PROPOSITIONS

1) Whether rejection of anticipatory bail application by H.C puts on bar on sec

482 cr.pc petion ?
2) Whether applicants can be forced to move a bail application in compliance of
Rejection order?
3) Whether the H.C u/s 482 cr.pc can decide the case on merits without hearing the
informant/ complainant?
4) What are the duties of H.C regarding the quashing of Summoning order, charge sheet and
entire criminal proceeding while entertaining a petition U/S - 482 cr.pc
5) What are duties of Magistrate regarding cognizance and summoning order ?
1. Bhadresh Bipin Bhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat 2016 1 SCC 152
Principles of grant of anticipatory bail
Bar on regular bail application applies only when anticipatory bail is granted
and not when the same is rejected
Once accused is granted anticipatory it would be unreasonable to make him
surrender before trial court and again apply for regular bail
2. (2011) 1 SCC 694 : Principles on anti bail

3. The SC referred to two earlier decisions in State of Telangana v. Hamid Abdullah Jeelani[8],
and Ravuri Krishna Murthy v. State of Telangana[9], which held that the HC cannot grant
interim protection from arrest under Section 482 CrPC, after dismissing a quashing petition.
The SC held that granting interim protection from arrest while dismissing a quashing petition
would indirectly amount to an order for anticipatory bail, which can be passed only if the
conditions prescribed under Section 438 of the CrPC are satisfied. Hence, according to the
SC, if a quashing petition is dismissed, the accused should be relegated to filing an
application for anticipatory bail under Section 438.[10]

State of Telangana v. Hamid Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779.

Ravuri Krishna Murthy v. State of Telangana, Criminal Appeal Nos. 274-275
of 2021, decided on 05.03.2021.
Neeharika Infrastructure para 23

4. Sibbia case [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] that the High Court or the
Court of Session has to exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438 CrPC by a
wise and careful use of their discretion which by their long training and
experience they are ideally suited to do.

5. Kamlesh & Anr. vs. The State of Rajasthan & Anr.2 , whereby it has been opined that a
petition U/s 438 Cr.P.C. is very much maintainable even after dismissal of an application filed
U/S 482 Cr.P.C. 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1822

In Kamlesh and another versus State of Rajasthan and another,

2019 SCC OnLine SC 1822, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was
deciding a Criminal Appeal filed against an order passed by
Rajasthan High Court whereby an application for grant of
anticipatory bail was rejected by the High Court only on the
ground that petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying for
quashing of FIR, has already been rejected. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that: - "5. We are of the view that the order of the High
Court cannot be sustained. High Court ought to have considered
the application on merits. The fact that petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C. was dismissed for quashing was not conclusive and could
not be the reason for rejecting the application."
6. Petition(s) For Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.6057 of 2021 (Vinod Kumar
Sharma & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.), whereby it is stated that the
order to the accused to surrender and apply for regular bail includes anticipatory
bail also.
7. . Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on paragraph nos.11 and 12 of
the judgment of this Court passed in Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application
U/S 438 Cr.P.C. No.8059 of 2023 (Dr. Rajni Tripathi vs. State of U.P.), whereby the
anticipatory bail was granted to the delinquent therein even after the application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was disposed of and much reliance was made on the
judgment of Vinod Kumar Sharma and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Another3 . 2022 1 Crimes (SC) 193
8. Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 438 Cr.P.C. No.4560 of 2023 (Udit
Arya vs. State of U.P.), whereby even after the proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C.
were taken up against the delinquent therein, the anticipatory bail of the accused
was allowed
9. Lavesh Vs. State (NCT, Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 730) wherein the Apex Court has
observed that if any person has been declared absconder by issuing proclamation
u/s 82 Cr.P.C. normally his anticipatory bail application should not be entertained
but the present applicant has not been declared absconder, therefore, Neutral
Citation No. - 2022:AHC-LKO:55480 that bar may not be attracted against him.
10. Sri Rai has also drawn attention of the Court towards Vinod Kumar Sharma &
another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & another passed in Special Leave to Appeal
(Crl) No. 6057 of 2021 whereby the Apex Court vide order dated 16.12.2021
observed that even if an application of the accused filed u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been
disposed of, he / she may not be restrained to file his / her anticipatory bail
application .
11. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Mohan Singh
& Ors." reported in SCC (1975) 3 706 is clear that dismissal of an earlier 482
petition does not bar filing of subsequent petition under Section 482, in case the
facts so justify."
12. Section 482 successive if filed for different set of facts: Anil Khadiwala Vs. State
Govt. of NCT of Delhi reported in 2019 (17) SC 1002, relying upon the earlier
judgment of the Hon'ble Surpeme Court in the case of Superintendent And
Remembrancer Vs. Mohan Singh And Ors. reported in AIR 1975 SC 1002 has
opined that successive application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. under the changed
circumstances is maintainable. Relevant portion whereof is being quoted herein-
below:

"8. In Mohan Singh (supra), it was held that a successive application under Section
482 . under changed circumstances was maintainable and the dismissal of the
earlier application was no bar to the same, observing:
13. Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such Orders
as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of
justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having
regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent
jurisdiction is sought to be invoked (Anil Khadiwala Vs. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi
reported in 2019 (17) SC 1002)
The facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of
respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time
of the earlier application of the first respondent because, despite the rejection of
the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution had failed to make
 any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and
the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one and a half
years............

14. Anup Kumar Singh vs State Of U.P. And Another on 16

February, 2023: 482 after rejection of 438: APPLICATION U/S
482 No. - 4302 of 2023 Allahabad High Court: 43. On examination of the
order impugned, this Court finds that the court below has recorded
categorical finding of fact and has rightly cancelled the anticipatory bail
granted earlier to the applicant, which warrants no interference by this
Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as there is no
illegality or infirmity in it.
15. State v. Navjot Sandhu 2003 6 SCC 641 after a review of
large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under: (SCC p. 657,
para 29)
“29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an
abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely
necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be
exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few
and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is
generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be
quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without
jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It
must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there
is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against
an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal
Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in
some other enactment.”

16. Ravindra Saxena v. State Of Rajasthan 2010 SCC 1 684

4. Being unsuccessful before the Sessions Judge, the
appellant moved an application for anticipatory bail before
the High Court in the earlier case, which was dismissed by
the High Court as well on 13-8-2007. The appellant also
sought quashing of the FIR in a petition filed under Section
482 CrPC before the High Court of Rajasthan. This was also
rejected by the High Court. The appellant again moved an
application for anticipatory bail which was rejected by the
High Court on 24-3-2008.
17. 482 filed after anticipatory rejected (2005 SCC 13 540)
STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER V. SAROJ KUMAR SAHOO
Though orders were passed by the High Court for
appearance before the court concerned while rejecting the
application for bail under Section 438 CrPC, the respondents
never appeared before the court concerned and on the
contrary on 19-4-2001 the respondent Saroj Kumar Sahoo
 filed an application under Section 482 CrPC before the High
Court for quashing the FIR and connected proceedings in
Bhubaneshwar Vigilance Police Station Case No. 61 of 2000
registered for alleged commission of offences under Sections
120-B, 420, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short
“IPC”) read with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(a) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short “the Act”)

18. In R.P Kapur v. State Of Punjab. AIR 1960 SC 866 this Court summarised some
categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash
the proceedings:

(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or
continuance e.g want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence
adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
( SCR p. 393)

19. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335

102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
code or the act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”

20. ALLAHABAD HC: CRIMINAL MISC ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION U/S 438 CR.P.C.
No. - 57 of 2023 VIJAY PAL PRAJAPATI V STATE OF UP
 Therefore, the law is clear that the dismissal of the applicant’s application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar against consideration of the merits of his
application for anticipatory bail.
As has already been stated in the preceding paragraphs, mere nonpayment of
money paid under a contract cannot be a ground for criminal prosecution of a
party to the agreement and, in any case, that cannot be a ground for rejection of
the anticipatory bail application of the accused person. Therefore, I am of the view
that the application Page 6 of 7 for grant of anticipatory bail to the applicant
cannot be rejected on this ground

21. 13. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Rajiv Thapar and others versus Madan Lal Kapoor: (2013) 3 SCC 330. Para 29 of
the aforesaid judgment which reads as under:-
“29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it
chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution
against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at
the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing
of charges. These are all stages before the
commencement of the actual trial. The same
parameters would naturally be available for later stages
as well. The power vested in the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove,
would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it
would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case
without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead
evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered
with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High
Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced
by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion
that his/ their defence is based on sound, reasonable,
and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as
would rule out and displace the assertions contained in
the charges levelled against the accused; and the
material produced is such as would clearly reject and
overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the
accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It
should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the
accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant,
without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this
the material relied upon by the defence should not have
been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably
refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable
quality. The material relied upon by the accused should
be such as would persuade a reasonable person to
dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations
as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the
High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under
Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for
 that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and
secure the ends of justice.”

22. Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1, the Supreme
Court dealing with the inherent power of the High Court provided under Sections
482 of Cr. P.C., has observed as under:—

“Scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC

23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts'
powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex
debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which
alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power
under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

23. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Mohan

Singh1 (1975) 3 SCC 706. Therein, it was held that a subsequent application
under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, presently
Section 482 Cr. P.C., would be maintainable in changed circumstances. It
was affirmed that a subsequent application, which is not a repeat
application squarely on the same facts and circumstances, would be
maintainable. To the same effect was the more recent decision of this
Court in Anil Khadkiwala v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)2. (2019) 17 SCC
294 Earlier, in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla3, (2007) 4 SCC 70this
Court held that when the first petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. was
withdrawn with liberty to avail remedies, if any, available in law, the High
Court would not be denuded of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr. P.C. on being petitioned again and the principle of res judicata would not
stand attracted. Again, in Vinod Kumar, IAS. v. Union of India4, 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 559 a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that dismissal of an
earlier petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not bar filing of a
subsequent petition thereunder in case the facts so justify.

S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan8, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 94 the Madras High
Court observed that a person who invokes Section 482 Cr. P.C. should
honestly come before the Court raising all the pleas available to him at that
point of time and he is not supposed to approach the Court with
instalment pleas. It was further observed that there may be a change of
circumstances during the course of criminal proceedings which would give
scope for the person aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the
Court, but when he is posted with all the facts and circumstances of a case,
 he cannot withhold part of it for the purpose of filing yet another petition
seeking the same relief.

CIVIL VS CRIMINAL

24. G. Sagar Suri v. State of UP, (2000) 2 SCC 636, it had been observed
that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great
deal of caution in issuing the process, particularly when matters are
essentially of civil nature...

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2022/04/14/forum-shopping-civil-
complaint-criminal-case-section-482-supreme-court-legal-research-
updates-news-high-courts/
Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of U.P., (2021) 5 SCC 435, it was observed
that, “…permitting multiple complaints by the same party in respect of
the same incident, whether it involves a cognizable or private complaint
offence, will lead to the accused being entangled in numerous criminal
proceedings. As such he would be forced to keep surrendering his
liberty and precious time before the police and the courts, as and when
required in each case....

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2022/04/14/forum-shopping-civil-
complaint-criminal-case-section-482-supreme-court-legal-research-
updates-news-high-courts/
Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 344, decided
on 22-03-2022...(Criminal in civil)

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2022/04/14/forum-shopping-civil-
complaint-criminal-case-section-482-supreme-court-legal-research-
updates-news-high-courts/

This extract is taken from Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B., (2022) 7 SCC 124 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 787 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 344 at page 140
25. This Court has time and again cautioned about converting purely civil disputes
into criminal cases. This Court in Indian Oil Corpn. [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India
Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] noticed the prevalent impression
that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the
interests of lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that : (Indian Oil Corpn.
case [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri)
188] , SCC p. 749, para 13)

“13. … Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any
criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be
deprecated and discouraged.”

Popular Muthiah v. State, (2006) 7 SCC 296 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 245 : 2006
SCC OnLine SC 661 at page 311
 31. This Court in Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan [(2001) 8 SCC 570 : 2002 SCC (Cri)
24] while dealing with the inherent powers of the High Court held : (SCC p. 573, para 6)
“The principle embodied in the section is based upon the maxim : quando lex aliquid
alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest i.e. when the law
gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself
would be unavailable. The section does not confer any new power, but only declares
that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the section.
As lacunae are sometimes found in procedural law, the section has been embodied to
cover such lacunae wherever they are discovered. The use of extraordinary powers
conferred upon the High Court under this section are however required to be reserved,
as far as possible, for extraordinary cases

Popular Muthiah v. State, (2006) 7 SCC 296 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 245 : 2006 SCC
OnLine SC 661 at page 312
36. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545] it was stated : (SCC
p. 657, para 29)
“29. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words ‘Nothing in
this Code’. Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397
or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However as is set out in Satya
Narayan Sharma case [Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC 607 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 39] this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in some other
enactment. If the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could be
corrected in exercise of revisional powers or appellate powers the High Court must
refuse to exercise its inherent power. The inherent power is to be used only in cases
where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely
necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very
sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most
common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal
proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously
or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It
must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a
specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the
aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law
engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be
exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.”

CBI v. A. Ravishankar Prasad, (2009) 6 SCC 351, wherein it was held

that: “Inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 CrPC are meant
to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the
administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the
process of the court. These inherent powers can be exercised in the
following category of cases: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure
the ends of justice. Extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC should
be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution.”...
 https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/12/24/madras-hc-when-in-
circumstances-registration-of-case-is-itself-an-abuse-of-process-of-law-
court-can-exercise-inherent-powers/

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NO BAN ON GENERAL POWER OF 482

This extract is taken from Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988 :
2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 at page 322
26. In Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] the Court
explained the width and amplitude of the inherent power of the High Court
under Section 482 vis-à-vis the revisional power under Section 397 as follows :
(SCC pp. 47-48, para 10)
“10. … The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention
because nothing of the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude
of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section
482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a specific
provision is made : easy resort to inherent power is not right except under
compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that
inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under
the same Code. In Madhu Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10]
this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect, correctly
discussed and delineated the law beyond mistake. While it is true that Section
482 is pervasive it should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same
Code, such, for instance, in Section 397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in
some situations between the two provisions and a happy solution : (Madhu
Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] , SCC pp. 555-56, para 10)
‘10. … would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of
Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High
Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision
in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the
other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play,
there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely
of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the
revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court
 will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order
clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the
court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the
High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section
397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High
Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must
exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the
desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally,
vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction.’
In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where
abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the
court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of
the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be
taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At
the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in
exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In
between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example,
where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final
disposal. The present case falls under that category where the accused
complain of harassment through the court's process. Can we state that in this
third category the inherent power can be exercised? In the words of Untwalia,
J. : (SCC p. 556, para 10)
‘10. … The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent
the abuse of the process of the court and/or to secure the ends of justice.
The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The
High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its
inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the
power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code,
even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power
of the High Court is impermissible.’
I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is not rebuffed in
the case situation before us. Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to
our allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical insistence on the
formal filing of a copy of the order under cessation need not take up this
Court's time. Our conclusion concurs with the concession of counsel on both
sides that merely because a copy of the order has not been produced,
despite its presence in the records in the court, it is not possible for me to
 hold that the entire revisory power stands frustrated and the inherent power
stultified.”

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 at
page 326
31. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3
SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] restated what has been stated in the earlier decisions that
Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High Court, it only saves the inherent
power which the court possessed before the commencement of the Code. The Court went
on to explain the exercise of inherent power by the High Court in para 6 of the Report as
under : (SCC p. 94)
“6. … It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be
exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all
cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from
express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and
duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the
section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All
courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to
undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid
alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law
gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising
powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do
real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority
of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that
authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be
an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash
any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice.”

The Supreme Court, in Madhu Limaye v. Maharashtra, has said:

“Nothing in the Code, not even Section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power
preserved in Section 482. Where the impugned interlocutory order clearly brings about a
situation which is an abuse of the process of the court then for the purpose of securing the
ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary and nothing contained
in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court”.
Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chandra1 (2012) 9 SCC 460 , this Court laid down the
following guiding principles: “27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due
care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of
quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section
228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and
that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and
the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the
allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent
person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a
criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High
Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is
needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the
stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such
power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for
correcting some grave 1 (2012) 9 SCC 460 7 error that might be committed by the
subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere,
at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the
Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and
continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide
specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the
freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to
investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be
permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the
allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed
therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no
‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal
offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the
court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another
very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is
sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the
court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they
will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading
to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a
fullfledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating
agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where
allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because
a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be
maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under
Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by
an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there
was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and
documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is
an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even
broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of
prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected
to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the
 charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental
legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would
amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of 8 justice favours,
otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone,
the courts exist. *** 27.16. These are the principles which individually and
preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to
exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been
laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the
proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been
stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the
requirements of the offence.”

MOST IMPORTANT

Nathu Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 6 SCC 64 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 757 : 2021
SCC OnLine SC 402 at page 70
18. The only guidance relating to what is to take place once an application under Section
438 CrPC is rejected is found in the proviso to Section 438(1) CrPC, which specifically
provides that once an application is rejected, or the court seized with the matter refuses to
issue an interim order, it is open to the police to arrest the applicant. It is this proviso that
the present appellants have relied upon to argue that the High Court, once it rejected the
anticipatory bail applications of the respondent-accused, did not have the power to grant
any further relief.
Nathu Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 6 SCC 64 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 757 : 2021
SCC OnLine SC 402 at page 70

19. At first blush, while this submission appears to be attractive, we are of the opinion
that such an analysis of the provision is incomplete. It is no longer res integra that any
interpretation of the provisions of Section 438 CrPC has to take into consideration the fact
that the grant or rejection of an application under Section 438 CrPC has a direct bearing on
the fundamental right to life and liberty of an individual. The genesis of this jurisdiction lies
in Article 21 of the Constitution, as an effective medium to protect the life and liberty of an
individual. The provision therefore needs to be read liberally, and considering its beneficial
nature, the courts must not read in limitations or restrictions that the legislature have not
explicitly provided for. Any ambiguity in the language must be resolved in favour of the
applicant seeking relief. In this context, this Court, in the Constitution Bench decision of this
Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , which was recently upheld and followed by this Court
in Sushila Aggarwal [Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri)
721] at SCC p. 56, para 14, held as follows: (Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case [Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , SCC p. 586, para 26)

“26. We find a great deal of substance in Mr Tarkunde's submission that since denial
of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the
imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when no such
restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a
procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who
is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of
his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks
bail. An over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found
in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to
personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable
restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned.”

Nathu Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 6 SCC 64 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 757 : 2021
SCC OnLine SC 402 at page 71
22. Without going into the question of whether Section 438 CrPC itself allows for such a
power, as it is not necessary to undertake such an exercise in the present case, it is clear
that when it comes to the High Court, such a power does exist. Section 482 CrPC explicitly
recognises the High Court's inherent power to pass orders to secure the ends of justice. This
provision reflects the reality that no law or rule can possibly account for the complexities of
life, and the infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future.

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This extract is taken from Nathu Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 6 SCC 64 :
(2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 757 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 402 at page 71
23. We cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that courts are faced with
day in and day out, while dealing with anticipatory bail applications. Even when
the court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be
circumstances where the High Court is of the opinion that it is necessary to
protect the person apprehending arrest for some time, due to exceptional
circumstances, until they surrender before the trial court. For example, the
applicant may plead protection for some time as he/she is the primary caregiver
or breadwinner of his/her family members, and needs to make arrangements
for them. In such extraordinary circumstances, when a strict case for grant of
anticipatory bail is not made out, and rather the investigating authority has
made out a case for custodial investigation, it cannot be stated that the High
Court has no power to ensure justice. It needs no mentioning, but this Court
may also exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such
an order.

INDEX