Relationalism. A Theory of Being

Q€LATI©NALI§ M
A Theory
of Being
Relationalism
A Theory of Being
Joseph Kaipayil
Relationalism
A Theory of Being
JIP Publications
Bangalore
2009
Copyright © 2009 by Joseph Kaipayil
All rights reserved
Published by JIP Publications

Jeevalaya Institute of Philosophy
Bangalore 560083
ISBN 81-87664-06-1
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1. Relationalism in Perspective 12
% Sankhya Dualism
1.2. Buddhist Processism
1.3. Vaisheshika Pluralism
14. Vedantic Monism
153 Rationale for Relationalism
2. Phenomenology of Relationality 39
21. Phenomenal Relationality
2.2. Epistemological Relationality
2.3. Ethical Relationality
3. Ontic Relationalism 54
3.1. Beingand Reality
3.2. Particular and Property
33. Relation
3.4. Being-principle
35. Structure of Ontic Relationalism
3.6. Aesthetic and Ethical Significance
Conclusion 79
References 81
Acknowledgements
T'acknowledge my appreciation to all who have helped me,

directly or indirectly, in my pursuit of philosophy. Thanks
in large measure to Sherly T.D., Becky A. McClain, Richard
J. Feil, Richard DelliFraine, and Shaji A. Kochupurayil for
their assistance with this book.
Introduction
The aim of this work is to flesh out the relationalist

theory of being, ontic relationalism, I outlined in my
last work, An Essay on Ontology (2008). The first part of
this study will present relationalism as a perspective
which takes us beyond the metaphysical divide of the
one (monism) and the many (pluralism). In the second
part, we will make a brief analysis of how our
experience of relationality (the relational nature of
reality) provides us some compelling reason to uphold
metaphysical relationalism. And, in the third part, the
question of being will be looked at from the perspective
of relationalism.
Though the concept of relation has received a good
deal of attention from past and present philosophers,
relationalism as a metaphysical theory has not yet been
adequately expounded. This does not mean that
relationalism is a novel position, unknown in the
history of philosophy. In philosophy, you cannot invent
an entirely new concept which had never occurred to
anyone in the past. The whole history of philosophy is a
kind of recycling of ideas.! What keeps philosophy
historically going is the shifting emphasis on ideas. In
other words, the notion of relationalism has been
suggested in one form or another in the writings of
many classical and contemporary philosophers, Eastern
and Western. But no sufficient emphasis on this idea
Relationalism: A Theory of Being
was ever given and a full-fledged theory of

relationalism is yet to emerge.
Relationalism, in a broader sense, signifies that
things and events in the universe and in society are
interrelated, or to put it simply, that things and events
exist in relations. This familiar, common-sense notion of
relationalism is evident to us in our ordinary, everyday
experience of things and in our scientific
comprehension of the world. As a philosophical theory
of reality, however, relationalism is much more than
this.
Before I say what relationalism is according to me, I
should say what it is not:
(a) Relationalism is not anti-substantivism. On an

anti-substantivist view, things are not objects
in their own right, but only events dependent
on other events for their existence. Even if we
grant the argument that relations are
ontologically more fundamental than entities
themselves, the question is, if there are no
entities with some enduring substantivity, how
do relations themselves exist? Relation is
“holding” between two or more things. If
entities disappear, relations also will
disappear.
(b) Relationalism is not processism either, though

Buddhism and process philosophy (classically
of Whitehead) can rightly be called relational
philosophy. Indeed, any philosophy that gives
importance to relation can be called relational
philosophy. Process philosophy is relational
8
Introduction
philosophy in this sense. But processism is a

kind of anti-substantivism, as it views existents
as occurrents and not continuants (things).
Occurrents, unlike continuants, fail to be real
relata.
(c Relationalism is not relationism. Relationism

holds that what ultimately exists are relations
and that reality is the totality of relations. For a
relationist, relata are aspects of relation, and
that which is acting on and that which is acted
upon are only aspects of action which is
relation (cf. Oliver 1981: 156, 170).
(d) Relationalism is not relativism either.

Relativism is the view that reality comes to us
unsorted and it is the cognitive subject that
arranges the furniture of the world (cf. Lynch
1997: 417). Epistemological and ethical
relativism, that truth and good are relative
(subjective and contextual), can be the flipside
of metaphysical relativism. On a relationalist
view, however, reality always comes to us
relationally arranged, and truth and good,
though relational in nature, are not relative.
What, then, is relationalism? For me, relationalism, as a

theory of reality in general and as a theory of being in
particular, maintains the following:
(a) Being (all that exists) is relational. Relationality

(relatedness) is the very characteristic of
reality, both existentially and structurally. The

real (that which exists) is relational.
(b) Reality is irreducibly pluralistic —and

inescapably unitary. Then relationalism is our
search for the ontological principles that
account for the unity and diversity of the
world. As the main task of relationalism is to
show rationally and systematically how the
world is a unity and a plurality at the same
time, relationalism turns out in the end to be a
theory of the one and the many.
(c Every entity is a unity. Nothing can exist

except as a relational unity of its constituents.
This means no entity can claim absolute
(unqualified) structural simplicity.
(d) The identity of an entity is defined by its

relations. These relations include the entity’s
intra-relations (relations among its constitutive
elements) and inter-relations (relations with
other entities).
What is the epistemic claim of relationalism as a theory?

A theory is a model or framework to explain and make
sense of the things we experience. A scientific theory is
a conceptual model of the world, a model that describes
the world of our empirical experience (cf. Hawking
1997: 10, 184). Likewise, a metaphysical theory is a
conceptual model of the world. The only difference
between a scientific theory and a metaphysical theory is
that the latter tries to describe the world in more
10
Introduction
ultimate terms by using more abstract concepts, the

concepts beyond which no rational abstraction can
possibly go.
As it is possible for us to look at the world and
interpret it differently, no theory is absolute and
immune to revision.2 Hence, in both science and
philosophy, the epistemic strength of a theory is to be
assessed by its explanatory potential, i.e. its ability to
give a cogent explanation of a wide spectrum of reality
we experience. The merit of relationalism, if there is
any, is its ability to give a unified perspective on reality
by accounting for the unity and the plurality we
experience in the world.
Notes
1 “Continually changing, like the phoenix that unceasingly

arises from its own ashes, philosophy feeds itself and is
forever being created anew” (UNESCO 2007: 240).
2 Philosophy, as an ongoing critical reflection on human
experience, cannot accord dogmatic status to any particular
theory or any school of thought. If pluralism ceases to exist in
philosophy, philosophy will cease to be philosophy (see
Kaipayil 1995: 95-96, 2002: 16-18). “The death of philosophy -
if such a death could be imagined - would only occur if it lost
its lively multiplicity. Its essence rests fundamentally on the
differences among people - on embracing this ‘otherness’, in
the spirit of a constant challenge to our opinions” (UNESCO
2007: 195).
11
1
Relationalism in Perspective
It is important to present a philosophical theory

through comparison and contrast with other examined
theories of the same genre.! So in this chapter, I will try
to situate relationalism in the context of a select few
theories of reality.
The four predominant philosophical views on being
or reality to date are monism, dualism, pluralism and
processism. Monism holds that being is ultimately one
and all entities could be reduced to that one being,
whatever that be. Dualism argues that being is not one
but two, and there exist two basic beings or categories
of beings, one transcendent (spiritual) and the other
empirical (material). Pluralism would say that reality is
irreducibly plural, for there exist many kinds of beings.
Finally, processism proposes that being is but a
becoming, a process of interrelated events.
There are many forms of monism, dualism,
pluralism and processism, both in Eastern and Western
philosophies. Since it is impossible to cover them all
here, T have selected four examples from classical
Indian philosophy: Sankhya to represent dualism,
12
Buddhism to represent processism, Vaisheshika to

represent pluralism and Vedanta to represent monism.2
1.1. Sankhya Dualism
Of all classical schools of Indian Philosophy, Sankhya

(also spelled Samkhya) is arguably the oldest. Kapila,
who flourished most likely in the sixth or fifth century
BCE, is credited with founding this school.? The most
authoritative text of the school, however, is the
Sankhyakarika (“Sankhya Verses”) of Ishvarakrishna (3t
or 4t century CE). As there is no extant authentic
Sankhya work prior to Sankhyakarika (hereafter SK),4 for
our exposition of classical Sankhya we rely solely on
Ishvarakrisna.>
According to Sankhya, as for most schools of
classical Indian philosophy, the highest good is
permanent cessation of human suffering by attaining
liberation from the cycle of rebirth.6 “Because of the
torment of ... suffering, (there arises) the desire to know
the means of removing it” (SK 1).7 For Sankhya, the
discriminative knowledge that the soul is different from
the body and is eternally liberated brings about this
liberation. This led Sankhya to postulate two eternal but
opposite categories of being, purusha (spirit) and prakriti
(matter).8
Prakriti, unlike purusha, is unconscious, but
generative. Prakriti in its primordial state (mulaprakriti)
is non-perceptible because of its subtlety, but is known
through its evolutes which make the physical world
(see SK 3, 8).9 All the evolutes of prakriti are its effects
13
and they pre-existed in the primordial prakriti and are

non-different from it (SK 9).10 Both prakriti and its
evolutes are characterized by three qualities (gunas): the
pure (sattva), the active (rajas) and the dark (tamas).
These qualities “successively dominate, support,
activate, and interact with one another” (SK 12).1t
Prakriti exists and evolves for the sake of purusha,
and purusha exists as the enjoyer of prakriti (SK 13, 17,
31, 37, 56-58, 60). The whole universe has been formed
from this association of purusha and prakriti. But
paradoxically, since purusha and prakriti are totally
different categories, purusha cannot really involve in
prakriti but can only be its spectator (SK 19).12 Purushas,
though of the same nature, are many, and this allows
the existence of a plurality of individual embodiments
at any given time.13
Birth and rebirth (transmigration) is caused by
purusha’s attachment (passion) for and subsequent
association with prakriti (cf. SK 45). To further explain
the mechanism of transmigration, Sankhya introduced
the concept of subtle body (linga, meaning “instrument”
or “cause”), constituted by intellect, ego, mind, ten
senses, and five subtle elements (SK 39, 40, 42). When
the physical body (the body born of father and mother)
perishes, it is this subtle body that carries the
dispositions or impressions (samskaras) and
accompanies a purusha into the next embodiment. As
long as purusha keeps its close connection with this
subtle body, it (seemingly) suffers pains associated with
rebirth. “The purusha ... attains there the suffering made
by decay and death; until deliverance of the subtle body
...” (SK 55).14
14
The release of purusha (from the cycle of rebirth) is

by means of knowledge (SK 44, 69). If a purusha gains
discriminative knowledge that no purusha is bound or
liberated or migrates, that it is prakriti in its
modifications that is really bound or is liberated or
migrates (SK 62, 64), then prakriti will cease to act for
that purusha (SK 65).15 “As a dancer ceases from the
dance after having been seen by the audience; so also
prakriti ceases after having manifested herself to the
purusha” (SK 59).16 Even after gaining the true
knowledge, purusha remains embodied because of the
force of past dispositions; but on disembodiment
(death), purusha achieves total “isolation” (kaivalya)
from prakriti (SK 67, 68).
1.2. Buddhist Processism
Siddhartha Gautama (died ¢. 380 BCE),"7 better known

as the Buddha, initiated a radically new philosophical
movement that rejected all beliefs about the
substantiality of God, the soul and the world. In the
place of traditional substance metaphysics he advocated
process metaphysics, which reduced all unities to their
constituents and both unities and constituents to
process.
The Buddha proposed processism as part of his
solution to the problem of human suffering. According
to him, human life is full of sufferings (sorrows), caused
by our many desires, and the way to get out of this
predicament is cessation of all desires, achieved
through the enlightenment that everything is transient
15
and there is nothing permanent for us to get attached

to, neither God nor the world, not even one’s own self.
Getting down to the specifics, the Buddhist
processism consists primarily of three doctrines: the
theory of impermanence (anichcha), the theory of no-self
(anatta) and the theory of dependent origination
(patichcha-samuppada).’8 We make a very brief
discussion of these doctrines as contained in the Sutta
Pitaka of the Pali canon.??
For Buddhism, there is no permanent being, from
which all things spring (Majjhima Nikaya 1). Indeed,
everything is impermanent (cf. Samyutta Nikaya 36.9);
and impermanence (anichcha) is the nature of reality.?
What exists is not being (substantial being) but just
becoming. All mental and physical phenomena are
mere aggregates of their parts; and these aggregates
themselves are not permanent but always changing (cf.
Samyutta Nikaya 22.48, 25.10).2! This would imply that
things are not substances and are without any enduring
self-identity.22 Since impermanence is the nature of
reality and things are “without self-nature” (nih-
svabhava), Buddhism rules out the existence of all
transcendent things, with their claims of endurance (cf.
Majjhima Nikaya 1).
Coming to the no-self theory, Buddhism holds that
due to impermanence of things no substantial self
(soul), can exist. The self is only an assumed agent of
our mental states (cf. Digha Nikaya 9, 15; cf. Majjhima
Nikaya 11; Samyutta Nikaya 22.1,42,59). If there is no
enduring self that survives death, what is it that
transmigrates and gets embodied in the next birth?
Buddhism would say that it is the aggregate of one’s
16
karmic dispositions that get embodied in the rebirth

(Majjhima Nikaya 9; Samyutta Nikaya 12.2). According to
Buddhism, when we act with desires we stock up
dispositions (inclinations) and these dispositions get
embodied as a new birth. To stop rebirth and achieve
total cessation of suffering, one needs to blow out all
desires, made possible by enlightenment achieved
through meditation (Anguttara Nikaya 10.58; Majjhima
Nikaya 1, 11, 72, 141; Samyutta Nikaya 12.65, 56.11;
Dhammapada 1.1-2).
The third doctrine, the theory of dependent
origination, states that the world is in a constant process
of integration and disintegration of its units and there is
no reality outside and beyond this process. This world
process sustains itself by the universal law of causation.
Things are causally connected, and a thing originates
dependent on is antecedent cause (Digha Nikaya 15; cf.
Majjhima Nikaya 28). For example, from birth as a
prerequisite condition comes aging and death.? The
world process goes on and on, based on this eternal law
of dependent origination (cf. Samyutta Nikaya 12.44).
Thus for Buddhism all that exists is process.
1.3. Vaisheshika Pluralism
Buddhism set in motion fresh debates among

philosophers of ancient India.2* Indeed, the challenge
posed by the Buddhist process metaphysics was an
important factor in the formation of all post-Buddhist
schools - Vaisheshika, Nyaya,® Mimamsa,% and
Vedanta. Regarding the origin of Vaisheshika (also
17
spelled Vaisesika), Radhakrishnan, for instance, says

that the philosophical impulse of this school “is derived
from its hostility to Buddhistic phenomenalism”
(Radhakrishnan 1951: 177).27
Vaisheshika expounded substance pluralism as
against the Buddhist processism.? The primary text of
this school is Vaisheshikasutra (“Vaisheshika
Aphorisms”) of Kanada, who flourished in the third or
second century BCE.? In our exposition of the
Vaisheshika pluralism, we limit ourselves to the
Vaisheshikasutra (hereafter VS).30
Kanada set out his metaphysical pluralism in six
fundamental categories of being. These ontological
categories (padarthas) are: substance (dravya), quality
(guna), activity (karma), the universal (samanya),
particularity (vishesha), and inherence (samavaya) (VS
1.1.4).3
Substance is the most fundamental category, as
substances are the only entities that can exist
independently. Kanada lists nine basic substances:
earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self and mind
(VS 1.1.5). These substances are eternal and are not
created or annihilated, either by cause or by effect (cf.
VS 1.1.12). It may be noted that earth, water, fire and air
are eternal, not in their gross state but only in their
elemental atoms (cf. VS 7.1.2). These atoms combine in
various ways to form material bodies (cf. VS 4.2.5;
5.213). Like many ancients, Kanada seems to have
believed that ether permeated all space and was the
medium of sound (VS 2.1.27; 7.1.22). Regarding time
and space, the former denotes the succession (before
and after) of things (VS 2.2.6,9) and the latter their
18
location (nearness and farness) (VS 2.210; 7.2.21).

Coming to the self (atma/atman) and the mind (manas),
Vaisheshika, like other classical schools, made a
distinction between the two. While the self (soul) is the
agent that knows the senses and their objects, mind is
the instrument by which this knowing takes place (VS
3.1.2,19-20; 3.2.1,4; 9.1.11).32
Substances are always characterized by quality and
activity, and the characteristics (nature and function) of
different substances depend on different qualities and
activities they possess (VS 2.1.1-31; 2.2.1-16). Though
quality and activity as categories are eternal, they do
not have independent existence.®® They exist as
properties of substances.3* Substances, qualities and
actions interact to cause many effects. Some of the
interacting causes are perceptible, but others are unseen
causes. For example, freezing and melting of water is
due to heat (fire), while circulation in trees is due to
unseen cause (VS 5.2.7-8).
The universal (samanya) and particularity (vishesha)
render identity to entities. Without these we wouldn’t
be able to organize the world and make any sense of
it.35 The universal (samanya) is the nature that is
common to members of the same class, say cow-ness to
cows. There is no cow without cow-ness inherent in it.
The highest universal is being or existence (satta), and it
is inherent in substances, qualities and activities and
make them exist (VS 1.24,7,9,17).3¢ Particularity
(vishesha) constitutes the ultimate difference a thing has
(VS 1.2.6), making it different from other members of
the same class.¥” Each cow is different and unique
because of the particularity it carries. It seems that for
19
Kanada the universal and particularity, though they are

real, do not exist independently of the objects where
they inhere in (cf. VS 8.1.5-6).38
The last category is inherence (samavaya). This
category makes causality possible, for it is the co-
inherence of cause and effect. “Samavaya is that by the
virtue of which cause and effect may be said to be in
one another” (VS 7.2.26). This doesn’t mean that the
effect is pre-existent in the cause. Unlike Sankhya,
Vaisheshika considers every effect to be something
new, different from its cause.®
Kanada's ontology was naturalistic (non-theistic), as
it explained the world without any reference to God.
But the later Vaisheshikas introduced God into the
Vaisheshika system. God makes his first arrival in
Prashastapada (5t century CE).# This theistic turn was
not so much for theoretical reason but for the practical
reason of being accommodative to rising Hindu
orthodoxy.#! The influence of contemporary Naiyayikas
also cannot be ruled out# The Vaisheshika God
however was not a creator God, but only an efficient
cause who would organize and guide the already
existing universe.
1.4. Vedantic Monism
The principal text of Vedanta®® is the Brahmasutra

(hereafter BS),% the authorship of which is traditionally
attributed to Badarayana (2nd or 1st century BCE).®
Counteracting the Sankhya dualism, the Buddhist
processism and the Vaisheshika pluralism, Badarayana
20
propounded an idealist substance monism based on the

Upanishads.# According to the Upanishads, being is
ultimately Brahman,” the Supreme Self, which
manifests itself in the world of becoming and is to be
known and experienced as one’s own innermost self
(atman).s8
For Badarayana, as for the authors of the
Upanishads, Brahman is the origin and the intelligent
guide of the world. “(Ultimate Reality is that) from
which origin, etc. (i.e. subsistence and destruction) of
this (would proceed)” (BS 1.1.2).# Brahman permeates
all things and exists as their inner self (BS 1.1.22-24,29-
30; 1.2.18; 2.3.13; 3.2.20,27) and intelligent support (BS
1.2.3; 1.3.10-11). Brahman is not only the origin but also
the end of the world. “The eater (is the Highest Self) on
account of taking in of (whatever is) movable and
immovable” (BS 1.2.9). The world comes out of and is
reabsorbed into Brahman (cf. BS 1.4.25; 2.3.14). So,
Brahman originates, sustains and consumes the world.
The world does not have any ontological existence
independent of and apart from Brahman. This is not
because Brahman is the creator of the world, but
creation itself is the causal Brahman becoming
(parinama), or transforming itself into, the world of
effects. The effect should pre-exist in the cause (BS 2.1.7-
9, 14-15, 19). And hence Brahman is not only the
efficient cause of the world, but its material cause as
well (BS 1.4.23; 2.2.37). “(Brahman is the material cause)
on account of action referring to itself. (This is possible)
owing to transformation” (BS 1.4.26). Probably as clay
transforms into things made of clay or gold becomes
gold ornaments or milk turns into curd, Brahman
21
modifies itself and assumes the form of the world (cf.

BS 2.1.9;2.1.24).50
By conceiving Brahman as the material cause of the
world, Badarayana left to the later Vedantins a big
problem of explaining how the immaterial Brahman
transforms itself into the material world, without losing
its own identity (BS 2.1.4, 8-10, 26-27). Following the
lead of Shankara (traditionally dated 788-820),
Advaitins would say that the world is only an
appearance (vivarta). On the contrary, Ramanuja
(traditionally dated 1017-1137) and Vishishtadvaitins
would argue that the world is coeternal with Brahman,
the relation between the two being one of the body and
the soul.?
Another philosophical problem Badarayana left
unsolved is the ontological identity of the individual
self (atman). There are passages which state that the
individual self is eternal and is never subject to birth or
death (e.g. BS 2.3.16-17; cf. 1.3.19). This leads Advaitins
to suppose absolute nonduality (advaita) between the
individual self and the Supreme Self, Brahman.5® But
there are also passages which draw a distinction
between atman and Brahman (e.g. BS 1.2.3, 8; 1.2.20;
13542; 1421-22; 2122; 23.4143,4650). The
distinction, however, is so thin that it is like the serpent
and its coils (BS 3.2.27) or light and its substratum (fire)
(BS 3.2.28); furthermore, in meditation, we experience
the Supreme Self as our own inner self (BS 3.2.5; 4.1.3,5).
In explaining the mechanism of reincarnation,
Badarayana adopted, probably from Sankhya, the
concept of the subtle body. The subtle body (sukshma-
sharira), which carries the karmic impressions,
22
accompanies the individual self to the next life. But,

for those who have attained true knowledge of
Brahman, all karmic merits and demerits stop to cling
to them (BS 4.1.13-14) and they become one
(inseparable) with Brahman (BS 3.2.26; 4.1.19; 4.4.4) and
are totally released from transmigration (BS 4.2.22).5
1.5. Rationale for Relationalism
For Sankhya, reality is ultimately two, as it consists of

two distinct and separate categories of being, namely
spirit and matter; for Buddhism, reality is a process, as
things are momentary aggregates, originated
interdependently and without any claim for ontological
substantiality; for Vaisheshika, reality is pluralistic, as it
consists of many categories of being and there exist
irreducibly distinct substances; and for Vedanta, reality
is fundamentally one, as the multiplicity of being is
manifestation of the one Absolute Being.
As legitimate philosophical positions, the above
discussed ontological views have their explanatory
merits and can answer many of our questions on
reality. So I am not proposing relationalism as a
competing, alternative theory. I would rather prefer
relationalism to be a perspective which is beyond
monism, dualism, pluralism and processism. Let us
examine these views first.
The difficulty any metaphysical dualism would face
is to adequately explain how two completely different
categories or substances can causally interact. In the
case of Sankhya, it is the dualism between spirit and
23
matter. There wouldn’t be any trouble if we let these

two, matter and spirit, operate in their own completely
separate worlds. But that isn’t the case. Sankhya
presupposes some kind of interaction between the two.
Prakriti exists and evolves for the sake of purusha, and
purusha, until it attains total liberation, is entangled
with prakriti. Moreover, prakriti and purusha jointly
produce all phenomena, the former serving as the
material cause and the latter as the efficient cause. Yet,
Sankhya wants to keep its absolute dualism of
categories.’* No genuine categorial interaction can be
accounted for unless we bring the categories into a
coherent system, making them interconnected
components of that system. Unlike dualism,
relationalism allows categories to bear on one another,
thanks to certain ontological essentials that they all
share.
Processism accords ontological primacy to process
over substance (particular). On the Buddhist view, no
entities can claim any kind of substantivity, as they are
only recurrent confluence of components, lacking a self-
nature. Both entities and their relations are
subordinated to a universal causal flux. To put it
differently, all plurality is negated or is reduced to a
unity, which is also denied a self-nature. So, from the
perspective of processism, the world is a single process
to which particulars are subjected as participants, but at
the end, particulars themselves lose their ontological
claims and dissolve in the process. Thus process
becomes the very essence of reality. The problem which
Buddhism and any other processism face is how they
can account for process itself. Process is action and
24
action cannot exist without an agent to act. Just as there

cannot be a dance without people dancing, there cannot
be process without objects acting. Unlike processism,
relationalism recognizes that events and relations
cannot occur without some continuants (entities with
some enduring existence and identity) as agents.
Pluralism is an attractive theory, since it realistically
represents the world of our everyday experience. We
experience that there exist not only many entities but
also many categories of entities. Vaisheshika does a
superb job of analyzing the world and categorizing its
furniture. These categories of being, according to
Vaisheshika, are eternal and they interact with one
another and make one world. But Vaisheshika and
similar forms of pluralism face the same problem which
dualism faces, namely how categorial interaction can be
possible. Of course, Vaisheshika speaks of samavaya
(inherence) as connective ontological glue. But samavaya
itself is presented as a separate category. If it is a
separate category, what connects this category to other
categories? Neither is the God of the later Vaisheshikas
a real answer, because their God is only an efficient
cause, lacking ontological sufficiency to bring about real
interaction between diverse entities. Unlike pluralism,
relationalism maintains that entities are ontologically
open to one another due to certain ontological features
they share. This ontological openness gives entities the
possibility to interact and contribute towards the unity
of the world.
Monism has always been an appealing theory,
especially with idealist thinkers who would make a
distinction between reality and appearance. For all
25
monists, the real is deeper than what senses can meet.

This search for the ultimately real reduces plurality to
some universal oneness. Substance monism, whose
fitting example Vedanta is, takes this ultimate reality to
be a substance. For Vedanta this one substance is
Brahman, the Supreme Self, which undergoes cosmic
modifications (transformations) without sacrificing its
identity as self. The difficulty of monism is to find an
adequate explanation for the reality of the world. Even
if we grant that the world of plurality we deal with
every day may only be relatively real when compared
with the truly real, the world and its plurality of entities
is still a fact and this fact needs to be explained, rather
than explained away. While pluralism finds it hard to
explain the world’s unity, monism finds it hard to
explain its plurality. Unlike monism, relationalism tries
to explain the unity of the world without sacrificing its
plurality, because the unity it speaks of is the
ontological unity of the pluralistic world.
I think it is possible to bring dualism under
pluralism and treat it also as a form of pluralism,
because dualism affirms the existence of more than one
category of entity. Similarly, processes could be brought
under monism and treated as a form of monism, say
process monism. The only difference between process
monism and substance monism is that the former posits
reality ultimately as a process, whereas the latter posits
it ultimately as a substance. Then there are only two
basic positions, monism and pluralism. Consequently,
relationalism, being an attempt to strike a delicate
balance between the unity and the plurality of the
world, can be seen as a perspective beyond monism and
26
pluralism, and the problem it addresses is the ancient

problem of the one and the many.
Notes
! In this regard, one may note that the paradigm suggested by

classical Indian philosophizing is to state others’ views first,
before defending your own position. The views expounded
by others would form the prior-view (purvapaksha) to your
own view, which is the posterior-view (uttarapaksha).
2 By selecting these schools, I don’t make any claim for their
exhaustiveness of the views they represent.
3 The term Sankhya (also spelled Samkhya), deriving from the
verbal root khya (to know) with the prefix sam (exact),
etymologically means “exact knowledge.” But it literally
means “number.” Some of the original ideas of Sankhya may
have been pre-Vedic, and some of these Sankhya conceptions
were absorbed into Vedic Hinduism at a very early period.
Kapila, the systematic founder of Sankhya, must have
organized these pre-Vedic and Vedic ideas into a system of
thought. Contemporaneous with the pre-Vedic and Vedic
proto-Sankhya, there might have existed an earlier form of
Jainism, which Vardhamana Mahavira (6" or 5% century
BCE) is thought to have organized into a religion. Similarly,
Yoga also may have a pre-history when it existed as an
atheistic discipline, until it was reformulated as a theistic
school by Patanjali (2 or 1¢t century BCE) in his Yogasutra
(“Yoga Aphorisms”). Metaphysical dualism of spirit and
matter, belief in reincarnation, and salvation as emancipation
27
of spirit from matter were features common to these proto

Sankhya, Yoga and Jainism. For a discussion of the pre-Vedic
origins of Sankhya, Yoga and Jainism, see Joshi 1977: 32-36,
98-102, 118-21,102, 134-35.
* The existing Sankhyasutra (“Sankhya Aphorisms”),
attributed to Kapila, is a spurious work of much later period,
probably as late as fifteenth century. It makes its first
appearance in Aniruddha’s Sankhyasutravritti of the fifteenth
century (see Dasgupta 1975: 222). It may also be noted that
even for Madhava, the fourteenth century author of
Sarvadarshanasangraha (“A Summary of All Philosophies”),
the principal Sankhya authority was Sankhyakarika.
5 Though Ishvarakrishna claims that his work is a faithful
summary of the doctrine handed down to him from Kapila
through a succession of disciples (Sankhyakarika 69-71), there
is no doubt that he elaborated and expanded it. While the key
concepts of purusha and prakriti might go back to Kapila, the
philosophy received its classical shape in Ishvarakrisna’s
Sankhyakarika after evolving over a period of many centuries
and drawing on different traditions. So what we are going to
talk about as Kapila's Sankhya is the Sankhya philosophy as
expounded and systematized by Ishvarakrishna. Two
important commentaries on the Sankyakarika are Gaudapada’s
Sankhyakarikabhashya (6% century) and Vachaspatimishra’s
Tattoakaumudi (9™ century).
¢ Regarding the origin of the idea of reincarnation, we can
only speculate. The pre-Vedic proto Sankhya and Jainism
might have proposed it as an aetiological explanation of
human suffering, attributing the cause of suffering in the
present life to wrong doing in previous life. The origin of the
28
concept cannot be credited to Vedic Hinduism, because the

Vedic hymns just don’t mention it. The Rigvedic man prayed
and offered sacrifices for long life and earthly prosperity and
for immortality in that realm where all longing wishes are
fulfilled (Rig Veda 9.113.11; 10.14.2; 10.15.7). But in the
Upanishads, we find doctrine of rebirth well established (e.g.,
Brihadaranyaka 6.2; Chandogya 53-10). So, Hinduism must
have accepted the concept of reincarnation from pre-Vedic
proto Sankhya and Jainism during this interim period.
According to both Sankhya and Jainism, ignorance of one’s
true self launches one into the cycle of birth and death, and
the way to liberation is through discriminative knowledge.
The Upanishads too accepted this Sankhya and Jain premise.
The influence cannot have been in the opposite direction (i.e.,
Hinduism influencing Jainism and other Indian schools), for
Buddhism, which set out to establish a school of thought
side-stepping the Vedic authority altogether, also accepted
the doctrine as part of its theory of dependent origination.
7 Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from
Ishvarakrishna 1969.
8 Purusha and prakriti literally mean “person” and “nature”
respectively. The Sankhya belief in the eternity of purusha is a
pre-condition for its belief in reincarnation. Unless the souls
pre-existed, they cannot become embodied; and if the soul
can become embodied in this life, its embodiment in the past
and in the future is a logical possibility. But we don’t know
what made Sankhya postulate the existence of the soul in the
first place. As in many philosophies and religions, Sankhya
also might have postulated the spiritual self to account for
our mental states. Moreover, the desire for immortality is
29
deep in the human psyche, as belief in afterlife helps people

conquer the ultimate fear of death. So no culture is sparse in
speculations on the kind of metaphysical mechanism that
guarantees our continued existence.
9 Sankhya enumerates twenty-three evolutes (modifications)
of prakriti (SK 22, 24-26). The following are these evolutes:
cosmic intellect (mahat), cosmic ego (ahamkara), individual
mind (manas), five individual sense-organs (sight, hearing,
touch, smell and taste), five individual motor organs (organs
of speech, hand, leg, and digestive and reproductive organs),
five subtle elements (sound, touch, colour, taste and smell),
and five gross elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth).
10 The most important arguments for satkaryavada (the theory
of pre-existence of the effect in the cause) are the non-
productivity of non-being and the fact that something can
produce only what it is capable of producing (SK 9).
1 The concept of gunas was introduced perhaps to explain
how prakriti can produce diverse modifications. “(In the)
upper (world) (there is) a predominance of sattva. (In the)
lower creation (there is) a predominance of tamas. In the
middle, (there is) a predominance of rajas. (This is so) from
Brahma down to a blade of grass” (SK 54). It may be
interesting to note that for Sankhya gods also belong to the
created order.
12 However, this association or proximity is so close that the
unconscious prakriti “appears as if characterized by
consciousness” and the inactive purusha “appears as if
characterized by activity” (SK 20).
13 Sankhya establishes the plurality of purushas because of the
diversity of birth, death and actions (SK 18). Because there is
30
infinite number of purushas, there is infinite possibility of

modifications for prakriti.
14 An alternative translation of this verse (SK 55) reads:
“There (in the world of men) the sentient (or intelligent) soul
experiences pain arising from old age and death until the
linga has ceased to be ...” (Ishvarakrishna 1957).
15 At least by the time of Vachaspatimishra (9 century),
Sankhya came to accept the Yoga system of Patanjali as the
practical means to achieve this discriminative knowledge.
16 Prakriti says to herself “’I have been seen’ and never again
comes into the sight of purusha” (SK 61). In other words, the
attitude of the liberated purusha will be “’T have seen (her)’
and of prakriti, ‘T have been seen’” (SK 66).
17 Scholars had placed the Buddha’s death c. 480 BCE. But
today many scholars bring this date forward by
approximately a century, to a date c. 380 BCE (see Bechert
1991-1997).
8 In Sanskrit anitya, anatma and pratitya-samutpada
respectively.
19 The Pali canon consists of three collections of Pali texts:
Vinaya Pitaka (monastic rules), Sutta Pitaka (discourses
attributed to the Buddha and his early disciples), and
Abhidhamma Pitaka (doctrinal expositions). Although tradition
holds that the Council called by emperor Ashoka fixed this
canon, it did not receive its final form not until the first
century BCE.
2 In Jater Buddhism, the concept of impermanence led to the
development of the theory of momentariness (kshanika-vada),
which states that everything is in a flux and things exist
moment by moment.
31
2 The human being, for example, is an aggregate of five

groups of aggregates: body, sensations, perceptions,
dispositions and consciousness (Samyutta Nikaya 22.48, 25.10).
2 Later, the Madhyamika school, following the lead of
Nagarjuna (c. 150-200 CE), would hold that all phenomena
are “empty” (shunya), as they are devoid of any “self-nature”
(svabhava). A thing is without a substantial nature, for its
existence is dependent on other things which originate it.
» The classic example of dependent origination is the
Buddhist explanation of the human becoming (e.g. Samyutta
Nikaya 12.2; Majjhima Nikaya 9): From ignorance originate
actions with desires and consequent karmic dispositions;
from these karmic depositions originate the consciousness of
the potential individual; from this consciousness originates
the actual individual; from the actual individual originate six
senses (five senses and mind); from these senses originates
sense-object contact; from this sense-object contact originate
sensations; from sensations originate desires; from desires
originates clinging to life; from clinging to life originates
becoming (tendency to be born); from becoming originates
birth; and from birth originate old age and death (suffering).
Ashoka’s (reign c. 265-238 BCE; also given as c. 273-232
BCE) patronage of Buddhism made the new movement more
popular, and this gave philosophers added necessity to
engage it.
* Nyaya (“Logical Reasoning”) is Vaisheshika's sister school.
Gautama of the first or second century BCE is thought to
have founded Nyaya. His Nyayasutra (“Nyaya Aphorisms”)
treats perception, inference, comparison and testimony as
valid means to arrive at true knowledge. As early as
32
Prashastapada, ~ the fifth century author of

Padarthadharmasamgraha (hereafter PDS), and Uddyotakara,
the sixth-century author of Nyayavartika, the philosophers of
Vaisheshika and Nyaya schools used each other’s doctrines.
And, by the time of Udayana (10" century), who wrote
Kiranavali, a commentary on PDS, and Shridhara (10%
century), who wrote Nyayakandali, yet another commentary
on PDS, Vaisheshika and Nyaya had almost merged to form
one school, Nyaya-Vaisheshika.
2 Mimamsa (“Inquiry”) was a system of hermeneutics,
developed for proper interpretation of the Vedic texts and
rituals. The most authoritative text of this school is Jaimini's
Mimamsasutra (composed between 300 and 100 BCE).
2 “While the Vaisesika accepts the Buddhist view of the
sources of knowledge, perception and inference, it argues
that souls and substances are solid facts ...” (Radhakrishnan
1951:177).
2 But this in no way denies the possible pre-Buddhist
existence of some earlier strand of substance pluralism,
which Vaisheshika probably incorporated. Dasgupta (1975:
280-81), for example, supposes that the Vaisheshikasutra
represents elements of an older school of Mimansa. But
scholars like him (1975: 281) and Thakur (2003: 9) believe that
Vaisheshika knew little of Buddhism, as there is no reference
to Buddhist doctrines in the Vaisheshikasutra. Though
Buddhism is not mentioned by name, the fact of the Sutra
making a detailed analysis of how we know the existence of
the self is a clear indication that it wanted to establish the
substantiality of the self against some prevalent non-
substantialist view (VS 3.2.6,10-20). For Kanada, the existence
of the self can be inferred primarily through our self-

awareness, the awareness that I am so-and-so and that I am
the agent of knowing, different from the senses and their
objects (VS3.1.2;3.2.10,14-18).
# Kautilya’s Arthashastra (3 century BCE) listed only
Sankhya, Yoga and Lokayata (Charvaka) among philosophies
(anvikshiki). This may be an indication that Vaisheshika, like
Vedanta and Nyaya, must not have existed as established
philosophical schools before the third century BCE. The
earliest external reference to Vaisheshika may be found in the
Buddhist Abhidharma literature of the first or second century
CE, while the medical text, Charaka Samhita, again of the first
or second century CE, seems to presuppose some
Vaisheshika concepts (see King 1999: 58; Dasgupta 1975: 280-
81).
3 Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from Kanada
2003.
3 Although Kanada discussed how we perceive the non-
existence (asat) of things (VS 9.1.1-10), neither he nor
Prashastapada considered it an ontological category. But in
the course of time, Vaisheshikas like Udayana and Shridhara
(10* century) added “absence” (abhava) to the list, making the
total number of basic categories to be seven. Absence was
added perhaps to make sense of negative statements (cf.
Phillips 1995:50).
* Unlike Sankhya and Vedanta, Vaisheshika seems to hold
that the self is unconscious in itself and it becomes conscious
by its conjunction with the senses and the mind.
% Colour, taste, smell, touch, number, size, distinctness,
conjunction, disjunction, nearness, remoteness, cognition,
34
pleasure, pain, desire, hate, volition, efc. are the qualities (VS
1.16). The later Vaisheshikas interpreted efc. as meaning
sound, weight, fluidity, viscidity, speed, merit and demerit,
and thus made the total number of qualities to be twenty-
four. Activities are five: upward movement, downward
movement, contraction, expansion and locomotion (VS 1.1.7).
% “(Having) actions, gunas and (being) coinherent cause are
the characteristics of dravya” (VS 1.1.15). Qualities reside
(inhere) in substances (VS 1.1.15-17; 2.2.23). We know
substances through their properties (VS 8.1.4).
% “(Cognition of) dravya, guna, and karma presupposes the
samanya and the visesa” (VS 8.1.6).
% “By which dravya, guna and karma appear to be existent,
that is satta” (VS1.2.7).
Bverylhing, except being (sutta), has its vishesha (VS 1.2.17).
38 Samanya and vishesha are not directly perceived, but are
inferred by the intellect (VS 1.2.3).
3 “In the absence of the interaction of kriya and gunas, before
coming into being (an effect is said to be) non-existent” (VS
9.1.1).
4 Prashastapada’s Padarthadharmasamgraha (“Summary of
Inquiry on Categories”).
411t may be noted that the Yuktidipika, a Sankhya work of the
sixth or early seventh century CE by an unknown author,
says that Vaisheshika accepted God from the Pashupatas
(Pashupata Shaivites).
# God was introduced into Gautama'’s non-theistic Nyaya by
the later Nayayikas, starting with Vatsyayana (4% or 5t
century CE), the author of Nyayabhashya. ~Gautama’s
Nyayasutra (hereafter NS) makes a reference to God in sutra
35
4.1.19. But this was in the context of refuting an argument

that God is the guarantor of the efficacy of human actions
(NS 4.1.19-21).
4 Vedanta means “end of the Veda.” The school is known so,
because its basic doctrines are derived from the Upanishads,
which make the end part of the Vedic scriptures.
44 Brahmasutra (“Aphorisms on Brahman”) is also known as
Vedantasutra. All quotations are from Radhakrishnan 1960.
45 In several of his sutras the author of the Brahmasutra relies
on the authority of Badarayana (e.g, BS 1.3.26,33; 3.2.41;
3.4.1819), and this makes the authorship hard to settle.
Nakamura (1983: 406), for example, opines: “In the Brahma-
sutra, since there is frequent mention of the theories of
Badarayana as authority for his own theories, the Sutra-
author must have lived after Badarayana.”
4 Badarayana resurrected the meditative tradition of the
Upanishads arguably as a response to Buddhism in kind. For
Vedanta, as for Buddhism, liberation is through meditative
knowledge rather than religious rituals (see BS 3.3.25,42;
3.4.1,12,25-27,52; 44.12).
4 Notwithstanding its ritualistic polytheism, the Rig Veda
(1200-800/700 BCE), in some of its later hymns (e.g. RV
1.164.46; 10.82, 121, 129), contained the idea of the “One”
(Ekam) as the “maker of the universe” (vishvakarman) and the
“lord of creatures” (prajapati). By the time the Upanishads
came to be written (600-300 BCE), the “One” came to be
called Brahman, meaning “Great” or “Absolute.”
4 According to the Upanishads, Brahman is the real of the
real, out of which all things came out, like the thread coming
out of the spider (Brihadaranyaka 2.1.20), and is the intelligent
36
guide of the world (Aitareya 3.5.3; Shvetashatara 6.1.2). The

Upanishads also conceived of Brahman as the inner principle,
ie. the atman (soul or self), of the world. The eloquent
imagery is that Brahman created the universe and then
entered into it as its soul, thus becoming both the formed and
the formless at the same time (Tuittiriya 2.6). As self (atman),
Brahman is present in the whole world, very much as salt is
present everywhere in the saline water yet unperceived
(Chandogya 6.13.1-2). And, those who know Brahman as their
true self have Brahman as their only desire and obtain the
blissful union with Brahman (Brihadaranyaka 14.10; 4.4.6;
Taittiriya 2.1; 2.5; 3.6; Chandogya 3.14.4; 6.13.3; Mandukya 2;7).
Instead of the impersonal term Brahman, some of the later
Upanishads prefer the more “personal” term Ishvara (the
Lord or God). The only Lord rules over the malerial world
and the individual selves (Shvetashatara 1.3; 1.10); He leads
the individual selves finally to their liberation from rebirth
(Katha 2.20; Mundaka 3.2.1).
49 See also BS 1.2.22;1.3.1;1.4.2-3, 14, 27; 3.3.16.
50 Badarayana attributes no motive to Brahman in creating the
world, except that it is as natural for Brahman to create, as it is
natural for us to engage in sports. “But, as in ordinary life,
creation is mere sport (to Brahman)” (BS 2.1.33).
51 Although Shankara himself did not use the term vivarta, the
idea was implied in his concept of superimposition (adhyasa)
(Brahmasutrabhashya 1.1.1; 3.3.9). According to Shankara, the
world is only relatively real (i.e. ultimately unreal), produced
by Brahman’s power of illusion (maya).
52 For Ramanuja, individual selves and material world
together form the body (sharira) of Brahman, either as subtle
37
body in the unmanifest stage or as gross body in the manifest

stage (Shribhasya1.1.1,1.4.27,2.3.18).
% According to Advaitins, what is subject to ignorance and
rebirth is not our transcendent self (atman) but our empirical
self (jiva) which is part of the “illusory” world.
5t “(The soul) goes (out of the body) enveloped (by subtle
material elements) with a view to obtaining a different
(body)” (BS 3.1.1). On subtle body, see also BS 3.1.27; 4.2.8-11.
% The released souls possess all qualities of Brahman, except
the power of creation (BS 4.4.17).
% The theories of occasionalism (Malebranche) and pre-
established harmony (Leibniz), though inadequate, offer
some kind of solution. To make the mental states and events
occur in exact parallel with the physical states and events, the
exponents of these theories can bring in God as causal agent.
But Sankhya cannot afford this, for there is absolutely no
place for God in its scheme of things.
38
2
Phenomenology of Relationality
As T argued in my earlier works (Kaipayil 2002, 2003,

2008), a metaphysical or ontological theory can have
epistemological justification only if it is a “critical”
theory, that is to say, it should be based on empirical
experience. Ontology and metaphysics cannot be some
fancy a priori speculation. For this reason, it is necessary
to establish the epistemic justification (reasonableness)
of relationalism, before I can move on to any further
discussion of a relationalist account of being. Hence a
brief phenomenology of relationality follows.1
The different forms of relationality (relatedness of
reality) we experience can broadly be divided into:
phenomenal relationality, epistemological relationality
and ethical relationality. By phenomenal relationality, I
mean the relationality we find in the physical world, the
relationality of physical entities; by epistemological
relationality, I mean the relationality we experience in
our knowing process; and by ethical relationality, I
mean the relationality of our social existence. Each of
these three forms of relationality will display that
reality is a plurality and a unity at the same time; or
rather, reality is a unity of plurality.
39
2.1. Phenomenal Relationality
Science is the best available description of the physical

world, and metaphysics should be practised in
continuity with physics (science). That said, it does not
mean that the content and cognitive terminus of
metaphysics are settled by science, as some
philosophers want us to believe (e.g., Ladyman 2007:
309-310).2 Metaphysics puts to philosophical reflection
the information it gathers from science, just as it does
with any other empirical experience.
Given the enormity and complexity of science, it is
just impossible to engage all of it here. So I select
relativity and quantum mechanics, the two theories of
modern physics which touched the very basis of
physical reality and altered much of how we perceive
the world today.
The theory of relativity states that the laws of physics
are the same for all observers in uniform motion.? In
other words, reality appears basically the same if you
use the same standard of measurement. The
philosophical implication is that there must be some
inherent unity of reality which makes the working of
the world appear the same, or at least similar, to all
perceivers who use the same tool of measurement.
Other relativistic notions, such as mass-energy
convertibility, unification of space and time as
spacetime continuum, and interpretation of gravitation
in terms of spacetime curvature around massive bodies,
do further demonstrate the unity of physical reality.
According to the theory of relativity, therefore, the
concepts of bodily objects, space and time are connected
40
together and contribute towards a single concept of the

physical world as a spacetime continuum. This gives
the prospect of a unified theory, the theory of
everything that would account for all known features of
the physical world. Finding such a theory of everything
is the dream of every physicist! Hawking, for example,
hopes that since everything in the universe depends on
everything else in a fundamental way and the universe
is not arbitrary but is governed by definite laws, there
can be a complete unified theory (1997: 12-13).
While the theory of relativity did demonstrate the
inescapable unity of reality, quantum theory has
demonstrated the irreducible plurality of reality. The
world is not a single chunk, one extended substance.
This means, the basic material of the universe is not
some uniform, undifferentiated, infinitely divisible
stuff. On the contrary, the world is a plurality and the
material of the world comes in individual particles.
These fundamental particles provide the basic units that
make up all matter and energy in the universe.
Scientists have discovered many such fundamental
particles, the best known being quarks, leptons and
bosons. Quarks make up protons and neutrons, which
in turn make up the nucleus of an atom. Leptons
include electrons, the negatively charged particles that
surround the nucleus of an atom.5 Bosons carry the four
basic forces in the universe.¢
According to the standard model of particle physics,
atoms are made up of electrons, protons and neutrons,
and protons and neutrons are composed of smaller
particles known as quarks, which in turn are bound by
gluons. But the odd thing is that the mass of gluons is
41
zero and the mass of quarks is only about five per cent,
leaving the vast remainder of an atom’s mass to be
explained. In 2008, a team of researchers led by Laurent
Lellouch of France’s Centre for Theoretical Physics has
shown that the missing mass reside in the energy
associated with the subatomic particles’ motions and
interactions.” This in turn illustrates that everything in
nature interacts someway with everything else and the
physical world cannot exist except as a unity of
interacting individuals.
The unity and plurality of physical reality is also
indicated by the so-called string theory, which aims to
unify relativity and quantum mechanics.8 String
theories speculate that absolutely everything in the
universe, i.e. all of the particles that make up matter
and forces, is comprised of tiny vibrating strings. All
strings are thought to be identical and one-dimensional.
But they vibrate in different patterns. This vibrational
pattern determines what kind of particle the string is.
One pattern makes it a quark, for example, while
another makes it a photon.®
Unity and plurality are the features of the physical
world. This is the picture of the world, which relativity
and quantum theories together present. What we can
derive from this fact about the world is that physical
reality is relational in virtue of its unity and plurality. If
the world were one single substance, the world
wouldn’t be relational, for relation can exist only if
there are two things to relate. If there didn’t exist some
innate unity of nature, the world wouldn’t be relational
either, for isolated things cannot relate. Two things can
relate only when there is something common between
42
them. Because things in the world have many common

features, like mass, energy, charge, spatiotemporality,
etc., they can relate and make one world.
2.2. Epistemological Relationality
Knowledge is relational, because knowledge is the

result of interaction between the knower and the
known. This makes knowledge relational both in its
origin and in its three existential aspects, namely belief,
consciousness and truth.
How is knowledge relational in its origin? All
human knowledge has its origin in sense experience.
The sensory stimuli are carried to the brain where that
information is interpreted to make sense of it. In other
words, the brain organizes the sensory information into
concepts, and through these concepts we make sense of
the objects of our sense perception. We articulate these
concepts in words and make meaningful statements
about the external world.1® This shows that knowledge
is possible due to our sensory interaction with the
world. Even as knowledge is not limited to empirical
knowledge, no knowledge is possible without its basis
in empirical experience. Hence knowledge by nature is
a posteriori and not a priori. This applies even to
apparently a priori sciences, mathematics and logic. We
know the world not because mathematics and logic are
out there a priori, ready for us to apply them to
understand the world. Rather, it is because the world is
out there and we have the practical need to understand
and handle it. So we devised mathematical and logical
43
tools.11 Once these tools are in place, we can apply them

a priori to understand the complex structures of the
world.
Knowledge is relational in its belief aspect, for a
belief is always a belief about some thing. My
knowledge of an object comes to me in terms of my
beliefs about it. An object may have more to it than our
beliefs make of it. But the predicament is such that we
cannot know an object, except as what we make of it
through our beliefs.
In order for a belief to be knowledge, it should be a
justified belief. That is to say, belief should be justified
by the object. Otherwise the belief is false knowledge.
My knowledge that the tiger is India’s national animal
is my belief about the tiger, for example. This belief that
the tiger is the national animal of India should be
founded on the tiger’s states of affairs that it is India’s
national animal. Suppose someone says, “The tiger is
not India’s national animal.” That statement is also a
belief about the tiger. But that belief fails to be
knowledge for not being justified by the fact about the
tiger that it is India’s national animal. So beliefs should
represent, if not correspond to, the features (facts) of the
object. In other words, belief should be relational not
only to the object in general but its particular features as
well.
Knowledge is relational also in its consciousness
(awareness) aspect, because, consciousness, as in the
case of belief, is always consciousness of some thing.
Consciousness has two levels: consciousness of objects
(object-consciousness)!2 and consciousness of oneself or
self-consciousness. When I know a thing, I become
44
conscious of that thing. This is not belief. Beliefs are

thoughts about the object I am conscious of. I become
conscious of an object the moment it becomes the object
of my knowledge. I cannot formulate beliefs about a
thing unless I am aware of it as the object of my
knowledge. Regarding self-consciousness, it is only
through my consciousness of objects that I become self-
conscious. When I am conscious of the object, I become
self-conscious that I am the knower, that I exist and I
know.13
Finally, knowledge is relational in its truth
dimension. Truth belongs to belief, for truth is our
acceptance of a belief to be the case about the object.
Since beliefs are often articulated in statements or
propositions, we may say truth is a property of the
proposition. And since beliefs and propositions are
about some thing, truth relates to reality, without being
identified with it.
It is possible to have multiple beliefs about one and
the same object; each of these beliefs can be true,
provided its claim has justification in the facts about the
object. But the problem is how we can know the facts
about an object in order to determine whether a belief
relates to a fact it refers to. First of all, we should admit
that reality is complex and that there is more to it than
our descriptions of it. Secondly, we need to accept that
each of our descriptions or beliefs is indeed an
interpretation of the object under consideration and
hence a limited representation of that object.* Thirdly,
it is important to recognize poly-alethism that the truth
about an object can be manifold.
45
Poly-alethism, or manifoldness of truth, does not

entail alethic relativism. It only means that truth is
perspectival, as we can have many perspectives on a
thing. The validity or truth claim of a perspective
depends on how faithfully it describes the essential
properties of the object.1s Unlike poly-alethism, mono-
alethism absolutises one perspective as the only
perspective and that one perspective as the only truth.
Make no mistake, poly-alethism leads to tolerance and
respect for differences, while mono-alethism leads to
intolerance and negation of differences.
What we said above about the origin and nature of
knowledge leads us to believe that knowledge involves
three terms: the knower and the known and knowledge.
Knowledge is possible only if there exist the knower
and the known, and knowledge results from their
interaction.
2.3. Ethical Relationality

The two classic views as to the origin of ethics are: the
Humean sentimentalism and the Kantian rationalism.
The Humean view is that empathy, i.e. our ability to
sympathize with others, is the source of morality. The
Kantian view, on the contrary, sees the origin of ethics
in our rational ability to know right and wrong. It is
hard to choose one over the other, for reason and
emotion are not mutually exclusive when it comes to
moral choices.
But the limitation I find with both views is that they
make the basis of ethics subjective, either your feeling
46
or your judgment. Ethics is much more than feelings;

ethics is much more than just rights and wrongs. Ethics
is fundamentally your respect and care for the other. To
put it differently, the reason for ethics is the other
person in virtue of his or her being a human being.
Ethics kicks in when I encounter the other. The reason
why I should respect and care about others is that they
are just human beings, that they are beings like me,
with thoughts, feelings and decisions. So ethics is
through and through relational. It is all about human
beings relating to each other, respectfully and caringly.
Yes, if we are innately ethical by virtue of empathy
(Hume) or/and moral intelligence (Kant), that makes it
easy for us to be ethically relational.
As T mentioned above, ethics kicks in when two
human beings meet, necessitating both to treat each
other with respect and care. To treat someone with
respect and care means two things. Negatively, it means
not to hurt the other; positively, it means to promote the
other’s flourishing (well-being). It is because of this
ethical trust, the trust that human beings will treat one
another ethically, that humans can enter into social
relations and fashion social institutions. This takes us to
the next point, namely societal relationality.
As with ethics, the human being is the reason for
society to exist. As no human being is self-sufficient,
humans need other humans to flourish. So individuals
come together with a “collective intentionality” (Searle
1995: 25) to create a social structure for mutual
protection. It is assumed that people cooperate in this
process with freedom and equality (cf. Rawls 1993: 19).
When people come together as free and equal members
47
in a dialogical process, it will lead to the creation of a

democratic society where individuals can continue to be
free and equal. Only in a genuine democracy can
individuals flourish, as democracy is committed to
freedom and equality (cf. Kaipayil 2003:53-54).
A true democracy is a liberal democracy where the
ontological primacy of the individual is affirmed.1®
Liberal democracy is one that respects and protects the
individual’s civil liberties, personal freedoms and
human rights in its social and political deliberations;
liberal democracy is one that allows pluralism of
thought and choice.”” Only a liberal democracy can
tolerate pluralism. Without this liberal feature,
democracy will deteriorate into either totalitarianism or
majoritarianism. In totalitarianism, the regime
determines what people should do; and in
majoritarianism, the majority determines what the
minorities should do. The individual freedoms and
rights are at stake in either scenario.
A liberal democracy cannot but be a secular
democracy. In a secular democracy, state sponsors no
religion, even as it protects the religious freedom of its
people. Religious people have the right that their voice
be heard in political discourse, but religious beliefs
cannot dictate political decisions. State, as an institution
that caters to the protection of all and each of its
citizenry, has the obligation to see that no religion
negate the individual’s basic liberties and rights.
Finally, a genuine democracy is a welfare
democracy. A welfare democracy is one which sees its
ultimate objective as the welfare (well-being) of all
people. Policies and programmes should be such that
48
they provide peace and prosperity to all, not

collectively, but individually. This doesn’t mean that it
is the duty of the government to run businesses to
deliver goods and services to people. The primary
function of the government is regulatory. Its job is to see
that mechanisms are in place that the country develops
and that the fruits of such development reach people.
Democracies cannot remain in isolation, because
their commitment is to the welfare of the individual.
Despite their cultural differences, human beings are
ontologically the same everywhere, and their worth and
dignity transcends cultures and regions. People are
becoming increasingly aware of their common
humanity and are considering themselves citizens of
the global human community. Additionally, the world
has become indispensably inter-dependent. Peace,
prosperity, and human development and security have
become impossible without international co-operation.
Just as individuals make a state, states make the
world community. But unlike individuals, individual
states don’t have ontological priority. Even in the world
community, it is the individual that calls the ontological
shots. Hence, the ultimate aim of the world community
should be to ensure the individual’s well-being. This is
simply the reason why the international community
cannot afford to leave the issues of basic freedoms and
human rights to individual countries to decide; the
well-being of the individual is the reason why countries
should cooperate to combat disease, poverty, terrorism
and violence; the human being is the reason why
countries must come together to protect the earth and to
explore space for the benefit of all.
49
What are we to make of all what we said thus far

about ethics and society? It discloses the relational
make-up of both ethics and society. Ethics and society is
the product of individuals in interaction. If individuals
fail to acknowledge their ethical and societal
relationality, the result will be unfettered libertarianism
which disregards the common good in the name of the
individual good; if the community fails to acknowledge
the ontological primacy of the individual, the result will
be unfettered communitarianism which de-faces
individuals by denying their identities and conferring
on them a collective identity. Both situations are
unacceptable. Maybe, what we need is the relationalist
interpretation of the individual and the community,
rather than interpreting the individual in terms of the
community or the community in terms of the
individual.
Notes
1 The term “phenomenology” is used here to mean a

descriptive account of how things (phenomena) are, as they
are given to our experience.
2“We need a metaphysics that goes beyond reporting science
in order to address the unsettled questions and evaluate the
presuppositions” (Sider 2008:5).
3 Since everything in the universe is moving, we cannot take
any object as absolute frame of reference to base all other
motion. All motion is relative to your frame of reference. But
the laws of physics should hold true for all frames of
reference. This dictated that the measured speed of light must
be the same in all inertial frames of reference. Consequently,
50
the speed of light has been considered the fundamental

constant of nature.
4 These particles are called elementary or fundamental
particles, as they cannot be broken down any further (at least
in ordinary circumstances). Each lepton and quark has an
antiparticle partner, with the same mass but opposite charge.
When a particle and its antiparticle meet, they annihilate each
other, creating a tiny burst of energy.
> A team of physicists from the Universities of Cambridge
and Birmingham recently discovered that electrons can,
indeed, divide into two new particles called spinons and
holons when crowded into in a narrow wire (Science 31 July
2009; ScienceDaily July 31, 2009).
¢ Electromagnetism, strong force and weak force are carried
by photons, gluons and weak gauge bosons (W and Z
bosons) respectively. In quantum field model, gravitation is
mediated by gravitons, instead of being described in terms of
curved spacetime as in general relativity. But gravitons are
yet to be observed in an experiment.
7 See “Einstein’s mass-energy relation,” in Encyclopaedia
Britannica Online, 2009, available:
http:/ /www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/ 181422/ Einst
eins-mass-energy-relation
8 No part of string theory has ever been experimentally
confirmed, though.
9 In order for the string theory to explain the kinds of
particles observed in nature, the strings need to vibrate in
more than four dimensions. One of the hurdles string
theories face is how they can reconcile these extra dimensions
with the four known dimensions of the physical world.
10 Concepts or thoughts are chronologically anterior to words
and language. It has been observed that “when a child wants
to express an idea, he or she searches for words, and in doing
so those words become functional elements of his or her
thought” (UNESCO 2007: 9).
51
11 Mathematical entities are conceptual entities we have

devised to count, measure and classify things. Similarly, the
inferential structures which logic employs are, in the final
analysis, our conceptualizations of the order and sequential
connections of things we find in the world. Neither
mathematical entities nor logical structures are ontologically
real; they are real only by virtue of their conceptual
representation of the world. The classical Indian logic, Nyaya,
emphasized the “material” aspect of logic by requiring the
major premise be supplemented with at least one example to
show its basis in reality.
12 Object-consciousness includes both our awareness of the
external world and awareness of our subjective experiences
like feeling, emotions and thoughts.
12 Consciousness does not exist on its own, for it exists only as
consciousness of a subject (knower). I am afraid Vijnanavada
Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta have an inflated view of
consciousness that consciousness can exist on its own and
that reality is ultimately pure consciousness, devoid of any
subject-object duality.
14 Tt may be noted in this regard that science used to claim
certainty of its descriptions, until the quantum uncertainty
(indeterminacy) principle knocked down certainty criterion
and replaced it with probability. The uncertainty principle in
quantum mechanics states that it is impossible to specify
simultaneously the position and momentum of an elementary
particle. Elementary particles behave both as a particle and as
a wave, and because of their wave and particle properties, we
can calculate only how likely a particle will be in a certain
position at a certain time.
15 Humans, from a biological point of view, share similar
cognitive apparatus and hence it is possible to reach a
comfortable agreement, if not consensus, about what we
conceive of the world and how we can interact with it for
practical purposes. After all, modern science happily
52
conducts its daily business with the assumption that the laws
of physics are the same for all observers in uniform motion.
16 The individual has the ontological primacy over the
community, as the community is constituted of and by
individuals. If individuals disappear, the community
disappears too.
17 One form of intolerance to pluralism which society always
faced and still continues to face is religious fundamentalism.
It is absurd that people can divide and hate people in the
name of religion. Religion should be a force that can bring
people together for the sake of their common humanity. All
religions believe in the inviolability of human life. If that is
the case, it is simply absurd to hurt any human being in the
name of religion, for whatever reason.
3
Ontic Relationalism
Philosophy is primarily a theoretical endeavour,

notwithstanding its practical implications. Because of its
theoretical nature, practically all philosophy is done
through concepts. As Stroll (2009: 215) remarks, all
philosophical ~ problems, especially —metaphysical
problems, are essentially conceptual in nature.
In its conceptual explorations of reality, metaphysics
is akin to theoretical physics. A theoretical physicist
constructs her theory of the physical world by laying
out basic concepts of physical things and their
properties. These concepts are so basic that they cannot
be reduced any further. The “basicness” of these
concepts requires their simplicity and parsimony. So
they should be “as simple and as few as possible
without having to surrender the adequate
representation of a single datum of experience”
(Einstein 1934). Similarly, a metaphysician constructs
her theory of reality using the requisite minimum
number of basic concepts (cf. Kaipayil 2008: 19). In the
following sections, I make a modest attempt at a
relationalist theory of being, laid out in a few basic
54
Ontic Relationalism
concepts, viz. being, reality, particular, property,

relation and Being-principle.
3.1. Being and Reality
The question of being pertains to existence of things.

But, why should there be things in the first place? To
put it differently, why is there something rather than
nothing? Well, the simple answer is: there is something
(at least one who asked this question) and something
cannot come out of nothing, for nothing comes out of
nothing, and hence something must be there always.
This something, which can be any thing, is called being.
Being is the most obvious and yet the most obscure
and puzzling of all philosophical concepts. It is most
obvious because being is everywhere around us and we
ourselves are being. When we think, we think of being;
when we act, we act on being. On the other hand, being
is obscure, defying any definition of it. Philosophers in
East and West have taken it in so many different ways
and have come up with different answers to the
question of being. This elusiveness of being keeps
ontology lively.
Can we humans avoid the question of being? No, we
cannot. Not because we are fascinated by this exotic
stuff, but because it pops up as soon as we start to
think. So we cannot avoid the question of being. If we
avoid it, we will be avoiding our own being; self-
avoidance is impossible. Also, if we avoid it, we will be
avoiding the object of our thought and action; we
cannot think or act without some being as the object of
our thinking and doing. We exist, we think and we act
55
on account of being. So the question of being will

always be with us.
What I said above does not make a case for arguing
that being is mysterious, as some philosophers in the
past wanted to make of it. I believe there is nothing
mysterious about being, for the reason that it is a
concept without a content of its own. It is ontologically
an empty concept, because there exits no being as such.
Any thing can become its content, because anything
that exists is being. Being, therefore, is not the being of
beings, some abstract “to-be” of things. Instead, being is
any thing that exists. Now, to exist is to exist as a
particular thing, as an entity with some identity. So
being is always a particular being, say this particular
man or that particular horse. “Being,” in the end, is a
term we apply to any particular entity that exists or we
take to exist.
What, then, is reality? Like being, reality is also an
empty concept, a concept with no content of its own.
Like being, its content is also provided by things that
exist. So, “reality,” like “being,” is a term we apply to
things that exist. The main difference is that the term
being refers mainly to individual things, whereas the
term reality can mean all things taken together as a
totality (cf. Kaipayil 1995: 4 n.10). Going by this
distinction, we can say beings make reality. But still
what exists are particular beings.
Given that being has existence only as particular
beings, the question of being boils down to the question
of particulars. Particulars have their identities because
of properties. This leads to conversations on particular
and property.
56
Ontic Relationalism
3.2. Particular and Property
There is no experience or thought which are not related

to some objects. These objects of our experience and
thought are broadly of two kinds: actual objects and
conceptual objects. Actual objects are things that exist in
actuality. They are commonly called particulars or
individuals. Conceptual objects are products of our
thought and are commonly called ideas. Ideas do not
have any independent existence, as they exist as ideas
of some thinking particulars, who we generally call
persons or subjects. If we can call actual entities
(particulars) first-order entities, conceptual entities
might be called second-order entities. The second-order
objects are real, only in so far as they are related to the
ontological reals, which are the first-order entities.
Unlike the second-order conceptual entities, the first-
order actual entities have ontological autonomy, i.e.
they exist on their own. An entity that exists on its own
is traditionally called “substance.” In contemporary
philosophical literature, however, the term “particular”
is preferred, as it can rid itself of some of the
interpretations, especially the theological ones, which
the concept of substance gathered over the centuries.
As Aristotle suggested, particulars are individual
things which exist in their own right, endowed with
some identifying features or properties. For Aristotle,
the paradigm cases of particulars are, as he put it, “the
individual man” or “the individual horse” (see Kaipayil
2008: 38). So a particular is an entity with some identity,
like this particular person or that particular thing.
Particulars may broadly be of two kinds: basic
particulars and corporate particulars. Basic particulars
are unitary particulars, ie. individuals with greater
57
internal unity. On the contrary, corporate or compound

particulars come into being because of basic particulars
and have only a functional unity. While an individual
man or an individual horse is an example of a basic
particular, a house or a car may be the candidate for a
corporate particular. Regarding social entities like
family and community, I am afraid they cannot be
particulars. They are just concepts referring to groups of
individuals standing in certain agreed-upon relations.
Particulars, both basic and corporate, have their
identities and it is the identity that makes an entity a
particular, say a particular man or a particular horse.
The identity of a particular is constituted by its
properties (qualities or features). If you want to describe
a thing, the only way to do it is through describing its
properties.
In a wide sense, properties are entities predicated of
particulars. These entities which play properties are
generally taken to be universals, in the sense that the
selfsame property can be instantiated by different
individuals. Redness can be instantiated (individuated)
by a red pen and a red carpet, for instance. This does
not mean that properties are out there floating and
waiting to be exemplified. There are no floating
properties (see Kaipayil 2008: 65). All properties are
properties of some individuals (particulars), whose
predicates they are.
Following Locke’s distinction between “primary”
and “secondary” qualities,> we can speak of primary
and secondary properties. Primary properties are
properties that exist in the objects independent of the
perceiver of these properties, like electrical charge of
charged particles. Secondary properties are perceiver-
58
Ontic Relationalism
dependent properties of the objects, like the colour and

smell of a rose. I think we can also include evaluative
properties, like truth, good and beauty, among
secondary properties.
What about the laws of nature? Are they particulars
or properties? I think they are properties. Laws are
internal to things, because they are dispositions or
tendencies of particulars to behave in a certain way. The
law of a negatively charged particle to repel another
negatively charged particle or the tendency of water to
flow is not external to them. “Things are disposed to
behave in a certain way of necessity, so laws are not
something that needs to be added to nature to make it
work” (Mumford 2009: 478). As the Rig Veda (1.105.12)
puts it: “The flowing of the floods is Law.” The flood
flows and the law for the flood to flow is internal to the
flood.
Particular and property cater to each other
ontologically. Though two distinct ontological concepts,
neither of them has reality without the other (cf.
Kaipayil 2008: 65). Just as no properties can exist except
as properties of some particular, a particular cannot
exist without its constitutive properties. Given this,
properties are ultimately the way a particular is.
If properties choose to disappear, particulars
themselves will disappear. A particular is, indeed, an
integrate (integral unity) of properties. Properties
constitute the particulars. Does it make a case for
arguing that properties themselves should exist first
with their causal features for instantiation and that
properties should be treated as particulars?? No, I don’t
think so. We should not overstate the notion of
“constitution,” because it is not like a bunch of
59
properties coming together and forming a new

particular. The basic furniture of the world comes to us
always as propertied particulars. “Constitution,” then,
pertains primarily to the structure of the particular. The
structure of the particular is laid out in properties.
Particulars exist and have their identity due to their
being endowed with properties. Change occurs to
particulars when they shed some of their existing
properties or/and acquire some new ones. But if they
want to retain their self-identify, they need to somehow
keep most of their essential properties. Despite whether
it is by enduring or by perduring that a particular
persists,* a particular can continue through time only
by retaining its identity-defining properties.> The Taj
Mahal at time t; and the Taj Mahal at time t; are the
same Taj Mahal, as long as it kept most of the original
material and most of the original structure. If the Taj
Mahal loses these identifying properties, it will stop to
be that particular we know of as “Taj Mahal.”
Particulars can be classified into different kinds
(sorts), based on the properties they are endowed with.
It is possible for one and the same particular to belong
to more than one class, provided it qualifies for such an
inclusion by their properties. We already said that
particulars can be of two kinds, basic particulars or
corporate particulars. Another broad division would be:
concrete particulars and abstract particulars.
Concrete particulars are physical particulars
endowed with materiality. Mass, energy and spatial-
temporal identification constitute the materiality of the
physical entities we know. Some physical particulars
have an additional feature which we call life. Life
distinguishes an entity as an organism. From a
60
Ontic Relationalism
biological point of view, an entity is considered an

organism, a living particular, if it is capable of
performing two kinds of activities: metabolism and
reproduction. The case is not that an entity has life first
and then performs these functions; rather these and
other organic functions, made possible by the complex
biochemistry of the given particular, together constitute
what we call life. Some higher-order organisms have
yet another property which we call mind. These
organisms are capable of complex cerebral functions
that effect their mental states, like cognitions (thoughts),
emotions and decisions. These mental states are
collectively called mind.6
Coming to abstract particulars, the particulars that
transcend spatial-temporal specifications, philosophers
differ a lot in their “ontological commitments,” ranging
from total denial of such entities to exaggerated realism
about them. Taking properties, relations, mental states,
laws, numbers, etc. to be features of particulars, the
only kind of abstract particulars I tend to admit are
metaphysical principles (cf. Kaipayil 2008: 69-70).
Metaphysical principles are explanatory posits, which
means, they are postulations we make in our attempt to
explain the world in ultimate terms. As we said earlier
(section 2.1), science is the best available empirical
explanation of the world. But science leaves many
questions about reality unanswered and these
explanatory gaps needs to be filled in. It is here
metaphysics steps in. Because of its “abstractness,” a
metaphysical principle is beyond proof or disproof. Its
probability or reasonableness depends on its
explanatory power.
61
3.3. Relation
Relation holds between two entities. Self-relation is

impossible. There should be at least two relata for a
relation to exist. “It is hard not to think of relations as
dependent on relata in the sense that, without the
relata, there is nothing to relate” (Heil 2009: 311).
Sometimes relations are considered properties which
particulars have, like the parent-child relation as a
property a parent and a child have. But in fact their
property is the property of being a parent or a child
which comes into existence because of their parent-
child relation. Nonetheless, being a parent or being a
child is a relational property.
Relations can be intra-relations and inter-relations.
Intra-relations exist between the constitutive elements
of a basic particular. Every particular is a unity, a unity
of its constituents. Nothing exists, except as a unity. A
basic particular is constituted of its sub-basic
particulars. A sub-basic particular is a basic particular
which has become the constitutive component of
another basic particular. The model of an atom and its
sub-atomic particles is a telling illustration of this
concept. Take, for example, the simplest atom,
hydrogen. A hydrogen atom is composed of one proton
and one electron. The proton and the electron which
make this atom are themselves basic particulars. But
they became sub-basic particulars to this hydrogen
atom, which is the basic particular in this case. The
relation that holds between two sub-basic particulars in
a basic particular is an intra-relation.
Inter-relations exist between two or more basic
particulars. As inter-relations are easier to comprehend,
they do not require any illustration. However, I would
62
Ontic Relationalism
like to say a word about two possible effects of these

relations. Interrelations can result in changes in
interacting particulars, like a’s being a parent because of
a’s relation to b (child). In some cases, interrelations can
result in creation of new particulars, like two hydrogen
atoms and one oxygen atom producing a molecule of
water.
One kind of relation that has been extensively
discussed in philosophy and science is causality.
Without belief in causality we cannot explain the
regularity we find in the world. We organize empirical
experience into a causal order and make sense of what
we experience. In this sense, “[clausal necessity is
something we postulate to explain the world around
us” (Garrett 2006: 66). The objectivity of causation is
presupposed in science and in our everyday life;
without this presupposition, the daily business of both
science and our ordinary life would become impossible.
If the Humean sceptic insists on some hard evidence in
our experience of a really causing b, I am afraid we
don’t have any to offer her, except that when a acted b
occurred.”
An intricate problem associated with causality is
whether the effect is identical with the cause or not.8 If b
(effect) is altogether new and is different from a (cause),
a wouldn’t be the cause of b; and if b pre-existed in a, b
fails to be the effect of a." Causality is a relation; the
cause and the effect are relational to each other in an
antecedent-consequent relation. Being related in a
cause-effect relation entails neither their identity nor
their non-identity but only their antecedent-consequent
relatedness. We know, for example, thoughts and
feelings are caused by electrical and chemical
63
communication between brain cells. In this example,

our brain’s electrochemical process and our mental
states are causally connected, without the effect being
identical to the cause.
We have not discussed so far what relation per se is.
Is relation real or merely conceptual? If it is real, how
does relation relate to things? If it is purely conceptual,
what is this concept about? I said at the beginning of
this section that relations are not properties, although
there are properties which are relational, like a’s being
the parent of b. Relations are not particulars either, for
relation can happen only if there are at least two
interacting particulars. If relation is neither a particular
nor a property, it can only be a concept, an empty
concept like being and reality. “Relation” is that
convenient term or concept we use to mean the
interaction of particulars. Interaction does not exist
independent of interacting particulars. If particulars
choose to drop out of all interactions, there wouldn’t be
any relations.
Particulars are relational by nature, because they
always interact among themselves. It is through
interaction with other particulars that a given particular
keeps itself in existence, e.g. an organism taking in
nutrients from its environments and keeping itself alive.
Also, it is through interaction between particulars that
new particulars are generated, e.g. two hydrogen atoms
combining in nuclear fusion to make one helium atom.
The world you and I live in and are part of is
constituted of interacting particulars. So at the end of
the day, what exists is interacting particulars. This also
means reality is nothing other than particulars in
interaction.®
64
Ontic Relationalism
3.4. Being-principle
At the beginning of this chapter, we said that all

philosophy, especially metaphysics, is done through
concepts. Concepts cannot remain isolated. In order to
construct a theory, concepts should be arranged to
become a conceptual scheme. A theory is indeed a
group of basic concepts linked together into a
conceptual system. In this gathering of concepts into a
scheme, the movement is always in the direction of the
increasing simplicity of the conceptual basis (cf.
Einstein 1936), until we reach an apex concept to which
all concepts could be linked. In other words, the
prospect of a theory is to gather our experiences and
ideas around a central concept.’ Coming to ontic
relationalism, the relationalist theory of being, this
central concept should be the ultimate guarantor of
relationality (the relatedness of reality). Any concept
that has the explanatory power to play this role can be a
candidate. I, however, endorse the candidature of
“Being-principle.”
Like any other metaphysical concept, Being-principle
is also a postulation. We postulate this concept as the
ultimate explanation of the world we know and deal
with. One may wonder why we need any such posit.
Well, it is for the simple reason of what is called the
principle of sufficient cause. The principle of sufficient
reason, in its classical formulation by Leibniz (The
Monadology, 32), states that there can be no fact real or
no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason
why it should be so and not otherwise. In simple terms,
“[e]verything that is the case must have a reason why it
is the case” (Pruss 2006: 3). It is a necessary postulate of
knowledge.
65
The principle of sufficient reason is different from

the principle of causality, which states that everything
should have a cause. Causality applies only to cause-
effect sequence of things, like @ has caused b or b has
been caused by a. Thus causality is a relation between
sequentially connected relata. Sufficient reason, on the
contrary, is an explanation why something is the case.
Sufficient reason can be causal or otherwise. In either
case, to know a thing’s sufficient reason is to know the
principle which constitutes that thing (cf. Kaipayil 2008:
60).
Being-principle is the sufficient reason why the
world is such and not otherwise. In order to know what
Being-principle is, we should first know what the world
is like. In section 2.1 we mentioned how the world
basically looks like to our scientific perception of it. To
complement what we discussed there, I would like to
add a quick note on the history of the world.
According to the generally held Big Bang theory,
some 13.7 billion years ago, the initial singularity of
elemental particles, whose intense density created
enormous heat, exploded into elementary particles. The
elementary particles came together to form hydrogen
and other lighter atoms; these lighter atoms came
together and formed stars, and fusion reactions in stars
and supernova explosions created heavier atoms. At
some point later, chemical interactions of carbon
molecules and minerals led to the development of
simple organic molecules, such as amino acids, lipids
and sugars, which eventually developed into more
complex structures of genetic material and thus the first
living organisms came into existence. Finally, mind
appeared in the universe when the biochemical
66
Ontic Relationalism
complexity of certain organisms caused the

development of sensory and nervous systems, which
enabled them to interpret their sense stimuli. This is
roughly the picture science makes of the physical
world. No one knows what the future holds for the
world. Speculations range from a flat universe to a
closed universe to an open universe.!!
Science cannot tell us anything about the pre-history
of the universe, i.e. what existed before the theoretical
Big Bang; nor can it tell whether there exist parallel
universes. It tells only about the universe at hand, the
universe you and I live in and are part of. Hence, T
believe, it is enough that metaphysics and ontology
postulate the sufficient reason of this universe. In other
words, the concept of Being-principle is slated for the
job of being the sufficient reason of the world we know
and deal with.
Having said the above, I admit that a legitimate
objection can arise: why can’t the world be its own
reason? Yes, it is possible to conceive of the world that
way. Owing to their interdependence, individual things
may require an agential explanation for their origin and
continued existence but the world as a whole may not.
The world may be there eternally in some form and can
self-operate with its own inner principles and laws. This
naturalistic explanation, that the world is self-existent,
self-organizing entity, is acceptable and is indeed a
reasonable metaphysical ~ postulation. Similarly
reasonable is the explanation of the world in reference
to Being-principle as its possible sufficient reason. The
advantage of postulating Being-principle is that it gives
us a single concept to explain both the individual
phenomena in the world and the world as a whole.
67
Moreover, Being-principle we are talking about is not a

principle external to the world but its internal principle,
accounting for its existence, structure and activity.12
Now let me come back to the picture of the world
science depicts and see what we can gather from it. The
world as a whole and each of its constituent entities
exhibits three most fundamental features: existence,
order and activity (cf. Kaipayil 2008: 70-72). Firstly, the
world exists; the sufficient reason for the world’s
existence may be called the principle of existence.
Secondly, the world exhibits order. The sufficient
reason for this orderliness of the world may be called
the principle of intelligence. Thirdly, the world is active;
the sufficient reason for the world’s activity may be
called the principle of force. Since existence, order and
activity are simultaneous features of the world, these
three principles (existence, intelligence and force)
cannot exist independently as separate principles. They
exist and act together in coordination. So Being-
principle is a unity of these three primal principles:
existence, intelligence and force (Kaipayil 2008: 72-73).
It is called being-principle, because it itself is a being
and is the principle (reason) behind other beings.
The fourth fundamental feature of the world, the
feature that is very significant for relationalism, is its
simultaneous plurality and unity. The world at all
times, from the Big Bang to the present, manifests that it
is not a single substance but a unity of many
particulars. On the one hand there exist a plurality of
things and on the other there is inter-relatedness, an
underlying unity, among them. If Being-principle
accounts for the existence, order and activity of the
68
Ontic Relationalism
world, we can assume that the same Being-principle is

the reason for this feature too.
As principle of existence, intelligence and activity,
Being-principle is not exhausted by or limited to any
one being. This accounts for why the world is a
plurality. At the same time, all beings are grounded in
Being-principle. This accounts for the unity of the
world.
Finally, 1 think I should add a cautionary note to
refrain one from any quick identification of Being-
principle with God. Even as God can be interpreted as
the being-principle of the world (cf. Kaipayil 2002: 46,
2003: 41-42, 2008: 73), I consider Being-principle and
God as belonging to two disciplines, ontology and
theology. I, nonetheless, admit that ontology and
theology do intersect at many junctions and inform
each other as to how we can make sense of reality and
engage with it meaningfully.3
3.5. Structure of Ontic Relationalism

Now that major concepts are clarified, we need to put
them in their proper place in order to explain how they
hang together and make a relationalist theory of being.
The key player in the structure of critical
relationalism is particular. All that exists are particulars,
including Being-principle. Particulars have their
identities due to their properties. But properties have no
independent existence; they exist only as properties of
particulars. What actually exists in the world are
propertied particulars - you and me, the tree and the
tiger, atoms and molecules, and, if you want, houses
and cars. So the world is a world of particulars. We
69
usually group these particulars (individuals) into

classes or categories for the purpose of description.
Classes do mnot exist though, except as classes of
individuals.
Particulars stand in various relations with other
particulars, and relations are different kinds of
interaction between particulars. Being interactions,
relations have no independent existence. They come
into existence only when and as long as particulars
interact.
All particulars that we do everyday business with
have spatiotemporal ~determinations. So, ontic
relationalism cannot keep space-time out of discussion.
In the pre-relativity period, pace Leibniz, space and time
were thought to be out there, with objects freely moving
in them. Relativity, with its space-time continuum
concept, made it possible to think of space-time in
relational terms. This makes our job a lot easier.
Space and time are distance and duration
respectively. Distance is the distance between
particulars and duration is the duration of how long a
particular is in existence relative to other particulars. All
measurement of space and time can only be done with
respect to some particulars. Space-time, therefore, is a
system whose coordinates are determined by
particulars. Particulars make space-time possible, and
particulars make possible its expansion and
contraction. If all particulars choose to exit from
existence, space-time will disappear with them.
Now let us see what place Being-principle has in the
world of particulars. Being-principle is also a particular,
albeit with difference. Unlike physical particulars,
Being-principle is not subject to spatiotemporal
70
Ontic Relationalism
limitations. So it can be immanent in all particulars and

yet transcend them at the same time. Another difference
is that Being-principle is a necessary particular, while
other particulars are contingent particulars. It is
necessary, not because it exists necessarily but it is the
necessary condition for all other particulars to exist and
act. Particulars are rooted in Being-principle as their
source, and Being-principle expresses itself in
particulars as their origin.
As we said in 3.4, Being-principle, as principle of
existence, intelligence and force, is never exhausted by
particulars and hence no particular expresses it fully.
Moreover, each particular is a unique expression too.
Because of its inexhaustiveness as principle, Being-
principle has the possibility of originating and
sustaining the plurality of particulars. Because of this
ontological possibility of Being-principle to originate
and keep in existence the plurality of particulars, the
world has the ontological possibility of having plurality
as one of its two relationalist features, the other feature
being unity.
The second relationalist feature of the world, namely
unity, is also possible because of Being-principle.
Because of their rootedness in one and the same Being-
principle, particulars have the possibility of being
ontologically open to other particulars, within and
outside their own categories, even as keeping their own
identities. They interconnect and make one world,
orderly and ordinarily harmonious.5
Having said the above, I do not mean that Being-
principle intervenes and determines how each and
every particular acts in a given time and place. I think
how particulars behave is left mostly to dispositions or
71
laws which particulars are endowed with.26 This also

means necessity does not cancel out chance
(randomness) completely.’” Should two hydrogen
atoms and one oxygen atom meet, they will produce a
molecule of water. It is a necessity. But which hydrogen
atoms and which oxygen atoms meet at a given time
and place and produce which molecule of water is
almost a chance. Maybe, due to randomness there is
variety and surprise in the world!
We have two more concepts to accommodate: being
and reality, the most celebrated concepts in the entire
lexicon of metaphysics. However, if particulars are the
only reals, the ontological status of being and reality is
almost a foregone conclusion. They are two ways of
speaking about particulars (see section 3.1). Being is the
highest, honorific term we use to speak about things
that actually exist or we take to actually exist. Since all
that actually exists are particulars, being turns out to be
particulars, necessary or contingent. There is no being
in the abstract. Being is always in the concrete, as
particular beings. All particulars are relational, for they
exist in their relatedness to the supreme particular,
Being-principle, and other particulars. Since all
particulars are relational, being is relational. All beings,
owing to their relationality, together make an
ontological (existential) ~structure. We call this
ontological structure by another honorific term, namely
reality. Since all constitutive participants of reality are
relational by nature, we also say reality is relational.
72
Ontic Relationalism
3.6. Aesthetic and Ethical Significance
A philosophical theory, like a scientific theory, is an

explanation of the world, albeit in more ultimate terms.
But unlike a scientific theory, a philosophical theory
seeks also the meaning of life (cf. Kaipayil 1995: 94-95;
2002: 18-21; 2003: 2).18 Metaphysics is no exception to it.
Thus the ultimate use of metaphysics is to find the
significance of reality for our lives.
I think what makes us distinctly human is not only
our capacity for abstract reflection but also our gift for
aesthetic appreciation and ethical action. So no ontology
is complete without aesthetics and ethics. Ontology is
basic to aesthetics and ethics, for the way we think
about being (ontology) is mostly the way we feel about
being (aesthetics), and the way we think and feel about
being is the way we treat being (ethics).1
Aesthetics is our disinterested appreciation of the
beauty of things. Aesthetics, from the point of view of
relationalism we articulated hitherto, is then our
appreciation of particulars as expressions of the primal
particular, Being-principle. When we become aware
that the world we live in and are part of is grounded in
the one Being-principle, it will lead us to admire and
care for creation as “sacred.”? This aesthetic experience
also involves our perception of the splendorous
diversity and unity of things, leading us to celebrate
diversity, even as we recognize their ontological unity.
Aesthetic appreciation acquires special significance
when it comes to the particulars of our own kind, other
humans. A human being is a marvelous display of the
features of Being-principle - its existence, thought and
energy. Humanity holds a special place in the universe,
73
though we cannot hold an anthropic interpretation that

the universe has been made and fine-tuned for humans.
We are a marvelous creation, part of the universe,
but capable of beholding it in wonder and admiration.
Yet, only with another human being can you and I enter
into a genuine communication. The best available way
for us to enter into communication and communion
with Being-principle and experience its intelligent
existence in action is by entering into communication
with other humans, because you and I, by virtue of our
existential symmetry, can speak the language of
common humanity. This aesthetic appreciation of
another human being as one’s communicative partner
puts us on our ethical responsibility to respect every
human being and commit ourselves to their flourishing.
Beholding the other in aesthetic appreciation and
holding the other in ethical care is what brings
satisfaction of life, as it fulfills our call to be human.
Notes
11, however, disagree with Stroll (2009: 217-18) that science is

“factual” and philosophy, “conceptual,” and science and
metaphysics will exist in parallel. I believe that scientific
theories are also conceptual in nature and all theories are
theories about facts of our experience. Metaphysics kicks in
when physics reaches its conceptual limits.
2 Locke’s primary qualities of physical objects include size,
shape, weight and solidity, among others, and secondary
qualities include colour, taste and smell.
74
Ontic Relationalism
3 On the trope view, properties themselves are just as much

particulars as the things that have them. The basic particulars
(e.g. cats and dogs) are thought to be made up of these
abstract particulars. For more on trope theory, see Kaipayil
2008: 76n14.
4 The two current views about how particulars persist
through time are: endurantism and perdurantism. While for
endurantism objects persist by “enduring,” that is, by being
wholly present at each moment of their existence,
perdurantism holds that objects persist by “perduring,” that
is, by having different temporal parts located at different
times (see Gilmore 2007: 177; Loux 2002: 221). It is hard to
choose between these two views.
5 For more on identity, see Kaipayil 2008: 67-68, 2003: 31-32.
6 This means the mind is not a substance but only a functional
unity of the mental states effected by neural exchange of
chemical-electrical impulses.
7 However, seeing the laws of nature as natural dispositions
of things to act in certain ways can withstand some of the
Humean criticism of causality.
8 Sankhya holds that the effect pre-exists in the cause and the
effect is only the expression of the pre-contained.
Vaisheshika’s view is that the cause and the effect are not
identical and every effect is something new.
¢ Does this ontological prioritization of particulars (the view
that particulars are the only ontological reals and that being,
reality and relation are discourse about particulars) put me in
the nominalist camp? Not necessarily. Of course,
relationalism shares with nominalism the idea that what
exists ultimately are particulars. But I also accept the reality
of properties as ways (modes) in which particulars exist.
75
Besides, I admit at least one metaphysical principle, Being-

principle, for explanatory reasons.
10 There may be some truth to what Heidegger famously said:
“Every thinker thinks only one thought” (1968: 50).
" In a flat universe, the expansion of the universe would
cease after a while; in a closed universe, the universe would
collapse upon itself; and in an open universe, the universe
would expand forever.
12 Furthermore, the world can even be thought of as
contemporaneous (instantaneous) with Being-principle. In
this regard, it may be noted that Augustine (De Civitate Dei,
10.31; 11.4) and Aquinas (Summa contra Gentiles, 2.31-38;
Summa Theologica, 1.46; De Aecternitate Mundi contra
Murmurantes) saw no contradiction of reason in saying that
something made by God has always existed. For both
Augustine and Aquinas, the non-eternity of the world is a
question of faith rather than reason. It may also be noted that
according to Augustine and Aquinas laws of nature and
God’s design don't contradict. For them, the created things
are patterned after their exemplary ideas, eternal reasons
(rationes ~aeternae), existing in the divine mind (e.g.,
Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, 46.2;
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.15.1,1.44.3). Augustine also had
a notion of natural evolution, according to which the
“seminal reasons” (rationes seminales) God placed in nature
evolve according to the laws established by the divine
wisdom (e.g., De genesi ad itteram, 5.21.45, 9.17.32; De Trinitate,
3.8.13-19).
1 God talk is mainly religious talk. What philosophy can
arguably do is to examine the reasonableness of believing in
God'’s existence. Panikkar has it right when he said: “The
76
Ontic Relationalism
traditional ‘proofs of the existence of God’ offered by

Christian scholasticism, for example, only prove the non-
irrationality of the divine existence to those who already
believe in God” (2006:16). So the similarity and difference
between Being-principle and God is something like that of
the Supreme Being and God. Being-principle, like the
Supreme Being, is a concept of rational abstraction, while
God is a concept of faith, with the possibility of God being
conceived differently in different faith traditions. A fortiori,
God is the object of worship.
14 According to Big Bang model, our entire cosmos had
swelled from a singularity to the size of 94 billion light years
across and still continues to expand. This shows that space is
created by the expansion of matter. It is possible that there
can be voids (devoid of any objects) in space, bul (he
boundary of space is determined by the farthest objects.
15 Thanks to their rootedness in Being-principle, particulars,
despite their own identities, are able to enter into harmonious
relation with other particulars and contribute towards an
orderly universe. But how can we explain the presence of
evil, which is disruption of this harmony? The selfsame
problem has always been a challenge to theism, yet I wonder
if anyone has ever offered anything better than Leibniz’s “the
best of all possible worlds” argument. Despite its
imperfections, it is the best of all possible worlds God could
have created, according to Leibniz. The world could have
been more harmonious and more perfect than it is, but we
don’t know why it is not. Another way to look at evil is to see
it as exceptions due to randomness involved in the working
of nature (see below n. 17). Whatever be the explanation of
77
evil, as I said elsewhere (cf. Kaipayil 2003: 44-45), the

presence of evil is a challenge to us to do good to others.
16 In this regard, I find the Thomistic notion makes quite a
sense that God acts through secondary causes.
17Tt may be noted in this connection that quantum mechanics,
with its uncertainty principle, indicates that events can only
be predicted with probabilities. Moreover, a law of nature
holds only when other things are equal, leaving the
probability that it may not hold under certain circumstances
(cf. Schrenk 2007: 9).
18 The concept of philosophy as guidance to life has recently
been revived by the newly emerged discipline called
philosophical ~counseling. The aim of philosophical
counseling is to help people critically examine the ideas and
perceptions associated with their specific problems and come
to terms with life in a positive and meaningful way. For more
on philosophical counseling, see Schuster 1999, Raabe 2001,
Marinoff 2001.
19 This parallels how we manage our daily experience by the
triple action of cognition (reason), emotion and volition.
Cognition leads to emotion, and cognition and emotion lead
to decision. Every emotion has a cognitive content to it, and
no volition is without thought and emotion.
2 Spirituality may, after all, be our sensitivity to this
sacredness of things: life, humanity and nature (cf. Mohanty
2002: 120).
78
Conclusion
The world we live in and deal with, the very world

which we are part of, is a world of plurality on the one
hand and a world of unity on the other. The plurality
and unity of the world is attested, not just by our
everyday experience but by modern science as well.
Hence it is philosophically essential to address how we
can make sense of the world’s irreducible plurality and
inescapable unity, because the task of philosophy,
especially metaphysics, is to unravel the structure and
meaning of the world.
Metaphysical monism, both substance monism and
process monism, overstates unity, while pluralism,
dualism included, overstates plurality. Most
metaphysical theories fall into either camp. What we
need is a perspective that goes beyond this divide and
accommodates both pluralism and unity in a conceptual
scheme. Maybe, relationalism can provide this new
perspective. Indeed, many a philosophical, ethical and
social problem cannot be adequately addressed except
from a relationalist point of view.
Relationalism states there is no unity, except as the
unity of participating entities. Entities are the carriers of
existence. If entities were to disappear, there wouldn’t
be any existence left, let alone the world. Yet, entities
are ontologically open to one another that they
interrelate and make one unified world.
79
No metaphysical theory can sustain itself unless it is

founded on ontology, because all philosophical and
metaphysical questions melt down to the question of
being, to the question of how we interpret the meaning
of being. So relationalism too requires a foundational
theory of being, ontic relationalism as I called it.
According to the relationalist theory of being, or ontic
relationalism, I proposed, particular (individual) has
the claim for ontological primacy, as being exists only
as particulars. Particulars, however, are inherently
relational as they are ontologically open to other
particulars and can interrelate and make the fabric of
reality. Accordingly, for ontic relationalism, the
particular in its relationality is the meaning of being.
From the point of view of ontic relationalism, the
task of ontology is to discover and articulate the
relationalist meaning of the world. Ontology, being
humanity’s perennial search for the principles of being,
can probably do this interpretative job better, if done
with reference to a theoretical Being-principle in which
particulars and their relationality can be thought to be
grounded.
80
References
Badarayana (1960) The Brahma Sutra (The Brahma Sutra:

The Philosophy of Spiritual ~Life), trans. S.
Radhakrishnan, New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers.
Bechert, Heinz (ed.) (1991-1997) “The Dating of the
Historical Buddha” (Die Datierung des historischen
Buddha). Abhandlungen der Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Gottingen - Philologisch-
Historische Klasse (Symposien zur
Buddhismusforschung, TV-1991,1992,1997).
Dasgupta, Surendranath (1975) A History of Indian
Philosophy, vol. I, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Einstein, Albert (1934) “On the Method of Theoretical
Physics;”available:
http:/ /www jstor.org/ pss/184387
—— (1936) “Physics and Reality;” reprinted in The
Einstein Reader (New York: Citadel Press, 2006).
Garrett, Brian (2006) What Is This Thing Called
Metaphysics?, London: Routledge.
Gilmore, Cody (2007) “Time Travel, Coinciding
Objects, and Persistence” in Dean W. Zimmerman
(ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 177-98.
Hawking, Stephen (1997) A Brief History of Time.
London: Bantam Books.
81
Heidegger, Martin (1968) What Is Called Thinking?,

trans. J. Glenn Gray, New York: Harper and Row.
Heil, John (2009) “Relations,” in Robin Le Poidevin et
al (eds), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics,
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 310-21.
Ishvarakrishna (1957) The Sankhya Karika of Iswara
Krishna: An Exposition of the System of Kapila, trans.
John Davies, Calcutta: Susil Gupta.
(1969) “The Samkhyakarika of Isvarakrsna,”
trans. Gerald James Larson, in Gerald James
Larson, Classical Samkhya: An Interpretation of Its
History and Meaning, New Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
Joshi, N.V. (1977) Indian Philosophy from the Ontological
Point of View, Bombay: Somaiya Publications.
Kaipayil, Joseph (1995) The Epistemology of Comparative
Philosophy: A Critique with Reference to P.T. Raju’s
Views, Rome: Centre for Indian and Inter-religious
Studies.
(2002) Critical Ontology: An Introductory Essay,
Bangalore: Jeevalaya Institute of Philosophy.
(2003) Human as Relational: A Study in Critical
Ontology, Bangalore: Jeevalaya Institute of
Philosophy.
(2008) An Essay on Ontology, Kochi: Karunikan
Books.
Kanada (2003) Vaisesika-Sutra of Kanada, trans.
Debasish ~ Chakrabarty, New Delhi: D.K.
Printworld.
King, Richard (1999) Indian Philosophy: An Introduction
to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
82
References
Ladyman, James et al (2007) Every Thing Must Go:

Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Loux, Michael J. (2002) Metaphysics: A Contemporary
Introduction, London: Routledge.
Lynch, Michael P. (1997) “Relativism and Truth: A
Reply to Steven Rappaport,” Philosophia 25: 417-21.
Marinoff, Lou (2001) Philosophical Practice, New York:
Academic Press.
Mohanty, J.N. (2002) Between Two Worlds, East and
West: An Autobiography, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Mumford, Stephen (2009) “Laws and Dispositions,” in
Robin Le Poidevin et al (eds), The Routledge
Companion to Metaphysics, ~Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, pp. 471-79.
Nakamura, Hajime (1983) A History of Early Vedanta
Philosophy, vol. I, trans. Trevor Leggett et al, New
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Oliver, Harold H. (1981) A Relational Metaphysic, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Panikkar, Raimon (2006) The Experience of God: Icons of
the Mystery, trans. Joseph Cunneen, Minneapolis:
Fortress Press.
Phillips, Stephen H. (1995) Classical Indian Metaphysics:
Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of the “New
Logic,” La Salle: Open Court.
Pruss, Alexander R. (2006) The Principle of Sufficient
Reason: A Reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Raabe, Peter B. (2001) Philosophical Counseling: Theory
and Practice, Westport: Greenwood Publishing.
83
Radhakrishnan, S. (1951) Indian Philosophy, vol. II,

London: George Allen and Unwin.
—— (1960) The Brahma Sutra: The Philosophy of
Spiritual Life, New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers.
Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism, New York:
Columbia University Press.
Schrenk, Markus (2007) The Metaphysics of Ceteris
Paribus Laws, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Schuster, Shlomit C. (1999) Philosophy Practice: An
Alternative to Counseling and Psychotherapy,
Westport: Praeger Publishers.
Searle, John (1995) The Construction of Social Reality,
New York: The Free Press.
Sider, Theodore (2008) “Introduction,” in Theodore
Sider et al (eds), Contemporary Debates in
Metaphysics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing,
pp. 1-7.
Stroll, Avrum (2009) “Metaphysics Revivified,” in
Robin Le Poidevin et al (eds), The Routledge
Companion to Metaphysics, Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, pp. 209-18.
Thakur, Anantalal (2003) Origin and Development of the
Vaisesika System, in D.P. Chattopadhyaya (ed.),
History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian
Civilization, vol. I, pt. 4, New Delhi: Centre for
Studies in Civilizations.
UNESCO (2007) Philosophy: A School of Freedom, Paris:
UNESCO.
84
Joseph Kaipayil
RELATIONALISM
A Theory of Being
Relationalism is not merely a view that

things are relational or inter-related. As the
author sees it, relationalism is basically a
theory of being, which addresses the
metaphysical problem of the one and the
many. Unity and plurality are inherent
features of reality. Neither of them can be
explained away. Hence we need a
new, relationalist perceptive which
accommodates both these features of the
world. In this work, Relationalism : A Theory of
Being, the author tries to give an ontological
foundation and framework for such a
perspective, by interpreting the meaning of
being in terms of particular (individual) in
its relationality. This work provides many an
insight into how we can look at not only
metaphysics but epistemology and ethics as
well from a relationalist point of view.
ISBN 81-87664-06-1

Relationalism. A Theory of Being

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

Relationalism. A Theory of Being

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Relationalism. A Theory of Being

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Q€LATI©NALI§ M

Published by JIP Publications

T'acknowledge my appreciation to all who have helped me,

The aim of this work is to flesh out the relationalist

was ever given and a full-fledged theory of

(a) Relationalism is not anti-substantivism. On an

(b) Relationalism is not processism either, though

philosophy in this sense. But processism is a

(c Relationalism is not relationism. Relationism

(d) Relationalism is not relativism either.

What, then, is relationalism? For me, relationalism, as a

(a) Being (all that exists) is relational. Relationality

reality, both existentially and structurally. The

(b) Reality is irreducibly pluralistic —and

(c Every entity is a unity. Nothing can exist

(d) The identity of an entity is defined by its

What is the epistemic claim of relationalism as a theory?

ultimate terms by using more abstract concepts, the

1 “Continually changing, like the phoenix that unceasingly

It is important to present a philosophical theory

Buddhism to represent processism, Vaisheshika to

1.1. Sankhya Dualism

Of all classical schools of Indian Philosophy, Sankhya

and they pre-existed in the primordial prakriti and are

The release of purusha (from the cycle of rebirth) is

1.2. Buddhist Processism

Siddhartha Gautama (died ¢. 380 BCE),"7 better known

and there is nothing permanent for us to get attached

karmic dispositions that get embodied in the rebirth

1.3. Vaisheshika Pluralism

Buddhism set in motion fresh debates among

spelled Vaisesika), Radhakrishnan, for instance, says

location (nearness and farness) (VS 2.210; 7.2.21).

Kanada the universal and particularity, though they are

1.4. Vedantic Monism

The principal text of Vedanta®® is the Brahmasutra

propounded an idealist substance monism based on the

modifies itself and assumes the form of the world (cf.

accompanies the individual self to the next life. But,

1.5. Rationale for Relationalism

For Sankhya, reality is ultimately two, as it consists of

matter. There wouldn’t be any trouble if we let these

action cannot exist without an agent to act. Just as there

monists, the real is deeper than what senses can meet.

pluralism, and the problem it addresses is the ancient

! In this regard, one may note that the paradigm suggested by

of spirit from matter were features common to these proto

concept cannot be credited to Vedic Hinduism, because the

deep in the human psyche, as belief in afterlife helps people

infinite number of purushas, there is infinite possibility of

2 The human being, for example, is an aggregate of five

Prashastapada, ~ the fifth century author of

of the self can be inferred primarily through our self-

4.1.19. But this was in the context of refuting an argument

guide of the world (Aitareya 3.5.3; Shvetashatara 6.1.2). The

body in the unmanifest stage or as gross body in the manifest

As T argued in my earlier works (Kaipayil 2002, 2003,