SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 191039. August 22, 2022 ]

ARLENE HOMOL Y ROMOROSA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

Grave abuse of confidence aggravates and qualifies the crime of theft. When the gravity of exploitation of
trust is not proven, the crime is only simple theft and the abuse of confidence shall be treated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. The Court applies this rule in resolving this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
assailing the Court of Appeals-Cebu City's Decision[2] dated June 26, 2008 and Resolution[3] dated
December 16, 2009 in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 00080.

ANTECEDENTS

Dr. Jelpha Robillos y Jimenez (Dr. Robillos) hired Arlene Homol y Romorosa (Arlene) as a clinic secretary.
Also, Dr. Robillos tasked Arlene to collect and remit installment payments from customers who purchased
jewelry. On March 2 and 8, 2002, Arlene received a total of P1,000.00 from Elena Quilangtang (Elena) for
the gold bracelet that she bought. However, Arlene did not give the money to Dr. Robillos. On March 14,
2002, Arlene resigned from work. The following day, Dr. Robillos reminded Elena of her unpaid
installments. Elena replied that she already paid to Arlene. Aggrieved, Dr. Robillos filed a criminal
complaint against Arlene. Finding probable cause, the public prosecutor charged Arlene with qualified theft
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 11513,[4] to wit:

The undersigned, City Prosecutor I, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses ARLENE R.
HOMOL of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:

That, on or about March 2, to March 8, 2002, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is a secretary/collector
of Dra. Jelpha Robillos, with intent of gain and with grave abuse of confidence which
facilitated the commission of the offense and without the consent of said Dr. Jelpha Robillos,
the owner thereof and also her employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away ONE THOUSAND PESOS ([P]1,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as partial payment from a customer which she ought to remit to the said
owner/employer being a collector, to the damage and prejudice of said Dra. Jelpha Robillos, in
the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article[s] 308 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
[5] (Emphases supplied)

Arlene pleaded not guilty. At the trial, Arlene did not deny receipt of P1,000.00 but insisted that she
remitted it to Dr. Robillos.[6] On July 26, 2004, the RTC convicted Arlene of estafa involving unfaithfulness
or abuse of confidence under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The RTC held
that Arlene misappropriated the payment and violated the trust of Dr. Robillos and Elena,[7] thus:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Arlene Homol y Romorosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under subdivision No. 1, paragraph (b) of Article
315 of the [RPC] and penalized under the 3rd paragraph of the same article and, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days, as the minimum, to One (1)
Year and (1) Day, as the maximum, and to indemnify [Dr.] Jelpha J. Robillos the sum of
P1,000.00, the amount misappropriated by the accused.

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphases supplied)

Arlene elevated the case to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 00080. Arlene argued that the RTC
erroneously convicted her of estafa when the charge was for qualified theft. Moreover, the Information is
fatally defective for failure to allege juridical possession which is an element of estafa.[9] On June 26, 2008,
the CA affirmed the RTC's findings that all the elements of estafa involving unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence were alleged and proven. The CA ruled that Arlene was guilty of estafa because she was in
possession of the money when she misappropriated it. The CA explained that what distinguishes theft from
estafa is the possession of the thing. In theft, it is presumed that the personal property is in the possession of
another, unlike in estafa, where the possession of the thing is already in the hands of the offender.[10]

Arlene sought reconsideration but was denied.[11]

Hence, this recourse. Arlene did not dispute the facts but maintains that her right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation was violated. The charge was for qualified theft which translates only to
material possession. The Information did not allege juridical possession necessary for estafa. At any rate, a
mere employee does not have juridical possession over the amount supposedly misappropriated and cannot
be held liable for estafa.[12]

RULING

The Petition is partly meritorious.

It is fundamental that every element of the crime must be set out in the Information[13] to avoid surprise on
the part of the accused and to afford [them] the opportunity to suitably prepare [their] defense.[14] No
matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any
offense unless it is charged in the Information on which [they are] tried or is necessarily included therein.
[15] More importantly, "[the allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and
an accused's right to question [their] conviction based on facts not alleged in the Information cannot be
waived."[16] Here, the charge against Arlene is designated in the Information as qualified theft. Yet, the CA
and the RTC convicted Arlene of estafa involving unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence. Thus, the Court
deems it necessary to discuss first the distinctions between these two crimes.

Theft is distinguished from estafa by the

manner in which the offender in each case
acquires possession of the property.

"Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against[,] or intimidation
of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent."[17] If
committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified.[18] The crime of qualified
theft under Article 308 in relation to Article 310 of the RPC requires the confluence of the following
elements, to wit:
 1. There was a taking of personal property;

2. The said property belongs to another;

3. The taking was done without the consent of the owner;

4. The taking was done with intent to gain;

5. The taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against person, or force
upon things; and

6. The taking was done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the
RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.[19]

On the other hand, the requirements to prove estafa involving unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC are the following:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same:

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[20] (Citation omitted)

Theft should not be confused with estafa. In general, the two crimes are distinguished by the manner in
which the offender in each case acquires possession of the property. The thief takes the item without the
owner's consent. The estafador receives the thing and converts it to their own use or benefit. "However,
there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property."[21] The misappropriation constitutes
theft if the accused was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the
thing. Whereas, the conversion constitutes embezzlement or estafa if the accused has the juridical
possession of the thing.[22] The next question now is whether the Information for qualified theft alleges
sufficient facts to sustain a conviction for estafa.

The prosecution failed to recite in the

Information facts constitutive of estafa.

It is an essential element of the crime of estafa that the money or goods misappropriated or converted by the
accused to the prejudice of another was received by him "in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same."[23] The phrase
contemplates receipt of the thing by virtue of a fiduciary relationship between the parties,[24] or transactions
where juridical possession of the item is transferred to the accused.[25] Mere receipt of the property does not
satisfy this element,[26] wherein the accused is entrusted only with material possession of the thing.[27]

In this case, the CA and the RTC both held that the prosecution alleged and proved all the elements of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC. However, the Information is silent whether Arlene received
the money in a fiduciary capacity, or under an obligation to return the same.[28] The phrase in the
Information that Arlene "ought to remit"[29] the money is insufficient absent the allegation that this duty is
rooted in transactions where she acquired juridical possession of the thing. In contrast, the Information
alleged that Arlene received the money as a mere collector.[30] As such, the money merely passes into
Arlene's hands and her custody is only until the amount is remitted to Dr. Robillos. Arlene acquires only
physical or material possession over the unremitted funds. Verily, an employee who receives money or
property in behalf of the employer is not vested with juridical possession but only physical or material
possession.[31] An employee cannot be considered as an agent if the duty to collect is imposed by reason of
his employment,[32] thus:

It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is

considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. The material possession
of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical
possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not
pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or
otherwise. Hence, conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere
material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to
whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of
the same property constitutes Estafa.[33] (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)

Corollarily, Arlene cannot be convicted of a crime not embraced within the Information. Nevertheless, the
Court finds that the allegations sufficiently charged Arlene with qualified theft.

The Information alleged all the

constitutive elements of qualified theft.
However, the prosecution proved only
simple theft absent evidence that the abuse
of confidence is grave.

There is no ambiguity in the Information. The designation of the offense and the recital of facts sufficiently
constitute the crime of qualified theft. Arlene was not denied of her constitutional right to be fully apprised
of the charge against her, and to suitably prepare a defense. The Information alleged that Arlene, with intent
to gain, took P1,000.00 belonging to her employer, Dr. Robillos, without the latter's consent, thereby
gravely abusing the confidence reposed on her as a collector. Apparently, the charge is for the crime of theft
"[s]ince there is no allegation that the taking was accomplished with violence or intimidation against person
or force upon things." The allegation that the taking is with grave abuse of confidence categorizes the theft
as qualified rather than a simple one.[34] It is settled "that the Information need not use the exact language
of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether
it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render
judgment properly."[35] Again, Arlene could not have been bewildered as to the nature of the accusation
against her.

However, the Court finds that the prosecution established only simple theft.[36] First, Arlene received
P1,000.00 from Elena but failed to remit the amount to Dr. Robillos. Second, the money belongs to Dr.
Robillos as it comprised installment payments from customers who purchased jewelry. Third, the absence of
consent was shown in Dr. Robillos attempt to recover the unpaid installments from Elena. Fourth, the
furtive taking of the money, raised the reasonable presumption of intent to gain. Fifth, Arlene got hold of the
money in the performance of her duty as a collector without force, violence or intimidation. Yet, the
prosecution failed to establish the element of grave abuse of confidence.

The Court has explained that grave abuse of trust is a "circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the
commission of the crime of theft; hence, the imposition of a higher penalty is necessary."[37] In qualified
theft, the taking must be the result of a relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance,
between the accused and the offended party that has created a high degree of confidence between them.[38]
Thus, grave abuse of confidence by a thieving employee should be contextualized not only by the
relationship between the employer and employee, but also by the purpose for which the employee was
given the employer's trust.[39] In People v. Sabado,[40] the accused is guilty of qualified theft when he
gravely exploited the trust of his employer. The Court considered the accused's exclusive management of
the shop and access to the vault, to wit:

Theft here became qualified because it was committed with grave abuse of confidence.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of
dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused-appellant and the offended party
that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the accused-appellant abused.
Accused-appellant, as established by the prosecution, is an employee of the Pawnshop.
Accused-appellant could not have committed the crime had he not been holding the
position of the trusted employee which gave him not only sole access to the Pawnshop's
vault but also control of the premises. The relevant portion of the RTC's disquisition reads:

Based on the extant records[,] it appears that accused Luther Sabado was a trusted
employee of Diamond Pawnshop. In fact, the following circumstances show the
trust and confidence reposed on him by the shop owners, to wit: he manages the
shop alone; he has the keys to the locks of the shop; and he has access to the
vault and knows the combination of the same. x x x.

The management of Diamond Pawnshop clearly had reposed its trust and confidence in the
accused-appellant, and it was this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself
to the damage and prejudice of his employer.[41] (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)

In Viray v. People,[42] however, a house caretaker was convicted only of simple theft for breaking into his
employer's home to steal several valuables. The Court found that the employer denied the accused access to
the house which refutes the degree of trust and confidence between them, thus:

This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be
qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. However, we
disagree from its finding that the same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying element of
grave abuse of confidence to sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft.
Instead, [w]e are one with the RTC that private complainant did not repose on Viray['s]
"confidence" that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft.

The very fact that petitioner "forced open" the main door and screen because he was denied
access to private complainant's house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private
complainant. Without ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that were the
subject of the taking, it cannot be said that private complaint had a "firm trust" on
petitioner or that she "relied on his discretion" and that the same trust reposed on him
facilitated Viray's taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction of qualified
theft.

To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for qualified theft, there
must be an allegation in the [I]nformation and proof that there existed between the
offended party and the accused such high degree of confidence or that the stolen goods
have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the accused. In other words, where the
accused had never been vested physical access to, or material possession of, the stolen goods, it
may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material possession thereby committing
such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property[.][43] (Emphases supplied and citations
omitted)
Similarly, the Court in People v. Maglaya,[44] refused to impose the penalty prescribed for qualified theft
when the accused was not given material possession or access to the property. The Court determined that
the accused did not act with grave abuse of confidence despite his duties involving the handling and
receiving of money from his employer's customers, viz.:

Although appellant had taken advantage of his position in committing the crime
aforementioned, [w]e do not believe he had acted with grave abuse of confidence and can
be convicted of qualified theft, because his employer had never given him the possession of the
machines involved in the present case or allowed him to take hold of them, and it does not
appear that the former had any especial confidence in him. Indeed, the delivery of the machines
to the prospective customers was entrusted, not to appellant, but to another employee.[45]
(Emphasis supplied)

Here, it was not proven that Dr. Robillos had special trust, or high degree of confidence in Arlene. The
allegation in the Information that Arlene is a "secretary/collector" of Dr. Robillos does not by itself, without
more, create the relation of confidence and intimacy required in qualified theft. More telling are the
minuscule amounts involved and the fact that Dr. Robillos allowed Arlene to resign without any question,
discount the existence of a high degree of confidence between them. The prosecution, likewise, failed to
substantiate the gravity how Arlene betrayed Dr. Robillos' supposed special trust to qualify, or facilitate the
taking of the money. Dr. Robillos principally hired Arlene as a clinic secretary while her task as a collector
is foreign to her usual duties. The circumstances do not show that Arlene's job was instrumental in
facilitating the taking of the money. There is no evidence that Arlene could not have committed the crime
had she not been holding the position of a secretary or collector. To reiterate, abuse of confidence must be
grave. On this point, the Court is convinced that Arlene took advantage of her position in committing the
crime but not on the level of grave abuse of confidence. Thus, Arlene is guilty only of simple theft.

At most, the abuse of confidence shall be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance since the
gravity of exploitation of trust was not proven.[46] Indeed, abuse of confidence is inherent in qualified theft
but not in simple theft since the circumstance is not included in the definition of the crime.[47] Under Article
14 of the RPC, abuse of confidence exists only when the offended party has trusted the offender who later
abuses such trust by committing the crime. The abuse of confidence must be a means of facilitating the
commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would
not abuse said confidence. The confidence between the offender and the offended party must be immediate
and personal.[48] As discussed above, Arlene took advantage of her position as a secretary or collector in
committing theft but the gravity of exploitation of trust was not proven.

Under Republic Act No. 10951,[49] the penalty for simple theft is arresto mayor to its full extent if the value
of the property stolen is over P500.00 but does not exceed P5,000.00.[50] As this penalty does not exceed
one (1) year, the Indeterminate Sentence Law becomes inapplicable. With the presence of the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, the imposable penalty must be within the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty which ranges from four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Accordingly, this Court imposes upon Arlene the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day. Applying the
prevailing jurisprudence, the actual damages due to Dr. Robillos amounting to P1,000.00 shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the RTC's Decision on July 26, 2004 until full payment.[51]

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated June 26, 2008 and
Resolution dated December 16, 2009 in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 00080 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that Arlene Homol y Romorosa is found guilty of simple theft and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day. The award of actual damages to
private complainant Dr. Jelpha Robillos y Jimenez in the amount of P1,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the date of the Regional Trial Court's Decision dated July 26, 2004 until full
payment.
SO ORDERED.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 33-41.

[2]Id. at 11-22. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with the Concurrence of Associate
Justices Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla (now a retired Member of the Court) and Florito S. Macalino.

[3]
Id. at 28-29. Penned by Executive Justice Franchito N. Diamante (Chairperson) with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and Edgardo L. Delos Santos (retired Associate Justice of the Court).

[4] Id. at 12; and Records, pp. 8-10.

[5] Records, p. 122.

[6] Id. at 122-123.

[7] Id. at 129.

[8] Id. at 129.

[9] Rollo, pp. 20-21.

[10] Id. at 11-22.

[11] Id. at 28-29.

[12] Id. at 33-41.

[13] Rules of Court, Rule 110, Section 8.

[14] Pielago v. People, 706 Phil. 460, 469 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

[15] Rules of Court, Rule 120, Section 4.

[16] Andaya v. People, 526 Phil. 480, 497 (2006) [Per J. Ynarez-Santiago, First Division].

[17] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 308, paragraph 1.

[18] Id., Article 310.

[19] People v. Bago, 386 Phil. 310, 334-335 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].

[20]
Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332 (2008) [Per J. Chiao-Nazario, Third Division]; Ceniza-Manantan v.
People, 558 Phil. 104, 118 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; and Chua-Burce v. Court of
Appeals, 387 Phil. 15, 25-26 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

[21] Santos v. People, 260 Phil. 519, 526 (1990) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

[22] Id. at 525-526.

[23] Pamintuan v. People, 635 Phil. 514, 522 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].

[24] Id. at 523.

[25]
Murao v. People, 501 Phil. 53, 64-65 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division], citing
Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 484, 497-498 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].

[26] Legaspi v. People, 842 Phil. 72, 81 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].

[27] Pideli v. People, 568 Phil. 793, 806-807 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R.T., Third Division].

[28] Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 703, 707-708 (1956) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc].

[29] Records, p. 122.

[30] Id.

[31]San Diego v. People, 757 Phil. 599, 608-609 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; and Balerta v.
People, 748 Phil. 806, 819 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division], citing Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals,
387 Phil. 15 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

[32] People v. Mirto, 675 Phil. 895, 913 (2011) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

[33] Benabaye v. People, 155 Phil. 144, 154-155 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].

[34] Avecilla v. People, 285 Phil. 11, 20 (1992) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].

[35] People v. Pulg, 585 Phil. 555, 562 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

[36] People v. Euraba, G.R. No. 220762 [Notice], April 18, 2018.

[37] People v. Mejares, 823 Phil. 459, 470 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

[38]
People v. Cahilig, 740 Phil. 200, 209-210 (2014) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]. See also People v.
Koc Song, 63 Phil. 369, 371 (1936) [Per C.J. Avanceña, En Banc].

[39] Tejolan v. People, G.R. No. 218972 [Notice], June 30, 2021.

[40] 813 Phil. 221 (2017) [Per J. Tijam, Third Division]. See also People v. Koc Song, supra note 37.

[41] Id. at 228-229.

[42] 720 Phil. 841 (2013) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

[43] Id. at 852-853.

[44] 141 Phil. 278 (1969) [Per C.J. Conception, First Division].

[45] Id. at 285.

[46] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 14, paragraph 4.

[47] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 62.

[48]
Luis B. Reyes, The REVISED PENAL CODE, Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998, pp. 342-344, citing
United States v. Torrida, 23 Phil. 189, 192 (1912) [Per J. Trent, En Banc].

[49]An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based, and
the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, Otherwise
Known as "The Revised Penal Code," as Amended. Approved: August 29, 2017.

[50] Republic Act No. 10951, Section 81, paragraph 5.

[51] Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

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