Secdocument 921
Secdocument 921
Secdocument 921
Nathan Guy
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For Katie
vi
Contents
Acknowledgments viii
Abbreviations x
Introduction 1
Notes 153
Bibliography 219
People Index 237
Subject Index 240
Locke’s Works Index 243
Acknowledgments
Nathan Guy
Abbreviations
LCT John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration [1689], ed. James H. Tully
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983). Citations are by page number.
LL John Harrison and Peter Laslett, The Library of John Locke [1965], 2nd
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). Citations are by page number.
LN John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature [1664]: The Latin Text with a
Translation, Introduction, and Notes, Together with Transcripts of Locke’s
Abbreviations xi
Shorthand in His Journal for 1676, ed. and trans. W. von Leyden (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1954, reissued 1988). Citations are by page number.
QLN John Locke, Questions Concerning the Law of Nature [1664]: With
an Introduction, Text, and Translation, trans. Robert Horwitz, Jenny
Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990). Citations are by page number.
STCE John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education [1693], ed. with
introduction, notes, and critical apparatus by John W. Yolton and Jean
S. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Citations are by paragraph.
TIS Ralph Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First
Part, Wherein All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism Is Confuted;
and Its Impossibility Demonstrated (London: Printed for Richard
Royston, bookseller to his most sacred majesty, 1678).
xii
Introduction
The portrait of a decidedly “secular” Locke held sway in many places for much
of the twentieth century. Though some did not question Locke’s personal faith
commitments (believing them to have no bearing on his political philosophy),
others described Locke as, at best, a deist (if not a closet atheist), whose use
of religious language was either incidental or insidious. For these interpreters,
Locke’s emphasis on both toleration and individual liberty is intended to push
theological matters to the periphery of political affairs and has no bearing on the
basis of his political thought.1 However, a recent spate of research questions the
assumption that Locke sought to remove theology from his political theory and,
instead, claims that the “deeply Christian” Locke establishes his political thought
on an essentially theological foundation.
This “religious turn” in Locke scholarship is often associated with the
work of Jeremy Waldron, although its roots are much deeper. Nonetheless,
Waldron’s 1999 Carlyle lectures (and their subsequent publication in 2002)
brought the discussion into the larger public arena, where history, philosophy,
theology, and political theory meet.2 A number of works, building on
Waldron’s keen insights, have issued from the presses in the last decade
seeking to further solidify the inseparable bond between Locke’s political
thought and his theological moorings.3 In this book, I will argue that the
religious turn in Locke scholarship is fundamentally correct but offer both a
historically contextual basis for such a move and a programmatic articulation
of the theological basis for Locke’s approach. Much more needs to be said
about Locke’s historical and theological context, as well as his theology in
general—not least his doctrine of creation. In this book I hope to use Locke’s
own tripartite foundation of God, the law of nature, and revelation (Christian
scripture) as a means to trace Locke’s theological position and, in so doing,
point out areas of his political philosophy in which his theology provides
grounding or makes a profound impact.
2 Finding Locke’s God
A three-fold foundation
In the place where a revised version of this material appears in the finished Essay5
of 1689, Locke prefaces his remarks by declaring the area of moral actions to be
of highest importance.6 Chief among the various “laws” to which our actions are
held accountable is “The Divine Law,” which Locke describes as
that Law which God has set to the actions of Men, whether promulgated to them
by the light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation. That God has given a Rule
whereby Men should govern themselves, I think there is no body so brutish
as to deny. He has a Right to do it, we are his Creatures: He has Goodness and
Wisdom to direct our Actions to that which is best: and he has Power to enforce
it by Rewards and Punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another Life:
for no body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchstone of
moral Rectitude; and by comparing them to this Law, it is, that Men judge of the
most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions; that is, whether as Duties,
or Sins, they are like to procure them happiness, or misery, from the hands of
the ALMIGHTY.7
In both cases, Locke delineates “God,” the “Law (or light) of Nature,” and
“Revelation” as foundational topics upon which his moral philosophy is
founded. Though Locke only mentions these in passing, in this book I will show
that the relationship between morality and these three areas of study provides
the key to appreciating Locke’s entire project. For Locke, a study of moral rules
requires a lawgiver (God), the law itself (law of nature), and the ultimate means
whereby we derive certain knowledge of, motivation toward, and obligation to
keep that law (revelation). It is not surprising, then, that the impetus for Locke’s
epistemological considerations (eventually culminating in the Essay) was a set
of questions concerning “the Principles of morality, and reveald Religion”—
principles that, as Nidditch rightly notes, “underlay his text” even when not
examined explicitly.8
Introduction 3
Yet this theological foundation for his moral philosophy also serves as the basis
for his central political claims. In the Second Treatise,9 the basic tenet of Locke’s
political philosophy is that human beings are “all equal and independent,” share
in “one community of nature,” and have dominion over “the inferior creatures,”
as a result of theological reasons:
For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise
maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order,
and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are,
made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure.10
Locke bases his view of human equality not only in the mere formal truth that
human beings are born “of the same species and rank” and thus reasonably
obligated to one another (in a modern humanitarian sense) but also in the
claim that humans were created by God, given a particular role in the world,
and are morally obligated to Him. Locke employs philosophical arguments for
the existence of God and readily uses Christian scripture to lend support to his
basic thesis.
Locke’s project of moral and political philosophy, then, can easily be
described as a theological one. The theological impulse that lay beneath Locke’s
political project harmonized well with some explicit teachings of a moderating
influence in seventeenth-century England. Locke was especially acquainted with
teachings and personalities associated with the Oxford Tew Circle, the London
Latitudinarians, and the Cambridge Platonists—three sources of influences,
which are each credited with developing approaches to theology that stand
between Calvinistic puritanism on the one hand and high Anglicanism on
the other. These moderates sought a middle ground through an appreciation
for common ground among monotheists, the role of reason in articulating a
minimalistic set of key religious truths, and an emphasis on the personal and
individual character of faith in contrast with any coercion by the state.11 Though
ever independent, Locke’s theological perspective is decidedly Latitudinarian
with echoes of similar moderating approaches. This background provides a
fitting framework for placing Locke’s political project within the sphere of a
moderating Christian political philosophy.
The manner and extent to which Locke’s political schema is shaped by his
religious interest has proved to be a fruitful field of study, attracting historians,
philosophers, theologians, and political scientists. Among those with theological
4 Finding Locke’s God
interests, recent studies in this regard have either focused on Locke’s epistemology,
reevaluated his use of scripture, or sought to reconstruct his personal faith
commitments. But few have attempted to bring these items together in an
articulation of the deep theological structure of his entire political system. Placing
Locke in the religious context of seventeenth-century Latitudinarians, as well as
paying careful attention to his implicit and explicit theological argumentation
throughout his writings, this book will seek to provide a more definitive study of
how Locke’s political methodology stems from a theological basis. In this sense,
Locke would better be classed as a heterodox Christian political philosopher than
credited with championing the rise of secular methodology in political affairs.
The argument of this book builds on results of previous research. With
regard to literary criticism, a critical-realist approach to reading Locke’s works is
preferable to the Straussian hermeneutic of suspicion, subversion, and charade.
In the main, Locke should be interpreted as meaning what he says.12 There
is good reason to suppose coherence and continuity among Locke’s various
writings, rather than accepting the inverse (i.e., the Laslett thesis).13 In terms of
biography, that Locke was a believing and practicing Christian, albeit heterodox,
until the day he died should now be beyond a matter of dispute.14 Furthermore,
Locke is rightly viewed as a natural law theorist, even if one concludes he is
far from traditional in his understanding.15 From these considerations, several
authors have noted that his philosophical, political, and moral outlook was
influenced (and possibly shaped) by explicitly Christian principles. A sub-point
(gaining great traction though by no means the “consensus”) is that Locke’s
ethical outlook is necessarily tethered to theological (and particularly Christian)
principles.16
However, a bird’s-eye view of the religious turn in Locke scholarship would
suggest two important moves needing to be made, both of which I attempt
to accomplish in my book. First, locating Locke within the context of the
Latitudinarians of the late seventeenth century is pivotal to understanding
how his deeply held religious beliefs echo forth in every facet of his writing
and may also serve as the impetus for how he conceives his work to be a form
of Christian political philosophy. Understanding Locke’s tolerant Christianity
and his appreciation for natural theology may help explain why Locke sounds
“secular” in his political argumentation and has wide-reaching appeal among
political philosophers and ethicists who do not share Locke’s theological
persuasion. Second, the religious turn must now give way to a more carefully
considered theological turn in which the Latitudinarian Locke works out political
implications of his views concerning God, the law of nature, and revelation—each
Introduction 5
Theology needs more than scattered political images; it needs a full political
conceptuality. And politics, for its part, needs a theological conceptuality. The
two are concerned with the one history that finds its goal in Christ, “the desire
of the nations.”23
A defensible case could be made that Locke believes this. But a much harder
case is to prove that Locke does this. O’Donovan describes “the alternative to
political theology” as one that allows religious and political spheres but wishes
to preserve distinction and separation. According to this camp, “religion may
and does shape politics through carefully guarded channels of influence that
preserve a cordon sanitaire.”24 Against this alternative, writes O’Donovan,
political theologians believe
Given how Locke has been viewed for a century, it is not surprising that
O’Donovan seems to place Locke in this second “alternative” camp, along with
Pufendorf and Kant.26 I believe the case for viewing Locke as an advocate for
a clear distinction and separation of religion from political life is overblown,
and it is likely that Locke believed in the kind of political theology O’Donovan
has in view.27 This book lends support to the idea that Locke not only believed
in this but operated out of convictions sympathetic (and sometimes parallel)
to Christian political theologians. In the words of John Perry, the LCT shows
Locke “reenvisioning political philosophy and political theology in new ways”
Introduction 7
In this book, I adopt Forster’s suggestion. Settled between the secular political
philosopher and the Christian public theologian stands a third category occupied
by Locke: that of the Christian political philosopher, whose arguments not only
self-consciously depend upon Christian assumptions but also offer theological
argument in favor of and integrally tethered to his political theory.31 Within his
own historical context, Locke is best seen as offering a Latitudinarian political
philosophy, one flowing out of particular religious conviction. While Locke does
not demand that the civil authorities claim Jesus as Lord, his vision of society
evokes a markedly Christian understanding of life in political society, a vision
weakened the further one moves away from a particularly Christian perspective.
In Chapter 6 I narrow the scope even further: not only does Locke’s theory
require a true idea of God and a particular theology of creation, but it also
includes acceptance of and dependence on God’s self-revelation and claims
made in scripture. Although Locke has a very high view of scripture, it never
culminates in fideism; instead, Locke traces the human need for special
revelation from God in order to fully grasp one’s purpose in life, the God one
serves, and the vision for how to carry out God’s purposes—all of which leads to
ultimate happiness. He traces this need in both his theological writings (such as
the RC) and, surprisingly, his philosophical works (such as the Essay). Although
he has a high view of reason, Locke admits human frailty and sinfulness require
humility; God has provided knowledge of his will, and authoritative grounds for
obligation and motivation, through the sending of Christ, and the codification
of God’s teachings in scripture. This perspective works itself out in several
elements of Locke’s moral and political theory. By way of illustration, one can
see how the second greatest commandment—to love one’s neighbor as one’s
self—is more than just some intuitive golden-rule principle; it is a binding rule
that forms part of Locke’s doctrine of property. When one considers how eternal
matters are linked to “life together” in Locke’s larger theo-political schema, it
becomes clear that he draws from scriptural language, principles, and mandates
in order to form his moral and political philosophy. Thus, contrary to religious
enthusiasm, humanity is given a reliable identifiable and universalizing witness
for guidance in matters that extend beyond religious concerns.
Finally, I summarize my findings and suggest that the intuitions of Dunn,
Waldron, Nuovo, and others who advocate a religious (re)turn to Locke’s moral
and political philosophy are correct. I will add, however, that Locke offers a
coherent Christian Latitudinarian political philosophy, the foundation of which
is set on three planks. Locke’s political theory cannot be divorced from this
wider theological perspective. I seek to advance the field of study in this area by
clarifying Locke’s “true idea of God,” relating Locke’s doctrine of creation to his
teleological theory of natural law, and showing how Locke is able to hold a high
view of reason alongside a high view of scripture. Thus I show how Locke relies
on a Christian conception of God, the law of nature, and divine revelation in
scripture in forming his political philosophy.
This research project is valuable for several reasons. First, it provides a
historical contribution to Locke scholarship, aiding in the recontextualization
of the deeply Christian structure of Locke’s political thought. After supporting
and clarifying the significance of the religious (re)turn in Lockean studies, this
book shows how Locke’s religious convictions are borne out of a particular
Introduction 11
An interdisciplinary approach
out of coherent theological aims, and I will explain how these aims provide
grounding for his political thought. As a result, this book presents Locke as a
Christian political philosopher, whose approach reveals important clues about
his theological commitments on which his political philosophy depends.
Part One
How could two such radically different portraits emerge from the same set
of works? Neither the religious nor the secular reading of Locke is a modern
invention, and neither has a sole claim to antiquity. For example, one can find
philosophers and political theorists traversing the “secular” trail throughout the
three centuries separating Locke from the current scene. One can identify five
The New Perspective on Locke 17
moves, some of which cover the span between Locke’s lifetime and our own, that
have tended to the reception of Locke as fundamentally a secularist.
toward new desired ends, it is apparent that the political fruit of toleration,
liberty, and equality was advanced (by intent or neglect) without the same level of
regard for the theological roots, which connect Locke’s moral philosophy to his
political ends. The one considered “the most influential philosopher of modern
times”11 was virtually unread in most places of influence for the first quarter of
the eighteenth century. According to Jonathan Israel, there was a “remarkable
disinclination of leading intellectual figures early in the century to engage
seriously with Locke’s work,” a conclusion he finds “striking.”12 For example,
it was not until the 1730s that Locke garnered much influence in France, the
Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Italy, and that in the realm of epistemology.13
Though the Lochisti were a potent force in the 1740s, Locke’s Essay was only placed
on the papal Index in 1734, suggesting a lack of any notable influence until that
time.14 A similar story may be told concerning Locke’s influence in the Americas.
Although Locke is considered the father of the American Revolution, claiming
the Two Treatises was “causally responsible” for the American political scene
of the 1700s is “largely false.”15 As Dunn has ably shown, Locke’s Two Treatises
was not greatly read in the American colonies before 1750, and any significant
influences on American revolutionary sympathies “was largely confined to the
post-1760 constitutional writings of the highly educated.”16 Interestingly, the
book was not nearly as popular in eighteenth-century France or even England as
is customarily thought.17 In fact, what stands out when conducting a historical
survey of the Two Treatises’ reception history is its glaring ambiguity, being used
for differing (and sometimes, cross) purposes.
Recognizing the shelf wear on Locke’s moral and political works offers a
clue to tracing historically the deviation from Locke’s original aims through
appropriation for new desired ends. Spellman points out that in the mid-
1750s, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert’s Encyclopaedia spoke of Locke as the founder
of “scientific philosophy,” following in the footsteps of Newton, credited as the
father of “scientific physics.”18 Voltaire considered Locke to be “the Hercules of
metaphysics,” abandoning the methodology and overturning the conclusions
of the scholastics and divine right theorists. Conceiving of Locke’s works (for
nearly eighty years) passing only through the hands of a few educated persons
with their own moral and political agenda leads one to conclude with Spellman
that, whatever Locke’s intentions, his work was shaped for new purposes by “a
less devout eighteenth century” that misunderstood Locke’s central aims and
intentions.19
In the nineteenth century, one sees a third “move” take shape. A particular
(re)reading of the philosophy of history created an ill-informed sense of key
The New Perspective on Locke 19
political persecution, Locke practices “the art of writing” by couching his true
beliefs “between the lines” of his own works, allowing “thoughtful men” to
tease out the real meaning of a book.28 “The real opinion of an author is not
necessarily identical with that which he expresses in the largest number of
passages,” writes Strauss, and writers in Locke’s position are likely to offer highly
ironic statements, which intentionally commit “such blunders as would shame
an intelligent high school boy.”29 “The truly exact historian” will take the hint
and recognize that Locke’s actual views are the exact opposite of what these
“large number of passages” might suggest.30
Thus, the Bible-quoting, Hooker-referencing, commentary-writing Locke
who sought to distance his own teaching from the “justly decried”31 Hobbes was
simply acting out a charade. According to Strauss, Locke may have confessed
with his lips an allegiance to theologically based natural law, but his heart (a la
Hobbes) lay with a radically atheistic notion of natural right.32 As a champion of
replacing virtue with freedom as the chief end of society, Locke’s political theory
of acquisition is seen as the fruit of subversively amoral Machiavellian thought.33
In 1960, Cox continued this line of extreme skepticism, again claiming that
only proper principles of interpretation can draw out Locke’s hidden meaning—
often directly contradicting his explicit statements. Like Strauss, Cox offers the
needed hermeneutical schema, one that was apparently not available before these
men were able to discover it.34 Cox praises Locke for his rhetorical acumen and
skills of deception35 before citing cases where Locke says one thing but believes
the exact opposite.36
Strauss’s removal of Locke’s meaning from the actual content of his
writings left historians and political theorists with room to usher in their own
contemporary concerns. Just as Strauss offered an analysis of Locke as part of his
negative critique of modern liberalism, others are sympathetic in their portrayal
of Locke as a defender of modern liberal values.37 Yet the “hiddenness of Locke’s
true meaning” argument can lead to any number of interpretations. In 1962,
Macpherson used a hermeneutic of suspicion to provide a Marxist interpretation
of Locke. Like Strauss and Cox before him, Macpherson claims “the presence
of apparently clear inconsistency is to be treated as a clue” to unstated or
“inadequately stated” social assumptions.38 These social assumptions, shared with
Hobbes, included possessive individualism, focused on unlimited acquisition of
property within a larger class warfare. Locke sets out to provide the moral basis
for this approach. In so doing, Locke marshals forth theological arguments (and
calls upon authorities such as Richard Hooker and the Natural Law tradition)
as instruments of rhetoric—which ultimately, according to MacPherson, leave
The New Perspective on Locke 21
Locke with a weaker (and less consistent) political theory than that of Hobbes.39
As an open-textured method, this mid-century reading of Locke paved the way
for positing Locke as simply a defender of a nontheological secular liberalism.
The extreme skepticism and eisegetical approach of Strauss and those who
followed in his train has been decisively answered on several fronts.40 But, as has
been shown, one can find the residual effects in the general approach to political
philosophy as well as the history of ideas. On the one hand, among those who
believe Locke’s philosophy may be studied within the large sweep of history (as
addressing perennial problems), it is altogether too easy to slide Locke into a
line of tradition that starts with Machiavelli, runs through Hobbes, and on to a
contemporary individualistic, freedom-based political theory concerned at base
with self-preservation and group consent. On the other hand, for those who
believe Locke must be narrowly examined within the strict confines of his own
historical context, the ease is to render Locke irrelevant to any contemporary
philosophical concerns.41 These seem to be extremes.
To some extent, all five of these moves displaced Locke’s theology in order to
present a “truer” reading of his political philosophy. But, this book will argue,
historically understood his theological premises are central to the political
project and cannot be excised without radically altering the whole.
A historical pedigree
For example, Israel notes that a religious reading of Locke’s moral and political
philosophy is present in Italy in the mid-eighteenth century. Tommaso Moniglia,
the Pisan professor of scripture and Church history, published a dissertation
“against the fatalisti” at Lucca in 1744. In his treatise, Moniglia saw Locke as
22 Finding Locke’s God
From his earliest concern with the relationship of morality to revealed religion
to his last writings on the reasonable Christianity, Locke saw political life as
requiring both reason and faith … Locke’s periodic resort to religion, then,
is less an act of piety (or failure of analytic nerve) than an integral part of his
philosophical and political enterprise.66
This book will argue that the religious turn is necessary but needs further
to be explored. Locke may have sought to curb political control away from
unscrupulous religious leaders, and he may have championed the separation of
church and state (for mutual benefit). But it was not his intention to separate a
distinctly Christian worldview (which includes ideas about God, humanity, law,
morality, and creation) from the ends of his political program. He is offering
a pragmatic Christian political philosophy without using distinctly Christian
language.
In the chapters to follow, this book will argue that much of Locke’s mature
political thought is driven by his Christian theological convictions in deeper
and richer ways than often assumed even by exponents of the “religious turn.”
We will begin by placing Locke within the religious contexts of his own day.
The excellent groundwork for placing Locke within the circle of Latitudinarian
theology laid down early but clarified by Marshall and supremely by Tetlow can
be sharpened. For example, precisely how did this background provide not only a
general influence but an impetus to provide a political philosophy working out of
theological premises shared or advocated by Whichcote, Cudworth, and the like?
The answer of this book is that many of Locke’s political aims (and theological
argumentation to support those aims) are already present in his theological
context. This backdrop shows how Locke was able to establish the crucial link
between his political ends and his Christian theological commitments.
While several scholars have mentioned different portions of Locke’s
theological angle, it remains necessary to identify the platform of Locke’s moral
and political theory as resting on three theological planks (God, the law of nature,
and revelation). Each of these planks, in turn, is in need of further elaboration.
Though some have assumed any deity can do justice to Locke’s religious claims,
only a “true” idea of God (as Locke conceives it)—whose character includes
goodness, mercy, and justice, who affirms the freedom of human beings made
to participate in creation, and whose past and future actions are described in the
Bible—can serve as the moral basis for a truly just society. While Colman rightly
identifies a coherent moral theory in Locke’s philosophy, a clearer theological
answer is needed to explain how elements of hedonistic psychology relate to
moral accountability within a wider natural law theory97 as well as how to establish
the basis of human equality. For Locke, the answer lies in a larger theology of
creation (connected to covenant theology) that grounds any law of nature and
30 Finding Locke’s God
provides ultimate ends beyond temporal happiness and higher than any human
pleasure or societal unity.
Finally, while much attention has been given to Locke’s use of and appreciation
for scripture, there still is work to be done on Locke’s doctrine of scripture and
how that relates to his wider interest. Locke’s Latitudinarian framework explains
his high view of scripture that lends itself to a kind of biblical conservatism:
one that seeks general acceptance of a minimal creed discovered through the
“plain” reading of an agreed-upon standard—Christian scripture. In this way,
Locke affirms the necessity of revelation at the same time as decrying religious
enthusiasm. Locke’s reading of scripture allows him to place judgment in the
hands of God at the last day—a move that is essential to the logic of his argument
for the executive powers of government and allows Locke to advocate a generous
liberality and discretion among political and religious leaders whose judgments
are, at most, penultimate. Locke’s high regard for scripture, and claims concerning
the necessity of divine revelation, provide the bridge for understanding how
(and why) particular aspects of the call of the gospel find their way into Locke’s
political theory, and establish the way in which, for Locke, both reason and faith
serve to support his political aims.
In truth, only Locke’s three planks—laid down in Locke’s terms—can carry
the weight of Locke’s political agenda. Locke’s political theory is not a “secular”
approach to governance that Christians can accept; it is a coherent Latitudinarian
political philosophy intended to support Christian aims (across denominations),
which could also be accepted by those outside the Christian faith.
2
According to Jeremy Waldron, who is perhaps the leading proponent for the
religious turn in Locke scholarship, Locke believed it was “not reasonable … to
think that you can proceed safely in public discourse or in public life, without
accepting the theism which … is an indispensable basis for equality and social
stability.”1 For Waldron, “proceeding safely in public discourse” goes beyond
philosophical recognition of the theological roots of egalitarianism but extends
to the very language used. Given the theological underpinnings in Locke’s
political philosophy, writes Waldron,
This view, however, is not without detractors. John William Tate is a modern
Locke scholar who represents an interpretive stream diametrically opposed to
public theological appeals or overtly religious argumentation in the political
sphere. According to Tate, “Locke understood … that … religion and theology
constituted no basis for public deliberation or civil and political agreement,
either concerning the role and purpose of government, individual consent
to that role, or the obligations arising from these.”3 “Far from ‘religious
argumentation’ being ‘indispensable,’” writes Tate, “Locke explicitly tries to
exclude it from the justification of civil and political arrangements and the
exercise of political authority associated with these arrangements.”4 For Tate, the
foundation of Locke’s political philosophy is found in shared material interests,
far removed from divisive theological commitments.5 Neither natural law,
32 Finding Locke’s God
Perusing Locke’s political writings, one is able to find ample evidence of language
lending itself toward this “secular” perspective. For example, in the LCT Locke
is emphatic that church and state are “most different” and occupy two different
spheres, “absolutely separate and distinct,” with “just bounds” set between them.8
The state, charged with care for temporal worldly concerns, is the “Keeper of the
publick Peace”; the church, interested in the eternal things of heaven, is “the
Oversee[r] of Souls.”9 According to Locke, there is only an “unhappy Agreement
that we see between the Church and State” when the boundaries are crossed.10
Just as Locke describes the distinct roles for “church” and “state,” he also
speaks of what is not in each jurisdiction. “Churches have [not] any Jurisdiction
in Worldly matters.”11 Ecclesiastical authority “ought to be confined within the
Bounds of the Church, nor can it in any manner be extended to Civil Affairs.”12
Likewise, the state is not concerned with eternal matters: “All the Power of Civil
Government relates only to Mens Civil Interests, is confined to the care of the
things of this World, and hath nothing to do with the World to come.”13 Since the
magistrate has jurisdiction only over “civil interests,” which concern “temporal”
things, “it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the Salvation
of Souls.”14 Locke’s strong and passionate feelings on the matter are expressed
most clearly near the beginning of the work:
The Church it self is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the
Commonwealth. The Boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He
jumbles Heaven and Earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who
mixes these two Societies; which are in their Original, End, Business, and in
every thing, perfectly distinct, and infinitely different from each other.15
[In preparation.
[In preparation.
CUMMING (Rev. John, d.d.),—A MESSAGE FROM GOD; or,
Thoughts on Religion for Thinking Men. Fourth Edition,
fcap. cloth, gilt edges, 2s.
—— OUR FATHER; A Manual of Family Prayers for General and
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