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Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science 14
Toshio Yamada
Contemporary
Capitalism and
Civil Society
The Japanese Experience
Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity
Science
Volume 14
Editors-in-Chief
Takahiro Fujimoto, Tokyo, Japan
Yuji Aruka, Tokyo, Japan
Editorial Board
Satoshi Sechiyama, Kyoto, Japan
Yoshinori Shiozawa, Osaka, Japan
Kiichiro Yagi, Neyagawa, Osaka, Japan
Kazuo Yoshida, Kyoto, Japan
Hideaki Aoyama, Kyoto, Japan
Hiroshi Deguchi, Yokohama, Japan
Makoto Nishibe, Sapporo, Japan
Takashi Hashimoto, Nomi, Japan
Masaaki Yoshida, Kawasaki, Japan
Tamotsu Onozaki, Tokyo, Japan
Shu-Heng Chen, Taipei, Taiwan
Dirk Helbing, Zurich, Switzerland
The Japanese Association for Evolutionary Economics (JAFEE) always has adhered
to its original aim of taking an explicit “integrated” approach. This path has been
followed steadfastly since the Association’s establishment in 1997 and, as well,
since the inauguration of our international journal in 2004. We have deployed an
agenda encompassing a contemporary array of subjects including but not limited to:
foundations of institutional and evolutionary economics, criticism of mainstream
views in the social sciences, knowledge and learning in socio-economic life,
development and innovation of technologies, transformation of industrial
organizations and economic systems, experimental studies in economics, agent-
based modeling of socio-economic systems, evolution of the governance structure
of firms and other organizations, comparison of dynamically changing institutions
of the world, and policy proposals in the transformational process of economic life.
In short, our starting point is an “integrative science” of evolutionary and institutional
views. Furthermore, we always endeavor to stay abreast of newly established
methods such as agent-based modeling, socio/econo-physics, and network analysis
as part of our integrative links.
More fundamentally, “evolution” in social science is interpreted as an essential
key word, i.e., an integrative and /or communicative link to understand and
re-domain various preceding dichotomies in the sciences: ontological or
epistemological, subjective or objective, homogeneous or heterogeneous, natural or
artificial, selfish or altruistic, individualistic or collective, rational or irrational,
axiomatic or psychological-based, causal nexus or cyclic networked, optimal or
adaptive, micro- or macroscopic, deterministic or stochastic, historical or theoretical,
mathematical or computational, experimental or empirical, agent-based or socio/
econo-physical, institutional or evolutionary, regional or global, and so on. The
conventional meanings adhering to various traditional dichotomies may be more or
less obsolete, to be replaced with more current ones vis-à-vis contemporary
academic trends. Thus we are strongly encouraged to integrate some of the
conventional dichotomies.
These attempts are not limited to the field of economic sciences, including
management sciences, but also include social science in general. In that way,
understanding the social profiles of complex science may then be within our reach.
In the meantime, contemporary society appears to be evolving into a newly emerging
phase, chiefly characterized by an information and communication technology
(ICT) mode of production and a service network system replacing the earlier
established factory system with a new one that is suited to actual observations. In
the face of these changes we are urgently compelled to explore a set of new properties
for a new socio/economic system by implementing new ideas. We thus are keen to
look for “integrated principles” common to the above-mentioned dichotomies
throughout our serial compilation of publications. We are also encouraged to create
a new, broader spectrum for establishing a specific method positively integrated in
our own original way.
Contemporary Capitalism
and Civil Society
The Japanese Experience
Toshio Yamada
Nagoya University
Nagoya, Japan
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
Preface
v
vi Preface
Part II “The Rise and Fall of Contemporary Japanese Capitalism” includes four
chapters. Here I analyze Japanese capitalism from the postwar period to the present
day using the methodology of French régulation theory. The keyword in this analy-
sis is “companyism” rather than “Fordism.”
Chapter 4, “The Introduction of Régulation Theory in Japan,” is a new essay. In
the 1970s the “golden age of capitalism” had passed, and a new era of confusion and
unemployment in developed countries was beginning. In this environment, Japanese
capitalism made great strides by taking up the weapon of aggressive exports, and in
the 1980s Japan even reached the point of being recognized as a “great economic
power.” In the face of such transitions, existing economics lost its persuasiveness in
Japan just as it did in other countries. It was under these circumstances that the
régulation theory created in France began to attract attention, and in this chapter I
examine the nature of the works through which this theory was presented in Japan.
Chapter 5, “Postwar Japanese Capitalism and Companyist Régulation,” attempts
an analysis of postwar Japanese capitalism inspired by régulation theory. Japan’s
mode of régulation, which cannot be fully grasped using the régulationist keyword
“Fordism,” is understood instead in terms of the concepts of “companyism” and
“the companyist compromise,” and the key to understanding the postwar Japanese
economy is sought in the fact that this “companyism” is effective in guiding
investment-led and export-led growth regimes. The examination of companyism,
looked at in another way, is in fact the examination of civil society. This chapter is
based on “Japanese Capitalism and the Companyist Compromise,” included in
Robert Boyer and Toshio Yamada, eds., Japanese Capitalism in Crisis: A
Regulationist Interpretation, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, with exten-
sive revisions and additions.
Chapter 6, “The Collapse of Companyism and Today’s Post-Companyist
Transformation,” traces the transformation the Japanese economy has undergone
from the collapse of the bubble at the beginning of the 1990s to the present. During
this period Japanese companies undertook striking overseas expansion and multina-
tionalization. In the process, the Japanese mode of régulation characterized as
“companyism” was clearly to a large extent destroyed. That being said, it is not as
though at present a vigorous new mode of régulation and growth regime have been
established. I refer to this current state as the “post-companyist transition” and com-
pare it with the “companyism” it has succeeded. This chapter is based mainly on
sections I contributed to two previously published articles, “How Has the Japanese
Mode of Régulation Changed?: The Whereabouts of Companyism,” coauthored
with Yasuro Hirano and included in Robert Boyer, Hiroyasu Uemura and Akinori
Isogai, eds., Diversity and Transformations of Asian Capitalisms, London and
New York: Routledge, 2012, and “Multinationalization of Japanese Firms and
Dysfunction of Companyist Régulation,” coauthored with Yasuro Hirano and pre-
sented at the International Conference on Research & Regulation 2015 held at the
Université Paris Diderot in June of 2015.
Chapter 7, “Analyses of Japanese Capitalism Based on the Régulation Approach:
An Overview of Thirty Years of Research,” is a survey of 30 years of Japanese eco-
nomics research based on régulation theory. The main topics it addresses are as
viii Preface
follows. (1) Was the high growth in the 1950s and 1960s Fordist? (2) How was
Japan as an economic power in the 1970s and 1980s régulated? (3) What type of
crisis has the Japanese economy been in during its long stagnation since the 1990s?
(4) How is Japan situated in relation to other Asian countries? This chapter was
written by adding content to “Analyses of Japanese Capitalism Based on the
Régulation Approach: An Overview of Twenty Years of Research,” a paper pre-
sented at the Yokohama-MFJ International Conference held in Tokyo at the Maison
Franco-Japonaise in August of 2008.
Part III “Theoretical Considerations of Contemporary Capitalism” includes four
chapters. In them I consider several theoretical topics with a focus on the diversity
of capitalism in the modern world, the dominance of neoliberalism, and the current
state of affairs in countries with transition economies. Through this I anticipate the
development of the régulation approach and further maturation of civil society.
In Chap. 8, “Stage Theory or Typology?: Methodological Reflections on the
Comparative Analysis of Capitalism,” I consider methodological questions that
must be taken into account when discussing diversity in modern capitalism and the
unique character of capitalism in Japan. Are the differences between capitalism in
each country differences in these countries’ stage of historical development, or dif-
ferences in their tracks or types? How should the temporal and spatial variance in
each country’s capitalism be understood as a whole? My discussion of these ques-
tions is based on “Methodological Reflections on the Comparative Analysis of
Capitalism,” an article previously published in The Journal of Comparative
Economic Studies (The Japanese Society for Comparative Economic Studies), 10,
March 2015.
In Chap. 9, “Economic Crises and Growth Regimes,” I attempt a theoretical
examination of the dynamics of capitalism in time and space based on the régulation
approach. In engaging in a historical/structural analysis of the modern world, I elu-
cidate the importance of what are called the “comparative approach” and the
“growth regime approach.” The chapter was written by substantially expanding my
article “Economic Crises and Growth Regimes,” previously published in Hideko
Magara, ed., Economic Crises and Policy Regimes: The Dynamics of Policy
Innovation and Paradigmatic Change, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward
Elgar, 2014.
In Chap. 10, “The Neoliberal Regime and Its Possible Crisis: A Reflection from
the Viewpoint of Institutional Change,” I elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of
neoliberalism in the current era, while giving an overview of the potential for crisis
through, on the one hand, synthesizing growth regime and policy regime theories
and, on the other hand, analyzing the mechanisms of gradual institutional change.
Focusing in particular on the ways in which neoliberalism is destroying democracy,
I emphasize the need to counter this by activating the “society principle” and invig-
orating civil society. This chapter was written by making extensive additions to
“Institutional Change and Regime Crisis: A Critical Viewpoint on Neoliberalism,”
previously published in Hideko Magara, ed., Policy Change Under New Democratic
Capitalism, London and New York: Routledge, 2017.
Preface ix
In Chap. 11, “Transition Economies and State Capitalism,” I address the fact that
in recent years there has been a strengthening trend toward “state capitalism” in the
socio-economies of nations transitioning from socialism to capitalism (particularly
Russia and China). I attempt to understand this state capitalism as a particular type
of mode of régulation – one arising out of the immaturity of civil society. Here this
analysis is presented for the first time in English.
On many occasions, including international conferences held in Paris, Grenoble,
Turin, and many cities in Japan, I have received useful comments and helpful sug-
gestions from a considerable number of friends and colleagues. In particular, I wish
to express my deep gratitude to Robert Boyer, Hiroyasu Uemura, Hideko Magara,
Bruno Amable, Nanako Fujita, Robert Chapeskie, and the Japan Association for
Evolutionary Economics.
I would also like to thank the publishers and editorial boards of the books and
journals cited above for allowing previously published texts to be reproduced in this
book.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis has been added by the author.
2. Words in square brackets ([ ]) in quotations have been added by the author.
3. Ellipses (…) in quotations indicate text has been omitted by the author.
4. Citations in the body of text include the name of the author, year of publication,
and page(s) on which the cited text appears. For example, “Uchida (1953:34)”
refers to a quotation from page 34 of a text by Uchida published in 1953. Full
citations are given at the end of each chapter.
5. Throughout this book, the French word “régulation” (for the most part written
without italics) is used with its French spelling (acute accent on the “é”) to dis-
tinguish it from the English “regulation” which has a slightly different
connotation.
xi
Contents
xiii
xiv Contents
Japanese Communist Party (JCP). This meant that Marxian economists had begun
to lose both the desire and the ability to participate in formulating economic poli-
cies. In this way Marxian political economy, having in many respects lost interest in
actual political concerns entirely, became an abstract discourse of criticism of capi-
talism in general; it defended itself by turning its back on the actual circumstances
of the era.
In the postwar period, Japanese Marxian economists were also indifferent to, or
actively withdrew from, international academic society. Japanese scholars had of
course been very sensitive to the world’s latest academic trends and translated into
Japanese many Marxian texts such as those of Paul M. Sweezy, Maurice H. Dobb,
and Eugen S. Varga. But these “international interchanges” were only instances of
scientific “importation,” not of reciprocal contribution and debate. Consequently,
until the 1970s Japanese Marxian political economy developed in isolation, cut off
from trends in the rest of the world. And as a result of this isolated development,
“(rather like some fragment of a biological species which is cut off from others by
geographical circumstances) their [Japanese Marxists’] theories began to evolve in
a number of distinctive directions” (Morris-Suzuki 1989: 104). The two most prom-
inent of these “distinctive directions” were systematization into grand theories and
a flourishing of exegetical studies of Marx’s texts.
Speaking more precisely, postwar Japanese Marxian political economy can be
divided into three schools: the orthodox school, the Uno school, and the civil society
school. While the Uno school is a descendant of the prewar Rōnō school, the other
two constitute two types of successors to the Kōza school that took part in the so-
called debate over Japanese capitalism (nihon shihonshugi ronsō) that unfolded in
the 1930s. It is therefore useful to give a brief account of this debate before moving
on.
In the 1920s, Japan saw the publication of the first Japanese language translation
of Marx’s Capital; however, the capitalist world depicted in Capital differed greatly
from Japan’s socioeconomic realities at the time. The biggest issue was how to
evaluate the remnants of feudal or semi-feudal systems, which at that point still
existed to a considerable extent throughout Japan. Were they transitory features that
would disappear along with the capitalist development of Japan or structural fea-
tures that would necessarily survive as long as Japan remained capitalist? Were they
a result of Japanese backwardness in terms of stages of capitalist development or
necessary elements peculiar to Japanese capitalism? In other words, it was also a
debate over how to evaluate the nature and possibility of civil and modern socioeco-
nomic elements within a Japanese context. These questions provoked a great num-
ber of disputes that comprised the “debate over Japanese capitalism” among
Japanese Marxists in the 1930s.
At the same time, this debate was also closely related to political strategies for
socialist revolution. The Rōnō school considered feudalism a product of Japan’s
backwardness in terms of its stage of development, insisted that its socio-economy
would converge on that of other advanced capitalist nations as its capitalist develop-
ment progressed, and asserted that the coming revolution must be socialist. This
school included, among many others, Tamizō Kushida (1885–1934) and Itsurō
1.2 Directions of Economic Reconstruction 5
Sakisaka (1897–1985). On the other hand, the Kōza school, led by Moritarō Yamada
(1898–1980) and Eitaō Noro (1900–1934), stressed the impossibility of dissolving
feudalism under capitalism; they asserted that its survival was inevitable, that it
would result in a specific type of Japanese capitalism, and that Japan required two
revolutions: first bourgeois and then socialist. This debate thus included many cre-
ative ideas on how to analyze the capitalist economies of the day outside of a
Western context.
In postwar Japan, however, Marxism underwent a general decline, primarily
because it remained wedded to the “general crisis theory of capitalism” in the midst
of an era of rapid growth. This is aptly stated by Furihata: “While modern theory
[for example, that of the neo-classical synthesis] was shown to be in error by the end
of [the period of] high growth, Marxian political economy had already collapsed as
a result of high growth itself” (Furihata 1983: 6). Most of the Marxian economists
fled from the analysis of actual economies, turning to textual critiques of Marxian
manuscripts, the study of which expanded to an abnormal extent during the high-
growth era (Takasuka 1985). Japanese Marxian economics thereby became turned
in on itself and fell into its own crisis. This crisis was further amplified by the suc-
cessive collapses of the socialist countries beginning at the end of the 1980s. It can
also be said, however, that this crisis gave birth to a fruitful new approach that made
more flexible use of Marxian ideas.
In short, we can summarize the Japanese Marxian political economy in the last
half of the 20th century as a period in which this approach to economics, despite
enjoying a heritage of high level discourse created during the debate over Japanese
capitalism before the war, failed to adjust to the conditions of postwar Japan. But we
cannot grasp the full import of Japanese postwar political economy by noting only
this general trend. Because of the historical and critical perspectives the Marxian
perspective alone could provide, Marxian political economists, especially those of
the Uno and civil society schools, proposed a number of insightful ideas concerning
the issues of postwar economic development. Here we will consider these ideas by
dividing the so-called postwar era into three periods: the economic reconstruction
period, the rapid economic growth period, and the post-oil shock period.
But no one believed that the purpose of reconstruction should be to reproduce the
Japan of the prewar era. What form, then, should the new Japanese economy take?
Marxists joined the debate over the nature of this new era. And to their advantage,
Marxists alone enjoyed the benefit of having inherited their own discourse from the
prewar debate over Japanese capitalism. Japanese Marxian political economy was
at the height of its influence in the period of economic recovery, during which pro-
totypes of the representative Marxian schools of postwar Japan were formed.
was needed was a struggle for “the complete overthrow of the semi-feudal system”
(Inoue et al. 1953).
In short, there was no possibility of ongoing economic development, not only
because Japan was in the midst of the general historical phase of SMC but also
because Japanese capitalism in particular preserved semi-feudal elements from the
prewar era. According to this orthodox Marxian view, Japanese capitalism still
retained its structural contradictions in spite of the postwar reforms and existed as
an extremely weak capitalism in comparison to Western models. Inoue suggests that
as a result the reconstruction of the Japanese economy could not be achieved with-
out transforming it into a socialist system. In his view, only a socialist revolution
could lead to economic development.
There was, however, another group which, although it succeeded the same Kōza
school, established a different theory. This approach was referred to as “moderniza-
tion theory,” though not in the Rostowian sense. This group was not necessarily
composed of Marxists alone. Even those of its members who were close to Marxism
addressed Marx in relation to Adam Smith or Max Weber and did not elevate Marx
alone in their analysis. Here we will examine one such thinker, Hisao Ōtsuka
(1907–1996), who was remarkably active in this period.
His point of view on the development of the Japanese economy can be summa-
rized as follows (Ōtsuka 1946). What is most important for the reconstruction of the
Japanese economy is the creation of a “modern type of human being.” The objective
conditions this requires are a liberation of the peasantry “from below” (general for-
mation of an independent and self-sustaining peasantry) and the creation of a
domestic market before the creation of foreign markets that was being insisted upon
by the government. In other words, it is only on the basis of these two conditions
having been met that a modernized population can be formed in Japan, a population
made up of a “modern type of human being” that will then constitute one of the
most powerful “productive forces” in the reconstructed Japanese economy.
Ōtsuka’s approach is based upon his earlier studies of European economic his-
tory conducted both before and during the war, and its result is an original and
influential doctrine called “Ōtsuka Historiography.” Calling into question the driv-
ing forces that had brought modern capitalism into existence, Ōtsuka (1951, 1964)
sharply criticizes the accepted theory of the German Historical School that had
located these forces in the “development of commerce” and proposes a new theory
that situates them in the formation of a “mediocrity of fortune” (intermediate pro-
ducers’ stratum) and its subsequent polarization. According to Ōtsuka, while the
“path from above,” or the progression from commercial capital (antediluvian capi-
tal) to industrial capital, was seen primarily in Prussia, the “path from below,” or the
progression from yeoman capital (intermediate producers’ stratum) to industrial
capital, was most evident in Britain and America. The “path from above” could not
8 1 Political Economy in Japan After World War II
be truly revolutionary in the birth of capitalism. On the contrary it was the “path
from below” that constituted a pure and civilized capitalism sustained by modern
type human beings and modern productive forces.
From Ōtsuka’s perspective, the direction of development for postwar Japan
should be one in which peasants become landed farmers by liberating themselves
from semi-feudal relations and in which a broad domestic market is built up on the
bases of both the public wealth (Volksreichtum) in the hands of farmers and the divi-
sion of national labor between agriculture and industry. What was critically impor-
tant at that moment was that working people be molded into a “modern type of
human being” and thereby become vehicles of “modern productive forces.” While
orthodox Marxism insisted on the impossibility of capitalist development and the
great potential of socialist development, Ōtsuka, despite having inherited the same
Kōza school theory, emphasized that the authentic path of economic development
consisted in a “from below” approach supported by a modern type of human being,
regardless of whether Japan adopted a capitalist or socialist system.
We have so far followed two theories stemming from the tradition of the Kōza
school, but postwar Japan also had an excellent political economy framework devel-
oped by the Rōnō school, the other prewar school of Japanese economic thought.
The political economic thought of Kōzō Uno (1897–1977), which came to be called
“Uno Theory,” attracted many followers who formed the influential “Uno school.”
Uno’s works are, it can surely be said, among the greatest achievements in postwar
Japanese economics (see Barshay 2004: Ch. 4). His political economy is constructed
in a very systematic way from a pure and abstract theory to a concrete analysis of
the real world. Though the domains that Uno himself studied are situated on the
level of pure theory (“general principles”), his methodology not only originated
from his own reflection on the debate over Japanese capitalism in the interwar
period but also is deeply related to debates on the direction Japan was to take in its
reconstruction. Before we examine his system of political economy, therefore, we
will first briefly review what he wrote about economic reconstruction.
The reconstruction of postwar Japan, Uno (1946) argued, should be based mainly
on the establishment of capitalist agriculture and large enterprises, rather than on
landed farmers and industrial capital, so that farm and factory workers will have the
organizational basis to develop democracy. In short, Uno stressed that economic
democratization had to be founded on industrial socialization, and he predicted the
emergence of socialism in Japan based upon industrial socialization and a widening
economic democratization.
Uno Theory, which emphasizes capitalist management of agriculture and social-
ization of industry, contrasts sharply with Ōtsuka Historiography, which stresses a
broad formation of small commodity producers. Uno presents a new conception in
which economic democratization in contemporary Japan should be achieved, in
1.2 Directions of Economic Reconstruction 9
contrast to the case of England, for example, on the basis of industrial socialization.
Uno’s novel insight lies, in short, in the recognition that a backward country does
not simply imitate and repeat the historical processes of advanced countries; its
capitalist development may end up taking a different form in accordance with the
historical stage of world capitalism in which it starts its development. This view
formed the basis of his own methodology and system of political economy.
Any system of Marxian political economy, Uno (1962) argued, has to be divided
into three progressive levels: general principles, stage theories, and analysis of
actual conditions. The first level, that of general principles, is a field in which,
assuming for methodological purposes a pure capitalist society, we define the most
fundamental economic laws of capitalism. The second level, that of stage theories,
is a field of research addressing the particular contents of different stages of capital-
ist development, such as the stage of commercial capitalism (exemplified by the
mercantilist policies of the 16th and 17th centuries), the stage of industrial capital-
ism (exemplified by liberal policies after the Industrial Revolution), and lastly a
stage of finance capitalism (exemplified by the rise of imperialism beginning in the
late 19th century). And it is only on these foundations of general principles and
stage theories that we can undertake analyses of the actual conditions of capitalism
in a particular country during a particular period, such as, for example, postwar
Japan. Analysis of actual conditions constitutes the third and last level and also the
ultimate goal of all economic studies.
To be sure, the pure capitalism that is presupposed in the postulation of general
principles has never existed. But a methodological supposition of pure capitalism is,
Uno says, neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, because capitalist societies, especially
that of England, manifested, from the 17th century to the middle of the 19th century,
a tendency to evolve toward pure capitalism. It is on this real and historical basis
that one can construct the general principles of political economy. From Uno’s point
of view, Marx’s Capital is clearly a text of pure theory or general principles of capi-
talism, but as such is insufficient and incomplete; one finds there a careless mixture
of pure theory with a number of propositions that do not belong at the level of gen-
eral principles, for example, those concerning the pauperization of the working
class, primitive accumulation, and so on. According to Uno, the pauperization the-
sis, for example, describes a characteristic particular to English capitalism, espe-
cially during the first half of the 19th century, and thus a phenomenon whose study
ought to belong to the level of stage theory or of the analysis of actual conditions.
If all capitalist countries always moved toward pure capitalism, it would be
enough for us to have, as disciplines of political economy, merely general principles
and the analysis of actual conditions. In reality, however, the self-purifying ten-
dency of capitalism was reversed with the historical appearance of finance capital at
the end of the 19th century. This is why the general principles, by themselves, are
not sufficient and a stage theory is required. Uno distills these reflections from the
debate between the Kōza and Rōnō schools. Both schools, he claims, made the same
mistake of attempting to apply Marx’s Capital directly to the actualities of Japanese
society at the time. As a result the Kōza school overestimated the distance between
Capital and Japanese society, while the Rōnō school erred in the opposite direction.
10 1 Political Economy in Japan After World War II
The essential task both schools had overlooked was the construction of a theory
of the stage of imperialism as a basis for the analysis of the Japanese economy of
their era.
Even as he was devising the above methodology of political economy, Uno
devoted himself to the completion and perfection of his own general principles (Uno
1950/1952). Uno Theory is typical of postwar Japanese thought in its construction
of a grand theoretical system and is a great achievement of which postwar Japanese
Marxian political economy deserves to be proud. Furthermore, in advocating “the
separation of science from ideology,” Uno was an early critic of Stalinism and also
opposed the interference in academic studies of particular political parties or sects.
Uno’s most important book has been translated into English (Uno 1980), his ideas
are often introduced in texts written in English (Mawatari 1985), and we can also
find English works making use of his ideas (Albritton 1986, 1991). Although the
historical limitations and defects of Uno Theory are obvious when we consider it
from the viewpoint of the 21st century, viewed in its original context it still shines,
side by side with Ōtsuka Historiography, as an exemplary achievement of social
science in postwar Japan.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the advanced capitalist world experienced a long period of
prosperity called the “Golden Age of Capitalism” or the “Fordist Era.” In Japan, too,
in 1956, just one decade after the country’s military defeat, the White Paper on the
Economy claimed, “we are no longer in the postwar period.” In fact, in the previous
year, 1955, the GNP of the Japanese economy had recovered to the highest level of
the prewar era. By 1956, the period of economic growth under postwar reconstruc-
tion had ended. The new expectation was for growth through the modernization of
technology and the economy. Although a pessimistic view prevailed both inside and
outside of Marxism, the Japanese economy thereafter enjoyed, contrary to all fore-
casts, an average annual real growth rate of around 10% for some 20 years, an
exceptionally high rate of economic growth. This period (1956–1973) is often
referred to as the “era of high economic growth.” During this period the rural popu-
lation decreased sharply, the real wages of workers increased, new consumer goods
became popular, and people’s lifestyles and values changed drastically.
In general Marxian political economists were either critical of high economic
growth or viewed it impassively. But high growth raised serious questions for
Marxism. The first was how to explain the emergence of this high economic growth
itself, not only in Japan but also in advanced capitalist economies in the age of the
so-called “general crisis of capitalism.” The second was how to understand why the
particular mechanisms of rapid growth in this country existed in Japan and nowhere
else. Next we will examine the struggles of Marxian economists as they grappled
with these questions.
1.3 High Economic Growth and Its Significance 11
Alongside the trend toward abandoning the theory of SMC, there appeared another
movement intended to revise and restructure it. This was a theory of SMC proposed
by Tsutomu Ōuchi (1918–2009). As one of the leading followers of Uno, his objec-
tive was the construction of a foundation for the analysis of actual conditions that
Uno had left incomplete. This was what motivated his approach to SMC. Ōuchi
(1970) explains the essence of SMC as control of the economy by the state through
fiscal policies based on a managed currency system. As he indicates by naming his
doctrine the “crisis theory approach,” the ultimate objective of the state under SMC
consists in escaping from crises, and the principal method for doing so is reducing
real wages through inflationary measures. Ōuchi thus explains SMC not simply by
resorting to the idea of general crisis alone, but by paying attention to the modifica-
tions in capital–labor relations in capitalist countries it precipitates.
In spite of these positive contributions, Ōuchi’s theory has a fatal flaw: it is inca-
pable of explaining high economic growth because it accepts the theories of general
crisis and chronic stagnation. For him, Japan’s high rate of growth was, in the end,
an abnormal phenomenon (Ōuchi 1962). This rapid growth was to be explained
exclusively by the “backwardness” of the Japanese economy and the “postwar fac-
tor.” He considered “backwardness” to be primarily “an abundant existence of low-
wage labor” and the “postwar factor” to be new possibilities for the expansion of
investment and the domestic market owing to the end of the war. However “back-
wardness” and the “postwar factor” of Japanese capitalism were only temporary
phenomena which would disappear before long, and rapid growth based upon these
particular conditions was nothing but an “abnormal,” “particular,” “temporary,” and
exceptional phenomenon. From the vantage point of the present, it is clear that in
this he was quite mistaken.
We have examined two new versions of SMC theory. The story of their develop-
ment is a valuable record of the ways in which the theory of SMC, which was born
during an era of difficult conditions for capitalism, endeavored to transform itself in
the face of the fact of high economic growth. One approach rejected the crisis-
oriented character of the theory so as to start from the fact of rapid growth and
prosperity but failed to establish a positive economic theory. The other was success-
ful in building a refined economic explanation based on Uno theory but was unable
to explain rapid growth, retaining the crisis-oriented character of the original theo-
retical framework. Both are ultimately unsuccessful theories. But these two
approaches played the important role of “negative intermediate” in leading postwar
Japanese political economy to finally abandon the paradigmatic concept of SMC
and later accept new concepts concerning contemporary capitalism, for example,
that of “Fordism.”
1.3 High Economic Growth and Its Significance 13
A view of economic development that did not adopt any position on SMC also
emerged in Japanese political economy. This was Yoshihiko Uchida’s “civil society
theory.” Beginning in the early postwar period, Uchida (1913–1989), through reflec-
tion on the debate over Japanese capitalism, made an ongoing effort to address
questions concerning the particularity of Japanese capitalism and the direction of
social reform. He had learned much from Ōtsuka Historiography, an approach from
which he borrowed, for example, the concepts of a “modern type of human being”
and a “mediocrity of fortune,” which he then expanded into a conception of “civil
society.”
In the context of this discussion, let us for the moment define “civil society” in
an abstract and transhistorical sense as “a system of equivalent exchange and pro-
ductive forces” or “a society with freedom and human rights.” (We will examine
Uchida’s discourse on civil society in greater detail in the next chapter.) Based on
this concept of civil society, Uchida pointed out the problems with capitalist devel-
opment in Japan and criticized the Japanese form of high economic growth (Uchida
1967, 1981). According to Uchida, the establishment of capitalism in Japan was
achieved not through the creation of liberated and equal individuals, but rather
through the incorporation of feudal and premodern elements. This claim, advanced
by the Kōza school in the prewar period, led Uchida to posit “the distinguishing of
civil society from capitalism” and finally to characterize Japan as “capitalism with-
out civil society.” Of course, conditions were very different before and after the war.
In the postwar era, especially in the era of high economic growth, we cannot deny a
certain degree of development of civil elements. But can we really say that the
unprecedentedly high rate of economic growth resolved the issue of civil society in
Japan? Or was it precisely thanks to the weakness of civil or modern elements in
Japanese society that the economy was able to develop so rapidly?
Uchida (1967) blamed the weakness of the civil elements vis-à-vis the power of
capital on the fact that people’s lives and collective consciousness were still orga-
nized around the logic of capital; the power of capital is robust, in contrast to the
weakness of human rights, as was demonstrated in the problems that arose con-
cerning education and pollution. In the 1960s Uchida criticized the Japanese form
of high economic growth by citing Hajime Kawakami’s (1879–1946) older com-
parison of Japan and Europe: “In Europe, God created human rights, and after-
wards man created the rights of the state. Conversely in Japan, God first created the
rights of the state, and then the state created human rights” (Kawakami 1911, 1982:
119). In the Japanese model of economic development, only the power of capital
and that of the state manifested themselves, while human rights and civil society
remained immature. It was precisely for this reason that Japan was able to develop
so rapidly.
14 1 Political Economy in Japan After World War II
With the onset of the first oil shock in 1973, Japan’s period of high economic growth
came to an end. Economic growth came to a halt not only in Japan but in all advanced
countries; following this shock, economic indices in all of these other nations also
continued to worsen for a long period of time. Advanced countries were afflicted by
stagnation, which brought on an era of long-term global depression. Contrary to
most predictions, however, Japan’s economy, one of the most severely damaged by
the oil price shock, recovered relatively quickly. Japan returned to growth by rapidly
introducing microelectronic technologies and transforming its industrial structure,
but perhaps the greatest key to its recovery was the cooperation of the working class
in this transformation. By the early 1980s, the Japanese economy was again relying
on export demand as it developed into a global power. At the end of that decade
Japan then experienced the speculation-driven “bubble” economy, followed by an
ongoing depression after the bubble burst in the early 1990s.
In the post-oil shock period of the last quarter of the 20th century, that is, in the
third period of the postwar Japanese economy described in this chapter, the tradi-
tional theories of general crisis and SMC completely lost their validity and were
practically abandoned by almost all Marxian economists. In general, Marxian polit-
ical economy found itself marginalized within the world of economics. At the same
time, however, new theoretical approaches appeared that were not predetermined by
traditional views. In this period, there were two major questions to which econom-
ics was expected to provide answers. First, what were the causes and mechanisms
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