusqu’à l’extrême bord de la réflexion dialectique ? Je me
trouvai d’abord ici comme je fus tant de fois devant les pages les
plus abruptes de Fichte ou de Schelling, cherchant l’objet, qui, dans

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The Globalization of World Politics: An

Introduction to International Relations

Part One International relations in a global era

1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics ............................. 5

Part Two The historical context

3 The rise of modern international order ..............................................................39

Part Three Theories of world politics

7 Liberal internationalism ........................................................................................ 103

Part Four Structures and processes

14 War and world politics ........................................................................................... 213

Part Five International issues

24 Environmental issues ............................................................................................. 377

Part One International relations in a global era

1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics ................................................. 5

2 Globalization and global politics ...............................................................................................19

Part Two The historical context

3 The rise of modern international order ..................................................................................39

4 International history of the twentieth century .....................................................................54

5.4 Europe: rise and decline? 74

6 Rising powers and the emerging global order ......................................................................85

Part Three Theories of world politics

7 Liberal internationalism ............................................................................................................ 103

8 Marxist theories of international relations .......................................................................... 116

9 Realism ............................................................................................................................................ 132

10 Feminism ........................................................................................................................................ 147

11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches ............................................................................. 162

12 Poststructuralism ......................................................................................................................... 179

13 Social constructivism .................................................................................................................. 194

Part Four Structures and processes

14 War and world politics ............................................................................................................... 213

15 International and global security ........................................................................................... 228

16 Global political economy .......................................................................................................... 244

17 Gender ............................................................................................................................................. 260

18 Race in world politics ................................................................................................................. 276

19 International law .......................................................................................................................... 293

20 International organizations in world politics ..................................................................... 308

21 The United Nations ..................................................................................................................... 323

23 Regionalism in international affairs ....................................................................................... 355

Part Five International issues

24 Environmental issues .................................................................................................................. 377

25 Global health ................................................................................................................................. 394

26 Refugees and forced migration ............................................................................................... 409

27 Poverty, hunger, and development ........................................................................................ 425

28 Global trade and global finance .............................................................................................. 441

28.3 The regulation of global trade 446

29 Terrorism and globalization ..................................................................................................... 456

30 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction .................................................................... 473

31 Nationalism, national self-determination, and international relations ..................... 488

32 Human rights ................................................................................................................................. 505

33 Humanitarian intervention in world politics ...................................................................... 521

Praise for The Globalization of World Politics

‘A comprehensive, well-written, up-to-date introduction to IR and the historical and theoretical

‘The Bible of International Relations’

New to this edition

• New Chapter 9 on realism by Or Rosenboim

• New Chapter 25 on global health by Sophie Harman

Consolidate your understanding

Develop critical thinking skills

Connect IR theory and practice

1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics ............................. 5

Case Study 11.1 Imperial wars after decolonization? Rethinking Vietnam��165

Case Study 19.1 Is international law an expression of Western dominance?�� 297