Turner The Story of Social Id 2010

Page 13
Introduction: Part 2
O
T
The Story of Social Identity

FO
•
John
ohn C. Tu
Turner and Katherine J. Reynolds
(Department
Department oof Psychology, Australian National University, Canberra)
R
D
n this chapter we shall outline briefly the origins

rigins
igins inevita
inevitably become more selective, thematic, and
I and development of the social identity perspective ve brief.
rie
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in social psychology from its beginning in 1971 up Why shou

should anybody want to make the effort to
to the present (around 2009). This is a long and follow and unde
understand this story? The short answer
complex journey. Social identity ideas came into is because
ause it outlin
outline
outlines a new vision of human beings
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being to make sense of unexpected experimental uman minds: o

and human on
one that is rich, productive, and
data having to do with the effects of social categor- lly
empiricallyly and theoretic
theoret
theoretically coherent. This view
ization on intergroup behaviour (Tajfel, 1972a; rejects the dominant
minant individ
individualistic conception of
Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; Turner, the human mind nd
d and argues ttha
that a defining feature
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1972, 1975). But what started as a limited analysis is the social and psychological
sychological in int
interdependence of
of specific processes in intergroup behavior has the individual and the he group. Hum Huma
Human beings are
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developed over some 30 or more years into a neither merely individuals alss nor merely grgroup mem-
broad-ranging and powerful new perspective on bers. Their individual and group selves, aand per-
human social psychology, with relevance to almost sonal and group aspects, exist st in an uneas
uneasy but
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every significant problem, finding, or theory in the creative interplay, both collaborative tive and antagon
antagon-
field. In fact, its relevance to all the social sciences istic. The social identity tradition is thehe most recent
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has become increasingly clear. It is useful to try to and easily the most powerful attempt too date to
summarize the story of this development to provide come to grips with the scientific reality of the psy-
a context for understanding current research and to chological group. This issue is at the heart of social
ocia
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give some feeling for where both social identity psychology, with the consequence that insights hts
work and social psychology need to go in the future. into the functioning of the psychological group and
Our emphasis will be on trying to show how core its relationship to the self-process are relevant to
principles and themes developed rather than every fundamental problem of social psychology.
reviewing endless empirical studies, and also on Properly grasped, the social identity perspective
dispelling the many misconceptions that exist. As offers an opportunity for intellectual and theor-
we move toward the present, the discussion will etical coherence and predictive power that the
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11:31:06:01:10 Page 13
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14 Introduction: Part 2
science has not had since Lewin’s field theory Beginnings: Social Identity and
(Lewin, 1948, 1952). Its implications extend Positive Distinctiveness
beyond social psychology to psychology at large
(and especially the problem of cognition) and the John Turner met Henri Tajfel in 1971 at the Uni-
oother social sciences. One does not have to agree
oth versity of Bristol in the UK when he applied for
with this view to find value in the perspective. and then began a PhD there under his supervision.
Tajfel had already had a complicated and difficult
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Science progresses by testing ideas rather than

by closing one’s mind to them. Regardless of life and achieved much in social psychology (see
whether a res rese
researcher agrees or disagrees, those Turner, 1996). Turner had just obtained a degree
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whoho are serious ab

about understanding human beings in social psychology at the University of Sussex
need to bee aware oof the social identity perspective (after some eventful years and delays). In terms of
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and the argume

arg
arguments it pu puts forward on the limita- background, the two were chalk and cheese. Tajfel
tions of the ccurrent
ent individ
individu
individualist orthodoxy and the was a Polish Jew, of middle class background, who
ffer
ffers.
alternative it offers. had become French and then British, been edu-
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The chapter willll nott be a sum

summ
summary of everything cated on the continent, and was committed to
that has been done over er some 35 ye years, nor will it unraveling scientifically the causes of prejudice.
viduals or the rre
be a list of all the individuals research that Turner was English, working-class, and a
has contributed to the largee body of wo work on social Londoner, who got to university by accident, cour-
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identity. This is impossible and pe perha

perhaps not even tesy of a free state education and state support.
or for
ore
helpful. It is easy to miss the forest or the tre
tree
trees. Tajfel’s dominant social categorization was eth-
rough insights
Our aim is to try to map the forest through nicity and Turner’s was class, but they understood
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provided by Turner, who was involved in the story each other implicitly, agreeing about the kinds of
from the very beginning. The chapter provides rovides
vides a an
analyses of society and social psychology that
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historical overview of the basic theoretical ideas dea were needed and those that were nonsense. Both
and how they developed, so that the contributions ons hadd thou
thought about the meta-theory of social psych-
to this volume can be understood in the broader ology a lotlot. Both had accepted the reality of mind
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historical context. It also highlights very briefly as an evolutio

evolutionary product and human universal,
the more specific contribution of these basic theor- utt rejected a con
but conception of social psychology as a
etical developments in the areas of stereotyping, uctionist
oni “psychologizing”
reductionist “psych of society (see
leadership and power, social change, and personal- Tajfel, 1972a; Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1997). There
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ity—four areas (amongst others) that have been a mbrace

was an embrace race of the int
inte
interactionist position pion-
focus of Turner and colleagues’ research since the eered by Kurtt Lewin and otheothers, where the psycho-
logical nature of individuals
dividuals had to be apprehended
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1980s and 1990s until the present day. None of this

means of course that there are not many others within an understandingnding of groups and member-
who have made important contributions to social ship in society.
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identity research and ideas. The late Henri Tajfel ume

In 1971 in the first volume me of the nnew EEuropean
started the story, writing the first social identity Journal of Social Psychology,, Tajfel and collcolle
colleagues
(Tajfel et al., 1971) published seminal
minal studies on
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paper in 1971 (or possibly 1970). Turner wrote the

second, also in 1971. Tajfel died in 1982, having the effects of social categorization n on intergro
intergroup
led collaborative work with Turner on social iden- discrimination. Their procedure became mee known as
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tity theory or SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). the minimal group paradigm. In discussing sing thes
these
Although Tajfel was supportive of the turn to self- data in the journal article there was no mention tio of
categorization theory or SCT (Turner, 1978, 1982, social identity, but instead a relatively circular
1985), he was unable to participate in the signifi- appeal to a “generic norm” of ingroup favouritism
cant developments to come. or ethnocentrism. By the time Turner got to Bristol
in September 1971, Tajfel (1972a) had produced a
new explanation. It appeared in a few pages at the
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The Story of Social Identity 15
end of a chapter for a French textbook on social social categorization in intergroup relations and the
categorization. The story of social identity begins findings of the minimal group paradigm in order to
with this chapter. flesh out the explanation of the minimal group data
In these few pages Tajfel introduces and defines in terms of the need for a positive social identity
the conce
con
concept of social identity and puts forward the and the drive for positive ingroup distinctiveness,
hypothesis tththat people are motivated by a need for which he did in a review paper written before the
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a positive soc soci

social identity and the idea that to end of 1971. Turner showed how social identity
eserve,
erve, maintain
preserve, maintai
maintain, or achieve a positive social processes could provide a systematic account of
ty they must esta
identity est
establish a positively valued dis- minimal and other forms of intergroup discrimin-
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ess for their oown groups compared to

tinctiveness ation and ingroup bias (in terms of a process that
other groups. s. Tajfel
jfel used tthe data from the minimal he called social competition) that was not based on
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group paradigm m to illu te w

illustrate wh
what he meant by the a conflict of interests à la Sherif (e.g., Sherif,
idea that people aare motivated bby the desire to 1967). In the paper, Turner developed the theor-
inctiveness for ttheir ingroups
establish positive distinctiveness
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etical implications of this account for both the

compared to outgroups. He also lso discus
discusse
discussed how the study of intergroup relations and processes of
effects of social comparisons ons
ns on intergrou
intergroup rela- self-categorization. Tajfel liked this paper a lot and
tions differ from their effects in n intragroup relat
relati
relations, asked Turner to present it at the Small Group Meet-
where Festinger (1954) had argued gued that th they ing of the European Association of Experimental
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produced a drive for uniformity pressures ssu

pressures. he
The Social Psychology (EAESP) on Intergroup Rela-
minimal group data had shown that social ia categor-
ial egor
egor- tions, held at Bristol in February 1972. This
ization into groups in isolation from and uncon- unc me
mee
meeting was the first at which social identity ideas
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founded by all the variables normally thought ght

ht to p
were publicly presented and it generated excite-
cause group formation and negative intergroup up v
ment of various kinds. Subsequently, after circulat-
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attitudes was sufficient for discrimination in which pap for several years and with some
ing the paper
the ingroup was favored over the outgroup. As collection of data, it was published in 1975
Tajfel put it, they were data in search of a theory: urner,
er, 1972, 1975).
(Turner, 197
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His ideas about social identity and positive distinct- cial identity research
Social res
re thus began with an
iveness heralded what later became SIT into life. prob
explicit focus on problems of intergroup dis-
It is true that these data themselves were the crimination andnd ethnocentr
ethnocentrism, not the nature of
product of a longstanding interest in social categorical
the psychologicalcal group. Its key
k hypothesis was
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ization and prejudice, both in Tajfel’s academic that people need to achieve pos posit
positive ingroup dis-
and personal life (Turner, 1996), but the minimal socia identity, not
tinctiveness to gain a positive social
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group paradigm was novel, as were the ideas cre- ion

that there is a distinction n between pe per
personal and
ated in response to it. Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) social identity. Neither paperper argued that ethno-
had earlier asked the same question about the role centrism was universal or that social
ial categoriza
categoriz
categorization
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of social categorization (was it alone sufficient for roduced ingrou

automatically and inevitably produced ingroup
intergroup discrimination?) but their paradigm was bias, and the analysis did not argue gue
ue that some
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not fully minimal and their findings and explan- intrapsychic drive for self-esteem is the basic
ation were different (Turner, 1975; Turner & factor in either group formation or intergrouptergroup
Bourhis, 1996). Tajfel did not present his ideas as discrimination.
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“SIT”. No such term or theory existed at this time. In terms of the need for self-esteem, Turner ner
In discussing what he saw as the central explana- (1975) explicitly derived it from the interaction
tory idea in this analysis, Tajfel was explicit that it between social comparisons between groups and
was the notion that social comparisons between the social values that existed in society and that
groups were aimed at establishing positively members used to define their group identities
valued distinctiveness for one’s own group. (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Tajfel (1972b) had
Turner’s first task was to review the role of already explained that he saw social values as
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derivatives of social ideologies. Thus, from the aged comparisons in terms of such identities. The
start, the need for self-esteem, for positive self- motive for positive ingroup distinctiveness, when
evaluation, was seen as fully “social- instigated, could lead to competitive, ingroup-
psychological” (Tajfel, 1972b; Turner & Oakes, favoring intergroup responses under certain condi-
1
19
1986) rather than being independent from social tions and other responses under other conditions.
conte
context and self-definition. Turner (1975) also From 1971 to 1976 the work was done that
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pointed oout, in a sign of what was to come, that produced the next two important “legs” of what
there were sseveral strategies available to perceivers Tajfel and Turner (1979) called a “conceptual tri-
to
o achieve a ppositive self-evaluation other than pod”. Turner’s empirical work (Turner, 1975,
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tergroup discri
intergroup discrimination, including changing 1978) examined what happened in the minimal
one’ss self-categorization
self-categoriz
-categori and redefining the dimen- group paradigm when a “self–other” categorization
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sions andd vvalues thatt de

defined an identity. was superimposed on the ingroup–outgroup cat-
wo papers
These two pers (Tajfe
(Tajfel, 1972a; Turner, 1972) egorization of anonymous others, so that people
sential foundat
provided an essential foundation for what was to
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could react to ingroup and/or outgroup others

come, but were moree appropri
appropriat
appropriately described as compared to the (personal) self. He found that
ness
“positive distinctiveness ss theory”
theory” at tthis time rather people would ignore the ingroup–outgroup cat-
than what became “SIT”. ”. Indeed Tajfel never liked egorization where they could make decisions that
the term SIT, which was coined by T Turner and directly favoured self provided that the social cat-
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Brown (1978) as a deliberately ely aabbr ted title,

abbreviated egorization had not been used previously to define
because he thought it did not do jus u
justice to the po
pos
posi- self and remained minimal. On the other hand, they
tive distinctiveness analysis. Tajfel el thought it acted on an ingroup-favoring basis even at the sac-
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would mislead and in this he has been proven roven right. rifice of personal and direct self-interest under
co
con
conditions where the social categorization had
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becom
become more meaningful and salient to them
because
cause tthey had used it previously. These findings
An Intergroup Theory on Three Legs:
confirmed
con med sseveral things: that social categoriza-
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The Emergence of SIT tions had to bbe accepted and to some degree
Tajfel summarized the basic processes at work in ternalized
ernalized by m
internalized members to have an effect (dis-
the new analysis as the “social categorization– ination
ation was not aautomatic and inevitable), that
crimination
social identity–social comparison–positive dis- er and ingrou
self–other ingroup
ingroup–outgroup categorizations
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tinctiveness sequence”. This sequence gave us an could be seeneen as compe

competi
competing alternative ways of
understanding of important processes in group elf, and that un
defining the self, under the right condi-
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psychology that could shape intergroup behavior elf-interest

f-interest was lless powerful than
tions individual self-interest
(rather than individual behavior) and could be group identity.
used to supplement the processes already specified Tajfel saw all this as wellll and, on rrea
reading these
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by Sherif in his realistic group conflict theory conclusions, immediately was stimulated to make
(e.g., Sherif, 1967). Human beings defined them- a big conceptual breakthrough h (which had clclearly
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selves in terms of social categorizations that pro- come from his life experience and been in hhis
vided them with social identities. These were mind for many years; see Turner, 1996). 996). This wwas
important aspects of their self-concepts based on the “interpersonal–intergroup continuum”. um
m”. At one
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group memberships. These identities were defined level the continuum clarified that the minim inim
minimal
and evaluated by intergroup (not intragroup) com- group findings did not imply that people were
parisons on dimensions associated subjectively only group members, that they always acted in
with perceivers’ social values and hence there was terms of social identity processes and showed
a motive to define social identity positively, mean- ethnocentrism just because they belonged to social
ing positively different from other relevant groups, categories, and so on. It became clear that social
where social and psychological conditions encour- identity processes were only expected to have
11:31:06:01:10 Page 16
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effects in selected situations where conditions were the organized social environment. These lectures
right and that there was more work to be done became the basis for his chapters in Tajfel (1978)
specifying such conditions. At another level, it was and the whole set of ideas formed the basis for a
a big conceptual advance because it enabled Tajfel major research program on social identity and
and Turn
Tu
Turner to make a qualitative psychological intergroup relations funded by the British Social
istinction between individual and collective
distinction Science Research Council from 1974 to 1977.
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behavior. Actin
Acting as a group member was psycho- Turner became the director of the experimental
gically
cally differen
logically different from acting as an individual wing of the program in 1974 and then joined Tajfel
herif
(as Sherifrif had said) and people were capable of as co-director with Howard Giles in 1976. Giles,
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oth. The languag

doing both. language of social categorization with Richard Bourhis, joined the project to look
was important tant for spec
specifying what this meant at the role of language in social identity; Tony
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operationally. It aalso highlighted

hligh
hlight that more work Agathangelou and Sue Skevington worked on the
was needed on thee conceptualization
ceptualiza
ceptualizati of social cat- field wing; and Turner and Rupert Brown pursued
egorization itself (the task that create
created SCT).
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experimental studies. The first experiment con-

SIT (Tajfel & Turner, ner, 1979) offoffer
offers specific ducted (Turner & Brown, 1978) clarified some of
hypotheses about the causes ess and effects oof shifts the issues in the extended analysis, in particular
along the interpersonal–intergroupergroup contin
continu
continuum. elaborating the notion of “insecure group relations”
Being a theory of what goes on in n society betw
betwe
between into perceived instability and illegitimacy, much
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groups, it has to incorporate an accountcount

nt of when
en of which then found its way into Tajfel and Turner
ely
ly and
people act or are likely to act collectively, d this (1979).
tinu
tinuum
is the continuum. In fact, however, the continuum G
Given the collective psychology and the
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has been replaced by the personal–social identity entity interpe

interpersonal–intergroup continuum, the final leg
distinction of SCT, which built on the earlier ier of the tr
trip
tripod was to specify how the members of
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conceptualization but better formulated its key groups in di different positions in society reacted to
insights. SCT did this so successfully that many each other as a function of that psychology. It was
completely confuse the two theories, but this is an mportant
tant to take iinto account the degree to which
important
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important area where the two theories are in fact peoplee were objecti
objectiv
objectively and subjectively able to
very different. We shall come back to this point, move from om
m one group to another, whether group
but for the moment it suffices to make clear that boundaries were ere seen to be ppermeable or imperme-
Tajfel referred to the continuum as “acting in terms able, since this iss was relevan
relevant to shift along the
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of self” versus “acting in terms of group”, whereas continuum. It wass also importan
important to consider from
the essence of the personal identity versus social both the dominant/high gh status and the subordinate/
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identity continuum was that both were acting in low status point of view thee extent to whi
which “cogni-
terms of self (Turner, 1978, 1982). Did or would tus quo were pe
tive alternatives” to the status per
perceived.
Tajfel have denied this? Of course not. As soon as tatus
As a function of the different status us positions oof the
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the reformulation was made (in 1978) he recog- groups, they had motives eitherr to maintain oor
nized its value and embraced it. The personal– achieve positive distinctiveness and how ow they acted
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social identity distinction has become so successful derstanding

erstanding
to do so varied with their collective understanding
that it has moved from academic to popular media of the intergroup relationship as stable or unstable
and is used routinely without awareness of the and/or legitimate or illegitimate. Each group could ould
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theoretical context. follow one or more different strategies (individual ual

In 1974 Tajfel gave a series of lectures in which mobility, social creativity, or social competition;
he set out to explore the relevance of the basic- Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978)
process analysis for real-world societies in which depending on their specific understanding of their
intergroup relations are characterized by hierarch- situation and other relevant factors.
ies of power, wealth, and prestige. He put the social Thus, far from arguing that low self-esteem,
psychology into the context of social structure— negative social identity, or low social status always
11:31:06:01:10 Page 17
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predicted more ingroup favouritism, from the intergroup attitudes were not the cause of inter-
beginning the theory was more complex and group relations but their effect, and moreover that
sophisticated. SIT was capable of predicting a to understand how intergroup attitudes were gener-
variety of intergroup attitudes and responses ated and changed one had to examine the relations
((including leaving one’s own group) depending on
(in between groups at their own level, not reduce
an in
interaction between at least four factors: status intergroup prejudices to the psychology of the
position × acting individually versus collectively ×
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individual. Sherif’s specific theory of how inter-

sst
perceived stability/instability × perceived legitim- group relations generated intergroup attitudes was
acy/illegitimacy
cy/illegitimac A high status group member who
acy/illegitimacy. a realistic conflict theory, emphasizing conflicts of
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aw
saww their superiority
superio
superior as illegitimate and unstable interests, not lack of contact, familiarity, prejudice,
ittle attachment
and felt little attac to their group could join etc. SIT was not a rejection of conflicts of interest
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st
the low status up to eliminate a “conflict of
group but complementary to it, expanding the role of
is ance, guilt).
values” (dissonance, guilt) A low status group
guil social structure, collective theories, and ideologies
infer
member who saw their inferiority as stable and
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and integrating an understanding of self-interest

legitimate and could uld not join the high status group into a richer and more collective view of the self
ikely to engage in social cre-
as an individual was likely and social identity. Tajfel and Turner were in
ority on alterna
ativity, finding superiority alternat
alternative dimen- agreement with Sherif and felt that he would have
nferiority
eriority on the
sions whilst accepting inferiority t status been a social identity theorist—they were certainly,
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dimension (and downgradingg the he latter’s

latt im
import- in principle, Sherifians.
ance). SIT (as it now was) suggested st a whole array
ste arra
arr Whereas the orthodox prejudice tradition
of possibilities and interesting hypothesesypotheses to focuses on the role of a pathological, deviant,
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explore (Turner, 1999). What a pity then n that critics or irrational individual psychology in explaining
of the theory have aimed their arrows onlyy at a few so
soc
social antagonism, SIT’s focus was on the collect-
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misguided hypotheses that had never been in the th ive ps

psychology of intergroup attitudes, produced
theory (e.g., that people should show more ingroup oup
up within
thin a social structure of intergroup relationships
bias the lower their personal self-esteem or the and mediat
mediated by people’s collective definition,
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more they identified with the ingroup; that the the- perception, an and understanding of those relation-
ory cannot predict outgroup favouritism and the hips.
ps. The theo
ships. theor
theory rejected individualism and
effects of legitimacy, that it ignores power, only ctionism,
onism, arguing that all cognition was social-
reductionism,
ever predicts universal ethnocentrism, etc.). ogical and tha
psychological that the political and macro-
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The final theory was completed in 1976 and pub- mplexities of in

societal complexities intergroup relationships
lished as Tajfel and Turner (1979, being updated in were socially shared, group-b
group-based interpretations
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1986). Other work such as the edited book by mental

and were fundamental ntal to racism and social con-
Tajfel (1978) contained ideas and studies (and flict. There is much h more to say aabout the new
often revisions of already available material) that thinking provided by thee theory,
eory, but we shall return
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were already known when writing the Tajfel and to it later. For the moment, let us merely nonote what
Turner chapter, which was deliberately a system- was distinctive and new aboutt the theory:
theo
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atization of where they had got to by 1976. There

were other articles published after 1979 but 1. It focused on group psychology, not individ
individual
nothing superseded what was written then (as a ejudice,
udice, and
psychology, to explain racism, prejudice,
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substantive statement of SIT). conflict.

SIT was a new kind of theory in social psych- 2. It agreed with Sherif and colleagues that iinter-
ology, which may be one reason why it has often group attitudes followed and did not cause
been co-opted into the mainstream view of preju- intergroup relations, but added social identity
dice it rejected. The revolution was begun by processes to realistic goal relations to explain
Sherif and his colleagues (e.g., Sherif, Harvey, the effects of intergroup relations.
White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), who argued that 3. It put intergroup relations into society, a social
11:31:06:01:10 Page 18
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structure that determined the character of between personal and social identity was made and
intergroup relations. the hypothesis that social identity was the basis of
4. It proposed that it was the cognitive interpret- group processes was elaborated (Turner, 1978,
ation of intergroup relations that shaped inter- 1982). In the second in 1982–1983, whilst Turner
grou and individual behavior and that such
group was at the Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies
interpreta
interpretation was a collective, ideological, cog- (IAS), the distinction between personal and social
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nitive
itive activit
activity, not an isolated individual one. identity was elaborated into the notion of levels of
5. Itt illustrated hho
how processes that impinged on a self-categorization and the theory was formalized
cially
ally shared, group self could affect
socially (Turner, 1985). In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
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vior. This last po

behavior. point—distinguishing a col- working on the self-concept and stereotyping (the
lective selfelf from
rom the sself-concept in general— latter with Penny Oakes and Alex Haslam), the
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contained within ith it a powerful

werf lever for the next hypothesis of self-categorizing as the activation of
step forward. fixed cognitive structures was rejected in favor of
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self-categorizing as a reflexive process of social

contextual judgment (Turner, 1988; Turner, Oakes,
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). This new dynamic
The Emergence of SCT
perspective enabled a solution to the problem
From 1971 onwards Turner was interested in the of the validity of stereotyping in terms of the
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implications of the minimal group paradig ara

paradigm or
for veridical-because-contextual nature of self-
psychological group formation. By 1978 78 thiss had categories and a new understanding of the nature of
become his central research question. Whatt w was a self
elf and its role in socializing and motivating cog-
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psychological group? How did they form and what nition (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner
was the effect of their formation? et al., 199
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1994; Turner & Oakes, 1997; Turner & Ono-
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In 1978 the European Laboratory of Social rato, 1999). A new synthesis has been made pos-
Psychology (LEPS) held a conference on social sible in relatio
relation to Tajfel’s original problem of
identity at the University of Rennes in France. ejudice
dice and theo
prejudice theoretically related phenomena of
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Turner wrote and presented a paper “Towards a sociall change, power,

power personality, and the relativity
cognitive redefinition of the social group” that tion.
ion
of cognition.
summed up ideas he had been developing about the blem
The problem m that stimul
stimula
stimulated SIT was why did
nature of the psychological group. This paper, sub- minate in the m
subjects discriminate minimal group para-
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sequently published as Turner (1982) but also as an digm? The theory y went on to ex eexplain the condi-
invited paper in a French journal in 1981, was the tions under which groups acted to change their
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beginning of self-categorization theory (SCT), the intergroup attitudes and actions

ctions in societ
socie
society. It was a
next stage in the social identity story. theory of intergroup conflict, ict, ethnocentris
ethnocentrism, and
As mentioned, SCT is a different theory from sychological
hological hyp
social change and the main psychological hy
hypoth-
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SIT. It is not an extension or derivation, but in fact esis was that people sought to achievehieve or maintai
maintain
is a more general account of the self and group positive ingroup distinctiveness to gain ain a positive
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processes than SIT was ever intended to be. The social identity. SCT addressed a different entt question
term “SCT” did not appear in Turner (1978) but the in the minimal group paradigm—why did subjects
fact that it was a new explanation of a different identify with the minimal groups at all and why
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problem was obvious to everyone working with did they act as if they had group identities that hat
Tajfel and Turner at the time. The confusion has mattered to them? More generally, the question
been that not everything that uses the words “social was how does psychological group formation take
identity” is part of SIT. So why was it a new the- place and, indeed, is there actually a group process
ory? And where did it come from? There have been that is psychologically real and distinctive, irredu-
three main steps in the creation of the contempor- cible to the psychology of individuals?
ary theory. In the first in 1978, the distinction The key hypothesis was that group processes
11:31:06:01:10 Page 19
Page 20
emerged from a shift towards defining the self as a best and the group mind at worst (Tajfel’s writings
social category, in terms of social identity, from the stood out for his continual emphasis on the socially
self as an individual person, in terms of personal shared uniformities of attitude and behavior). The
identity. What mattered was not the need for posi- problem was that these interpersonal theories were
ttive social identity but the processes of depersonal-
tiv not actually supported by the data. They persisted
izatio that emerged from self-categorization. How
ization nevertheless because they fit the dominant ideol-
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one defi
de
defined oneself, not positive interpersonal ogy, the ideology of individualism.
relations, w
wa
was basic to the group as a psychological One of these disconfirmations emerged from
process.
rocess. This iis a theoretical point, not a simple social identity research. Why did low status groups
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mpirical one. Of course interpersonal relations are

empirical not simply fall apart psychologically? Why did the
often related
ted to gro
group formation, but they were not members not simply try to move upwards in
T
red
considereded nece
necessaryry or sufficient, since what mat- fantasy if they could not objectively? How did
ters is theirr relationship
tionship to the key psychological low status, subordinate groups, lacking in
process of social cial identifi
identi ficat
identification (Turner, 1982,
FO
resources, prestige, and power, manage to hold on

1984; Turner, Hogg, gg, Oakes, & S Sm
Smith, 1984). These to the loyalty of their members so that they could
points are explained d inn some detail in Turner and work to change the status quo? On closer examin-
istinction betwe
Bourhis (1996). The distinction betwee
between personal ation of the group cohesion literature (e.g., Lott &
and social identity and the he specifi
speci ficati
ca
specification of its Lott, 1965), one found that supposedly they could
R
relevance to the causal production duction

tio oof collective
olle not! People were attracted to groups that mediated
psychology was the beginning off tth ew theory
the new theory. rewards for them. No rewards, no group! But the
After the great advances of the group oup dynamics data showed that groups did sometimes become
D
tradition, inspired and led by Lewin and nd aided by more cohesive and unified as a function of
other giants of Gestalt-influenced social al psych-
psych de
dep
deprivation, derogation, and defeat, contrary to
IS
ology (Asch, Sherif, Festinger), North American erican

ca reinfo
reinforcement theory (Turner, 1981; Turner,
group research had gradually regressed to a neo- eo- Sachdev,
achdev, & Hogg, 1983; Turner et al., 1984). Also,
behaviorist individualism in which the concept of other data llo
looking at the effects of social categor-
TR
group became superfluous because it had ceased ization or g gr

group formation on interpersonal
to have any explanatory power. By the 1970s, lations
ations implied very strongly that group forma-
relations
researchers were asking “whatever happened to tion was as a psychol
psychological process that actually
the group in social psychology?”. The answer was changed d things. People
Peopl were not just individuals,
IB
clear—it had been reduced to a collection of indi- and being a group memb membe
member was psychologically
viduals interacting to satisfy personal motives and different (justt as Sherif had highlighted years
U
self-interest who had thereby become cohesive eory

ory was needed and what form it
before). A new theory
and mutually influential. Every process (of inter- could take was evidentent in the minim
minimal group para-
personal attraction, cooperation, and mutual influ- onal–
–intergroup continuum
digm and the interpersonal–intergroup
TI
ence) when analyzed turned out to be explicable (see Turner, 1982; Turner & Oakes, 1989).
apparently as individuals affecting individuals What did the theory say? The he essence of Tu
Turner
O
without any suggestion that the formation of a (1978) was that psychological group formati formatio
formation
group relationship could qualitatively change these was a matter of social identification on rather ththan
interpersonal relations, that the relations between group cohesion. People became a group p not insofar
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group members could be causally affected by their as they developed positive interpersonal attitudtitud
attitudes
membership in a joint unit. Indeed such sugges- on the basis of mutual need satisfaction but insofar
tions were frowned on as unscientific. It is hard as they defined themselves in terms of a shared
to believe now that in the 1960s and 1970s, talk of social category membership. A shared social iden-
psychological products and processes such as tity emerged on the basis of cognitive criteria such
group memberships or social norms being “shared” as shared fate, shared situation, or shared attributes
was dismissed by textbooks as poetic license at (positive or negative). Turner hypothesized that
11:31:06:01:10 Page 20
Page 21
people defined themselves as either individual per- Early Applications: Social Influence,
sons or as social categories, in terms of personal or Group Polarization, the Crowd, Social
social identity, and that as their self-perception Cohesion, and the Problem of Salience
shifted from personal to social identity they would
ceive themselves as the relatively interchange-
perceive In 1978 Turner applied and received funding for
able membe
members of a shared social category. This research on the new theory and his research group
of research assistants and PhD students (Wetherell,
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process of depdepersonalization or self-stereotyping

uld
couldld be used to explain how the fundamental Smith, Reicher, Oakes, Hogg, Colvin), some of
group p processes em emerged from social identity. whom played both roles, began applying the ideas
O
Thus as social identity bbecame salient and people to different fundamental areas. Some members of
mselves
defined themselves ves in te
terms of the same shared this group were already at Bristol (Oakes, Reicher,
T
identity, they would

ou ten o see themselves as more
tend to Smith), whereas others arrived from elsewhere
he defining
alike in terms of the fining attri
attrib
attributes of the iden- (Colvin, Hogg, Wetherell). The initial research (up
up-based attract
tity, giving rise to group-based attraction reflecting to the formalization of the theory in 1982–1983)
FO
group-derived similarities es rather

ther than atattraction to looked at social influence from different angles (in
personal characteristics (thee group-based at attraction the Asch conformity paradigm, group polarization,
stinction). Sim
versus personal attraction distinction). Simi
Similarly influence within the crowd), psychological group
cooperation and mutual influence ce between me m
mem- formation and the distinction between personal and
R
bers reflected shared social identities. ies. A ccritical

al group-based attraction (trying to show how group
point here is that this formulation allowss oone to o see cohesion was a function of social identification
group formation as an adaptive process that makes ma rat
rather than interpersonal attraction), and the prob-
D
group behavior, cohesion, cooperation, and in inflflu-

influ- lem oof the salience of social categories. In 1982
ence possible, and thus does not merely follow ow (the
he sam
same year that Tajfel died) Turner began
IS
but actually enhances the chances of successfully working on a more systematic statement of the
reaching goals. theory that res
reso
resolved some of the basic conceptual
The paper did various other things such as nd empirical
and mpirical iss
issues that had emerged (Turner,
TR
reviewing the evidence for the role of social cat- 1985).). Then, having moved to Australia after his
egorization in group formation, the effects of the year in the
he USA, he pre
prepared the book that would
latter, and the idea that social identity varied in present the theory
eory and allo
allow his PhD students to
salience in a highly situation-specific way. All these esearch on the tth
present their research theory (Turner, Hogg,
IB
ideas have since been pursued with great vigor Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1981987). To understand
empirically and have become widely accepted the work from 1978 8 on, it is best to summarize
some key issues in the neww statement oof the theory
U
notions in the science. Is there anyone left in social

psychology who has not heard of the personal ver- and then briefly summarizee the research di directions
sus social identity distinction and does not know as they emerged.
TI
that the salience of the latter changes behavior in

predictable ways to make it more collective and
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group oriented? People now think this is common

Levels of Self-Categorization
sense, and yet before 1978 the notion that social
identity was fundamentally implicated in the very In the year Turner spent at IAS Princeton (1982–982
82–
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nature of group behavior was unknown. And even 1983) he had an opportunity to think about how ow
now it is not properly understood, it being widely to conceptualize the categorization processes at
thought, for example, that ingroup identification work in the personal–social identity distinction.
is just another individual difference variable rather Finding the work of Rosch and her colleagues par-
than a process that, under given conditions, works ticularly useful, he recast the relationship between
to eliminate individual differences in a given personal and social identity as one of different
situation. levels of self-categorization. There were several
11:31:06:01:10 Page 21
Page 22
critical points. Self-concepts were self-categories; and the match between these features and category
self-categorizations were organized hierarchically specifications. They were influenced by Tajfel’s
by means of class inclusion and the different levels (1957, 1969) accentuation theory and in particular
were functionally antagonistic in their perceptual the Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) study showing per-
eeffects at any given time but nevertheless mutually
eff ceptual accentuation effects. When the line length
depen
dependent. Lower order self-categories were of eight lines and the category membership were
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formed inter alia from social comparisons within correlated (all short lines were in category A and
higher ord
orde
order ones, and higher order ones were all longer lines were in category B), the judged
formed
or nter alia
inter a on the basis of lower level ones. difference between the shortest of the longer four
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elf-categorizatio and social comparison were

elf-categorization
Self-categorization lines and the longest of the shortest four lines was
esses that requ
processes required each other: All categoriza- exaggerated. There was an accentuation of similar-
T
ected comparison
ect
tion reflected co ariso and all comparison took ities within the classes and differences between the
we stimuli ca
place between cat
categorized as having an classes on length. Thinking of the fit of social
identity at somee higher level.
FO
categorizations in terms of peripheral–focal correl-

These notions weree formali
formalize
formalized carefully and ations between group membership and members’
particular hypotheses ess derived frofrom them. An positions on some response dimension led Turner
important point is that they explain ho how personal and Oakes to distinguish between comparative and
and social identities can bee salient at the
th same time normative fit. They originally defined normative
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gonistic
nis (seee Tu
and still be distinct and antagonistic Turner, fit as the degree to which perceived similarities
Reynolds, Haslam, & Veenstra, 200 0
2006). A great d
de
deal and differences between group members correlated
of thought also went into the problem m of salience with group memberships in a direction consistent
D
and the principles of meta-contrast and relative with the normative meaning of the group identities
prototypicality, which are explained in more oree detail (e
(e.
(e.g., men and women differ in relation to
IS
shortly. In addition, a focus was developing ng th

the indep
indepe
independent–dependent characteristics). Defining
detailed explanation of specific phenomena in comparat
mpara
comparative fit (or the degree of peripheral–focal
terms of self-categorization processes, especially correlation) arose from Turner’s attempt at
TR
group formation and cohesion, cooperation, and Princeton to p pr

provide a quantitative principle that
social influence. The notion of meta-contrast and ould allow the prediction of when and why
would
the idea that different individuals would be more or groupsps would polariz
polarize as a function of individuals’
less influential within a group as a function of their pretest views on any isissu
issue in any given context.
IB
relative prototypicality emerged from the attempt Turner was supervisin

supervising Margaret Wetherell’s
to explain group polarization from within the new PhD, trying to fi nd a social id
find ide
identity explanation of
U
theory whilst Turner was at the IAS. polarization. He knewew that one co
cou
could explain group
The problem of salience emerged as soon as nvergence on tthe normative
polarization as convergence
one understood that group behavior was based on position of the group if one could eex explain why
TI
social identity and that the influence of social group norms sometimes were group avera averages and
identities was situation specific. Penny Oakes and sometimes were more extreme. me. Turner wawas con-
O
Turner decided to address it in Oakes’ PhD. The vinced that there had to be some way of explaini
explainin
explaining
first step was adapting Bruner’s (1957) formula of norm formation in terms of social categorization
categorizat
relative accessibility × fit to describe the conditions processes that predicted how and why hy ingroup
N
under which a stimulus was captured by a category. prototypes formed where they did. He tried ed to find
fi
Bruner argued that certain categories would be some way of understanding the peripheral–focal
highly accessible (or likely to be activated) as a correlation between individuals’ group member-
function of contextual factors and the current ship and their responses on a dimension so that he
goals, needs, and purposes of the perceiver. Turner could predict exactly which person or position
and Oakes, in thinking about “fit”, never thought in would become most prototypical of the group as a
terms of the isolated attributes of some stimulus whole and when that prototype would or would not
11:31:06:01:10 Page 22
Page 23
be polarized. Eventually Turner succeeded by shift away from a distinction between physical and
inventing the principle of meta-contrast (Turner, social reality testing and ideas of normative and
1985; Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989). A collection informational processes specified by Deutsch and
of individuals tend to be categorized as a group to Gerard (1955) to a single process of influence—
the degre
degr
degree inter alia that the perceived differences referent informational influence (Turner, 1982).
between thethem are less than the perceived differ- Individuals always act in ways informed by under-
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ences between them and other people (outgroups) standings of how similar others would respond in
in the
he comparativ
comparative context. Ingroup–outgroup cat- the same situation.
zation
ion occurs wh
egorization when the differences perceived
O
between categories are llarger than the difference

perceived within n categori
categories. Furthermore, any spe-
Self-Categorization as Relational
T
nds to bbe seen

cific person tends een aas more prototypical
Flexible Judgment
of the group as a whole, ole, to the degree that the
perceived differencess between that person and Understanding meta-contrast, prototypicality,
FO
other ingroup members are less ess than th

the perceived and polarization led to the next big step. If self-
differences between that person and oou outgroup categories were inherently comparative then they
members. were infinitely variable, contextual, and relative.
The same principle that predictedted
d categoriz
categorizat
categorization This meant that they could not be stored as fixed,
R
of stimuli also predicted the relative prototypi

tot ty
prototypicality cognitive structures in some mental system before
of instances of any class. This analysis pr pprovided
ded a they were used, waiting to be prodded into action
vid
vidual-
concrete refutation of reductionism and individual- (as
as Turner, along with many others, had thought
D
ism in social influence and transformed the persua-ersua-

rsua- origin
origina
originally). The cognitive structural view of stereo-
sion–norm relationship. People did not produce ce typing aan
and the self-concept had to be abandoned.
IS
norms from influence but were able to persuade It also mea

meant that the very variability of self-
because they embodied norms, and the norm categories was not an indication of distortion and
expressed the identity of the group as a whole in as but
bias ut the very oopposite—an indication of their
TR
contrast to other groups, not an individual property, icality

cality and orien
veridicality orie
orientation to reality. The com-
averaged or summed, but a Gestalt property of the flexibility of self-categories
parative flexibility self
se arose because
members in a context. The principle generalizes to they were contextual
ntextual repr
repre
representations of people.
all categorization, not merely social categorization elective and v
They were selective va
variable because the
IB
(Turner et al., 1994). frames of reference ce within whi

which people defined
Research based on this conception of an themselves were always ays changing. If reality keeps
U
identity-based influence process stimulated the gories

changing and self-categories ries refl
reflect re
reflect reality, then
development of a more formal analysis of social they must change and be fl exible in ord
flexible orde
order to be
influence (Turner, 1985, 1991). SIT understood the accurate. Moreover the basicc principle
rinciple at wwork
TI
role of group influence processes in intergroup here, of meta-contrast, is a fully rational one. Th The
behavior and social change but did not provide a salience of self-categories is a functionon of motives,
O
new theory of influence. SCT did, however. Build- expectations, knowledge, and reality working orking in
ing on the insights from meta-contrast and proto- creative synthesis. Self-categorizing is variable,
typicality, one can see that those that embody the ence,
flexible, and selective, is based on past experience,nce
N
group norms and are most representative of the knowledge, and theories, and is reality oriented. ed.
group will be most persuasive or influential. It is These notions have big implications for categor-
this expectation that certain others should perceive izing, the self-concept and stereotyping, the valid-
the world in the same way as self (perceived differ- ity and relativity of perception, and for the nature
ence within and between categories) that makes of human cognition.
these others a valid source of information about The idea of the self-category as an on-the-spot
reality (Moscovici, 1976; Turner, 1991). There is a judgment was also facilitated by the work of Medin
11:31:06:01:10 Page 23
Page 24
and his colleagues (e.g., Medin & Wattenmaker, quintessential problem of social psychology: the
1987), showing that categories are expressions of mind–society interaction. Individuals, groups, and
theories and knowledge about how things go intergroup relations exist objectively. People are
together rather than simple similarities, and by defined in society as members of these groups
B
Ba
Barsalou’s (1987) work on the variability of proto- (e.g., religion, gender, ethnicity, age, class, roles,
typic
typica
typicality judgments, which argues against con- and so on) that have a particular history and social
N
cepts as fixed mental models. In general, SCT and relationship. They have a social location that is
the way it dde
deals with salience has been much influ- shared with others. It is recognized that these
enced
nced by many man significant figures, not merely groups have a psychological aspect; the norms,
O
ajfel, but also L

Tajfel, Lewin, Asch, Sherif, Rosch, and values, beliefs, and ideologies are socially trans-
Medin.in. The rewo
rewor
reworking of self-categorizing as a mitted through influence and internalized, funda-
T
process of re fle e and comparative social judg-

reflexive mentally affecting one’s psychology—creating
ment ratherr than n as the ac
activation of pre-existing socially-shared regularities that affect the content,
cepts meant tha
stored self-concepts that the idea of relative structure, and functioning of the mind (see Turner
FO
accessibility based d on Bruner ha had to be replaced by & Oakes, 1997; this volume).
perceiver readiness, sincence the former implied that a In this view, social psychology is not the exten-
stored, ready-made categoryegory was more oor less close sion of general psychological processes to social
to usage rather than being g created in ththe process stimuli or social contexts—it integrates social and
R
of use as and when needed (seee Oak Oakes, Ha

Haslam, cultural patterns and products with psychological
& Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 11994;; Turner & explanation. The emphasis on social structure and
Onorato, 1999). large-scale social processes, the distinction
D
egories
None of this implies that self-categories gories vary between personal and social identity, the recogni-
arbitrarily unconstrained by continuities of realit
reality, ti
tio
tion of different levels of self-categorization and
IS
experience, motives, and knowledge. On thee con- on interd

interdependent higher and lower order selves,
trary, it is the fact that there is a systematic way of andd the flexible, variable nature of the self-
relating such variation to changes in reality that categorizati
categorizatio
categorization process are the building blocks that
TR
enables the theory to argue for the veridicality of give substance tto this alternative interactionist view.
self-categorizing, that relativity is not relativism This alternative view and its implications for the
(Turner & Oakes, 1997). The vantage point of the field perhaps
erhaps can be appreciated more fully when
perceiver varies because individuals and groups are examiningng its spec
speci fic aand unique contribution in
specific
IB
continually interacting and these interactions have matic

atic areas. Wh
major thematic Wha
What follows can only be a
implications for the self-categorization processes w.. There is so mu
brief overview. much to say in terms of
U
(and emergent similarities and differences) as an the progress that has been made made, so much detail
individual and group member. A flexible, relational plicate the larger ideas, and so
that is needed to explicate
self-process allows for this variation to be repre- much research still waitinging to be done (s
(see the con-
TI
sented and acted upon psychologically. olume).

lume). In the re
cluding chapters in this volume). remainder
of this chapter four thematic icc developments
developmen are
O
described: stereotyping, leadership rship

hip and powpowe
power,
social change, and personality. These ar areas
Major Elaborations and Thematic
(amongst others) also have been majorr themes of
N
Developments
research for Turner and colleagues throughout ghout
out th
the
The story of social identity so far and the theor- late 1980s and 1990s until the present day. In com-
etical elaborations and developments it offers cap- bination they highlight the diversity of topics to
ture the interplay between psychological processes which social identity core ideas are relevant and
and the socially structured system of relations in the exciting possibilities that the perspective offers
which individuals and groups are defined and func- in developing a more integrated understanding of
tion. This perspective provides answers to the the person. Some have been a focus for research
11:31:06:01:10 Page 24
Page 25
over many years and some over the past 5 years or 2. Stereotyping is tied to the structure of inter-
so. As highlighted by Haslam et al. (the two con- group relations. It is recognized that people
cluding chapters of this volume), though, over the hold the attitudes that they do toward the mem-
same time period there are other research groups bers of particular groups because they are in a
and resea
rese
research areas where SIT/SCT is having a sig- specific kind of relationship with those groups.
ificant imp
nificant impa
impact. People are embedded in social structures, they
have a particular social position (e.g., high or
low status), they have qualities that have certain
Stereotyping
eotyping
typing and tthe Relativity of existing social meaning (e.g., gender), and they
tion
Perception occupy certain social roles that denote status and
value (e.g., men versus women). To understand
In the 1980s andnd 1990
1990s a re
research focus was on
stereotyping one must look at the social–struc-
answ ng the question
stereotyping. In answering q “Why do
tural realities of the intergroup relationships at
we stereotype?”, the dominant view v is because of
FO
work in any system of human relations (i.e.,

shortcomings of the human cognitiv
cognitive system. It
who is advantaged and disadvantaged, who has
ive system is li
is argued that the cognitive limited in
status and who does not, are group goals com-
capacity and therefore cannot ott apprehend oth
others as
petitive or cooperative, do the groups have
ategorization,
gorization, si
individuals in all their detail. Categorization, sim-
shared interests or not).
R
plification, and overgeneralization are functi

func
functional
3. Collective theories about intergroup relations
outcomes of these cognitive shortcomings,ings,
ng leading
ding
are central to stereotyping. The impact of the
to others being judged as more similar and d ali
alike
structural reality of intergroup relations is
D
than they really are. The core assumption here is me

mediated by collective theories, ideologies, and
that stereotypes are false and erroneous because use belief about group life (e.g., what it means to
beliefs
IS
they come into existence through weaknesses in be a man versus a women). People act in terms
human cognitive abilities. of intergroup relationships as mediated by their
The SCT analysis of stereotyping is different collective
lective defi
defi
definition, explanation, perception,
TR
for three main reasons:

andd understandin
understanding of their situation and their
1. Stereotypes are not erroneous but represent life onship
nship to others
relationship others.
as group members. It is argued that human
beings are group members as well as indi- There have been een two main responses to these
IB
viduals, and it is accepted that there is collective arguments. The firstrst

st is that stereo
stereoty
stereotyping is distorted
psychology as well as individual psychology. by the goals, values, es, motives, ide ideologies, and
U
When human beings define themselves as group ceiver

expectations of the perceiver ver and theref
therefore cannot
members and act as group members, they take be useful or valid. In SCT, though, it is argu
argued that
on shared beliefs, goals, and attitudes that all perception is relative to the he perceiver and
TI
define “who we are” and “who we are not” in a affected by his or her knowledge, ge, motives, anand
given context. They build up knowledge, expectations, and in particular thosee that come to
O
experiences, and theories as group members the fore to define the self in a given socialcial
al context.
about groups and group relations. They are An essential distinguishing feature of the he SCT
perceptually ready to perceive the world in par- yping
analysis is that both individuation and stereotypingping
N
ticular ways. Stereotypes reflect these group (and all perception) are outcomes of self–other cat- at-
properties (e.g., norms, values, beliefs), which egorization processes (see the concluding chapters
cannot properly be understood by looking at the of this volume). The shift from individuation to
individual group members in isolation or as stereotyping is simply a shift in the level of self-
aggregates. Stereotyping first and foremost is categorization from personal identity to social
understood as an outcome of these group identity.
processes. The other main misunderstanding is that the
11:31:06:01:10 Page 25
Page 26
SCT analysis of stereotyping essentially embraces schisms, and come to new understandings of “who
and supports relativism. The idea here is that we are”. The SCT analysis of social influence rec-
because stereotyping and other forms of cognition ognizes that challenging people’s current under-
are argued in SCT to represent features of reality standing of the world, the creation of uncertainty,
ffrom the vantage point of the perceiver, the stereo-
fro and the resolution of disagreements occur amongst
types that people hold must be equally valid. SCT those where at some level there is perceived psy-
N
does arg
argu
argue for relativity but not relativism. Social chological similarity. Disagreement with outgroup
infl
in fluence and
influence aan consensus at higher levels of self- members, on the other hand, reinforces self–other
categorization
ategorization ccan correct for relativism by seeking differences and affirms one’s views as right and
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greement across individual and group perspec-

agreement correct.
tives. Therere are sosoc
social mechanisms to validate and There is disagreement because there is an
T
tee ccertai
invalidate iews Australians, for example,
iews.
certain views. asymmetry within the structure of the group iden-
n
through consensus, us, discus
discuss
discussion, rules, norms, and tity (see discussion on meta-contrast). There are
laws, influencee and shape wh which perceptions and people who will be considered better representa-
FO
dered right and vvalid. These social

actions are considered tives of the group, a “truer” group member as a
arrangements can vary ry
y (or stay the sa
same) as a func- function of these processes. Schisms partly relate
tion of disagreements and nd arguments ab about what is to boundaries being drawn amongst certain group
correct and true and attempts ptss to seek ch
chan
change or not. members in the interests of making claims about
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As a function of these processes, cesses,

se ffor exam
example, who best embodies the norms, values, and beliefs
there have been changes in gender er stereotypes
eotypes aan
and of the group as a whole. There are more central and
associated laws regarding equal opportunity portunity and more peripheral members, people who better
D
discrimination. embody definitions of “who we are” compared to

The central message is that stereotypess are not ““who
w we are not”. In this way, it is possible to
IS
rigid or erroneous but reflect perceptions of group ou argue that social influence occurs in groups and
relations from the perceiver’s vantage point. As thatat one or more people will be more influential
others have argued, the one way you can always than others
others.
TR
find “erroneous” stereotypes is to look from outside. The

he SCT an ana
analysis has direct implications for the
Often, what it means is “we don’t agree with you”. nderstanding
derstanding of leadership (Turner & Haslam,
understanding
Agreement and disagreement between individuals 2001)) and power (Tu(Turner, 2005; Turner, Reynolds,
and groups are an outcome of life as individuals & Subasic,sic, 2008). Th
The idea that group members
IB
and group members. Acceptance or rejection of are more orr less represen
representa
representative of a group means
stereotypes is informative about the nature of that leadership p is distributed in groups and there
U
intergroup relations and can motivate social change is no clear dividee between leadleaders and followers
and the emergence of new shared understandings in terms of some leadership cha characteristic or
of what is acceptable and unacceptable. ation
“essence”. The implication n is that lea
lead
leadership suc-
TI
ntally depend oon group

cess and failure fundamentally
identity and being able to shapeape
pe and create sh
shared
O
understandings of “who we are” and nd “whatat we ddo

do”.
Social Influence, Leadership, and Power
In this analysis there is recognition of the relati
relation-
Beginning in the 1990s also was a more specific ship between leaders and other group members
embers in a
N
application of the SCT analysis of social influence broader context of group relations.
to the issue of leadership and then later power. SCT When it comes to the concept of power, tensions
does not argue for monolithic conformity where all remain between the SCT analysis of influence and
group members will necessarily agree and be inter- social-psychological explanations of power. Put
changeable in their views. Group members can and simply, power as defined by control over resources
do disagree and they discuss, argue, and exchange is purported to override social influence processes
views. In groups, members can and do leave, create as described in SCT and related work. The
11:31:06:01:10 Page 26
Page 27
traditional interdependence model of power argues leadership, and power that it is possible to under-
that control over resources leads to power (liking, stand concretely that SCT is a different theory of
influence, dependence) and power leads to influ- the group from social interdependence, where it is
ence. Turner (2005) in his three-process theory liking and dependence that underpin group forma-
of power
powe turns this process on its head. The SCT tion. In the three-process theory it is argued that
analysis of power argues that the foundation of identity confers power and it is not grounded in
N
power is getting others to carry out one’s will—the material resources. Power is an emergent property
ercise
rcise of such po
exercise ppower through people is the ultim- of specific social and psychological relations
esource
ource (and al
ate resource allows groups to harness the between people. The value of resources is
O
sources they ne
things/resources nee
need to achieve their goals). indeterminate outside of the framework of a shared
Persuasion, authority
hority, an
authority, and coercion are outlined to social identity (e.g., who and what is valued), and
T
rocesses
oce
be the three processes of powe
pow
power. All three rest on only within it can leaders persuade others or exer-
fl ce process
identity and the influence processe
processes that flow from cise legitimate authority over them. Even coercion
ys:
it in the following ways:
FO
ultimately depends on this dynamic: Coercion will

not succeed if a leader cannot rely on others to do
1. Persuasion emerges from m the perc
percep
perception that
their bidding. Power is always socially constrained
people share an ingroup membership: the there are
and conferred and is not separate from influence
fs, and goals. T
shared norms, values, beliefs, The
but is itself evidence of influence at work.
R
leaders and followers therefore efore wil

willi
willinglyy
engage in activities that will furthe
urt
further heir
their
group’s goals and aspirations.
D
2. Authority emerges from ingroup membership bership

From Prejudice to Social Change
and structure where there is the perception that
h t
IS
the system through which power relations are SIT and SSCT came out of the prejudice tradition
defined is legitimate. The leaders and followers within social p
psychology but it has been necessary
willingly engage in activities because they o recast the p
to pa
paradigm in order to understand
TR
accept the relevant roles and responsibilities in udice

dice and soc
prejudice social change. The traditional
the group. ch, referred tto by Turner in the Freilich
approach,
3. Coercion emerges when there is not a shared on
Foundationn Eminent Lec
Lect
Lecturer Series in 2001 as the
ingroup membership between parties and as rthodoxy
hodoxy” (Turn
“prejudice orthodoxy” (Turner, 2001), argues that
IB
such there is a need to bring about compliance ejudice are:

the causes of prejudice
through one’s capacities to provide positive and
athological per
1. Specific quasi-pathological personalities or
negative outcomes. Coercion also requires per-
U
individual difference factors

actors that, mo
more or less,
suasion and authority over those who bring
ple to generalize
directly predispose people generalized preju-
others (against their will) to act in particular
dice against vulnerable minority
ority (and otother)
TI
ways.
outgroups.
Power as coercion is argued to be the weakest form 2. General psychological processes ess that, once
O
of power as it reveals a lack of genuine ability to triggered by some stimulus, state,, or event,
influence through group identity. It also is likely to inevitably and automatically lead to hostility
create further disidentification, weakening persua- mited
towards outgroups (e.g., frustration, limited
N
sion and authority and making these less likely to cognitive capacity, group formation, and nd
emerge in the future. Thus, leaders, leadership ethnocentrism).
groups, institutions, elites, and authorities have real 3. The meaninglessness of intergroup attitudes and
social power when they are able to achieve action stereotypes where, as outlined above, any group
through influence and persuasion rather than judgment or stereotype, any social categorical
control. representation of a person or group of people, is
It is through the SCT analysis of social influence, somehow faulty, biased, and misleading.
11:31:06:01:10 Page 27
Page 28
4. The passivity of cultural and social learning current structure of relations (e.g., dominant and
where, through socialization, prejudice is subordinate, high and low status, advantaged and
learned from one’s society. The assumption disadvantaged) is widely accepted or rejected. In
seems to be that what culture teaches, one has social identity theory and related work there has
no choice but to learn (e.g., automatic process- been a focus on legitimacy, stability, and permea-
in and implicit attitudes).
ing bility as factors that account for system stability
N
through social mobility and social creativity and

SIT/SCT aand related work over many years social change through social competition and
together
ogether serve as a detailed rejection of these conflict (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979). What has been
O
auses. More rec

causes. rece
recently, the focus of thinking and missing is a detailed exploration of the processes
arch has been on how prejudices conceptual-
research by which some action, outcome, or relationship is
T
ized as a ffunct
function of ppersonality, general psych- transformed from one perceived as legitimate to
fic psychology,
ology, deficit psycholog and/or socialization
psychology one perceived as illegitimate, and specifically with
directly impact on social psych
psychological theories of
FO
respect to social change how a subordinate group

social change. If the causes of ccurrent prejudices redefines its relationship with the dominant group
are unavoidable and d deeply rooted in our psych- from legitimate to illegitimate. Over the last
cious), then it is difficult to
ology (even our unconscious), 10 years or so this has been a particular focus of
envisage the possibility off real and gen
genu
genuine social SCT work (Turner & Reynolds, 2002). At the cen-
R
change. Is it any surprise thatt within

th ssocialal p
ps
psych- ter of this analysis is the recognition that the self is
ology over so many years there has as beenn a focus oon hierarchically organized and that it is possible to
tenance of the
explaining system stability and maintenance shift from intragroup (“we”) to intergroup (“us”
D
cial change?
status quo rather than processes of social versus “them”) and vice versa.
(Turner & Reynolds, 2003). Legitimacy is understood in this work, in line
IS
SIT and SCT offer a different view where preju- eju with tthe thinking of many authors, as a state of
dice is not inevitable and social change and socialcial
ial affairs
fairs in accord with (or not) a rule, a law, a belief
progress are possible. Prejudice is an outcome of about what is right, proper, or moral. Following
TR
people’s understanding as group members of a par- SCT, it is acti

actio
action that is in line with or that violates
ticular intergroup relationship. In this intergroup ome
me norm, value
some value, rule, procedure, right, or obliga-
relations perspective, it is necessary to take into tion associated
ociated with a shared ingroup membership,
account people’s group memberships, the real rela- where someome perpetrato
perpetrator is in violation of a specific
IB
tionships between them, the social structure within rule that “wewee are suppose
supposed to share”. The concept
which they function, the ideologies that they use to of legitimacy itself
tself is intertwin
intertwined with group iden-
U
define themselves, and the social system and their tity. A legitimate actor (leader, aauthority, govern-
relationships. This analysis means that if group ment, institution), by y defi
de finition, emb
definition, embodies a shared
relations change through social action, if there is a social identity; in acting g in line with a ssh
shared social
TI
change to people’s social relationships, then preju- identity, in accord with ingroupgroup norms, id identifica-
dice towards particular groups can also change tion with the group is enhanced d (along with p per
percep-
O
(and this change can be represented in all aspects tions of fairness, trust, leadership rship
hip satisfactio
satisfaction,
of cognition—in implicit and explicit processes). It endorsement, and influence). Reciprocally, ciprocally, aany
is possible through forms of social organization, actor with whom one identifies is thereby ereby
reby more
N
conventions, and practices to impinge on, modify, likely to be seen as legitimate. When somee syste system
and change people’s group identities and associ- actor behaves legitimately, one is more likely to
ated social norms and affect how they think, feel, identify with and seek membership in it and is more
and are likely to act. likely to endorse and justify this group. Under
These ideas offer a much less pessimistic view these conditions, there is system identification and
of humanity and human social relations. Funda- system justification.
mental to social change is the degree to which the Conversely, when some system actor behaves
11:31:06:01:10 Page 28
Page 29
illegitimately, in violation of the shared higher seen as illegitimate, as an irreversible threat to

order ingroup identity “we are supposed to share”, the very principles it was once assumed to share
this facilitates its recategorization as an outgroup. and embody.
Identification with the higher order ingroup is
This analysis of illegitimacy and the emergence of
uced aand it is more likely that there will be
reduced
a shift from a higher order ingroup “we” to “us
nterest and sympathy (and ultimately identifica-
interest
versus them”, to a definition of “us” that requires
N
tion) with thothos

those that contrast with, and are in
the removal or even elimination of “them”, pro-
position
osition to, the actor. Using more system lan-
opposition
vides a more systematic analysis of both social
guage,e, through
hrough these pprocesses one comes to deni-
O
change and stability. It helps to explain how system

grate and d reject the syst
syste
system and its representatives
legitimacy and justification or system illegitimacy
and advancee and justify a contrasting (sub-)group.
T
and system rejection (and vice versa) emerge.

Along with th this aanalysis
ysis there has been an
attempt to identify fy the factors tth
that move system
members to interpret, explain, and uunderstand the
FO
The Nature of the Self-Process

illegitimacy of their own wn and d others’
others’ experiences
e
and the Person
olated
ated occurrenc
(e.g., prejudice) not as an isolated occurrence but as
an outcome of the illegitimacy y of the system iitself In thinking about stereotyping as a flexible, relative
and the dominant actors within it.. Four of the ccen- process of self-categorization that oriented the per-
R
tral factors can be summarized briefly fly ass ffollo

follows: son to group realities, it became obvious that there
were more general implications for self and iden-
1. An illegitimate act is interpreted as an n in
inter- tity
ity In Turner (1982) there was a view about how
tity.
D
group rather than interpersonal experience (i.e., the sel

self-concept was structured and organized that
victims and perpetrators act toward each other her has been developed and refined within SCT. In fact
IS
as group members rather than as individuals). a major them

theme of SCT has been the reconceptuali-
2. An illegitimate act is attributed to the shared zation of the seself. Its major contributions through-
internal characteristics of the dominant group outt thee 1980s and 1990s have been to flesh out what
TR
(i.e., perceiving it to be deliberate, reflecting true mplies for group

this implies grou behavior such as stereotyp-
attitudes rather than some accident or mistake). mogeneity,
ogeneity, influen
ing, homogeneity, in ue
influence, and prejudice. During
3. An illegitimate act is explained in terms of a ears
the past 5 yearsrs or so, atten
attent
attention has turned to what
“category essence”, a theory of what makes it a this implies for or individuality
individuality, personality, and in
IB
social entity (we assume that factors affecting sonal

onal identity. Tr
particular for personal T
Traditionally there
the perceived entitativity of the dominant group has been a personality ity
ty model of the self-concept
U
include its degree of organization and homo- where the personal is thee baseline, defi de fini
n
defining what is
geneity and the perceived extent to which real and accurate. The SCT T alternative is tth
that per-
illegitimate acts are intended, repeated, and ultiple
sonal identity is just one of multiple ple aspects oof self
TI
systematic). that are all more or less important ant depending oon
4. The illegitimate “essence” or identity of the context. The central arguments are that: hat:
at:
O
dominant group is linked to the social system as

a whole through the development and dissemin- 1. Self-categorization processes are variable
variable..
ation within the subordinate group of a collect- Individuality, like social identity, is not fi xed
fixed
N
ive theory or ideology (i.e., the emergence of and stable, but is variable and context depend- d-
radical, subversive beliefs that explain the ent. It is not a ready-made set of predispositions
illegitimate “essence” and power of the domin- or traits, but a flexible definition of the self in
ant group in terms of the illegitimate nature of relation to current realities. The personal (just
the system and become normative within the like the social) self is an outcome of the
subordinate group). At the extreme the very person × situation interaction. In SCT the “per-
existence of the dominant group will come to be son” in this equation relates to the knowledge,
11:31:06:01:10 Page 29
Page 30
experiences, expectations, goals, ideology, and the salient level of self-categorization, and
theories that a person brings to a situation (i.e., influence processes). Along with the emergence
perceiver readiness). The “situation” in this of new groups come different norms, values and
equation is the events that occur and the way beliefs, and understandings of appropriate and
they are given meaning by the perceiver (includ- valued social conduct. In these processes lies
in about the self through processes of com-
ing the potential for different individual and group
N
parati
parative and normative fit). As a function of aspirations that present the opportunity for new
these inint
interactive processes a particular self- personalities (while others may be modified and
categorizatio
orizati will become salient and deter-
categorization attenuated).
O
mine oone
one’s’ss beh
behavior in a given social context.
This SCT view of the person in which the personal
Ass such,
h, indivi
individ
individuality (like group identity) is a
T
and social are integrated highlights the interplay

emporar
mp
contemporary eatio and therefore there can
creation
between individual and collective life. There is
nu and chang
be continuity change depending on whether
much work that is being done on individuality,
the factors that underpin se self-categorizing stay
FO
personality, and the personal self but all of it flows

the same or vary. If there is stability in back-
from the different understanding of the self
ground knowledge ge and the situa
situat
situations a person
advanced by SCT.
y-to-day basis, one would
confronts on a day-to-day
expect relatively stablee self-catego
self-categoriz
self-categorizations to
R
(re)emerge (e.g., “who am I”).. IIf pe n fa

person factors
Glimpses of the Future: Social Psychology
or situational factors change, ge however,
wever, o on
one
as a Special Science
would expect self-conceptions to change also also.
D
2. There are interdependencies between een

en different The social identity perspective has always seen
dentities,
ntitie
levels of self-categorization. Group identities, so
soc
social psychology as a special science. We reject
IS
beliefs, and outcomes such as norms, values, alues,

ue the id
idea that it is simply a branch of general psych-
and goals shape the meaning of individuality. ity. ology
ogy ap
applied to social stimuli. The whole trend in
Understanding how we differ from others in a individualis
individualistic psychology is towards a reifying
TR
particular situation is interpreted through the reductionism—

reductionism —
reductionism—the cause is found in some inner
social and political processes that shape our sen —but in social identity research the
sence
essence—but
higher order selves (what is valued, considered hasis
emphasis is should be on the unified psychological-
appropriate, and so on, amongst those we con- eld, in a much m
social field, more Lewinian spirit. People
IB
sider most psychologically similar to us at a rmed

med by their ssocial relationships and
are transformed
given time). The SCT analysis of social influ- activities, and this includes the
their minds, and theory
U
ence is central here because it reveals how atti- must make such h transformatio
transformation possible and
tudes, behavior, and cognition can change as a explicable.
function of group processes and intergroup rela- Group life and social context
ntext are no
not factors that
TI
tions. In this way the individual and group are moderate the functioning of the mind, they funda-
interdependent and personality has to be under- ychological
chological proc
mentally shape it. Social-psychological pro
processes
O
stood as an outcome of both. arise from the functioning of the human

uman mind in aan
3. Social change can bring personal change. organized social environment. The social context
Along with social change comes the potential oning.
ning. Thus
qualitatively affects their mental functioning.
N
for change in people’s background knowledge, humans are not merely individuals and neither either
her aare
theories, beliefs—their interpretive resources— our minds. We have both collective selves as
and the structural position and meaning of their well as personal selves. The group is an emergent
group memberships. With social change often psychological process that makes possible collect-
comes the emergence of new group member- ive products, which in turn become psychological
ship and allegiances (e.g., as a function of new forces, social values, ideologies, and power struc-
patterns of intergroup relations, changes in tures. All aspects of human psychological func-
11:31:06:01:10 Page 30
Page 31
tioning, from the cognitive to the emotional, Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes.
motivational, and behavioural, are affected by the Human Relations, 7, 117–140.
Lewin, K. (1948). Resolving social conflicts. New York:
mind–society interaction. Whatever the nature of Harper & Brothers.
the observation, they are all shaped by the socially Lewin, K. (1952). Field theory in social science. London:
ned sself-process. This is a view of human
defined Tavistock.
psychology that is not limiting of what we can be Lott, A. J., & Lott, B. E. (1965). Group cohesiveness as inter-
personal attraction: A review of relationships with ante-
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and how huma

humans can live. It acknowledges how
cedent and consequent variables. Psychological Bulletin,
ople
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people redefin their social relationships and,
redefine 64, 259–309.
in the process,
rocess, their ppe
personhood.
O
Medin, D. L., & Wattenmaker, W. D. (1987). Category

rk on social iden
In work identity these ideas have been cohesiveness, theories, and cognitive archeology. In
developed inn great
eat detail
detail, in particular in research U. Neisser (Ed.), Concepts and conceptual development:
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ence
nc and social
on social influence cial nnorms, prejudice, the Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
on y, and cog
self-process, personality, cogn
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many who have shared d in the enterpri
enterprise to date and
FO
London: Academic Press.

who have helped to make ake the
he leap fo for
forward. The Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & Turner, J. C. (1994). Stereotyp-
story of social identity is that at it generates a new ing and social reality. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
undamental imp
distinctive vision that has fundamental implica- Rabbie, J. M., & Horwitz, M. (1969). Arousal of ingroup–
outgroup bias by a chance win or loss. Journal of Personal-
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ity and Social Psychology, 13, 269–277.

psychology, and other disciplines. Thee scie fic
scientific Sherif, M. (1967). Group conflict and co-operation: Their
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mind will be socially radical, contradicting gmmany She
he M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif,
Sherif,
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current assumptions within science. In many ways C W.

C. W (1961). Intergroup conflict and cooperation: the
Robber Cave experiment. Norman, OK: University of
Robbers
the work has hardly begun.
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Oklahoma Book Exchange.

(1957 Value and the perceptual judgement of mag-
Tajfel, H. (1957).
nitu Psychological
nitude. Psycholo Review, 64, 192–204.
fel, H. (1969). Cognitive
Tajfel, Co
Cog aspects of prejudice. Journal of
TR
Acknowledgments ial
Socialal Issues,
Issues, 25,
25 79–97.
79
79––9
This chapter was supported by funding from the Soci categorization. In S. Moscovici
Tajfel, H. (1972a). Social
roduction
tion a la psychologie
(Ed.), Introduction psyc sociale (Vol.1). Paris:
Australian Research Council, including an Austral-
Larouse.
ian Professional Fellowship to Professor Turner.
IB
Tajfel, H. (1972b). ). Experiments in i a vacuum. In J. Israel

We would like to thank Boris Bizumic, Carolyn & H. Tajfel (Eds.), .),
), The context of social psychology
Newbigin, and Emina Subasic for comments on (pp. 69–119). London: Academic Press. P
earlier drafts of this manuscript. Thanks also to fferentiation between
Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (1978). Differentiation b social
U
groups: Studies in the social cial

ial psychology of intergroup
the editors of this volume, Nyla Branscombe and
relations. London: Academic Press. ress
ress.
Tom Postmes, for their helpful suggestions and
TI
Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M. G.,, & Bundy, R. F. (1971).

(1
patience. Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. EuropeanEurope
Europea
Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149–177. 7
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative ve theory of
ative
O
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Page 13

The Story of Social Identity

n this chapter we shall outline brieﬂy the origins

in social psychology from its beginning in 1971 up Why shou

being to make sense of unexpected experimental uman minds: o

Science progresses by testing ideas rather than

whoho are serious ab

and the argume

The chapter willll nott be a sum

identity. This is impossible and pe perha

historical context. It also highlights very brieﬂy as an evolutio

ity—four areas (amongst others) that have been a mbrace

1980s and 1990s until the present day. None of this

identity research and ideas. The late Henri Tajfel ume

paper in 1971 (or possibly 1970). Turner wrote the

The Story of Social Identity 15

a positive soc soci

ess for their oown groups compared to

group paradigm m to illu te w

etical implications of this account for both the

produced a drive for uniformity pressures ssu

founded by all the variables normally thought ght

group paradigm was novel, as were the ideas cre- ion

of social categorization (was it alone sufﬁcient for roduced ingrou

sions andd vvalues thatt de

could react to ingroup and/or outgroup others

Brown (1978) as a deliberately ely aabbr ted title,

tinctiveness sequence”. This sequence gave us an could be seeneen as compe

psychology that could shape intergroup behavior elf-interest

The Story of Social Identity 17

oth. The languag

operationally. It aalso highlighted

experimental studies. The ﬁrst experiment con-

groups, it has to incorporate an accountcount

has been replaced by the personal–social identity entity interpe

social identity distinction has become so successful derstanding

theoretical context. follow one or more different strategies (individual ual

individual. Sherif’s speciﬁc theory of how inter-

and integrating an understanding of self-interest

dimension (and downgradingg the he latter’s

misguided hypotheses that had never been in the th ive ps

The ﬁnal theory was completed in 1976 and pub- mplexities of in

1986). Other work such as the edited book by mental

atization of where they had got to by 1976. There

substantive statement of SIT). conﬂict.

The Story of Social Identity 19

vior. This last po

contained within ith it a powerful

self-categorizing as a reﬂexive process of social

implications of the minimal group paradig ara

Turner wrote and presented a paper “Towards a sociall change, power,

beginning of self-categorization theory (SCT), the intergroup attitudes and actions

mpirical one. Of course interpersonal relations are

resources, prestige, and power, manage to hold on

relevance to the causal production duction

ology (Asch, Sherif, Festinger), North American erican

group became superﬂuous because it had ceased ization or g gr

self-interest who had thereby become cohesive eory