Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony

Author(s): Thomas R. Bates

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1975), pp. 351-366
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 GRAMSCI AND THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY

BY THOMAS R. BATES

In November 1926 the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Par

Antonio Gramsci, was arrested and subsequently sentenced to twenty years in
prison by the Fascist State. His long and miserable confinement, which
sulted in his death in 1937, also resulted in one of the most significant contr
tions to twentieth-century Marxist thought, the theory of "hegemony."
fortunately, he was unable to elaborate this theory in a systematic way befor
his frail body finally gave out on him in the summer of 1935. The theory lie
fragmented and dispersed throughout his Quaderni del carcere, waiting t
pieced together like an old jigsaw puzzle. The historian, placed in the unc
fortable role of archeologist, risks creating the illusion of a theory wh
wasn't there, or arbitrarily emphasizing a casual idea. What justifies a po
mortem construction of the theory is the fact that the concept of hegemony
the unifying thread of Gramsci's prison notes, and appears to be the log
conclusion to his total political experience.
The basic premise of the theory of hegemony is one with which few wou
disagree: that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas. "The fo
dation of a ruling class," he wrote, "is equivalent to the creation of a Wel
schauung."' Marx had likewise observed that "the ruling ideas of each a
have ever been the ideas of its ruling class."2 Gramsci, however, found
simple fact much more suggestive than had Marx, for whom it was bu
corollary of economic theory. The homo economicus of industrial Englan
which had captivated Marx in the British Museum, cast less of a spell in
economically backward land of Saint Francis, Vico, and Croce. The tug of
idealist tradition can be seen in Gramsci's estimation of the power, bot
creative and conservative, of ideas. To ideas he ascribed the vital functio
preserving the "ideological unity of a whole social bloc."3 Not that ideas
powerful enough to eliminate class struggle, but they were obviously cap
of muting it sufficiently to allow class societies to function. Without this id
logical factor it would be difficult to explain how western civilization
survived at all.
Gramsci had no wish to argue with Marx's nostrum that every state
dictatorship, but he also realized that the pleasing simplicity of the aphor
had led to serious political errors on the part of the Italian Left in
confrontation with Fascism. Taken too literally, it had become analytic
useless, making it impossible to distinguish between forms of rule and to
terpret properly the character of historical periods. It may be that every sta

'II materialismo storico e lafilosofia di Benedetto Croce (Turin, 1966), 75; herea
II materialismo storico.
2"The Communist Manifesto, " Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed.
Lewis Feuer (New York, 1959), 26.
3ll materialismo storico, 7.

351

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 352 THOMAS R. BATES

is ultimately a dictatorship, and will

serious challenger, whether from the ou
that dictatorship is the sole form of po
is "hegemony." The concept of hegemon
political leadership based on the consent
by the diffusion and popularization of th
The term "hegemony" is certainly n
and has traditionally signified dominatio
case, however, the pedigree can be tra
lary of the Russian revolutionaries in th
term was introduced by Plekhanov, Axe
with the "Economists" over the issue
gemony of the proletariat over the peas
tariat, Plekhanov's group was in esse
leadership in a backward cultural situati
frequent tirades against "tail-endism,
more than the political leadership of
was to instruct the masses as to their tru
perilous path of reformism. More precis
of the huge peasantry to the revolution
Italian scholar Norberto Bobbio has a
Lenin for the concept of hegemony is
Bobbio, the term was used more by St
terms "leadership" and "management
when he did use "hegemony" it was sy
also used the word in this sense while h
was not until his prison meditations
Italian history that he began to see the
cept.
A letter of May 1932 reveals Gramsci's own image of the historical
significance of the concept. It originated in the revolt against "orthodox" or
positivistic Marxism. The effort of Benedetto Croce to "liquidate" orthodox
Marxism was superfluous, said Gramsci, because orthodox Marxism had al-
ready been superseded by Leninism, which resolved the problems to which
Croce had addressed himself:

It happened that in the very period in which Croce elaborated this so-called
club of his, the philosophy of praxis was elaborated by its greatest modern
theorists in the same sense, and the moment of "hegemony" or of cultural
leadership was systematically upgraded precisely in opposition to the
mechanistic and fatalistic concepts of economism. It is possible to affirm that
the essential feature of the most modern philosophy of praxis consists
precisely in the historico-political concept of hegemony.6

4E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, 3 vols. (Baltimore, 1969), I, 29-
31.
5Norberto Bobbio, "Gramsci e la concezione della societa civile," Gramsci e la
cultura contemporanea, ed. Pietro Rossi (Rome, 1969), 94.
6Letter to Tatiana, 2 May 1932, Lettere dal carcere, ed. Elsa Fubini (Turin, 1965),
616.

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 GRAMSCI AND THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY 353

Gramsci's recognition of the concept of hegemony as a wate

nineteenth- and twentieth-century Marxism was fundamenta
For, as he develops it, "hegemony" is clearly his theoretical r
fin de siecle crisis of Marxism and to those far-reaching quest
sciousness and society posed in the Italian revolt against positivism
The "upgrading" of the factor of cultural leadership in hist
reappraisal of the Marxist concept of "superstructure," which
be construed as a pale reflection of socioeconomic organizat
study of the role of intellectuals in society led him to brea
perstructure into two great "floors," which he described as "c
"political society." Civil society is composed of all those "private
organisms"-schools, churches, clubs, journals, and parties-which con-
tribute in molecular fashion to the formation of social and political conscious-
ness. Political society, on the other hand, is composed of those public institu-
tions-the government, courts, police, and army-which exercise "direct
dominion." It is synonymous with the "state." The ruling class exerts its
power over society on both of these "floors" of action, but by very different
methods. Civil society is the marketplace of ideas, where intellectuals enter as
"salesmen" of contending cultures. The intellectuals succeed in creating hege-
mony to the extent that they extend the world view of the rulers to the ruled,
and thereby secure the "free" consent of the masses to the law and order of the
land. To the extent that the intellectuals fail to create hegemony, the ruling
class falls back on the state's coercive apparatus which disciplines those who
do not "consent," and which is "constructed for all society in anticipation of
moments of crisis of command ... when spontaneous consensus declines."8
Implicit in this theory is a definition of the "intellectual" by his socio-
political function:

An independent class of intellectuals does not exist, but rather every social
group has its own intellectuals. However, the intellectuals of the historically
progressive class ... exercise such a power of attraction that they end ... by
subordinating the intellectuals of other social groups and thus create a system
of solidarity among all intellectuals, with links of a psychological (vanity) or
caste nature. This fact is realized spontaneously in historical periods in which
the given social group is truly progressive.9

A case in point-and, indeed, Gramsci's primary model in elaborating this

concept-was the role of intellectuals in the Risorgimento. The "organic in-
tellectuals" of Italy's new ruling class were the Moderates, who exercised this
"spontaneous" power of attraction over all other intellectual groups and, most
notably, over the Mazzinian Party of Action.
Paradoxically, the success of the Moderates was also the failure of the
Risorgimento.
They wanted to "dominate," not to "lead," and furthermore they wanted their
interests to dominate, not their persons. That is, they wanted a new force to
become arbiter of the nation: this force was Piedmont and the Monarchy.10

7Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura (Turin, 1966), 9; hereafter Gli in-
tellettuali.
8lbid. 911 Risorgimento (Turin, 1966), 71. '?Ibid., 106.

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354 THOMAS R. BATES

The result was a "passive revolution,"

by a class but by a state, which created
The Moderates, representing a mona
sula like a foreign power, were uneasy a
They feared nothing so much as the p
known quantity in the Risorgimento, an
of excessive popular enthusiasm. The d
was represented by the Party of Act
charismatic leadership of Garibaldi, and
for a great land reform. Here then was
into the work of building a unified natio
But the Party of Action lacked the
command of the masses. Gramsci, wh
Jacobin prejudices by the frustratin
recognized their vital role in the creat
obins in modern history, he believed,
counterrevolution and premature com
Action had no Jacobin content, no "
party."13 Gramsci did not mean that
rulers of the new state, but that a Ja
masses in the making of Italian history,
story indeed. Even in "failure" it wou
ticipation in political life, opened new d
and South together in a unified experien
truly national political culture.
The Actionists failed to pose a disti
Moderate's conservative program of
themselves the victims of Moderate h
tionists accounted, in Gramsci's opini
Post-Risorgimento State called trasfor
describe the fact that the more governm
the same.

This so-called "transformism" is nothi

the fact that the Party of Action was
and that the popular masses were dec
ambit of the new state.14

The failure of the Liberal State to creat

it failed to become truly liberal. As it
put it, the "legal" Italy failed to becom
According to Gramsci's theory, heg
dependent phenomena. The authorita
less than that of Socialist Russia, a resul
both cases, the lack of "spontaneous" c
to resort to force. Gramsci described
nance of force as "economico-corpora
which there was no general agreement

"Ibid., 106-107. '2lbid., 88. '31bid., 86. 14bid., 100.

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 GRAMSCI AND THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY 355

no generally accepted world view harmonizing with econo

reality. In such situations, politics is the direct and unrefined exp
dictatorship in the economic sphere.15
It was no surprise to Gramsci that the beginning of ev
sociopolitical transformation, be it bourgeois or proletarian, i
by a period of dictatorship, the length of which depends precisely
of the dictatorship to promote general acceptance of the chang
the economic structure. In the Risorgimento Gramsci discern
reflection of the historical tendency of the Italian bourgeoisie to
within 'corporative' limits."16 In other words, the Moderate
Risorgimento were not able to unify the bourgeoisie on a national
tract them from their narrow, self-interested pursuits long enou
them a clear vision of their common historical tasks and a confident sense of
national purpose. A social class cannot convince others of the validity of its
world view until it is fully convinced itself. Once this is achieved, society enters
a period of relative tranquility, in which hegemony rather than dictatorship is
the prevailing form of rule.
Gramsci incorrectly identified this period of hegemony with Croce's idea of
the "ethico-political" in history. This was an understandable error, since
Croce illustrated his concept in two historical works, A History of Italy, 1871-
1915, and History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century (1815-1915),16' which
obviously excluded those periods of revolutionary struggle and dictatorship
which preceded and followed the period covered by his narrative. Gramsci
criticized this exclusion of violent struggle, as if the ethico-political period were
"something that had been dropped from the heavens."17 However, Croce's
concept of the "ethico-political" was not temporally defined, since it applied to
all times. In every historical period he aimed to discover the quality of univer-
sality, in every struggle some sign of the human spirit seeking to realize its
freedom. Indeed, Croce had first arrived at this concept of history through his
study of the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799, but his initial attraction to the
Jacobin, anti-monarchical elements in this revolt turned to disgust as he saw
the outcome in a reactionary police state.18 His disillusionment by the ethico
political "failure" of that revolt helps to explain his later reluctance to tackl
periods of bloody strife and his final description of Fascism as a "parenthesis"
in Italian history. Gramsci's error, therefore, was only formal. He accurately
sensed the bias in Croce's concept, which in application could be equated with
the concept of hegemony.
One reason for the similarity between Gramsci's and Croce's theories has
already been suggested. Both men were rebelling against the positivist view of
history which prevailed in Italy at the turn of the century. Both sought to re-
store to Italian historiography the full significance of the human personality

1511 materialismo storico, 12. 'gGli intellettuali, 41.

o1a A History of Italy, 1871-1915, trans. Cecilia M. Ady(New York,
of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Henry Furst (New York, 19
17"Benedetto Croce and His Concept of Liberty," trans. Samuel Put
and Society, 10 (Winter 1946), 289.
'8A. Robert Caponigri, History and Liberty: The Historical Writing
Croce (London, 1955), 21-26.

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 356 THOMAS R. BATES

and an appreciation of the complex m

sphere. Despite the formal similarity of
their political motives were entirely o
alternative to Marxism, Gramsci's was
to Croce. Identifying himself as a pr
imagined himself locked in fierce ide
Liberal Italy, whom he regarded as the m
classes.19 But one suspects that an und
attack on Croce was that he himself had learned so much from the old master.
In fact, Gramsci frankly acknowledged the "instrumental value" of Croce to
Italian Marxism:20

He has drawn attention to the importance of cultural and intellectual factors

in historical development, to the function of great intellectuals in the organic
life of civil society or of the state, to the moment of hegemony and consensus
as the necessary form of the concrete historical bloc.

A large measure of Gramsci's debt to Croce can be found in the latter's

Etica e politica, a series of essays written in the early 1920's and later
published by the House of Laterza in Bari. In Etica e politica Croce took a
Machiavellian approach to the study of politics, an approach which he had
long ago inherited from the "Machiavellian school" of Italian theorists, par-
ticularly Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto. Gramsci could not have been
displeased with this approach, which shared with Marxism a profound
skepticism toward traditional political categories. For all modern Machia-
vellians, the fundamental categories of power are force and consensus, and
these are not mutually exclusive but interdependent realities. Croce, just as
much as Gramsci, believed that there could be no consensus without force, no
"liberty" without "authority."21
Croce's inspiration is apparent in Gramsci's concept of civil and political
society. The effort of some scholars to trace these concepts to Marx and Hegel
only leads to confusion because, though he borrowed their language, Gramsci
did not borrow their meanings.22 For both Marx and Hegel, "civil society"
'911 materialismo storico, 249. 20Ibid., 201.
21Benedetto Croce, Etica e politica (Bari, 1967),
this relationship was practical as well as theoretic
litti's short-lived Cabinet of 1920, he had urged hi
against a strike movement in the civil service. Fur
confidence even after the murder of Matteotti
Croce: Man and Thinker (New Haven, 1952), 17-1
H. Stuart Hughes, Croce was moving towards a
democracy: Hughes, Consciousness and Society (
just as it is true that he endorsed the most illibera
it. Only in 1925 did Croce realize that he had gotten
22The term "civil society" has a long history. It w
and French Physiocrats of the 18th century to den
economic intercourse, a supposedly "natural" and
the state. Hegel, in his Philosophy of Right (1821
defining civil society as a realm of chaos and corru
he invested with universal values. Marx adopted the

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 GRAMSCI AND THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY 357

refers to social structure; more precisely, to what Marx termed th

of production." According to Marx it is this sphere of social
provides the horsepower of history. Likewise for Gramsci, civ
sphere of potent historical action, but it belongs not to the struct
superstructure of society. It is not the sphere of commerce and in
of ideology and "cultural organization" in the broadest sense.
concept can rather be traced to Croce's idea of the "church," defin
politica as "the formation of moral institutions in the largest se
the religious institutions and revolutionary sects, including the sen
customs and fantasies and myths of a practical tendency and c
Croce, as for Gramsci, the "church," or civil society, is the sphere
tellectuals (Croce's "political geniuses") operate, whether in coo
the state or in opposition to it. For both men, whatever "ethic
state may have is to be found in this sphere, not within the state p
Croce's development of ethicopolitical history was inspired by t
aims. One, as Gramsci correctly observed, was the destruction
His other purpose was to combat the "Actualist" philosophy of
tile, whose concept of the "Ethical State" provided the theoreti
of the Fascist dictatorship.26 Gramsci's attitude towards this d
tremely important for understanding his own view of the state an
to hegemony. It is interesting that Gramsci appears to take Croce's
jecting the Gentilian Ethical State, in which civil and politica
fused, as well as his "governmental concept of morality":

The concept of the citizen as functionary of the state descends

the failure to divide political society and civil society, political
politico-state government; in reality, therefore, from the anti-his
concept of state that is implicit in the concept of Spirit... .27

only to turn it against him, denying that the state could transcend the p
and conflicts of civil society; cf. Bobbio, "Gramsci e la concezione dell
op. cit., 80-85, and Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Though
(London, 1970), 13-21.
23Norberto Bobbio contends that Gramsci's concept was inspired m
than by Marx, as Hegel's "civil society" included not only industry and
also the cultural and juridical forms attached to these activities; cf
concezione della societa civile," op. cit., 80-85. Gramsci himself ackno
to Hegel for his definition of civil society as the sphere in which a social
hegemony over the entire society, and embodying the "ethical conten
Passato e presente (Turin, 1966), 164. However, this was to give Hegel to
for Hegel rather deduced the ethical content of the state from his abstr
state, for which he was justifiably criticized by Marx; cf. Avineri, op. cit
24Croce, Etica e politica, 230. Croce derived his categories "churc
from the German historian von Ranke, and found a more distant ante
distinction between "certainty" (force) and "truth" (morality): Etica ep
25Ibid., 230-31.
26Croce states his anti-Marxist and anti-Fascist aims in Etica e polit
88. Gentile's concept of the Ethical State, and Croce's objections, ar
Henry S. Harris in The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (Urbana,
27Passato epresente, 32.

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 358 THOMAS R. BATES

The "anti-historicity" of the Gentilian

distinguish the "ethical" phase from t
history. More specifically, the philosophe
cism. According to Gramsci, Fascism
which was a hegemonic crisis of world-h

The crisis consists precisely in the fact t

be born. In this interregnum the most v

Gentile, of course, saw nothing morbid i

dictatorship defending the interests of
base Fascism on a national consensus, to
through the sweet voice of reason. He
the Tutor of his people.29 According t
possibly create a new "ethical phase" ou
itself no more than an expression of the
cept of the state was, like Hegel's, self-ju
of a state can only be evaluated historical
But what if civil society is in no cond
majority of people do not know what is b
ignorant of the means to achieve it? In t
the state to shoulder the destiny of socie
ethical content of its own? Gramsci's L
response to this problem:

The state is the instrument for adjusti

ture. But it is necessary that the state w
tives of the change in the economic str
society to adjust itself by means of p
structure, for the old homo oeconomic
with all the honors he deserves, is a n
form of vacuous and inconclusive economic moralism.31

28Ibid., 38.
29A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism (New York, 1969), 226.
30Gramsci's critique of Gentile's totalitarian theory of state has led a number of
scholars to conclude that the theory of hegemony is somehow liberal or social-demo-
cratic: cf. Bobbio, "Gramsci e la concezione della societa civile," op. cit., 93-96;
Giuseppe Tamburrano, Antonio Gramsci: la vita, il pensiero, l'azione (Manduria,
1963), 258-59, 295. This view has gained favor in Italy to the extent that Stalin and the
Russian regime had fallen into disfavor. As late as 1958, however, the P.C.I. main-
tained the recognizably Stalinist view that there is no practical difference either between
civil society and the state, or between hegemony and dictatorship; cf. Palmiro Togliatti,
"II leninismo nel pensiero e nell'azione di Antonio Gramsci," Studi Gramsciani (Rome,
1958), 14-35. Taken literally, Togliatti's claim is patently incorrect: hegemony and
dictatorship are not the same thing. But this does not mean that the concept of hege-
mony is not totalitarian: on this score the Old Left understands Gramsci better than his
post-Stalinist interpreters. Also see Gwyn Williams, "The Concept of 'Egemonia' in
the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation," JHI, 21 (Oct. 1960),
586-99.
3111 materialismo storico, 266-67.

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 GRAMSCI AND THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY 359

This was Gramsci's final answer to those moderate socialists like Turati,
Treves, and Mondolfo, who had turned against the Bolsheviks in 1917 on the
grounds that the Russian people were not ready for socialism. Of course they
weren't ready for socialism! The point was to prepare them, and this could cer-
tainly be done better by leaders dedicated to socialism than by leaders dedi-
cated to a "capitalist stage" of development. But does not the acceptance of
this historical task oblige socialists to embrace the concept of the State-as-
Educator; in other words, the Hegelian State? It does, and Gramsci frankly
recognized this fact. Indeed, his real criticism of the Hegelian State, in a
positive sense, was that it conceives of its educational tasks too narrowly.32
There is an obvious logical conflict between Gramsci's critique of Gentile
and the Fascist State, and his positive program for the Socialist State. This
conflict, characteristic of his prison thought, is responsible for the contradic-
tory interpretations held by contemporary scholars. Only when his critique is
placed in the perspective of his program do we perceive the difficulty of ex-
tracting liberal sweetening from what is really sour grapes. What bothered
Gramsci most was not how Fascists played the game, but that they won the
game. The modern phenomenon of "statolatry" was not, to his way of
thinking, the prerogative of reaction, but might just as well serve the cause of
revolution:

For some social groups which, before ascending to autonomous statehood, did
not have a long period of their own independent cultural and moral de-
velopment... a period of statolatry is necessary and rather opportune. This
"statolatry" is nothing but the normal form of "statehood," of initiation, at
least, to autonomous statehood, and to the creation of a "civil society" which
was not historically possible to create before the ascent to independent
statehood. ... In any case, such "statolatry" must not become theoretical
fanaticism and be considered perpetual. It must be criticized, so that it de-
velops, producing new forms of statehood ....33

What Gramsci is saying here is that dictatorship, in certain historical circum-

stances (such as Russia in 1917), may be the only means to create hegemony,
and that, paradoxically, it may take an exceptionally strong state to abolish
the state. But he also warns against "theoretical fanaticism"; that is, making
the state a law unto itself. This caution against statolatry en permanence may
be understood as his true critique of statolatry in its reactionary form, as well
as prudent advice to the Stalinist regime. In reality, he concludes, "only the
social group which poses the end of the state and of itself as the goal to be
achieved can create an Ethical State...."34
With the theory of hegemony Gramsci sought to explain a number of puz-
zling historical phenomena. The problem which had most troubled Gramsc
a young socialist was the widening gap between the mechanistic prognoses
orthodox Marxism and the movement of reformism in the twentieth century
Like Lenin and many other left-wing socialists, he was overwhelmed by the ap
parent "indifference" of the masses. Lenin's response to this dilemma w

32Note su Machiavelli (Turin, 1966), 128-30.

33Passato e presente, 166. 34Note su Machiavelli, 128.

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 360 THOMAS R. BATES

two-fold: first, he rejected the notion th

consciousness "spontaneously" from the m
second, he formulated the theory of im
talism," to explain the formation of l
proletarian movement and led it furt
Though nowhere does Gramsci criticize L
response is contained in the theory of he
nation in economic data, but in "cultur
The apathy and indifference of the m
tionaries expressed for Gramsci the fact
force of the state, but also to the worl
revolutionary perspective, the worker m
ters imposed on him by the cultural o
does this come about?

Critical understanding of oneself . . comes through the struggle of political

"hegemonies," of opposing directions, first in the field of ethics, then of
politics, culminating in a higher elaboration of one's own conception of reality.
The awareness of being part of a definite hegemonic force ... is the first step
towards a progressively higher self-consciousness, in which theory and
practice finally unite.36

The hegemonic struggle requires the leadership of intellectuals, for, on a mass

scale:

Critical self-consciousness signifies historically and politically the creation of

intellectual cadres. A human mass does not "distinguish" itself and does not
become independent "by itself" without organizing itself (in a broad sense),
and there is no organization without intellectuals ... without organizers and
leaders....37

Class consciousness is, then, the product of an ideological struggle l

the intellectual "officers" of competing social classes. The phenomeno
"false consciousness," which from the standpoint of economic determin
simply incomprehensible, represents from Gramsci's standpoint simply
tory of the ruling-class intellectuals in this struggle. Conversely
phenomenon of the passing of "traditional" intellectuals (those of a de
ruling class) into the proletarian camp, which Marx recognized but n
paused to explain, is explained by Gramsci as a victory for the proletari
tellectuals, who are aided by the fact that their class represents
"progressive" stage of human development.38 Gramsci attributed far

35V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?" and "Imperialism: the Highest Stage of

talism," in Essential Works of Lenin, ed. Henry M. Christman (New York, 1966
176, 177-270.
36Il materialismo storico, 11. 37Ibid., 12.
3811 Risorgimento, 71. Marx makes a fleeting re
"Communist Manifesto," Basic Writings on Politi

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 GRAMSCI AND THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY 361

importance to this process than Marx had, but of course Mar

nessed the startling power of twentieth-century ideologies.
Gramsci was one of the few modern Marxists to attempt
explanation of the "generation gap" or the "radicalism of you
to Gramsci, the older generation always educate the young. T
which elder generation shall do the educating? The passing of bou
into the proletarian camp indicates the failure of the bourge
their own offspring properly, and to prepare them for the s
youth must then turn to the elders of the proletariat for guidan
when the bourgeois elders see this happening on a national sca
tervene politically and militarily to stem the tide, to cut off the
munication between their young and the progressive forces.
backfires.

The struggle, of which the normal external expressions are suffo

the structure of the old class like a dissolving cancer, weakening
it. It assumes morbid forms of mysticism, sensualism, moral
pathological degenerations. The old structure does not provide and
satisfy the new exigencies. The permanent or semi-permane
ployment of the so-called intellectuals is one of the typical expre
insufficiency, which assumes a harsh character for the youngest,
leaves no "open horizons."40

Gramsci retained a skepticism towards these alienated fils d

skepticism which was not, however, mere prejudice, but wa
judgment informed by the experience of the Italian labor movem
one to explain the passing of entire groups of left-wing intell
enemy camp? More precisely, how was one to explain the phe
cialists entering into bourgeois governments and of revolutionary
entering into the nationalist and then the Fascist movement?
these puzzling events as the continuation on a mass scale of th
of the nineteenth century. The "generation gap" within the rulin
sulted in a large influx of bourgeois youth into the popular move
cially during the turbulent decade of the 1890's. But in the wa
of the Italian State in the early twentieth century, these pro
returned to the fold:

The bourgeoisie fails to educate its youth (struggle of generati

allow themselves to be culturally attracted by the workers, a
they ... try to take control of them (in their "unconscious" d
the hegemony of their own class on the people), but during h
they return to the fold.4'

This view of bourgeois radicalism, considerably more skept

expressed in his early writings, suggests that he may have bee

39Gli intellettuali, 43. 40Ibid.

4lIbid., 42; also II Risorgimento, 1
concrete evidence in support of thi
hand impressions.

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362 THOMAS R. BATES

prison by his rereading of Robert

Political Parties.. .(1962). Like Gramsci
of bourgeois intellectuals to the prolet
velopment of revolutionary consciousn
their motives and reliability, and war
cies.42 Gramsci had good reason to b
turned Fascist.42a
Another historical phenomenon which
hegemony is the strange connection b
political decadence:
It can be said that every culture has
which coincides with the period of co
which it expresses, and perhaps coinci
real hegemony disintegrates at the b
thought, precisely for that (reacting to
matically, becomes a transcendental
so-called epoch of decadence (in whic
characterized by a refined and highly "s

An example of such speculative thou

Croce. One of Gramsci's primary aim
create an "Anti-Croce" comparable to
shattering Croce's hegemony in Italia
own historical writings essentially an "A
effort to liquidate Marxism, incorpor
philosophy? Gramsci observed that a tra
of an historical abyss with a young and
around and grasp at its executioner in
instance,

is sufficiently robust and so productive

to it in order to furnish its arsenal with
This signifies that Marxism is beginn
traditional culture, but the latter, which
refined and finished, tries to react like

The theory of hegemony has impor

strategy and, in fact, the theory resp

42Robert Michels, Political Parties (New

42a Gramsci's personal copy of Michels' w
Paris (1914) which was sent to him in priso
1929. Michels was drawn to Fascism in the
matic leadership fulfilled in the person
Michels with a chair at the University of
Parties (New York, 1962), 32-33.
43I/ materialismo storico, 43.
44Ibid., 157. This essay is translated by
Other Writings (New York, 1967), 90-117.

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 GRAMSCI AND THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY 363

revolutionary strategy which, in the Second International, was

assumptions of economic determinism. These fatalistic assumpt
variety of strategical errors. The "economists" failed to under
mass ideological facts always lag behind mass economic phenom
at certain moments the automatic drive produced by the econo
slowed down, cramped or even broken up momentarily by
ideological elements."45 One of the most successful "ideological b
bourgeois intellectuals was the myth that real democracy and
could be achieved through parliament and universal suffrage, a myt
the parties of the Second International almost entirely succumb
believed that parliament and polling booth are mere forms, the real
which is determined by effective control of the cultural organizatio
lines of communication in civil society.

The "normal" exercise of hegemony in a particular regime is cha

a combination of force and consensus variously equilibrated, wi
force subvert consensus too much, making it appear that the force
the consent of the majority.46

The parliamentary game was, therefore, an enormously effecti

creating the illusion of popular sovereignty.
The powers-that-be in the state have a great advantage in the
hegemony, by virtue of their superior organization, information, a
communication. Alongside parliament, they have the yet more
strument of "public opinion," the potential of which was foreseen b
as by few others.

Public opinion is strictly linked to political hegemony. It is the poin

between civil society and political society, between consensus an
state, when it wants to initiate an unpopular action, preventivel
adequate public opinion; that is, it organizes and concentrates certain
of civil society.47

The complex superstructures created by the modern nation-st

sistant to the most catastrophic of economic crises, as proved
mediate dopoguerra and again in the great financial crash of 19
compared the cultural organization of these advanced societies to
system" in modern warfare: though shelled they can still put up an
sistance.48 For this reason he rejected Rosa Luxemburg's thesis
Strike: The Political Party and the Trade Union; appeared in It
Sciopero generale. II partito e i sindicate in 1919) that economic
necessary and sufficient catalyst for a successful revolution
Gramsci described this thesis as a form of "iron economistic determinism"
and "historical mysticism."49 He recognized that it might be valid in the c
of Russia in 1917, but this was a special case:
45Note su Machiavelli, 37; trans. Louis Marks in The Modern Prince and Oth
Writings, 135-88.
46Note su Machiavelli, 103. 47Passato e presente, 158.
48Note su Machiavelli, 66-67. 49Ibid., 65.

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 364 THOMAS R. BATES

In [Russia] the state was everything. Civ

latinous. In the West, between state and civ
ship, and in the trembling of the state a
soon manifested.50

As the Czarist State lacked a cultural fortress impressive enough to calm

down an irate and hungry populace, the lightning "war of maneuver" suc-
ceeded without having been prepared by a protracted "war of position" or
"siege." Likewise, the moderate Kerensky regime fell before it had time to
erect even the foundations of a new fortress. Gramsci attributed Trotsky's
theory of "permanent revolution" to these special Russian conditions, and
held that this theory no longer applied to Europe.51 The failure of the revolu-
tions of 1848 and of the Paris Commune in 1871 had spelled the end of the
"war of maneuver" in Europe:
In both military and political art the war of maneuver is ever more a war of
position, and a state wins a war to the extent to which it prepares itself in
peacetime. The massive superstructures of the modern bureaucracies are the
"trenches" in which the war of position is ever more frequently fought.52

In fighting wars of position, revolutionaries must be able to recognize "or-

ganic crises" and their various stages. According to Gramsci, an "organic
crisis" involves the totality of an "historical bloc"-the structure of society as
well as its superstructure. An organic crisis is manifested as a crisis of hege-
mony, in which the people cease to believe the words of the national leaders,
and begin to abandon the traditional parties. The precipitating factor in such a
crisis is frequently the failure of the ruling class in some large undertaking,
such as war, for which it demanded the consent and sacrifices of the people.
The crisis may last a long time, for, as Gramsci wrily observed, "no social
form is ever willing to confess that it has been superseded."53 In combatting
the crisis, the intellectuals of the ruling class may resort to all sorts of
mystification, blaming the failure of the state on an opposition party or on
ethnic and racial minorities, and conducting nationalist campaigns based on ir-
rational appeals to patriotic sentiment. This is a very dangerous moment in
civic life, for if the efforts of the mandarins fail, and if the progressive forces
still fail to impose their own solution, the old ruling class may seek salvation in
a "divine leader." This "Caesar" may give the old order a "breathing spell" by
exterminating the opposing elite and terrorizing its mass support. Or the
contending forces may destroy each other, leaving a foreign power to preside
over the "peace of the graveyard."54
To avoid these pitfalls of an organic crisis is the responsibility of the revolu-
tionary leaders. Gramsci flatly repudiated the politics of tanto peggio, tanto

50Ibid., 68. 51Ibid., 67.

52Ibid., 84. Gramsci's ar
tactic and condemns implic
53Ibid., 42, 50.
54Ibid., 49, 51.

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 GRAMSCI AND THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY 365

meglio ("the worse, the better") as flagrantly irresponsible. This

implication, a repudiation of the Italian Communist Party's atti
Fascism in the early 1920's in which Gramsci had unfortunately
least it may be said that Gramsci learned his lesson, whereas th
even in 1934 commented favorably on Hitler's triumph in Germany
of "dispelling the democratic illusions of the masses and liberating t
the influence of social democracy."55 Gramsci also advised agains
arditismo, or military adventurism, for which the proletariat is les
than the petty bourgeoisie, and which would only fan the flame
Politics must have priority over military action, for "only politics c
possibility of maneuver and movement."56 This was to recognize
tions are easier to prepare in liberal-democratic regimes than in
regimes, for it is precisely the aim of the latter to exclude polit
after his arrest in 1926, was in an excellent position to realize this.
Perhaps the most important practical principle which the co
Left can glean from the theory of hegemony is that an old ord
made to vanish simply by pointing out its evils, any more than a ne
be brought into existence by pointing out its virtues. A social order
how exploitative, cannot be understood simply as a conspiracy
rulers. Rulers who can make a society work, who can make milli
do their bidding and make them do it without the lash, are comp
The meek may be blessed, but they shall not on that account inheri
If the wretched of the earth have always been on the wrong end of
is because someone else knew which was the right end. It is not
workers to gripe about the boss. They must make themselves bet
boss, not only in their moral conduct, but also in their technical kn
Gramsci severely criticized those left-wing intellectuals who
petty crimes and immorality often associated with an oppressed
determinists who justified such behavior on the grounds that
product of his social environment, Gramsci replied that "the enviro
not justify, but only 'explains' the behavior of individuals, and
those historically most passive."57 Revolutionaries must learn t
between behavior which is revolutionary and behavior whic
criminal. For even if criminality may be a form of rebellion against
order, to ennoble it with ethical approval may only serve to reinfor
conduct inferior to that of the ruling class and, therefore, inca
perseding it. "History is, on the contrary, a continuous struggle of
and groups to change what exists in each given moment. But for th
be effective, these individuals and groups must feel superior to wha
pable of educating society, etc."58

55Cited in Angelo Tasca, "Fascism and the European Crisis of the

Century," in Italy from the Risorgimento to Fascism, ed. A. W. Salamo
1970), 294. It is noteworthy that Tasca was expelled from the party for
notions similar to those of the imprisoned Gramsci.
56Note su Machiavelli, 47, 64. 57Passato e presente, 203. 58Ibid.

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366 THOMAS R. BATES

The meek, the ignorant, the foolish, an

understandable their condition, will never
those who are proud, strong, righteous, and
society and create a new culture which, af
riority only when it replaces the old.

University of Oregon.

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