THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CG.

JUNG

CONSCIOUSNESS

TRANSLATED BY DAVID N. ROSCOE

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C.A. MEIER
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
Copley Square
CONSCIOUSNESS
Copyright 1989 by C.A. Meier
Translation 1989 by Sigo Press
All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, must not be
reproduced in

any form without permission from the publisher.

e
25
Sigo Press
New Chardon Street, #8748
Boston, Massachusetts 02114

Publisher and General Editor: Sisa Stemback

Associate Editor: Marc Romano

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Pubiication Data

Meier, C. A. (Carl Alfred), 1903-

Consciousness.

(The Psychology of C.G. Jung; v. 3)

Translation of: Bewusstsein.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Consciousness. 2. Jung, C. G. (Carl Gustav),

1875-1961. I. Title. II. Series: Meier, C. A.

(Carl Alfred), 1903- Lehrbuch der komplexen

Psychologie C.G. Jungs. English ;

v. 3.

BF173.J85M43513 vol. 3 150.19’54s 88-15824

[BF311] [153]

ISBN 0-938434-12-8 [hbk]

Printed in the United States of America.

 In memoriam
C. G. Jung

Centum Annorum
1875-1975 a.d.

Knowledge is the specific nature of the Psyche.

Corpus Hermeticum X, 9
 Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/consciousnesstheOOcarl
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ix

INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter I: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX 7

Chapter II: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS .. 17

Chapter III: THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 27

Chapter IV: THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 47

Chapter V: THE THEORY OF AFFECTS 65

Chapter VI: THE ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS OF 69

CONSCIOUSNESS
Chapter VII: THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE 77
'
OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND
EXTRAVERSION IN THE HISTORY OF
CIVILIZATION

Chapter VIII: THE ORIENTATION FUNCTIONS, OR THE 95

BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
APPENDIX — Literature on Typology 109

NOTES 115

BIBLIOGRAPHY 119

INDEX 123
 Except where otherwise noted, translations of source material are by
David Roscoe. All English citations of C. G. Jung are drawn from his
Collected Works, Bollingen Series XX, Princeton: Princeton University
Press. All Faust passages, again, unless otherwise noted, are drawn
from the George Madison Priest translation.
 FOREWORD

In order to write a comprehensive psychology of consciousness, an

author would have to take into consideration every aspect of the human
spirit. would have important contributions to
All the arts and sciences
make. Whether or not they are closely related to psychology would
probably be regarded as irrelevant. Every expert, depending on his
nature, would attack the observations of any such author, condemning
them as encroachment upon his own territory or else dismissing them
as mere “psychologizing.” The observations that would bear the brunt
of the attack would be those on religion, for it is a thorn in the flesh of
theologians (and not only them) to think that religion could possibly
have something to do with psychology. And yet where is religion active
if not in the human soul?And when we psychologists say: the more
conscious, the better, why does the Church then feel threatened? At
any such a psychology of consciousness, one which does full
rate,
justice to the subject, would be beyond the competence of the author.
Yet that does not stop many young people crying out for an extension
of consciousness; so there is a thirsting for greater awareness. Yoga
and drugs are supposed to supply the goods. Contraria contrariis!
Faced with this abundance of both knowledge and ignorance, we have
decided initially to describe just some of the most striking phenomena of
consciousness. As we chart our course we shall make use of the compass
of Jungian typology, the value of which was constantly brought home
to Jung in his practice. Orientation is always indispensable when the
 CONSCIOUSNESS
X

known explored as the unknown. For consciousness is and always

is

has been the greatest miracle in our world.

Going back to the arts and sciences, we have given their individual
connec-
exponents the opportunity to make the corresponding relevant
tions with their own special subjects. For the
reasons outlined above it
only possible to provide mere rudiments. It was the
author s experi-
is
of contact
ence that at every stage he felt he could recognize points
particularly true tor
with “neighboring disciplines.” That is, of course,
the numerous specialized fields of modem
psychology. But in most
cases he not only did not have the necessary expert
knowledge, but he
had keep telling himself that his essential task was to present Jungs
to
thoughts on the subject of consciousness. Yet even in this it
became
necessary to be selective and to try to make a sort of summary.
The
fact that in the second part of this volume we
have adhered closely to
compass of typology should not give rise to the false impression
the
that believe that only consciousness is covered by the system of
we
of the
typology. Its greater importance lies rather in an understanding
dynamics of the psyche, i.e., where the unconscious comes into play.
However, what this concept really has to yield in this respect can only
be proved in the next volume.
Conversely, our use of Jungian typology should not give rise to the
false impression that these “types” have a real, personal
existence of

their own. A psychological type is actually what Goethe

indicated with

the expression daimon in his octave of the same title, that is, a
molded
form that develops as it lives. The Greek word typos means molded
form,” and if it is to live and develop there must be the unconscious,
for which it isconversely a prerequisite.
Finally it remains to me to thank my wife and all my friends who
have been involved in the manuscript, especially Barbara Reinhardt
and Barbara Gubler; my thanks are also due to the Swiss School Council
for their friendly contribution of a substantial sum from Donald
the Dr.

C. Cooper Fund of the Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule in

Zurich.
 INTRODUCTION

It does not worry me that people do not know me.

What worries me is do not know people
that I

— Kung-Fu-Tse, Conversations 1.16

In Volume II of this textbook we works
stated that in the published
of C.G. Jung there is relatively little space devoted to the dream as
such, certainly not as a continuous presentation. The same may be said
for consciousness. It would, however, be completely misguided to
jump to the conclusion that consciousness plays a subordinate role in
Jungian psychology. It must be made clear right away that for Jung
consciousness js the central factor in human psychology, and indeed in
human existence itself. major work, Psychological Types
Jung’s first ,

(1921) could in fact be regarded as a work on consciousness in that it

takes the conscious orientating functions and attitudes as its basis. But
this is just one aspect of the problem of consciousness, and in his work
Jung also brings into the discussion the role of the compensatory
function and attitude of the unconscious. This approach establishes a
dynamic relation between consciousness and the unconscious, and it is
this very relation that was to be of abiding passionate interest to Jung.
From this angle he viewed human psychology as a circling round the
synthetic center between conscious and unconscious; in his method he
remained faithful to C.G. Carus when he said that “the key to recogniz-
ing the essence of the conscious soul life lies in the region of the
1

unconscious.”

1
 CONSCIOUSNESS
2

preparatory
Thus Jung’s later work can readily be understood as
concerned
work for the psychology of consciousness, for although it
regarded
itself with the laws of the psychology of the unconscious, it
the unconscious as the topsoil of consciousness.
The aim of all psychic
effort, however, will always be to strive
for consciousness. True,

the possibility of consciousness is bestowed upon us at birth, but its

dimensions, the structured and organized, can only be defined
way it is
in the dimen
by ontogenesis. Initially it would appear that the increase
the gradual assimi-
sions of consciousness essentially comes about with
lation of the material of experience, which
comes to us from the
gradually
surrounding and external world in the course ot life. But it
transpires that the
more material of
more conscious we become, the

experience comes to us from our inner world as well. The

assimilation
in fact becomes
of this material is at least as important as the other, and
by
more and more important as life goes on. What is meant here
assimilation is adaptation to and bringing into relationship
with what is
theory,
already conscious. This has been described in detail in learning
but what has not told us is how we are to learn to really
understand that
which is to be assimilated.
As the unconscious is really the topsoil of the conscious, this means
that it is likely that we have only truly learnt, understood and assimilated
a similarity exists or can be recognized between the new
material
when
and the imminent, corresponding unconscious condition; this similarity
must create the impression of a platonic anamnesis, as if we were
recalling some fundamental given fact as correct.
It would seem that as far as the learning process is concerned, what
is essential is not only external stimuli — which are the only things to

be considered by the orthodox learning theory based on experiment

ot information
for during the learning process we receive a constant flow
from within. Actually, unlike external stimuli, this flow of information
never ceases, even in sleep, as can be proved by dreams. But during
the waking state this flow is drowned by the sheer volume of external
stimuli The direction being taken by the latest sleep research indicates
3
.

that there is a link between dreaming and learning.

One is perfectly justified in saying that according to Jung the aim ot
human existence is to be conscious but in view ot what we have just
,

said, we must give a more precise definition ot what this actually

means:
ever since the Fall of man, it has been impossible for us to allow
ourselves to be guided by our instincts. We know about “Good and
Evil” and we have to choose between them. When we do so, it always
emerges that the criteria vary according to the individual and his cultural
background, and that we are now almost unable to act according to
INTRODUCTION 3

pure instinct. That could be cause for regret, but the existence of
consciousness gives us freedom and thus presents us with a choice. It
is the difficulties arising from this aspect of choice that Konrad Lorenz
4
and his critics have both been tackling in their different ways .

Thus the fact that we are so different from the rest of the mammals
has very do with our cerebral cortex, for this does not adequately
little to
account for the existence of our pronounced consciousness. Our con-
sciousness is both our distinction and our curse, the reason for the
latter being that it compels us to accept the responsibility for making
decisions. Just how far we should and may rely on our instinct in so
doing remains on open question.
A feature of our consciousness is thatcome to terms
it enables us to
with our instinctive forms of reaction, in other words to make conscious
decisions; this takes us into the sphere of ethics, however, and as we
are dealing with psychology here, this is not the place to pursue such
a subject. These decisions, however, despite the existence of conscious-
ness, are not so “free” as one would like to hope (or fear), and this is
a specific challenge to psychology, which sees itself as having to seek
an answer to the question of what role is actually played in our behavior
by the act of making conscious decisions. This means, of course, that
a preliminary decision has to be reached as to whether we want to
decide or whether we prefer to obey our instincts. If the former is the
case, and this should be so in all important human issues (it is also the
situation where ethics really comes into its own), then it appears that
we would be wise to steer a middle course; this middle course not only
does not reject what we might describe as the biological prerequisites,
but actually takes them into account, and yet also meets the demands
of consciousness. In other words, the conflict that thus arises should be
deliberately confronted, and it is precisely this that is meant by the
demand for consciousness in the Jungian sense of the term.
Let us recall at this point that the much deplored separation of
conscious and unconscious that is held to be responsible for all the evil
in the world by no means a modem manifestation; from the very
is

beginning, it must have been a source of fundamental contradictions

and problems. And it is precisely here that the Jungian demand for
consciousness gains its real significance, for it is to be understood as
an achievement of synthesis, one which can only be attained as the
outcome of lifelong effort.
This brings us to a paradox: consciousness is the product of a synthe-
sis between consciousness and the unconscious. This reminds us of

a phrase that has caught on in analytical jargon and often leads to

misunderstandings: one often hears the phrase used about someone that
 CONSCIOUSNESS
4

actually mean
what he did was “very unconscious,” but what we
is that
arguments. Seen
he acting only according to exclusively conscious
is

from the analytical point of view, however, this

means that the person
is not allowing his unconscious
motives into the discussion, so that
sense would say that this person is acting very
markedly in
common
accordance with conscious viewpoints, in other
words, is very con-
out to make man con-
scious. But analytical psychology is precisely
then confront him
scious of his unconscious motivations, too, and only
Only then
with making decisions when that stage has been reached.
would someone really deserve the epithet conscious as we understand
it, namely when he has tackled
the conflict that has now become
a lot to
conscious and then reached a decision. Admittedly, this is
demand and it can hardly be demanded of everyone. At the moment it
is only a vanishing minority that
goes so far, usually whether they want
to or not, because it is neurotic troubles that have driven
them into
analysis. We have learnt much from people who suffer, for suffering

is not necessarily a sign of weakness.

Holderlin says:

Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der
Gott.
Wo aber die Gefahr
5
ist, wachst
Das Rettende auch

God is close
and yet intangible.
But where there is danger
There is also salvation

When human nature is and perhaps only then, it can also cure.
sick,
However, it is not very easy to prove that a person who lives con-
sciously in this way lives “better,” for upon what factors is our judgment
based, and how are we to evaluate them? Moreover, the considerations
that lead to consciousness give rise, because they take time, to procrasti-
nation in the way people behave, and this is a further burden, one which
can actually be dangerous. In this respect, the habitually hesitant can
also come across as neurotic, insofar as they have lost some of their
spontaneity. A similar thing applies to those with too many scruples.

I have not seen such “results” of analysis in the Jungian sphere, though
some of the people coming out of Freudian analysis have been alarming,
although it may well be that compulsive neurotic elements were present
in them from the beginning. In such cases my explanation would be
 INTRODUCTION 5

that psychoanalysis on Freudian linesgenerally speaking a more

is

heroic and often “more successful” attempt to exercise what is truly

unconscious, which then leads to the disappearance of genuine sponta-
neity.
As
regards the extrapolation of data from the sick onto the healthy,
it must be stressed here, as before, that since Charcot, Janet and
Freud, modem psychology has made all its decisive findings from this
extrapolation. This is why
people who resist the unconscious like
to criticize analytically-minded psychologists as holding theories that
smack of the sickroom or even the madhouse, and they claim that the
psychologists are such “cases.” It is particularly those who are not
doctors who make such pronouncements, for the specifically medical
mentality of courageously looking all things human
eye is not to in the
their taste. Terence s Homo sum nil humani a me alienum puto (I am
,

human, let nothing human be alien to me) is, however, a very humanis-
tic attitude, and we shall not be put out by it but will turn it to our own

advantage. This attitude will emerge later, whether or not we are able
to do full justice to the phenomenon of consciousness and still be true
to the above prerequisites, which any
should constantly be borne
at rate
in mind during the reading; otherwise, the impression could easily be
created that what we are attempting here is a schematic representation
of a phenomenon which, by virtue of its particular liveliness, could
never be reduced to a schema. Hence I shall make every effort to
keep the representation essentially phenomenonological, so that the
important epistemological question can only be touched on throughout.
At this point I shall not give a closer delineation or definition of the
term conscious the reason being that first of all we shall familiarize
,

ourselves with the many different aspects of the phenomenon so as to

then see what conclusions this knowledge of the details allows us to
come to.

Given the fact that there is no publication that compiles Jung’s views
on the central issue of consciousness, I am in the fortunate position of
owning his notes for a one-semester course he gave on this subject at
the ETH in 1935. He passed them on to me when I succeeded him,
generously allowing me to use them as I saw fit. This means that the
essential points of what I have to say can lay claim to authenticity, and
for this I should like to express posthumous thanks to my teacher.
 CHAPTER I

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX

Consciousness is undoubtedly the alpha and omega of all psychology.

This is particularly true for C.G. Jung’s analytical psychology, the aim
of which is to arrive at as complete a consciousness as possible. As has
already been mentioned, there is no summary of the psychology of
consciousness in Jung’s works. This is because Jung’s main concern
was to indicate the process of becoming conscious, be it a spontaneous
process or one set in motion through analysis. In other words, his aim
was towards consciousness and then to describe it. In
to tread the path
many instances this leads to a fascination with the unconscious and its
attendant phenomena, but this should never be the aim of analysis.
With the exception of Psychological Types Jung’s published works
,

lead many people to this over-estimation of the unconscious. It is

therefore necessary to stress again and again, perhaps somewhat exag-
geratedly, that most of Jung’s works are actually preparatory instruction
for consciousness and that what is achieved in analysis is precisely this
striving for consciousness.
Unfortunately much of the secondary literature on Jung has also
fallen victim to this fascination. One notable exception is Aniela Jaffe
in her work The Myth of Meaning although perhaps the title does not
,

6
make one might have wished
this as clear as .

A textbook on analytical psychology could very well start off with

a discussion of consciousness. We explained in the first two volumes
why we have opted for another sequence, not the least reason being

7
 CONSCIOUSNESS
8

of the most difficult

that apsychology of consciousness is probably one
will immediately become apparent
and complicated issues to tackle, as
in what now follows. The
sequence we have chosen is also correct
both phylogenetically and
from a developmental point of view, for
recent development, so that
ontogenetically consciousness is the most
a certain familiarity with its precur-
if we are to understand it, we need
sor — the unconscious.
we are raced
Moreover, when we come to describe consciousness,
sciences, our consciousness,
with a particular problem: in the natural
i.e., a psychic entity, observes
a physical object or process and then,
it back into a psychic
one. It may, for example,
as were, “translates”
it
tor us is an intellec-
become a mathematical formula or definition, which
tual, i.e., psychic assimilation
and an understanding, provided the
for us into terms of reference
physical facts observed are thus classified
the situation exists already
with which we are familiar. In other words,
natural sciences, where the psyche
observes the physical— the
in the
observed and described by a totally different
and
physical object is
scientist is thus in the fortunate
largely independent system. The natural
sort of Archimedean point
position of having at his disposal, a priori a ,

outside the problem that is to be dealt

with in mere psychology.

It can be seen at once that in

psychology the situation is very different
observing the psychic.
and much less favorable, for here the psychic is
problem ot
It be clear that this situation is an epistemological
will
be aware of in all
fundamental importance and is one that one should
an Archimedean
psychological matters. We psychologists do not have
point of view.
the case in the earlier volumes of this textbook,
However, if, as was
observing the unconscious, or rather
on its effects
the conscious is

consciousness, then the situation is not quite as

bad as one might
the conscious and the
expect. For here there are two different systems
unconscious —
with the first one (the conscious) observing
the second
the observer (the
one (the unconscious). Thus the point of view of
actually outside the object (the unconscious),
although
conscious) is still

it perhaps disconcertingly close.

is

From the point of view of epistemology, things are much

worse with
the conscious is observing
the psychology of consciousness, for here
the conscious. Whereas in the psychology
of the unconscious the two
other (conscious and
systems can still be distinguished from each
basically of the same
unconscious), here we have two systems that are
nature (conscious and conscious), which as it
were, can only be mirrored
observes the consciousness ot
in each other. When my consciousness
all human contact, the
another individual, which is the normal case ot
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX
9

two systems are not actually completely identical, but are essentially
of the same nature. But when I, that is my consciousness, observe
my consciousness (reflection, introspection), then the two systems are
perfectly identical, with the result that we are obliged to introduce
an
artificial distinctionbetween subject and object.
From the remarks made so far, it might seem as though this is a
situation peculiar to the field of psychology, so that we
psychologists
are thus victims ot an irremediable congenital defect. In this unpleasant
position there is a certain consolation to be derived from learning that
the same fundamental inadequacy is proving to be a source of trouble
even in modem physics. On this point I shall refer to Wolfgang Pauli,
because there is no clearer or more concise way of defining the problem:

These facts concerning complementarity in physics lead naturally

beyond the narrow confines of physics to similar situations in the general
conditions of human
perception. In physics, however, the term con-
sciousness does not need to be applied directly, since an automatic
recording apparatus can also be regarded as a means of observing. All
that has to be assumed about can be described in everyday
it is that it

language, possibly supplemented by the terminology of classical physics.

This means of observation thus represents a technically extended perceiv-
ing subject. In this way, modem
physics generalizes the old opposition
of the perceiving subject and the perceived object into the idea of a
distinction between the observer or the means of observation, on the one
hand, and the system observed on the other. Whereas the existence of
such a distinction is a necessary condition of human perception, its
placement is, to a certain extent, arbitrary
and the result of a choice
influenced by considerations of expediency, and thus partially a free
choice. #

In fact, the subject/object has paradoxical characteristics closely analo-

gous to the relation between the means of observation and the system
observed, as is the case in quantum physics. This paradox in perception
described by Bohr as
is follows: on the one hand the description of our
thought activity calls for the opposition of an objectively given content
and an observing subject, whereas, on the other hand, object and subject
cannot be given that the last-mentioned concept also
strictly separated,
7
belongs to the thought content In connection with this, Bohr also points
.

out that “the conscious analysis of any concept stands in an excluding

relationship to its immediate application.”
The concept of consciousness also calls for a distinction between
subject and object, the existence of which is a logical necessity, whereas
once again the placement of the distinction is to a certain extent arbitrary.
If these facts aredisregarded, this gives rise to two different types
of metaphysical extrapolation, which themselves may be described as
complementary. One is of the material or general physical object, the
 CONSCIOUSNESS
10

nature of which is said to be independent of the way which it is

in

observed. We have seen that modem physics has been obliged by estab-
lished facts to abandon this abstraction as too narrow. The complemen-
tary extrapolation Hindu metaphysics of the pure object of
is that of
perceiving, with no object to oppose it. Personally I have no
doubt that
this idea, too, has to be acknowledged as an
untenable extrapolation.
The Western spirit cannot acknowledge such a concept of a superhuman
cosmic consciousness, with no object to oppose it, and must keep to
the

middle course indicated by the idea of complementarity. Looked at

in

this way, the concept of consciousness already presupposes a duality of

subject and object.
In place of the objectless pan-consciousness of the
Orient, Western

psychology has set up the concept of the unconscious, whose relationship

to the conscious reveals paradoxical characteristics
similar to those we
meet in physics. one hand, any conscious-making, i.e., any
On the
into
observation, represents a fundamentally uncontrollable intervention
character of
the unconscious contents. This then limits the objective
the reality of the unconscious and at the same time
endows it with
8
subjectivity .

Somewhat with reference to Niels

later (1957), Pauli continues, also
9
Bohr “In so far as the perception of the contents of consciousness is
:

alsoan observation, the more general question of the separability of

the
subject and object leads beyond the narrow confines of physics into
10
broader field of life manifestations.” In saying this, he is thinking of
psychology in particular.
It is known fact that in physics the relation between observer and
system observed has found a satisfactory formal solution with Heisen-
berg’s principle of uncertainty. Unfortunately, we do not have
an
efficiency psychology, a fact which makes it impossible to
quantum in

describe psychological processes from an energetic point ol view a

point to which we shall return later. On the other hand, the concept of
the distinctionbetween subject and object in psychology seems to me
to be more productive, and we shall deal with it later.
Let us repeat once again that for this quite elementary reason it is
much more difficult to present a psychology of consciousness than of
the unconscious. This obviously makes a paradoxical impression, for

it is quite clearly thanks to consciousness that we owe our ability to

understand. It seems to highly likely that the popular interest in

me
psychology, as we see today in the Western world under so many
different guises, is ultimately due to this problem, even if it happens
completely unconsciously. At any rate, the human psyche has become
problematic in this day and age. The fact that there is something
intrinsically unpleasant, something basically dubious about the psyche
 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX
j j

making statements about the psyche, should be essentially

explained
by the above remarks. If the object of consciousness
psychology is at
the same time its subject, then we are
reminded of Schopenhauer’s
definition of the perceiving subject as “that which perceives everything
but is not itself perceived .”
1

This gives rise to the thorny question of

whether a psychic statement can ever lay claim to validity
or can even
be “true.” The observations made so far compel us to
be rather modest;
so, as the starting point for our further
investigations, let us take the
commonplace observation that every psychic statement, or indeed
any
statement at need not necessarily be true in term of its actual content;
all,

however, we must also add that as an occurrence it is certainly

real,
i.e., it cannot be disputed and is thus true
in the ancient sense of the
Greek aletheia which means both truth and reality 12
, .

The point of view that would seem to commend itself in the light
of
this fact is apurely “phenomenological” one which, particularly when
describing the psychology of consciousness, confines itself
to establish-
ing what has occurred. This alone would probably yield
enough that is
of interest, for consciousness as such already has an
inexhaustible
variety of characteristics and different aspects.
Before going on to the subject of pure phenomenology, I should
like
to mention something that Jung was very fond of saying:
the conscious
is a sheer miracle. If it didn’t occur, didn’t
exist, it could never have
been discovered. DuBois-Reymond, in one of his famous speeches,
said
that even the of LaPlace could not have foreseen consciousness
spirit
coming into being .” 13 It is simply, if not exactly suddenly, there, and
its origins and nature will probably never be
known. Titles such as The
Origins and History of Consciousness and suchlike are misleading,
for
at best all they can be, as we said in the introduction, is a presentation
of the ontogenesis of consciousness, not to mention the phylogenesis.
Hence consciousness is actually an irrational reality, and forms an
irrational contrast to the world of physical manifestations.
The world
of consciousness may be compared to the world seen from within.
Consciousness is also the condition for all experience and all perception,
and thus for us it is a condition for the existence of the world, for
whereas example, the material supplies answers to the
in physics, for
questioning psyche, in psychology or in consciousness, the psyche
answers itself. In other words, the questioning element supplies its own
answer. It has no use for an external object, except possibly as an
analogy to make the issue more clear.
But the authenticity and reality of this statement of the psyche about
the psyche, i.e., the conscious, cannot be denied. If that were the case,
we could bring this book to a close here and now. Lest anyone should
 CONSCIOUSNESS
12

it would be
be getting the idea that this is all a modem discovery,
(he came from
salutary to note the following passage from Tertullian
theologians
Carthage, died in 222 a.d., and was one of the first Christian
to write in Latin):

I summon a completely new witness, or rather I summon a witness that

is more known than any written monument, more debated than any
and is
system of life, more published abroad than any promulgation
constitutes the whole of
greater than the whole of man, yea that which
divine and
man. Approach then, O my soul, whether you be something
eternal, as many philosophers believe— the less then
will you lie or —
not wholly divine because mortal, as Epicurus alone
contends— the less
are bom of
then you ought to lie— whether you come from heaven or
earth, whether compounded of numbers or of atoms,
whether you have
indeed
your beginning with the body or are later joined to it; what matter
whence you come and how you make man to be what he is, a reasonable
being, capable of perception and of knowledge. But I summon
you not,
in the schools, conversant with
0 soul, as proclaiming wisdom, trained
and nourished in the academies and pillared halls of Athens.
libraries, fed
No, I would speak with you, O soul, as wondrous simple and unlearned,
awkward and inexperienced, such as you are for those who possess
nothing else but you, even as you come from the alleys,
from the
streetcomers and from the workshops. It is just your unknowingness
that

need, for your experience, slight though it be, is not accepted

1
by
anyone. want to question you as to what you bring with you into man,
I

how you have learnt to feel, either from yourself or trom your creator,
whoever he be. As far as I know, you are not a Christian; for you 14usually
become a Christian rather than coming into the world as such .

So, in the of Tertullian, let us give the psyche the possibility

spirit

of speaking to us and showing us what it can and cannot do. And let
us not be too discouraged for the moment if we have to try to operate
without a frame of reference and do not even have objective scales.
Since the conscious as an object is neither more nor less than the
subject, we are inevitably reminded of the example of the dog chasing
its own tail. Certainly psychology, especially the
experimental branch,
has long been looking for ways out of this dilemma, by introducing
reproducible experiments and questionnaires, resorting to statistical
methods and using the results to draw conclusions about individual
cases. (Incidentally, this approach bears a striking similarity to that
adopted in parapsychology.) Unfortunately, individual cases, by defi-
nition, are small in number, with the result that the situation is still a

rather awkward one. The tautological tact remains that in all other

sciences the nonpsychic “translated” into the psychic (terms, laws,

is

contracts), whereas in psychology, as we have seen, especially in the

 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX
| 3

psychology of the conscious, the psychic expresses the

same (psychic)
by the same (psychic).
Thisprobably the essential reason for the still prevalent disregard
is

for psychology in scientific circles. But unfortunately

these same circles
are committing the equally common basic error of projection; they
still

naively believe that psychology is what I think, do

and am. Hence it
is the same with everyone else, and if
this not true of B, then there is
something wrong with B. They then, in all good faith,
set about
performing missionary work, and this is when the actual
misrepresenta-
tion occurs. As this sort of tautology is unconscious, it cannot be
rectified and
puts a stop to any psychology. The extent of this error
it

can be seen in the fact that even a few years ago a

professor of
philosophy European university was able to come out with the
at a
remark that there was no need for psychology in the syllabus,
for we
have it, we are it, pure and simple. When he used the verb “to
be” he
left psychology trailing behind! Our anatomy
and physiology are also
things that we all have and can do, of course. But
when something
goes wrong with our health, the problem is treated by
calling on
the results of our research into anatomy and physiology,
and we are
undoubtedly grateful for having that knowledge. As we remarked in
the introduction, this point of view should also be applied when we
look at the significance of psycho-pathological finding compared to
normal, healthy psychological functioning. Of course, in such extrapo-
lations the right parameters should be selected, otherwise
one can be
accused of psychologism, and rightly so. Unfortunately this is no rare
occurrence, for many psychologists do not have the necessary manner
or delicacy.
Bearing in mind all these restrictions, there is one further approach
that offers us certain criteria
forjudging the phenomena of conscious-
ness. It is always possible to introduce a comparative approach,
the
best way being to examine great differences in certain conscious
factors.
To this end several fields of research can be applied as auxiliary sci-
ences:
1 . EthnologyEthnological and anthropological observations pro-
.

vide us with knowledge of the consciousness phenomena of different

ages and cultures. When a certain factor of consciousness in very early
or very primitive cultures is compared with its condition in very late or
very advanced cultures, this comparison enables us to make inferences
about the history of its development.
This also applies, of course, to
2. Comparative history of religion.
3. Developmental psychology in that , it observes the differences,
 CONSCIOUSNESS
14

Similar
forexample between child and adult, as regards such a factor.
of age or age
conclusions can also be drawn from the psychology

Here we have the comparison (difference) ot the

Ethology.
4.
species, which is
psychology of man with that of certain animals or
as already practised by
actually a form of comparative psychology,
Vol. 1 of this
C.G. Cams (1866) and Charles Darwin (1872) (cf.
textbook).
5. Sociology ,
deals with the difference between
in so far as it

aspects of
certain races or classes. I this respect, certain
Folklore also belong to our “auxiliary sciences.”
6.
common knowledge that certain families form
7. Genealogy. It is
see themselves as
dynasties, in the old sense of the term, and that they
important, are very proud of their family characteristics
and actu-
very
them. This means that there are tremendous differences
ally cultivate
between one family and another, and these differences may
shed light
genetic factors
on the question we are dealing with. Here, of course,
are involved. .

Even within one family there can be great individual differences in the
structure of consciousness, and these differences
give us fundamental
neurotic and psy-
insights into our question, for everyone has normal,
chotic relatives. Of course, the genetic factor is a
prominent one, as is
psychological ap-
the so-called constitution research, but the purely
Evidence
proach still enables us to draw very interesting conclusions.
15 16

of this are, for example, the and J.B. Lang, which

works of E. Furst
were reported on in Vol. I of this textbook, and which led to
the

sarcastic comment that the family is the dictatorship ot its

most neurotic
member!
Whereas above-mentioned comparative methods work on the
the
intra-individual,
basis of group and collective psychology, there are also
i.e., individual psychological approaches,
which can help towards an
understanding of the conscious. The best approach with this method ot
investigation is to compare opposing quantities, such as, tor example,

Conscious Unconscious, which, as we have said was

what Carus began with.
Thinking Feeling
Drive Willpower, which respect we only need
in

think of Romans 7:18-19

to realize what tremendous problems of opposites arise from this posi-

tion: “I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the
good I want, but the evil do not want is what
I do.” But science
I
 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX
15

cannot advance unless there are opposites, unless the

negation does not
automatically appear with any position adopted. In this
respect at least,
the old Aristotelian scheme of thesis-antithesis-synthesis retains its
validity.
Moreover, the sum of the above-listed approaches does form
a sort
ot objective factor, for this factor is outside subjective psychology. For
example, one could say that collective language is such a factor,
as can
be seen here in Switzerland in the broad selectivity in
the various
dialects. One thinks of the great differences in the various types
of
language, for example between the Indo-Germanic languages
and Chi-
nese. Whereas the Indo-Germanic languages are based on
a grammar,
it is the syntax that is important in
Chinese. That is why Indo-Germanic
logic is a logic based on language, whereas Chinese logic
is analogistic,
based on principles of association. Of course, objective factors
also
include convictions of an intellectual, aesthetic, cultural and
moral
nature, as well as religious ideas. Social, national, family and
contem-
porary prejudices are also objective factors which affect most
individu-
als. Local influences, in the sense of a geographical
and climatic nature,
are purely objective, of course, as can be seen clearly in
the striking
differences between the collective mentality of mountain dwellers
and
that of those living on the plains. One is also constantly struck by the
insular psychology of the English, and they themselves experienced
the
colonial psychology which their civil servants used to develop
in the
colonies and dominions.
All these factors together create a collective psychology of a
special
character which, as can be seen, is established both internally
and
externally, although the internal factors may be of an objective nature.
This collection of objective data, some of which are imponderables,
produces something akin to an objective spirit, a consensus spiritualis .

True, it is largely removed from arbitrariness, but precisely for that

reason it makes
possible for there to be a system of measuring and
it

hence a psycho/ogy. As can easily be seen, this psychology is based on

very complex factors. It will constantly have
be borne in mind that
to
this is merely a relatively objective point of view, and that
for this
reason the validity of such a point of view can also only be relative.
Thus it can only make statements about the soul, but must never lay
claim to being a statement on what the soul actually is.
Because the objectivity of this so-called objective spirit is only
relative, one must once again and values from other
resort to criteria
cultures. In other words, here too the procedure to be adopted is a
comparative one.
 CHAPTER II

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS

In this chapter an attempt will be made to outline as precisely as

possible some of the most striking characteristics of consciousness. No
importance is to be attached to the order in which they are listed.
1. The conscious psychea system i.e., a mixture of just about
is ,

every characteristic possible, and they fall mainly into two categories!
a) somatic ones, such as sensory-physiological ones and
other
biological data, such as instinctive and
b) “mental,” imponderable factors, which cannot be measured
or
compared with anything in physical nature, such as ideas, thoughts
and feelings. ,

The system as a whole is both rational and irrational, ordered and

chaotic, partly intentional and partly accidental. These few pairs
of
opposites could be further differentiated and multiplied almost at will,
but I should like to limit myself to listing just the most important ones:

intentional accidental
rational irrational
ordered chaotic
objectively given subjectively given.

2. The conscious psyche interacts with both the external world and
the internal world (i.e., with the unconscious).
The internal and external worlds are objective realities for the con-

1 7
 CONSCIOUSNESS
18

system both for

scious psyche, and consciousness acts as a connecting
them and between them. It will readily be seen that this is one
way of
Here
describing one of the most important functions of consciousness.
lies the reason for a fact that is all too often
given inadequate consider-
ation in psychological and philosophical discourses,
namely the relative
authors should
validity of what is being presented. From the very outset
the
always give the chosen zero point ot their reference system, so that
reader knows what their “personal equation” is. (This is a qualification
order to
introduced into astronomy by F.W. Bessel [1784-1846] in
the observer in
correct the error due to the personal point of vi£w ot
In psychology it is reasonable to assume that this
“personal
space).
error” be attributed to the particular psycho-physiological individ-
may
just a disadvan-
ual constitution of the observer. But its presence is not
it is actually due
tage, even if it makes things awkward in research, for
to this that we are in a position to form an
“interpretation” of our
perception
actions. At any rate, the conscious psyche is a complicated
and coordination system for our actions; one could also say that the
conscious is the clearinghouse between the individual and his milieu or
between the individual and society.
3. Consciousness is a phenomenon that is limited in time, as can be

seen from the following:

a) at nights, when we are asleep, it switches off altogether or
almost completely, for long periods at a time.
b) it only begins to form in the course of life; one could say
that

the starting point is when the child begins to talk ot himself as

99
4WJ

c) in many, maybe regrettable cases, it comes to an end before

life itself does.
d) it peaks, i.e., its clarity only lasts for a few hours, a fact to

which we shall return later.

The first thing that emerges from this is on average a human
that

being spends over one third of his time in an unconscious state, a tact
that should be enough in itself to compel us to think about the relativity
of the significance of consciousness, or conversely, the significance of
the unconscious. The periodic function of the conscious is a major
problem, a question that is much discussed today, without a solution
having been reached. We are still largely in the dark as to where the
pendulum lies and what significance is to be attached to the various
internal and external timekeepers. It would not surprise me it the
relatively recently discovered REM phases in sleep were to turn out to
be a factor.
Returning to the subject of the clarity of consciousness, which is also
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONSCIOUS
19

characterized by its limitations in time,

here that a particular aspect
it is
of the conscious revealed, namely the fact that it requires
is
effort to
maintain a state of consciousness. This aspect of
consciousness means
that energetic factors have to be taken into
consideration. Everyone
knows from experience that if conscious effort is maintained for
any
length of time there is a need for recuperation. Many
people not only
become jaded but actually hungry if effort is invested for any length
of
time on consciousness, which takes its toll on our
physical strength.
The necessary recuperation is provided in all cultures under
social
auspices, both individual and collective. Whereas in the
East this is one
aspect of Yoga, the West has such institutions as the
cinema, theatre,
concerts and a host of other activities. What the first three
here have
in common them the external becomes the bearer of
is that with
consciousness Externally for example on the screen a series of
.
,
images ,

is produced which allows us passively

to fantasize and to project, for
it happens automatically that either
we identify with the “series of
images put before us” or else we experience processes which
are
otherwise unconscious, in other words we The reader is re-
project.
minded at this point about the effect of drama which I expounded on
inconnection with dream theory in Vol. II of this textbook
(p. 87-93).
This question will also be dealt with in section 4 below. The state
thus
produced corresponds psychologically to the normal middle course
between maximum clarity of consciousness and an unconscious domi-
nated by what we would describe in psychological terms as automatisms
(see Vol. of this textbook). We can readily understand that such a
I

state also serves as recuperation once we recall the energetic

manner
of observation of consciousness. What is striking here is that the “purely
mental” phenomenon of consciousness is seen to have a direct link with
the soma, the subject.
4. The
attentiveness of consciousness can be defined as a tension, a
concentration of consciousness in the sense of the highest conscious
confrontation of the subject with the object. Thus consciousness is
simultaneously understood as a self-perception of the subject in its
relation to the environment and the inner world (= object), in
other
words, the perceptive function is subsumed into consciousness. The
simultaneity that thus occurs —
or is produced of internal and external
objects in relation to the ego— is a synthetic achievement of conscious-
ness in that it does not exist in its own right. That is why it is also
described as assimilation a process by which the objects are “acquired ”
, .

It is in this process of assimilation that consciousness makes

its major
effort or exertion. As an illustration of this, please see Figure 1

In his work Wachen, Schlaf, Traum und verwandte Zustande, J.E.

 CONSCIOUSNESS
20

Purkinje, the famous anatomist and physiologist, made

the following

comments on the subject of this function of consciousness.

With different individuals, the state of being awake takes on varying

modalities and degrees of intensity, depending upon age, sex, tempera-
ment, cultural level, type of occupation, and so on. In the prime
of life,

the forties and sixties, the individual is in the most

intense stage
between
psychic
of being awake, partly because then is when the subjective,
power is almost developed and partly because the external conditions
usually at
and relationships, as a means of waking the psychic life, are
their most abundant then. In early childhood the
degree ot being awake
is usually at its lowest, gradually progressing
through childhood, youth
maturity and falling off again in old age. However, it is
important
and
ot con-
here to distinguish between the absolute and relative quantity
sciousness, for the latter is determined by its barriers as regards
its

intensity. As regards the absolute quantity, it is in middle age that the

sum of consciousness and reflection is at its
total highest. In childhood

and youth the sum total is smaller, but the intensity may be just as great,
if not greater; this is partly due to greater excitability because ot the new
stimuli of the inner and outer worlds, partly to the stronger
movement
towards the outside, but mainly it is due to the smaller sphere ot action
within which a smaller amount of mental power, i.e. a relatively larger

amount of consciousness, is operating. This is the opposite of the phrase.

pluribus intentus, minor est ad singula sensus meaning that the fewer
,

objects the mind focuses on, the greater is its effectiveness. Thus with
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONSCIOUS
21

a woman, although there is a smaller degree of consciousness in

a more
limited sphere of activity, the intensity is as
great if not greater than with
a man, where there is a greater degree of
consciousness in a wider sphere
of activity. In the familiar setting of one’s own
sphere of activity, it is
possible to attain a high degree of consciousness,
but this vanishes as
soon as one is faced with unfamiliar circumstances.
The intensive and
extensive aspects of this state of mind create a state
of tension. The more
we compress mental power into the individual, the less is
left over for
the surrounding area. Conversely, as expressed
in the saying above, the
more meaning we invest in the whole, the less is available
to the individ-
ual. But there are also times, at least
occasionally, when mental powers
exert themselves, and those are the situations
of the highest alertness or
mental power, when both the parts and the whole are
imbued with the
greatest intensity of consciousness. The activity
of the conscious has
two fundamental directions: one outwards, towards the
things around
us, the world consciousness, and the other inwards,
our individual
consciousness, one of them may predominate at any given
moment, or
they balance each other out. It is precisely at this
point of equilibrium
that we find the center of alertness, reflection
and total self-composure.
From there the path may
lead inwards, into greater subjectivity, exalta-
tion of feeling, thought and will-power; or it
may turn outwards, as an
objective losing of oneself in perceptible concepts, external
activity and
endeavors, as a way of being outside of oneself. In both
of these direc-
tions of consciousness, reflection is more or
less obscured in that at
the balancing point of subject/objectivity, where
consciousness is most
intense, the difference is swallowed up in one sphere or the other amid
total indifference and inability to distinguish between the two 18 .

In addition to the perceiving function of consciousness,

there is also
its equally important coordinating function in relation to
the ego.
Looked at from a formal point of view, it consists in adapting the
objects to the subject (cf. the last sentence in Purkinje above)
and thus
is connected to the process of assimilation
mentioned earlier, which
makes it clear that this is the main endeavor of the achievement of
consciousness.
It is common knowledge that in the release from tension there is a
dissimilation, through which the painstakingly acquired assimilation
collapses and the objects of the imagination are no longer
coordinated.
From the viewpoint of the ego, this gives rise to a lack of coherence
in
the contents of the imagination, which amounts to a lack of
distinction.
But this is a characteristic of the unconscious, for there all the contents
are contaminated by each other (see Vol. I of this textbook).
From can be seen that one of the most important faculties or
this it

features of consciousness is discrimination i.e. the ability to distinguish

,
 CONSCIOUSNESS
22

to distinguish
between the objects of the imagination and especially
dwelt on at length
between them and the subject. This characteristic was
in ancient psychology, where it was
described by the term diakrisis or
distinction. Schelling’s disciple, Wilhelm
Rosenkrantz (1821-1874)
to know it
comments on it with the utmost clarity: “We only come
(outside us),
when we can distinguish between ourselves and the thing
our discrimination, and can look upon the thing
as it is
that is with
thing and then link
presented to us. We must separate ourselves and the
them up again in our consciousness (our assimilation).
the inability to make distinctions affects
consciousness
Just how far
can be seen vividly in the psychopathological sphere, for example in the
manic state, where it appears in the form of the well-known flight from
dissimilation of internal objects in particular is
graphi-
thoughts." The
demonstrated by certain schizophrenics who suffer from
bodily
cally
20
hallucinations. Freud was fascinated by the case of the Chief Justice of
21
hallucinations in
Saxony, Daniel Paul Schreber, who suffered from
the form of “runaway men" who sometimes
disappeared under his skin
(frustrated attempt at assimilation) with the cry
“Oh, be damned!
5. The narrowness of consciousness A distinctive feature of the

conscious is can only dispose of a few clear ideas at any one

that it

spotlight, which can only

time. A good way of demonstrating this is the
rest being temporarily in
light up a limited number of objects, with the
light symbolism used here springs to mind
The because of
the dark.
many common idiomatic expressions, such phrases as “it dawned on
me," “I see," or the concept of enlightenment or illumination.

dark

light

dark

E = ego or internal and

consciousness t external objects

Fig. 2
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONSCIOUS 23

As can clearly be seen, this schema is borrowed from the anatomical-

physiological world of our sight process, with our clear conscious
contents corresponding to the field of vision. Its radius and thus the
quantum of the contents that are simultaneously covered is determined
by the opening of the iris diaphragm. When the aperture is habitually
too small, we speak of narrow-mindedness in the figurative sense; in
pathological cases we speak of “tunnel-vision,” in medical terms known
as “tubular scotoma.” Ernst Mach (1838-1916), alluding to the much
discussed views of Freud in Vienna at the time, used to say in his
lecture on optics: “Ladies
and gentlemen, there are people who are now
trying to investigate the human soul through the telescope of the vagina.
But they can’t find anything, the opening is much too small” (related
by W. Pauli).
Another reason why the light image is a good one is that we are
relatively free to change the direction of the beam. With my beam I
can scan all sorts of objects virtually at random and more or less
determined by my free will. This would be the place to embark on a
lengthy discussion on the concept of free will, but bearing in mind what
we said in the introduction, we shall have to make do with a few
remarks in passing, otherwise we would get bogged down in the field
of ethics. In our situation the will turns out to be the more or less
available energy which enables us to turn the spotlight almost at will.
But when we are totally obsessed with an idea, some content of the
conscious, which is certainly nothing unusual, then the turning becomes
difficult, if notcompletely impossible. Thus the thorny question re-
mains of whether wanting is something that can be wanted when one
will. Should this not be the case, then it is not a want but a must. This
dubious question of volition is a late acquisition in the whole psychic
system. For example, we see with so-called primitives that for volition
they need a rite d' entree and for nonvolition they need a rite de sortie.
And we, too, when we are in situations where we feel helpless, resort
to rituals, such as prayer for example. Nor is there anything wrong with
this; at least it is better than the superstitious belief that has often proved
22
fatal that “where there’s a will, there’s a way.” As we have said,
volition is an acquisition that has come into being through the gradual
raising to conscious level of preferences and inclinations; as a cultural
acquisition, it has a long history of development, it did not come into
being overnight and we cannot always keep on that level. The training
of the will should be influenced more by qualitative than quantitative
factors; more and more internal and external objects should be lit up
by the spotlight, making it possible for them to be assimilated. Thus in
the course of ontogenesis there is an increase in the aperture of the
 CONSCIOUSNESS
24

beam and and range. In other words, the sphere of

in its brightness

influence of the conscious and its scope both grow,

which certainly
material ot the
counts as a form of cultural progress. At any rate, the
concept ot
imagination grows in this way. There is here a link with the
vigilance which ,
is much discussed particularly in the field of neurobiol-
ogy, but we shall not comment further on this as there is still a lot ot
work be done on the subject.
to
What we can comment on is the fact that this material of the imagina-

tion is actually
6. Memory. Enough has already been said on what the memory is

supposed to be, so simply give a few theoretical details here,

we shall

it is the ability of the conscious to actively

and spontaneously reproduce
material of the imagination. Its duration and scope vary widely
from
the
person to person. In our teaching methods, we improve memory.
try to

Moreover there are memory training tricks involved in the well-known

laws of Association (see Vol. of this textbook). Once again I should
I

like to refer to Purkinje: “Through the agency of the

memory, objective
perception is subjectively reproduced in the imagination, somewhat
altered, either simply by fancy or because of certain
requirements.

What happens now is that practicality tries to assert itself and transfer
the altered idea onto real things and then change these in turn to suit its
23
own purposes.
Today we are under the impression that everything we have experi-

enced is stored in the memory, a view that would seem to be confirmed

by such things as the treatment of amnesia under hypnosis. Conversely,
these experiences also prove the highly regrettable tact that this material
is not always available. Just think of the way
we study for examinations
and are then unable to recall what we have learnt just when we need it!
What is crucial when it comes to the availability ot the material in the
memory is that one has seen the connections between the various facts
and thus has a picture of the whole. Otherwise there is always the risk
of memory gaps; these gaps are partial amnesias and must not be
forgotten when it comes to discussing memory! One can only echo the
words of Faust:

Ah, happy he who still can hope to rise.

Emerging from this sea of fear and doubt!
What no man knows, alone could make us wise;
And what we know, we well could do without.
—Faust 1

These lapses are particularly embarrassing in old age, when it is

precisely recent events that cannot be remembered. Old people are well
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONSCIOUS 25

able to recall events in the distant past, and this makes for a reversal
of the cultural progress we talked about earlier.
Whether or not an idea can be reproduced often depends on the affect
that is involved, or simply interest, so that something
unpleasant is
either quickly forgotten or, on the other hand, cannot be shaken off.
Further unpleasant effects of the memory are, for example, automa-
tisms, ideas that crop up spontaneously and become obsessive. A
good
example would be tunes that we cannot get out of our heads; there are
also idees fixes or other ideas that block the thought process. What
I

should like to emphasize, in other words, is that with the memory there
is always a factor that is irrational,
imponderable, spontaneous and
creative. Fortunately it does not usually disturb but is urgently needed
and is useful, for which we should be grateful. At any rate, when it
comes to the memory we had better not lay claim to absolute freedom,
for freedom can only be possible in relation to something that is known,
a fact which I should like to emphasize above all, Sartre notwith-
standing.
 CHAPTER III

THE STRUCTURE OF
CONSCIOUSNESS

The Ego as the Center of the Consciousness

Providing the contents of consciousness have a certain coherence and

one common point of reference which forms a sort of center for them,
this center is known as the ego. Wherever there is a center, there has
to be a periphery, and the area between the two, the contents of the
circle, is known as the field of consciousness. Any ideas or concepts
that lie in this field are linked by the fact that they are related to the
ego. The field of consciousness may shift but the ego always remains
in the center.. Thus certain contents are permanently involved with
consciousness and form the ego complex. Part of this is also that one
is aware of one’s body. Anyone who is not aware of it is in an abnormal

state, for example in ecstasy (beside oneself).

Moreover consciousness is constantly contaminated by certain un-
conscious contents; these are permanently constellated by the ego. This
is the “shadow” (cf. below under section 4). Closer investigation shows

that this ego is not an elementary particle, but in fact has a very
complicated structure. corresponds exactly to the definition of a
It

complex as defined and experimentally researched by C.G. Jung in his

“Diagnostic Studies in Word Association,” which the reader will find
4
referred to in Volume I. The complex, like an atom, is a compositum
with a nucleus and several secondary elements. From now on, to save

27
 CONSCIOUSNESS
28

whenever we refer to the ego, it will be understood that

we mean
time,
the ego complex. ~ ,

Unlike most of the complexes discussed in Volume

I, it cannot, ot
relatively incompatible
course, be said of the ego complex that it is
with consciousness, for it is nucleus. But, as will be seen,
actually its

this nucleus is inherently— from a formal and phenomenological point

of view —
a quite complex
dimension.
nucleus ot
The nucleus element will be discussed later but, like the
an atom, it will always remain a mystery.
The following remarks can be made about the ego complex:
consists of general and poorly defined bodily sensations
which
1) It
correspond most closely to what French ps^chologv as
is known in
they can be best
cenesthesie. These general feelings form an entity, and
understood by observing what happens when this entity tails
apart, as
Vol. II,
happens, for example, in the initial stages ot a psychosis (cf.
pp. 84-85). They in turn are affected by

sensorial feelings, affects and drives, i.e. somatic stimuli

and
a)
b) purely psychic stimuli, such as ideas, thoughts
and memories.
They are perceived as hunger, thirst, fatigue or a teeling ot well-being,
equanimity, animation, (a) or joy, disgust and lust (b).

In addition to this relative uniformity, however, the following obser-

vations can be made, too:
2) The ego complex a plurality, a state of affairs that can be
is

expressed in its most elementary form by the fact that it is possible to

“be another person.”

Two souls, alas, are housed within my breast,

And each will wrestle tor the mastery there.
The one has passion’s craving crude tor love.

And hugs a world where sweet the senses rage;

The other longs for pastures tair above.
Leaving the murk for lofty heritage.
— Faust 1

And if in a dream my ego does things that my waking ego abhors, then

one forced to accept the existence ot more than one ego. Fortunately,
is
ot coherence
the double ego or partial ego show a very high degree ,

constancy and continuity (which is much less the case with pathological
complexes), so that there is practically just one identity to this partial ;

ego. This is why William James (1842-1910) says that “the ego has a
functional identity.” We may have some misgivings about all this, but
we should not lose sight of the positive side; this plurality ot the ego
THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 29

is also what gives the ego and this in turn is a necessary

its flexibility,

condition it there is to be any development of the personality in the

course of life. If consciousness were completely static, this would
amount to a paralysis of the personality.
However, of the ego has its bad as well as its good
this plurality
aspects, if I may resort to the jargon of astrology. The “functional
identity" or entity may crumble, as can be seen clearly in pathological
cases. There the situation of the dual personality is a familiar one, and
elements of this can be seen
Goethe quotation above. There are
in the
other examples in literature, the most famous one probably being “The
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” by R.L. Stevenson. Among
the psychopathologists to have done research into such cases of multiple
25
personality, one of the most prominent ones is Morton Prince. The
problem of the ego is made more acute by the fact that
3) the ego is itself a subject that is, itself part of the contents of
,

consciousness, indeed its central part. Even as long ago as Maimonides

(1 135-1204) the ego was considered the entity of consciousness, and

proved to be unwavering despite his ideas. With Kant, the ego is the
“transcendental synthesis of apperception.” There is no misunderstand-
ing him when he says: “I am conscious of myself is a thought that
26
contains a two-fold ego, the ego as subject and the ego as object.” Or
when he says that “the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my
ideas," as otherwise they could not be his ideas, then he isspeaking of
course of this fundamental fact of consciousness, i.e. the ego, which
is also the res cogitans of Descartes. Let us recall at this point Schopen-
hauer’s definition as referred to in the introduction, namely that the ego
is the perceiving subject that perceives all, but is not itself perceived.

And Fichte says: “The ego is only in so far and how far it is conscious
of itself." I would like to add that it is important when looking at all
these philosophical observations to realize that the existence of the
ego automatically presupposes the existence of the non-ego, of the
unconscious; this theoretical point of view is not entirely irrelevant in
relation to the existence of the unconscious, especially as a complement
to the “Unconscious in its Empirical Manifestations” which is the
subject matter of Volume I.

One
of the things that emerges from 3) above is the idea of the ego
as self-awareness for this is probably what is meant by the ego as its
own subject. J.W. Dunne has dealt theoretically with this problem as
27
that of the observer of the observer. His experiences, published in his
book An Experiment with Time cannot be doubted but unfortunately
,

28
they are too inadequately documented for strictly scientific purposes.
(They are essentially of a parapsychological nature, dealing, for exam-
 CONSCIOUSNESS
30

pie, with precognition, which would lead to a possible connection with

the idea of the “observer of the observer”).

Dunne’s views on the ego
lead him to an infinite regression from the
observer of the observer to

the observer of the observer of the observer, etc . ;

what the cosmological
explanation ot such
proposals he applies boil down to is that the
possibilities rests on the assumption whenever a further dimension
that

is added (to the established four)

then a whole series of worlds can be
his view
imagined, with each one subsuming the other. He puts forward
with great brilliance and a goodly portion of English
humor, but it
amounts to little more than a mathematical game. But these thoughts,
as well as the philosophical and psychological ideas we have referred
has
to, are nothing more than a regression to the absolute ego. Jung
29 “
pointed out to us that Origenes tackled this question. Vides quomodo ,

ille, qui putatur unus esse non est unus,

,
sed tot in eo personae videntur
quot mores” (“You see that the one who seems to be one is
not
esse,
one, but so many people appear in him as he has individual characteris-

tics”).
30
The Indians would atman or Brahman. In our
talk here of the

culture it is probably Schelling who has coined the most

concise and

accurate phase for the absolute ego: “The absolute ego is

what can
never ever become the object.’’
When we look at what has been said about the ego under 3), we must
conclude that whatever has been said does not and cannot exhaust the
question, for the creative origin of these remarks is still the subject.
So
the ego cannot be once again set torth as the object, not even in further

progress or regression. thus remains the apriority of perception. In

It

the center of the ego problem and thus in the center of the
problem ot
consciousness, or in the center of the problem ot perception, we are
once again in a paradox. I feel that Husserl was trying to unite these
opposites when he remarked that “The ego has a transcendency in
immanency.” The observations made so far about the problem of con-
sciousness reveal that the closer we come to the central question, the
more strongly we feel that we are nowhere near a solution, and the
more aware we become of the paradox ot the phenomenon. I am not
disappointed about this, for in psychology we have had to accept more
and more fundamental facts are of an essentially paradoxical
that the
nature. Since 1935 have been pointing out that in this respect there is
I

a striking parallel with the situation in physics, which is what brought

1

about Jung’s interest in these questions. Not being involved in the

exact sciences, we psychologists feel more justified now that physics
has found itself faced with similar paradoxes and has had to deal with
them and accept them. It is very reassuring to see that our problems ot
epistemology are not unlike those in the exact sciences.
THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 31

One such paradox to emerge from what has been said under sections
1-3 is that 4) the ego is only partially conscious. Insofar as the ego is

by definition conscious, one must assume for reasons of symmetry (cf.

analogy with physics) that it also has an unconscious part, however
paradoxical this may sound, seeing that we refer to the ego as the center
of consciousness. In actual fact we find that behind the conscious ego
there is an equivalent unconscious ego. True, with this complex (for
that is what it is, just like the conscious ego, cf section ) we are talking
1

about a dimension that cannot lay full claim to consciousness, but must
remain partially unconscious, at least in genuine symmetry to the ego.
This is a part that is linked reciprocally with the light symbolism of the
conscious, i.e., with the shadow. What we have to do here is make a
regression by regarding the ego as a complex that contains an ego field
as a covering outside the inner one, a field made up of concepts of the
ego, with its nucleus being the “absolute subject” (cf. Fig. 3). “Behind”
this ego field there would be its requisite anti-pole, just as for the
Pythagoreans there was the dark anti-earth to the earth, or for the
alchemists the shadow of the sun to the sun “Sol et ejus
. umbra perficiunt
opus ” is a quotation by Michael Majer in the Scrutinium chymicum ,
32
meaning that nothing can be complete without its opposite.

This more or less unconscious anti-pole to the conscious ego has

been described by Jung as the shadow, and he realized that it invariably
 CONSCIOUSNESS
32

the bete noire as

projects onto an external figure of the same sex, ,

actually bearing the shadow of the subject. The

term shadow makes it
personality, one that
quite clear that it refers to an inferior part of the
is maladjusted and probably characterized by inferior moral values,
which is why nobody likesshadow side is addressed. We
it when his

are not supposed to tread on each other’s toes!

The so-called primitives
seem to be fully aware of this, for they literally avoid treading on
the

shadow of a friend, as the consequences could be disastrous.

The genesis of this shadow existence can be traced back essentially
to two factors: first, to the natural presence
of certain inclinations,
which means that with every individual, those characteristics that
do
not fit in with or actually oppose those inclinations are forced into the
background, i.e. into the shadow. Second, there is the tact that
life

makes us develop certain qualities or talents, be they for social or

are
professional reasons, with the result that less suitable qualities
neglected if not actually repressed. These then are what make up
the

shadow, and it is clear that in fact it is not necessarily made up

exclusively of “negative” characteristics. And yet in the
course ot

life these characteristics often only come

into their own through dire

necessity, if personality is not to become one-sided and inflexible. At

any rate Jung found that any further development of the personality
depended absolutely on this central problem being recognized and on
an ability to come to terms with this unacceptable side.
5) A further observation concerning the
psychology of the ego: the
ego is found or discovered in the course of one' s individual history.
We recall here that Fichte says “the ego sets its own being,” which, of
course, may be regarded as tautology. At any rate, what is certainly
true is that the ego represents the absolute real which is probably,
why
Bergson calls it the duree reelle, for no actual existence can be attributed
to something that is not observed. The only exception here is the

absolute subject.
In the history of an individual the ego, as has been stated already, is
determined at some point, perhaps between the third and fifth years.
Thus also a sort of cultural achievement, as can be seen it we
it is

look at what things are like before it is discovered. Before the ego is
discovered or formed, there is simply an objective series of psychic
states that areexperienced but only partially remembered. There are
islands of consciousness without a continent having been built. Thus
the conscious is not yet an entity, a whole. There is no refiection yet,
and as a consequence, no sense of responsibility. There is a total
absence of self-control, a great readiness to be distracted, a selective
memory, no will-power, but unrestrained covetousness. Children and
THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 33

adults who remain in this state are unable to concentrate, are easily hurt
and offended — they are over-sensitive. Many feelings of inferiority and
hypersensitiveness can be traced back to this, and it manifests itself in
a rather unpleasantform in populations with mixed races, such as North
and South America.
The presence of an ego complex that is still weak has at first to be
asserted by the subject, for as yet there is a lack of self-confidence.
This only comes with an ego that is firmly in place. As a complex, the
ego complex has the tendency to pick up (assimilate) many things, such
as property, family, position, knowledge etc., with which conscious-
ness readily identifies. In the course of life, the wise man has to learn
the painstaking lesson that these things are not important for his identity.
The ego complex is thus reduced, indeed it will have to be sacrificed
if it is not to become a problem complex. Coming to terms with the

shadow, the right attitude towards the persona, the anima and the self
(see Vol. IV), all these are the road to the true identity, to individuation.
So much importance is attached to the ego today Western
in the
world, but it must be pointed out that a relatively “small” ego does not
just have negative For example, it is precisely for this reason
effects.
that so-called primitives create an impersonal impression, for they are
not identified with their ego. Oddly enough, the same phenomenon
crops up in all great cultures, whenever we have artistically superior
pictures of human beings. We can see that these people always assume
a sort of hieratic expression. The impersonality of the portrait was the
accepted form up to Byzantine art and the early Renaissance (e.g. the
Siennese). In the art of the twentieth century there is a similar tendency
and a lack of interest in creating portrait-style resemblances, which
might well be a reaction to the exaggerated clinging to the ego so
prevalent in this day and age.
What now follows is rather complicated, and so to make it somewhat
clearer I shall resort to a diagram that first appeared in Joan Corrie’s
33
ABC of Jung s Psychology in 1927 (Fig. 4). In her book, Corrie
admits her indebtedness to Jung for the diagram. What it does is to give
a sort of “geology” of the individual. The individual person always
soars above the statistical average of the collective in some way or
other, sometimes in “splendid isolation,” and so it is possible to look
at him ashe were a mountain. However high he raises himself, the
if

various strata will rise with him, for as a man and a living creature he
is part and parcel of these strata. The sequence of ego levels is what

then forms the mountain’s peak, and the number of its levels (N) can
in theory be calculated, from regression right up to the “absolute
subject.” (We shall look at further aspects of this diagram later on).
 CONSCIOUSNESS
34

From a purely phenomenological point of view, the

N should not be
levels remain
much larger than 2, with the result that higher ego
theoretical, although the figure will probably vary
from culture to
culture (cf. Chap. IV).
The absolute subject is the source of the psychic dynamics of the
6)
elevation to the
individual, in other words it is a force for firstly, the
,

mountain peak is due to its ettorts, and secondly, it expressed itself

as
ot the utmost
an immediate source of energy and one that is felt. It is
spontaneity, i.e. autonomous, for who can actually choose
whether
this “geological fold” or that “volcanic elevation” should come about
precisely at this place or this time? And who can take it
upon himself
to decide that the individual should have this structure and not another?
We experience the libido directly as energy in the form of a “life force”

hand, a vitality whose object we are. It flows towards

that is felt at first
us or is denied us. The question of causality here is a tricky
one, and

it is not a good idea to talk of psychic

energetics and to try to introduce
psychological thermodynamics. (The titles of Jung’s endeavors in this
respect came about under the influence of the “energetic
imperative

of Julius Robert Mayer, Mach and Ostwald, and the enthusiasm that
34
prevailed at the time).
This incongruity of psyche and physics was felt right away, and so
it was agreed that instead of talking about
energy in the psychic sphere,
the word libido would be used (Lat libido — appetite, lust, impulse,
desire, craving), which does not Apart from the
really get us very tar.

fact that unpleasant clashes that broke out between Freud and Jung
over
the definition of this term, I do not have much interest in a “libido
theory” based on the above reasons, for its foundations are both inade-
quate and unsound. Nevertheless, we shall continue to use the term
“libido” to refer to psychic energy.
In conversation, Markus Fierz once made a suggestion to the ettect
that in any discussion on the “energetics of the soul,’ the tables could
be turned and one could apply this approach to the psychological
background of physical energetics. It might then be possible to put
forward a plausible argument that the projection ot an archetype with
all its numinosity was responsible for the rudiments ot thermodynamics,

i.e. the concept of indestructible “energy." This was the approach

I

adopted in Volume I when talking about J.R. Mayer.

7) The two aspects on the one hand it is experienced
libido has :

directly as energy and is thus not concrete; on the other hand it is

concrete, in the form of images, which is what gives the libido its
formal aspect. The image is thus the specific form of the energy. The
psychic flow of energy is a series of images.
THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 35

C/5
t-.

O
*—
C/5
<u
subject
x X o CO
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(U <D
co u,
bfi
<u
To Cl,
CO G cG
G 6 C/5
G <D <u
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•*Ho >> c
CO • r-H
4— To
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 CONSCIOUSNESS
36

diagram of Fighave escaped the

4: will not
Here we return to the it

reader’s attention that the figure has a phallic

form. This is certainly no
personality is a cre-
coincidence, for the formation of each individual
ative act par excellence since creation
never comes to an end, and for
this eternal power the phallus (not the
penis) is the eternal symbol. But

the strength which the individual seems to produce derives from the
apparently chaotic depths of what is common to the
whole world, the
central fire, as the ancients called it; for the
alchemists it was the prima

materia coming from what was primary and original,

and thus which
,

is not
would probably be identical with Schopenhauer’s “will.” It
difficult to see that we are now in the sphere
of the actual unconscious,
the true unconscious or, as Jung says, the collective unconscious.
Thanks to his diagram) the individual emerges from
energy (grey in the

out of the period of indifferentiation without us

being able to find
adequate causality for that emergence. So here too we end up
with a

paradox; the very nucleus of consciousness, its ultimate

peak and its
essence, is and remains the unconscious. Perhaps the
paradox needs to
the “abso-
be expressed thus: that the “absolute subject” corresponds to
object.” It would then be identical with Plato's “being,”
Spinoza’s
lute
“god,” its only substance, which because of itself. It would also
is

correspond to the god of Aristotle, who only thinks himself. Reason,

really the greatest thing, thinks itself, and its thinking is a
thinking
if it is

of thinking” ( Metaph . 9. 1074).

This reminds us of what Goethe had to say about the “hollow spot
in the brain,” a comment which I should like to quote here:

Man is midst of a real world as a real person and endowed

placed in the

with such organs that he can recognize and produce the real and the
possible. All sound people are convinced of their existence and
of
something existing around them. Yet there is a hollow spot in the brain,
that is, a place where no object is reflected, just as there is a
blind spot

in the eye. If Man pays particular attention to this and

becomes absorbed
in it, then he becomes mentally ill, has a presentiment
ot objects trom

another world which are actually non-objects; they have neither shape
nor boundary but give rise to fear as a sort ot empty night-spatiality,
haunting those who cannot shake them off.

Let me mention at this point that the last sentence reveals an attitude
that we shall come to see later (in Chapter IV) as typical ot the extravert.
8) The concrete aspect of the libido is thus the stream ot images or
the fantasy. can be understood as the manifestation or the product ot
It

energy-laden psychic contents. We have to distinguish between two

types of fantasy:
THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 37

a) Passive fantasy : automatisms, dreams and involuntary

this includes
waking fantasies. It is likely that this form of activating the fantasy is a
temporal continuum which only seems to be interrupted because it is
drowned out by ideas of the waking conscious mind, exertion of will
and concentration on psychic contents.
b) Active fantasy, this can be brought about by the positive participation
of the conscious in unconscious contents. Doing this can sometimes
be a very elevated form of mental activity, in that the conscious and
unconscious psyche are both pulling in the same direction in synthetic
cooperation, which can lead to a joint creative product. I would remind
the reader of my examples in Volume I, especially Kekule. There is no
better way of phrasing it than to quote Shakespeare:

The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,

Doth glance from heaven to earth and earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
— A Midsummer Night’s Dream V.i. 12-17

Both forms of fantasy are identical with the way that psychic pro-
cesses operate, that is with their formal, image aspect. Perhaps what
they do is simply reveal, at the lowest level, the life process as it goes
on: this would make them continuous and also make it possible to view
them as both causal and final. As an example one might turn to such
6
a fantasy as quoted in Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy /
Images of the fantasy are thus to be viewed as direct representations
or image aspects of psychic contents, especially when the latter do not
correspond to real objects. Let us recall that when we are in conversa-
tion, for example, and our ideas have not yet taken clear shape, we are
very prone to say “it’s like .”, and then we come up with a metaphor
. .

which is pure imagery. It is possible that only later are we able to bring
in clear, abstract concepts.
The question is: what are the sources of these images? They may be
said to have two roots, external and internal. We shall try to draw up
a list here, bearing in mind that the two categories may overlap.

External

1. Sensory perceptions, in which we shall include physical sensa-

tions. But it must be borne in mind that these perceptions are
subject to many illusions (e.g., the most common sensory illu-
sions) and because of blurred perception they leave much scope
 CONSCIOUSNESS
38

thus only an approximate

for extension of the fantasy and are
representation of the real object.
Concepts of external objects and experiences, i.e.
what we might
,
2.
call the situation image.
objects
3. Thoughts and feelings which attach themselves to external
and experiences and are what we might call
meaning images.
in mind
4. Recollections of external objects and experiences, bearing
that mistaken recollections may well be
causes as well as effects
of fantasies.

Internal

5. Exercising of will
6. Affects, moods
7. Intuitions and perceptions of unconscious contents
8. Dreams (as passive fantasies)
9. Possible pathological hallucinations and delusions

In summarizing let us state that components of the fantasy may have

either external or internal sources.
Not every reader will find it easy to accept our strict equation
ot
psychic
image and libido as two simultaneously existing aspects of the
dynamis. People do not all have the same gift for directly perceiving
images. This does not necessarily mean that they have a lack of
visual

ability, but rather that they are unable to see visions.

But I am inclined
to believe that this ability is initially very widespread, for it is easy to
observe in children. It is only in the process of so-called education that

children have to learn to distinguish their fantasies from

“reality,”

indeed to suppress them, and it is this that leads to the above shortcom-
ing. Ifone is to embark upon active imagination, one may have to learn
to regress to a relatively childish level. To clarity what we mean by the
term “image,” let us recall that the German word tor “image is Bild ,

which is connected with Bildung, meaning “education or training.

In other words the image has a formative effect. The
alchemists hoped

that through the reality and hence the effectiveness ot

images they
would be able through imaginatio vera ( imago
to transform matter, i.e. ,

= image). There was much talk during the Renaissance ot the forming
and transforming effect of the image. Giantrancesco Pico (the nephew
of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola) was preoccupied with the role played
by the image in the sense of its formative effect upon man. What he is
concerned with is ancient anthropoplastic in relation to artistic and
scientific activity. These philosophers were much preoccupied with
the

ancient Greek morphe as spiritual form, the formative image as idea or

 THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 39

type (“shaped form which develops as it grows,” Goethe). And when

we look at 2 Corinthians 3,18: “But we all, with open face beholding
as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image,”
we reminded once again of the Aristotelian idea of all matter
are
being determined by form, and all change consisting in bringing the
potentiality of a substance into actuality.
remarkable to note that even the last century Sir Francis Galton
It is

was conducting experiments on the image aspect of the libido; he

reported on them in “Proceedings of the Royal Institute,” Vol. IX
1878-81, pp. 644-655, under the title “The Visions of Sane Persons.” 37
As he was collecting his material, he was amazed to find that this
characteristic was much more widespread than he had expected. What
we have said so far on confirmed by Galton both in theory
this subject is
and practice, and it is fascinating to see that almost forty years before
Jung he was collecting spontaneous material which comes very close
to that of active imagination.
Let us now attempt to describe some further characteristics of the
ego.
The ego has a series of directly opposed traits and in this respect is
9)
like the head of Janus. There now follows a list of these opposing features
and it should be borne in mind that they can easily co-exist side by side,
which, of course, leads to paradoxes once again. So the ego is:
either or
agens, i.e., all will patiens, i.e., fascinated, for example
productive receptive
active reactive
positive negative
warm cold
radiating absorbing, reflecting
light dark
constant changing
sunlike moonlike, borrowed light

As can be seen, the list, which could easily be extended, becomes

more and more full of imagery as it gets longer. Rather than extend the
list I from Origenes, who gives a very apt
shall turn to a quotation
“
description of this aspect of the ego: Intellige te alium mundum esse
in parxo et esse infra te Solem, esse Lunam, ese etiam Stellas .” (Under-
stand that you are another cosmos in miniature and that in you are also
38
the sun, the moon and other stars.”)
I shall try to outline how the casuistry of this polarity of the
ego
manifests itself by taking as an example two characteristics and showing
how differently they appear with the active and the passive ego.
 CONSCIOUSNESS
40

a) The influencing capacity:

passive
active
as suggestibility
as will
want you to
= outside will dominates
“I . .

b) The productive capacity:

passive
active
as dreaming
as ability to
especially daydreaming
express oneself
planning ahead
and passive fantasies
shaping
linguistically
graphically
musically
dramatically
in mime
in pantomime
and letting things
As can beseen, the opposition is that of activity
is an external or internal
happen, and once again we see that there
results.
“causality,” which produces reciprocal
When we talk about active and passive we must realize that it is

from within and sometimes

always a “force,” which sometimes works
problem of psychic energy
from without, and this takes us back to the
myself on this subject,
we touched on above. I do not wish to repeat
discussion of the Julius Robert
having dealt with the essentials in my 3
Volume I of this textbook. The connection between
"
Mayer case in
clearly there.
energy and image is brought home particularly
Just as the elements of the image
derive from external or internal
conscious or the ego usually
sources, it is possible to observe that the
has a preference for the one or the other,
and this is described as
object.
10) the attitude of the ego to the
Qualitatively this attitude may also have the
following directly oppos-

ing traits:

°r negative
positive
or realistic
emotional
or objective
subjective
or impersonal
personal

If they are predominantly conscious they may be more of an intention in

nature, and predominantly unconscious, then more of an inclination.

if

Quantitatively the attitude may have varying

degrees of intensity.

These are brought about by

THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 41

1) the will (e.g. attentiveness)

2) the interest (or the fascination)
3) the emotion

The expression “intensity” as a quantity reminds us once again of the

term “energy” and it can also be understood as the amount of invested
libido.But we must bear in mind that in psychology the expression
“energy” is invariably used in the anthropomorphic sense. That was
also the case in physics until relatively recently, for whenever people
talked of “force they turned to the “image” of animal horsepower or
human muscular power. The expression libido is a better one, being
less prejudiced, although in using it one does seem to be following
Mephistopheles' advice in Part I of Faust, when he says that we should
not bother our heads too much, for when we cannot find the expression,
a word always turns up at the right time.
May we never forget that this word is “just an image.” This has been
the case in Jung’s works, for after describing a fantasy, a stream of
images, of a patient in his first great work, Transformations and Symbols
of the Libido he felt compelled to set alongside the contents of these
images another theory based on energetics this was in the form of his
;

next great work. On Psychic Energy (1928), which actually comple-

ments his Transformations and Symbols of the Libido and should be
41
read parallel to it.

In 1932, Count Hermann Keyserling published a book under the

title South-American Meditations. On
pages 153/154 he describes a
phenomenon that is very typical of the mentality of the South American
and is probably due to the climate and also to the racial mixture. He
talks about the word gana which corresponds very accurately to what
,

we mean by libido,. This is what Keyserling says:

In met the first people of whom I could actually say that

Argentina I

they could not do what they wanted to. Some of them were tremendously
spontaneous; at first I had the impression that they had vivid imaginations
and great will-power, but I soon found out that appearances were decep-
tive. They improvised without any preconceived ideas; they could only
do things when they had to. And their will-power was not much stronger
than an ability to say no, comparable on another level with the water lily
when it pushes away a foreign body. This way of thinking was so
different from what I had hitherto regarded as the only possible one, and
the meaning behind it only became clear when a friend told me the
following tale. She was playing tennis in the country just outside Cordoba
and she offered a child one peso per hour to be ball boy. The boy shook
his head sadly: no puedo (I can’t). —
Why not? Porque no me da la gana
(the gana does not move me).
 CONSCIOUSNESS
42

not a just-not-feeling-like-doing-something,
which is
This gana is

decision of will that is based on perception;

nor is it quite
behind any
the same gana which does not mean volition either: it is
as the Spanish ,

the unconscious primeval force, welling

up from inside, and the con-
idea of gana too, does
scious has no power over it. And the Spanish
,

to any determining content of intellectualized

Western
not correspond
nor urge, nor instinct
consciousness. It means neither volition, nor drive,
words, but rather it is a
nor internal obligation as we understand these
organic urge. It
combination of elementary mental image and blind,
so-called volition is the
includes the fantasy element, which with the
actual creative element, which is why one should not say, “where there s

a will, there’s away,” but rather, “ideas create reality.” On the other
and
hand/ what gana lacks is the ability to demarcate, to delineate,
because of this lack the actual will has no directives.
The function
represented by gana in the Spanish soul corresponds to
what the Germans
This why the Spaniard rarely uses
and the French would call volition. is

the word term he never actually wants.

voluntad'. in our sense of the
When idea and spontaneous drive coincide, this leads to a powerful
and lets
dynamic force. Otherwise the Spaniard lets things go; he lives
enjoys what is going on as a spectator and rejects
any serious
live,
commitment. he makes a promise, he works on the assumption that
If
the promise be fulfilled
the other party has sufficient tact not to insist that
costs. Moreover, the fact that gana dominates
rather than volition
at all

means that in Spain initiative comes from the whole nation or is totally

absent. Hence there iseither faith or indifference, hazana, heroic deed,

or passiveness. The fact that it was Spain of all countries that brought

forth Ignatius de Loyola, whose Spiritual Exercises are a true testimony

to will-power, fits in with the law of nature that every nation produces
42
its countertype .

Thus can be seen that with such people and under these conditions
it

the motivating image or the fantasy is either there or not there, so that
the question of will does not even arise. One can almost envy such
foreign
people! And yet what is going on with them is not completely
to us. For although the libido or the gana is in the
foreground of the
phenomenon, the image or the fantasy is in the background, and that
is also the case with us. Just think of the all too frequent failure of

children at school. It
although the foreground
can often be proved that

is the inability to make abstractions,

the background is the lack of

fantasy. Of course one must understand that this background

remains
unconscious and can yet be effective, provided it is not repressed by a
conscious exertion of consciousness. To avoid this, our society has
various institutions at its disposal, such as chess and card games, which
even for mathematicians form a means of fruitful cooperation between
foreground and background.
 THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 43

It should be clear by now that a satisfactory libido theory cannot be

postulated unless the role of the unconscious is taken into consideration.
Let us just recall the example of Julius Robert Mayer (to which I
have already referred on several occasions), where the unconscious
essentially made itself felt in the form of depressions. One of
Jung’s
basic convictions is the compensatory relation between the
conscious
and the unconscious. In fact, to be more precise, he saw them as
complementary systems.
We have taken the term “potential” from the field of physical energet-
ics, and we can thus talk of a libido potential. All we mean by this is
the higher or lower psychological valence of the one content or
system
compared to the other. The libido flow would then be polarized, always
flowing from the higher to the lower level. But this “hydrodynamic
approach does not seem to meet the requirements of the psyche, for
the two systems of the conscious and the unconscious, for example,
are not “communicating tubes.” So one cannot say in advance how high
one level or the other is, which means that there is no predicting the
direction of the flow of the libido, as would be possible if it were simply
a mechanical system. The composition of the libido, or the potential,
or the level, cannot be measured but can only be postulated according
to this theory, and then in practice the astounding observation must
occasionally bemade that the current is beginning to flow uphill. An
example of what I mean is the following: consciousness can be greatly
stimulated or indeed excited by an idea, and one becomes completely
fascinated or obsessed by it. This content almost certainly has a maximal
libido composition. Then for no apparent reason it suddenly loses all its
potential and one realizes that one is depressed. This is what happened to
J R- Mayer time and time again. So it can be seen that borrowing from

physics does not make matters any easier to understand, but can actually
make them more complicated. This springs from the fact that we cannot
really bring the unconscious into the equation because it cannot be
adequately measured. On the other hand, one term that has stood the
test is the idea of the progression and regression of the libido. This

simply refers to where the libido is gravitating at any given moment,

without the subject of potential arising. In the case of progression, the
libido would be directed at adapting to the surroundings whereas the ,

object of regression is to adapt inwards. So one can claim that when

switching from regression to progression, or vice-versa, those contents
which were previously paid little or no attention enter into conscious-
ness. It will be clear that
such a swing of the pendulum occurs with
relatively small amplitudes in normal psychic life, and is in fact what
makes up the autonomous or self-regulating activity of the psyche.
 CONSCIOUSNESS
44

More pronounced swings of pendulum, on the other hand, would

the
melan-
correspond to such pathological states as mania (progression) or
choly (regression).
The above observations are not intended to be a pointless
critical
energetic approach to
attempt to throw out or carry to absurdity any
psychology. My concern is to steer clear ot the pompous terminology
in this sector of our science, and that is why
one so often comes across
I should like to illustrate with the simplest possible example from
everyday life what I have said above about everyone experiencing his
psychic energy as a direct force: a young man
meets a young woman
(note the “physics”
and they are immediately attracted to each other
terminology!). It is common knowledge that in
such cases neither of
them can see what the basis is for this energetic phenomenon
clearly
fantasies that crop up of
of attraction, for it is a product of images and
their own accord. They may not even cross
the threshold of conscious-

ness and yet, as already stated, they are still very effective.
we have
1-9. Despite their
We have listed their sources above under section 8b,
great effectiveness, these images do not need to
correspond to the object
to the same extent, with the result that later
the sobering discovery can
the original
be made that one has been “mistaken,” thus betraying
fantasy nature of one’s conceptions. From the point
of view of experi-
probably the
ence, however, the initial effect remains a force and is
same one Freud tried to demythologize with his term object
that
libido.”
We remind the reader point that the term “energy" had been
at this

introduced much earlier into psychological terminology, albeit with a

totally different meaning. This is specific energy, according to the
Berlin physiologist Joh. Muller (1801-1858). The idea stems from the

well-known physiological fact that every sensory organ only conveys

the sensation that is specific to it, no matter how the stimulus is created.

Pressure on the eye not light stimulus) produces just as much light
(i.e.
cutting
sensation as electric stimulation or mechanical stimulation or
through the optic nerve. Equally, the ear can only hear, regardless of
what modalities it is stimulated with. Muller thus speaks ot specific
sensory energy. It is perfectly obvious that these stimulus modalities
have nothing to do with the term “energy” as such.
Conversely, “psychic energy” should be understood rather in the
sense of the energeia of Aristotle, where it has the meaning ot living
reality and effectiveness, actuality as opposed to potentiality. In Aris-
totle, God alone is all actuality, and his energies
are eternal and un-

changing. (I cannot help recalling once again J.R. Mayer’s concept ot

indestructible force). According to Aristotle, everything that happens
THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
45

is change from the state of dynamics to that of energy. Matter is

the
4
pure dynamis. As God is all actuality he has no potential and
therefore
no suffering, no pathos and therefore no substance, an important
topic
with scholars, especially Thomas Aquinas. how
Just look far away we
are from Einstein’s E= Me! Purely in passing, I would like to say that
serious thought should be given to how the M could be determined in
psychology.
 CHAPTER IV

THE LOCALIZATION OF
CONSCIOUSNESS

The question of where the actual seat of the conscious is has long
been something that has preoccupied humanity, although the terms
“psyche” or “soul” have been used more frequently than the word
“conscious.” Over the centuries and in different cultures, definitive
assumptions have been made about where the conscious is situated. As
we shall see, the Greeks argued for centuries about the seat of the stoic
hegemonikon, the guiding principle of Zeno. These discussions about
the seat of the Aristotelianhegemonikon which went on for centuries,
,

are a particularly good example of the uncertainty regarding the where-

abouts of anything to do with the psychic. Fortunately M. Putscher has
taken great pains to examine the changes in this attitude, so we can refer
44
to her excellent book when necessary Concerning the Orientation
.

Functions of Consciousness by C.G. Jung (cf. Chapter VIII) we should

like to point out that Thomas Aquinas, unlike Avicenna, who postulates
five spiritual forces, is convinced that there are four of them. For more
information on cerebral localizations we now have a good overview of
43
the subject in the work by Clarke and Dewhurst .

From the viewpoint of analytical psychology, these variations pro-

vide material for comparing the stage of development that the conscious
has reached in the cultures and nations concerned. Let us make it
clear right away that we are not so conceited as to assume that our
contemporary Western level of consciousness, and hence the apparent
localization of the conscious in the brain, is the highest stage of this

47
 CONSCIOUSNESS
48

we much more inclined to claim that

sequence. On the contrary, are
localization
the whole organism the locus of the psyche and that the
is

in specific organs can only be

accepted as possible locations for specific
aspects of the psyche. . , .
,
approach and methodology have certainly shown
,
that
Our scientific
cerebral cortex also brings about
the experimental elimination of the
the same empirical research
the extinguishing of consciousness. But
has also shown that the continuity of the
psyche is thus also stopped.
Moreover, observations have shown that in accidents involving brain
wartime, for example,
trauma, such as bullet wounds in the brain in
of unconsciousness.
psychic processes continue in an apparent state
experiences,
The numerous well-documented cases of out-of-the-body
are also along these lines.
as collected by Celia Green, for example,
level, but that should
Actually, they are almost on a parapsychological
shall return to this later in a different context.
We The
not bother us.
clinical observations of Jantz and Beringer
also shed an interesting light
this problem
on Dunne’s observer of the observer. Another aspect of
is the rather trivial fact that every
night we have the most vivid experi-

ences in what is largely an unconscious state. Of course what this means

is unconsciousness, and hence indirectly that ot
that the question of
seen at
consciousness, is far from being cleared up. Every doctor has
patient it cannot
a sickbed that even with the most heavily comatose
has
always be said with certainty that all consciousness and perception
been extinguished. Nevertheless, it is clear that the cortex has a
certain

priority when it comes to the processes ot consciousness,

and the sub-
consciousness.
cortical processes only have a conditional influence on
As and the sensory organs, is ectodermal in
the brain, like the skin
origin, it is also, among other things, a sensory and
perceptive organ;

its perceptions are, of course,

predominantly optical and acoustic, as
can be seen during its activity when it is basically shielded from
external
essentially our
stimuli in sleep, i.e. in the dream. Thus the brain is
psychic orientation system, though never the psyche itself.
Let us now look at and compare some ot the ancient theories about
the localization of consciousness.
1 . A well-known one is what many “primitives reter to as the bush
They believe
soul. that their soul, and hence their innermost identity—

we would tend to call it their conscious ego —

is located at a certain

other
place in the bush, perhaps in a certain animal, tree or stone. In
words it would be extra corpus. This, ot course, does present certain
dangers because it means that the soul can easily be separated from its
owner. This will make him physically and psychically ill and he can
even die, for the soul possesses a so-called participation with him, or
 THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 49

he with it. So the medicine man has to fetch

hack, and one of the it

ways that happens is as follows: the medicine man goes into the bush
with a birdcage and cages some “soul birds” that have escaped. On his
return the patient lies on the floor and the cage is opened. The cage is
some distance away from the patient’s head and there is a trail of seeds
leading from one to the other, with the last one being on the patient’s
brow. When the birds are released they peck their way along this trail
and the bird to take the last grain of seed, the one on the patient’s brow,
isregarded as his escaped soul bird; it has thus become integrated again
with the sufferer and the “loss of soul,” the illness, is cured. There are
numerous examples of this kind. This localization of the soul outside
the body, which is typical of the primitive, and the ensuing “participa-
tion,” give rise to many other psychic effects of people on external
4
objects and vice-versa. *
There they are taken for granted, but from our
point of view they have to be looked on as purely parapsychological,
i.e., as psychokinesis. They also remind us of the ancient doctrine of

sympathy, but this still leaves us with the unsolved question of the
subject/object relation. There are especially difficult problems when the
two are physically separated without there being any known channels
through which the effect can be conveyed. Even in our society, by the
way, “mystic" atmospheres such concepts of sympathy arise
in certain
very easily and have considerable poetic merit.
If we are going to pursue this theory of localization
on a comparative
basis, it is the anatomy, i.e., the body, that will be our frame of
reference, and we shall work our way through it stage by stage.
2. Localizations in the bladder and rectum would be regarded by us
as the most primitive. Yet there are phases in life (infancy) in which
these areas dominate in importance or then assume it again more or less
pathologically. One tends to think of the “mentality” of the dog, for
example.
3. For the next stage, the stomach is a characteristic organ. I am not
referring to that category for whom satisfying the stomach is the be all
and end of existence and even less to the fact that there are still
all

nations for whom the stilling of hunger is given top priority. Yet there
were civilizations where people were only motivated to go hunting, for
example, when the pangs of hunger could no longer be staved off.
And German we say that we only really become aware of some-
in

thing when it starts to “lie on one’s stomach” (auf dem Magen lie gen).
The solar plexus, which on the aorta, seems to be a
lies at this level

sort of organ of expression for many contents of the psyche. According

to what Laurens van der Post has told me there are impressive examples
of this with the bush men. At vast distances they can perceive and thus
 CONSCIOUSNESS
50

predict the approach of strangers because

they feel a warning “tapping

in the pits of their stomachs, and

this almost certainly comes from the

solar plexus.
localiza-
4 The diaphra gm from the Greek phren can be seen as the
,
,

Achilles kills Hector:

tion of the psyche in the passage in the Iliad where

Hector knew the truth in his heart and spoke aloud:

—Iliad XXII. 296

we talk of schizo phrenia the illness that most

Today in psychiatry ,

seriously affects consciousness, but in doing

so we do not intend to

convey any indications of localization. In the Roman

world the dia-
phragm was regarded as the seat ot thinking and feeling. Another name
for it is praecordia and it is said ot it that intima praecordia movit

when something especially moving happens.

real seat ot the soul, and
5. Today for us we regard the heart as the

not just as a poetic metaphor, at least in so far as it

makes its presence
felt through strong feelings and passions.
With the Greeks the corres-
of life,
ponding expression is thymos and actually means “the breath
in Latin passio, ajjectus or perturbatio in other words, effects that are
,

for intorma-
part and parcel of our being human. See Volume II, p. 50,
tion on the heart as seat of the koinon aistheterion
the central organ ot ,

sense and feeling in Aristotle.

For modern-day man the highest stage in this hierarchy is the
6.
brain. This localization can hardly be disputed but does
not at all
the
exclude the fact that the lower stages can also be represented in
brain. It is even less the case that the brain will ever
succeed in
completely controlling or rendering ineffective the lower localizations.
That would mean we had lost direct contact with our biological and
psychic prerequisites and had turned into tormidable sub- or superhu-
mans. We can safely say that the purely brain-computer controlled state
of being a robot an absurd extrapolation. The whole man is the one
is

who functions correctly and in proportion on at least these six levels:

brain, heart, diaphragm, stomach, intestines and bladder, and,
finally,

even extra corpus.

In a private seminar in 1930, C.G. Jung presented the
case ot a

patient who had done active imagination in the course ot analysis and
had produced drawings and pictures. These had made an extremely odd
impression and Jung only started to understand them when he read a
book that was first published in 1918. This was The Serpent Power by 44
Sir John Woodroffe, Arthur Avalon. The book gives the Sanskrit
alias

text with an English translation of the Shatchakranirupana

(Description

of the Six Centers) and is basically a Yoga meditation text. It is

 THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 51

the Bengali-South India Tantra Yoga, sometimes known as Kundalini

Yoga. Tantra here simply means “book,” and thus Tantrism consists
of Yoga sects who have their holy books, just as we have the Bible.
Kundalini has the form of a coiled and sleeping serpent and, as can be
very clearly seen from the text and from meditation, symbolizes psychic
energy, or libido. In the Yoga process, this energy is circulated round
the whole body, and in this respect
bears a striking similarity to the
“Circulation ot Light” in Chinese Taoism so accurately described by
50
Erwin Rousselle. In this process the Kundalini flows through the seven
chakras ( chakra Sanskrit for center), which are presented as localized
is

hierarchically in different centers of the body. These localizations bear

striking analogies to those we have described above, which we arrived
at quite independently both from clinical observations and from the
fields of comparative history of religion and ethnology.
The fact that this Western method of approach is closely similar to
that in the East is not just a confirmation, but should lead us to see for
ourselves that the fundamental psycho-biological aspects of mankind
are more or less the same everywhere. In other words,
what emerges
that in Jung’s language the facts of the collective unconscious are the
is

same everywhere, that is, archetypal. But let us not lose sight of the
fact that the East their representations are much more strongly
in
differentiated than with us, because of thousands of years of tradition,
observation and experience of the body in the East; and so we have a
lot to learn from them.

Far be it from us to make propaganda for Yoga, for our spiritual

background is too different from that of the East for us to really be able
to adopt Indian philosophy. When the Shakta (a member of the Bengali
Tantra sect) says “he who makes honor without fighting against the
powers of the world and against tradition does not achieve his
aim but
brings about his downfall,” then this shows us that this attitude is
identical with that which Jung felt was necessary for analysis, but it also
shows us that Yoga is the specifically Indian way to the introspective
handling of experience.
I shall now attempt to list the seven centers, making use of Avalon’s
text, but I shall have to leave out many details, simply concentrating
on those which help to make some things clear for us in the West.
I shall just give the basic details of the description of the chakras in
the following order: 1. the Sanskrit name of the center; 2. localization
in the body; 3. where corresponding localization of
this is feasible, the
ganglia of the vegetative nervous system, with which we are familiar,
for if it is possible to categorize them in this way, it would be easier
for us to allow these centers a certain degree of psychic representation;
 CONSCIOUSNESS
52

Fig. 5
Localization of the 7 chakras
in the body
THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 53

Fig. 6
1 .
(lowest) chakra Muladhara
 CONSCIOUSNESS
54

Fig. 7
2. chakra Svadhisthana
THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 55

Fig. 8
3. chakra Manipura
56 CONSCIOUSNESS

Fig. 9
4. chakra Anahata
THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 57

Fig. 10
5. chakra Visuddha
58 CONSCIOUSNESS

Fig. 11
6. chakra Ajna
THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 59

Fig. 12
7. (final, highest) chakra Sahasrara
60 CONSCIOUSNESS

I 2 3 4 5 6 7

Name translation location ganglia element petals animal

*

root support perineum plexus earth 4 elephant

1. Muladhara
pelvicus

2. Svadhisthana own place bladder plexus water 6 makara

hypogastricus

3. Manipura jewel navel plexus fire 10 ram

abundance coeliacus seu
Solaris

Anahata unassailable heart plexus air 12 antelope

4.
cardiacus

Visuddha purification larynx plexus ether 16 white

5.
pharyngeus elephant

6. Ajna episteme between the pineal gland 2 none

eyes
7. Sahasrana pure on the scalp- none the void 1000 none
consciousness extra corpus

Cf. Figs. 1-8

4. the assignment according to the “elements”; and 5. the number ot

petal leaves of the corresponding lotus, i.e. chakra, without going into
the finely differentiated number and letter symbolism that operates in
India (anyone interested in this body of lore, and it is certainly worth
looking at, should consult another work of Avalon’s: The Garland of
51
Letters where he goes into detail about the mystical aspect of the
,

phonetic symbol); lastly, 6. the corresponding animal symbol.

What the Yogi is supposed to do is to meditate these centers trom
bottom to top, one after the other, not only to imagine them in every
detail, but to buildthem up out of the elements and make them present
in physical terms, and realize them in dhyana or “sinking, a way
,

which we cannot really understand. What I think becomes what thinks

me; I am thought. The energy or libido necessary for this process comes
from the Kundalini sleeping in the lowest center, which now wakes up
and is gradually driven upward through the other centers, where it leads
to realization, analmost physical perception of the chakra concerned.
Every earlier level is preserved and taken up to the next one. Once at
the top, one turns round and successively dismantles each level till the
Kundalini is once again at rest in the Muladhara. Then the Yogi returns
to his daily round.
This hierarchy inevitably reminds one of Hughlings Jackson’s “pro-
gressive cerebration” referred to in Volume II, for they have much in
5"
common, even though they have entirely different starting points.
 THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
61

Going back to the patient we mentioned

whose drawings
earlier,
were so Tantric in character, C.G. Jung brought in an expert to
explain
them.
1. This was J. W. Hauer (Tubingen), a scholar of Indian culture
and Sanskrit who was invited to a private seminar in
1932, with Jung
giving a psychological commentary on the proceedings.
I am in the
fortunate position of being able to draw on those discussions.
In Muladhara, the lowest level, we are, psychologically
speak-
ing, on the conscious level of our everyday existence,
of family,
profession, and so on. The four lotus petals symbolize material
reality
in its entirety, which is why the element of earth
is assigned to this
chakra. As we are very close to this reality, the state here is an almost
latent one, where all that is divine slumbers, as does the Kundalini.
still
All she does is hum gently “like a swarm of lovesick bees,” coiled three
and a half times round the Linga (phallus), her head covering
the
entrance to the Sushumna, the door of Brahman (the lingam reminds
us of our diagram. Fig. 4, on p. 35). The animal symbol here
is the
elephant, which for India signifies domesticated libido. The next
stage
now is to arouse the Kundalini
and galvanize her into action.
2. Svadhishthana. There are two symbols here which, like
the ele-
ment of water, clearly represent the unconscious: the crescent moon
and the Makara, an alligator-like animal. The latter can be recognized
as a sort of leviathan, the reverse, as were, of the elephant of the
it

Muladhara. Let us here remind the reader of what was said in Chapter
III about the shadow as the first stage in coming to
terms with the
unconscious as part of the process of becoming conscious. What is true
for us in the West is expressed here in the East as a necessity, in
that
negative tendencies have to be accepted as a prerequisite for increased
consciousness.
3. Manipura. The picture shows a crucible on the fire and its sym-
bolic animal is a ram, which corresponds to Agni, the Lord of Fire. (In
our astrology, too, the ram is the house of Mars, and Mars is closely
related to Agni.) The chakra is assigned to the element of fire. And in
the bindu the dot
, on top of the inscribed Sanskrit letter, we find Rudra,
the destroyer of creation, for the inflaming of passions threatens to
destroy everything again. We
are reminded here of Heraclitus when he
says: “it is difficult to fight against desire, for it will purchase what it

wants with the soul. This is the thymos the affect, a purely emotional
,

psychology, where one is only conscious of the things that “make one’s
blood boil,” that affect one’s stomach (hunger) or bile. In other words,
of lack of freedom, and yet also the beginning of a real
this is a state
psychology. But we are still below the diaphragm, and conscious
psychology only begins above this level.
62 CONSCIOUSNESS

4. Anahata means “unassailable,” which symbol that

refers to the

now appears for the first time, that of the “self,’ the Indian Atman. The
term “self’ coined by Jung represents a center of the personality, and
has been exhaustively described in the phenomenology ol the Atman
in Indian philosophy. The element here is air, for comes
out of earth ( 1 )

water (2) and out of this, by means of fire (3), comes air (4). The

element air is represented by the lungs, where the heart is embedded.

And the symbol animal of the antelope, noted for its fleetness, represents
air as well. From the neurophysiological point ot view, we are now
on the level of the partially conscious control of the functions, of which
breathing is obviously one. Man is now beginning to reflect, to judge,

to make distinctions. becoming capable of removing himself from

He is

the pure affect. At the same time he is now for the first time becoming
aware of his impersonal side (self-Atman). Only now have we reached
the starting point of our conscious psychology. It is also probably at
this level that Christian be understood. The self is
mysticism is to

something that is extraordinarily impersonal, and by looking at it as

something objective one becomes impersonal oneself. What we call
personality disappears. However, the risk for us in the West is that

identification with the self, which amounts to an inflation, a sort of

delusion of grandeur, such a dangerous thing that no warning about

is

it can be too strong. I remember an experience that Jung had with the

Pueblo Indians in Taos, New Mexico, which made a deep impression

on him. His Pueblo friend was complaining about the Americans,
saying that they were all crazy, for they claimed that they thought here
(pointing to his brow) whereas everybody knows that we think here
(pointing to his heart).
Visuddha. Due to our Western way of looking at things, it will
5.
now become increasingly difficult to have a clear idea ot which psychic
characteristics we are talking about in these higher centers. Visuddha
is assigned to the element ether, of which we can say that it is a material
and yet not a material, thus a purely abstract concept, and so making
this chakra one of pure concepts, or purely psychic. This also makes
it the chakra of the reality of the psychic altogether, and unfortunately

it now moves into loftier spheres where we have little to say on the

subject. Today Western man seems to be roughly on the level of

Anahata. At this level the world and its events seem to be an image of
our own psyche, of our own individual internal drama. Phonetic sound,
language and singing belong here for the Indian. In bindu we see
Arddhanarishvara, an androgynous god who is both sun and moon,
gold and silver, thus uniting elementary opposites.
 THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 63

6. Ajna
the place of union, the unio mystica. There are no longer
is

any animal symbols, tor at this level psychic experience no longer

needs support in external reality. Not even God can be found here, for
through the unio mystica the Yogi himself has become the psychic
content of God, which means he is himself the content of the psychic.
The lingam crops up once again here, but as itara siva a different ,

lingam, which has nothing in common with the lingam of the first level
except the form. We must be perfectly frank and admit that all of this
is barely conceivable for our Western mentality.
Sahasrara. What we have just said is even more true of this
7.
center. But here there is an interesting paradox: here there is a void,
sunyata of which it is said: “That is the place where all being is no
,

longer being. Only now is realness attained. Whoever goes totally into
the void arrives at total fullness. Only when this void has been achieved
does the knowledge that has been acquired on the way become real.”
For here there is only Brahman. And Brahman cannot experience itself,
for it is a-dvaita “not two.” It is not-being being, which means the
,

same thing as the idea of Nirvana, which is nir-dvandva meaning free ,

of opposites. As a result of the union that has taken place in Sahasrara

between the Kundalini (Shakti) and Shiva, which amounts to a sacred
marriage ( hieros gamos ), there flows from here a stream of nectar. This
nectar signifies total liberation, so that the Yogi now enjoys the blissful
stateof advaya (where there is no second one), and is therefore identical
with Kundalini.
What makes impossible for us to judge here is the difficulties we
it

have with the metaphysical speculation, so beloved by the Indians, on

the concept of perception with no objective opposite. As W. Pauli so
accurately says, it has to be rejected by us as an untenable extrapolation,
for our consciousness presupposes the duality of subject and object and
the split between them. Pauli concludes that the situation with us in the
West is we
focus on the idea of the unconscious instead of on the
that
idea of an objectless pan-consciousness. We should not overlook the
fact that with Sahasrara we once again find ourselves outside the body,
a situation that is curiously reminiscent of the extra corpus localization
of the “bush soul” of the primitives. We
could actually draw a curve
as the Tantrists do, and move from the bush soul of the primitive, which
is completely outside the body, over the caudal end, through various
levels, which get higher and higher, until we reach the cranial end and
are once again outside the body.
The linking factor for us is the libido and its circulation, which makes
itself felt here in the way it affects the body, or various organs. Let us
 )

CONSCIOUSNESS
64

not forget that this isthe origin of the term “affect.” But we have always
known in the West that this is not the whole activity of the psyche.
On
this subject I should like to quote the words ot an alchemist.

Corpus enim nihil scit, quicquid in corpore fortitudinis sive motus

est,

mens fac it ista; corpus tantum est mend sicut instrumenta alicujus ar-
dficis. Anima autem, qua homo a
caeteris animalibus differ! ilia opera- ,

tur in corpore, sed majorem operationem habet extra

corpus, quoniam

absolute extra corpus dominatur.

and
For the body knows nothing about what is in it as regards strength
movement; that is what the spirit does; the body is to the spirit no more
is what
than the instrument to the artist. The soul, however, which
in the
distinguishes man from other living creatures, has those functions
body, but it is outside the body that it has a more significant effect,
because it is outside the body that it is a force unto itself . . .

And Gerardus Domeus a corpore distractio necessaria

says: mentis
55
est. (“The spirit must be separated from the body
.”) More recently
we have found out about a gnostic early Christian passage in the same
spirit: “Jesus said: woe betide the flesh ( sarx that
depends on the soul
56
.”
(psyche); betide the soul that depends on the flesh
woe
Recently Tantrism seems to have made a deep impression on the
West, with the result that the Tantric texts are now more accessible in
English and other Western European languages.
We are of the opinion that everything that has been written and said
in the West about stages and levels of consciousness is illustrated in
an
interesting way and given an empirical basis by these experiences and
our Jungian way of looking at them.
 )

CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF AFFECTS

There is a clear and obvious connection

between the comments in
57
the last chapter and what A. Adler referred to in 1907 as “the language
of the organs.” Adler's studies were related to evidence of the fact that
in a disturbed organism psychic contents only reached the level of
consciousness when they made their presence felt affectively.
Unfortunately the effect is rather naively equated with the cause and,
58
as we have seen in Volume I, things are not so simple as that. In a
certain sense the effect is hypostatized. Purely phenomenologically at
any rate, a certain organ is affected by an initially unknown, uncon-
scious content, and this is identical with the emotion perceived. It used
to be said that the organ was irradiated. It would be opportune here to
59
take a serious look at the James-Lange theory of affects. What is
certain at any rate is that an emotion ( e-motio is felt as a movement
which has to be restrained — it is felt as an immediate force whose
libidinous nature is clear; vice-versa, libido is perceived directly as
power.
It is for these reasons that the theory of affects has been a concern
of mankind since ancient times, and of course even today it is still an
issue with the Doctors of the Church, where it has led directly to the
drawing up of the catalogue of vices.
Affect, like the Greek pathos Latin passio and perturbatio is felt
, ,

as an excessive animation ( motio ) of the soul and therefore regarded as

subhuman. This is why Plato considers it the lowest of the three parts

65
66 CONSCIOUSNESS

of the soul. Ever since Democritus, there has been a demand for
harmonious, imperturbable tranquility. Adiaphora, Eudamonia and
Harmonia are largely synonymous. In connection with our discussion
of the libido as a force, e-motio as movement, and the question as to
the origins of this energy, it is interesting to see that the Stoa describes
the affect as kinesis alogos ,
that is, a movement whose mechanism is

not understood. This takes us back indirectly to the unsolved problem

of the relation between the psyche and the physis. Later the pneuma
was introduced as a third factor, and Philo was convinced that its origins
were purely metaphysical.
As the affect is a fire, an inflammation, Aristotle and the Peripatetic
School recommend a metriopatheia curbing the passions (a recommen-
,

dation endorsed by the Latin Academics Krantor and Cicero). The

Cynics and the Stoics made stronger demands; what they sought was
Apathy, an extermination of the affects in human beings, something
which Christians would say only God could achieve. But this raises
problems about the wrath of God in the Old Testament, which was an
important issue with the Gnostics, who wondered about the peace of
God. Origenes spoke about the affects in images of demons, wild
animals and fire. Freedom and release from these affects led to modera-
tion and reflectiveness, characteristics regarded by the Greeks as the
mark of the wise man. This became somewhat more humane with
ideal
the Christians, especially with St. Augustine, who modestly demanded
that the affects should be “guided aright.” There are doubtless sound
foundations, based on empirical experience, for Galen’s view that we
breathe in order to cool down the heart (emotional excitement) and to
curb the affects. It reminds us of the Indian breathing exercises {prana -
yama) in Yoga, and hence what was said earlier about Anahata.
As we can see, the theory of affects was a central issue in ancient
times and has been the subject of lengthy discussion in various schools
of philosophy. In medicine and in culture, too, excessive swings in
emotion are treated more sympathetically. Music is particularly impor-
tant in this respect. I have examined elsewhere the therapeutic signifi-
cance of music and do not wish to repeat myself, except to remind the
reader that in the Asclepieia, music was regarded as having great
6(1
therapeutic benefits Music acts as a catharsis and a natural outlet
.

for pent-up emotions. The theater is also important as a therapeutic

61
institution, and as such was discussed at length in Volume II So .

people had a wide variety of means at their disposal in order to bring

about transformation. Oddly enough these were later largely forgotten,
and what was recommended instead was a living out of the affects as
the only reasonable and healthy course of behavior. Only in monastic
 THE THEORY OF AFFECTS
67

and in the East has the asceticism necessary for

life
maintaining mental
calmness been in any way cultivated.
Only thanks to recent clinical observations have people
once again
become aware of the psychic and somatic consequences of
fluctuations
of the libido, and thus gone on to demand
psychosomatic medicine.
Forensic psychiatry has also been obliged to look
more seriously at the
question of to what extent considered reflection, free
self-determination
and insight can be cancelled out by spontaneous
outbursts of emotion.
Conventional representations of the psychology of
consciousness
tend to ignore the field of the affects. Yet it will
be clearly seen from
what we said earlier that there
can be no understanding of consciousness
without taking into consideration the emotions as a
source of psychic
dynamics. In the light of complex psychology, apathy, for
example,
would amount to a total lack of vitality and hence a state of
maximum
entropy, a sort of death warmed up. This is why it has
been necessary
in this chapter to repeat some of the things
we have said earlier, for it
is only here that emotion really comes
into its own in the understanding
of the dynamics of consciousness.
 CHAPTER VI

THE ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS

OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Earlier on, in the discussion on attentiveness (pp. 18-19) and later,

in the analysis of fantasy (pp. 35-36) we came face to face with
the
fact that the libido has the possibility of being directed towards two
diametrical poles. The predominance of one or the other in different
people can represent a habitual one-sided attitude. C.G. Jung realized
this very early on, and it seemed to him to be the characteristic feature
of the two corresponding types. This is why, in one of his first major
works, Psychological Types published in 1921, Jung embarked on
,

systematic research into this phenomenon, which culminated in the

identification of the two attitude types of “extraversion” and “introver-
sion.” These terms had been proposed by Jung at the Psychoanalytical
2
Congress in Munich in 1913, and then were first published in 1915 in
French and English, but oddly enough not in German. 63 Jung also gave
extracts from his work on this subject in an appendix to the second
German edition of Der Inhalt der P sy chose M
In the meantime these terms have fallen into popular usage, although
the number of readers of this fundamental book is probably compara-
tively small. The terms are also an accepted feature of scientific discus-
sion, a subject to which we shall return later. Here they are examined
on the basis of psychological-statistical testing methods, with the results
of one test being “validated” by those of a different one. One hopes
that in this way they would attempt to come closer to Jung’s original
definitions, to organize the methods more specifically. This is extremely

69
70 CONSCIOUSNESS

normally anyone who draws up such a test has an uncon-

difficult, for
scious preference or contempt for one or the other attitude types, and
he automatically falls into one of the categories. It is not clear whether
statistical methods will make it possible to eliminate this bias. One
might be that anyone drawing up such a test
theoretical prerequisite
would have to have gone through sufficient Jungian analysis for this
prejudice to be compensated. Investigations that have taken place on
the basis of the one genuine Jungian method of testing still leave room
65
for doubt as to whether they have managed to achieve this neutrality .

However, there can be no disputing the reality of Jung’s attitude typol-

ogy as a basic principle of distinction between polar manifestations of
human consciousness. Most of the everyday and age-old human prob-
lems that crop up in all situations can be traced back to this question. But
whenever there is a growth of consciousness there can be a solution to the
problem, and this alone should suffice to make us realize the significance
of this issue. In Psychological Types Jung gave a large number of com-
,

parative historical amplifications on the subject, so there is little reason-

in belaboring the point here by repeating them. There is just one aspect
that we shall dwell on later on because it has given rise to arguments over
the centuries and is therefore particularly instructive.
To begin should like to try to explain the basic situation by
with, I

means of a diagram that Jung himself made use of in his lectures:

collective conscious

The ego is situated in the center of the field of consciousness. It sheds its

“spotlight” either particularly on the objects of the surroundings, the external

objects, or particularly on the objects of the inner world, the inner objects. In
the case the object or the system of reference of the ego is the world, the
first

collective conscious; in the second case the object or system of reference of

the ego is the subject itself, i.e. his inner world and its background, the
collective unconscious.
 THE ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 71

With a little practice we can soon see in our dealings with people
whether the spotlight is usually turned more on the external or the inner
objects. The two attitude types could be characterized briefly as follows:

The Extravert: For him the main thing and brilliant

is the bright
world, with its wide variety of contents. The dark inner world with
its reactive, passive character seems to vanish away, is dimmed and

repressed. Everything happens during the day and for the day. His most
important aim is his activities and thereby drawing attention to himself,
having an effect on others and seeking effect in others. Everything
that is good and worthwhile is external, in the immediate and distant
66
surroundings. Meister Eckehart says :

The man who does not have God within him but has to seek him outside,
by means of certain works, people or places, does not actually have him.
Then something can easily happen that disturbs him. He is not just
disturbed by bad company but by good company, too, not just by the
street but also by the church, not just by bad words and deeds but by
good ones. For the obstacle lies within him: God has not yet come into
the world in him. If that were the case, he would feel well and secure
in all places and with all people: he would always have God.

Thus the extravert “has God outside.” This extraverted attitude is

conveyed vividly in Schiller’s “Ode to Joy”:

men shall be brothers,
All
Where your gentle wing does hover.
Approach, ye millions, and embrace!
To the whole world my kiss shall swell!
This attitude also appears chorus of Beethoven’s Ninth Sym-
in the final
phony, although ft must be said that Beethoven comes over as genuine,
whereas Schiller does not, for he behaves like a false extravert here, as
can be seen in the tastelessness of his verse.
The He is not terribly interested in the dazzling glare of the
Introvert:
world of sunshine. What does impress him is the impression itself. What
concerns him is the actual suffering of the impression, especially that
which this too bright world creates in the dark depths of his inmost being.
The main thing for him is what this dark inner being reactively sends
out to consciousness. We can hear him saying something on these lines:
“True, the sun is shining, asdoes every day, but I feel wonderful.”
it

Often it is a subjectivism that seems to be almost an illness. Freud uses the

term “narcist” (instead of narcissist!), but it transpires that the definition
cannot be made compatible with that of the introvert, for Freud’s view is
that the subjectivism of the narcissist startsfrom the ego. With Jung,
however, the introverted subjectivism is given with the presence of what
72 CONSCIOUSNESS

he calls the “subjective factor,” so that the ego would actually be its
victim. This subjective factor can be described as follows: between the
perception of the object and the introvert’ s own action there is a subjective
view that is interposed over the perception. The introvert selects the sub-
jective determinants as the decisive factors and is therefore oriented by
“that factor in perception and cognition which responds to the sense stim-

uli inaccordance with the individual’s subjective disposition." For the

introvert, “the world exists not just in itself but also as it appears to me.”
Jung also says: “If we were to ignore the subjective factor, it would be a
complete denial of the great doubt as to the possibility of absolute cogni-
67
tion .” Positivism seems to make precisely this mistake:

By overvaluing our capacity for objective cognition we repress the

importance of the subjective factor, which simply means a denial of the
subject. But what is the subject? The subject is man himself we are —
the subject. Only a sick mind could forget that cognition must have a
subject, and no knowledge whatever and therefore no world
that there is
at all unless “I know” has been said, though with this statement one has

already expressed the subjective limitation of all knowledge.

This applies to all psychic functions: they have a subject which is just
as indispensable as the object. It is characteristic of our present extra-
verted sense of values that the word “subjective” usually sounds like a
reproof; at all events the epithet “merely subjective” is brandished like
a weapon over the head of anyone who is not boundlessly convinced of
the absolute superiority of the object. We must therefore be quite clear
as to what “subjective” means in this inquiry. By the subjective factor
I understand that psychological action or reaction which merges with the
effect produced by the object and so gives rise to a new psychic datum.
In so far as the subjective factor has, from the earliest times and among
all peoples, remained in large measure constant, elementary perceptions

and cognitions being almost universally the same, it is a reality that is

just as firmly established as the external object. If this were not so, any
sort of permanent and essentially unchanging reality would be simply
inconceivable, and any understanding of the past would be impossible.
In this sense, therefore, the subjective factor is as ineluctable a datum
as the extent of the sea and the radius of the earth. By the same token,
the subjective factor has all the value of a co-determinant of the world
we live in, a factor that can on no account be left out of our calculations.
It is another universal law, and whoever bases himself on it has a
foundation as secure, as permanent, and as valid as the man who relies
on the object. But just as the object and the objective data do not remain
permanently the same, being perishable and subject to chance, so too,
the subjective factor is subject to variation and individual hazards. For
68
this reason its value is also merely relative .
THE ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 73

After these generalizations, I should now like to attempt to describe

the two more closely by drawing up a list of
attitudes types their
characteristics, showing how they complement each other.
Ext rave rt Introvert
active passive
unhesitating hesitating
obliging critical
friendly unfriendly
warm cold
optimistic pessimistic
confident clumsy
sympathy stubbornness
joining in enduring
candid
enthusiastic reserved
apparent impulsiveness rejection of
flightiness external influence
wanting to make
an impression anxious, cautious
exerting influence
organizing headstrong, defiant
dynamic distrustful
exercizing power listless
activity apathy
empathy
expectations from the
outside world haughtiness
readiness to help
courage to the point of
recklessness unfriendliness
extravagance greed
mimicry with movement mimicry without movement
collectivism individualism
sense of community no sense of community
forward restrained
tcctless tactful
indiscreet discreet
unaware of form aware of form
vague precise
aimless sense of purpose
talkative taciturn
ruthless considerate
superficial thorough
vulgar distinguished
dependent independent
74 CONSCIOUSNESS

On the basis of Jung’s “General Description of Types” in Chapter X

of Psychological Types it would be relatively
,
easy to draw up longer
and more detailed catalogues of introverted versus extraverted behav-
69
iors. As early as 1924 M. Freyd, inspired by the English translation
70
of Psychological Types ,
made an attempt to do this. All the later
proposals about setting up typological tests on introversion and extraver-
sion are derived from this.
Greater efforts have been made recently by Jungians to validate the
Gray- Wheel wright Test and to improve its selectivity, but this work is
still going on. All these efforts will only really pay off when they can

be applied to the clarification of the dynamics of the psyche. What is

meant by this is the conclusions that this will lead to as regards human
understanding and the so-called technique of analysis. I should like to
refer to my 1970 article on this subject (see the Bibliographical Appen-
dix, entry 67), although I must point out that there are still no statistical
data as yet, and these could only be supplied by comprehensive analysis
of psychological tests.

The value of such lists comes from the

for psychological testing
setting up of characteristics as pairs of opposites. We can then draw up
a questionnaire which calls for either/or answers. One would have to
decide which of the two characteristics one felt to be applicable to
oneself. Anyone reading the above list will have automatically looked
at it this way, anyway, and made a spontaneous diagnosis for or against

extraversion or introversion.
The possibility for diagnosis concerning typological affiliation is

based on the following fact, which and parcel of this affiliation:

is part
for example, if I am introverted, regardless of whether I am aware of
it or not, then 1 shall quite naively regard as unpleasant, disagreeable
and inferior those characteristics of the extravert which are placed
opposite the characteristics I regard as appropriate for myself as an
introvert. Just by doing this I have shown that I am an introvert, for
one automatically assumes that one’s own attitude is the right one. This
somewhat naive reflex prevails even when there is a high degree of
consciousness, and is evidence of the tenacity of the conscious attitude,
which, of course, from an objective vantage point, always means one-
sidedness. This leads to all sorts of misunderstandings and misinterpre-
tations, both individually and collectively, the classical example of the
former being marriage.
There developed an immediate popular interest in Jung’s two attitude
types (introverted and extraverted). In particular, the psychology ori-
ented to diagnosis of personality has made the concept its own, and it
has crept into everyday language as well.
 THE ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 75

In the passage from Psychological Types quoted earlier, it is clear

from the way Jung describes introversion that he is trying to “defend
the honor" of the introvert, and thereby, of course, giving himself
away. This is confirmed by later biographical details. However, all his
life he tried to develop his extraversion and to live it
out when appro-
priate. As we shall see later, in Volume IV, one of the requirements of
individuation is one should learn to understand the opposite attitude
that
and those who share it. But this is no easy task for, as we stated
earlier, this attitude dominates, even when there is a high degree of
consciousness. This can be seen clearly in the cases of Freud and Adler:
Jung showed with unmistakable clarity that Freud’s basic concepts stem
from an extraverted attitude, those of Adler from an introverted one 72 .

The level of consciousness of the two pioneers was undeniably high,

and yet each felt that the other’s point of view was incompatible with
his own, q.e.d. Any objective observer can see how regrettable this is.
What is even more regrettable Freud nor Adler made
is that neither
use of Jung’s proposal. The two attitudes seem to be irreconcilable
opposites, for the acknowledgment of the opposing type by either one
would mean that at least half of one’s own universe would collapse.
Jung’s psychology is always complex, for he never forgets that in
our mental account book there are no separate columns for rational
factors on the one hand and irrational ones on the other. This is also
proved by the fact that there is no such thing as a “pure type.” Every
person has characteristics of his opposite type, albeit to a slight degree.
These characteristics remain essentially unconscious, and so when they
emerge they are felt as nothing more than a complication or an embar-
rassing disturbance. As the conscious attitude, being the habitual orien-
tation of the libido,' is taken for granted and functions quite “automati-
cally,” it does not force one to reflect. Either/or questions, however,
such as appear in psychological tests, also automatically constellate the
opposite type by means of puzzle questions. One starts to reflect and
discovers that actually one “might be different.” This can affect the
decision and hence the experiment.
With a certain amount of psychological knowledge and the acquisi-
tion of experience, it not difficult to diagnose the attitude type of a
is

person at sight. I have been struck by the fact that even with a small
child, if not an infant, it is possible to make a diagnosis. This would
seem to indicate that there are genetic factors involved, but this question
has not been tackled at all. And yet this supposition is given some
support by Kretschmer’s observations on the link between body struc-
7
ture and character. Kretschmer reached his conclusions at the same
'

time Jung was working out his typology, so that it can be said that their
76 CONSCIOUSNESS

views support each other although they were arrived at independently.

Jung, however, did not wish to stress this connection too much, because
he felt that introversion or extraversion were to be understood as a
purely psychic phenomenon. It is the dominant orientation that steers
the libido: with extraversion it is towards external objects, with introver-
sion it towards inner objects, more precisely to the "subjective
is

factor.” If this were genetically determined it would be a permanent

factor, but clinical experience shows that this is not the case. For many
people, in the course of their lives and as their consciousness grows,
there is a decline in the valence of the original attitude and the opposite
attitude gains in importance. In most cases this is a gradual process.
People learn from their experience with others that the opposite type
also has a right to exist, that it is also right. In making the first attempts
at walking in this direction, one becomes more tolerant and more
understanding. However, it is possible for the change to be more

dramatic, in the form of a breakthrough, although this may lead to

clinical side effects. More will be said about this in Volume IV.
The irrational presence of one’s own introverted or extraverted point
of view, which, as experience shows, is never seriously considered by
the bearer, was described by Jung as follows: “for the introvert the
numinal accent is carried a priori by the inner object, for the extravert
by the external object.” What this is intended to convey is that the
predominance of inner or external objects with the two attitudes is
determined by a given fascination, something we are familiar with from
74
the numinous objects of Rudolf Otto This will be dealt with at greater
.

length in Volume IV.

 CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM

THE OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION
AND EXTRAVERSION IN
THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION
Every psychiatrist is confronted with the inexhaustible and often
confusing variety of basic human attitudes, and this oftencompels him
to become aware of and adopt decisive attitudes
to of his own. The
“compass” of typology can be of invaluable assistance for the following
reasons:
1Only when what is initially a confusing abundance of relatively
.

elementary phenomena can be arranged in order is it possible to have

an overview and to make them more easy to understand. The typology
of attitude has advantage of simplicity. Attitude is elementary and
thisr

does not need to be reduced to something simpler. The element is

clearly enough defined: it a priori the dominant orientation of the
is

libido. The attitude is a fact that seems to be given at birth, or at least

it behaves as though that is the case. Practical psychology need not
pursue the question any further here, although it might be of interest to
geneticists. Yet if this question is to be cleared up, it would be necessary
to have a reliable test to record the attitude type. We have already
stressed that the attitude type is not completely free from the influence
of the surroundings, but that probably applies to all psychical factors.
Is it not mainly through these that man is in a state of reciprocal action

with his surroundings?

2. In the psychiatrist’s consulting room an attempt is made towards
genuine human understanding. This naturally involves opposing atti-
tudes between doctor and patient. If the psychiatrist has the same

77
78 CONSCIOUSNESS

attitude as the patient, easy to reach an understanding. But this

it is

does not teach the patient to get along better with people who are
completely opposite in nature. This ability can only be acquired with
a partner of the opposite type. Thus the analyst must, it necessary, be
able to turn himself “upsidedown.” This, of course, presupposes that
the analyst himself has acquired an understanding of how to do this.
Jung’s attitude typology automatically means that any future analyst
must go through a “training analysis,’’ and in fact Jung was the first to
introduce this idea, mainly because of his findings in the field of
typology. Freud accepted this at once and without reservation.
This “teaching analysis” can be viewed as a model for the neces-
3.
sary development of the personality and for its adaptation to reality. As
we have said on several occasions, pathology is a borderline case in
this respect. Adaptation presupposes understanding other people and
other things. In this sense, attitude typology has proved to be a very
useful prescription, if not actually a panacea. This statement should not
be taken as easygoing optimism. We are very well aware that there is
enormous resistance to “turning oneself upside down.” For as we said
in the introduction, acceptance of the opposite is a problem that is both
painful and full of moral implications. This can be seen in the fact
from the psychiatrist’s consulting room onto the
that the extrapolation
“healthy” human situation is of often regarded as unacceptable by the
equally “healthy” human instinct.
We realize that, with the three points referred to, we have outlined
a whole program for the acquisition of consciousness. We can only go
into this more thoroughly when we have also dealt with the functions
of consciousness Chapter VIII. But let it be said at this point that
in
anyone concerned with realizing his wholeness as a human being will
not be spared the task of having to come to terms with his opposite
attitude. That this possibility exists is based on the fact that each and
every one of us participates in all that is human, to a greater or lesser
degree (i.e. consciously or unconsciously). And we can also refer to
Matthew 25,45:

Verily I say unto you: Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least,
ye did it not unto me.

If we now turn to the subject matter of this chapter, then basically

we are pursuing a historical amplification of Jung’s concept of extraver-
sion and introversion, as set out by him in his book on psychological
types. This amplification is related mainly to the medieval universals
dispute which has been a bone of contention for centuries. But this
,

historical perspective should not prevent us from looking at many of

OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN HISTORY 79

the problems Western world today from this point of view.

in the
Ideally, the understanding of this one historical problem of opposites,
from the point of view of attitude typology, would help towards recon-
ciling many conflicting attitudes both in the collective as well as in the
personal here and now.
The controversy over the problem of universals was particularly
heated among the philosophers of the 12th to the 14th centuries. Actu-
ally goes back even further than that, as can be seen from the H.
it

Heine quotation which Jung uses to introduce his book:

Plato and Aristotle! These are not merelytwo systems, they are types of
two distinct human natures, which from time immemorial, under every
sort of disguise, stand more or less inimically opposed. The whole medi-
eval world in particular was riven by this conflict, which persists down to
the present day, and which forms the most essential content of the history
of the Christian Church Although under other names it is always of Plato
.
,

and Aristotle that we speak. Visionary, mystical, Platonic natures disclose

Christian ideas and the corresponding symbols from the fathomless depths
of their souls. Practical, orderly, Aristotelian natures build out of these
ideas and symbols a fixed system, a dogma and a cult. Finally the Church
embraces both natures, one of them entrenched in the clergy and the other
in monasticism, but both keeping up a constant feud.

The paragraph that comes next is not quoted by Jung, but I shall take
the liberty of bringing it in here because I find it relevant:

In the ProtestantChurch the same feud is to be found, and that is the

rift between pietists and orthodoxists, who correspond to a certain extent

to the Catholic mystics and dogmatists. The Protestant pietists are mys-
tics without fantasy, and the Protestant orthodoxists are dogmatists with-
out spirit.

Jung’s great achievement is to have brought all this into a perspective

that iscomprehensible from a human, psychological point of view.
This has been recognized for several years in academic psychology
(although the author is often forgotten!), but its significance lies much
more in its practical application. As we stated earlier, however, this
calls for exceptional ability. Heine had
and the best thing
this ability,

would be to copy his treatise in its entirety here. Germany has always
abounded in philosophical and religious disputes, and will probably
continue to do so. May they continue to produce geniuses of the stature
of Heine.
The more than general concepts such as
universals are nothing
beauty, goodness, man, animal. The problem was whether they were
jusi words or whether they had an existence of their own. Anyone who
80 CONSCIOUSNESS

attributed to them a reality of their own was considered a Realist ,

anyone who regarded them just as words was a Nominalist. One of the
Realists of the Middle Ages was Johannes Scotus Eriugena (810-877),
and a typical Nominalist was William of Occam (1270-1347). The
dispute revolved around the relationship of the general terms to things.
If, as is the case with the Realists, the former are attributed a general

existence that lies behind individual things, i.e. what actually consti-
tutes the essential reality of things, then we can recognize in this attitude

the orientation to Jung’s “subjective factor”. This would make the

Realists introverted. however, like
If, the Nominalists, we do not
ascribe to the universals any distinctive reality of their own, then we

recognize ourselves as extraverted.

The discussion among scholars was based upon arguments about the
meaning of genera (types) and species (individual things). Jung expresses
himself very clearly on this subject, saying that the genera are an expres-
sion for the existing conformities of things; he goes on to say:

For anyone who psychologically so constituted as to perceive chiefly

is

the similarity of things, the collective concept is, as it were, given from
the start; it forcibly obtrudes itself (like a real existence = Realism). But
for anyone who is psychologically so constituted as to perceive chiefly
the individuality of things, it is their difference which forces itself upon
him and not their similarity (as in Realism) and such a person is a
76
Nominalist .

I feel that, with this concise summary of attitude typology, Jung

expresses extremely clearly the enormous range of on clarify- its effect
ing problems of the history of thought. This emerges even more clearly
when we follow Heine’s lead and trace back the history of the universals
dispute to the days of the early Scholastics. can then be seen that the
It

seeds of the dispute were already sown with Plato and Aristotle: the
“old way” (Rationalism) of Plato and the academics corresponds to
Realism, the introverted attitude, for which the Platonic ideas exist in
themselves. For Plato the general is viewed simultaneously, in a spiri-
tual way, with the perception, and is hence as real as all things spiritual.
The “modem way” (Empiricism) of Aristotle, the Megarians and the
Cynics corresponds rather to Nominalism. Here the general is only
derived from the individual. The weight of reality is assigned almost
exclusively to transient things that are outside, whereas eternal ideas
that are inside are not given their due. Thus the “modem way” is
definitely more inclined towards extraversion.
The judgments that have been formed here are perhaps of a somewhat
general nature, and a thorough philological and philosophical examina-
 OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN HISTORY 81

tion might reveal that the Aristotelian standpoint is an attempt at media-

tion The important thing, however, is that with his comparative approach
.

to the history of thought Jung was able to prove that the problem of oppo-
sites in attitude typology has been an ongoing process for centuries.
Examples of this are the fierceness with which the Arian and the Com-
munion disputes were conducted. This was a christological dispute that
in retrospect can be seen as significant in the history of dogma, although
at the time there was hardly any dogmatic theology. Arius (4th century)

and Athanasius (3rd century), both from Alexandria, had different points
of view; Arius believed in the similarity of Christ’s substance with God,
as opposed to outright identity which had been the accepted view since
,

Athanasius. Arius was denounced by the Council of Nicaea in 325 a.d.

Today the sole testimony to his belief is the Arian baptistry in Ravenna,
where Jung had a vision which until late in life he misunderstood as
real. The Arian point of view of homoiousia (similarity of substance)
corresponds to an extraverted attitude, whereas that of homoousia (iden-
tity of substance) corresponds to an introverted one.

Peter Abelard (1079-1 142) also concerned himself with the problem
of the universals. With his conceptualism he makes an attempt at
conciliation in the sense of moderate realism. He regards the universal
as a mere term. For him universals are words, intellectual conventions
expressed by language but based on real things. Thus the genus is
merely the thought content or object. A thing is never a general but
always an individual fact. It can be seen that this attempt at conciliation
—
remains precisely that an attempt. The distinction between ousia and
hypostasis is supposed to be of assistance here, but one is not really
convinced by that.
An epitaph in an Oxford manuscript will serve as a fine illustration
of the universals dispute:

Hie genus et species in sola voce locavit,

Et genus et species sermones esse notavit
Sic animal nullumque animal genus esse probatur.
Sic et homo et nullus homo species vocitatur.

He taught that genera and species were matters of words alone,

And made it clear that genera and species were sermones.*
Thus he proved that both “living thing” and “no living thing”
are each a genus,
And “man” and “no man” both rightly called species.
* Ed. note: In context, the term “sermones” could refer either to arguments or to

particular styles or modes of discourse. The latter interpretation seems the more
accurate. Both this passage and its translation are drawn from Psychological Types, p.
50 .
82 CONSCIOUSNESS

as early as the 5th or 4th century b.c., Antisthenes had said:

And
“There is no such thing as horseness, just horses.” Thus one can say:
when for me the genera are objective facts, then I am a realist; it they
are just subjective, I am a nominalist. The genera as
realist takes the

given in re or even ante rem whereas with the nominalist they are post
,

rem.
As evidence of how old the problem is of typological attitude, shall I

now list some of the most important representatives of the two attitudes.
Realists Nominalists
Anselm of Canterbury Antisthenes
Bernard of Chartres Stoics
Remigius of Aurerre Occam
Vincent of Beauvais Leibniz
Scotus Eriugena Berkeley
Kant, with his proposition of Hume
the a priori recognition of
logical thinking
Condillac
Thomas Aquinas
(as a moderate realist)

Many European readers will have recalled by now that in our intellec-
tual history we have a classical extra-introverted pair: Goethe and
Schiller. Jung examined very carefully the relationship of the two
philosophers and poets in the light of attitude typology. Their correspon-
dence shows with utmost clarity the loving care with which Schiller
sought to make clear to his dear friend Goethe his own introverted point
of view. As this correspondence is easily accessible, it will not be
introduced here. Schiller was fully aware of the problem of opposites
and concerned himself intensively with the inherent moral problem. It
can be claimed that his two works, On the Aesthetic Education of Man*
7>
and On Naive and Sentimental Poetry actually deal with the problem
,

of attitude typology.
If we are now evidence for our viewpoint by quoting from
to offer
the first of these works, then we should begin by making the following
qualification: Schiller’s remarks apply first and foremost to the conflict
of opposites, more specifically to the fact that one attitude feels the other
to be undesirable and inferior and therefore opposed and suppressed. As
long as this struggle goes on externally, obvious
its effects are all too
in the outside world, both locally and on a national level. But Jung

discovered that although one attitude predominates on average in the

individual, what makes attitude typology possible in the first
which is

place, the other attitude is by no means nonexistent. The possibility is

 )

OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN HISTORY 83

always there that one “can be different.” However, as in this case we

usually say that the other attitude is in the unconscious, then it would
be wrong, from the point of view of methodology, to discuss it in a
book on consciousness. The place to do this will be in Volume IV,
where the ensuing dynamics of the psyche will be dealt with. But some
facts will have to be dealt with here, especially those dealing with the
dynamic relation that exists between the opposing attitudes.
It is to be hoped that the reader will see for himself the relevance of
the following Schiller citations. We
keep to the excerpts Jung
shall
himself used in his Psychological Types though adding short commen-
,

taries of our own.

Schiller takes as his starting point the opposition between the individ-
ual and society, and says:

I do not fail to appreciate the advantages to which the present genera-

tion, considered as a unity and weighed in the scales of reason, may lay
claim in the face of the best of antiquity, but it has to enter the contest
in close order and whole compete with whole. What individual
let

modem will emerge to contend in single combat with the individual

Athenian for the prize of humanity? Whence comes this disadvantageous
relation of individuals in spite of all the advantages of the race?
— (6th letter on the Aesth. Ed. of M.)

Later on in the same letter Schiller attempts to formulate the conse-

quences of this opposition:

If the community makes the function the measure of the man, if it

respects in one of its citizens only memory, in another a tabulating

intellect, in a third only mechanical skill; if, indifferent to character, it

here lays stress upon knowledge alone, and there pardons the profoundest
darkness of the intellect so long as it co-exists with a spirit of order and
a law-abiding demeanour — if at the same time it requires these special
aptitudes to be exercised with an intensity proportionate to the loss of
extensity which it permits in the individuals concerned —can we then
wonder remaining aptitudes of the mind become neglected in
that the
order to bestow every attention upon the only one which brings honour
and profit?
— (Ibid.

Here we have the opposites of intensity and extensity. The demand

for intensity is placed upon the individual by society, for the competitive
spirit means that the individual is forced into increased specialization
in his narrow field. Thus intensity is limitation and one-sidedness. But
this dire necessity is confronted with the other demand, the one for
extensity, the need to stretch the personality towards a sort of totality
 CONSCIOUSNESS
84

and rounding off. For Schiller, intensity corresponds to the extraverted

last sentence sug-
attitude, extensity to the introverted one. Schiller’s
as
gests both a “pragmatic” justification ot the conflict of opposites,
well as the amorality of a lack of consciousness about it.
just been said,
In the following section, as an extension to what has
to be a sort of teleological justification of the
conflict of
there seems
opposites as well as a view of it as a cultural necessity.

There was no other way of developing the manifold capacities ot man

than by placing them in opposition to each other. This
antagonism ot
powers is the great instrument of culture, but it is only the instrument;
for as Ions as it persists, we are only on the way towards
culture.
—(Ibid.)

Later on in the same letter comes the following paragraph:

Only by concentrating the whole energy of our spirit in one single

focus, and drawing together our whole being into one single power, do
we attach wings, so to say, to this individual power and lead it by artifice
far beyond the bounds to which nature seems to have imposed
upon it.
— (Ibid.)

This means that the “choice” of attitude, unless it is a compulsion,

leads to one-sidedness. But when it is possible to “muster all one’s
strength,” then it takes wing and starts to encroach on the borderlines,
transgresses beyond nature, i.e., what is simply given, so that a sort ot
transfer point is reached. We have mentioned this possibility above,
but it will be dealt with at greater length in Volume IV. For Schiller
there compulsion to compensate for the mutilation of our nature
is a
being brought about by enforced one-sidedness. This can be seen clearly
towards the end of the following passage:

Thus, however much may be gained for the world as a whole by

this fragmentary cultivation ot human powers, it is undeniable that the
individuals whom it affects suffer under the curse ot this universal aim.
Athletic bodies are certainly developed by means of gymnastic exercises,
but only through the free and equable play ot the limbs is beauty tormed.
In the same way the exertion of individual talents certainly produces
extraordinary men, but only their even tempering makes full and happy
men. And in what relation should we stand to past and future ages it the
cultivation of human nature human sacrifice necessary ? We
made such a
should have been the bondslaves of humanity, we should have drudged
for it on end, and branded upon our mutilated nature the
for centuries
shameful traces of this servitude —
in order that a later generation might

devote itself in blissful indolence to the care of its moral health, and
develop the free growth of its humanity! But can man really be destined
 OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN HISTORY 85

to neglecthimself for any end whatever? Should Nature be able, by her

designs, to rob us of a completeness which Reason prescribes to
us by
hers? It must be false that the cultivation of individual powers necessitates
the sacrifice of their totality; or however much the law of Nature did
have that tendency, we must be at liberty to restore by means of a higher
Art this wholeness in our nature which Art has destroyed.
— {Ibid.)

Thus, if it is going to be possible to develop hitherto underdeveloped

powers, to strive for the opposite of the attitude that has previously
been adopted, then this wholeness will call for “a higher Art.” One is
almost inclined to say that here Schiller has anticipated the rejection of
all accepted values that we find with Nietzsche and hence
modem
psychology in general. Schiller was fully aware of the conflict involved
in these demands and this can be seen in his frequent use of the word
“must,” especially in the following excerpt:

Nature in her physical creation indicates to us the way we should

pursue in moral creation. Not until the struggle of elementary powers in
the lower organisations has been assuaged does she rise to the noble
formation of the physical man. In the same way, the strife of elements
in the ethical man, the conflict of blind instincts, must first be allayed,

and the crude antagonism within him must have ceased, before we may
dare to promote his diversity. On the other hand, the independence of
his character must be assured, and subjection to alien despotic forms have
given place to a decent freedom, before we can submit the multiplicity in
him to the unity of the idea.
— (7th letter)

The word “must” appears three times, thus emphasizing both the diffi-
culty of this matter and its necessity. The conflict between blind instinct
and the morality of consciousness is illuminated from the point of
view of descension theory. This “crude contradiction” is actually an
irrefutable reality!
The conflict is depicted even more clearly in the next passage:

freedom which always declares its hostility to their first

Terrified of the
attempts, men will in one place throw themselves into the arms of a
comfortable servitude, and in another, driven to despair by a pedantic
tutelage, they will break out into the wild libertinism of the natural state.
Usurpation will plead the weakness of human nature, insurrection its
dignity, until at length the great sovereign of all human affairs, blind
force, steps in to decide the sham conflict of principles like a common
prize-fight.
— {Ibid.)
 \

CONSCIOUSNESS
86

Schiller probably had Rousseau’s Back to Nature in mind here, but

he is fully avoid the issue and ot the dangers

aware of the temptation to

of “the natural state.” Nor should one forget that

even “freedom” has
its drawbacks. Thomas H. Huxley
(1825-1895) aptly remarks that “a
the end
man’s worst difficulties begin when he can do as he likes.” At
that the work was
of the Schiller quotation, one should bear in mind
written in 1795 and that the French Revolution had
been raging since
relation to the rumble
1789; moreover, the words are also prophetic in
of Napoleon’s cannons.

sway of prejudice, this intellectual

Whence arises this still universal
darkness, beside all the light that philosophy and experience
have shed?
The age is enlightened, that is to say knowledge has been discovered
at least suffice to set right our
and publicly disseminated, which would
practical principles. The spirit of tree enquiry has scattered the delusions
which approach to truth, and is undermining the
for so long barred the
foundations upon which fanaticism and traud have raised their thrones.
Reason has been purged of the illusions of the senses and of deceitful
sophistry, and philosophy itself, which first caused us to forsake
Nature,

is calling us loudly and urgently back to her bosom — why is it that we

remain barbarians?
still
— (8th letter)

So Reason alone is not enough. We are still barbarians. Reason ruled,

but it was the beast that triumphed. And Rousseau' s recipe also failed.
If Schiller had written today, he would have been able
to have recourse

to the message of the Nazis and other political programs as

object

lessons.
We mentioned earlier that Schiller also dealt with the opposition of
the two attitude types in his On Naive and Sentimental Poetry We shall
not dwell further on this here, but simply sum up by saying that
sentimental writing corresponds to the introverted attitude, which Schil-
ler attributes to the idealists, and that naive writing corresponds to
the

extraverted attitude, which he attributes to the realists. One should note

here that conversely, in the universals dispute, those Nominalists who
were introverted were described as realists.
We have taken as our starting point Jung’s assumption that Goethe
was extraverted and Schiller introverted. The above quotations trom
Schiller will have been ample confirmation that the latter observation
is true. For confirmation ot Goethe’s opposite attitude,
we need only
recall the quotation from Maximen und Reflexionen (p. 36).
A few verses from Faust offer further clarification:
 OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN HISTORY 87

I take the way of turmoil’s bitterest gain.

Of love-sick hate, of quickening bought with pain.
My heart, from learning’s tyranny set free.
Shall no more shun distress, but take its toll
Of all the hazards of humanity.
And nourish mortal sadness in my soul.
I'll sound the heights and depths that man can know.
Their very souls shall be with mine entwined.
I'll load my bosom with their weal and
woe,
And share with them the shipwreck of mankind.
—Faust I

There can hardly be a more vivid way of formulating the extension

of the ego of an extraverted person into the outside world. But the
dangers of this exaltation can be seen clearly in the last line. And of
course also possible to read something totally different in Goethe,
it is

for his genius comprises far more than the “half truth” of pure extraver-
sion. What we have said has been one-sided, for didactic reasons, and
we beg excused for this. But there is no doubt that with Goethe
to be
the emphasis was on extraversion, even at a ripe old age, and this can
be seen in his short 1823 essay on “ Bedeutende Forderniss durch ein
einziges geistreiches Wort.”

hereby admit that the great and such important-sounding task of

I

knowing oneself has always struck me as suspicious, a trick of secretly

allied priests who confused people by placing unattainable demands on
them and sought to turn them away from externally oriented activity into
a false introspectiveness. Man only knows himself in so far as he knows
80
the world, which he only sees in himself and himself in it.

To conclude this section on the typological opposition of the two

poets, let us listen once more to what Schiller has to say:

Let some
beneficient deity snatch the infant betimes from his mother’s
breast, nourish him with the milk of a better age and suffer him to grow
up to full maturity under that far-off Grecian heaven. Then when he has
become a man, let him return, a stranger, to his own century; not to
gladden it by his appearance, but rather, terrible like Agamemnon’s son,
to cleanse it. He will indeed take his material from the present age, but
hisform he will borrow from a nobler time
81
— nay, from beyond all time,
from the absolute unchangeable unity of his being.
— (9th letter)

Few people are likely to feel an enthusiasm for the role of Orestes,
but the parable chosen by Schiller reminds us vividly of the tragedy of
 CONSCIOUSNESS
88

realizes the “absolute unchangeability

of his being. In
the hero who
terms this is developed into the fight between
good and evil,
Christian
God and the Devil, but here there a need for a divine, mediator. With
is

Schiller it is an ideal human being who becomes the mediator, on the

basis of a unity of his being that given before any consciousness. It
is

is obvious that what is going on here, to keep to human terms of

for individuation. This will be dealt
with at
reference, is the demand
greater length in Volume IV.
pleasing and onginal
At this point I should like to offer a particularly
in the Baroque
example of the representation of a typological opposition
(1547-1637) was an
period: Robert Fludd alias Robertus de Fluctibus
sciences he acted
eminent doctor and alchemist. In the history of natural 82
as a counterpole in a discussion with
Kepler. He was also violently

by Mersenne and Gassendi because of his conviction

that
disliked
denied Nature the
Nature was a Mysterium a preconceived idea that
,

Particularly interest-
possibility of being viewed in quantitative terms.
Philosophia Moysaica
ing for us among his many publications is his
,

of the second
and especially the copper engraving on the title page
The representation ends with what we might call
83
part (cf. Fig. 14).
typological dualism on the lower earth level, where
Creation splits up

into the Apollonian world of light and the

Dionysian world of night.
But the same dualism is also to be found on the upper
cosmic level,
and in its basic orientation, at the highest level, goes
back to the
voluntas and noluntas divina (cf. W. Pauli in footnote 82).
So with
substanti-
Fludd dualism is inherent in God the Father, and this can be
ated by quoting Isaiah 45:6—7 and Ecclesiastes 42:25.
However, in the
latter case there is no evidence of a version that
corresponds exactly in
the Vulgate text. To counteract this rather crass
dualism he places in
declaration of
the center, in a conciliatory but tentative manner, the
faith: ex duobus unum and DELJS tamen unus.
Fludd’ s diagram reminds us of a later interpretation of the
Dionysian-
Apollonian pair of opposites, one which is to be found in Nietzsche.
In his famous early work Die Geburt der Tragodie
aus dem Geiste der
he says what can be summed up briefly as follows: tragedy
81
Musik ,

came Greeks as a “metaphysical miracle” through

into being with the
pairing the Apollonian with the Dionysian element. There
are clear

religious aspects to this reconciliation of opposites.

Other pairs of
opposites are brought into this creative coincidentia oppositorum such ,

as the dream (Apollonian, and ecstasy (Dionysian). One is

cf. Vol. II)

reminded here of the beautiful painting by Lorenzo Lotto (ca. 1550,

85
“Apollo Sleeping”) as Apollo sleeps, the Muses give themselves
:

over to frivolous play, i.e. the Dionysian principle. The all-embracing

 OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN HISTORY 89

principle of diastole (Dionysian) and systole

(Apollonian), as Goethe
called it, also fit into Nietzsche’s concept. Nobody
can really dispute
Nietzsche’s view that overcoming the problem of opposites
is a mentally
creative act, no matter how often scholarly criticism
has come to other
conclusions in looking at his early works.
Psychological Types Jung has given many other examples of
In his
,

the intro- and extraverted attitude. Students will probably

be interested
in those that deal with the effects of the attitude
with teachers. We shall
content ourselves here with some particularly illuminating
examples
and quotations from Chapter VIII of Jung’s book.
Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932), an expert in physics and chemistry,
was famous for his discovery of the catalysis. He was also a sort of
natural philosopher and a leading exponent of contemporary monism
(cf. his Monistische Sonntagspredigten 1911-1916). But he also
preached the energetic imperative (1912, cf. p. 34). Jung made use
of Ostwald ’s biographies of eminent natural scientists ( Grosse Manner
,

Leipzig 1910) to show how the descriptions of these various researchers

lend themselves to a study of typology. Ostwald himself was aware
of
the difference, as we can see from the way he up his “great men’’
splits
into the two categories of “Classicists” and “Romantics.” It goes without
saying that to a large extent the Classicists correspond to Jung’s intro-
verted attitude type and the Romantics to the extraverted attitude type.
In Ostwald ’s words:

Whereas the former characterized by the all-round perfection of each

is

of his works, and at the same time by a rather retiring disposition and a
personality that has but influence on his immediate surroundings,
little

the romantic stands out by reason of just the opposite qualities. His
peculiarity lies not so much in the perfection
of each individual work as
in the variety and striking originality of numerous works following
one
another in rapid succession, and in the direct and powerful influence he
has upon his contemporaries.

Relating typology to the teaching activity of a professor, Ostwald says

that a Romantic can identify with his students and is able to come up
with the right word at the right time. The on the other hand,
Classicist,
is absorbed in his own thoughts and problems and hence completely

ignores the difficulties his students have in understanding him. Taking

Helmholtz as an example of the classic type, Ostwald says of him:

wide experience, and richly creative

In spite of his prodigious learning,
mind, he was never a good teacher. He never reacted on the instant, but
only after a long time. Confronted by a student’s question in the labora-
tory, he would promise to think it over, and only after several days
 CONSCIOUSNESS
90

Gcraina fecit Deus omnia, quorum alterum eft contrariumalteri, nec

quicquam fadlum eft quod mancum ett. Ecclefiafticicap.4*» vc tf.i5-
>

F^o Dominus & non eft alter formansLucem, creans tenebras, faciens bonufiD &
crcans malum Ego Dominus fadcns hxc omnia.
:
Ifai. ^A

Fig. 14
Frontispiece to Part of Philosophia Moysaica
II

by Robert Fludd, Gent 1638.

 OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION
IN HISTORY 91

would he bring the answer. This turned out to be so

remote from the
predicament of the student that only in the rarest
cases could the latter
see any connection between the difficulty he
had experienced and the
nicely rounded theory of a general problem
subsequently expounded to
him. Not only was the immediate help lacking
on which every beginner
largely relies, but also any guidance adapted
to the student’s own person-
ality, that would have helped him to
outgrow the natural dependence of
the beginner and win to complete mastery
of his subject. All these
deficiencies are directly due to the teacher’s inability
to react instantane-
ously to the student’s needs, so that, when the desired
reaction does
come, its effect is entirely lost 86 .

Ostwald is even clearer in the way he depicts the difficulties of the

classic type in relating to his student. As a case in point he takes the
mathematician Gauss, who used to discourage students from enrolling
lor his courses, claiming that they would not take
place anyway because
of poor attendance. Ostwald goes on to say that teaching was
repugnant
to Gauss because it involved having to

having to pronounce scientific results in his lectures without first

...

having checked and polished every word of the text. To be obliged

to
communicate his findings to others without such verification must have
felt to him as though he were exhibiting himself before
strangers in his
87
nightshirt .

In the role of teacher or “man of

the world,” the introverted person
will always have to struggle with his inferior extraversion. But this
struggle may produce a valuable outcome. Let us recall the words of
88
Heraclitus: “the struggle is the father of all things .”
I should now like to go back to Schiller, this time
to his On Naive
And Sentimental Poetry.
This brings me remarkable psychological antagonism among
to a very
men in an age of progressive culture, an antagonism which, because it
is radical and grounded in the innate emotional constitution, is the cause
of a sharper division among men than the random conflict of interests
could ever bring about; which robs the poet and artist of all hope of
making a universal appeal and giving pleasure to everyone although —
this is his task; which makes it impossible for the philosopher, in spite
of every effort, to be universally convincing —
although this is implied
in the very idea of philosophy; and which, finally, will never permit a

man in practical life to see his mode of behaviour universally applauded:

in short,an antagonism which is to blame for the fact that no work of
the mind and no deed of the heart can have a decisive success with one
class of men
without incurring the condemnation of the other. This
antagonism is, without doubt, as old as the beginning of culture, and to
 CONSCIOUSNESS
92

individual cases, such as

theend it can hardly be otherwise, save in rare
always exist. But although
have always existed and, it is to be hoped, will
every attempt
it very nature of its operations that it frustrates
lies in the

at a settlement, because no
party can be brought to admit either a
other’s, yet there is always
deficiency on his own side or a reality on the
important antagonism to its final
profit enough in following up such an
point at issue to a simpler
source, thus at least reducing the actual
• 89
formulation.

be
The and the “simpler formulation” would actually
“last point”
Jung’s two attitude types. We said at the
beginning that the attitude is
be further reducible,
a given circumstance, in other words cannot really
“simpler formulation.” What
so that an uncertain future would await a
rare individual
would always remain, however, is the achievement of
of the pairs of opposites
cases” who fight their way through the struggle
reasons, however, this
and produce the creative synthesis. For didactic
can only be dealt with in Volume IV, since it
would mean
problem
consciousness, and in
bringing in the unconscious as the opposite of
this volume we are dealing exclusively
with the latter.
With his typology book, Jung, in keeping with his own
introversion,

is attempting a sort of apologia

for this attitude. This was necessary

for centuries the West has been cultivating a

one-sided overesti-
because
being just one
mation of extraversion, with mysticism and romanticism
of the exceptions that prove the rule. The East, by
way ot contrast, has
though there
been almost exclusively introverted for thousands ot years,
over
seem to be indications of a swing of the pendulum, with the taking
in their wake
of Western extraversion, science and technology, bringing
all the dangers and uncertainties that
arise when ancient traditions start
to give a
to crumble. From the many that are available, I should like
example of the typically introverted attitude ot the
particularly ancient
Indians. It comes from one of the oldest ot the Upanishads :

1. Yajnavalkya called on Janaka, Emperor ot Videha. He said to

himself: “I will not say anything.’’ But once upon a time
Janaka, Emperor

of Videha, and Yajnavalkya had had a talk about the Agnihotra

sacrifice,

and Yajnavalkya had offered him a boon. Janaka had chosen

the right

to ask him any questions he wished, and

Yajnavalkya had granted him
the boon. So it was the Emperor who first questioned
him.
2. “Yajnavalkya, what serves as a light for a man?”
“The of the sun, O Emperor,’’ said Yajnavalkya, “for with the
light

sun as light he sits, goes out, works, and returns.

“Just so, Yajnavalkya.”
3. “When the sun has set, Yajnavalkya,
what serves as light for a
man?”
 OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN HISTORY 93

The moon serves

as his light, for with the moon as light he sits, goes
out, works, and returns.”
“Just so, Yajnavalkya.”
4. “When the sun has set and the moon has set, Yajnavalkya, what
serves as light for a man?”
“Fire serves as his light, for with fire as light he sits, goes out, works,
and returns.”
“Just so, Yajnavalkya.”
5. “When the sun has set, Yajnavalkya, and the moon has set and the
fire has gone out, what serves as a light for a man?”
Speech serves as his light, for with speech as his light he sits, goes
out, works, and returns. Therefore, Your Majesty, when one
cannot see
even one’s own hand, yet when a sound is uttered, one can go there.”
“Just so, Yajnavalkya.”
6. “When the sun has set, Yajnavalkya,
and the moon has set and the
fire has gone out and speech has stopped, what serves as light for a
man?”
“The self, indeed, is his light, for with the self as light he sits, goes
out, works, and returns.”

In conclusion, let us recall that in the history of medicine, ever

since
the Greeks and right up to modem times, discussions about health
and
sickness have constantly revolved round eucrasy (good mixture) or the
harmony of the elements, juices and forces. The basic operation deals
exclusively with pairs of opposites (such as hot-cold, wet-dry), and in
the classical case (with the four elements, for example), a tetrad always
occurs, which is particularly interesting for us in view of the following
91
chapter.
 CHAPTER VIII

THE ORIENTATION FUNCTIONS,

OR THE BASIC FUNCTIONS
OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In retrospect can be said today that the germ for Jung’s attitude
it

typology first appeared in his association experiments (cf. Volume I).

In these experiments two opposite forms of reaction were seen: the
objective type and the predicate type. The expression “type" was se-
lected because apparently there were two habitually ways of
different
reacting. In the psychopathological sphere, the objective types seemed
to predominate Dementia praecox (schizophrenia) and the predicate
in
types in so-called hysteria. Today we would categorize them as the
introverted and the extraverted type.
Another question then arose in this context: when it came to dealing
with problems, the schizophrenics seemed to have more difficulty with
the thinking approach and the hysterics with the feeling approach.
Jung’s original inclination was to make the following categories:

objective type predicate type

Dementia praecox hysteria
introverted extraverted
thinking problems feeling problems

However, turned out to be rather more complicated than that.

it

Endless discussions, especially with his friend Dr. med. Hans Schmid
and with Toni Wolff, led to the situation being clarified in the form
in which it finally appeared in Psychological Types (1921). These

discussions were usually oral, and part of the relevant correspondence

95
 .

CONSCIOUSNESS
96

unfortunately lost, or, in the case of Dr. Schmid,

only recently
is

published. More can be read on this subject in Hans

Konrad Iselin s
Entstehung von
book, published as recently as 1982 and entitled Zwr
C.G. Jung’s “Psychologischen Typen”
It is actually possible to identify a
tremendous number of individual
conscious functions. Test psychology attempts to isolate
them as tar as
possible, and even to measure them, but usually
they can only be
the easier
recorded in groups. However, the more complex the group,
it is about a “personality diagnosis” or about a “personality
to talk
“intelligence.” Individ-
profile” or, when appropriate, about recording
ual functions are difficult to grasp, and what are
they anyway? What

was important to Jung was to perceive the elementary determinants

in

In this way he
the bewildering variety of consciousness phenomena.
possible.
hoped to arrive at some order and orientation as directly as
The Association Experiment was to be understood as an attempt to
just
research the simplest processes possible (these very associations
“reaction
referred to). And in actual fact, as mentioned above, the
types” provided early indications, but they still needed to be
thought

through.
So Jung went on to ask himself which elementary consciousness
processes (= functions) are necessary if an internal or external object
or factual situation be fully grasped. Which psychic elements are
is to

necessary if we are to have adequate orientation in our internal and

external space? The arguments involved in answering this question
will

be as simple as possible.
Jung’s answer consists of a tetrad ,
which can be formulated as

follows:
We can see that
1) there is something perceived before us, that something is there,

and we can determine what it is like i.e. cold, hard, sharp. In nine-
,

teenth-century psychology this was called perception which tallies ,

with the fonction du reel in French psychology. Jung gives this function
the name SENSATION.
We can also see
2) WHAT it is. Thus what is perceived is categorized according to
a priori ideas. In psychology this was once called apperception. Jung

calls this function THINKING.

Furthermore I also see
3) HOW me. For example, is it pleasant or unpleasant ? Thus
it is for
experience how it affects me, what it means to me. This is then an
I

evaluating function, which Jung calls FEELING.

And also have an impression of
I
 THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 97

4) where it comes from and/or where it is going. This is not a

question of sensory perception, but rather a sort of notion. Jung talks
here of “indirect perception,” which actually comes about through the
unconscious. Well-known examples of this are: first-sight diagnoses
with good doctors, the famous “first impression,” which is so often
confirmed, hunches and suchlike. Telepathic and “psychometric” phe-
nomena can be attributed to this function, which Jung called INTU-
ITION.
Whereas the first three definitions are clear and simple, that of
intuition often comes up against lack of understanding or rejection. To
begin with, rational understanding resists the fact that such things as
telepathy are regarded as serious factors. But Jung was never prejudiced
about such phenomena (cf. his doctoral dissertation, Collected Works ,

Vol. I). Secondly, people find it disconcerting that the unconscious is

introduced into the definition of a conscious function. For Jung, how-
ever, it was a typical characteristic to bring in the unconscious whenever
and wherever he could. And anyway, as we said on several occasions
in Chapter III, experience has shown that it can never be totally elimi-
nated. For intuition, defined here as a conscious function, all the
unconscious does is to supply the material. In other words, this material
comes from an unconscious perceiving process, which is what leads to
the similarity between intuition and sensation as perceiving functions.
This material that cannot itself be perceived by consciousness. Let
is

us take the simple example of when we are walking along the street
and we suddenly find ourselves thinking of someone: the first person
we bump into round the next comer is the very person we were thinking
of. The conscious cannot see round comers but the unconscious can.
That at least is the conclusion we must come to unless we dismiss such
events by “explaining” them away as coincidences. We already stated
in Volume I that the unconscious “can do more” than the conscious. If
long overdue letters cross in the post, or if we find ourselves thinking
about someone who then rings us up long distance, these are processes
that belong to the sphere of parapsychology, where they are described
as telepathy, or, in popular language, “mind-reading.” We cannot go
into that subject at length here, but it is closely related to intuitive
insight.
As we said earlier, we find it necessary to dwell at such length on
the subject of intuition because this is usually the function that people
have difficulty in understanding.
An attempt will now be made with a concrete, albeit constructed
example, to illustrate what place the individual functions have in the
conscious orientation. Jung always enjoyed explaining this as follows:
 :

CONSCIOUSNESS
98

If we take a given object

1) Sensation (S) gives me the following information, for example: it

red, shining, sparkling, aromatic and has a definite

form;
is

2) Thinking (T) tells me that the object is a glass of red wine;

(F) describes all this as something that is extremely
pleas-
3) Feeling
ant, or, of I am a teetotaller, something that is
nasty and “poisonous.”
(I) tells me that it is a Pommard 1937
and might be a
4) Intuition
Christmas present from a certain friend of my host’s.

Further to the of the four, one should add that Jung always
last

emphasized that intuition only has an accuracy of about 50%. It should

complicates
be recalled at this point that this fact is something that
the evaluation of parapsychological experiments, which
once again
indicates the link between the two spheres. Another point to be
remem-
of
bered is that the last element in the example above is reminiscent
what is sometimes known as “psychometry” in parapsychology.
In his day-to-day contact with friends, colleagues and patients, Jung
discovered that there are people in whom
one of these four functions
predominates, and others in whom it is one of the others. Particularly
instructive are of course the extreme cases, which, as always, are to be
found psychopathological sphere. After collecting a great deal
in the
of material, especially clinical observations, Jung was able to discover
certain regular principles according to which these functions behave.
In conclusion we shall try to sum up these principles in seven fundamen-
tal laws.

First Fundamental Law:

Four formal functions are essential if a phenomenon is to be fully

apprehended. These are sensation (S), thinking (T), feeling (F), and
92
intuition (I). Let us give an example: a phenomenon has a definite
form. This is what S tells me. It also has a coming and going, given
by I, that is, it has a form that changes with the passage of time. This
has a certain effect upon me, which comes from F. It also has an effect
upon me because of its meaning or significance, which comes from T.

Second Fundamental Law

Of one pair is rational and discriminating (T and

the four functions
F), and one pair is irrational and perceiving (S and I).
T and F are rational functions, as their judgments are based on reason
 THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
99

and can be influenced by reflection. As these judgments only

apprehend
pure facts, one imagines they are based on reason, which is
not the case
with the irrational functions S and 1. In discriminating,
one considers
first and foremost sensible things such
as the meaning (T) and value
(F) of the object, and not so much the individual being
( Gestalt ) of the
object or the way it changes with the passage of time.
In perceiving, what one established first and
foremost are the form
(S) and the alteration (I) of the object, and secondly its meaning and
value: in other words, one concentrates on absolute happenings,
which
in Nature are not usually predictable. This is why
feeling and intuitive
types would belong to the “aesthetic type’’ in Nietzsche.
This second fundamental law can be summed up in the following
diagram:

thinking
Two rational functions
^ \ judging
feeling

sensation
Two irrational functions perceiving
^ intuition

Third Fundamental Law:

The two functions within each of the two pairs (second fundamental
law) oppose each other and thus obey a principle of exclusion, as can
be seen in the following diagram:

T * F
S > I

The thinking function must not take the feeling value into account
when considering a set of circumstances. As we stated earlier, the
psychiatrist must come to terms in a thinking way with the all too human
problems of his patients, without being affected by their pleasantness or
unpleasantness (F). Feeling shuns Thinking: Le coeur a des raisons que
la raison ne connait point. This proverb, by the way, shows that the F
( coeur ) is a rational function, for raison and ratio (lat.) are identical.

“My country, right or wrong” is a further example of the fact that in

patriotism (F) there is no room for reflection. We had better not go into
the question here of whether love (F) always dulls the brain, making T
impossible. One can more readily assume this of hatred.
 . :

CONSCIOUSNESS
100

Sensation has to establish “what is actually

happening,” and must
therefore exclude the before and after and the
whole paraphernalia (l).
that all sensory data
Scientific investigation and observation demand
possible (S), and so
relating to the object be established as precisely as
anything that does not belong must be painstakingly and artificially
(I)

eliminated; this is one reason why we can only consider specimens in

science
Intuition,on the other hand, has to overlook concrete details so as
to be able to get at and perceive the
before and after, the whole
paraphernalia, the atmosphere of the things. That is
why an intuitive
I still have the
can be heard saying: “Alright, everything’s O.K., but
etc.”; here, of course, the word “feeling” really stands
feeling that . . .

for Intuition. It must be mentioned point that unlike French,

at this

Italian and English, the German terminology for feeling is sadly lacking
in clarity and precision. Gefiihl in German
can stand tor Intuition (as
it is warm
above), or for Sensation (“l have the Gefiihl (feeling) that
here”), and thirdly for Feeling in our sense of the
term. The maudlin

sentimentality for which the Germans are well-known is

almost cer-
(cf. Chapter 3, I).
tainly connected with this lack of differentiation

Fourth Fundamental Law

The four functions of consciousness show different degrees of differ-

entiation within the same individual.

This principle arises partly out of the third fundamental law, in so
far as, in accordance with the exclusion principle
formulated there, the
predominance of one of the paired functions excludes the predominance
of the opposite function. Thus, tor example, when the T is differentiated
in a person, then his F must be undifferentiated,
according to the third
fundamental law. The differentiated function is called the superior
function. This means that the opposite function, as defined in the third
fundamental law, automatically becomes the inferior function. Thus,
for a feeling dominated person, the T, by a process of elimination, must
be the inferior function, just like the S with the intuitive. In the context
of this terminology the word “inferiority also means unconsciousness.
The formulationof our fourth fundamental law naturally calls tor a
definition of the term “differentiation.” In theory, the differentiated
function should simply have the highest degree of consciousness, but
in fact it is not all that easy to establish whether that is
the case. In

practice it is easier to prove that, for example, a thinking type quite

automatically deals with his objects initially, without any reflection.
 THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
101

and according to thinking criteria as a matter of course.

But it may
not always be easy to establish this diagnostically.
In this case what
is recommended, as
often the case in medicine, is to attempt a
is
diagnosis by process of elimination, i.e. in accordance with
the third
fundamental law. For by definition the inferior function is often
much
more striking to us, at least in our partner, than the differentiated
one.
In a pronounced thinking type we are much
more quickly aware of
his difficult feeling life, for example, than of his impeccable logic.
So what differentiation means is the consciously making available
of the function that under normal circumstances has pre-eminence.
The inferior function, on the other hand, functions quite autono-
mously, that is, unconsciously and arbitrarily, and is thus perceived
by the bearer at most as a disturbance (cf. 6th fundamental law).
But normally it has a low energy level.
Now that we have a superior function and hence an inferior one (its
opposite, in accordance with the third fundamental law), there remain
the other two functions. It emerges that these two functions do in fact
to a certain extent come into play in the conscious
psychology of the
subject. True, they do not predominate, but they remain more or less
at the disposal of consciousness, in a consultative capacity, so to
speak, unless they are affected by the exclusion principle of the third
fundamental law. That is why we call them auxiliary functions. Of
these two functions, once again one of them is better (or less badly)
differentiated, whereas the third is even more poorly developed, which
is why it is called an inferior function. This is where we can
see clearly
that differentiation isconnected with consciousness, for the inferior,
totally undifferentiated function is found, as we said above, on
a
completely unconscious level. Thus we speak of a primary and a
secondary auxiliary function, the difference between them being a
declining degree of differentiation. The poorer differentiation of the
secondary auxiliary function also arises from its position opposite the
primary auxiliary function, as a result of which it is subject to the
exclusion principle. But this tension of opposites with the auxiliary
functions is alleviated to a certain extent in that they are both relatively
unconscious; hence this tension is not such a force to be reckoned with
as is the general tension between conscious and unconscious.

Fifth Fundamental Law:

Theattitude of the differentiated function coincides with the attitude
type , and the attitude of the inferior function coincides with the opposite
102
CONSCIOUSNESS

type. What this means is that, for example, in an extraverted thinking

type the T mustnecessarily be extraverted. Yet at the same time this
diagnosis has revealed that, by way of contrast, his inferior F must be
introverted.
This fundamental law contains, among other things, what Jung again
and again referred to as the compensatory relationship between the
conscious and the unconscious. It is also striking that there is a strong
connection between attitude and differentiated function, which is not
to be dismissed lightly and should be looked at more closely.
Unfortu-

nately we do not have all the statistical data, but the fact
itself is

irrefutable.

Sixth Fundamental Law:

Both the inferior function and the opposite attitude are found largely
in the unconscious or are contaminated by the unconscious.
This emerges from Jung’s basic hypothesis of the compensatory
relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, a concept that
cannot be overestimated in the typological problem either, for, as can
easily be seen, it is also a factor in the fundamental laws three to
five. The inferior function and the opposite attitude which — are, in

accordance with the fifth are, by

fundamental law, linked together —
virtue of their unconsciousness, autonomous as regards consciousness.
Once again, in accordance with the principle of the compensation of
the conscious by the unconscious, we shall come across them most
frequently in our dreams, where they are usually personified. Of course
they also crop up in every spontaneous manifestation of the uncon-
scious, as described in Volume I, and they are usually of a disturbing
nature. And finally we come to the:

Seventh Fundamental Law:

In the course of life there is usually a natural shift of emphasis among

the functions, which ends up with a total reversal of the typological
perspective.
Sooner or later, usually at what is called the mid-life stage, the wheel
of functions begins to turn. What used to have most emphasis gradually
becomes less important and what had hitherto been despised slowly
comes into its own. This is a real sacrifice and the transition can be
very painful, especially if it is postponed because of obstinate clinging
 .

THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 103

to oldways. As has been stressed already, this can lead to a breakdown

of the personality. It may not always be as traumatic as what happened
to Paul on the road to Damascus, but it is always dangerous
when the
main function and attitude is rigid and inflexible.
A description of the dynamics of this process of the shifting of
emphasis will be left till Volume IV. Here we shall conclude by looking
at two questions:
The attitude type (introverted or extraverted) can be recognized very
early on in the history of an individual. It may be genetically deter-
mined. Introversion, whose right to exist Jung defended very strongly,
was claimed by him to have as its psychological origin the predominance
of the “subjective factor.” Later we shall use the term “numinal accent”
to express the fact that for the extravert the external object is interesting,
whereas for the introvert it is the internal object.
The function type can only be clearly recognized later on in life. It
does not seem to be so much a given factor as the attitude. Jung does
not put forward any psychological causes, such as the “numinal accent,”
for the predominance of any one or other of the functions. The “function
selection” seems to be particularly determined by the milieu, positively
or negatively, especially by the family structure, and later on by the
demands of one’s “chosen” profession or sphere of interest.
On pages 96-97 we gave the reasons why four functions and only
four are necessary for a phenomenon to be fully apprehended. It turns
out that these four functions are made up of two pairs of opposites. The
problem of opposites, as discussed in Chapter VI, makes its presence
feltonce again in the functions, this time in constituting their quatemity
Jung tried to set forth this quatemity early on, as Fig. 15 shows, with
the contents of the circle coinciding with the wholeness of the object
to be apprehended.

Fig. 15
104 CONSCIOUSNESS

A very similar figure had been created quite spontaneously by one

of Jung’s early test subjects, and can be found on p. 53 of his doctoral
93
dissertation. It is also strikingly reminiscent of the diagrams of Frau
94
Hauffe with Justinus Kemer.
In 1923, Jung called this diagram the compass for his “critical
9
psychology,” which he would not like to be without. The image
fascinated him all his life, and was indeed to prove indispensable in
his nocturnal joumeyings and in his work with patients. The sea of
psychological manifestations really does indicate that some means of
orientation is called for. Jung later compared it to the system of axes
in telescopes. These various analogies bring out the image’s symbolic
character very clearly, which also means that some part of the phenome-
non, namely that associated with the inferior function, necessarily
remains unconscious. Empirically, our observation always remains
only partially conscious, i.e., not really complete.
We are reminded here of Schopenhauer’s experiment when, in his
dissertation in 1813, he tried to analyze the “thinking processing of
96
experience” in the light of “a priori connections.” The “Principle of
Sufficient Reason,” the principium rationis sufficients, is for him the
logical thinking law, according to which every thought must go back
to an axiom, a thought content that has already been acknowledged. Its
basis must be logical and objective, i.e., it must not be subjective and
psychic. This, he proposed, is the most general formal principle of
thinking and is understood as a priori, but must not be applied indiscrim-
inately. In examining the basic laws of our mental processing of the
material of our experience, which enables us to classify together our
experience of a priori connections (we would say a total apprehending
thereof), Schopenhauer identified four types of connections between
individual things (“always and everywhere, everything is, merely by
virtue of something else,” a phrase which, in our opinion, reflects the
principle of opposites):

1 . the principium fiendi this

: is the occurrence of events in sequence,
the —
growing apart in time, in short visual, empirical concepts,
causality from outside.
2. the principium cognoscendi this is perceiving, with the dominant
:

element being abstract concepts, ideas and truth. If judgment is

to be cognition, it must have “a sufficient reason.”
3. the principium essendi this is being, the situation in space and
:

consequently in time, i.e. the when and where. All the compo-
nents in space and time have a specific relation to each other,
with a role being played by formal concepts considered a priori,
such as arithmetic and geometry.
THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 105

4. the principium agendi this deals with acting, the motivation, the
:

—
why in other words, causality from within.
It would be tempting here to try make
categories according to Jung’s
four functions, but that might be stretching things a bit too far. It is
sufficiently interesting in itself that
Schopenhauer and Jung, acting on
apparently quite rational grounds, both hit on the irrational tetrad.
Schopenhauer is thus brought in merely as amplification.
In conclusion, we shall take the liberty of mentioning a further
amplification, to show that Jung’s quaternary typological schema can
be found again and again on very different levels, albeit in different
forms: cosmogonic myths can be seen in the light of complex psychol-
ogy as the symbolic representations of the process of becoming con-
scious. As an example we shall present a myth of the North American
Hopi Indians (Arizona).

The Hopi Creation Myth

When the world was young, the people, animals and all things were
not on the earth’s surface but beneath Total darkness reigned, both
it.

above and below. There were four worlds: this world on the earth’s
surface and three cave worlds, one below the other. None of the cave
worlds was large enough to contain all living creatures and men, for they
multiplied so rapidly that the first cave world was full to overflowing. The
people were poor and did not know where they could go to in the
darkness, and when they moved around they bumped into each other.
The cave was full of the dirt and dung of those who dwelt there. Nobody
could even turn round to spit without spitting on someone, or blow his
nose without catching someone. The cave echoed with the cries of misery
of the people.
So the leaders said: “This is not good’’ and “How can it be improved?”
— —
and “Let us try.” Two boys brothers said: “Yes, let us try and see,
and everything will be good; because of our wills, it will be good.” This
is how “The Two” spoke to the leaders and chief priests of the cave

dwellers. “The Two” broke through the ceilings of the upper caves down
to the gloomy dwelling place of the people and animals. Here they
planted all the plants that would grow, in the hope that one of them
would grow up to the hole through which they had come and that it
would be strong enough to bear the weight of the people and animals.
They hoped that the people and animals would be able to climb up into
the second cave world. Finally, after several attempts, it came about that
the bamboo cane grew so high that the tip went through the top, and was
so strong that the people could climb up. It was full of knots, so it could
106 CONSCIOUSNESS

be used as a ladder, and ever since then the bamboo cane has grown
with knots, as can be seen today in Colorado.
The people and animals climbed up this bamboo cane into the second
cave world. When some of them were up there, they were afraid that
this cave might also be too small (for it, too, was dark and they would
not see anything). So they shook the ladder, so that those who were
climbing up fell back. Then they pulled the ladder up, to stop any of the
others from climbing up. It is said that those who were left behind also
got out one day. They are our brothers in the West.
After a long period of time had elapsed, the second cave world was
just as crowded as the first one had been. Arguments and complaints
could be heard just like before. Once again the bamboo cane was placed
under the roof and once again the people and animals were saved. But
once again the slow ones were pushed back down the ladder. The third
cave world was bigger but it was just as dark as the others. Then “The
Two” found fire, so that torches could be lit, and by their light the people
could build their huts and wander from place to place.
But bad times came to this world, too. The women went crazy. All
they did was dance and they neglected everything. They even forgot
their children. The women intermingled so that the men could not
distinguish their own wife from the other women. It was never day, just
night.The women danced the whole night long in the Kiwas and only
stopped to sleep. The fathers had to act as mother to the neglected little

ones. When the babies cried from hunger, the fathers took them to the

Kiwas where the women were dancing. The mothers heard the crying
and came to feed their babies. Then they forgot them again, left them
to the fathers and went back to their dancing.
Because of these troubles, the men once again sought light and deliver-
ance. They went up into the fourth world, which is our world. But when
they got up there, they found that it was just as dark as the others, for
the Earth was closed in by the sky, just like the cave worlds with their
ceilings. The people went around and did their work just by the light of
their torches and fires. They came across the tracks of just one creature,
the sole ruler of the unpopulated world, the tracks of the “corpse demon”
or “death.” They fled to the East, but the world was wet, and in the
darkness they were completely at a loss, for they seemed to be surrounded
by water, and the paths led out into the water.
Along with the people, who had come up from the cave worlds with
other creatures, were five animals: the spider, the vulture, the swallow,
the coyote and the locust.The people and the creatures discussed together
about how they could make light. Many, many attempts were made, but
all in vain. It was decided that the spider would be the first one to try.

It spun a cloak of pure white cotton, which gave off some light but not

enough. That is why it is our grandmother. Then the people took the
white hide of a stag, without any holes in it, and tanned it. They made
 THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 107

it and painted it turquoise. And lo and behold: when it was

into a shield
finished, it gave off such a bright light that the whole world was
lit up.
In its light the cotton light faded away. So they sent the shield
light to
the East, where it became the sun, and the cloak light to the West, where
it became moon.
the
Now down below cave world the coyote had stolen a vessel
in the
that was very heavy, so heavy that the coyote could not carry it.
So he
decided to leave it behind, but was curious to know what was inside. As
it was now light, he opened it, whereupon
several shining fragments and
sparks shot out, burning his face. Ever since then, the coyote has had a
black face. The sparks turned into stars.
By these lights
could be seen that the world was really very small
it

and was surrounded by water on all sides, which is what made it wet.
The people turned to the vulture for help and so, spreading out its wings,
it fanned the waters, so that they flowed to the East
and to the West till
the mountains started to emerge.“The Two” carved out channels right
through the mountains and the water flowed through them, digging its
path deeper and deeper, thus creating the canyons and valleys of the
world. The waters flowed on endlessly till the world grew
and drier
drier. Now that it was light and the land was emerging, the people
followed the tracks of Death, which led to the East. That is why Death
is our great Father and Mother, for we followed its tracks from the exit

out of the cave world onwards; and it was the only creature that awaited
us in the great world of water, which is now this world. Although all
the waters had flowed away, the whole earth still remained wet and soft;
this is why up to the present day we can still see the tracks of the people
and of the many curious creatures leading from the this place to the West
and to the place we came from. For in the meantime the Earth has turned
into stone, and the tracks have been maintained as if they had been made
97
yesterday .

So here, too, four steps are necessary in order to reach the conscious
world and to finally emerge from the unconscious.
The form of the functions schema comes from the necessity
circular
of looking at an object from all sides if one wishes to apprehend its
wholeness, if one wishes to become completely conscious of it. One
half, conditioned by the original unconsciousness of the inferior func-
tion and the opposite attitude, remains dark at first. From this there
arises the necessity of circulating transmuting and circumambulating
,

the meaning center. The concept of the rota or the opus circulare in
alchemy also reveals this necessity. We still have some living examples
of this circumambulation, for example the riding round the juridical
98
precincts in Beromiinster on Ascension Day It can be seen clearly
.

here that this ritual ensures the wholeness that has been achieved, puts
108 CONSCIOUSNESS

a spell on it, constantly threatened by the unconscious, which

for it is

is never exhausted. But the dynamics of these processes within the

circle of the functions and attitudes will only be dealt with in detail in
Volume IV.
And a question end with: why is it that radially symmetrical
to
structures and centralized buildings always make such a spontaneously
satisfying impression on us?
 APPENDIX

A list of books and articles on the topic of Jungian typology, arranged

chronologically.

1. C. G. Jung and F. Riklin, Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien, 1. Beitrag.

Journ. Psychol. Neurol. III., Leipzig 1904, pp. 55-83, 193-215, 283-
308 and IV. pp. 24-67.
2. C. G. Jung, Contribution a l’etude des Types Psychologiques. Archs.
Psychol., XIII. 52, Geneve 1915, pp. 289-299.

3. B. M. A
Study of Psychological Types. Psychoanal Revw
Hinkle, 9
1922, pp. 107-197.

4. E. S. Conklin, The Definition of Introversion, Extraversion, and Allied

Concepts, Journ. Abnorm. Psychol., 17, 1923, pp. 367-382.

5. M. Freyd, Introverts and Extraverts, Psychol. Revw., 31, 1924

pp 74-
87.

6. E. S. Conklin, The Determination of Normal Extravert-Introvert Interest

Differences, Journ. Genet. Psychol., 34, 1927, pp. 28-37.

7. C. G. Jung, Psychological Types. Contribution to Analytical Psychology,

London 1928, pp. 295-312. ( Collected Works VI)
8. K. Campbell, The Application of Extraversion-Introversion Tests
J. to
the Insane, Journ. Abnorm. Psychol., 23, 1929, pp. 479-481.

109
 . . —

110
9.
CONSCIOUSNESS

W. McDougall, A Chemical Theory of Temperament Applied to Introver-

sion and Extroversion, Journ. Abnorm. Psychol., 24, 1929, pp. 393-409.
10. A. R. Root, A Short Test of Introversion-Extraversion. Pers. J., 10,
1931, pp. 250-253.
11. C. G. Jung, Psychologische Typologie. Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart.
Zurich 1931, pp. 115-143.

12. R. J. Ball, Introversion-Extraversion in a Group of Convicts. Journ.

Abnorm. Psychol., 26, 1932, pp. 422-428.

13. J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford, An Analysis of Factors in a Typical

Test of Introversion-Extroversion, Journ. Abnorm. Psychol., 28, 1933/
34, pp. 377-399.

14. J. P. Guilford, Intro-Extraversion. Psychol. Bull., 31, New York 1934,

pp. 331-354.

15. Toni Wolff, Einfiihrung in die Gurndlagen der Komplexen Psychologie.

Die kulturelle Bedeutung der Komplexen Psychologie 1935, pp. 51-122.
16. J. H. v.d. Hoop, Bewufitseinstypen Bern 1937.

17. R. M. Collier and M. Emch, Introversion-Extra version; The Concepts

and their Clinical Use. Amer. Journ. Psychiatr., 94, 1938, pp. 1045-
1075.

18. J. and K. M. Braly, Extra- and Introversion. Psychol. Bull.,

P. Guilford
27, 1939, pp. 96-107.

19. W. Stephenson, Consideration of Jung’s Typology, Journ. Mental. Sc.,

85, No. 355, 1939, pp. 185-205.

20. V. Case, Your Personality, Introvert or Extrovert. New York 1941.

21. S. Cobb, Foundations of Neuropsychiatry, 2nd ed., Baltimore 1941.

22. C. Evans and T. R. McConnell, A New Measure of Introversion

Extraversion. Journ. Psychol., 12, 1941. pp. 11-124.

23. J. S. Huxley, Man Stands Alone. New York 1941.

24. D. E. Super, The Bemreuter Personality Inventory: A Review of Re-

search. Psychol. Bull., 39, 1942, pp. 340-347.

25. H. Gray, Obesity: A

Challenge to the Psychiatrist. Stanford Med. Bull.,
1, No. 7, November 1943, pp. 195-199.
26. J. B. Wheelwright and A. Biihler, Jungian Type Survey (The Gray-
J.

Wheelwright Test), 1944, 15th revision, Soc. Jungian Analysts of North

Calif., San Francisco 1964.

27. H. Gray and J. B. Wheelwright, Jung’s Psychological Types and Mar-

riage. Stanford Med. Bull., 2, No. 1, February 1944, pp. 37-39.

28. H. Gray and J. B. Wheelwright, Jung’s Psychological Types, Including

the Four Functions. Journ. Gen. Psychol., 33, October 1945, pp. 265-
284.
 APPENDIX
111

29. H. Gray, Intuition and Psychotherapists. Stanford Med. Bull.,

3, No. 3,
August 1945, pp. 132-134.
30. H. Gray and J. B. Wheelwright, Jung’s Psychological Types, Their
Frequency of Occurrence. Journ. Psychol., 34, January 1946,
pp. 3-17.
31. R. B. Cattell, Description and Measurement of Personality. New York
1946.

32. H. Gray, Brother Klaus, with a Translation of Jung’s Commentary. Journ.

Nerv. Ment. Dis., 103, No. 4, April 1946, pp. 359-377.

33. H. Gray, Jung’s Psychological Types in Relation to Occupation, Race,

Body-build. Stanford Med. Bull., 4, No. 3-4, August-November 1946
pp. 100-103.

34. H. Gray, Psychological Types and Changes with Age. Journ. Clinical
Psychol., 3. No. 3, July 1947, pp. 273-277.

35. H. Gray, Jung’s Psychological Types: Meaning and Consistency of the

Questionnaire, Journ. Gen. Psychol., 27, October 1947,
pp. 177-186.
36. H. J. Eysenck, Dimensions of Personality. London 1947.
37. H. Gray, Jung’s Psychological Types in Men and Women. Stanford Med.
Bull., 6, No. 1, February 1948, pp. 29-36.

38. FI.Gray, Jung’s Psychological Types: Ambiguous Scores and Their Inter-
pretation, Journ. Gen. Psychol., 40, January 1949, pp. 63-88.

39. FI.Gray, Freud and Jung: Their Contrasting Psychological Types, Psy-
choanalyt. Revw, 36, No. 1, January 1949, pp. 22-44.

40. H. Gray, Jung’s Psychological Types in Married People. Journ. Social

Psychol., 29, May 1949, pp. 189-200.

41. C. A. Meier, Projektion, Ubertragung und Subjekt-Objektrelation in der

Psychologie. Dialectica 8, Neuveville 1954, p. 302.

42. K. W. Bash, Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychopathologie. Stuttgart

1955.

43. H. J. Eysenck, Dynamics of Anxiety and Hysteria. London 1957.

44. R. B. Cattell, Personality and Motivation Structure and Measurement
New York 1957.
45. J. P. Guilford, Personality. New York 1959.

46. Toni Wolff, Studien zu C. G. Jungs Psychologie. Ed. C. A. Meier, Zurich

1959, pp. 77-171.

47. H. J. Eysenck. The Structure of Human Personality. London 1960.

48. P. M.
Carrigan, Extraversion-Introversion as Dimensions of Personality.
Psychol. Bull., 57, 1960, pp. 326-360.

49. I.B. Myers, Manual, The Mvers-Briggs Type Indicator. Princeton, N. J.,
1962.
 .

112 CONSCIOUSNESS

50. M. Fierz Die vier Elemente.

,
Traumund Symbol. Ed. C. A. Meier, Zurich
1963.

51 . H. K. Fierz. Klinik und analytische Psychologie (Studien aus dem C. G.

Jung-Institut, Band XV). Zurich 1963.

52. L. J. Ross, The Item Content and Some Correlates of a

Strieker and J.

Jungian Personality Inventory. Princeton, N. J. 1963.

53. L. J. Strieker and J. Ross, An Assessment of Some Structural Properties

of the Jungian Personality Typology. Journ. Abnorm. Psychol., 68, 1964,

pp. 62-71.

54. L. J. Strieker and J. Ross, Some Correlations of a Jungian Personality

Inventory. Psychol. Reps., 14, 1964, pp. 623-643.

55. M. Dicks-Mireaux, Extraversion-Introverstion in Experimental Psy-

J.

chology. Journ. Analyt. Psychol., 9, 1964, pp. 117-128.

56. K. Bradway, Jung’s Psychological Types. Journ. Analyt. Psychol., 9,

1964, pp. 129-135.

57. F. B. Brawerand J. M. Spiegelmann, Rorschach and Jung. Journ. Analyt.

Psychol., 9, 1964, pp. 137-149.

58. B. Klopfer and J. M. Spiegelmann, Some Dimensions of Psychotherapy.

Spectrum Psychologiae, 1965, pp. 177-183.
59. E. Wolpert and L. Michel, Die Typologie C. G. Jungs als Gegenstand
empirischer Personlichkeitsforschung. Psychol. Forschg., 26, 1966, pp.
112-131.

60. I. von Zepplin, Die Variablen der Holtzmann Inkblot Technique

S. in

ihrer Beziehung zur Introversion und Extraversion. Bern 1966.

61. M. A. Wozny and Dayhaw, Jung’s Personality Dimensions in

L. T.
the Gray-Wheelwright Psychological Type Questionnaire. Diss. Univ.
Ottawa, Can., 1966.

62. I. N. Marshall, Extraversion and Libido in Jung and Cattell. Journ.

Analyt. Psychol., 12, 1967, pp. 115-136.

63. I. N. Marshall, The Four Functions: A Conceptual Analysis. Journ.

Analyt. Psychol., 13, 1968, pp. 1-32.

64. H. G. Richek and O. H. Bown, Phenomenological Correlates of Jung’s

Typology. Journ. Analyt. Psychol., 13, 1968, pp. 57-65.

65. H. Mann, M. Siegler and H. Osmond, The Many Worlds of Time. Journ.
Analyt. Psychol., 13, 1968, pp. 33-56.

66. C. A. Meier, Dynamic Psychology and the Classical World. G. Mora and
J. Brand (Eds.), Psychiatry and History, Problems in the Writing and the
History of Psychiatry Springfield, 111., 1969.

67. C. A. Meier, Individuation und Psychologische Typen. Zs. Analyt. Psy-

chol., I, 1970. pp. 6-19.
APPENDIX
113

68. A. Plaut, “Analytical Psychologists and Psychological

Type.” Journ
Analyt. Psychol., 17, 1972, pp. 137-149.
69. R. Gollner, “Empirische Uberprufung einiger Aussagen
von C. G. Jung
liber Einstellungs- und Funktionstypen.” Analyt.
Psychol., VI/2, 1975.
70. U. Baumann, J. Angst, A Henne, and F. E. Muser, “The
Gray-Wheel-
wright Test.” Diagnostica, XXI, 1975,
pp. 66-83.
71. K. Bradway and Wayne Detloff, “Incidence of
Psychological Types.”
Journ. Analyt. Psychol., 21, 1976, pp. 134-146.
72. C. A. Meier and M. A. Wozny, “An Empirical Study of Jungian Typol-
ogy.” Journ. Analyt. Psychol., 23, 1978,
pp. 226-230.

I should like to add that a new typological test has recently been
developed by June Singer and Mary Loomis. A preliminary publication
is entitled “The Singer-Loomis Inventory of
Personality: A Measure of
Cognitive Styles Based on C. G. Jung’s Theory of Psychological
Types.” There also exists a short publication entitled “About the SLIP:
A Preliminary Manual for the Singer-Loomis Inventory of Personality.”
Both works are dated 1979.
C.A.M.
.
 .

NOTES

1. C.C. Cams, Psyche. Stuttgart 1846.

2. cf. C. A. Meier, “The Jungian point of view in the latest experimental sleep and
dream research,” Zs. Analyt. Psychol. 11/3, Berlin 1971, p. 157.
3. Cf. Aristotle, Vol. II of textbook, p. 50-52.
this
4. K. Lorenz, Das sogennante Bose. Vienna, 1963.
5. Holderlin, Patmos.
6. A. Jaffe. The Myth of Meaning in the Work of C.G. Jung. Einsiedeln 1989.
German Orig., 1967.
7. N. Bohr, Atomtheorie and Naturbeschreibung. Berlin 1931. Chap. Ill p. 62.
8. W. Pauli, “Die philosophische Bedeutung der Idee der Komplementaritat”.
Experientia, VL, Basel 1950, p. 72ff.
9. N. Bohr, “Licht und Leben”. Die Naturwissenschaften 21 , p. 245ff., cf. Vol II

of this textbook, p. 16ff.

10. W. Pauli, Dialectics II La Neuveville 1957, p. 45.
1 1 . Schopenhauer, Parerga 1

12. cf. Plato, Rep. 597 E and Tim. 29 C.

13. E. DuBois-Reymond, Reden p. 131. ,

14. Tertullian, De testimonio animae /, 5-7.

15. E. Furst, “Statistische Untersuchungen uber Wortassoziationen und iiber famili-
are Ubereinstimmung im Reaktionstypus bei Ungebildeten”. Journ. Psychol. Neurol.
IX, 1907, pp. 243-278.
16. J.B. Lang, Uber Assoziationsversuche bei Schizophrenen und den Mitgliedern
ihrer Familie, Zurich Diss. 1913.
For more on Purkinje see footnote 24, Vol. II of this text book, p. 7.
17.
18. J.E. Purkinje, in Handwortenbuch der Physiologie mit Rucksicht auf physiolo-
gische Pathologie ed, Rudolph Wagner, Vol III/2, Braunschweig 1846, p. 416f.
19. W. Rosenkrantz, Wissenschaften des Wissens, J. Mainz 1868, p. Of. 1
 — . ,

116 CONSCIOUSNESS

20. S. Freud, “Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen uber einen autobiographisch besch-

riebenen Fall von Paranoia. (Dementia paranoides),” Jb. Psychoanal. psychopathol.
Forschgg. Ill, Leipzig and Vienna 1911, pp. 9-68.
21. D.P. Schreber, Denkwurdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken. Leipzig 1903.
22. cf. Romans 7.

23. J.E. Purkinje, ibid., p. 419.

24. C.G. Jung, On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomen-
ona. CW 1. German original, Leipzig, 1902.
25. Prince, The Dissociation of a Personality. New York 1905.
M.
26. E. Kant, Werke, Vol. VIII, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Berlin 1923.
27. J.W. Dunne, The Serial Universe, London 1934. Dunne was a great expert on
aerodynamics and as such was very involved in the development of the Handley-Page
wing for aeroplanes. He was therefore undoubtedly a careful and reliable observer.
28. As above, An Experiment with Time. London 1934.
29. C.G. Jung, The Psychology of Transference. CW 16, para. 397.

30. Origenes, Leviticus homily, 5,2.

31 . C. A. Meier, Modeme Physik moderne Psychologie. Die kulturelle Bedeutung
der Komplexen Psychologie. Berlin 1935, pp. 349-362.
32. Michael Majer, Scrutinium chymicum, Emblema XLV, Francofurti 1687.
33. J. Corrie, ABC of Jung’s Psychology. London 1927.
34. C.G. Jung, Uber die Energetik der Seele. Zfirick 1928. Uber psychische Ener-
getikund das Wesen der Traume. Zurich 1948.
35. Goethe, Maximen und Reflexionen IV. Nachgelassene Schriften.
36. C.A. Meier, Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy Einsiedeln, 1989.
Reprint of 1967 edition, pp. 7-9.
37. Hereditary Genius. London 1869. Sir Francis Galton (1822—191 1), a cousin of
Charles Darwin, studied heredity and was a pioneer of eugenics.
38. Origenes, Leviticus homily, 5.2, quoted from C.G. Jung, Psychology of the
Transference (in The Practice of Psychotherapy, New York and London, 1954).
39. C.A. Meier, The Unconscious in its Empirical Manifestations Boston: Sigo ,

Press 1984, p. 28ff.

40. C.G. Jung, Transformations and Symbols of the Libido. Zurich 1912, later

modified slightly as Symbols of Transformation, Zurich 1952.

41. cf. footnote 33.
42.H. Keyserling. Sudamerikanische Meditationen. Stuttgart 1932.
43. cf. J. Stallmach. Dynamics und Energeia. (Monographien zue philosophischen
Forschung Bd. XXI), Meisenheim am Glaan 1959.
44. M. Putscher, Pneuma, Spiritus , Geist. Wiesbaden 1973.
45. E. Clarke and K. Dewhurst, An Illustrated History of Brain Function (Oxford,
1972).
46. H. Jantz and K. Beringer, Das Syndrom des Schwebeerlebnisses unmittelbar
nach KopJverletzungen. Der Nervenarzt XVII, 1944, 202, quoted from C.G. Jung,
p.

Synchronizitat als ein Prinzip akausaler Zusammenhdnge Naturerklarung und Psyche.

.

(Studien aus dem C.G. Jung Institut Zurich IV), 1952, p. 92. ( Synchronicitv : An
Acausal Connecting Principle. The Interpretation of Nature and Psyche, p. 125).
47. C. Green, Out-of-the-body-Experiences London 1968.
48. L. Levy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, trans. I.A. Clarke (London, 1926).
49. Sir John Woodroffe. The Serpent Power. Madras 1918.
50. E. Rousselle, Seelische, Ffihrung im Taoismus. Eranos-Jb. 1933, Zurich 1934,
 , ,

NOTES
1 17

pp. 135-199. Spiritual Guidance in Contemporary Taoism in “Spiritual Disciplines”

{Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks 4, B.S.XXX, 1960).
51. A. Avalon. The Garland of Letters. 3 ed. Madras 1955.
52. cf. Volume II of this textbook, pp. 80-81.
53. Heraclitus fr. 86.
54. Musaeum Hermeticum, De
sulphure. Francofurti 1677, p. 610.
55. G. Dorneus, Philosophia meditativa. 1602.
56. Evangelium nach Thomas ed. A. Guillaumont, Leiden , 1959, p. 55 (Logion
112). Now available in The Nag Hammadi Library, ed. James M.
Robinson (San
Francisco, 1977).
57. A. Adler, Studien iiber die Minderwertigkeit von Organen. Vienna and Berlin
1907.
58. cf. Volume I of this textbook p. 67.
59. cf. Volume I, p. 163.
60. C.A. Meier, Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy.
61 . cf. Volume II of this textbook.
62. C.A. Meier, “Individuation und psychologische Typen.” Zs. Analyt. Psychol.
1. 12,Berlin 1970, pp. 6-19.
63. C.G. Jung, contribution a l’etude des Types Psychologiques. Archs. Psychol.
XII, Geneva 1915, pp. 259-299. C.G. Jung “On Psychological Understanding " Journ. .

Abnorm. Psychol., Boston 1915, pp. 3-17. Now in German in C.W. Ill, p. 198ff.
64. C.G. Jung, Der Inhalt der Psychose. Leipzig and Vienna, 2nd ed. 1914,
pp.
34—44. “The Content of the Psychoses,” CW7.
65. U. Baumann, J. Angst, A. Flenne and F.E. Muser, “Der Gray- Wheelwright
Test.” Diagnostica XXI, pp. 666-83, Gottingen, 1975. K. Bradway, W. Detloff,
“Incidence of Psychological Types.” Journal of Analyt. Psychol. Vol. XXI, pp. 1 34—
146, London 1976. M.A. Wozny and C.A. Meier, “An Empirical Study of Jungian
Typology.” Journal of Analyt. Psychol. Vol. XXIII, pp. 226-230, London, 1978.
66. Meister Eckehart, Schriften und Predigten. Ed. Herman Buttner. Jena 1917
Vol. II p. 10.
67.C.G. Jung. Psychological Types, para 621.
68. C.G. Jung, Psychological Types. Zurich 1921, paras 621-622.
69. M. Freyd, “Introverts and Extraverts.”P.syc7jo/. Revw. 31 Baltimore, , Pa. 1924,
pp. 74—87.
70. C.G. Jung, Psychological Types. Princeton 1971.
71. See Bibliographical Appendix.
72. C.G. Jung, Psychological Types, p. 60-62.
73. E. Kretschmer, Korperbau und Charakter. Leipzig 1921.
74. R. Otto, Das Heilige. Munich 1917.
75. H. Heine, Deutschland (Original: 1834) Cf. Germany {Works, translated by
Charles Godfrey Leland, 5.) New York, 1892. (p. 81).
76. C.G. Jung, in the manuscript of a lecture.
77. The correspondence between Goethe and Schiller, vol. 20 of Werke, Gedenkaus-
gabe. Edited by Ernst Beutler, Zurich, 1948-54.
78. F. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. by Reginald Snell. New
Haven and London, 1954. All citations taken from this source.
79. F. Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung. 1795.
80. Goethe, "Bedeutende Forderniss durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort.” 1823.
81 . Schiller is undoubtedly thinking here of the “Verlesungen uber das Wesen des
 ,

CONSCIOUSNESS
118

of J.G. Fichte, who was

Gelehrten und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit”
in 1806 in Berlin.
also an introvert; this work was actually only published
82. cf. W. “The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of
Pauli,
Kepler.” Originally published in German as “Naturerklarung
und Psyche" (Studien aus
dem C.G. Jung-Institut Zurich, IV Ed. C.A. Meier, Zurich 1952).
83. R. Fludd, Philosophaica Moysaica fol. 66. Ghent 1638.
,

84. Die Geburt der Tragodie aus dem Geiste der Musik 1870-71.
Fr. Nietzsche,
Translated by William A. Haussman. The Birth of Tragedy,
Edinburgh and London,
1910.
85. No. 947 in the Budapest Gallery, panel 23, Catalogue Klara Garas, Budapest
1972.
86. From C.G. Jung, Psychological Types. CW 6, para. 551.

87. Ibid., para. 553.

88. Heraclitus, fr. B. 53.
89. cf. Footnote 79.
90. Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 4, 3, 1-6.
Psychiatry
91 Cf.C.A. Meier, “Dynamic Psychology and the Classical World.” In:

History, Ed. George Mora and Jeanne L. Brand, Springfield, 111. 1970, pp.
and its

159-171.
92. From now on the functions will be referred to by the following abbreviations:
S = sensation, T=thinking, F=feeling, 1 = intuition.
93. C.G. Jung, On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called
Occult Phenomena.
CW. Zurich dissertation. German original, Leipzig, 1902.
I.

94. J. Kemer, Die Seherin von Prevorst. Stuttgart und Tubingen

1829.
1962.
95. cf. C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams. Reflections. Ed. A. Jaffe, Zurich
96. A. Schopenhauer, The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason.
97. P. Radin, The Story of the American Indian. New York 1927, pp. 188-191.
Cf. also the myth in Plato, Phaedo 114B.
98. cf. Eduard Fritz Knuchel, Die Umwandlung in Kult, Magie und
Rechtsbrauch.
Basel 1919.
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Holderlin, F., Patmos

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Lorenz, K., Das sogenannte Bose. Vienna, 1963
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tung der Komplexen Psychology. Berlin, 1935
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 INDEX

Abelard, Peter, 81 anima/animus, 33

“absolute subject,” 32, 34 Anselm of Canterbury (as Realist), 82
as inner force, 34 Aquinas, Thomas, 45
identity with “absolute object,” 36 and four psychic forces, 47
in consciousness, 30 as moderate Realist, 82
Adler, Alfred Arddhanarishvara (Hindu androgynous
“language of the organs” and, 65 god), 62
typological opposite of Freud, 75 Arian/Communion dispute (see Universal
advaya (“not-two”), 63 dispute )
affects, 25, 28, 38, 65-67 Aristotle, 15, 39, 44, 50, 79
ancient theories of, 66-67 “curbing the passions” and, 66
in Platonic view of soul, 65-66 extraversion of, 80
James-Lange theory of, 65 Arius, 81
libido and, 63, 65 asceticism, 66
overlooked in psychology, 67 assimilation, 2, 19, 33
thymos as, 61 definition of, 2
Agni (Hindu god of fire), 61, 63 Athanasius, 81
similarity to Mars, 61 attentiveness (of consciousness), 19-20
aletheia, II attitude (see also type, psychological)
analysis as orientation of libido, 75, 77
analogy to physics, 8 (see also libido, ener- compensatory, of unconscious, 1, 43
getic model) Gray-Wheelwright Test and, 74
attitude and, 70, 77-78 in individual psychology, 82
Freudian, as “heroic,” 4-5 individuation and, 75
Jungian, and typology, 70 of ego to object, 40-41
of “normal” vs. “abnormal” cases, 5 ot Schiller, ot Goethe, 82-91 passim
training/teaching, 78 one-sidedness and, 82, 84

123
 —

INDEX
124

superior/differentiated function and, 101 differentiation and, 100

102 definition of, 100-101

types, characteristics of, 71-72, 73 ego-complex and, 28

partial consciousness of, 30, 31
diagnosis of, 75, 100
vs. Eastern (intro- energetic factors in, 19, 43 (see also
Western (extra verted)
verted), 92 libido)

epistemological problems and, 7-15 pas-

Avalon, Arthur (Sir John Woodroffe), 50,
sim, 29
60
ethical problems and, 3, 23, 25
Avicenna, 47
field of, 22-24, 57
functions of, 19-24
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 71
coordinating, 21
Bengali-South India Tantra (see Kundalini discriminating diakresis ), 21-23
(

Yoga) assimilating, 19
Bergson, Henri-Louis, 32 memory, 24
Beringer, K., 48 function-types of, 95-105 passim (see
Berkeley, George (as Nominalist), 82
also thinking, feeling sensing,
Bernard of Chartres (as Realist), 82
intuiting)
Bessel, F. W., 18
auxiliary, 101
bete noire, 32 (see also shadow) behavioral characteristics of, 98-102
Bohr, Niels, 9-10
mutal exclusivity of functional pairs,
Brahman (atman), 30, 61, 62
99
as advaita (not-two), 63
rational/discriminating vs. irrational/
(see also self) perceiving, 98-99
tetradic organization of, 96

Cams, C. G., 1, 15 superior vs. inferior, 100-102

cenesthesie, 28 (see also ego-complex) inferior/undifferentiated

chakras, 51, 52-59, 60, 61-62 (see also Kun- as “opposite type,” 101-102

dalini Yoga) unconscious and, 102

Charcot, J. M., 5 autonomy of, 101

Cicero, 66 differentiation of, over time, 102,

Clarke, E., 47 103-106

Classicism (see Universals dispute) superior/differentiated, as attitude-

coincidentia oppositorum, 88 type, 101

creative synthesis and, 92 individuation and, 78

complex, atomic structure of, 28 “irrationality” of, 11

Condillac, E. B. de (as Nominalist), 82 Jungian psychology and, 1

consciousness light analogy, 22-24, 71

analogy with physics and, 19, 34, 43-44 localization of,47-64 passim
(see also libido) anatomical model, 49-50

assimilation and, 2 ancient theories of, 48-51

attentiveness of, 19-21, 66 “bush soul,” 48-49

automatisms and, 19, 44 (see also Kundalini Yoga)

clarity of, 18-19 narrowness of, 22

comparative analysis of, 13-15 phenomenology of, 11, 13-22 passim

compensatory attitude of unconscious stages of, 47-48, 64, 102-103

and, 1
structure of, 27-45 passim
compensatory function of unconscious subject/object distinction in, 29-31, 49
and, 1, 43, 83 systemic nature of, 17-25 passim

contents of, 27 temporal limitation of 17-19

 )

INDEX
125

vs.unconscious, 3, 4, 8, 13, 43, 97, 101 feeling, 95-104 passim

Come, Joan, 33
as rational/discriminating function
96,
Council of Nicaea (325 a d 81
), 98-99
Cynics, 66
Fichte, J. G., 29, 31
Fierz, Markus, 34
Darwin. Charles, 14
Fludd, Robert (Robertus de Fluctibus)
Democritus, 66
Philosophia moysaica (as example of psy-
Descartes, Rene, 29
chological dualism), 88
Dewhurst, K , 47 Freud, Sigmund, 5, 22, 34, 71
diakrisis, 22 (see consciousness, functions as typological opposite of Adler, 75
of)
Freyd, M., 74
differentiation, 100-101
Furst, E., 15
definition of, 100
Domeus, Gerardus, 64
Galen, 66
dreams, 2, 17, 28, 48 Galton, Sir Francis, 39
as passive fantasy, 38
gana (Sp. “will”), 41-43
Dubois-Reymond, E. 11 ,
Gauss, Friedrich, 91
Dunne, J. W., 29-30, 48
Gnostics, 66
Goethe, W., *, 36, 82, 86-90 passim
J.
ego (see ego-complex)
as extravert, 82, 86
ego-complex, 27-45 passim
“Bedeutende Fordemiss durch ein
cenesthesie and, 28
einziges Geistreiches Wort,” 87
coherence, constancy, and continuity of,
correspondence with Schiller, 84-89
28 Faust I, 24, 28, 41, 87
development of, 32-33 Mephistopheles in, 41
ego-field and, 31 Maximen und Reflexionen, 36, 86
external stimuli and, 28 Green, Celia, 48
fantasy and, 36-39
immaturity of, 33 Hauer, J.W., 61
partial consciousness of, 31, 32 hegemonikon (Zeno), 50; (Aristotle), 50
plurality of, 28 Helmholtz, Herman (as Classicist), 89-90
vs. fixed identity, 28 Heine, Heinrich, 79-80
polanty/dualism of, 39 Heraclitus, 61, 91
structure of, 33-36 hieros gamos “sacred marriage”), 63
(

unconscious and, 29 (see also shadow Hopi creation myth, 105-107

Einstein, Albert, 45 Holderlin, J.C.F., 4
Eriugena, Johannes Scotus, 80, 82 homoiousia (similarity of substance), 81
extra version, 37, 69-93 passim homoousia (identity of substance), 81
description of, 71 Hume, David (as Nominalist), 82
orientation of libido in, 76 Husserl, Edmund, 30
outer object and, 71 Huxley, Thomas H., 86

fantasy, 36-39 idees fixes, 25

active, 37 Iliad, 50
as concrete product of libido, 36, 37 image, 37, 38
in structure of ego-complex 35-39 autonomy of, 38
passive, 37 definition of, 38
sources of 37-38 transformative effect of, 38
external 37 imaginatio vera, 38
internal 38 instincts, 3, 37
 ,

INDEX
126

Anahata (heart), 52, 56, 60, 62

introversion,69-93 passim
Visuddha (larynx), 52, 57, 60, 62
description of, 71-72
orientation of libido in, 76 Ajna (between eyes), 52, 58, 60, 61-

inner object and, 72

63
72-73 Sahasrana (scalp; extra corpus), 52,
“subjective factor’’ and,
intuition, 38, 95- 104 passim 59, 60, 63

97 Nirvana and, 63
as bridge with unconscious,

as irrational/perceiving function, 97 Kung-Fu-Tse (Confucius), 1

psychometric phenomena and, 97

Iselin, Hans Konrad, 96 Lang, J.B., 14
Leibniz, Gottfried (as Nominalist), 82
Jackson, Hughling, 60 learning theory, 2
Jaffe, Aniela, 7 libido, 34, 36, 41, 43-44, 63, 67, and
James, William, 28-29 passim
Janet, Pierre, 5 Aristotelean concept of, 44
Jantz, Pierre, 5 as kinesis alogos (Stoa), 66
Jung, Carl Gustav, 1,7, 11, 30, 41, 50, 61, as psychic energy, 34
72, 75, 76, 82, 104, and passim “circulation” in bodily organs, 63
as introvert, 75, 92 elephant as symbol of domesticated, 61
association experiments, 24, 27, 95 energetic model of, 42-45, 66
theory of consciousness, 5 fantasy, as concrete product of, 36-39
works: in affects, 63
Der Inhalt Der Psychose, 69 Muladhara chakra (Kundalini) as, 60
On Psychic Energy, 41 polarity of, 43, 69
Psychological Types, 1, 7, 69-95 regression of, 43
passim two aspects of, 34, 36
Symbols of Transformation, 41 unconscious and, 43
“The Orienting Functions of Conscious- Lorenz, Konrad, 3
ness,” 47 “loss of soul,” 49
Lotto, Lorenzo, 88
Kant, Immanuel, 29, 82
definition of ego, 29
Mach, Ernst, 23, 34
Kekule, F.A., 37
Maimonides, 29
Kepler, Johannes, 88
Majer, Michael, 31
Kemer, Justinus, 104
Mayer, Julius Robert, 34, 40, 43-44
Keyserling, Hermann, 41-43
Meister Eckehart, 71
koinon aistheterion (Aristotle), 50
memory, 24-25, 32
Krantor (Latin Academic), 66
affect and, 25
Kretschmer, E., 15-lb
metriophora (
“curbing the passions”), 66
Kundalini Yoga, 51-64 passim, 66
morphe, 38-39
analogy to “circulation of light” in
Muller, Johannes, 44
Taoism, 51
as “introspective way,” 51
libido and, 60 Neumann, Erich
localization of consciousness in chakras : The Origins and History of
Muladhara (perineum), 52, 53, 60, Consciousness, 11

61 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 88-89

Svadhisthana (bladder), 52, 54, 60, The Birth of Tragedy, 85

61 Nirvana ( nir-dvanda “no opposite”), 63
Manipura (navel), 52, 55, 60, 61 Nominalism (see Universals dispute)
 INDEX
127

Origenes, 30, 39, 66

correspondence with Goethe, 82-87, 91
Ostwald, Wilhelm, 34, 89, 91
works:
Otto, Rudolf, 76
“Ode to Joy,” 71

On Naive and Sentimental Poetry 82, ,

Patmos (Holderlin), 5 91-92

Pauli, Wolfgang, 9-10, 23, 63, 88 On the Aesthetic Education of Man ,

and object/subject dilemma, 9 82-87

persona, 33
extensity vs. extensity in, 83-84
phallus
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 29, 36
as creative symbol, 36 four connecting principles, 104-105
as Lingam (Kundalini Yoga), 61, 63 The Principle of Sufficient Reason , 104
Philo Judaeus, 66
Schreber, Daniel P, 22
Pico, Gianfrancesco, 38
Schmid, Hans, 95-96
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, 38
self, 62 (see also Brahman)
Plato, 2, 36, 65-66, 79-80 definition of term, 62
as introverted, 80 identification with, dangers of, 62
conception of affect, 65-66 sensation, 96, 98-101
prima materia as fonction du reel, 96
central fire (libido) and, 34 as irrational/perceiving function, 96-97
Schopenhauer’s “will” and, 36 shadow, 31-33
Prince, Morton, 29 recognition of, 32, 62
Principle of Uncertainty (Heisenberg), 10 Shakespeare ( Midsummer Night’s Dream),
psyche 37
activity of, 64 Shatchakranirupana 50-51 ,

as synonym for consciousness, 47 Spinoza, 36

localization of, 47-64 Stevenson, Robert Louis, 29
physics and, 30, 33-34, 43-44 Stoicism, 66, 82
self-regulating activity of, 43 sunvata (the void), 63
subjectivity of, 7-13 Sushuma (“the door of Brahman”), 61
vs. “scientific” objectivity, 15
Tantrism, 51
Purkinje, J.E., 19-21, 24
Terence, 5
Putscher, M., 47
Tertullian, 12

thinking, 96, 98-101 passim

Realism (see Universals dispute)
as apperception, 96
regression, 30
as rational/discriminating function, 98-
of libido, 47
99
Remigius of Aurerre (as Realist), 82
type, psychological (see also attitude)
rite d’ entree rite de sortie, 23
as “basic” of analytic psychology, 70-71
Romanticism (see Universals dispute)
diagnosis of, 75, 100
Rosenkrantz, Wilhelm, 22
Gray- Wheel wright Test and, 74
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 86
in analysis, 77-78
Rouselle, Erwin, 51
no fixed determination of, 75
Rudra (Hindu destroyer/creator god), 61
objective vs. predicate, 96
testing, 71, 74, 97
St. Augustine, 66
typology (see also individual functions)
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 25
as “compass,” ix, 11
Schelling, F.W.J., 22, 30
tetrad of functions in, 96-105
Schiller, Friedrich, 71, 82-87, 91-92
passim unconscious
as introvert, 82, 86 as nucleus of consciousness, 36
 )

INDEX
128

Romanticism and, 89
auxiliary functions and, 101
compensatory attitude of, 1
William of Occam, 80

compensatory function of, 1, 47 Realism (see also introversion)

47 Dionysian and, 88
fascination of, 7,

97 proponents of, 82
intuition and,
Empiricism (Aristotle), 80
libido and, 47
Classicism and, 89
shadow and, 32
Kundalini Yoga), 61-63 Eriugena, Johannes Scotus, 80
symbols of (in

vs. objectless pan-consciousness, 63 unio my Stic a 62-63

,

Universals dispute
Arian vs. Communion dispute and, 81
van der Post, Sir Laurens, 49
defined, 79-80 Vincent of Beauvais (as Realist), 82
Nominalism (see also extraversion
Apollonian and, 88
William of Occam (as Nominalist), 80, 82
proponents of, 82
Rationalism (Plato), 80 Wolff, Toni, 95
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consciousnesstheOOcarl

GAYLORD F
iSBN 0-93843470-5 PSYCHOLOGY ASSOCIATION
/ TES

CONSCIOUSNESS. CA Meier, one of Jung's closest friends and associates, turns our attention to one of the
most problematic fields in modern psychology—the nature of consciousness. Beginning with a discussion of
the paradox inherent in any concept of consciousness— defined as the only entity capable
the formulation of
of observing itself— Meier proceeds with chapters on the phenomenology of consciousness, its structure, its
dynamics, and its relationship to the seat of all psychic energy, the unconscious. Drawing on a wide variety
of sources literary, philosophical, anthropological, and psychological, Meier has written one of the most
erudite yet accessible treatises on the subject ever available. Like its companion volumes. Consciousness
is o valuable addition to the library of anyone interested in Jung or Jungian Psychology.

Carl Alfred Meier resides, teaches and practices

in Zurich, Switzerland. One of Carl G Jung's closest
associates, he is the founder of the Jung Institute in Zurich
Dr. Meier is the duthor of Ancient Incubation and
Modern Psychotherapy, among other books, as
well as numerous articles pertaining to Jungian psychology.

To know ourselves as we we must pay careful attention to our dreams, for unless we become
truly are.

as conscious as we possibly can, we shall never reach that inner wholeness which with Jung, mdny of us
consider the goal of all serious human endeavour C.A Meier's book can be of help to those
who try to gam that self-knowlege —HWdegard Weinrich, Ph.D.

SIGO PRESS
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