Access Control Concepts
Access Control Concepts
Access Control Concepts
Introduction
Types of access control, physical and logical controls and how they are com-
bined to strengthen the overall security of an organization.
Controls Overview
Earlier in this course we looked at security principles through foundations of risk
management, governance, incident response, business continuity and disaster
recovery. But in the end, security all comes down to, “who can get access
to organizational assets (buildings, data, systems, etc.) and what can
they do when they get access?”
Access controls are not just about restricting access to information sys-
tems and data, but also about allowing access. It is about granting the
appropriate level of access to authorized personnel and processes and denying
access to unauthorized functions or individuals.
Access is based on three elements:
• subjects: any entity that requests access to our assets. The entity
requesting access may be a user, a client, a process or a program, for
example. A subject is the initiator of a request for service; therefore, a
subject is referred to as “active.” A subject:
– Is a user, a process, a procedure, a client (or a server), a program,
a device such as an endpoint, workstation, smartphone or removable
storage device with onboard firmware.
– Is active: It initiates a request for access to resources or services.
– Requests a service from an object.
– Should have a level of clearance (permissions) that relates to its abil-
ity to successfully access services or resources.
Controls Assessments
Risk reduction depends on the effectiveness of the control. It must apply to the
current situation and adapt to a changing environment.
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Defense in Depth
We are looking at all access permissions including building access, access to
server rooms, access to networks and applications and utilities. These are all
implementations of access control and are part of a layered defense strategy,
also known as defense in depth, developed by an organization.
Defense in depth describes an information security strategy that in-
tegrates people, technology and operations capabilities to establish
variable barriers across multiple layers and missions of the organiza-
tion. It applies multiple countermeasures in a layered fashion to fulfill security
objectives. Defense in depth should be implemented to prevent or deter a cy-
berattack, but it cannot guarantee that an attack will not occur.
A technical example of defense in depth, in which multiple layers of technical
controls are implemented, is when a username and password are required
for logging in to your account, followed by a code sent to your phone
to verify your identity. This is a form of multi-factor authentication
using methods on two layers, something you have and something you
know. The combination of the two layers is much more difficult for an adversary
to obtain than either of the authentication codes individually.
Another example of multiple technical layers is when additional firewalls are
used to separate untrusted networks with differing security requirements, such
as the internet from trusted networks that house servers with sensitive data
in the organization. When a company has information at multiple sensitivity
levels, it might require the network traffic to be validated by rules on more than
one firewall, with the most sensitive information being stored behind multiple
firewalls.
For a non-technical example, consider the multiple layers of access required to
get to the actual data in a data center. First, a lock on the door provides a phys-
ical barrier to access the data storage devices. Second, a technical access rule
prevents access to the data via the network. Finally, a policy, or administrative
control defines the rules that assign access to authorized individuals.
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For example, only individuals working in billing will be allowed to view consumer
financial data, and even fewer individuals will have the authority to change or
delete that data. This maintains confidentiality and integrity while also allowing
availability by providing administrative access with an appropriate password or
sign-on that proves the user has the appropriate permissions to access that data.
Sometimes it is necessary to allow users to access the information via a tem-
porary or limited access, for instance, for a specific time period or just within
normal business hours. Or access rules can limit the fields that the individuals
can have access to. One example is a healthcare environment. Some workers
might have access to patient data but not their medical data. Individual doctors
might have access only to data related to their own patients. In some cases, this
is regulated by law, such as HIPAA in the United States, and by specific privacy
laws in other countries.
Systems often monitor access to private information, and if logs indicate that
someone has attempted to access a database without the proper permissions,
that will automatically trigger an alarm. The security administrator will then
record the incident and alert the appropriate people to take action.
The more critical information a person has access to, the greater the security
should be around that access. They should definitely have multi-factor authen-
tication, for instance.
Privileged Accounts
Privileged accounts are those with permissions beyond those of normal users,
such as managers and administrators. Broadly speaking, these accounts have
elevated privileges and are used by many different classes of users, including:
• Systems administrators, who have the principal responsibilities for oper-
ating systems, applications deployment and performance management.
• Help desk or IT support staff, who often need to view or manipulate end-
points, servers and applications platforms by using privileged or restricted
operations.
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• Security analysts, who may require rapid access to the entire IT infras-
tructure, systems, endpoints and data environment of the organization.
Other classes of privileged user accounts may be created on a per-client or
per-project basis, to allow a member of that project or client service team to
have greater control over data and applications. These few examples indicate
that organizations often need to delegate the capability to manage and protect
information assets to various managerial, supervisory, support or leadership
people, with differing levels of authority and responsibility. This delegation,
of course, should be contingent upon trustworthiness, since misuse or abuse of
these privileges could lead to harm for the organization and its stakeholders.
Typical measures used for moderating the potential for elevated risks from mis-
use or abuse of privileged accounts include the following:
* More extensive and detailed logging than regular user accounts. The record of privileged a
* More stringent access control than regular user accounts. As we will see emphasized in thi
or more accurately, highly trusted users with access to privileged accounts—
should be required to go through additional or more rigorous authentication prior to those p
* Deeper trust verification than regular user accounts. Privileged account holders should be
* More auditing than regular user accounts. Privileged account activity should be monitored
Segregation of Duties
A core element of authorization is the principle of segregation of duties
(also known as separation of duties). Segregation of duties is based on the
security practice that no one person should control an entire high-
risk transaction from start to finish. Segregation of duties breaks
the transaction into separate parts and requires a different person
to execute each part of the transaction. For example, an employee may
submit an invoice for payment to a vendor (or for reimbursement to themselves),
but it must be approved by a manager prior to payment; in another instance,
almost anyone may submit a proposal for a change to a system configuration,
but the request must go through technical and management review and gain
approval, before it can be implemented.
These steps can prevent fraud or detect an error in the process before implemen-
tation. It could be that the same employee might be authorized to originally
submit invoices regarding one set of activities, but not approve them, and yet
also have approval authority but not the right to submit invoices on another. It
is possible, of course, that two individuals can willfully work together to bypass
the segregation of duties, so that they could jointly commit fraud. This is called
collusion.
Another implementation of segregation of duties is dual control. This would
apply at a bank where there are two separate combination locks on the door
of the vault. Some personnel know one of the combinations and some know
the other, but no one person knows both combinations. Two people must work
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together to open the vault; thus, the vault is under dual control.
The two-person rule is a security strategy that requires a minimum of
two people to be in an area together, making it impossible for a person
to be in the area alone. Many access control systems prevent an individual
cardholder from entering a selected high-security area unless accompanied by
at least one other person. Use of the two-person rule can help reduce insider
threats to critical areas by requiring at least two individuals to be present at
any time. It is also used for life safety within a security area; if one person has
a medical emergency, there will be assistance present.
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lights, cable protection, laptop locks, badges, swipe cards, guard dogs, cameras,
mantraps/turnstiles, and alarms.
Physical access controls are necessary to protect the assets of a company, in-
cluding its most important asset, people. When considering physical access
controls, the security of the personnel always comes first, followed by securing
other physical assets.
Badge Systems and Gate Entry Physical security controls for human traf-
fic are often done with technologies such as turnstiles, mantraps and remotely
or system-controlled door locks. For the system to identify an authorized em-
ployee, an access control system needs to have some form of enrollment station
used to assign and activate an access control device. Most often, a badge is
produced and issued with the employee’s identifiers, with the enrollment sta-
tion giving the employee specific areas that will be accessible. In high-security
environments, enrollment may also include biometric characteristics. In gen-
eral, an access control system compares an individual’s badge against a verified
database. If authenticated, the access control system sends output signals allow-
ing authorized personnel to pass through a gate or a door to a controlled area.
The systems are typically integrated with the organization’s logging systems to
document access activity (authorized and unauthorized)
A range of card types allow the system to be used in a variety of environments.
These cards include: Bar code, Magnetic stripe, Proximity, Smart, Hybrid
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they can successfully advocate for functional and effective physical spaces where
information is going to be created, processed and stored.
CPTED provides direction to solve the challenges of crime with organizational
(people), mechanical (technology and hardware) and natural design (architec-
tural and circulation flow) methods. By directing the flow of people, using
passive techniques to signal who should and should not be in a space and pro-
viding visibility to otherwise hidden spaces, the likelihood that someone will
commit a crime in that area decreases.
Monitoring
The use of physical access controls and monitoring personnel and equipment
entering and leaving as well as auditing/logging all physical events are primary
elements in maintaining overall organizational security.
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Cameras Cameras are normally integrated into the overall security program
and centrally monitored. Cameras provide a flexible method of surveillance and
monitoring. They can be a deterrent to criminal activity, can detect activities if
combined with other sensors and, if recorded, can provide evidence after the ac-
tivity They are often used in locations where access is difficult or there is a need
for a forensic record.While cameras provide one tool for monitoring the external
perimeter of facilities, other technologies augment their detection capabilities.
A variety of motion sensor technologies can be effective in exterior locations.
These include infrared, microwave and lasers trained on tuned receivers. Other
sensors can be integrated into doors, gates and turnstiles, and strain-sensitive
cables and other vibration sensors can detect if someone attempts to scale a
fence. Proper integration of exterior or perimeter sensors will alert an organiza-
tion to any intruders attempting to gain access across open space or attempting
to breach the fence line.
Logs In this section, we are concentrating on the use of physical logs, such
as a sign-in sheet maintained by a security guard, or even a log created by an
electronic system that manages physical access. Electronic systems that capture
system and security logs within software will be covered in another section.
A log is a record of events that have occurred. Physical security logs are essential
to support business requirements. They should capture and retain information
as long as necessary for legal or business reasons. Because logs may be needed
to prove compliance with regulations and assist in a forensic investigation, the
logs must be protected from manipulation. Logs may also contain sensitive data
about customers or users and should be protected from unauthorized disclosure.
The organization should have a policy to review logs regularly as part of their
organization’s security program. As part of the organization’s log processes,
guidelines for log retention must be established and followed. If the organiza-
tional policy states to retain standard log files for only six months, that is all
the organization should have.
A log anomaly is anything out of the ordinary. Identifying log anomalies is
often the first step in identifying security-related issues, both during an audit
and during routine monitoring. Some anomalies will be glaringly obvious: for
example, gaps in date/time stamps or account lockouts. Others will be harder to
detect, such as someone trying to write data to a protected directory. Although
it may seem that logging everything so you would not miss any important data
is the best approach, most organizations would soon drown under the amount
of data collected.
Business and legal requirements for log retention will vary among economies,
countries and industries. Some businesses will have no requirements for data
retention. Others are mandated by the nature of their business or by business
partners to comply with certain retention data. For example, the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) requires that businesses retain one
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year of log data in support of PCI. Some federal regulations include requirements
for data retention as well.
If a business has no business or legal requirements to retain log data, how
long should the organization keep it? The first people to ask should be the
legal department. Most legal departments have very specific guidelines for data
retention, and those guidelines may drive the log retention policy.
Alarm Systems Alarm systems are commonly found on doors and windows
in homes and office buildings. In their simplest form, they are designed to alert
the appropriate personnel when a door or window is opened unexpectedly.
For example, an employee may enter a code and/or swipe a badge to open a
door, and that action would not trigger an alarm. Alternatively, if that same
door was opened by brute force without someone entering the correct code or
using an authorized badge, an alarm would be activated.
Another alarm system is a fire alarm, which may be activated by heat or smoke
at a sensor and will likely sound an audible warning to protect human lives in
the vicinity. It will likely also contact local response personnel as well as the
closest fire department.
Finally, another common type of alarm system is in the form of a panic button.
Once activated, a panic button will alert the appropriate police or security
personnel.
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Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Discretionary access control (DAC)
is a specific type of access control policy that is enforced over all subjects
and objects in an information system. In DAC, the policy specifies that
a subject who has been granted access to information can do one or
more of the following:
• Pass the information to other subjects or objects
• Grant its privileges to other subjects
• Change security attributes on subjects, objects, information systems or
system components
• Choose the security attributes to be associated with newly created or
revised objects; and/or
• Change the rules governing access control; mandatory access controls re-
strict this capability
Most information systems in the world are DAC systems. In a DAC
system, a user who has access to a file is usually able to share that file with or
pass it to someone else. This grants the user almost the same level of access
as the original owner of the file. Rule-based access control systems are
usually a form of DAC.
This methodology relies on the discretion of the owner of the access control
object to determine the access control subject’s specific rights. Hence, security
of the object is literally up to the discretion of the object owner. DACs are not
very scalable; they rely on the access control decisions made by each individual
object owner, and it can be difficult to find the source of access control issues
when problems occur.
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can control access. With Mandatory Access Control, it is mandatory for
security administrators to assign access rights or permissions; with
Discretionary Access Control, it is up to the object owner’s discretion.
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