Peter Mair, Ruling The Void - 2005
Peter Mair, Ruling The Void - 2005
Peter Mair, Ruling The Void - 2005
1
E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy
in America, Chicago 1960. An earlier version of this argument was rehearsed in
‘Democracy Beyond Parties’, Center for the Study of Democracy, uc Irvine 2005,
available online: repositories.cdlib.org/csd.
2
See, for example, Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam, eds, Disaffected Democracies,
Princeton 2000; Pippa Norris, ed., Critical Citizens, Oxford 1999.
3
Blair’s Thousand Days, bbc 2, 30 January 2000. For a discussion of New Labour’s
approach see my ‘Partyless Democracy’, nlr 2, March–April 2000.
4
Tony Blair, ‘Third Way, Phase Two’, Prospect, March 2001.
5
Lord Falconer, quoted by Matthew Flinders and Jim Buller, ‘Depoliticisation,
Democracy and Arena-Shifting’, unpublished paper 2004.
6
Guy Peters, ‘Governance: a Garbage-Can Perspective’, isa, Vienna 2002.
7
For example, Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, London 1992, pp. 183–236.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 27
By the late 1990s, in short, it seemed that neither citizens nor policy-makers
placed much value on the role of political or partisan decision-making. But
while the evidence pointed to a widespread indifference to politics and
politicians, it was less clear that it indicated indifference towards demo-
cracy as such. Indeed, if one looked at the debates about constitutional
reform during the late 1990s, as well as at the more theoretical literature,
the impression was of a large and burgeoning interest in democracy, with
more attention being paid to how democratic systems worked, and to what
they meant in reality, than probably at any stage in the previous twenty
or thirty years. Far from being treated with indifference, democracy had
8
‘Is Government too Political?’, Foreign Affairs, no. 6, vol. 76, 1997.
9
Giandomenico Majone, ‘Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility’, European
University Institute, Working Paper 96/57, 1996.
10
Majone, ‘The Politics of Regulation and European Regulatory Institutions’, in
Jack Hayward and Anand Menon, eds, Governing Europe, Oxford 2003, p. 299.
28 nlr 42
There are two possibilities. The first is that they are in fact related, and
that the growing intellectual and institutional interest in democracy, its
meanings and its renewal, is in part a response aimed at combating the
expanding scale of popular indifference. Making democracy relevant, in
other words, comes on to the agenda at the time when it otherwise risks
becoming irrelevant. But while the timing suggests that this may be the
case, the actual content of the discussion points to a different story. For,
far from seeking to encourage greater participation, or trying to make
democracy more meaningful for the ordinary citizen, many of the contri-
butions on institutional reforms or democratic theory seem to concur in
favouring options that actually discourage mass engagement. This can be
seen in the emphasis on stake-holder involvement rather than electoral
participation that is found in both ‘associative democracy’ and ‘participa-
tory governance’, and in the emphasis on the sort of exclusive debate that
is to be found in ‘deliberative’ and ‘reflective’ democracy. In neither case
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 29
11
Jo Shaw, ‘Constitutional Settlements and the Citizen’, in Neunreither and Wiener,
eds, European Integration after Amsterdam, Oxford 2000, p. 291.
12
Philip Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the case for Depoliticising Government’,
University of nsw Law Journal, no. 58, 2001, § 46; Fareed Zakaria, The Future of
Freedom, New York 2003, p. 248.
13
Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, New Haven 1956. See also Yves Mény
and Yves Surel, eds, Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Basingstoke 2002;
Dahl, ‘The Past and Future of Democracy’, Occasional Paper Number 5, cspc,
Siena 1999; Shmuel Eisenstadt, Paradoxes of Democracy, Washington, dc 1999.
30 nlr 42
see them being disaggregated and then contrasted, both in theory and
practice. Hence the recent emergence of notions of ‘illiberal’ or ‘elec-
toral’ democracy, and the attempt to distinguish those democracies that
combine free elections—popular democracy—with restrictions on rights
and the potential abuse of executive power.14 As many studies of ‘Third
Wave’ democracies in particular seem to indicate, popular and constitu-
tional elements are no longer necessarily bound together.
Not only is there a growing conceptual distinction between the two com-
ponents, but also a widening disparity in practice—one in which the
popular element is downgraded with respect to the constitutional. For
Zakaria, for example, it is the presence of the constitutional rather than
the popular component that is essential for the survival and well-being
of democracy. As he puts it: ‘For much of modern history, what charac-
terized governments in Europe and North America, and differentiated
them from those around the world, was not democracy but constitu-
tional liberalism. The “Western model” is best symbolized not by the
mass plebiscite but the impartial judge.’15 In this view it is not elections
as such that make for democracy, but rather the courts, in combina-
tion with other modes of non-electoral participation. With respect to
the developing countries, as much of the ‘good governance’ literature
implies, the formula is very clear: ngos + judges = democracy. That is,
while an emphasis on ‘civil society’ is acceptable, and while a reliance on
legal procedures is essential, elections as such need not be.16
14
Larry Diamond, ‘Is the Third Wave Over?’, Journal of Democracy, no. 3, vol. 7,
1996.
15
Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6,
1997, p. 27.
16
See also Amy Chua, World on Fire, New York 2003.
17
Michelle Everson, ‘Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht’, in Bankowski and
Scott, eds, The European Union and its Order, Oxford 2000, p. 106.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 31
Role of parties
18
Mark Thatcher and Alec Sweet, ‘Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-
Majoritarian Institutions’, West European Politics, no. 1, vol. 25, 2002, p. 19.
19
Elmer Schattschneider, Party Government, New York 1942, p. 1.
32 nlr 42
Western trends
But in what sense are parties failing? First, as has been well attested,
parties are no longer managing to engage the ordinary citizen. Not only
are citizens voting in fewer numbers and with less sense of partisan
consistency, they are also increasingly reluctant to commit themselves
to parties, whether in terms of identification or membership. In this
sense, citizens are withdrawing from conventional political involvement.
Second, the party can no longer adequately serve as a base for the activi-
ties and status of its own leaders, who increasingly direct their ambitions
20
Beate Kohler-Koch, ‘European Government and System Integration’, European
Governance Papers, no. C-05-01, 2005.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 33
In fact, what we see here are two features that are not normally appli-
cable to cross-national changes at the level of mass politics. The first
of these is that virtually all of the separate trends that are treated here
point in the same direction. This in itself is very unusual. Analysts of
data relating to mass politics almost invariably expect to find mutually
opposing trends within the different streams of indicators, some point-
ing in one direction, some in another. Mass politics rarely moves en
bloc, as it were, but in this case it is precisely the uniformity of the
trends that is striking. Second, virtually all of these movements are
consistent across the advanced oecd democracies. This again is most
unusual. The normal expectation in comparative political research is
that, while particular trends may well be noted in some countries, they
are almost never universal. Some countries may shift together, but it is
only very rarely that all, or even most, shift in the same way and at the
same time. What we see now, however, is a much clearer indication of
cross-national convergence in the trends that matter. In other words,
34 nlr 42
not only are these now pointing in the same direction, they are also
doing so almost everywhere. It is in this sense that the trends, though
often small, are very significant.
Electoral entropy
To begin with the most obvious and immediate indicator: the levels
of participation in national elections. Given what has been said about
citizen withdrawal, it is here that we might expect some of the most
striking trends to be identified; yet while expectations regarding the
possible decline in levels of electoral turnout have been current for
some years, they have often been found to have little backing in the
aggregate empirical data. Although long-term stability in levels of par-
ticipation has been followed by a slight decline, this is usually not seen
to be sharp enough to cause concern for the healthy functioning of
modern democratic life.
But what is even more important to note is that this very marginal shift
accelerated in the 1990s, with average turnout across Western Europe
falling from 81.7 to 77.6 per cent in the last decade of the century. To be
21
For details see Mair, ‘In the Aggregate: Mass Electoral Behaviour in Western Europe,
1950–2000’, in Keman, ed., Comparative Democratic Politics, London 2002.
22
Pippa Norris, Democratic Phoenix, Cambridge 2002, pp. 54–5; Mark Franklin,
‘The Dynamics of Electoral Participation’, in LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, eds,
Comparing Democracies 2, London 2002.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 35
100
90
80
70
60
50
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
sure, even at this level, which is the lowest recorded in any of the post-
war decades, turnout remains relatively high, with an average of slightly
more than three-quarters of national electorates casting a ballot in the
elections held during the 1990s, a figure that remains substantially
higher than that recorded in nationwide elections in the United States,
for example. Nevertheless, even allowing for the fact that this drop from
the 1980s to the 1990s is less than 5 per cent, it is striking to see the
overall European figure now dipping below the 80 per cent mark for
the first time in five decades. Moreover, there is a striking consistency
across countries, in that eleven of the fifteen democracies involved also
recorded their lowest ever decade averages in the 1990s. The exceptions
to this pattern again include Belgium, where the lowest turnout came in
the 1960s, and Denmark and Sweden, where it was in the 1950s. Even
in these three cases, however, it should be noted that the average level
of turnout in the 1990s was lower than in the 1980s. The fourth excep-
tion is the United Kingdom, which was unusual in recording its trough
in participation in the 1980s. Indeed, Britain is the only one of these
fifteen countries that had a marginally higher level of turnout in the
1990s than in the 1980s, although it plunged to an all-time low of just
59 per cent in 2001.
36 nlr 42
This trend has continued into the 21st century. In addition to the uk, the
2001 elections in Italy and Norway, and the 2002 elections in Portugal,
France and Ireland were also marked by all-time low turnouts, as was
the 2000 election in Spain. Levels close to historic lows were recorded
in Greece in 2000, Austria in 2002, and Finland and Switzerland in
2003 (the last year included in this survey). In short, the trend towards
ever lower levels of participation has persisted. Both unidirectional and
pervasive, it offers a striking indicator of the growing enfeeblement of
the electoral process.
Before leaving these crude turnout figures, it is worth noting one other
telling feature. Indicators here are somewhat like those of climate
change: the shifts do not necessarily occur in great leaps or bounds, and
are not always linear. For these reasons, the importance of what is often
just a slight or uneven trend may be underestimated. Climatologists
have responded to this problem by laying less stress on the trends as
such, but instead noting patterns in the timing and frequency of the
peak values in their indicators. Thus, for example, evidence of global
warming is derived by noting that the warmest decade on record was
the most recent, the 1990s, while 1998 emerges as the warmest single
year, followed by 2001. Further evidence is adduced from the fact that
the eight warmest years on record have all occurred since 1990, even
though in that same period air temperatures were also recorded (e.g. in
1992, 1993 and 1994) which were little more than those reached in the
late 1970s.23 In other words, the pattern is evident, even if the trend is
not wholly uniform. This is also more or less true of turnout levels, and
indeed of many other indicators of mass political behaviour, and for this
reason the extent of change at this level is also often underestimated.
Although there is no undisturbed downward trend in levels of participa-
tion, for example, record lows now come with greater frequency, and in
a greater number of polities.
As can be seen from Table 1, which lists the three elections with the
lowest levels of turnout in each of the 15 long-established European
democracies, more than three-quarters of these 45 elections have taken
place since 1990. Not only do the 1990s hold the record for the low-
est turnout of any postwar decade in Western Europe, but within the
23
P. D. Jones and A. Moberg, ‘Hemispheric and large-scale surface air temperature
variations’, Journal of Climate, no. 16, 2003.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 37
(a) Record low levels of turnout, 1950–2003 (b) Frequency of record low turnouts
the election, the higher the odds that it will record a trough in participa-
tion. There is no certainty; like the pattern evinced by climate change,
turnout also sometimes bucks the overall trend, even today. In the long
term, however, the overall direction of the change is unmistakable,
and offers the first strong indicator of increasing popular withdrawal
from conventional politics.24
Voter volatility
24
This is also the conclusion drawn by Thomas Paterson in his valuable study of the
American case, The Vanishing Voter, New York 2002; see also Mair, ‘Voting Alone’,
European Political Science, no. 4, vol. 4, 2005, pp. 421–9, which incorporates parts
of the present discussion.
25
For example, Geraint Parry, George Moyser and Neil Day, Political Participation
and Democracy in Britain, Cambridge 1992.
26
Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability,
Cambridge 1990.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 39
stability than change. On the other hand, the 1990s is the first of the five
postwar decades in which the overall mean of instability breaches the 10
per cent threshold; it is also the first to record such a major shift from
the previous mean.
As with turnout data, there is no sign that these peaks are abating in the
21st century. In 2002, both Austria and the Netherlands experienced
record levels of aggregate instability, as did Italy in 2001. France, Norway
and Sweden also saw remarkably high levels of volatility in these years,
although no absolute records were broken. More generally, as can be
seen in Table 2 (overleaf), a clear majority of the most unstable national
elections since 1950 have occurred after 1990. In this case the pattern is
not so one-sided: volatility data inevitably prove more erratic than turn-
out data, being responsive to political crises as well as to institutional
and social-structural change. Nevertheless, the period since 1990 seems
exceptional: not only do more than half the record highs fall in this
period, but no other decade comes close to this clustering. With the mar-
ginal exceptions of Denmark and Luxembourg, it seems that the more
recent the election, the less likely it is to yield a predictable outcome.
Since 1990, then, it seems that ever fewer voters are ready to participate
in elections, although turnout levels still remain reasonably high; while
among those who do participate, there is a greater likelihood that they will
switch preferences from one election to the next.28 The exceptions have
been Luxembourg, which had very low turnout but only moderate volatility;
27
The 1990s rise in volatility outside Western Europe—Japan, Mexico, India, for
example—though noteworthy, lies outside the scope of this paper.
28
This counters an earlier observation based on us data by Lance Bennett, who
suggested that even though conventional political participation may be in decline,
‘those who continue to participate in traditional politics exhibit stability and sub-
stance in electoral choice, opinion formation and policy deliberation.’ Bennett, ‘The
Uncivic Culture’, ps: Political Science and Politics, December 1998, p. 745.
40 nlr 42
(a) Record Levels of Volatility, 1950–2003 (b) Frequency of record high volatility
Sweden, which recorded high volatility but not exceptionally low turnout;
and Denmark, which proved extreme on neither indicator. Beyond these
cases, the evidence of unusual patterns since 1990 is both striking and
consistent. Across Western Europe, electorates are not only voting less,
but they are also slackening in terms of partisan commitment.
Partisan attachment
This is also the message from survey data, the evidence of individual
experiences collected by election studies and commercial polling projects,
which now corresponds closely to the aggregates on turnout and volatil-
ity. Many of the former have been collated by Dalton and Wattenberg in
their comprehensive Parties without Partisans, and again both the con-
sistency and the ubiquity are striking. One key indicator is the degree
to which individual voters feel a sense of belonging or commitment to
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 41
Split-ticket voting, whereby voters opt for one party in one electoral
arena, and a different one in another, is also on the rise across all
those cases where it has been measured over time (Australia, Canada,
Germany, Sweden and the United States). A committed and engaged
voter, with a strong partisan loyalty, will undoubtedly vote for the same
party regardless of the arena involved—for example, voting Democrat in
us Presidential and Congressional elections, as well as local state and
county ones. Lesser partisan commitment is more likely to be associated
with a greater willingness to split the ticket. Voters are also less ready
or less able to tell pollsters how they will vote. Here too, with a single
Danish exception, almost every election study has reported an increase
in the proportion of voters who decide how to vote during the campaign
or shortly before polling day. Again, ‘the trend is clear: contemporary
voters are less likely to enter elections with standing partisan predis-
positions’. Hardly surprising then, that these voters are also unlikely
to engage in more demanding campaign activities, such as attending
political meetings, working for a party, persuading others to vote for a
particular candidate or donating money. On almost all of these meas-
ures, and in almost all countries for which data are available, the survey
evidence once again points to decline: voters are less willing to partici-
pate; for many, at least as far as conventional politics is concerned, it is
enough to be simply spectators.30
29
Russell Dalton, ‘The Decline of Party Identification’, in Dalton and Wattenberg,
eds, Parties without Partisans, Oxford 2000, p. 29.
30
Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg, ‘The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment’,
in Dalton and Wattenberg, Parties without Partisans, pp. 49, 58.
42 nlr 42
Voters are also less willing to take on the obligations associated with
party membership. Again, it is striking to note not only the sheer decline
in the number of party members, but also the pervasiveness of the phe-
nomenon across all long-established democracies. Although the pattern
here is more pronounced than in turnout or electoral instability, until
the 1980s the evidence of decline tended to be somewhat equivocal. The
first major study based on aggregate—often official party—data in 1992
found that, although the party membership ratio had fallen in most of
the relevant European polities (the only exceptions were Belgium and
West Germany), absolute levels of membership had often held up.31 It
offered little support for the idea that these countries were experiencing
‘a spreading disillusionment with partisan politics’.32
By the end of the 1990s, however, the patterns in the aggregate data had
become unequivocal. As Table 3 reveals, the ratio of party membership
to the electorate across a range of West European democracies had fallen
markedly between 1980 and the end of the 1990s.33 In 1980, an aver-
age of 9.8 per cent of the electorates were party members; by the end of
the 1990s, this had fallen to just 5.7 per cent. Still more strikingly, for
the ten European democracies in which it is possible to trace reliable
membership figures from 1960, the average membership ratio was 14
per cent; in a majority—six of the ten—more than one in every ten elig-
ible voters were members of political parties. At the end of the 1990s,
by contrast, there were twenty democracies for which it was possible
to find reliable membership data. Across all twenty, the average mem-
bership ratio was just 5 per cent, and only one—Austria—recorded a
ratio that exceeded 10 per cent.34
31
See Katz, Mair et al., ‘The Membership of Political Parties in European
Democracies, 1960–90’, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 22, no. 3, 1992,
pp. 329–45.
32
Norris, Democratic Phoenix, pp. 134, 135.
33
The table is adapted from data in Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, ‘Party Membership
in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000’, Party Politics, no. 1, vol. 7, 2001,
where they are discussed in more detail; see also Susan Scarrow, ‘Parties without
Members’ in Dalton and Wattenberg, Parties without Partisans, pp. 86–95.
34
The pattern is comparable in the advanced democracies outside Europe. In
Australia in 1967 there were 251,000 members, 4.1 per cent of the electorate; by
1997, the number had fallen to 231,000, just 1.9 per cent of a much larger electorate.
Canada went from 462,000 members in 1987 to 372,000 in 1994: 2.6 to 1.9 per
cent. In New Zealand, the decline was from 272,000 in 1981, or 12.5 per cent, then
the peak of a growing wave, to 133,000 in 1999, or 4.8 per cent. Webb et al., Political
Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford 2002, pp. 355, 389–90, 416–9.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 43
Party membership as
Change in Change as %
% of electorate
numbers of party of original
members membership
Country Period Start of period End of period
This was reinforced by the fall-off in the absolute numbers of party mem-
bers, in marked contrast to the pattern noted in 1992. In every one of the
long-established democracies the number of party members had fallen,
sometimes by as much as 50 per cent of 1980 levels. In no country had
there been an increase. This was exit on a grand scale—both in terms
of reach and direction. Throughout the old democracies, as the analysis
concluded, parties were simply haemorrhaging members.35
What conclusions can be drawn from this brief review of the evidence?
Clearly, it supports the contention that citizens are disengaging from
the arena of conventional politics. Even when they vote—and this is
less often than before, or in smaller proportions—their preferences
35
Mair and Biezen, ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies’.
44 nlr 42
are determined closer to polling day and are less guided by partisan
attachments. Electorates in this sense are becoming progressively de-
structured, affording more scope to the media to set the agenda, and
requiring a much greater campaign effort from parties and candidates.
What we see here, in short, is a form of voting behaviour that is increas-
ingly contingent. Much of this change has only become really apparent
since the end of the 1980s.
In early 2002, Anthony Giddens pointed to the watershed that had been
passed in mass media entertainment through the growing popularity of
reality tv. ‘Previously television was something that reflected an external
world which people watched. Now television is much more a medium
in which you can participate.’36 In conventional politics, by contrast, the
shift has been the other way around. Previously, and probably through to
at least the 1970s, conventional politics was seen to belong to the citizen,
and something in which the citizen could, and often did, participate.
Now, it has become part of an external world which people watch from
outside: a world of political leaders, separate from that of the citizenry.
It is the transformation of party democracy into ‘audience democracy’.37
Whether the increasing disengagement of voters is responsible for the
emergence of this new mode of politics, or whether it is an emerging
form of politics that is encouraging voter withdrawal is, at least for now,
a moot point. What is beyond dispute is that each feeds the other. As citi-
zens exit the national political arena, they inevitably weaken the major
actors who survive there—the parties. And this, in turn, is part of, and
36
Interview with Henk Jansen in Facta, no. 1, vol. 11, February 2003, p. 4
(my translation).
37
Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, Cambridge 1997,
pp. 218–35.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 45
Party leaderships have also sought to reduce the weight of their ties to
associated groups, and to downgrade the privileged access once accorded
to affiliated organizations.39 Increasingly, parties tend to think of them-
selves as self-sufficient and specialized organizations, willing to listen
to particular social actors but avoiding any close formalized links with
them. Leaders have distanced themselves from civil society and its social
institutions, while at the same time becoming more firmly entrenched
in the world of government and the state. We may summarize the key
developments of this process as follows.
38
As, for example, when British Labour leaders shrugged off their defeat when the
Labour Annual Conference voted to restore the link between pensions and average
earnings. The vote had gone 60/40 against the leadership, and Gordon Brown
responded: ‘I’m not going to give in to the proposal that came from the union lead-
ers today . . . It is for the country to judge, it is not for a few composite motions to
decide the policy of this government and this country. It is for the whole commu-
nity, and I’m listening to the whole community.’ Guardian, 28 September 2000.
39
A trend already noted in nuce by Otto Kirchheimer in his then highly prescient
analysis, ‘The Transformation of West European Party Systems’, in LaPalombara
and Weiner, eds, Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton 1966,
pp. 177–200.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 47
Second, parties are now increasingly subject to new laws and regula-
tions, which sometimes even determine their internal organizational
functioning. Many of these regulations were introduced in the wake
of public funding for parties, with the distribution of state subventions
inevitably demanding a more codified system of party registration and
control. Controlling party access to the public broadcasting media has
also required a new system of regulations, which again acts to codify the
status of parties and their activities. From having been largely ‘private’
and voluntary associations, parties have increasingly become subject to
a regulatory framework which has the effect of according them a (quasi-)
official status. As the internal life and the external activities of parties
become regulated by public law, the parties themselves become trans-
formed into public-service agencies, with a corresponding weakening of
their own organizational autonomy.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, parties have cemented their link-
age to the state by according increasing priority to their role as governing
(as opposed to representative) agencies. In political-science terms, they
have become more ‘office-seeking’, with a place in government not only
a standard expectation, but also an end in itself. Some forty years ago, a
now classic review of political developments in Western democracies was
organized around the theme of ‘oppositions’.41 Today opposition, when
structurally constituted, increasingly comes from outside conventional
party politics, whether in the form of social movements, street politics
or popular protests. The parties, on the other hand, are either governing
or waiting to govern. With this new status has come a downgrading of
the role of the ‘party on the ground’, and a shift in the party’s organi-
zational centre of gravity towards those elements that serve its needs
40
Ingrid van Biezen, Financing Political Parties and Election Campaigns, Strasburg
2003.
41
Robert Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven 1966.
48 nlr 42
All of this has had major implications for the functions that parties per-
form within the wider polity. Conventionally, parties are understood to
integrate and, if necessary, to mobilize the citizenry; to articulate and
aggregate interests, and translate these into public policy; to recruit and
promote political leaders; and to organize parliament, the government
and the key institutions of the state. That is, just as parties aimed to com-
bine government for the people with government by the people, so too
they combined key representative functions with key procedural ones—
all within the same agency. As parties have changed, however, and as
the mass-party model has passed away, the functions they perform in
contemporary polities have also shifted, and now focus much more on
procedural ones. This development goes hand in hand with their move
from society to the state, and is part of the process by which parties and
their leaders separate themselves from the arena of popular democracy.
Parties have become agencies that govern—in the widest sense of the
term—rather than represent; they bring order rather than give voice. It is
in this sense that we can also speak of the disengagement or withdrawal
of the elites, although while exiting citizens are often headed towards
more privatized worlds, the exiting political leadership is retreating into
an institutional one—a world of public offices.
42
See also John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy,
Cambridge 2002.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 49
from the ordinary realities of constituents’ lives, they live not just physically
but also mentally ‘inside the beltway’.43
The difficulty runs deeper. Elsewhere, I have argued that, with the sep-
aration of parties’ representative and procedural roles, the increasing
emphasis on the latter was part of a more or less necessary process of
adaptation: precisely because they no longer functioned so effectively
as representatives, parties sought to compensate by building up their
role within the institutions. These were not therefore parties in decline,
I then argued, but instead had adapted to a new set of circumstances,
seeking to survive in the context of a new organizational equilibrium.44
43
Hanna Pitkin, ‘Representation and Democracy’, Scandinavian Political Studies,
no. 3, vol. 27, 2004, p. 339.
44
Mair, ‘Political Parties and Democracy: What Sort of Future?’, Central European
Political Science Review, vol. 4, no. 13, 2003.
50 nlr 42
This now seems far too sanguine an interpretation. Parties might well
seek to compensate for diminished capacities in one direction by enhanc-
ing those in another, but there is no guarantee that they will succeed. On
the contrary: parties may be able to fill public office, but having aban-
doned their representative role, they may no longer be able to justify
doing so. In other words, if parties as governors are to be trusted, and
if party government more generally is to be legitimate, it is likely that
the parties must also be seen to be representative. For an elected politi-
cian, it is not enough to be just a good governor; without some degree of
representative legitimacy neither the parties themselves, nor their lead-
ers, nor even the electoral process that allows them to be chosen, will be
seen to carry sufficient weight or authority. The result will be to encour-
age distrust and scepticism.
What are the implications of these processes for the future of Western
democracies? I have suggested that the transformation in the role of
parties, as they have shifted away from expressive and representative
functions and moved closer to becoming appendages of the state, has
played a central part in the disaggregation of democracy’s popular and
constitutional components. Any broader reckoning as to why this is
45
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd edn, New York
1947, p. 288.
mair: Depoliticized Democracy 51
happening—and why now, barely one decade after the much heralded
‘triumph of democracy’, attempts are being made to downgrade its
popular pillar and limit its scope—must take into account a number
of themes that fall outside the purview of this essay: the impact of the
end of the Cold War, the decline of ‘embedded liberalism’, the declin-
ing purchase of party government, and the more general fallout from
processes of globalization and Europeanization. But the focus on parties
makes one further irony impossible to ignore: the victory of democracy,
in this form, poses stark problems of representative legitimacy for
the new governing class.