Position Paper of Faculty Members

of the UP Department of Political Science

on the Congressional Initiative
to Undertake Constitutional Revision

19 January 2023

INTRODUCTION

The undersigned faculty members of the Department of Political Science thank the House Committee on
Constitutional Amendments, particularly its Chair, the Honorable Rufus Rodriguez, for the invitation to
comment on the bills proposing to amend the 1987 Constitution. We acknowledge the continuing effort
of the Committee to listen to different sectors, including members of the academe, as Congress ponders
these bills related to amending and/or revising the Constitution. Our last engagement with the Committee
was on 12 February 2020 before the lockdown due to COVID-19.

Constitutional revision is an arduous task requiring care and rigor as it has long-lasting effects on our
development trajectory as a nation, with consequences that may both be intended or unintended. In
making this presentation, our intent is to share critical insights, to draw attention to issues that we hope
the respective committees in Congress as a whole, and in the Executive Branch, would consider as they
contemplate charter change and amendments as well as electoral and political reforms.

Our position paper responds to the series of questions posed by the Committee in its invitation. Certain
parts of this position paper were also presented to the House of Representatives’ Committee on
Constitutional Amendments during its public hearing on 16 November 2016, the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments during its public hearing on 8 December 2016, and the Senate Committee on
Electoral Reforms and People’s Participation on 17 January 2018. At the outset, while we acknowledge
that the current draft bills and resolutions pertain more on matters of procedural mechanisms, we also
believe that by addressing both the process and substance of constitutional change, the House of
Representatives and the Senate must be more inclusive and transparent by informing and engaging with
their constituents on this very important issue.
 PART 1
ON THE NEED TO AMEND OR REVISE THE CONSTITUTION
A. Issue of Scope of Changes

Historically, Philippine initiatives to change the constitution were made to break from the immediate past
and usher in a new political order. For instance, the 1935 Constitution provided the transition and vision
of a post-American colonial regime in the Philippines. The 1973 Constitution institutionalized one-man
rule. The 1987 Constitution dismantled the dictatorship, and offered solutions to heightened social
injustices that authoritarian rule had engendered, furthermore institutionalizing democratic checks and
balances across the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government as well as civil society’s
power in relation with the state. Simply put, the overarching change envisioned in the current
constitutional reform process must articulate the nature of the break that it wishes to achieve. It must also
be crystal clear that the problems the charter revision wishes to address cannot be done through
constitutional amendment, regular legislation, and/or executive action. Our people need to hear from the
political leadership answers that are based on grounded and evidence-based claims. Our people deserve
no less.

B. Issue of Timing

While constitutional amendments may not require any special historical moments, revisions in practice
were usually undertaken after some major upheavals like revolutions, coups, postcolonial wars,
democratic uprisings, post-peace agreement managed transitions, or after a regime change such as when
left-leaning governments were elected into power in several Latin American countries.

Since 2016, several proposed resolutions in both chambers of Congress, including those favoring the
federal shift or a charter change, claim that there is a “public clamor” for the shift or change. Opinion
polls belie this. A June 2018 Pulse Asia survey showed that around 67% are against changing the charter
during the time the survey was conducted (with 37% against it “now and in the future” while 30% are
against it “now but may be open to it sometime in the future”) while 18% “support charter change now”
and 14% are undecided.

The same survey shows that 74% of Filipinos have little, almost no, or no knowledge of the country’s
Constitution, with 69% of respondents having a low level of knowledge about the federal system being
proposed at that time. In Pulse Asia’s surveys on most urgent national concerns, top responses usually
include controlling inflation, improving/increasing workers’ pay, fighting criminality, creating more jobs,
and fighting graft and corruption in government. Since 2016, not more than 2 to4% of the respondents
consider changing the Constitution as urgent. In a September 2022 Pulse Asia survey, charter change was
not in the list of urgent national concerns. Any attempt to amend the constitution or change the charter
requires prior consultative and deliberative processes involving a genuinely informed citizenry. The claim
that there is public clamor for constitutional change remains unsubstantiated.

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It will be recalled that the election of delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention occurred in 1970,
with the purpose of revising the 1935 Constitution, a document made under the tutelage of the
Americans. But as early as 1967, in the middle of Ferdinand Marcos, Sr.’s first term, charter change
efforts had already gained ground. It was the political opposition that initially proposed charter change.
When Carlos P. Garcia died, Diosdado Macapagal, Marcos Sr.’s opponent in the 1965 elections, headed
the Convention. However, the dictator hijacked the process and established Martial Law. The rest is
history.

Moreover, the claim1 that the clear majority vote received by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is
tantamount to a greenlight from the citizenry to proceed with moves to change the constitution is a
misplaced presumption rather than a compelling fact. For one, amending the constitution was not a
significant part of President Marcos Jr.’s election campaign platform or legislative agenda. Further to the
contrary, President Marcos Jr. himself pointed out the difficulty in terms of the public acceptability and
legitimacy to change the constitution, saying that Charter Change would be taxing and tedious to push as
an agenda because the public believes that lawmakers are merely pushing this to extend their terms: “Sa
palagay ko, napakahirap ngayon na buksan ang saligang batas dahil ang tao ayaw nila. Ang suspetya nila,
ang mga pulitiko mageextend lang o magka-cancel ng eleksyon”.2 We cannot proceed with Charter change
without the genuine buy-in of an informed public, let alone its absence in the presidential legislative
agenda.

This prospect raised by President Marcos Jr. regarding the legitimacy to endeavor the change of the
constitution becomes even more dismal when we take into account the context of a Philippine economy
that is reeling from the effects of COVID-19, high inflation, poor public infrastructure, and confronting
the challenges to implement the Mandanas-Garcia ruling and full devolution under Executive Order 138
(a concern the two Houses of Congress must prioritize and address). The realities of the fiscal and
logistical demands required to roll-out credible and substantive processes to change the constitution make
it an even more problematic pursuit, especially in the face of more urgent and immediate local and
national problems.

C. Deliberative and Dialogic Process

Constitution-making should be a national endeavor. We ask Congress to reflect on the following process
questions in order to ensure a democratic process with democratic outcomes. How and at what stages can
broader participation take place in the drafting process? Should (and how might) the following
mechanisms be put in place:

● a national dialogue process managed independently by a commissioned or designated body;

1
Joint Resolution No. 1 introduced by Representative Aurelio Gonzales Jr, 30 June 2022, (2nd page)
2
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1544985/federal-govt-system-fits-ph-but-cha-cha-difficult-marcos-jr and
https://pcij.org/blog/3582/marcos-chair-of-partido-federal-ng-pilipinas-silent-on-cha-cha-during-first-sona

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 ● surveys to inform the dialogue process and drafting;
● online sites and other modes to receive proposals and submissions; or
● a Constitutional Convention of elected and, possibly, appointed delegates, the design for which
would guarantee the election and selection of qualified citizens other than members of traditional
political clans?
● How would the authorities that will be put in-charge of the whole endeavor, process and
synthesize the inputs from these participatory mechanisms? How would these processes be
funded?

We urge Congress to fully lay down its plans before the people so that the people may know and be
encouraged to participate from the beginning.

D. Reiteration

In closing Part 1 of our intervention, we reiterate the need, on the part of the proponents, for articulation
on the following process concerns:

● The need for the political leadership to fully articulate the objectives and the vision for initiating
constitutional revision.
● The need to fully conceptualize the process and time frame.
● The need to define responsibilities and leadership of the process.
● The need for broader participatory mechanisms and effective consolidation, synthesis and
integration of inputs.
● The need to come up with safeguards against misinformation and undemocratic practices.

PART 2
ON THE PARTS OF THE CONSTITUTION TO BE AMENDED OR REVISED

In the first part, we posed the question: What is in the current political, economic and social dispensation
that would warrant a major constitutional overhaul?

Now we reverse this question and pose fundamental counter-questions. The questions are:

● Could we instead envision an evolutionary transformation of our institutions?

● Specifically, could the perceived problems of our current national milieu be addressed instead
through several constitutional amendments, regular legislation, and/or executive action?
● Should we tread the path of constitutional reform in careful and measured ways, instead of fast
tracking a constitutional overhaul?

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We also humbly remind our honorable decision makers that constitutional change is NOT the “silver
bullet” or the holy elixir to cure our country’s problems. It is not a panacea to remedy our socio-economic
ills or the only means to accomplish our national desires and aspirations.

Reforms can be accomplished through an appropriate mix of legislation and policy interventions, and not
simply through constitutional amendments or even institutional overhaul. Existing laws can be reviewed
and amended (e.g. Local Government Code; Omnibus Election Code) and processes and practices
safeguarded and improved (e.g. preserving the integrity of the Judicial and Bar Council and selection
process of nominations and appointments of justices and judges without interference from politicians
while maintaining transparency and accountability).

For instance, consider the following observations in reaction to some of the proposed changes in the
Constitution:

1. Proposed amendment on Provision on restrictive economic provisions in the Constitution

- Infrastructure development is more important in improving the economy than changing
the ownership rules. Constitutional amendments on economic provisions are insufficient
to ‘attract’ more investors.
2. Proposed “designated survivor” law
- By selecting a successor from the legislature instead of the Cabinet (as in the case of the
United States, for example) this proposal undermines separation of powers. In other
words, the president is head of the Executive branch of government and so succession
should come from within the same branch until a new election.
3. Proposals on the joint election of the President and Vice President / changes in term limits
- Considering that the constitution is silent on the joint election of the President and the
Vice-President, a constitutional amendment is not required to reform the election rules
and include a provision for tandem voting for candidates on a common ticket
- Moreover, as a principle, electoral reforms should be implemented and exhausted first
before making changes on laws for re-election. The anti-dynasty law, as provided for in
the 1987 Constitution, should be in place first. There is also a more urgent need to
strengthen political parties to make tandem voting meaningful. As it stands, the bill’s
justification for joint election of the top executives is more inclined toward the continuity
of programs rather than for accountability. Finally, the proposal would re-open the
possibility for reelection–removing the 1987 Constitution’s imposition of a single term
limit as a safeguard against tyranny. In other democracies, leaders can be re-elected at
least once so that–in theory–they have the incentive to perform well in order to be re-
elected or for their party to be returned to power. In democracies where political party
system institutionalization is strong, re-election can act as an accountability mechanism.
However, given that our political parties are weak in the Philippines, expanding re-
election (or lengthening political terms for that matter, as some proposals would have it)
will tend to prolong elite capture of political office.

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Aside from consultations with constituents and stakeholders of these proposed changes in the
Constitution, we urge the two Houses of Congress to look into empirical studies already done by
academic institutions, think tanks, and civil society organizations reviewing the Constitution and other
laws, looking at major issues confronting the country, and the urgent and necessary reforms. Members of
the UP Department of Political Science, for example, have conducted and published studies in
constitutional performance assessment of the 1987 Constitution as well as participated in the University
of the Philippines Diliman’s Task Force on a Blueprint for Building the Nation (#PILIpiLUNAS2022)
which conducted a number of multisectoral webinars on the pressing issues confronting the Philippines
and provided recommendations, including constitutional amendments, amendments of existing
legislation, new legislation, improvements in government practices and policies, and greater advocacy,
information dissemination and involvement of civil society and the citizenry.

PART 3
ON THE MODE OF AMENDING OR REVISING THE CONSTITUTION
A. Who is in charge?

It is notable that the post-Marcos constitutional revision agenda was always executive-driven – the shift to
a parliamentary system under the Ramos and Arroyo administrations; and then the shift to federalism
under the Duterte administration.

In this regard, it is essential that the current executive leadership define where it stands on constitutional
revision and the process it envisions as well as identify the responsible authorities who will oversee it.
Meanwhile, should it decide to constitute itself as a Constituent Assembly, Congress has to ensure that it
will complete the process without taking time and resources away from other legislative priorities.

B. On the Appropriate Drafting Body

Congress fashioning itself into a Constituent Assembly is indeed less costly. However, studies of the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) raise the following dangerous
drawbacks to such a body:

● The assembly may seek to advance its institutional interests at the disadvantage of other
institutional actors.
● The political parties that dominate the assembly may lack internal democratic structures.
● The parties may tend to favor electoral systems that distort the distribution of representation and
power.
● Excluded parties may resort to violence or not own the process.
● What measures can be undertaken to guard against these dangers?

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At the same time, should the process be executive-directed as was the case during the first half of
President Rodrigo Duterte’s term, the revisions may unduly favor the executive as far as the allocation of
powers is concerned and the institutional design in general.

Another alternative to a Constituent Assembly is a Constitutional Convention. According to the Institute

for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), members of a Constitutional Convention are more focused on
their job of revising the charter having been elected for that specific purpose. Likewise, the process
through a Constitutional Convention can be more democratic, transparent, and deliberative (IPER 2004).
However, a Constitutional Convention may not necessarily be more inclusive than a Constituent
Assembly.

Delegates elected solely for the purpose of constitution rewriting are not necessarily better than appointed
ones. A case in point is the 1986 Constitutional Commission which produced a Constitution that will now
enter its 36th year, only two years short of the longevity of the 1935 Constitution. While the 1987
Constitution has been described by some critics as superfluous, it undoubtedly has very strong democratic
credentials.

In sum, the Constituent Assembly and Constitutional Convention both have advantages and
disadvantages. A Constituent Assembly has the following advantages: (1) less costly and inexpensive; (2)
consists of skilled, experienced lawmakers; and (3) likely lead to speedy and swift period of constitutional
amendments. However, its disadvantages are: (1) limited participation of other sectors; (3) lawmakers’
vulnerability to self-interest; and (3) popular legitimacy may be found wanting and lacking. On the other
hand, the Constitutional Convention has the following advantages: (1) encourages more participation of
other actors; (2) likely promotes diversity and pluralistic views and opinions: and (3) delegates selected
through popular elections. Its disadvantages include: (1) much larger expenses entailed by electing
delegates and separate deliberations; (2) possibly more time-consuming process of preparation,
deliberation and finalization of proposed amendments or revisions; and (3) possible lack of accountability
mechanism unlike representatives in Congress.

At the end of the day, choices on the appropriate mechanisms have to be made in favor of generating
greater legitimacy for the constitutional reform process. The decision must be based on careful study and
supplemented by empirical evidence, not on impressions and short-term objectives. In the case of the
Philippines, the Constitutional Convention appears to be more appropriate should there be a strong
public demand for constitutional revision, provided that it will be more representative than the current
composition of the two Houses of Congress, including experts, sectoral representatives, civil society, and
those not belonging to political dynasties.

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 PART 4
ON VOTING JOINTLY OR SEPARATELY
IN CASE OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
Voting separately supports the current bicameral nature of the Philippine Congress and establishes checks
and balances between two institutions representing two different constituencies: national and
congressional district constituencies. Voting jointly renders bicameralism and the principle of checks and
balances irrelevant and meaningless. In addition, allowing Congress to vote jointly would put the Senate
in a disadvantaged position because they can easily be outnumbered and dwarfed by their counterparts in
the House of Representatives who have the numbers in the context of constitutional change and
amendments. On the other hand, voting together may be more efficient but it invites distrust and
attempts to stifle minority or critical views.

PART 5
ON THE POWERS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
OR CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Can Congress pass a resolution limiting the power of the Constituent Assembly or Constitutional
Convention, or are their powers plenary? A resolution should simply declare that it is convening as a
Constituent Assembly or call for elections for members of a Constitutional Convention. The
Constitutional Convention should be free to define what parts of the Constitution, once convened, should
be changed in consultation with the people; a Congressional Resolution should not dictate what is the
direction of the revisions or amendments. The plenary powers of Congress are different from the powers
of the Constituent Assembly.

References

Arugay, Aries. 2016. “The Crises of Representation in the Philippines and the Role of Charter Change.”
Available at: https://halalan.up.edu.ph/the-crises-of-representation-in-the-philippines-and-the-role-
of-charter-change/
Atienza, Maria Ela L., Aries A. Arugay, Francis Joseph A. Dee, Jean Encinas-Franco, Jan Robert R. Go,
Rogelio Alicor L. Panao, and Alinia Jesam D. Jimenez. 2020. Constitutional Performance Assessment of
the 1987 Constitution: Summary of Findings. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Accountability (IDEA) the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development
Studies. https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/constitutional-performance-assessment-1987-
philippine-constitution/
Atienza, Maria Ela L., Aries A. Arugay, Jean Encinas-Franco, Jan Robert R. Go, and Rogelio Alicor L.
Panao. 2020. “Constitutional Performance Assessment in the Time of a Pandemic: The 1987
Constitution and the Philippines’ COVID-19 Response”. International IDEA Discussion Paper
3/2020. https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2020.36

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Bale, Tim. 2017. European Politics: A Comparative Introduction, 4th ed. Hampshire and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Hague, Rod, Martin Harrop, and JohnMcCormick. 2019. Comparative Government and Politics: An
Introduction, 11th ed. London: Red Globe Press.
Heywood, Andrew. 2019. Politics, 5th ed. London Macmillan International and Red Globe Press.
Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER). 2004. Changing the Constitution. Quezon City: IPER.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 2015. Federalism. May.
Opello, Walter Jr. C. and Opello, Katherine A. R. 2009. European Politics: The Making of Democratic
States. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Pulse Asia. Available at: www.pulseasia.ph
Task Force on a Blueprint for Building the Nation (#PILIpiLUNAS2022). 2022. #PILIPILUNAS2022
Governance Agenda: Pag-Angat at Pagsulong Tungo sa Magandang Buhay at Bukas (Executive
Summary). Quezon City: University of the Philippines Diliman Office of the Chancellor, 29 April
2022. Available at: https://cids.up.edu.ph/download/pilipilunas2022-governance-agenda/

MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF

THE PHILIPPINES, DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY 1101

Aries A. Arugay, PhD

Maria Ela L. Atienza, PhD
Dennis V. Blanco, DPA
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem, PhD
Jean S. Encinas-Franco, PhD
Enrico V. Gloria
Jan Robert R. Go, PhD
Sol Iglesias, PhD
Herman Joseph S. Kraft
Ruth R. Lusterio-Rico, PhD
Marielle Y. Marcaida
Maria Elize H. Mendoza
Matthew Manuelito S. Miranda
Jaime B. Naval
Ranjit Singh Rye
Jalton G. Taguibao, PhD
Maria Thaemar C. Tana, PhD
Jorge V. Tigno, DPA
Aletheia Kerygma B. Valenciano
Jean Paul L. Zialcita, PhD

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