Vishram Singh Raghubanshi vs State Of U.

P on 15 June, 2011

Supreme Court of India

Vishram Singh Raghubanshi vs State Of U.P on 15 June, 2011
Author: . B Chauhan
Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Swatanter Kumar
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 697 of 2006

Vishram Singh Raghubanshi ...Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. ...Responde

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, (hereinafter
called the `Act 1971') arising out of impugned judgment and order dated 5.5.2006 passed by the
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Contempt of Court Case No. 13 of 1999.

2. FACTS:

A) Appellant is an advocate practising for last 30 years in the District Court, Etawah (U.P.). On
25.7.1998, he produced one Om Prakash for the purpose of surrender, impersonating him as Ram
Kishan S/o Ashrafi Lal who was wanted in a criminal case in the court of IInd ACJM, Etawah. There
was some controversy regarding the genuineness of the person who came to surrender and
therefore, the Presiding Officer of the Court raised certain issues. So, the appellant misbehaved with
the said officer in the court and used abusive language.

B) The Presiding Officer of the court vide letter dated 28.9.1998 made a complaint against the
appellant to the U.P. Bar Council and vide letter dated 27.10.1998 made a reference to the High

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 Vishram Singh Raghubanshi vs State Of U.P on 15 June, 2011

Court for initiating contempt proceedings under Section 15 of the Act, 1971 against him. The High
Court considered the matter and issued show cause notice on 5.5.1999 to the appellant. In response
to the said notice, the appellant submitted his reply dated 24.5.1999, denying the allegations made
against him, but, tendering an apology in the form of an affidavit stating that he was keeping the
court in the highest esteem.

C) The Bar Council of U.P. dismissed the complaint referred by the Presiding Officer vide order
dated 18.3.2001, but the Allahabad High Court did not consider it proper to accept the explanation
submitted by the appellant or accept the apology tendered by him, rather, it framed the charges
against the appellant on 27.9.2004. In response to the same, the appellant again submitted an
affidavit dated 18.10.2005 tendering an apology similar to one in the affidavit filed earlier.

D) The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court considered the matter on judicial side, giving full
opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. The High Court ultimately held the appellant guilty
of committing the contempt and sentenced him to undergo 3 months simple imprisonment with a
fine of Rs.2,000/-. Hence this appeal.

3. This Court vide order dated 26.6.2006 suspended the operation of sentence and directed the
appellant to deposit the fine of Rs. 2,000/-

in this Court, which seems to have been deposited.

4. Shri Sanjeev Bhatnagar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that he would
not be in a position to defend the contemptuous behaviour of the appellant but insisted that the
appellant is aged and ailing person and had tendered absolute and unconditional apologies several
times. Thus, the apology may be accepted and the sentence of three months simple imprisonment be
quashed.

5. On the contrary, Shri R.K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has vehemently
opposed the prayer made by Shri Bhatnagar and contended that the appellant does not deserve any
lenient treatment considering the language used by him to the Presiding Officer of the court and
such a person does not deserve to remain in a noble profession. He further contended that the
apology has not been tendered at the initial stage. The first apology was tendered only after
receiving show cause notice dated 5.5.1999 from the High Court and under the pressure. More so,
the language of the apology is not such which shows any kind of remorse by the appellant, thus,
considering the gravity of the misbehaviour of the appellant, no interference is wanted. Therefore,
the appeal is liable to be rejected.

6. We have considered the rival contentions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.

7. Admittedly, the case of impersonification of the person to be surrendered is a serious one,

however we are not concerned as to whether the appellant had any role in such impersonification,
but being an officer of the court, if any issue had been raised in this regard either by the court or

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opposite counsel, it was the duty of the appellant to satisfy the Court and establish the identity of the
person concerned.

The conduct of the appellant seems to have been in complete violation and in contravention of the
"standard of professional conduct and etiquette" laid in Section 1 of Chapter 2 (Part-VI) of the Bar
Council of India Rules which, inter-alia, provides that an advocate shall maintain towards the court
a respectful attitude and protect the dignity of the judicial office. He shall use his best efforts to
restrain and prevent his client from resorting to unfair practices etc. The advocate would conduct
himself with dignity and self respect in the court etc. etc.

There may be a case, where a person is really aggrieved of misbehaviour/conduct or bias of a judicial
officer. He definitely has a right to raise his grievance, but it should be before the appropriate forum
and by resorting to the procedure prescribed for it. Under no circumstances, such a person can be
permitted to become the law unto himself and proceed in a manner he wishes, for the reason that it
would render the very existence of the system of administration of justice at a stake.

8. Before proceeding further with the case, it may be necessary to make reference to certain parts of
the complaint lodged by the Presiding Officer to the High Court against the appellant:

(i) During the course of cross examination in a criminal case on 22.8.1998, the appellant was
advised that he should ask questions peacefully to the witness on which the appellant stepped over
dias of the court and tried to snatch the paper of statement from him and started abusing him that
"Madarchod, Bahanchod, make reference of contempt to the High Court"

and stepped out, abusing similarly from the court room.

(ii) In another incident on 25.7.1998, three accused persons namely, Ram Krishan, Ram Babu and
Rampal surrendered before the court and filed an application no. 57Kha for cancellation for
non-bailable warrants, and the whole proceeding was completed by him. Aforesaid three accused
persons, namely, Ram Krishan and Ram Babu were real brothers and sons of Ashrafi Lal. On
30.7.1998 order was passed to release them on bail but before they could be released, it came to the
knowledge of the court that right accused Ram Krishan son of Ashrafi Lal had surrendered and sent
to jail. This fact was brought before the court by the mother of the person Om Prakash who was
actually sent to jail on 1.8.1998, of which enquiry was done and after summoning from jail the
person in the name of Ram Krishan stated in the court that his name was Om Prakash, son of Sh.
Krishan Jatav.

The complainant Bhaidayal was also summoned who also verified the above fact. Thereafter, an
inquiry was conducted by the Presiding Officer who found the involvement of the appellant in the
above case of impersonification.

9. The High Court examined the complaint and the reply submitted by the appellant to show cause
notice issued by the High Court. The High Court did not find the explanation worth acceptable and,
thus, vide order dated 27.9.2004, framed charges against the appellant in respect of those

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allegations dated 22.8.1998 and 25.7.1998 respectively.

10. It is not the case of the appellant that he was not given full opportunity to defend himself or lead
evidence in support of his case.

The appellant has not chosen to defend himself on merit before the High Court, rather he merely
tendered apology thrice. Even before us, Shri Sanjeev Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the appellant,
has fairly conceded that the appellant had been insisting from the beginning to accept his apology
and let him off. Mr. Bhatnagar's case has been that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
particularly considering the age and ailment of the appellant, apology should be accepted and
sentence of three months simple imprisonment be set aside.

11. It is settled principle of law that it is the seriousness of the irresponsible acts of the contemnor
and degree of harm caused to the administration of justice, which would decisively determine
whether the matter should be tried as a criminal contempt or not. (Vide: The Aligarh Municipal
Board & Ors. v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1767).

12. The court has to examine whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is done to the
public. The act will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the
people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective
litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice or if it is likely to
cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. (See:
Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors. v. The State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10; and Perspective Publications
(P.) Ltd. & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221).

13. In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2176, this
Court held that the power to punish for contempt is vested in the judges not for their personal
protection only, but for the protection of public justice, whose interest requires that decency and
decorum is preserved in courts of justice.

Those who have to discharge duty in a Court of Justice are protected by the law, and shielded in the
discharge of their duties; any deliberate interference with the discharge of such duties either in court
or outside the court by attacking the presiding officers of the court would amount to criminal
contempt and the courts must take serious cognizance of such conduct.

14. In E.M.Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T.Narayanan Nambiar, AIR 1970 SC 2015, this Court
observed that contempt of court has various kinds, e.g. insult to Judges; attacks upon them;

comment on pending proceedings with a tendency to prejudice fair trial; obstruction to officers of
Courts, witnesses or the parties;

scandalising the Judges or the courts; conduct of a person which tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. Such acts bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty or challenge its authority.

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In a given case, such a conduct be committed "in respect of the whole of the judiciary or judicial
system".

The court rejected the argument that in particular circumstances conduct of the alleged contemnor
may be protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution i.e. right to freedom of speech and
expression, observing that the words of the second clause, of the same provision bring any existing
law into operation, thus provisions of the Act 1971 would come into play and each case is to be
examined on its own facts and the decision must be reached in the context of what was done or said.

15. Thus, it is apparent that the contempt jurisdiction is to uphold majesty and dignity of the law
courts and the image of such majesty in the minds of the public cannot be allowed to be distorted.
Any action taken on contempt or punishment enforced is aimed at protection of the freedom of
individuals and orderly and equal administration of laws and not for the purpose of providing
immunity from criticism to the judges. The superior courts have a duty to protect the reputation of
judicial officers of subordinate courts, taking note of the growing tendency of maligning the
reputation of judicial officers by unscrupulous practising advocates who either fail to secure desired
orders or do not succeed in browbeating for achieving ulterior purpose. Such an issue touches upon
the independence of not only the judicial officers but brings the question of protecting the
reputation of the Institution as a whole.

16. The dangerous trend of making false allegations against judicial officers and humiliating them
requires to be curbed with heavy hands, otherwise the judicial system itself would collapse. The
Bench and the Bar have to avoid unwarranted situations on trivial issues that hamper the cause of
justice and are in the interest of none.

"Liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with license to make unfounded
allegations against any institution, much less the Judiciary". A lawyer cannot be a mere mouthpiece
of his client and cannot associate himself with his client maligning the reputation of judicial officers
merely because his client failed to secure the desired order from the said officer. A deliberate
attempt to scandalise the court which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the
system, would cause a very serious damage to the Institution of judiciary. An Advocate in a
profession should be diligent and his conduct should also be diligent and conform to the
requirements of the law by which an Advocate plays a vital role in the preservation of society and
justice system. Any violation of the principles of professional ethics by an Advocate is unfortunate
and unacceptable. (Vide: O.P. Sharma & Ors. v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (2011) 5 SCALE
518).

17. This Court in M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana & Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 600,
observed as under:

"The foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impartiality
of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made
against the presiding judicial officer with impunity....It is high time that we realise
that much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the

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executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system.
An independent judiciary is of vital importance to any free society".

18. This leads us to the question as to whether the facts and circumstances referred hereinabove
warrant acceptance of apology tendered by the appellant.

The famous humorist P.G. Wodehouse in his work "The Man Upstairs (1914)" described apology :

"The right sort of people do not want apologies, and the wrong sort take a mean
advantage of them."

The apology means a regretful acknowledge or excuse for failure. An explanation offered to a person
affected by one's action that no offence was intended, coupled with the expression of regret for any
that may have been given. Apology should be unquestionable in sincerity. It should be tempered
with a sense of genuine remorse and repentance, and not a calculated strategy to avoid punishment

19. Clause 1 of Section 12 and Explanation attached thereto enables the court to remit the
punishment awarded for committing the contempt of court on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the court. However, an apology should not be rejected merely on the ground that it is
qualified or tempered at a belated stage if the accused makes it bona fide. There can be cases where
the wisdom of rendering an apology dawns only at a later stage.

20. Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence, a justification, or an appropriate punishment for

an act which is in contempt of court.

An apology can be accepted in case the conduct for which the apology is given is such that it can be
"ignored without compromising the dignity of the court", or it is intended to be the evidence of real
contrition. It should be sincere. Apology cannot be accepted in case it is hollow; there is no remorse;
no regret; no repentance, or if it is only a device to escape the rigour of the law. Such an apology can
merely be termed as paper apology.

21. In Re: Bal Thackeray, Editor Samna, (1998) 8 SCC 660, this Court accepted the apology tendered
by the contemnor as the Court came to conclusion that apology was unconditional and it gave an
expression of regret and realisation that mistake was genuine.

22. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1374, the court noted that it cannot subscribe to the
'slap-say sorry- and forget' school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying
'sorry' does not make the slapper poorer.

(See also: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 2007) So an apology
should not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the
pen; for it is one thing to 'say' sorry-it is another to 'feel' sorry.

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23. An apology for criminal contempt of court must be offered at the earliest since a belated apology
hardly shows the "contrition which is the essence of the purging of a contempt". However, even if
the apology is not belated but the court finds it to be without real contrition and remorse, and finds
that it was merely tendered as a weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it. If the apology
is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to impose punishment, it
ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward. (Vide : Mulkh Raj v. The State of
Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1197; The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v.

State of Assam & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1925; C. Elumalai and Ors.

v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj and Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2214; and Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2010) 11
SCC 493).

24. In Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 189, this
Court while dealing with a similar issue observed as under:

".....Of course, an apology must be offered and that too clearly and at the earliest
opportunity. A person who offers a belated apology runs the risk that it may not be
accepted for such an apology hardly shows the contrition which is the essence of the
purging of a contempt. However, a man may have the courage of his convictions and
may stake his on proving that he is not in contempt and may take the risk. In the
present case the appellants ran the gauntlet of such risk and may be said to have
fairly succeeded."

25. This Court has clearly laid down that apology tendered is not to be accepted as a matter of course
and the Court is not bound to accept the same. The court is competent to reject the apology and
impose the punishment recording reasons for the same. The use of insulting language does not
absolve the contemnor on any count whatsoever. If the words are calculated and clearly intended to
cause any insult, an apology if tendered and lack penitence, regret or contrition, does not deserve to
be accepted. (Vide: Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court & Anr., AIR 1974 SC
710; The Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar etc., AIR 1976 SC 242; Asharam M. Jain v.
A.T. Gupta & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1151; Mohd. Zahir Khan v. Vijai Singh & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 642; In
Re: Sanjiv Datta, (1995) 3 SCC 619; and Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai & Ors. v. Patel Chandrakant
Dhulabhai & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 3016).

26. In the instant case, the appellant has tendered the apology on 24.5.1999 after receiving the show
cause notice from the High Court as to why the proceedings for criminal contempt be not initiated
against him. It may be necessary to make the reference to the said apology, the relevant part of
which reads as under:

"That from the above facts, it is evident that the deponent has not shown any
dis-regard nor abused the Presiding Officer, learned Magistrate and so far as
allegations against him regarding surrender of Om Prakash is the name of Ram
Kishan are concerned, the deponent has no knowledge regarding fraud committed by

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Asharfi Lal in connivance with others and deponent cannot be blamed for any
fraudulent act.

That notwithstanding mentioned in this affidavit, the deponent tenders

unconditional apology to Mr. S.C. Jain, IInd Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah
if for any conduct of the deponent the feelings of Mr. S.C. Jain are hurt. The deponent
shall do everything and protect the dignity of judiciary. (Emphasis added)

27. On 24.11.2005, the appellant has submitted an affidavit saying as under:

"That the deponent expresses his unqualified remorse for the incident giving rise to
the present contempt application. The deponent tenders his unconditional apology to
this Hon'ble Court and to Shri Suresh Chandra Jain, the then A.C.J.M.-2 Etawah for
the entire incident without any qualification or pre-condition. The deponent gives the
following solemn undertaking that no such incident would occur in future. The
deponent has immense respect for this Hon'ble Court and all other Courts of Law in
the land. The deponent also expresses bona fide, genuine and heart-felt regret for the
occurrence which the deponent consider a blot on him".

28. The High Court considered the case elaborately examining every issue microscopically and held
that there was no reason to disbelieve the facts stated by the judicial officer against the
contemnor/appellant, the facts were acceptable, and it was clearly proved that the contemnor was
guilty of gross criminal contempt. The charges levelled against the appellant stood proved. A Judge
has to discharge his duty and passes order in the manner as he thinks fit to the best of his capability
under the facts and circumstances of the case before him. No litigant, far less an advocate, has any
right to take the law in his own hands. The contemnor abused the Judge in most filthy words
unworthy of mouthing by an ordinary person and that is true without any justification for him
ascending the dais during the course of the proceedings and then abusing the judicial officer in the
words "Maaderchod, Bahanchod, High Court Ko Contempt Refer Kar". The courts certainly cannot
be intimidated to seek the favourable orders.

The appellant intimidated the presiding officer of the court hurling filthiest abuses and lowered the
authority of the Court, which is tantamount to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings.

The charge which stood proved against the appellant could not be taken lightly and in such a
fact-situation the apology tendered by him, being not bona fide, was not acceptable.

29. We have considered the facts and circumstances of the case.

The show cause notice was given by the High Court on 5.5.1999. The appellant submitted his reply
on 24.5.1999. The charges were framed against him on 27.9.2004 and in his first affidavit dated
18.10.2005, the appellant had denied all the allegations made against him. The so-

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called apology contained ifs and buts. Appellant is not even sure as to whether he has committed the
criminal contempt of the court or whether the most filthy abuses could hurt the Presiding Officer.

Appellant has been of the view that the Officer was a robot and has no heart at all, thus incapable of
having the feelings of being hurt.

The appellant filed second affidavit dated 24.11.2005 tendering apology. The apology has been
tendered under pressure only after framing of the charges by the High Court in the Criminal
Contempt when appellant realised that he could be punished. The apology was not tendered at the
earliest opportunity, rather tendered belatedly just to escape the punishment for the grossest
criminal contempt committed by him. The language used by the Advocate for a judicial officer where
he practices regularly and earns his livelihood is such that any apology would fall short to meet the
requirement of the statutory provisions. There has been no repent or remorse on the part of the
appellant at an initial stage. Had it been so, instead of making grossest and scandalous allegations
against the judicial officer, writing complaint against him to the Administrative Judge in the High
Court of Allahabad, the appellant could have gone to the concerned judicial officer and tendered
apology in open court.

The appellant instead of yielding to the court honestly and unconditionally, advanced a well guarded
defence by referring to all the facts that led to the incident. Apology tendered by the appellant gives
an impression that the same was in the alternative and not a complete surrender before the law.
Such attitude has a direct impact on the court's independence, dignity and decorum. In order to
protect the administration of public justice, we must take action as his conduct and utterances
cannot be ignored or pardoned. The appellant had no business to overawe the court.

Thus, we are of the view that the apology tendered by the appellant had neither been sincere nor
bona fide and thus, not worth acceptance.

30. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. A copy of the judgment and order be sent
to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah, for taking the appellant into custody and send him to the
jail to serve out the sentence.

....................................J.

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) .....................................J.

(SWATANTER KUMAR) New Delhi, June 15, 2011 ****

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