PDF Achieving The Paris Climate Agreement Goals Global and Regional 100 Renewable Energy Scenarios With Non Energy GHG Pathways For 1 5 C and 2 C Sven Teske Ebook Full Chapter
PDF Achieving The Paris Climate Agreement Goals Global and Regional 100 Renewable Energy Scenarios With Non Energy GHG Pathways For 1 5 C and 2 C Sven Teske Ebook Full Chapter
PDF Achieving The Paris Climate Agreement Goals Global and Regional 100 Renewable Energy Scenarios With Non Energy GHG Pathways For 1 5 C and 2 C Sven Teske Ebook Full Chapter
https://textbookfull.com/product/renewable-energy-and-climate-
change-quaschning/
https://textbookfull.com/product/introduction-to-renewable-
energy-conversions-1st-edition-sergio-c-capareda/
https://textbookfull.com/product/accelerating-the-transition-
to-a-100-renewable-energy-era-tanay-sidki-uyar/
https://textbookfull.com/product/renewable-energy-forecasting-
and-risk-management-paris-france-june-7-9-2017-philippe-
drobinski/
Hydroelectric energy: renewable energy and the
environment 1st Edition Bikash Pandey
https://textbookfull.com/product/hydroelectric-energy-renewable-
energy-and-the-environment-1st-edition-bikash-pandey/
https://textbookfull.com/product/physics-of-solar-energy-and-
energy-storage-2nd-edition-c-julian-chen/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-paris-agreement-climate-
change-solidarity-and-human-rights-1st-edition-judith-blau/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-paris-agreement-on-climate-
change-analysis-and-commentary-1st-edition-daniel-klein/
https://textbookfull.com/product/energy-efficiency-and-renewable-
energy-handbook-second-edition-d-yogi-goswami/
Sven Teske Editor
Achieving the
Paris Climate
Agreement Goals
Global and Regional 100% Renewable
Energy Scenarios with Non-energy GHG
Pathways for +1.5°C and +2°C
Achieving the Paris Climate Agreement Goals
Sven Teske
Editor
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019. This book is an open access publication
Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if
changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons
licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book’s
Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors
or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims
in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For the next generation.
For my son, Travis.
Climate Model: Foreword
vii
viii Climate Model: Foreword
new normal, and happening closer to home. An estimated 41 million Americans live
within a 100-year flood zone. Texas saw its third 500-year flood 3 years in a row.
Poor air quality is a public health emergency across the world and now the
fourth-highest cause of death – contributing to strokes, heart attacks, and lung
cancer – causing public unrest in countries like China and India, where the poorest
find themselves at the mercy of pollution from industrial facilities and the burning
of biomass. In states like Texas, Colorado, and North Dakota, communities are
fighting back against gas drilling operations near playgrounds or soccer fields,
where children breathe in poisonous gases.
These health impacts are only part of the story. Climate change, as the US
Pentagon notes, is a national security threat. In a 2017 report by the Environmental
Justice Foundation, senior US military experts pointed to the likelihood of tens of
millions of climate refugees displaced by extreme weather – in a world already
struggling with a refugee crisis. We already know that many conflicts are driven by
environmental factors and access to natural resources. The truth is that, where
ecosystems collapse, societies collapse too.
Politically, there has been a monumental failure to grasp the scale of this problem.
Climate scientists still face disinformation campaigns and a press corps that often
draws a false equivalence between those who support the scientific consensus for
human-caused climate change and those who do not. Surveys suggest that most
Americans do not know a scientific consensus exists, and scientists like Michael
Mann, who spoke to me for Before the Flood, face abuse for exposing the truth. As
a result, scientific research programs, critical to better understanding and addressing
climate change, are often attacked or defunded.
Nevertheless, in the face of these challenges, some progress is being made. With
the growth of the environmental movement, public awareness of the climate crisis
has increased significantly. Governments and the private sector are beginning to
ramp up their efforts. Renewable energy is booming. And the UN Sustainable
Development Goals, ratified by 193 countries, now call for a halt to deforestation
and land degradation by 2030. After decades of climate negotiations, the Paris
Agreement now calls upon the world’s governments to keep warming “well below
2°C” while striving for 1.5°C.
While we are beginning to move in the right direction, the reality is that these
efforts are simply not ambitious enough to address the climate crisis at scale. The
IPCC warns that to avoid the worst consequences of climate change, we must stay
below the 1.5 °C limit. But what does that mean in practical terms?
Determined to find solutions, my foundation supported a 2-year research program
led by a team of international climate and energy experts to develop a roadmap for
how we can actually stay below this critical climate threshold. The findings, outlined
in this book, give cause for optimism. With a transition to 100% renewable energy
by mid-century and a major land conservation and restoration effort, it is possible to
stay below the 1.5 °C limit with technologies that are available right now. It will be
Climate Model: Foreword ix
a lot of work, but the costs will be far less than the $5 trillion per year governments
currently spend subsidizing the fossil fuel industries responsible for climate change.
The climate model and energy transition pathways compiled in this book offer an
exciting, positive, and achievable vision of a better world in which we are no longer
dependent on fossil fuels and where the conservation and restoration of nature is
treated as indispensable to our survival. This is not fantasy. This is science.
Science is showing us the way forward, but you do not need to be a scientist to
understand that climate change is the defining issue of our time. If our world warms
past 1.5 °C, our way of life will profoundly change for the worse. Why not manage
the transition in a way that is orderly and equitable? Human beings caused this
problem, but with our vast knowledge and ingenuity, we can also fix it.
We are resilient. We can adapt. We can change.
Author: Dr. Sven Teske Chapters: 1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, 7, 8
E-mail: [email protected] (Power Sector analysis), 9, 10, 13
Author: Prof. Dr. Damien Giurco Chapters: 11, 13
E-mail: [email protected]
Author: Tom Morris Chapters: 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, 7
E-mail: [email protected]
Author: Kriti Nagrath Chapters: 3.2, 7
E-mail: [email protected]
Author: Franziska Mey Chapter: 10
E-mail: [email protected]
Author: Dr Chris Briggs Chapter: 10
E-mail: [email protected]
Author: Elsa Dominish Chapter: 10, 11
E-mail: [email protected]
Author: Dr Nick Florin Chapter 11
E-mail: [email protected]
xi
xii Contact Information
University of Melbourne
Address: Australian-German Climate and Energy College, Level 1, 187 Grattan
Street, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia 3010
www.energy-transition-hub.org
Abstract An overview of the motivations behind the writing of this book, the sci-
entific background and context of the research. Brief outline of all methodologies
used, followed by assumptions and the storyline of each scenario. Presentation of
main results of the renewable energy resources assessment, transport scenario, long-
term energy pathway, the power sector analysis, employment analysis and an assess-
ment for required metals for renewable energy and storage technologies. Key results
of non-energy greenhouse mitigation scenarios which are developed in support of
the energy scenario in order to achieve the 1.5 °C target. Concluding remarks and
policy recommendations including graphs and tables.
Introduction The Paris Climate Agreement aims to hold global warming to well
below 2 degrees Celsius (°C) and to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5 °C. To accom-
plish this, countries have submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDCs) outlining their post-2020 climate actions (Rogelj 2016). This research
aimed to develop practical pathways to achieve the Paris climate goals based on a
detailed bottom-up examination of the potential of the energy sector, in order to
avoid reliance on net negative emissions later on.
The study described in this book focuses on the ways in which humans produce
energy, because energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are the main drivers
of climate change. The analysis also considers the development pathways for non-
energy-related emissions and mitigation measures for them because it is essential to
address their contributions if we are to achieve the Paris climate change targets.
State of Research—Climate Beyond reasonable doubt, climate change over the
last 250 years has been driven by anthropogenic activities. In fact, the human-
induced release of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere warms the planet
even more than is currently observed as climate change, but some of that greenhouse-
gas-induced warming is masked by the effect of aerosol emissions.
xiii
xiv Executive Summary
Carbon dioxide emissions are so large that they are the dominant driver of
human-induced climate change. A single kilogram of CO2 emitted will increase the
atmospheric CO2 concentration over hundreds or even thousands of years. Since the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report, the
finding that cumulative CO2 emissions are roughly linearly related to temperature
has shaped scientific and political debate. The remaining permissible CO2 emissions
that are consistent with a target temperature increase of 2 °C or 1.5 °C and their
comparison with remaining fossil fuel resources are of key interest.
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report concluded that beyond 2011, cumulative CO2
emissions of roughly 1000 GtCO2 are permissible for a “likely below 2.0 °C” target
change, and approximately 400 GtCO2 are permissible for a 1.5 °C target change.
However, the recently published IPCC Special Report on the 1.5 °C target suggests
substantially higher carbon emissions of 1600 GtCO2 will achieve a 2.0 °C change
and 860 GtCO2 will achieve a 1.5 °C change, which must be reduced by a further 100
GtCO2 to account for additional Earth system feedback over the twenty-first century.
One of the key reasons behind this difference is definitional: how far do we consider
that we are away from 1.5 °C warming? While that question seems simple, it is sur-
prisingly complex when the observational data on coverage, the internal variability
and the pre-industrial to early-industrial temperature differences are considered.
This study does not resolve the differences in opinions about carbon budgets, but
it does provide emission pathways that are consistent with the 1.5 °C target increase
in the 1.5 °C Scenario, or with the “well below 2.0 °C” target increase in the 2.0 °C
Scenario consistent with other scenarios in the literature and classified as such by
the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C.
Global Trends in the Energy Sector In 2017, the ongoing trends continued: solar
photovoltaics (PV) and wind power dominated the global market for new power
plants; the price of renewable energy technologies continued to decline; and fossil
fuel prices remained low. A new benchmark was reached, in that the new renewable
capacity began to compete favourably with existing fossil fuel power plants in some
markets. Electrification of the transport and heating sectors is gaining attention, and
although the amount of electrification is currently small, the use of renewable
technologies is expected to increase significantly.
The growth of solar PV has been remarkable and is nearly double that of the
second-ranking wind power. The capacity of new solar PV in 2017 was greater than
the combined increases in the coal, gas and nuclear capacities. Renewable energy
technologies achieved a global average generation share of 23% in the year 2015,
compared with 18% in the year 2005. Storage is increasingly used in combination
with variable renewables as battery costs decline, and solar PV plus storage has
started to compete with gas peaking plants. However, bioenergy (including
traditional biomass) remains the leading renewable energy source in the heating
(buildings and industry) and transport sectors.
Since 2013, global energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil
fuels have remained relatively flat. Early estimates based on preliminary data
suggest that this changed in 2017, with global CO2 emissions increasing by around
1.4% (REN21-GSR 2018). These increased emissions were primarily attributable to
Executive Summary xv
increased coal consumption in China, which grew by 3.7% in 2017 after a 3-year
decline. The increased Chinese consumption, as well as a steady growth of around
4% in India, is expected to lead to an upturn in global coal use, reversing the annual
global decline from 2013 to 2016.
In 2017, as in previous years, renewables saw the greatest increases in capacity
in the power sector, whereas the growth of renewables in the heating, cooling and
transport sectors was comparatively slow. Sector coupling—the interconnection of
power, heating and transport and particularly the electrification of heating and
transport—is gaining increasing attention as a means of increasing the uptake of
renewables in the transport and thermal sectors. Sector coupling also allows the
integration of large proportions of variable renewable energy, although this is still at
an early stage. For example, China is specifically encouraging the electrification of
heating, manufacturing and transport in high-renewable areas, including promoting
the use of renewable electricity for heating to reduce the curtailment of wind, solar
PV and hydropower. Several US states are examining options for electrification,
specifically to increase the overall renewable energy share.
Methodology for Developing Emission Pathways The complete decarbonisation
of the global energy supply requires entirely new technical, economic and policy
frameworks for the electricity, heating and cooling sectors as well as for the trans-
port system. To develop a global plan, the authors combined various established
computer models:
budget
energy-related Energy system model (EM) Power system model
CO2 emissions bottom-up simulation of future ([R]E 24/7)
energy balances based on GDP, hourly balancing of
population, technology, electricity supply & demand
Reduced
complexity carbon & energy intensity development in in spatial resolution
cycle and climate all sectors and for 10 world regions for sub regional clusters
model (MAGICC)
to calculate the Simplified land-based annual
sequestration model Generalized Equal
climatic effects Quantile Walk
energy-related
complementing
of multi-gas reforestation, Complementing non-CO2 CO2 emissions
pathways restoration, gases based on the
sustainable use and IPCC scenario database
agroforestry options. characteristics
Output
demand by fuel, emission, investment curtailment
xvii
Besides the climate and energy models, employment effects and the metal
resource requirements for selected materials have been calculated. Now that the
methodology has been outlined, the next sections present the results and assumptions
for the nonenergy GHG mitigation scenarios, followed by the energy sector
scenarios
Nonenergy-GHG Mitigation Scenarios The most important sequestration
measure could be large-scale reforestation, particularly in the subtropics and tropics
(see yellow pathways in Fig. 2). The second most important pathway in terms of the
amount of CO2 sequestered is the sustainable use of existing forests, which basically
means reduced logging within those forests. In subtropical, temperate and boreal
regions, this could provide substantial additional carbon uptake over time. The time
horizon for this sequestration option is assumed to be slightly longer in temperate
and boreal regions, consistent with the longer time it takes for these forest ecosystems
to reach equilibrium. The “forest ecosystem restoration” pathway is also important,
which basically assumes a reduction in logging rates to zero in a fraction of forests.
Overall, the median assumed sequestration pathways, shown in Fig. 2, would
result in the sequestration of 151.9 GtC. This is approximately equivalent to all
historical land-use-related CO2 emissions and indicates the substantial challenges
that accompany these sequestration pathways.
Given the competing forms of land use throughout the world today, the challenge of
reversing overall terrestrial carbon stocks back to pre-industrial levels cannot be
underestimated. There would be significant benefits, but also risks, if this
(subtropics
and tropics)
1,000
(temperate
and boreal)
Forest
ecosystem
restoration
500 (subtropics Agroforestry
and tropics) (subtropics and tropics)
(temperate (temperate and boreal)
and boreal)
0
2000 2050 2100 2150
The 2.0 °C Scenario: The first alternative scenario aims for an ambitious reduction
in GHG emissions to zero by 2050 and a global energy-related CO2 emission budget
of around 590 Gt between 2015 and 2050. This scenario is close to the assumptions
and results of the Advanced E[R] scenario published in 2015 by Greenpeace (Teske
et al. 2015). However, it includes an updated base year, more coherent regional
developments in energy intensity, and reconsidered trajectories and shares of the
deployment of renewable energy systems. Compared with the 1.5 °C Scenario, the
xx Executive Summary
2.0 °C Scenario allows for some delays due to political, economic and societal pro-
cesses and stakeholders.
The 1.5 °C Scenario: The second alternative scenario aims to achieve a global
energy-related CO2 emission budget of around 450 Gt, accumulated between 2015
and 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario requires immediate action to realize all available
options. It is a technical pathway, not a political prognosis. It refers to technically
possible measures and options without taking into account societal barriers.
Efficiency and renewable potentials need to be deployed even more quickly than in
the 2.0 °C Scenario, and avoiding inefficient technologies and behaviours is an
essential strategy for developing regions in this scenario.
2.0C 1.5C
Powertrain split of world passenger car fleet
100% 100%
90% 90%
80% 80%
70% 70%
60% 60%
50% 50%
40% 40%
30% 30%
20% 20%
10% 10%
0% 0%
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Internal Combuson Engine Plug-In Hybrid Electric Hydrogen
Fig. 3 Powertrain split of the world passenger car fleet in the 2 °C Scenario (left) and 1.5 °C
Scenario (right)
transport performance until 2050 are extrapolated for the 5.0 °C Scenario. In rela-
tive terms, all transport carriers will increase their performance from the current
levels, and in particular, energy-intensive aviation, passenger car transport and com-
mercial road transport are projected to grow strongly. In the 2.0 °C Scenario and
1.5 °C Scenario, we project a strong increase in rail traffic (starting from a relatively
low base) and slower growth or even a decline in the use of the other modes in all
world regions (Fig. 4).
The modal shifts from domestic aviation to rail and from road to rail are mod-
elled. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, passenger car pkm must decrease in the
OECD countries (but increase in the developing world regions) after 2020 in order
to maintain the carbon budget. The passenger car pkm decline will be partly com-
pensated by an increase in the performances of other transport modes, specifically
public transport rail and bus systems.
5.0°C 2.0°C
350%
300%
250%
Transport-Evolution
200%
150%
100%
50%
0%
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
1.5°C
Fig. 4 Relative growth in world transport demand (2015, 100% pkm/tkm) in the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C
and 1.5 °C Scenarios
Executive Summary xxiii
Global Renewable Energy Potential To develop the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios,
the economic renewable energy potential in a space-constrained environment was
analysed. Land is a scarce resource. The use of land for nature conservation, agri-
cultural production, residential areas and industry, as well as for infrastructure such
as roads and all aspects of human settlement, limits the amount of land available for
utility-scale solar and wind projects. Furthermore, solar and wind generation
requires favourable climatic conditions, so not all available areas are suitable for
renewable power generation. To assess the renewable energy potential based on the
area available, all scenario-relevant regions and subregions were analysed with the
[R]E-SPACE methodology to quantify the available land area in square kilometres
with a defined set of constraints:
transport, industry and all commercial and residential buildings, must use energy
efficiently and from a huge range of renewable energy technologies. Compared with
the 5.0 °C Scenario, which was defined using assumptions from the IEA, the
alternative scenarios require more stringent efficiency levels. The 1.5 °C Scenario
involves the even faster implementation of efficiency measures than in the 2.0 °C
Scenario and the decelerated growth of energy services in all regions, in order to
avoid a further strong increase in fossil fuel use after 2020.
Global energy intensity will decline from 2.4 MJ/US$GDP in 2015 to 1.25 MJ/
US$GDP in 2050 in the 5.0 °C Scenario compared with 0.65 MJ/US$GDP in the
2.0 °C Scenario and 0.59 MJ/US$GDP in the 1.5 °C Scenario. This is a result of the
estimated power, heat and fuel demands for all sectors, with more stringent efficiency
levels in the alternative scenarios than in the 5.0 °C case. It reflects a further
decoupling of the energy demand and gross domestic product (GDP) growth as a
prerequisite for the rapid decarbonisation of the global energy system.
Total final energy demand is estimated based on assumptions about the demand
drivers, specific energy consumption and the development of energy services in
each region. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the global energy demand will increase by 57%
from 342 EJ/year in 2015 to 537 EJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final
energy will be 19% lower than the current consumption and will reach 278 EJ/year
by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will be 253 EJ, 26% below
the 2015 demand, and, in 2050, will be 9% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario.
Global electricity demand will significantly increase in the alternative scenarios
due to the electrification of the transport and heating sectors, which will replace
fuels, but will also be due to a moderate increase in the electricity demand of
“classical” electrical devices on a global level. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity
demand for heating will be about 12,600 TWh/year from electric heaters and heat
pumps, and, in the transport sector, there will be an increase of about 23,400 TWh/
year due to electric mobility. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and
high-temperature process heat) and the manufacture of synthetic fuels for transport
will add an additional power demand of 18,800 TWh/year. The gross power demand
will thus rise from 24,300 TWh/year in 2015 to 65,900 TWh/year in 2050 in the
2.0 °C Scenario, 34% higher than in the 5.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the
gross electricity demand will increase to a maximum of 65,300 TWh/year in 2050.
Global electricity generation from renewable energy sources will reach 100% by
2050 in the alternative scenarios. “New” renewables—mainly wind, solar and
geothermal energy—will contribute 83% of the total electricity generated. The
contribution of renewable electricity to total production will be 62% by 2030 and
88% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 9500 GW by
2030 and 25,600 GW by 2050. The proportion of electricity generated from
renewables in 2030 in the 1.5 °C Scenario is assumed to be 73%. The 1.5 °C
Scenario will have a generation capacity of renewable energy of about 25,700 GW
in 2050.
From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth of wind and PV to 7850 GW and
12,300 GW, respectively, will be complemented by the generation of up to 2060 GW
of solar thermal energy as well as limited biomass-derived (770 GW), geothermal
Executive Summary xxv
(560 GW) and ocean-derived energy (around 500 GW) in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both
the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead to the generation of high proportions (38%
and 46%, respectively) of energy from variable power sources (PV, wind and ocean)
by 2030, which will increase to 64% and 65%, respectively, by 2050. This will
require a significant change in how the power system is operated. The main findings
of the power sector analysis are summarized in the section below.
Calculated average electricity-generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs)
were around 6 ct/kWh. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, these generation costs will increase,
assuming rising CO2 emission costs in the future, until 2050, when they reach
10.6 ct/kWh. The generation costs will increase in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios
until 2030, when they will reach 9 ct/kWh, and then drop to 7 ct/kWh by 2050. In
both alternative scenarios, the generation costs will be around 3.5 ct/kWh lower
than in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 2050. Note that these estimates of generation costs
do not take into account integration costs such as power grid expansion, storage and
other load-balancing measures.
Total electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C Scenario will increase from today’s
$1560 billion/year to more than $5 500 billion/year in 2050, due to the growth in
demand and increasing fossil fuel prices. In both alternative scenarios, the total
supply costs will be $5050 billion/year in 2050, about 8% lower than in the 5.0 °C
Scenario.
Global investment in power generation between 2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C
Scenario will be around $49,000 billion, which will include additional power plants
to produce hydrogen and synthetic fuels and the plant replacement costs at the end
of their economic lifetimes. This value is equivalent to approximately $1360 billion
per year on average, which is $28,600 billion more than in the 5.0 °C Scenario
($20,400 billion). An investment of around $51,000 billion for power generation
will be required between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario ($1420 billion per
year on average). In both alternative scenarios, the world will shift almost 95% of
its total energy investment to renewables and cogeneration.
Fuel Cost Savings Because renewable energy has no fuel costs other than biomass,
the cumulative savings in fuel cost in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of
$26,300 billion in 2050, equivalent to $730 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel
costs in the 2.0 °C Scenario will be equivalent to 90% of the energy investments in
the 5.0 °C Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will sum to
$28,800 billion or $800 billion per year.
Final energy demand for heating will increase by 59% in the 5.0 °C Scenario
from 151 EJ/year in 2015 to around 240 EJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 36% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C
Scenario, relative to that in the 5.0 °C case, and by 40% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Global Heat Supply In 2015, renewables supplied around 20% of the final global
energy demand for heating, mainly from biomass. Renewable energy will provide
42% of the world’s total heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 56% in the
1.5 °C Scenario. In both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of the total heat
xxvi Executive Summary
demand in 2050. This will include the direct use of electricity for heating, which
will increase by a factor of 4.2–4.5 between 2015 and 2050 and will constitute a
final share of 26% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 30% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Estimated investments in renewable heating technologies to 2050 will amount to
more than $13,200 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments for plant
replacement after their economic lifetimes)—approximately $368 billion per year.
The largest share of investment is assumed to be for heat pumps (around
$5700 billion), followed by solar collectors and geothermal heat use. The 1.5 °C
Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable technologies. However, the
lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0 °C Scenario) will result in a lower
average annual investment of around $344 billion per year.
Energy demand in the transport sector will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario from
around 97 EJ/year in 2015 by 50% to 146 EJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario,
assumed changes in technical, structural and behavioural factors will reduce this by
66% (96 EJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario. Additional modal
shifts, technological changes and a reduction in the transport demand will lead to
even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 74% (or 108 EJ/year) in 2050
compared with the 5.0 °C case.
Transport Energy Supply By 2030, electricity will provide 12% (2700 TWh/year)
of the transport sector’s total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and, in 2050,
this share will be 47% (6500 TWh/year). In 2050, around 8430 PJ/year of hydrogen
will be used as a complementary renewable option in the transport sector. In the
1.5 °C Scenario, the annual electricity demand will be about 5200 TWh in 2050.
The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a hydrogen demand of 6850 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use will be limited to a maximum of around 12,000 PJ/year in the 2.0 °C
Scenario. Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be
introduced, with a maximum amount of 5820 PJ/year in 2050. Because of the lower
overall energy demand in transport, biofuel use will decrease in the 1.5 °C Scenario
to a maximum of 10,000 PJ/year. The maximum synthetic fuel demand will amount
to 6300 PJ/year.
Global primary energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario will decrease by 21%
from around 556 EJ/year in 2015 to 439 EJ/year. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario,
the overall primary energy demand will decrease by 48% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C
Scenario (5.0 °C, 837 EJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy
demand will be even lower (412 EJ) in 2050 because the final energy demand and
conversion losses will be lower.
Global Primary Energy Supply Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly
phase out coal and oil, after which renewable energy will have a primary energy
share of 35% in 2030 and 92% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario,
renewables will have a primary share of more than 92% in 2050 (this will include
nonenergy consumption, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy is
phased out in both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary energy
consumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C Scenario will sum to 5580 EJ, the
Executive Summary xxvii
cumulative coal consumption will be about 6360 EJ, and the crude oil consumption
to 6380 EJ. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand is 3140 EJ, the
cumulative coal demand 2340 EJ and the cumulative oil demand 2960 EJ. Even
lower fossil fuel use will be achieved under the 1.5 °C Scenario: 2710 EJ for natural
gas, 1570 EJ for coal and 2230 EJ for oil. In both alternative scenarios, the primary
energy supply in 2050 will be based on 100% renewable energy (Fig. 5).
Bunker Fuels In 2015, the annual bunker fuel consumption was in the order of
16,000 PJ, of which 7400 PJ was for aviation and 8600 PJ for navigation. Annual
CO2 emissions from bunker fuels accounted for 1.3 Gt in 2015, approximately 4%
of the global energy-related CO2 emissions. In the 5.0 °C case, we assume the
development of the final energy demand for bunkers according to the IEA World
Energy Outlook 2017, Current Policies scenario. This will lead to a further increase
in the demand for bunker fuels by 120% until 2050 compared with the base year
2015. Because no substitution with “green” fuels is assumed, CO2 emissions will
rise by the same order of magnitude. Although the use of hydrogen and electricity
in aviation is technically feasible (at least for regional transport) and synthetic gas
use in navigation is an additional option under discussion, this analysis adopts a
conservative approach and assumes that bunker fuels are only replaced by biofuels
and synthetic liquid fuels. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, we assume the limited
use of sustainable biomass potentials and the complementary central production of
power-to-liquid synfuels.
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, this production is assumed to take place in three world
regions: Africa, the Middle East and OECD Pacific (especially Australia), where
synfuel generation for export is expected to be most economic. The 1.5 °C Scenario
requires even faster decarbonisation, so it follows a more ambitious low-energy
pathway. The production of synthetic fuels will cause significant additional
electricity demand and a corresponding expansion of renewable power-generation
capacities. In the case of liquid bunker fuels, these additional renewable
900,000
Efficiency
800,000
Ocean energy
700,000 Geothermal
600,000 Solar
500,000 Biomass
PJ/yr
400,000 Wind
300,000 Hydro
200,000 Natural gas
100,000 Crude oil
0 Coal
REF 2.0°C1.5°C REF 2.0°C1.5°C REF 2.0°C1.5°C REF 2.0°C1.5°C REF 2.0°C1.5°C Nuclear
2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Fig. 5 Global projections of total primary energy demand (PED) by energy carrier in the various
scenarios
xxviii Executive Summary
bulk power, especially for industry, and to provide secured capacities to power sys-
tems. By 2030, the annual CSP market must increase to 78 GW, compared with
3 GW in 2020 and only 0.1 GW in 2017.
In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the phase-out of coal and lignite power plants is acceler-
ated, and a total capacity of 618 GW—equivalent to approximately 515 power sta-
tions (1.2 GW on average)—must end operation by 2025. This will mean a phase-out
of two coal power plants per week from 2020 onwards, on average. The replacement
power will come from a variety of renewable power generators, both variable and
dispatchable. The annual market for solar PV energy must be around 30% higher
than it was in 2025, as under the 2.0 °C Scenario. The onshore wind market also has
an accelerated trajectory under the 1.5 °C Scenario, whereas the offshore wind mar-
ket is assumed to be almost identical to that in the 2.0 °C Scenario, because of long
lead times for these projects. The same is assumed for CSP plants, which are utility-
scale projects, and significantly higher deployment seems unlikely in the time
remaining until 2025.
Utilization of Power Plant Capacities On a global scale, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C
Scenarios, the shares of variable renewable power generation will increase from 4%
in 2015 to 38% and 46%, respectively, by 2030, and will increase to 64% and 65%,
respectively, by 2050. The reason for the variations in the two cases is the different
assumptions made regarding efficiency measures, which may lead to lower overall
demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. During the same period,
dispatchable renewables—CSP plants, bioenergy generation, geothermal energy
and hydropower—will remain around 32% until 2030 on a global average and then
decrease slightly to 29% under the 2.0 °C Scenario (and to 27% under the 1.5 °C
Scenario) by 2050. The system share of dispatchable conventional generation
capacities—mainly coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy—will decrease from a global
average of 60% in 2015 to only 14% in 2040. By 2050, the remaining dispatchable
conventional gas power plants will be converted to operate on hydrogen as a
synthetic fuel, to avoid stranded investments and to achieve higher dispatch power
capacities. Increased variable shares—mainly in the USA, the Middle East region
and Australia—will produce hydrogen for local and the export markets, as fuel for
both renewable power plants and the transport sector.
Development of Maximum and Residual Loads for the Ten World Regions The
maximum load will increase in all regions and within similar ranges under both the
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The load in OECD countries will rise most strongly in
response to increased electrification, mainly in the transport sector, whereas the load
in developing countries will increase as the overall electricity demand increases in
all sectors.
The most significant increase will be in Africa, where the maximum load will
surge by 534% over the entire modelling period due to favourable economic
development and increased access to energy services by households. In OECD
Pacific (South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand), efficiency measures will
xxx Executive Summary
reduce the maximum load to 87% by 2030 relative to that in the base year, and it
will increase to 116% by 2050 with the expansion of electric mobility and the
increased electrification of the process heat supply in the industry sector. The 1.5 °C
Scenario calculates slightly higher loads in 2030 due to the accelerated electrifica-
tion of the industry, heating and business sectors, except in three regions (the Middle
East, India and Non-OECD Asia Other Asia), where the early application of effi-
ciency measures will lead to an overall lower demand at the end of the modelling
period, for the same GDP and population growth rates.
In this analysis, the residual load is the load remaining after the variable renew-
able power generation. Negative values indicate that the energy generated from
solar and wind exceeds the actual load and must be exported to other regions, stored
or curtailed. In each region, the average generation should be consistent with the
average load. However, maximum loads and maximum generations do not usually
occur at the same time, so surplus electricity can be produced and must be exported
or stored as far as possible. In rare individual cases, solar- or wind-based generation
plants can also temporarily reduce their output to a lower load, or some plants can
be shut down. Any reduction in energy generation from solar and wind sources in
response to low demands is defined as “curtailment”. In this analysis, curtailment
rates of up to 5% by 2030 and 10% by 2050 are assumed to have no substantial
negative economic impact on the operation of power plants and therefore will not
trigger an increase in storage capacities. Figure 6 illustrates the development of
maximum loads across all ten world regions under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios.
Global Storage and Dispatch Capacities The world market for storage and dis-
patch technologies and services will increase significantly in the 2.0 °C Scenario.
The annual market for new hydro-pumped storage plants will grow on average by
6 GW per year to a total capacity of 244 GW in 2030. During the same period, the
total installed capacity of batteries will increase to 12 GW, requiring an annual mar-
ket of 1 GW. Between 2030 and 2050, the energy service sector for storage and
storage technologies must accelerate further. The battery market must grow by an
annual installation rate of 22 GW and, as a result, will overtake the global cumula-
tive capacity of pumped hydro between 2040 and 2050. The conversion of gas infra-
structure from natural gas to hydrogen and synthetic fuels will start slowly between
2020 and 2030, with the conversion of power plants with annual capacities of
around 2 GW. However, after 2030, the transformation of the global gas industry to
hydrogen will accelerate significantly, with the conversion of a total of 197 GW gas
power plants and gas cogeneration facilities each year. In parallel, the average
capacity of gas and hydrogen plants will decrease from 29% (2578 h/year) in 2030
to 11% (975 h/year) by 2050, converting the gas sector from a supply-driven to a
service-driven industry.
At around 2030, the 1.5 °C Scenario will require more storage throughput than
the 2.0 °C Scenario, but the storage demands for the two scenarios will be equal at
the end of the modelling period. It is assumed that the higher throughput can be
managed with equally higher installed capacities, leading to full-load hours of up to
200 h per year for batteries and hydro-pumped storage.
Executive Summary xxxi
500%
400%
300%
200%
100%
0%
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
2020
2030
2050
OECD North Lan OECD Europe Middle East Africa Eurasia Other Asia India China OECD Pacific
America America
Max Load Development (Base year 2020) [%] Max Load Development (Base year 2020) [%]
Fig. 6 Development of maximum loads in ten world regions in 2020, 2030 and 2050 under the
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios
Trajectories for a Just Transition of the Fossil Fuel Industry The implementation of
the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will have a significant impact on the global fossil
fuel industry. While this may appear to be stating the obvious, current climate
debates have not yet led to an open debate about the orderly withdrawal from the
coal, oil and gas extraction industries. Instead, the political debate about coal, oil
and gas is focused on the security of supply and price security. However, mitigating
climate change is only possible when fossil fuels are phased out.
Coal: Under the 5.0 °C Scenario, the required production of thermal coal—
excluding coal for nonenergy uses, such as steel production—will remain at 2015
levels, with an annual increase of around 1% per year until 2050. Under the 2.0 °C
Scenario, coal production will decline sharply between 2020 and 2030 at a rate of
around 6% per year. By 2030, global coal production will be equal to China’s annual
production in 2017, at 3.7 billion tonnes, whereas that volume will be reached in
2025 under the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
TO PURIFY YEAST FOR BREAD OR CAKES.
A brick oven, heated with wood, is far superior to any other for
baking bread, as well as for most other purposes. The iron ovens,
now commonly attached to kitchen-ranges—the construction of
which has within these few years been wonderfully improved—
though exceedingly convenient, from the facility which they afford for
baking at all hours of the day, do not in general answer well for
bread, unless it be made into very small loaves or rolls, as the
surface becomes hardened and browned long before the heat has
sufficiently penetrated to the centre of the dough. The same
objection often exists to iron-ovens of larger size, which require care
and management, to ensure the successful use of them. A brick
oven should be well heated with faggot wood, or with a faggot, and
two or three solid logs; and after it is cleared, the door should be
closely shut for quite half an hour before the baking commences: the
heat will then be well sustained for a succession of bread, pies,
cakes, and small pastry. The servant who habitually attends at an
oven will soon become acquainted with the precise quantity of fuel
which it requires, and all other peculiarities which may be connected
with it.
A FEW RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MAKING BREAD.
Never use too large a proportion of yeast, as the bread will not
only become dry very speedily when this is done, but it will be far
less sweet and pleasant in flavour than that which is more slowly
fermented, and the colour will not be so good: there will also be a
great chance of its being bitter when brewer’s yeast is used for it.
Remember that milk or water of scalding heat poured to any kind of
yeast will render the bread heavy. One pint of either added quite
boiling to a pint and a half of cold, will bring it to about the degree of
warmth required. In frosty weather the proportion of the heated liquid
may be increased a little.
When only porter-yeast—which is dark-coloured and bitter—can
be procured, use a much smaller proportion than usual, and allow
much longer time for it to rise. Never let it be sent to the oven until it
is evidently light. Bitter bread is unpalatable, but not really
unwholesome; but heavy bread is particularly so.
Let the leaven be kneaded up quickly with the remainder of the
flour when once it is well risen, as it should on no account be allowed
to sink again before this is done, when it has reached the proper
point; and in making the dough, be particularly careful not to render it
too lithe by adding more liquid than is requisite. It should be quite
firm, and entirely free from lumps and crumbs throughout the mass,
and on the surface also, which ought to be perfectly smooth.
In winter, place the bread while it is rising sufficiently close to the
fire to prevent its becoming cold, but never so near as to render it
hot. A warm thick cloth should be thrown over the pan in which it is
made immediately after the leaven is mixed, and kept on it until the
bread is ready for the oven.
HOUSEHOLD BREAD.
(Author’s Receipt.)
Mix with a gallon of flour a large teaspoonful of fine salt, make a
hollow in the centre, and pour in two tablespoonsful of solid, well
purified yeast, gradually diluted with about two pints and a half of
milk, and work it into a thick batter with the surrounding flour, strew a
thick layer over and leave it to rise from an hour to an hour and a
half; then knead it up with as much more warm skimmed milk, or half
new milk and half water, as will render it quite firm and smooth
without being very stiff; let it rise another hour, and divide it into three
loaves; put them into square tins slightly buttered, or into round
baking pans, and bake them about an hour and a quarter in a well-
heated oven. The dough can be formed into household loaves if
preferred, and sent to the oven in the usual way. When a finer and
more spongy kind of bread is required for immediate eating,
substitute new milk for skimmed, dissolve in it about an ounce of
butter, leave it more liquid when the sponge is set, and let the whole
be lightly kneaded into a lithe dough: the bread thus made will be
excellent when new, and for a day or so after it is baked, but it will
become dry sooner than the other.
Flour, 1 gallon; salt, 1 teaspoonful; skimmed milk, 2-1/2 pints, to
rise from 1 to 1-1/2 hour. Additional milk, 1 to 2 pints: to rise 1 hour. 3
loaves, baked 1-1/4 hour.
Obs. 1.—A few spoonsful of cream will wonderfully improve either
of the above receipts, and sweet buttermilk, substituted for the other,
will give to the bread the shortness of a cake: we would particularly
recommend it for trial when it can be procured.
Obs. 2.—Shallow round earthen pans answer much better, we
think, than tins for baking bread; they should be slightly rubbed with
butter before the dough is put into them.
GERMAN YEAST.
A leaven may be first laid with the yeast, and part of the liquid
when it is preferred, as directed for bread made with beer-yeast, but
the result will be equally good if the whole be kneaded up at once, if
it be made quite firm.
PROFESSOR LIEBIG’S BAVARIAN BROWN BREAD.
Break down into very small crumbs three ounces of butter with two
pounds of flour; add a little salt, and set the sponge with a large
tablespoonful of solid yeast, mixed with a pint of new milk, and a
tablespoonful or more of strong saffron water; let it rise for a full hour,
then stir to a couple of well-beaten eggs as much hot milk as will
render them lukewarm, and wet the rolls with them to a light, lithe
dough; leave it from half to three-quarters of an hour longer, mould it
into small rolls, brush them with beaten yolk of egg, and bake them
from twenty minutes to half an hour. The addition of six ounces of
good sugar, three of butter, half a pound or more of currants, the
grated rind of a large lemon, and a couple of ounces of candied
orange-rind, will convert these into excellent buns. When the flavour
of the saffron is not liked, omit it altogether. Only so much should be
used at any time as will give a rich colour to the bread.
Flour, 2 lbs.; butter, 3 oz.; solid yeast, 1 large tablespoonful
(saffron, 1 teaspoonful; water, less than a quarter pint); new milk, 1
pint: 1 hour, or more. 2 eggs, more milk: 3/4 hour: baked 20 to 30
minutes.
RUSKS.
(Author’s Receipt.)
When we first heard unfermented bread vaguely spoken of, we
had it tried very successfully in the following manner; and we have
since been told that an almost similar method of preparing it is
common in many remote parts both of England and Ireland, where it
is almost impossible to procure a constant supply of yeast. Blend
well together a teaspoonful of pounded sugar and fifty grains of the
purest carbonate of soda; mix a saltspoonful of salt with a pound of
flour, and rub the soda and sugar through a hair-sieve into it. Stir and
mingle them well, and make them quickly into a firm but not hard
dough with sour buttermilk. Bake the loaf well in a thoroughly heated,
but not fierce oven. In a brick, or good iron oven a few minutes less
than an hour would be sufficient to bake a loaf of similar weight. The
buttermilk should be kept until it is quite acid, but it must never be in
the slightest degree rancid, or otherwise bad. All unfermented bread
should be placed in the oven directly it is made, or it will be heavy.
For a larger baking allow rather less than an ounce of soda to the
gallon (seven pounds) of flour.
Obs.—There are cases in which a knowledge of this, or of any
other equally easy mode of bread-making would be invaluable. For
example:—We learn from the wife of an officer who has for a long
time been stationed off the Isle of Skye, in which his family have their
abode, that the inhabitants depend entirely for bread on supplies
brought to them from Glasgow; and that they are often entirely
without, when the steamer which ought to arrive at intervals of eight
days, is delayed by stress of weather. The residents are then
compelled to have recourse to scones—as a mixture of flour and
water and a little soda (cooked on a flat iron plate), are called—or to
ship’s biscuit; and these are often found unsuitable for young
children and invalids. There are no ovens in the houses, though
there are grates for coal fires, in front of which small loaves of
unfermented bread could be baked extremely well in good American
ovens. Buttermilk can always be procured; and if not, a provision of
carbonate of soda and muriatic acid might be kept at hand to ensure
the means of making wholesome bread. In many other localities the
same plan might prove of equal benefit.
TO KEEP BREAD.