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The Grace of Being Fallible in
Philosophy, Theology, and Religion

Thomas John Hastings
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The Grace of Being
Fallible in Philosophy,
Theology, and Religion
Edited by
Knut-Willy Sæther
The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy,
Theology, and Religion
Thomas John Hastings • Knut-Willy Sæther
Editors
The Grace of Being

Fallible in Philosophy,
Theology, and
Religion
Editors
Thomas John Hastings Knut-Willy Sæther
Overseas Ministries Studies Center Department of Religious Studies
Princeton Theological Seminary Volda University College
Princeton, NJ, USA Volda, Norway
ISBN 978-3-030-55915-1 ISBN 978-3-030-55916-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
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known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
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The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
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Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface and Acknowledgments
The idea for this volume came about from several conversations in
Princeton between the co-editors, Knut-Willy Sæther of Volda University
College in Volda, Norway, and Thomas John Hastings of Overseas
Ministries Studies Center (OMSC), then located in New Haven,
Connecticut, USA, when Knut-Willy was a visiting scholar at Princeton
Theological Seminary and Tom was a senior research fellow in science and
religion at the Japan International Christian University Foundation in
New York City. Following Tom’s move to OMSC, in November 2017 he
and Knut-Willy invited a small group of European, Asian, and American
scholars in philosophy, theology, and religion to explore the themes of fal-
libilism and dualism. The meeting culminated with an initial discussion of
our chapters for the current volume. We wish to express our thanks to
Volda University College for supporting this project with a grant that cov-
ered the costs of travel, lodging, and proofreading and to OMSC for host-
ing the meeting.
Princeton, NJ, USA Thomas John Hastings

Volda, Norway Knut-Willy Sæther
v
Contents
1 A Fallibilist Approach in the Age of COVID-19 and

Climate Change 1
Thomas John Hastings and Knut-Willy Sæther
2 The Many Faces of Fallibilism: Exploring Fallibilism in

Science, Philosophy, and Theology 13
Knut-Willy Sæther
3 Fallibilism, Problematization, and the History of Thought 35

Jonas Gamborg Lillebø
4 Fallibilism: A Philosophical-Pneumatological Apologetic 51

Amos Yong
5 “Unworthy of the Earth”: Fallibilism, Place, Terra Nullius,

and Christian Mission 67
Lisa E. Dahill
6 Apologetics and the Provisionality of the Living Jesus:

Hans Frei’s Contribution 89
Drew Collins
vii
viii Contents
7 God’s Pneumatic Word and Faith, Hope and Love in

a Fallible World111
Paul Louis Metzger
8 A Pluralistic Pluralism: With Some Remarks

on Fallibilism125
Seung Chul Kim
9 Restoring the Pro Nobis > Pro Me: A Translated Religion,

Polycentric Ecumenism, and Moderate Fallibilism141
Index159
Contributors
Drew Collins Yale Divinity School, New Haven, CT, USA

Lisa E. Dahill California Lutheran University, Thousand Oaks, CA, USA
Thomas John Hastings Overseas Ministries Studies Center, Princeton
Theological Seminary, Princeton, NJ, USA
Seung Chul Kim Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, Nanzan
University, Nagoya, Japan
Jonas Gamborg Lillebø Department of Religious Studies, Volda
University College, Volda, Norway
Paul Louis Metzger Multnomah University and Seminary,
Portland, OR, USA
Knut-Willy Sæther Department of Religious Studies, Volda University
College, Volda, Norway
Amos Yong Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, CA, USA
ix
CHAPTER 1
A Fallibilist Approach in the Age

of COVID-19 and Climate Change
Thomas John Hastings and Knut-Willy Sæther
A man must have a good deal of vanity who believes, and a good deal of
boldness who affirms, that all the doctrines he holds are true, and all he
rejects are false.
—Benjamin Franklin, A Defense of Religious Tolerance
In knowing good and evil he knows what only the origin, God Himself,
can know and ought to know.
—Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics
Why is fallibilism, an epistemological position with consequences for

moral action, a viable topic for Christian thought and cultural engage-
ment today?
T. J. Hastings (*)
Overseas Ministries Studies Center, Princeton Theological Seminary,
Princeton, NJ, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
K.-W. Sæther
Department of Religious Studies, Volda University College, Volda, Norway
© The Author(s) 2021 1

T. J. Hastings, K.-W. Sæther (eds.), The Grace of Being Fallible in
Philosophy, Theology, and Religion,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_1
2 T. J. HASTINGS AND K.-W. SÆTHER
Though this collection was written before we were aware of the exis-
tence of COVID-19, it appears in the midst of a global pandemic that has
laid bare severe inequalities and weaknesses in the medical, economic, and
political systems that have been considered foundational or even sacro-
sanct in modern societies. The pandemic also has imposed unique chal-
lenges on the more intimate institutions of family, school, religious
community, and nonprofit organization. If modern life is an equation with
several variables, which under “normal” circumstances seem manageable
even if not always solvable, this global pandemic has introduced many new
and, as yet, unsolvable variables to that equation. In the interim, the pan-
demic has demanded crisis management, and, in the longer run, made the
entire human family dependent on a deliverance to come in some uncer-
tain eschaton—that is, when effective treatments and vaccines are discov-
ered, manufactured, and available to be safely and justly distributed
worldwide. Engendering apocalyptic levels of anxiety and uncertainty, the
COVID-19 pandemic has led many into a time of lament, doubt, and
yearning. In such a troubled moment, when the modern systems and insti-
tutions we have taken for granted have been stretched to the breaking
point, the perspective of fallibilism and its attendant intellectual and moral
dispositions may be worthy of consideration.
For the sake of clarification, our volume is not an exhaustive examina-
tion of fallibilism as an epistemological position, but it does explore how a
fallibilist orientation to truth claims might help to fund more spacious
approaches in philosophy, theology, and religion in our increasingly plu-
ralistic world and, hence, the title, The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy,
Theology, and Religion.
Another important caveat: Fallibilism is not another name for relativ-
ism. Fallibilism neither eschews quests for truth nor claims that “all truths
are equal.” Having said that, we should acknowledge that fallibilism has
been marshaled to cast doubt on scientific findings, such as the links
between tobacco use and cancer or between certain human behaviors and
climate change. In our view, such approaches make the mistake of equat-
ing fallibilism with relativism and are often a smoke screen for commercial,
political, or ideological motivations.
Instead, while acknowledging that we mere mortals will never be in
possession of absolute truth, fallibilism supports searches for “verisimili-
tude” in both the sciences and the humanities. “Verisimilitude” means
approaching the truth, reality, or actual in discrete fields of inquiry while
1 A FALLIBILIST APPROACH IN THE AGE OF COVID-19 AND CLIMATE… 3
admitting that we will never totally grasp the whole truth.1 We take the
term “verisimilitude” from John Polkinghorne who argues for a “critical
realism” in science and theology that is very similar to the fallibilist posi-
tion advocated here. Within the context of the science-religion dialogue,
Polkinghorne emphasizes that our approach to knowledge is always via
“verisimilitudes,” not absolute truths. Broadly speaking, Polkinghorne
searches for a trajectory by means of a kind of naïve realism and construc-
tivism, or a via media between absolutism and relativism. We are aware, of
course, that critical realism covers a wide range of nuanced differences.2
Thus, it may be more appropriate to speak of a variety of “critical realisms”
specific to the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities such as
theology. Variations such as absolutism, relativism, foundationalism, and
constructivism are also present in epistemological approaches.3 We will
not examine these important differences here, but just gesture at a possi-
ble relation between fallibilism and some basic aspects of critical realism as
an epistemological position.
According to Polkinghorne, the motivation for claiming critical realism
is that “our minds are so constituted, and we live in a world itself so con-
stituted, that intellectual daring in the pursuit of a strategy of cautious
circularity proves capable of yielding reliable knowledge.”4 In short, criti-
cal realism involves an ontological claim as well as an epistemological one.
The ontological claim says that science actually tells us how the physical
world is, albeit never finally and exhaustively. The epistemological claim
emphasizes that our way of insight is always subtle and complex. In other
words, critical realism is situated between naïve realism and constructivism
which, according to Polkinghorne, are nothing less than self-supporting
houses of cards.5 Polkinghorne concedes: “Of course, … knowledge is to
a degree partial and corrigible. Our attainment is verisimilitude, not
1
See John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1998), 104.
2
See Niels Henrik Gregersen. “Critical Realism and Other Realisms,” in Fifty Years in
Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and his Legacy, ed. Robert John Russell (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2004), 77–96.
3
See Robert Audi. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2003).
4
John Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians (London: SPCK, 1996), 16.
5
Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians, 15.
absolute truth. Our method is the creative interpretation of experience,

not rigorous deduction from it. Thus, I am a critical realist.”6
We see Polkinghorne’s approach as a useful first step that needs further
problematization and development. One reason for this is that
Polkinghorne seems to rely too heavily on the natural sciences in his epis-
temology, even though he claims that critical realism supports a multifac-
eted approach to reality. We are seeking a stronger interdisciplinary
consciousness and a more careful navigation that includes the humanities
(including religious studies, theology, and philosophy), as well as other
fields. One interesting trajectory for doing this is Andreas Losch’s
“constructive-critical realism.”7
According to Losch, the “constructive” modifier emphasizes that there
are different rationalities in play in our search for knowledge about reality,
“the rationalities of natural, social, human science and of course theology
are different ones.”8 Losch’s point is that a verisimilitude-based search for
knowledge is interwoven with nuanced cultural and social constructs and
conditions, as well as ethical decisions. Constructive-critical realism
enforces “the consciousness of diversity on an epistemological level, real-
izing that if we extend epistemology to human sciences, the recognition of
its ethical implications cannot be avoided.”9 Thus, a constructive-critical
realism is closely related to fallibilism in its verisimilitude-based approach
to knowledge, openness for correction, and its ethical implications.
In our attempt to understand the world, constructive-critical realism
opens up an awareness of the need for cautious navigation across different
academic fields. By emphasizing the moral and ethical dimensions in the
search for knowledge, it gestures at something really urgent in our current
multicultural context. Here ethical judgments are brought to the center,
and this move exposes deep lacunae in our current multicultural context.
Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 104.

6
See Andreas Losch, “Our World is more than Physics: A Constructive-Critical Comment
7
on the Current Science and Theology Debate,” Theology and Science vol. 3, no. 3 (2005):
275–290, and Knut-Willy Sæther, “Rationality in Play? A Philosophical Journey in the
Current Landscape of Facts and Truth,” in Navigating Post-Truth and Alternative Facts:
Religion and Science as Political Theology, ed. Jennifer Baldwin (Lanham/Boulder/New
York: Lexington Books, 2018), 71ff.
8
Losch, “Our World is more than Physics: A Constructive-Critical Comment on the
Current Science and Theology Debate,” 281.
9
Losch, “Our World is more than Physics: A Constructive-Critical Comment on the
Current Science and Theology Debate,” 287.
Further, we see constructive-critical realism as a self-critical approach that

stresses fallibilism in our search for knowledge.
By touching on religion, science, philosophy, and theology, this book
embraces an interdisciplinary approach. In the past two decades, academ-
ics have often invoked “interdisciplinary,” sometimes to legitimize a par-
ticular approach or research agenda and sometimes with political or
ideological motivations. Joe Moran says that “‘Interdisciplinarity’ has
become a buzzword across many different academic subjects in recent
years.”10 In this time of interdisciplinary studies, we find phrases like dia-
logue, interaction, and mutual enrichment claiming that our particular
academic field has to be understood as open and not isolated from other
academic fields.
This book embraces interdisciplinarity, both to give voice to different
academic traditions, represented by scholars in philosophy, theology, and
religious studies, and as an interdisciplinary consciousness embraced by
our authors. However, when we approach a specific topic—in this case
fallibilism—as individual scholars, we do so on the basis of our own schol-
arly fields. Hence, an “interdisciplinarity approach” is inevitably colored
by our particular points of departure.
To return again to the pandemic, COVID-19 has exposed the provi-
sional nature of our current knowledge and skill, but it has also strength-
ened the blessed truth that some knowledge claims are more reliable than
others. As we write, medical scientists have not yet found a treatment or
vaccine, yet in their social-distancing prescriptions and painstaking,
methodical research, they have proven themselves far more trustworthy
guides than certain public figures who have reacted to the pandemic out
of political survival instincts. As a glaring but not unique example, while
the pandemic crisis was playing out in the United States, an infectious
disease doctor proved a far more reliable guide than certain politicians.
As one example, the stark contrast between the public performances of
the doctor and the president in the daily COVID Task Force briefings
illustrated perfectly the binary of fallibilism and its opposite, infallibilism.
In response to questions, the confident yet humble doctor readily admit-
ted when he did not have an answer. He was honest, showing compassion
while advising continuation of preventative measures. By contrast, the
insecure president waffled again and again, saying that he agreed with the
doctor’s advice while boasting about his own “perfect” response to the
10
Joe Moran, Interdisciplinarity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), 1.
pandemic, refusing to take responsibility, suggesting lethal remedies,

pushing the economy to reopen, and blaming his predecessors, the news
media, and state governors. The doctor’s attention was fixed on finding a
treatment and a vaccine, while the president’s attention was fixed on his
reelection campaign. So there was the doctor, humbly admitting his falli-
bility as a scientist, and there was the president, adamantly refusing to
admit making a single mistake.
Since his supporters included significant majorities of religiously con-
servative groups who still push back on evolution,11 it seemed obvious that
the president’s equivocations on the medical science were a political calcu-
lation, not an ideological conviction. With all of the marks of tragicomedy
and theater of the absurd, the life and death consequences of these contra-
dictory approaches to the global pandemic were too grave to ignore. And,
especially in the United States, an even more important debate that will be
with us long after this president is gone is the stalemate about the truth or
falsity of the anthropogenesis of climate change. This is another life and
death issue where religious conservatives often question the overwhelm-
ing scientific consensus.12
Taking a step back from these conflicting approaches to the pandemic
and climate change, on a deeper level, it is clear that certain modern soci-
eties like the United States are still learning how to harmonize ancient
religious traditions with the much more recent advent of modern science.
While much nuanced academic work has been done on the dialogue
between religion (or theology) and science, it is clear that public discourse
has not kept pace with these discussions. In the media business, drama and
narrative conflict increases the number of viewing customers, thus the
U.S. news and entertainment business have tended to feature portrayals of
religious and ideological fundamentalists, on the one hand, and scientific
positivists, on the other hand, who deal with reality in terms of knock-
down, “either-or” arguments. These binary public approaches to religion
11
“How highly religious Americans view evolution depends on how they’re asked about
it,” Pew Research Center, February 6, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/02/06/how-highly-religious-americans-view-evolution-depends-on-how-
theyre-asked-about-it/, accessed April 29, 2020.
12
“Religion and Views on Climate and Energy Issues,” Pew Research Center, October 22,
2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2015/10/22/religion-and-views-on-cli-
mate-and-energy-issues/, accessed April 29, 2020. After signing the 2015 Paris Climate
Agreement, the United States had the dubious distinction of being the only major nation to
withdraw in 2017 under the current president’s direction.
and science have contributed to the increasingly acrimonious discourses of

cable news and the social media niche.
Against the background of the culture wars, for those who want to take
the contributions of both science and religion seriously, epistemic fallibil-
ism offers a moderating stance that neither claims too much or too little
for either endeavor nor forces a decision for one side over and against the
other. Of course, the criteria for what counts as “truth” or “error” within
religious and scientific communities differ, but to maintain a dynamic
position, innovators in both fields have exhibited a willingness to exercise
imagination by remaining open to new insights while acknowledging the
provisional nature of current understanding.
By claiming that no belief or theory may ever be considered final, epis-
temic fallibilism also avoids the relativist-absolutist polarity. This approach
suggests instead a family resemblance between patterns or modes of know-
ing in religion and science. To wit, theologians and philosophers have
long reflected on the differentiated relationship between what may be
called “first-order” experience and “second-order” reflection, and work in
cognitive science on the theory of mind suggests, in an analogous way,
that we cannot neatly separate “perception” from “cognition” in our
immediate experience of and subsequent reflection on objects in the
world, other people, or ultimacy.
As for the world’s great religious traditions, the fact of their historical
development, cultural embeddedness, translatability, and endurance is evi-
dence that embodied experiences of wonder continue to create in some
people feelings of awe, being a part of a larger whole, a sense of limited-
ness in a seemingly limitless cosmos, or other indications of ultimate
meaning, purpose, intelligibility, or transcendence. The “truth” or “fal-
sity” of claims of such experiences are adjudicated by means of particular
religious traditions, wherein such experiences have, over time, been tested
and transmitted across generations and locations via practices, rituals, and
teachings, and guided and interpreted within particular historical contexts
and sociocultural milieux.
As for the much shorter history of the sciences, their astoundingly rapid
development evinces a similar pattern of knowing, wherein embodied
experiences of wonder and intellectual awe vis-à-vis the natural world have
given birth, over time, to established bodies of field-specific theories,
which, based on the standard of experimental reproducibility—in the nat-
ural sciences—and phenomenological stability, variability, and generaliz-
ability—in the social sciences—adjudicates the relative “truth” or “falsity”
of any new hypothesis, experiment, or theoretical proposal. As an example

of “progress” in science, while Newton may be surprised to know that his
description of gravity as a force could not account for all phenomena, he
would surely thank Einstein for being sufficiently bold and imaginative to
pose new questions and follow the evidence for the uneven distribution of
mass and for proposing the curvature of spacetime as a corrective to
Newton’s law. And yet, in spite of the massive breakthroughs of Newton,
Einstein, and many others, physics today is still seeking a “Theory of
Everything.”
In modernity, there has been a tendency to see religion as treating pri-
vate or subjective realities and science as treating public or objective reali-
ties. Yet, the presence of dynamism, adaptability, self-correction, and
transformation in both epistemic realms points to the pivotal role of curi-
ous and fallible human knowers. This suggests that religious beliefs and
scientific theories are never, in a final sense, universal, but are forever in
need of new light. While evidence for the dynamics of change and devel-
opment in religious knowledge may not be as easy to trace and theorize as,
say, physical evidence for natural selection, the long perdurance of certain
religious traditions over time and across cultural boundaries suggests new
religious insights or spiritual information. For scientists and religionists,
epistemic fallibilism may offer one way of restoring humility to public dis-
course on vital issues that are impacting all peoples, that is, global warm-
ing, nuclear proliferation, economic inequality, artificial intelligence,
and so on.
So we return to our title, The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy,
Theology, and Religion, but of what might this grace consist? Given our
ability to acknowledge—at least in part—the limitations of our embodied
perceptions and reflections, we could argue that the grace for being fallible
is an endowment of nature. Yet, as all religious traditions point out, in the
course of our lives we are tempted over and over again to make faulty
judgments about ourselves and other people, deciding, for example, that
we are good or right while others are evil or wrong. Thus, while natural
selection has gifted us with some awareness of our epistemic limitations,
we obscure and sometimes obliterate this “innate” grace by thinking,
speaking, and acting as if we personally or our particular group of belong-
ing possesses special, better, or even unlimited knowledge. In Bonhoeffer’s
terms, humans sometimes display a tendency to “become like God, but
against God.” Thus, we find ourselves in need of grace beyond the shared
endowment of nature, grace in a radically different register, or what

Christian theologians call gratia extra nos.
To reiterate, the present volume is not a comprehensive exploration of
fallibilism per se nor does it provide an exhaustive fallibilist perspective for
philosophers, theologians, or scholars of religion. It is rather an interdisci-
plinary and international exploration of how a fallibilist disposition may be
helpful within and across several fields and cultural locations. Each chapter
could stand alone, but there are connections, which we will leave readers
to construct out of their own locations. The ordering of our chapters
reflects an ad hoc trajectory from philosophy to theology and religion.
Situating fallibilism’s roots with C. S. Peirce in the philosophy of sci-
ence, co-editor Knut-Willy Sæther in Chap. 2 traces the move from logi-
cal positivism to Karl Popper and subsequent thinkers, and to the current
picture of fallibilism in certain sciences. Drawing again on Peirce, he con-
tinues by mapping the broader philosophical picture and contrasts fallibil-
ism with skepticism. He then explores three areas in theology—dogmatism,
the nature of faith, and virtue—and shows how fallibilism sheds light on
these subjects. He concludes by considering some of fallibilism’s implica-
tions for ontology.
Jonas Gamborg Lillebø in Chap. 3 takes a philosophical look at the
reception of fallibilist ideas and suggests a move from epistemology to the
history of thought via the philosophy of science. He touches on differ-
ences between “contexts of justification” and “contexts of discovery” and
says that fallibilism opens up new possibilities beyond these traditional
contexts. With reference to Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality, he
asserts that “problematization” is Foucault’s way of moving beyond tradi-
tional epistemology by bringing in the “history of thought” as the focus
of philosophical reflection.
Amos Yong in Chap. 4 makes a connection between fallibilist “philo-
sophical” views of the partial, perspectival, and finite character of knowl-
edge and a theological perspective grounded in a strong pneumatology.
Rather than engendering absolute certainty, Yong argues that the Spirit
sponsors an embodied moral certainty that guides faithful discipleship,
which is content to live with finitude that awaits future light.
Chapter 5 by Lisa Dahill deals with historical, political, and religious
developments around conceptions of mission and European conquest.
Dahill shows how the lack of a fallibilist stance and disposition underwrote
extreme and erroneous convictions about cultural hegemony. She
critiques a specific historical development of the horrific “Doctrine of

Discovery” and the cognate category of terra nullius, by means of which
European political and religious forces devastated the indigenous peoples
of North and South America and beyond. As a way out of the fallacies of
Euro-Christian domination, she proposes three positive guidelines
for action.
Rejecting conservative and liberal apologetics for Christian faith and
biblical interpretation as reductionistic, Drew Collins in Chap. 6 draws
on the work of Hans Frei and others who stress the provisional “fallible”
character of Christian theology and the need for a figural reading of
Scripture that takes the texts very seriously in their narrative shape and
approaches apologetics in an ad hoc fashion. Collins is pushing for a way
of reading Scripture and doing theology that transcends rationalist and
experiential epistemologies.
In conversation with Karl Barth and Scripture, Paul Louis Metzger in
Chap. 7 outlines a fallibilist approach to theology and Christian life char-
acterized by humble faith, earnest hope, and resilient love. These disposi-
tions are, in turn, founded on the Reformed conviction that God’s
self-revelation in Jesus Christ is sufficient, albeit not exhaustive, and there-
fore should lead not “to arrogance or ambivalence, but to awe and won-
der.” Taking Barth’s view that Christ himself is the unity of the churches,
Metzger offers some positive ecumenical connections for our time.
Speaking as an Asian Christian theologian, Seung Chul Kim in Chap.
8 proposes a “pluralistic pluralism” as a corrective to a western-centric bias
in interreligious dialogue and notions of religious pluralism, which Kim
sees as presupposing “the all-embracing One.” Kim’s point is that Asian
Christians embody various religious traditions as an “inner other,” mean-
ing that religious pluralism for them is not just a new social reality but an
existential reality. Kim draws on J. R. Hustwit’s “fallibilist hermeneutics”
as a way of deconstructing the western-centric bias and making room for
a more egalitarian basis for interreligious dialogue.
Drawing on the contributions of Lamin Sanneh and Andrew Walls, co-
editor Thomas John Hastings in Chap. 9 argues that the relatively new
awareness of Christianity as a translated religion and its demographic and
cultural expansion should have by now subverted the enduring preten-
tions of western-centric theological normativity and given way to a more
fallibilist disposition that encourages two-way traffic between Christians
from different cultures and church traditions. Drawing on Karl Barth’s
apologia for a variety of faith perspectives within a “polycentric
ecumenism,” he suggests that these new insights are consonant with falli-
bilism, emergence, and eschatology. Finally, he offers a reevaluation of the
pro me and pro nobis dimensions of Christian faith as a way of fostering
serious intercultural theological engagements in the future.
Bibliography
Audi, Robert. 2003. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of
Knowledge. Abingdon: Routledge.
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. 1955. Ethics. New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster.
Gregersen, Niels Henrik. 2004. Critical Realism and Other Realisms. In Fifty
Years in Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and his Legacy, ed. Robert John
Russell, 77–96. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Isaacson, Walter. 2003. A Ben Franklin Reader. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Losch, Andreas. 2005. Our World is more than Physics: A Constructive-Critical
Comment on the Current Science and Theology Debate. Theology and Science
3 (3): 275–290.
Moran, Joe. 2002. Interdisciplinarity. Abingdon: Routledge.
Polkinghorne, John. 1996. Scientists as Theologians. London: SPCK.
———. 1998. Belief in God in an Age of Science. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sæther, Knut-Willy. 2018. Rationality in Play? A Philosophical Journey in the
Current Landscape of Facts and Truth. In Navigating Post-Truth and
Alternative Facts: Religion and Science as Political Theology, ed. Jennifer
Baldwin, 63–79. Lanham/Boulder/New York: Lexington Books.
CHAPTER 2
The Many Faces of Fallibilism: Exploring

Fallibilism in Science, Philosophy,
and Theology
Knut-Willy Sæther
Introduction: To Be Fallible in a Fallibilistic World

Quite often, there is an elephant in the room. In the room of our search
for knowledge one elephant is fallibilism. We try to ignore him, or even
tend to think he is non-existent, by speaking what we consider facts and
inevitable truth. We claim to “have the truth” and present facts with
“knock-down arguments”. In our daily lives we use language expressions
to say something with certainty, such as the phrase “It’s science!” This is
an expression of what we understand as fact—as true. On the other hand,
we are—at least sometimes—aware of the elephant as we obviously recog-
nize our limits of knowledge. We realize over and over again that our
search for truth takes shape as verisimilitude knowledge or that we need to
revise our understanding: In short, we are fallible. It requires quite a lot of
courage to claim that we get some things wrong.
K.-W. Sæther (*)

Department of Religious Studies, Volda University College, Volda, Norway
© The Author(s) 2021 13

T. J. Hastings, K.-W. Sæther (eds.), The Grace of Being Fallible in
Philosophy, Theology, and Religion,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_2
14 K.-W. SÆTHER
Despite the obvious fact that our knowledge is fallible, we need to

problematize how to understand this ambiguous term. We might speak of
fallibilism in different ways and in various contexts. What does it mean to
be fallible? What are we fallible of? In general, fallibilism is the idea that
any of our opinions about the world or about anything else might turn out
to be false.1 Thus, fallibilism typically denies the notion that knowledge
requires absolute certainty. In other words, fallibilism is the claim that it is
possible to know that something is the case even though you could be
wrong. Taking this as a general starting point, to be fallible seems to be
nothing extraordinary: It just develops naturally from how all search for
knowledge takes place.
Hence, to be fallible is in one sense a natural part of being human.
However, in this context, being fallible is not a phenomenon existing at a
meta-level as a general concept. As the general definition above expresses,
we might be fallible in relation to knowledge whether it is content, state-
ment, or proposition.
I will explore three strands of fallibilism: scientific, philosophical, and
theological fallibilism. I start by unpacking fallibilism in science, as this in
many ways is the initial context for fallibilism. I argue that our reflection
on fallibilism in science is a topic belonging to the field of philosophy of
science. Hence, fallibilism in the context of science is intertwined with
philosophy and can be described as epistemic fallibilism. However, the
second strand—the philosophical one—is more than just about fallibilism
in the framework of philosophy of science. I will explore the broader phil-
osophical concept by drawing on resources from C. S. Peirce. Third, I
unpack what fallibilism might be in the context of theology. I argue that
fallibilism in theology is heavily dependent on how we understand theol-
ogy and the nature of faith. Within the contexts of these three large
areas—science, philosophy, and theology—my underlying concern is to
shed light on how we in these fields are inevitably stuck to fallibilism, as
well as to shed light on the relationship between these fields concerning
fallibilism. Finally, from these three areas, I explore how fallibilism might
have some implications for how we reflect upon ontology. And in good
fallibilistic spirit, I attempt in this chapter to be more explorative than
concluding with knock-down argument.
1
Anthony O’Hear, “Fallibilism,” in A Companion to Epistemology, eds. Jonathan Dancy
and Ernest Sosa (Oxford/Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1993), 138.
2 THE MANY FACES OF FALLIBILISM: EXPLORING FALLIBILISM IN SCIENCE… 15
Fallibilism in Science
According to Nicolas Rescher, fallibilism is a philosophical doctrine
regarding natural science, which “maintains that our scientific knowledge
claims are invariably vulnerable and may turn out to be false”.2 Rescher
refers to both the initial context of fallibilism, that is, natural science, and
the locus of “where” we reflect upon fallibilism, that is, philosophy. In
other words, the topic of fallibilism belongs in one sense to the domain of
philosophy; however, the concrete context for initiating this philosophical
reflection on fallibilism is science. Thus, we are in the field of the philoso-
phy of science, mainly dealing with epistemology.
From Logical Positivism to Karl Popper

In science, traditionally we seek for some sort of secure knowledge. The
advantage of science and the scientific method is its ability to describe the
natural world, as well as its potential for problem-solving with a technical
outcome. However, such an understanding of the scientific process is not
a vote for “secure scientific knowledge”, but the scientific method at least
gives us a verisimilitude approach to reality. Such an epistemological posi-
tion is quite common among scientists, a position that might be described
as a sort of critical realism.3 On the other hand, it seems we frequently are
tempted to claim certainty of knowledge within the sciences, and even
within broader philosophical systems, as done by the logical positivists.
Logical positivism criticized the ability of philosophy to gain a priori
knowledge of reality through reason alone. On the contrary, they empha-
sized that we, based on our senses, are only able to formulate sentences
about reality through the process of verification. According to logical pos-
itivists, traditional philosophy had engaged with pseudo-problems, such as
moral philosophy and ethics.
However, the days of logical positivism—at least in its earliest version—
are gone, which we do not need to regret. We do not claim any longer
some sort of verification of our knowledge. Since the early years of logical
positivism in the 1920s, it was modified and developed in different
2
Nicolas Rescher, “Fallibilism,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London:
Routledge, 1998), 545.
3
See such as John Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians (London: SPCK, 1996), 11ff.
16 K.-W. SÆTHER
directions. However, one philosopher has in particular problematized the

positivistic picture of how we gain knowledge: Karl Popper.
For Popper, our scientific search for knowledge takes shape through the
process of the falsification of hypotheses. At best, our scientific knowledge
can be approximate since our hypotheses never can be verified, only falsi-
fied.4 Popper, and later critics of logical positivism, argues for fallibilism
based on several problems related to the particular view of scientific
method in logical positivism. The two main points relate to verification
and to data as theory-laden.
First, we have the problem of the verification of hypotheses which is
intertwined with induction. Popper argues that we do not have any
method in which scientific hypotheses can be verified based on observa-
tions. To verify means to prove that something is undoubtedly true. For
Popper, even observation statements as such are fallible. Hypotheses,
Popper continues, cannot be verified since induction, that is, inference
from observations of particularities to universal generalizations, is impos-
sible. Particularities, or data, are finite in number, discrete, and episodic.
By contrast, theories are general, non-finite, and transcend data. Second,
we have the problem that data are theory-laden. This is articulated most
clearly by Pierre Duhem, in addition to Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.
Data is always affected by some theoretical presuppositions held by the
investigator. We find different aspects of theory-ladenness; one is the fact
that the questions we can pose are limited by our conceptual horizons.5
Science in Popper’s view is not a quest for certain knowledge, but an evo-
lutionary process in which hypotheses or conjectures are imaginatively
proposed and tested in order to explain facts or to solve problems. Popper
insists that we must acknowledge an inability to attain the final and defini-
tive truth in the theoretical concerns of science. This is the reason why we
claim our knowledge of the world is vulnerable and hence adopt a fallibil-
ist position in the context of justification.6
Even if Popper criticizes logical positivism, he still shares its common
concept of knowledge and science: Search for scientific knowledge is a
process within the context of scientific method. For Popper this is about
testing of hypotheses or theories. However, this type of fallibilism is within
a context where we do not discover anything new. By excluding a
4
See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).
5
Rescher, “Fallibilism”, 547.
6
hypothesis, we do not gain new insight in such a way that we develop new
concepts or descriptions.7 In Popper’s fallibilism, what we consider as
wrong is excluded, but the process does not develop novelty for the scien-
tist. What we might lack in the Popperian view of fallibilism is the notion
of fallibilism as a resource for deeper insight, which could lead us in new
directions, yet unknown.8
New Atheism and the Current Picture of Fallibilism and Science

One observation which is related to fallibilism in science, and problema-
tizes the picture of leaving positivism behind, is the so-called new atheism.
Their view of scientific knowledge is in deep contrast to Popper and other
critics of logical positivism. Advocates for new atheism, such as Richard
Dawkins, leave out philosophical consideration in their understanding of
how to gain knowledge through scientific method. Dawkins puts God on
the scientific table, testing the hypothesis of God’s existence empirically.
Even though he is not an old-fashion logical positivist, by dealing with
verification and inductive inference, he nevertheless puts God on the
wrong table. In short, while Dawkins seems to walk in the landscape of
science, he does not. He actually claims a specific worldview. If we advo-
cate a worldview where science is the only deliverer of knowledge about
reality, we will not find God. In Dawkins’ terms, the God hypothesis can
be rejected. This is naturalism or scientism—not science. However, God
does not belong on the scientific table. This is not to limit science but to
take seriously what science is all about. Thus, the problems with Dawkins’
new atheism are threefold. First, it is bad science and philosophy, as his
journey in the landscape of science and worldviews is blurred. In particu-
lar, he shows a lack of philosophical and epistemological reflection. Second,
he has a narrow view of science and how methods in science actually work.
Third, he does not embrace an understanding of reality as multilayered,
which could open for varieties of methods in our search for knowledge of
this reality.
7
Arild Utaker, Tenker hjernen? Språk, menneske, teknikk (Oslo: Vidarforlaget, 2018), 242.
8
McLeish touches on a similar careful understanding of knowledge in science. He describes
our development of ideas and the scientific process in a nuanced way: “No scientific theory
is born antelope fashion, fully formed in limb and energy, able to run for itself and keep out
of harm’s way. Our ideas emerge far more frequently as a marsupial birth—inadequate, vul-
nerable and almost powerless.” See Tom McLeish, Faith and Wisdom in Science (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 200.
18 K.-W. SÆTHER
My point by bringing up new atheism is that some elements of positiv-

ism—well communicated in the public sphere—are still alive and represent
a clearly non-fallibilistic understanding of knowledge. Dawkins and his
advocators argue for science as delivering facts about what reality is all
about. The way of doing this is far removed from a humble approach con-
cerning the limits of science and the question of being fallible about
knowledge in general.
However, the current picture of science is even a little bit more compli-
cated in the public sphere. We recognize a paradox in our late modernity.
We look to science for secure knowledge, in terms of what is really the case
and as a source for gaining knowledge of the natural world. Most of us
trust science. Most of us trust the insight from applied science when we
are going to a hospital for surgery or driving our car. In one sense, our
trust in science is a heritage from modernity. On the other hand, a parallel
increasing mistrust of science takes place in the blurred context of “post-
truth society”. This situation has given room for “alternative facts” and
even questioning scientific results. It seems to be the case that “anything
goes” in the public sphere concerning facts and truth. The reactions
against this tendency are made visible as the marches for science. The pic-
ture of the current situation of the status of science, facts, and truth in the
public sphere is a mix of different perspectives and agendas, which I will
not analyze further here. Surely, mistrust in science is not the same as fal-
libilism. Mistrust in this context seems to create some sort of “skeptical
populism”, and I will later draw a line between fallibilism and skepticism.
In any case, the current situation presents a more complex situation on the
status of science and knowledge and how fallibilism fits into this picture.9
To sum up, fallibilism in the context of science is about how we under-
stand the scientific method and what insight we can make out of this pro-
cess. It does not hold that knowledge is unavailable, but rather that it is
always provisional.10 This tentativeness is not necessarily limited to the
area of science as we shall explore in the next section.
9
See also Knut-Willy Sæther, “Rationality in Play? A Philosophical Journey in the Current
Landscape of Facts and Truth,” Navigating Post-Truth and Alternative Facts: Religion and
Science as Political Theology, ed. Jennifer Baldwin, (Lanham/Boulder/New York: Lexington
Books, 2018), 63–79.
10
Fallibilism: A Broader Philosophical Picture

Fallibilism as described above covers one aspect of fallibilism. However,
we might also open up another picture of fallibilism which is somewhat
broader philosophically. It is described by Jonas Gamborg Lillebø in this
volume as the “context of problematization”. I will not follow his specific
trajectory on fallibilism but explore a picture of fallibilism which is more
philosophically comprehensive than the context of scientific method as
done by Popper. This picture can be traced back to Charles S. Peirce, the
philosopher who more than anyone developed fallibilism at the core of the
scientific and philosophical endeavor.
Fallibilism and Peirce

Peirce brings different aspects of fallibilism together in one philosophical
body and he is probably the first who coined the term fallibilism in our
search for knowledge. Although, mostly known as a philosopher, Peirce’s
context for discussing epistemology is also primarily within the context of
science, but he differs from Popper by developing fallibilism into a broader
philosophical perspective.
Peirce’s fallibilism has mainly its starting point in his critique of
Descartes’ “intuitive knowledge” (I think, therefore I am). According to
Peirce, we cannot claim any knowledge for sure by only referring to our
cognition. Thus, he criticizes Descartes’ rationalism as the entrance for
secure knowledge. However, Peirce is not arguing for empiricism as the
way for gaining secure knowledge. He criticizes empiricism and its claim
of sense data or sense impressions as the starting point or foundation for
knowledge of reality. The point for Peirce in his critique of both rational-
ism and empiricism is to claim that we do not have any sources for secure
knowledge.
In “The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism”, Peirce argues for a fallibil-
istic approach in science. His approach is not so much regarding knowl-
edge in itself, but about the process of inquiry.11 Thus, science is not
knowing, but love of learning, he says.12 For Peirce, we recognize at least
four “shapes” or concepts of knowledge that need to be corrected: (1)
11
Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism,” in Philosophical
Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover, 1955), 42ff.
12
Peirce, “The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism,” 42.
20 K.-W. SÆTHER
The shape of absolute assertion. Peirce says it is an ancient truth that we—
scientifically understood—cannot be sure of anything. The problem is that
science has been “infested with overconfident assertion”.13 (2) The con-
cept of claiming that something will not be known in the future: “It is easy
enough to mention a question the answer to which is not known to me
today. But to aver that that answer will not be known tomorrow is some-
what risky; for oftentimes it is precisely the least expected truth which is
turned up under the ploughshare of research.”14 (3) The shape of knowl-
edge where we claim some sort of scientific foundation of a particular
knowledge, in the sense that something we know is basic, ultimate, and
independent of something else. (4) The concept to claim a given scientific
law or truth as being finally formulated and not subject to revision.
For Peirce, these points are not only the case for science and the scien-
tific endeavor but apply to all sort of knowledge and thinking, including
philosophical inquiry as well: “On the whole, then, we cannot in any way
reach perfect certitude nor exactitude.”15 For Peirce, neither revelation, a
priori knowledge, nor direct experience is infallible (of different reasons).
Some fundamental questions in philosophy—and in particular epistemol-
ogy—are as follows: What does it mean to know something about reality?
What do we mean by claiming something to be true? How can we prove
or justify something we claim to be true? Hence, fallibilism is at the very
core of what philosophy is all about. This is expressed in different ways
throughout the philosophical endeavor and, as shown above, clearly artic-
ulated by Peirce by his four concepts of knowledge.
To acknowledge fallibilism in such a broader philosophical context
might be a challenge for many people to accept since it strikes a wide
range of areas in life; Peirce says: “The doctrine of fallibilism will also be
denied by those who fear its consequences for science, for religion, and
for morality.”16 Are we then lost in the deep sea of relativism, according
to Peirce? He clarifies that fallibilism is about how to deal with what we
consider as fact: “it is not my purpose to doubt that people can usually
count with accuracy. Nor does fallibilism say that men cannot attain a sure
knowledge of creations of their own minds. It neither affirms nor denies
13
14
15
16
that. It only says that people cannot attain absolute certainty concerning
questions of fact.”17
Peirce continues by developing his fallibilism within a larger picture of
symbols and signs. All knowledge is both inferential and semiotic. I will
not follow that road here. What is relevant for my discussion is to point
out how fallibilism in Peirce’s thinking is related to a wider context than
merely scientific justification. Even though his starting point for discussing
fallibilism is science, Peirce paints a picture where fallibilism covers a larger
area (the aforementioned four points). The context is about thinking in
general and includes all kinds of search for knowledge. His fallibilism
involves us in an open-ended, experimental, explorative, and playful search
for knowledge. In Alejandro García-Rivera’s terms, Peirce’s way of search-
ing for knowledge is “interpretive musement—thinking at ‘treetop’
level”.18 Fallibilism is a natural part of our thinking and an inevitable
human quality.
Such a broader notion of fallibilism echoes in contemporary philosoph-
ical writings, such as those of Robert Audi. He finds three main important
kinds of grounding of beliefs: Causal, justificational, and epistemic.19 For
Audi these three mostly coincide in our process of thinking. I will not
discuss these as such but point out that our well-grounded beliefs can be
mistaken and there are several sources of failure: “We are fallible in percep-
tual matters as in our memories, in our reasoning, and in other respects.”20
This might open the door to a number of fundamental questions:
How can I be justified in believing […] such as that my home is secure

against the elements, my car safe to drive, and my food free of poison? And
how can I know the many things I need to know in life, such as that my
family and friends are trustworthy, that I can control my behavior and can
thus partly determine my future, and that the world we live in at least
approximates the structured reality portrayed by common sense and science?21
17
18
See Alejandro García-Rivera, The Community of the Beautiful. A Theological Aesthetics
(Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1999), 8.
19
Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 7.
20
Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 8.
21
Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 9.
22 K.-W. SÆTHER
However, if we are fundamentally unsure about anything, this might

lead to an understanding of knowledge where we give up the potential for
gaining any knowledge. This is neither the case for Peirce nor the case for
contemporary understanding of fallibilism in a larger philosophical pic-
ture: “Fallibilism does not insists on the falsity of our scientific claims but
rather on their tentativeness as inevitable estimates: it does not hold that
knowledge is unavailable here, but rather that it is always provisional.”22 In
short, fallibilism is neither only about falsity of scientific claims, as in the
Popperian way, nor about giving up our search for knowledge in general.
The point is that knowledge is, at its core, provisional.
Fallibilism and Skepticism

At this stage, bringing together the discussions above on fallibilism in sci-
ence and in philosophy, we can clarify fallibilism in light of skepticism.
Fallibilism ought to steer a middle course between positivism and skepti-
cism. I have already described some of the core elements in positivism and
recent the new atheism, such as the role of empirical observation as the
main and only entrance to knowledge. I will not develop this further here.
One can argue that by advocating fallibilism we incline toward the
realm of skepticism. Skepticism expresses a fundamental doubt concerning
all elements in our search for knowledge. Such a position will accept nei-
ther the primacy of mind, as in rationalism, nor the primacy of senses, as
in empiricism. Thus, skepticism doubts the possibility for objective knowl-
edge at all. A strict skepticism is rare and has had a limited influence in
history. However, it takes shape in moderate forms. Fallibilism differs
from skepticism, as the latter stresses that true knowledge by definition is
uncertain. In Rescher’s words: “The point is not that our pursuit of truth
in science is futile, but rather that the information we obtain is to be seen
as no more (but also no less) than the best available estimate of truth that
is available to us in the circumstances. Fallibilism is something very differ-
ent from nihilistic skepticism.”23 Fallibilism does not imply the need to
abandon our knowledge. This is an important difference between these
two positions.
Thus, skepticism goes much further than fallibilism in doubting all
aspects of the process of gaining knowledge. By claiming a fallibilistic
22
Rescher, “Fallibilism,” 545.
23
Rescher, “Fallibilism,” 548.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
308Hic dicit quod ipse iam vigilans,
secundum vocem309 quam in sompnis
acceperat,310 intendit scribere ea que de mundo
vidit et audiuit, et vocat libellum istum Vox
Clamantis, quia de voce et clamore quasi
omnium conceptus est; vnde in huius operis
auxilium spiritum sanctum inuocat.
Incipit prologus libri Secundi.311
Multa quidem vidi diuersaque multa notaui,

Que tibi vult meminens scribere penna sequens:
Non tamen inceptis ego musas inuoco, nec diis
Immolo, set solo sacrificabo deo.
Spiritus alme deus, accendens pectore sensus,
Intima tu serui pectoris vre tui:
Inque tuo, Criste, laxabo nomine rethe,
Vt mea mens capiat que sibi grata petit.
Inceptum per te perfecto fine fruatur
10 Hoc opus ad laudem nominis, oro, tui.
Qui legis hec eciam, te supplico, vir, quod honeste
Scripta feras, viciis nec memor esto meis:
Rem non personam, mentem non corpus in ista
Suscipe materia, sum miser ipse quia.
Res preciosa tamen in vili sepe Minera
Restat, et extracta commoditate placet:
Hoc quod in hiis scriptis tibi dat virtutis honestas
Carpe, nec vlla tumens vlteriora pete.
Si te perstimulet stilus hic stillatus in aure,
20 Sit racio medicus mulceat inde graue:312
Et si compositis verbis non vtar, vt illis
Metra perornentur, cerne quid ipsa notant:
Et rudis ipse rude si quid tractauero, culpe
Qui legis hoc parce, quod latet intus habe:
Et si metra meis incongrua versibus errent,
Que sibi vult animus congrua vota cape.
Rethorice folia quamuis formalia desint,
Materie fructus non erit inde minor:
Sint licet hii versus modice virtutis ad extra,313
30 Interior virtus ordine maior erit.
Quamuis sensus hebes obstet, tamen absque
rubore
Que mea simplicitas sufficit illa dabo.
In sene scire parum multum solet esse pudori
Temporis amissi pre grauitate sui;
Set modo siqua sapit docet aut prouisa senectus,
Vix tamen hec grata vox iuuenilis habet.
Que scribunt veteres, licet ex feruore studentes,
Raro solent pueris dicta placere satis;
Obloquioque suo quamuis tamen ora canina
40 Latrent, non fugiam quin magis ista canam.
De saxis oleum, de petra mel tibi sugge,
Deque rudi dociles carmine sume notas.
Quicquid ad interius morum scriptura propinat,
Doctrine causa debet habere locum:
Verba per os asini qui protulit, hic mea spes est,
Eius vt ad laudem cercius ore loquar.
Ergo recede mee detractor simplicitati,
Nec mea scripta queat rodere liuor edax:
Lite vacent aures lectoris et obuia cedant
50 Murmura, differ opus, invida turba, tuum.
Si tamen incendat Sinon Excetraque sufflet,314
Non minus inceptum tendo parare stilum.
Est oculus cecus, aurisque manet quasi surda,
Qui nichil vt sapiat cordis ad yma ferunt;
Et si cor sapiat quod non docet, est quasi pruna
Ignea, sub cinere dummodo tecta latet.
Nil fert sub modio lucens candela reconsa,
Pectoris aut sensus ore negante loqui.
Quid si pauca sciam, numquid michi scribere
pauce
60 Competit, immo iuuat alter vt illa sciat.
De modicis igitur modicum dabo pauper, et inde
Malo valere parum quam valuisse nichil.
Non miser est talis, aliquid qui non dare possit;
Si dare non possum munera, verba dabo.
Attamen in domino credenti nulla facultas
Est impossibilis, dum bene sentit opus.
Gracia quem Cristi ditat, non indiget ille;
Quem deus augmentat possidet immo satis:
Grandia de modico sensu quandoque parantur,
70 Paruaque sepe manus predia magna facit:
Sepius ingentes lux pellit parua tenebras,
Riuulus et dulces sepe ministrat aquas.
Constat difficile iustum nichil esse volenti;
Vt volo, sic verbum det deus ergo meum.
Non tamen ex propriis dicam que verba sequntur,
Set velut instructus nuncius illa fero.
Lectus vt est variis florum de germine fauus,
Lectaque diuerso litore concha venit,
Sic michi diuersa tribuerunt hoc opus ora,
80 Et visus varii sunt michi causa libri:
Doctorum veterum mea carmina fortificando
Pluribus exemplis scripta fuisse reor.
Vox clamantis erit nomenque voluminis huius,
Quod sibi scripta noui verba doloris habet.
Hic dicit, secundum quod de clamore

communi audiuit, qualiter status et ordo mundi
precipue in partibus istis in peius multipliciter
variantur; et quomodo super hoc vnusquisque
fortunam accusat.
Incipit liber Secundus.
Capm i. Incausti specie lacrimas dabo, de quibus ipse

Scribam cum calamo de grauitate nouo.
Esse virum vanum Salomon dat et omnia vana,
Datque nichil firmum preter amare deum.
Quotquot nascuntur vox illis prima doloris,
Incipit a fletu viuere quisquis homo:
Omnes post lauacrum temptacio multa fatigat,
Demonis ars, carnis pugna, cupido grauis:315
Nunc stat et abstat homo, flat et efflat, floret et
aret,316
10 Nec manet vllus ei firmus in orbe gradus.
Incipit ecce mori vir, cum iam fuderit aluo
Mater eum, quem post terminat hora breuis:
Infantem fletus, puerum scola, luxus adultum,
Ambicioque virum vexat auara senem;
Sola nec vna dies homini tam leta ministrat,
Quin dolor ex aliqua parte nocebit ei.
Si tamen esse potest quod felix esset in orbe,
Dudum felices nos dedit esse deus:
Quicquid summa manus potuit conferre creatis,
20 Contulit hoc nobis prosperitatis opus.
Huius erat vite, si que sit, gloria summe,
Nobis pre reliquis amplificata magis.
Tuncque fuisse deum nobis specialius omni
Conuersum plebe clamor vbique fuit:
Famaque sic mundi, nobisque beacius omni
Tempus erat populo nuper; et ecce modo
Turpiter extincta sunt nostra beata vetusta
Tempora, nam presens torquet amara dies.
Quam cito venerunt sortis melioris honores,
30 Tam cito decasum prosperitatis habent:
Nos cito floruimus, set flos erat ille caducus,
Flammaque de stipula nostra fit illa breuis;
Set labor et cure fortunaque moribus impar,
Quod fuit excelsum iam sine lege ruunt.
Nostra per inmensas ibant preconia gentes,
Que modo mutata sorte pericla ferunt.
Querunt propterea plures cur tempus et aura
Stat modo deterius quam solet esse prius:
Querunt cur tanta nobis quasi cotidiana
40 Assunt insolita nunc grauiora mala:
Nam nichil in terra contingens fit sine causa,
Sicut Iob docuit, qui mala multa tulit.
Se tamen inmunes cause communiter omnes
Dicunt, vt si quis non foret inde reus;
Accusant etenim fortunam iam variatam,
Dicentes quod ea stat magis inde rea.
Fortunam reprobat nunc omnis homo, quia mutat
Et vertit subito quod fuit ante retro;
Hocque potest speculo quisquis discernere nostro,
50 Que fuerat dulcis nunc fit amara nimis.
Hic corripit fortunam et sui euentus

inconstanciam deplangit.
Capm. ii. O tibi que nomen fortune concipis, illos

Quos prius exaltas cur violenta premis?
Hiis quibus extiteras pia mater dira nouerca
Efficeris, vario preuaricata dolo:
Quos conformasti tua sors dissoluit in iram,
Quos magis vnisti spergis in omne malum.317
Si pudor in facie fallente tua foret vllus,
Te quibus associas non inimica fores.
Dudum flore rosa fueras, set mole perurens
60 Nunc vrtica grauas quos refouere soles:
Mobilis est tua rota nimis, subito quoque motu
Diuitis ac inopis alterat ipsa status.
Malo set a fundo conscendere summa rotarum,
Quam quod ab excelso lapsus ad yma cadam:
De super in subtus absit, de sub michi supra318
Adueniat, namque prospera lapsa nocent.
Est nam felicem puto maxima pena fuisse,
Quam miser in vita posset habere sua.
Est o quam verum, quod habenti multa
dabuntur,
70 Qui tenet et pauca perdere debet ea!
Hoc patet in nobis, quibus olim magnificatis
Gens quasi tota simul subdita colla dabat.
Patria nulla fuit, vbi nos in honore locati
Non fuimus, set nunc laus vetus exul abest:
Omnis enim terra nobis querebat habere
Pacem, nunc guerras hostis vbique petit.
Qui plana fronte dudum comparuit, ecce
Cornua pretendens obuius ipse venit;
Et qui cornutus fuerat, nunc fronte reflexa,
80 Cornibus amissis, vix loca tutus habet.
Que fuerat terra bene fortunata per omne,
Dicunt fortunam iam periisse suam.
Dic set, fortuna, si tu culpabilis extas;
Credo tamen causa nulla sit inde tua:
Det quamuis variam popularis vox tibi famam,
Attamen ore meo te nichil esse puto.
Quicquid agant alii, non possum credere sorti,
Saltem dumque deus sit super omne potens.
Non te fortunam quicquid michi ponere credam,
90 Vt gens que sortem murmurat esse tuam:
Hac tamen in carta, que sit sibi ficta figura,
Scribere decreui, set nichil inde michi.
Hic describit fortunam secundum aliquos,

qui sortem fortune dicunt esse et casum.
Capm. iii. O fortuna, tibi quod aperte dicitur audi,

Inconstans animi, que nec es hic nec ibi:
Es facie bina, quarum deformiter vna
Respicit, ex et ea fulminat ira tua;
Altera felici vultu candescit, et ipsi
Hanc qui conspiciunt, prospera cuncta gerunt.
Sic odiosa tua facies et amabilis illa
100 Anxia corda leuat sepeque leta ruit:
Ex oculo primo ploras, ridesque secundo,
Ac econuerso, te neque noscet homo.
Dum geris aspectum duplum variata per orbem,
Non te simplicibus constat inire viis.
Prosperitate tua stetero si letus in orbe,
Dum puto securo stare, repente cado;
Et timet incerta cor sepe doloris in vmbra,
Cum michi leticia cras venit ecce noua.
Omnia suntque tuo tenui pendencia filo,
110 Qui plus credit eis fallitur atque magis;
Sique leues oculi sint ictus, sunt leuiora
Ordine precipiti pendula fata tua.
Munera nulla iuuant vt te possint retinere,
Nec domus est certa que stat in orbe tua.
Tu grauior saxis, leuior tu quam leuis aura,
Asperior spinis, mollior atque rosis:
Tu leuior foliis tunc cum sine pondere siccis
Mobilibus ventis arida facta volant;
Et minus est in te, quam summa pondus arista,
120 Que leuis assiduis solibus vsta riget.
Tu modo clara dies, modo nox terrore repleta;
Tu modo pacifica, cras petis arma tua:
Nunc tua deliciis sors fulget, nunc et amaris
Pallet, vt incerta des bona desque mala:
Parca que larga manu tu singula premia confers,
Ac aufers cui vis, sic tua fata geris.
Non Iris tot diuersos in nube colores,
Marcius aut varia tempora Mensis habet,
Quin magis in mille partes tua tempora scindis,
130 Omnia dissimili tincta colore gerens.
Est meretrice tuus amor et fallacior omni,
Et velut vnda maris sic venis atque redis:
Nemo sciet sero que sit tua mane voluntas,
Nam tua mens centri nescit habere locum:
Omne genus lustras, nec in vllo firma recumbis,
Turbinis et vento te facis esse parem.
Non tua conceptam michi firmant oscula pacem,
Nam tua principia finis habere negat:
Est sine radice tua plantula, nec diuturni
140 Floris habet laudem, namque repente cadit.
Quod sibi permaneat tua nil sapiencia confert,
Set sunt ambigua singula dona tua:
Est tua prosperitas aduersis proxima dampnis,
Et tua, si que sit, gloria rite breuis.
Hic tractat vlterius de mutacione fortune

secundum quod dicunt: concludit tamen in fine,
quod neque sorte aut casu, set ex meritis vel
demeritis sunt, ea que hominibus contingunt.
Capm. iiii. Frustrantur cuncti querentes gaudia mundi,

Nam fortuna nequit mel sine felle dare:
Invidie comes est melior fortuna, nec vmquam
Fida satis cuiquam, mobilis immo manet.
Quis miser ignarus fortune nesciat actus?
150 Quod dat idem tollit, infima summa facit.
Fert vt luna suam fortuna perambula speram,
Decrescit subito, crescit et illa cito:319
Crescit, decrescit, stabilis nec in ordine sistit,320
Est nunc subtus ea, nunc et in orbe supra.
Regnabo, regno, regnaui, sum sine regno,
Omnes sic breuiter decipit illud iter.
Motibus innumeris variare momenta dierum,
Omne quod instituunt fata perire sinunt.
Quando fauet fortuna caue, rota namque rotunda
160 Vertit, et inferius que tulit alta premit:
Quos vocat eicit, erigit, obruit, omnia voluit,
Esse suum proprium vendicat ipsa dolum.
Passibus ambiguis fortuna volubilis errat,
Et manet in nullo cotidiana loco:
En rapuit quodcumque dedit fortuna beatum,
Fit macer et subito qui modo crassus erat.
Dum iuuat et vultu ridet fortuna sereno,
Prospera tunc cuncta regna sequntur opes:321
Cum fugit illa, simul fugiunt, nec noscitur ille
170 Agminibus comitum qui modo cinctus erat.
Monstrat in exemplis anni mutabile tempus,
Quam fortuna suis stat varianda modis.
Non est fortuna talis quin fallat amica,
Dum mentita sue lex regit acta rote.322
Hec rota continue per girum de leuitate
Vertitur, et nullo tempore fixa manet:
Hec rota personas mundi non excipit vllas;
Hec rota castigat, soluit, et omne ligat.
Non illam flectis precibus, non munere mulces,
180 Non nullis lacrimis nemo mouebit eam:
Non sexus, non condicio, non ordo vel etas,
Nil compellit eam cum pietate pati.
Ciuis et agricola, rex, rusticus, albus et ater,
Doctus et insipiens, diues inopsque simul,
Mitis et impaciens, pius, atrox, equs, iniqus,
Sunt in iudicio, iudice sorte, pares.
Hos premit, hos releuat, leuat hos vt ad yma
retrudat,
Interutrumque iocat quos ad vtrumque vocat:
Ludit et illudit rebus, cum lubricus axis
190 Labitur et secum lubrica queque facit.
Hec rota nugatrix sic girovagatur eodem
Motu, ne possit rebus inesse quies.
Impetus euertit quicquid fortuna ministrat
Prospera, nec stabilem contulit ipsa statum.
Heu! cur tanta fuit concessa potencia tali,
Cui nichil est iure iuris in orbe datum?
Si quid iuris habet, surrepcio dicitur esse,
Nam de iure nichil quo dominetur habet.
Sic dicunt homines, qui credunt omnia casu
200 Quod deus extruxit ipsa mouere potest:
Set fortuna tamen nichil est, neque sors, neque
fatum,
Rebus in humanis nil quoque casus habet:
Set sibi quisque suam sortem facit, et sibi casum
Vt libet incurrit, et sibi fata creat;
Atque voluntatis mens libera quod facit actum
Pro variis meritis nomine sortis habet.
Debet enim semper sors esse pedisseca mentis,
Ex qua sortitur quod sibi nomen erit:
Si bene vis, sequitur bona sors; si vis male, sortem
210 Pro motu mentis efficis esse malam.
Si super astra leues virtutum culmine mentem,
Te fortuna sue ducit ad alta rote:
Set si subrueris viciorum mole, repente
Tecum fortunam ducis ad yma tuam.
Expedit vt sortem declines deteriorem,
Dum tuus est animus liber vtrumque sequi.
Hic dicit secundum scripturas et allegat,

qualiter omnes creature homini iusto seruientes
obediunt.
Capm. v. Dixerat ista deus, si que preceperit ipse

Quis seruare velit, prospera reddet ei,
Campos frugiferos, botris vinetaque plena,
220 Temperiem solis et pluuialis aque;
Sidera compescet, Saturnum reddet amenum,
Qui fuerat pestis tunc erit ipse salus;
Inque suas metas gladius non transiet, immo
De virtute sua singula bella fugat.
Sic pax, sic corpus sanum, sic copia rerum
Sunt homini iusto, dum timet ipse deum:
Tempore quo iustus steterit, stant prospera secum,
Sique cadat iustus, prospera iure cadent;
Nam retrouersantur peruersi prospera iusti,
230 Cumque malus fuerit, carpet et ipse mala.
Sic deus ex meritis disponit tempora nostris,
Vt patet exemplis, si memoranda legis.
Angelus hic cecum Raphael sanare Tobiam
Euolat e celis pronus in orbe viris:
Imperio iusti nequeunt obstare subacti
Tortores baratri, set famulantur ei:
Ac elementorum celestia corpora iustum
Subdita iure colunt, et sua vota ferunt.
In virtute dei sapiens dominabitur astra,323
240 Totaque consequitur vis orizontis eum:
Circulus et ciclus, omnis quoque spera suprema
Sub pede sunt hominis quem iuuat ipse deus.
Sol stetit in Gabaon iusto Iosue rogitante,
Nec poterat gressus continuare suos;
Imperio Iosue solis rota non fuit ausa
Currere, set cursus nescia fixa stetit:
Stella quidem natum patefecit nuncia Cristum,
Quo pacem iustis reddidit ipse deus.
Aeream pestem legimus sanasseque sanctum
250 Gregorium Rome, subueniente prece.
Diuisit Moyses mare virga percuciente,
Quo poterat populus siccus inire pedes:
Firma fides Petri dum cepit credere Cristi
Verba, viam pedibus prebuit vnda maris:
Propter Heliseum limpharum gurgite mersum
Ferrum transiliit desuper atque redit.
Ignea tres pueros fornax suscepit Hebreos,
Flamma set illesis victa pepercit eis.
Terra set Hillario, que plana fuit prius, almo
260 Se leuat, et sedes alta recepit eum:
Ex duris Moyse saxis heremique iubente
Dum saliunt fluctus, gens bibit atque pecus:
Montes rex Macedum diuisos consolidauit;
Ex precibus iustis sic dedit esse deus.
Omnis in orbe fera iusti virtute subacta
Est, draco sicque leo, quos sibi subdit homo:324
Namque per hoc iustum nouit Babilon Danielem,
Romaque Siluestrum senserat esse sacrum.
Aeris et volucres iussu Moysi ceciderunt,
270 Inque cibos populi subiacuere dei:
Et piscis triduo Ione seruiuit in vndis,
Dum Niniue portu ventre refudit eum.
Omnia sic iusto patet vt diuina creata
Subueniunt homini, subdita sunt et ei.
O quam diues homo, quam magno munere felix,
Cui totus soli subditur orbis honor!
Felix pre cunctis, cui quicquid fabrica mundi
Continet, assurgit et sua iussa facit.
Si tamen econtra iustus sua verterit acta,325
280 Illico peruersum senciet inde malum.
Hic tractat secundum scripturas et allegat,

qualiter omnes creature homini peccatori
aduersantes inobediunt.
Capm. vi. Dum Dauid ipse scelus commisit, in aere pestis

Congelat, et gentem sternit vbique suam:
Et pro peccatis Sodomam combusserat ignis,
Estque Chore culpis eius adusta domus:
Propter peccatum torrens peruenit aquarum,
In moriendo quibus condolet omne genus:
Et terre solida viciis fuerant liquefacta,
Dum Dathan ac Abiron scissa cauerna vorat:
Angelus et domini Sirie turmas dedit ensi,
290 Lisiamque ducem fecit inire fugam:
Septem nocte viros Sarre iugulauit iniquos
Demon et Asmodeus, vult ita namque deus.
Nil fortuna potest iniusto ferre salutis,
Namque creans obstant atque creata simul:326
Nil valet auferre iusto fortuna valoris,
Nam deus ipse iuuat, et sibi fata nichil.
Vires Sampsoni, vel sensum quis Salomoni,
Absolon aut speciem contulit? Ecce quidem
Corpora natura dedit, et sic exiget illa,
300 Virtutes anime gracia sola dei:327
Sic patet vt fortuna nichil valet addere nobis,
Tollere seu quicquid, cum nichil ipsa dedit.
Cum tam pacificum rexit Salomon sibi regnum,328
Tot quoque diuicie quando fuere sue,
Cumque Philisteum constat vicisse gigantem
Funda manu Dauid, num deus ista tulit?
Cumque dies fuerant Ezechie morientis
Sic elongati, mors quoque cessit ei,
Set cum de culpa fuit excusata Susanna,
310 Hester et in populo glorificata suo,
Dic que fortuna tunc prospera contulit ipsis?329
Nulla, puto, neque iam quis rogo causet eam.
In recolente deum non est fortuna colenda,
Nec faciente malum sors valet esse bona.
Quid Pharao poterat fortunam corripuisse,

Cumque furore sui tot periere viri?
Aut Nabugodonosor sua quod mutata figura
In pecus extiterat, quid nisi culpa dabat?
Aut quid et ille Saül, qui regnum perdidit et se,
320 Num quia precepti fit reus ipse dei?
Non Azariam lepra candida sorte subegit,
Vsurpans templi presulis acta sibi?
Set quid Achab dicet? Naboth dum tolleret agrum,
Eius auaricia fit sibi causa necis.
Aut Roboas? quoniam senium bona dogmata
spreuit,
Diuisum regnum plangit habere suum.
Aut Phinees et Ophni, quos belli strauerat ensis,
Archaque capta fuit? preuia culpa tulit.
Aut quid Hely, qui retrocadens sibi vertice fracto
330 Corruit a Sella, dum stupet inde noua?
Non sors fortune poterat sibi talia ferre,
Set pro peccatis contigit illud eis.
Qui male fecerunt mala premia fine tulerunt,
Namque malos iuste perdidit ipse male.
Cum simulacra colens populus peccasset
Hebreus,
Illum tradebat hostibus ira dei:
Cum prece pulsaret celum simulacra relinquens,
Hostes terga dabant, illud agente deo.
Iudei reges valuerunt tunc super omnes,
340 Dum non iura sui preteriere dei;
Hostiles acies populus Iudeus in armis
Semper deuicit, dum bonus ipse fuit:
Set cum transgressi fuerant, tunc hostis vbique
Victos, captiuos, sternere cepit eos.
Ex meritis vel demeritis sic contigit omne,
Humano generi quicquid adesse solet:
Sic vario casu versabitur alea mundi,
Dum solet in rebus ludere summa manus.
Hic loquitur de deo summo Creatore, qui est

trinus et vnus, in cuius sciencia et disposicione
omnia creata reguntur.
Capm. vii. Est deus omnipotens solus qui cuncta gubernat,

350 Omnia preuidit totus vbique manens;
Omnia ventura sibi sunt presencia semper,
Quam prius et fiant, hec quasi facta videt.
Ante creaturam genitor deus, et genitura
Prima creatura, causaque prima mouens.
Omne quod est esse certum sibi tempus habebat,
Ante quidem tempus set deus omne fuit:
Omne quod est, quod erat, quod erit, quod ducit
ad esse,
Est deus, et nec ei temporis esse datur:
Nulla coeua deo poterunt se tempora ferre,
360 Sic patet est dominus iure priore deus.
Est pater, est natus deus, est et spiritus almus,
Tres ita personas nomina trina sonant:
Quelibet hic persona deus dominusque vocatur,
Est deus et dominus solus et vnus idem.
Hee sunt persone tres, set substancia simplex,
Hee tres sunt vnum, non tria, tres set idem:
Hiis tribus vna manet essencia, tres deus vnus,
Hic nichil aut maius aut minus esse potest:
Vna tribus mens, vna trium substancia simplex,
370 Vna tribus bonitas, vna Sophia trium.
Est ignis, calor et motus tria, sicque videntur;
Hec tria sic semper feruidus ignis habet:
Sic pater et natus et spiritus in deitate
Tres sunt, et solum cum paritate notant.
Cum dominus dicat, ‘Hominem faciamus,’ in illo
Clarius insinuat que sit habenda fides:
Hic persona triplex auctore notatur in vno,330
Cum maneat simplex in deitate sua.
Hic loquitur de filio dei incarnato domino

nostro Ihesu Cristo, per quem de malo in
bonum reformamur.
Capm. viii. Nunc incarnatum decet et nos credere natum,

380 Quem colimus Cristum credulitate Ihesum.
Sic opus incepit natus, de corde paterno,
De gremio patris venit ad yma deus.
De patre processit, set non de patre recessit,
Ad mundi veniens yma, set astra tenens;
Semper enim de patre fuit, fuit in patre semper,
Semper apud patrem, cum patre semper idem:
Assumpsit carnem factus caro, nec tamen illam
Desiit assumens esse quod ante fuit:
Vnitur caro sic verbo, quod sint in eadem
390 Hec duo persona, verus vbique deus:
Quod fuit, hoc semper mansit, quod non fuit, illud
Virginis in carne sumpsit, et illud erat.
Par opus huic operi nusquam monstratur, honori
Nullus par potuit esse, Maria, tuo.
Infirmus carne, set robustus deitate,
Carne minor patre, par deitate manens:
Hinc alit, hinc alitur, hinc pascit, pascitur inde,
Hinc regit, hinc regitur, hinc nequit, inde potest:
Hinc iacet in cunis et postulat vbera matris,
400 Hinc testatur eum celicus ordo deum:
Hinc presepe tenet artum sub paupere tecto,
Hinc ad eum reges preuia stella trahit:
Hinc sitis, esuries, lacrime, labor atque dolores,
Et tandem potuit sustinuisse mori.
Ponitur in precio res impreciabilis, ipse
Proditur et modico venditur ere deus:
Postque salus, vita, seui predacio claustri;
Inde resurexit regna paterna petens:331
Iudicioque suo, finis cum venerit orbis,
410 Attribuet cunctis que meruere prius.
Sic homo perfectus, sic perfectus deus idem,
Exsequitur plene quicquid vtrumque decet.
Suggerit hoc verum mortale quod vbera suggit,
Quod noua stella gerit suggerit esse deum:
Quod presepe tenet, hominis; quod tres tribus
vnum
Muneribus laudant, cernitur esse dei.
Vt sit inops diues, deus infans, rex sine lecto,
Lactis opem poscit pascere cuncta potens,
Hospicium presepe tenens, cui fabrica mundi
420 Est domus, et thalamus ardua tecta poli.
Venit vt esuriat panis, requiesque laboret,
Fons siciat, penas possit habere salus,
Lux obscurari tenebris, sol luce carere,
Et contristari gloria, vita mori.
Hec ita sponte tulit proprio commotus amore,
Vt deus in nostra carne maneret homo.
Sicut Adam fragilis fit primi causa doloris,
Ille deus fortis letificauit opus:
Culpa prioris Ade nascentes vulnerat omnes,
430 Donec sanet eos vnda sequentis Ade.
Primus Adam pecudi, volucri dominatur et angui,
Sub pede noster habet cuncta secundus Adam.
Tempore descensus veteri fuit ad loca flendi,
Ad loca gaudendi lex noua fecit iter.
Vt sic credat homo fore qui vult saluus oportet,
Nec sciat vlterius quam sibi scire licet.
Hic dicit quod quilibet debet firmiter credere,

nec vltra quam decet argumenta fidei
inuestigare.
Capm. ix. Cum deus ex nichilo produxit ad esse creata,

Ipse deus solus et sine teste fuit.
Vt solus facere voluit, sic scire volebat
440 Solus, et hoc nulli participauit opus.
Materies nulla, subtilis forma, perhennis
Compago nostre nil racionis habet.
Subde tuam fidei mentem, quia mortis ymago
Iudicis eterni mistica scire nequit:
Letitiam luctus, mors vitam, gaudia fletus,
Non norunt, nec que sunt deitatis homo:
Non tenebre solem capiunt, non lumina cecus,
Infima mens hominis nec capit alta dei.
Nempe sacri flatus archanum nobile nunquam
450 Scrutari debes, quod penetrare nequis.
Cum non sit nostrum vel mundi tempora
nosse,332
Vnde creaturas nosse laborat homo?
Nos sentire fidem nostra racione probatam,
Non foret humanis viribus illud opus.
Humanum non est opus vt transcendat ad astra,
Quod mortalis homo non racione capit:
Ingenium tante transit virtutis in altum,
Transcurrit superos, in deitate manet.
Qui sapienter agit, sapiat moderanter in istis,
460 Postulet vt rectam possit habere fidem.
Ingenium mala sepe mouent; non nosse
virorum333
Est quid in excelsis construit ipse deus:
Multa viros nescire iuuat; pars maxima rerum
Offendit sensus; sobrius ergo sciat:
Committat fidei quod non poterit racioni,
Quod non dat racio det sibi firma fides.
Adde fidem, nam vera fides, quod non videt,
audit,
Credit, sperat, et hec est via, vita, salus.
Argumenta fides dat rerum que neque sciri
470 Nec possunt mente nec racione capi:
Vera fides quicquid petit impetrat, omne meretur,
Quicquid possibile creditur ipsa potest.
Lingua silet, non os loquitur, mens deficit, auris
Non audit, nichil est hic nisi sola fides.
Vna quid ad solem sintilla valet, vel ad equor
Gutta, vel ad celum quid cinis esse potest?
Vult tamen a modicis inmensus, summus ab ymis,
Vult deus a nobis mentis amore coli.
Hunc in amando modus discedat, terminus absit;
480 Nam velut est dignus, nullus amauit eum.
Ille docet quodcumque decet, set et aspera planat,
Curat fracta, fugat noxia, lapsa leuat:
Nam crux et roseo perfusi sanguine claui,
Expulso Sathana, nostra fuere salus.
Quisque Ihesum meditans intendere debet vt
actus
Deponat veteres et meliora colat.
Vita per hoc nomen datur omnibus, et benedicti
Absque Ihesu solo nomine nemo potest.
Non est sanctus vt hic dominus, qui solus ab omni
490 Labe fuit mundus, sanctificansque reos.
Et nisi tu non est alius, quia s u n t nichil omnes
Hii quos mentitur aurea forma deos.
Sic beat ecclesia nos per te larga bonorum,
Et Sinagoga suis est viduata bonis.
Hic tractat quod in re sculptili vel conflatili
non est confidendum, nec eciam talia adorari
debent; set quod ex illis in ecclesia visis mens
remorsa ad solum deum contemplandum cicius
commoueatur.
Capm. x. O maledicta deo gens perfida, nempe pagani,

Quos incredulitas non sinit esse sacros;
Recta fides Cristi quos horret, nam sine recto
Iure creatoris ligna creata colunt.
Incuruatur homo, sese prosternit, adorat
500 Ligna, creatoris inmemor ipse sui.334
Ligna sibi, lapides, que cernit ymagine sculpta,
Quodlibet ipse suum iactitat esse deum.
Quem deus erexit, pronus iacet ante fauillam,
Et sculptam statuam stipitis orat homo;
Orat opem, petit auxilium, nec muta refantur,
Postulat et manibus quos creat ipsa manus.
Quam vacui sensus est et racionis egeni,
Quod dominus rerum res facit esse deos!
O perturbate mentis reminiscere pensa,
510 Cuius erat primo condicionis homo:
Ad mentem reuoca titulum, quo te deus olim
Insignem fecit, cum dedit esse tibi.
Nonne fuit primo totus tibi conditus orbis,
Subiecteque tuis nutibus eius opes?
Non fuit ad cultum, factus fuit orbis ad vsum,
Esse tuus seruus, non deus esse tuus.
Que iubet ergo tibi racio, quod vel faber igne
Conflat vel ligno leuigat, esse deum?
O miser, vnde deos tibi dices ydola vana,
520 Tuque deo similis ad simulacra iaces?
Omnibus, heu! viciis hec est insania maior,
Numina muta coli, dum nichil ipsa sciunt.
Que nec habent gressum, tactum, gustum neque
visum,
Numquid ymaginibus sit reputanda salus?
Ad racionale quid brutum, quid minus illud
Ad vitale genus, quod neque viuit, erit?
Arboris est vna pars sulcus, pars et ymago,
Pars pulmenta coquit, arbor et vna fuit:
Ecce duas partes calco, set tercia sculpta
530 Nescio deberet qua racione coli.
‘Fiat eis similis ea qui componit, et ille
Qui confidit eis’: sic iubet ipse deus.
Dignior est sculptor sculpto: concluditur ergo
Quod nimis est fatuus qui colit actor opus.
Nos set ymaginibus aliter fruimur, puto, sculptis,
Non ad culturam ius minuendo dei;335
Nos set habemus eas, memores quibus amplius
esse
Possumus, vt sanctis intima vota demus.
Credimus esse deum, non esse deos, neque ritus
540 Nos gentilis habet: absit ab orbe procul!
Set cum causa lucri statuas componit et illas
Ornat, vt ex plebe carpere dona putet,
Qui sic fingit opus saltem deuotus ad aurum,
Nescio quid meriti fabrica talis habet.
Cumque deus Moysi fuerat de monte locutus,
Visa dei populo nulla figura fuit;
Nam si quam speciem populus vidisset, eadem
Forma fecisset sculptile forsan opus.
Set deus ex tali sculpto qui spernit honorem,
550 Noluit effigiem quamque notare suam;
Est set ymago dei, puto, iuncta caro racioni,
Ex qua culturam vendicat ipse suam.
Vndique signa crucis in honore Ihesu crucifixi
Mentibus impressa sunt adoranda satis.
Vis crucis infernum vicit, veterisque ruine,
Demone deiecto, crux reparauit opus:
Crux est vera salus, crux est venerabile lignum,336
Mors mortis, vite porta, perhenne decus:
Pectora purificat, mentemque rubigine mundat,337
560 Clarificat corda, corpora casta facit;

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The Grace of Being Fallible in

Philosophy, Theology, and Religion

Biota Grow 2C gather 2C cook Loucas

Wittgenstein Religion and Ethics New Perspectives from

Aquinas and the Theology of the Body: The Thomistic

The Philosophy of Religion Wierenga

Difference in Philosophy of Religion Philip Goodchild

Political philosophy and the challenge of revealed

Eternally spiraling into God : knowledge, love, and

The Future of the Philosophy of Religion M. David Eckel

The Grace of Being

ISBN 978-3-030-55915-1 ISBN 978-3-030-55916-8 (eBook)

Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com

Princeton, NJ, USA Thomas John Hastings

1 A Fallibilist Approach in the Age of COVID-­19 and

2 The Many Faces of Fallibilism: Exploring Fallibilism in

3 Fallibilism, Problematization, and the History of Thought 35

4 Fallibilism: A Philosophical-Pneumatological Apologetic 51

5 “Unworthy of the Earth”: Fallibilism, Place, Terra Nullius,

6 Apologetics and the Provisionality of the Living Jesus:

7 God’s Pneumatic Word and Faith, Hope and Love in

8 A Pluralistic Pluralism: With Some Remarks

9 Restoring the Pro Nobis > Pro Me: A Translated Religion,

Drew Collins Yale Divinity School, New Haven, CT, USA

A Fallibilist Approach in the Age

Thomas John Hastings and Knut-Willy Sæther

Why is fallibilism, an epistemological position with consequences for

© The Author(s) 2021 1

absolute truth. Our method is the creative interpretation of experience,

Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 104.

Further, we see constructive-critical realism as a self-critical approach that

pandemic, refusing to take responsibility, suggesting lethal remedies,

and science have contributed to the increasingly acrimonious discourses of

of any new hypothesis, experiment, or theoretical proposal. As an example

endowment of nature, grace in a radically different register, or what

critiques a specific historical development of the horrific “Doctrine of

The Many Faces of Fallibilism: Exploring

Introduction: To Be Fallible in a Fallibilistic World

K.-W. Sæther (*)

© The Author(s) 2021 13

Despite the obvious fact that our knowledge is fallible, we need to

From Logical Positivism to Karl Popper

directions. However, one philosopher has in particular problematized the

New Atheism and the Current Picture of Fallibilism and Science

My point by bringing up new atheism is that some elements of positiv-

Fallibilism: A Broader Philosophical Picture

Fallibilism and Peirce

How can I be justified in believing […] such as that my home is secure

However, if we are fundamentally unsure about anything, this might

Fallibilism and Skepticism

Incipit prologus libri Secundi.311

Multa quidem vidi diuersaque multa notaui,

Hic dicit, secundum quod de clamore

Incipit liber Secundus.

Capm i. Incausti specie lacrimas dabo, de quibus ipse

Hic corripit fortunam et sui euentus

Capm. ii. O tibi que nomen fortune concipis, illos

Hic describit fortunam secundum aliquos,

Capm. iii. O fortuna, tibi quod aperte dicitur audi,

Princeton, NJ, USA Thomas John Hastings

1 A Fallibilist Approach in the Age of COVID-19 and

2 The Many Faces of Fallibilism: Exploring Fallibilism in

3 Fallibilism, Problematization, and the History of Thought 35

4 Fallibilism: A Philosophical-Pneumatological Apologetic 51

5 “Unworthy of the Earth”: Fallibilism, Place, Terra Nullius,

6 Apologetics and the Provisionality of the Living Jesus:

7 God’s Pneumatic Word and Faith, Hope and Love in

8 A Pluralistic Pluralism: With Some Remarks

9 Restoring the Pro Nobis > Pro Me: A Translated Religion,