PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT.

BUILDING SAFER LIVES

briefin g

SAFERWORLD
PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT. BUILDING SAFER LIVES

SAFERWORLD
China’s role and
PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT. BUILDING SAFER LIVES

interests in Central Asia

CHINA

Bernardo Mariani

October 2013
 China’s role and
interests in Central Asia
Bernardo Mariani
CHINA

SAFERWORLD

OCTOBER 2013
© Saferworld, October 2013. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means –
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Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material
included in this publication.
 1

1
Introduction

following the collapse of the soviet union , China has endeavoured to

build and strengthen its relations with the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While originally the main
focus of its political and diplomatic activities was to settle the Soviet legacy of disputed
borders, its ties with Central Asia later started to reflect a growing desire to protect
broader economic and security interests in the region.
Today, a substantial network of roads, railways, air flights, communication, and oil and
gas pipelines connects China to Central Asia.1 In 2012, carrying out almost $46 billion
of trade with the region’s five states, China was the most prominent economic actor
and main source of foreign investment in the region. Since China forged diplomatic
relations with the five Central Asian states in 1992, its overall trade with the region has
increased 100-fold.2 Huge financing and foreign direct investment in energy, natural
resource extraction, and commodities, such as the Central Asia gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan to China, the Atyrau-Alashankou oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to
China, significant investments in energy transport and communication in Uzbekistan,
the construction of new roads and tunnels in Tajikistan, and the expansion of road
connections between Kyrgyzstan and China have generated many headlines. The supply
of low-interest loans to credit-deficient central Asian countries such as Tajikistan has
also been a very noticeable feature. In June 2012, former President Hu Jintao announced
that Beijing would offer $10bn in loans to the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO).3 Central Asia also represents a growing market for China’s goods.
In addition to a much deeper economic engagement, the region has also experienced
an increase in political, diplomatic, and cultural ties with China. All five countries in
the region have signed strategic agreements with China. High-level visits by Chinese
officials have intensified. Confucius Institutes, which offer language courses and
cultural programmes, are now present in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan.4 The SCO Network University was launched in 2010 as a new platform for
cooperation in education and people-to-people exchanges.5
Security and stability in Central Asia matter a lot to China not only for the safety
and protection of its own investments in the region but also because of the almost

1 Towards New Glory of the Silk Road, Speech by H.E. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic
of China at the Opening Session of the Second China-Eurasia Expo at the China-Eurasia Economic Development Forum,
Urumqi, 2 September 2012.
2 Xinhua, Xi proposes a ‘new Silk Road’ with Central Asia, 8 September 2013, www.chinadaily.com.cn/sunday/2013-09/08/
content_16952160.htm
3 Reuters, Chinese President Hu Jintao said on Thursday that Beijing will offer USD 10bn in loans to the member states
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 6 June 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/us-china-sco-loans-
idUSBRE85602920120607
4 University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Confucius Institutes Around the Globe, http://confuciusinstitute.unl.edu/institutes.shtml
5 The Central Web Portal of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO University project: definitely successful, 8 June
2011, http://infoshos.ru/en/?idn=8338
2   CHINA’S ROLE AND INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

inevitable spillover effects that insecurity and instability might have within China’s
north-western region of Xinjiang. Furthermore, China has started to become a player,
although until now only tentatively, in Central Asia’s security landscape.
For the five Central Asian nations, China’s increased engagement presents many
opportunities, but also challenges, at a critical juncture in the region’s history. While
China’s presence is received with varying degrees of acceptance, tolerance, or mistrust
among civil society, its engagement has been welcomed by the political elites of the
region for the opportunities it creates to fuel economic growth and for putting the
local governments in a better negotiation position vis-à-vis the old dominant power,
Russia, as well as Western states.
While China’s economic footprint in the region continues to expand, key questions
remain concerning China’s main interests here and the future of its engagement.
What lies at the forefront of China-Central Asia relations? Is there a grand strategy for
Central Asia on the part of China? Is China really intent on reorienting Central Asia
towards Beijing and away from the world’s other major powers? Is China’s increasing
energy appetite, in particular its access to raw materials to fuel its economic develop-
ment, the key factor motivating its massive investments in the region? Or is China
primarily motivated by the security concerns about Xinjiang, where the native
population agitates for greater autonomy? Are China’s interests in the region ‘safe’?
Or may its economic interests, energy security, economic investments, even the lives
of its citizens, come under threat from insecurity and conflicts that periodically flare
up in the region? What are the implications of Chinese increased engagement for
conflict management in Central Asia? This paper uses very broad brushstrokes to try to
answer these questions and paint a basic overview of the economic, political, security,
and energy dimensions of China-Central Asia relations. After briefly describing
relevant foreign policy principles that inform China’s engagement in Central Asia, the
paper explores the reasons behind China’s engagement in the region. Policy statements
and rhetoric are then examined, as are significant Chinese economic and security
interventions. The paper ends with some tentative conclusions and an assessment of
some of the challenges that the China-Central Asia relationship will face in the future.
 3

2
Central Asia in
China’s foreign policy

2.1 Foreign policy to comprehend china ’ s engagement in central asia , it is important

principles to first analyse the main principles that underpin its foreign policy. Chinese foreign
policy is still informed, at least in the official discourse, by the 1954 Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence: respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression,
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence.6
Chinese officials emphasise that foreign policy questions in Central Asia, as well as in
other regions around the world, derive from the Five Principles. They portray China
as a developing country which is not part of any power bloc such as that around the
United States, and which through the Five Principles pursues the road of peaceful
development. Emphasis is placed on China never seeking hegemony, or wanting to
impose its will on other countries.7 By solemnly declaring to the world never to seek
hegemony, China tells its smaller Central Asian neighbours and the world at large that
its rapid economic development and the strengthening of its military capability not
only will not be a threat but also offer opportunities to its neighbours and partners in
what could be described as a ‘win-win situation’.8
The Chinese policy discourse often stresses the distinctiveness of China’s approach as a
responsible great power (fu zeren de daguo) that respects other countries’ sovereignty,
in contrast to what are perceived as Western powers’ efforts to interfere in other
countries’ social systems, development paths, and internal and external policies.
China’s alternative world model emphasises instead multipolarity and equal treatment
of all countries “no matter they are big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor”.9 Each
national government alone, acting on the basis of its own national conditions, has the
right and ability to properly handle matters related to domestic, political, economic, or
social affairs, including internal conflict. Such a view on the conduct of international
relations is clearly informed by China’s own history and its sensitivity on issues such as
Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

6 The Five Principles were originally codified in treaty form between China and India in the preamble to the Agreement on
trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, which was signed in 1954. They were incorporated a year
later in a statement issued at the historic Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia.
7 Carrying Forward Good-neighborly Friendship and Achieving Common Development, Keynote speech of Wu Bangguo,
Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress at the Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan,
23 September 2011, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t864104.shtml
8 Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind, in Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC
National Congress, 16 November 2012, www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_11.
htm
9 Ibid
4   CHINA’S ROLE AND INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

China’s position on most disputes around the world is that they should be solved by
mutual understanding, sincere dialogue, and peaceful negotiation, and it opposes
interference from the outside. This has been China’s view and approach on resolving its
border issues with Central Asian countries, as well as on major international crises and
hotspot regions, including the war between Iran and Iraq, the struggle between Israel
and the Arabs, the rivalry between North and South Korea, the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, and the most recent upheavals in the Middle East, including the current
Syrian conflict. Therefore the core idea behind the Five Principles as interpreted by
China today is sovereignty – that one state has no right to interfere in the internal
affairs of another state.
However, as one Chinese scholar put it, “principles must be understood in the context
of reality.” 10 The reality is that the balance of protecting China’s interests overseas while
maintaining a steadfast commitment to the principles of state sovereignty and non-
interference will become ever more precarious.11 As Chinese officials and scholars are
becoming more aware of the tensions between the principle of non-interference and
China’s responsibilities as a global power and have started to realise that “attempts to
separate politics and business do not generally succeed”,12 China has become more
flexible in its interpretation of non-interference and has been willing to take a more
active diplomatic role in the resolution of conflicts, for example the role that it has
played in Sudan and South Sudan over the past two years. When voting at the UN
on sanctions or interventions aimed at resolving or dealing with major international
crises, instead of using its veto power, China often abstains because “As a permanent
Security Council member China’s negative vote would constitute a veto, angering
countries who favor intervention. By not voting or casting an abstention, China has
allowed several interventions to go ahead without reversing its commitment to non-
intervention.” 13
While security and development are the main issues confronting Central Asia, it is
interesting to see how security and development are interpreted by China. On the
one hand, in order to develop properly a country needs a peaceful and stable internal
and external environment because “nothing could be achieved without a peaceful
and stable environment”.14 On the other hand, security is often seen from the prism
of development: underdevelopment generates insecurity and instability and is a root
cause of conflict, or in other words, investing in development offers the best guarantee
for promoting security. The security-development nexus was initially based on China’s
national experience and later translated into foreign policy, in particular through
the promulgation by former President Hu of ‘the harmonious society’ concept where
development and security are closely linked. The implications and conclusions to be
drawn for dealing with political and ethnic tensions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, or indeed other conflicts across the broader Central Asia region, are quite
clear: economic development has the power to attenuate, or even eliminate, political
and ethnic tensions.

2.2 Foreign policy Previous analyses have already warned against the assumption of a unitary, “monolithic
actors Chinese dragon”,15 producing a single and neatly-bound Chinese position on all
matters related to foreign policy. Instead, the formulation and implementation of
China’s foreign policy stance involves multiple institutions, factions, and ideologies.16

10 Lu G, Troubles in Kyrgyzstan: what action should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization take?, Lianhe Zaobao Wang, June
2010, quoted in European Council on Foreign Relations, op cit p 11
11 Campbell I, Wheeler T, Attree L, Butler DM and Mariani B, China and Conflict-Affected States – Between Principle and
Pragmatism, Saferworld, 2012, pp 8–12
12 Taylor I, China’s new role in Africa, (Lynne Rienner, 2009), p. 111
13 Nathan A, Principles of China’s Foreign Policy, Asia for Educators, Columbia University 2009, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/
special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm
14 Wen J, op cit
15 Large D, Beyond “Dragon in the Bush”: The Study of China-Africa Relations, African Affairs (2008), vol 107 no 426, p 46
16 Jakobsen L and Knox D, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI Policy Paper 26, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), 2010
 SAFERWORLD 5

This also applies to relations with Central Asia where a range of key actors are involved
in the formation and implementation of Beijing’s relations with the five countries of
the region. The State Council has overall responsibility for China’s Central Asia policy.
The International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and
the Politburo’s Leading Group of Foreign Affairs are also crucial in policy formation.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has official responsibility for the implementation of
China’s diplomatic relations with Central Asian republics. However, the Ministry
of Commerce appears to have more influence as it manages economic relations and
development assistance. The National Energy Administration that operates under the
National Development and Reform Commission plays a key role in matters related to
the top-priority area of energy cooperation. It takes the lead in, among others, launching
international energy cooperation, participating in the formulation of policies related
to energy resources, finance, taxation, and environment protection, and making
recommendations on energy price adjustments.17 The Ministry of Finance, the state-
owned China Development Bank, the China Export-Import Bank, and the China
Investment Corporation also play important roles in the economic relationship.
The People’s Liberation Army and the Department of Public Security also play crucial
roles in counter-terrorism cooperation, especially within the framework of SCO. State-
owned enterprises also have influence in the process of policy creation, formalisation,
and implementation. Among the most prominent in Central Asia are the state-owned
energy corporations: Sinopec, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC),
and the China National Offshore Oil Company. Although operating within the policy
framework set out by the Chinese party-state, such companies, with their huge business
portfolios and their own domestic and international interests – which do not necessarily
coincide with those of the party-state – can be powerful policy shapers.

17 www.nea.gov.cn/
6  

3
China’s main interests
in Central Asia

despite its deepened engagement in the region over the past decade ,
China’s interest in Central Asia has to be put into perspective. Central Asia does not
lie at the forefront of China’s main international, economic, and security concerns.
Traditionally, and even more so in recent years, China’s assertive proclamations and
actions have focused on more fundamental zones of interests, in particular the relation-
ship with the United States, Sino-Japanese relations, cross-strait relations with Taiwan,
tensions in the Korean peninsula, and relations with India.
Claims that China has hidden motives in Central Asia and is pursuing a grand geo-
political strategy aimed at ultimate control and dominance of the region are excessive
and exaggerated. China has neither the capacity nor the intention to be Central Asia’s
hegemon. As it has been argued, “there is no grand strategy for Central Asia on the
part of Beijing… What there is, however, is a confluence of all the activities of these
multifarious actors, which, regardless of what Beijing wants or doesn’t want, means
that China is nonetheless the most consequential actor in the region”.18 Others have
argued that China’s strategy towards Central Asia “may be a reflection of China’s larger
strategy toward the external world, which involves a lot of natural resources coming in
and a lot of trade going out.” 19
However, the lack of a grand design does not mean that Chinese foreign policy in
Central Asia is not realistic or strategic or that it lacks any geopolitical connotation.
There is a range of pragmatic issues and interests involved in China-Central Asia
relations. Scholars and analysts studying China’s engagement in Central Asia do not
always concur on what is the main driver, in particular whether economic issues,
especially natural resource extraction, or internal security issues, that is, the Xinjiang
question, are the main priority. What is clear is that both sets of interests have a direct
relationship to China’s domestic issues and that they are interconnected.
After three decades of very high growth rates, urbanisation, and a breathtaking social
transformation – and with only one per cent of the world’s oil reserves for the second-
largest consumption – China needs to secure sustainable energy supply sources from
elsewhere. Countries in Central Asia, especially those with large hydrocarbon reserves
and mineral deposits, have become for China premier investment destinations, given
their geographic proximity and the opportunity they also offer to secure continental
energy supplies, thus reducing Beijing’s dependence on maritime routes.

18 Petersen A, quoted by Kucera J in What is China’s Policy Driver in Central Asia? EurasiaNet, 2 January 2013
19 Ibid
 SAFERWORLD 7

However, China-Central Asia policy transcends a mere quest for resources. As stated
in the 2011 White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development, the “central goal of China’s
diplomacy is to create a peaceful and stable international environment for its develop-
ment.” 20 At the same time, through promoting economic development, China also
aims to stabilise the Central Asian states, which are important for the security of the
region, including the Chinese region of Xinjiang that borders former Soviet Central
Asia. There is an intrinsic link connecting China’s engagement in Central Asia to the
Uyghur question.21 China wants the region to develop and stabilise as underdevelop-
ment, instability, and possible conflict may spill over and undermine its efforts to
develop, ‘pacify’, and more strongly bind Xinjiang to the rest of China. It also wants its
Central Asian neighbours, which have the largest Uyghur populations of any countries
except for China, to take a more active part in the fight against Uyghur separatism.22
Unrest in Kyrgyzstan, that shares a 1,000-km border with China, and in the Ferghana
valley, that spreads across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, runs the risk of
disrupting trade, energy supplies, and, ultimately, to threaten its own internal stability,
especially in Xinjiang. This was clearly demonstrated by the 2010 riots in Kyrgyzstan
between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, which “directly affected Xinjiang’s exports there,
as well as to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.” 23

20 Government of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development (2011), p 3
21 Laruelle, M and Peyrouse S, China as a Neighbour: Central Asian Perspectives and Strategies, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
& Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Center affiliated with Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International
Studies and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, p.14
22 Doyon J, Strengthening the SCO in The New Great Game in Central Asia, European Council on Foreign Relations, September
2011, p 3
23 China’s Central Asia Problem, Asia Report No 244, International Crisis Group, 27 February 2013, p 11
8  

4
Policy statements
and rhetoric

chinese and central asia leaders visit each other very frequently ,
both bilaterally and on multilateral occasions, signing agreements and exchanging
opinions on bilateral relations and regional issues of common concern. Declarations
and policy statements issued in the course of such visits often feature good neighbourly
friendship, mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, and the pursuit of
common development goals as the basic principles for cooperation.
Topics related to common development, economic, and trade cooperation often take
precedence in the policy statements by Chinese leaders who have emphasised common
development as the fundamental purpose of good neighbourly relations.24 In a speech
at the Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan in 2011, Wu Bangguo, former Chairman of the
Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, announced China would
continue this pattern of “good-neighbourly friendship and common development” as
a means “to write a new chapter of peace, cooperation and harmony.” 25
In September 2012, former Premier Wen Jiabao declared the Eurasian continent to
be “one of the most promising regions in the world in terms of consumption and
investment” calling on further “opening markets to each other”,26 as well as advancing
“cooperation in cross-border infrastructure to accelerate the connectivity process” and
deepening “culture and people-to-people exchanges”.27
In a joint written interview by the media of SCO member states published in June
2012, former President Hu emphasised that “Through the signing of the Program of
Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation, member states have gained significant
progress in the cooperation projects of transportation, energy and communications.” 28
He praised the new SCO concept of development which consists in adapting “to the
general trend of economic globalization”,29 taking “into account the features of regional
economic development”,30 achieving “mutual benefit through complementing each
other with advantages of member states based on their own strategic planning”,31

24 Wu B, op cit
25 Ibid
26 Wen J, op cit
27 Ibid
28 President Hu Jintao Receives the Joint Written Interview by Media of the SCO Member States, 6 June 2012,
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t942719.shtml
29 Ibid
30 Ibid
31 Ibid
 SAFERWORLD 9

creating “favorable conditions for member states’ development”, and finally helping
“them grow the economy and improve people’s livelihood.” 32
During visits to Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in July 2013, Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed Beijing’s support of development in Central Asia,
its “endorsement of measures taken by them to maintain stability” and its “aim of
injecting a new vitality into the region”. He also stated that the leaders of the three
countries consider China “a trustworthy friend and partner”, and “highly value
Beijing’s huge influence in regional and international affairs as a responsible world
power”.33 These visits served as preparation for a state visit of Chinese President Xi
Jinping to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in September 2013.
A typical feature in Chinese official statements is that China does not seek political
concessions in return for its financial support. Unlike other major financial and
economic actors that often place conditions on loans and other financial instruments,
Chinese financial assistance is provided without any “additional conditions” and “on
the basis of equal partnership.” 34
Enhancing political trust to safeguard regional peace and stability also features promin-
ently in official statements by Chinese leaders.35 At the SCO summit held in Beijing in
June 2012, the Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cheng Guoping, stated that
“the peace and stability of Central Asia relates to the core interests of China, as well
as the members of the SCO. Our determination to maintain the peace and stability of
Central Asia is steadfast. We will absolutely not allow the unrest that happened in West
Asia and North Africa to happen in Central Asia.” 36
At the regional level, Chinese policy statements lavish compIiments on what are often
described as the “remarkable achievements” and “immense prospects” of the SCO,
which paved “the way for people in the region to overcome Cold War legacy and
conduct friendly cooperation”,37 and “played an important role in maintaining regional
peace and stability”.38 In a joint interview by media of the SCO Member States, Hu
Jintao also pointed out the contribution made by SCO in “accelerating the peaceful
reconstruction of Afghanistan” and becoming “an indispensable force to deal with
the security issue in the region.” 39 In the interview, he also set out China’s new security
concept in Central Asia, focusing on “comprehensive security, common security and
cooperative security” and enhancing “capability against real threats and risks”. He
added: “We will stick to the principle that regional affairs should be decided by countries
in the region, keep a close watch on the impact of turmoil outside the region and play
a bigger role in the peaceful reconstruction process of Afghanistan. We will target the
core issues and key factors of regional security, establish a more comprehensive security
cooperation system and enhance the capacity and efficiency of preventing and
addressing risks. We will reinforce communication, coordination and collaboration
on major international and regional issues and maintain the common security and
development interests of member states.” 40

32 Ibid
33 CNTV, China vows to deepen friendship with Central Asian countries, 19 July 2013,
http://english.cntv.cn/20130719/105257.shtml
34 Turkish Weekly, China pledges support for Kyrgyz infrastructure projects, 15 July 2013
35 Wen J op cit
36 China National Radio, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Unrest in West Asia and North Africa not allowed in Central Asia, 8 June
2012, http://news.sohu.com/20120608/n345027562.shtml
37 Immense Prospects for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Keynote speech by Cheng Guoping, Assistant Minister of
Foreign Affairs at the Third Lanting Forum, 8 June 2011, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t828793.shtml
38 Hu J, op cit
39 Ibid
40 Ibid
10  

5
Significant interventions
and engagement

5.1 Economic the economic importance of china ’ s role and impact in Central Asia is
engagement apparent in each of the five Central Asian republics for whom China has become
a major, if not the leading, economic partner through natural resource extraction
projects, investments in infrastructure, and low interest loans. Over ten per cent of
China’s oil and gas imports now come from Central Asia. The speed at which trade
relations have deepened is staggering. This has brought many benefits to Central Asian
countries: their foreign currency reserves have increased; governments’ finances have
become more secure; and there has been a rise in investment and development.

China’s trade data with Central Asia in 2012 41

Export Value Import Value Year on year of 2011 %

(China as (China as
Trade Value the exporter) the importer) Trade Export Import
Country (US$1,000) (US$1,000) (US$1,000) Value Value Value

Kazakhstan 25,676,790 11,001,670 14,675,120 2.9 15.0 -4.7

Kyrgyzstan 5,162,470 5,073,510 88,960 3.7 4.0 -9.4

Tajikistan 1,856,700 1,747,870 10,883 -10.3 -12.5 50.7

Turkmenistan 10,372,710 1,699,330 8,673,380 89.4 116.7 84.8

Uzbekistan 2,874,680 1,783,050 1,091,630 32.7 31.2 35.2

The bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and China have assumed an important
strategic role with expanding commercial and strategic cooperation between the two
countries, which was formalised through the establishment of an all-round strategic
partnership in June 2011.42 An Intergovernmental Cooperation Commission was
created in May 2004. China has sought to obtain a leading role in cultivating and
developing energy industries in Kazakhstan, harnessing Kazakhstan’s oil, natural
gas, minerals, including uranium, and other major energy resources. The Atyrau-
Alashankou pipeline that was developed by the CNPC and the Kazakh company
KazMunaiGaz is an important source of oil for the Dushanzi refinery in Xinjiang.43
In the largest foreign purchase ever by a Chinese company, in 2005, CNPC bought

41 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Department of European Affairs, http://ozs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/
date/201302/20130200025487.shtml
42 Joint Statement between China and Kazakhstan on developing all-round strategic partnership, 14 June 2011,
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t830280.shtml
43 Zasztowt K, China’s Policy Towards Central Asian SCO States, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 20 July 2012,
www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=11163
 SAFERWORLD 11

PetroKazakhstan 44 for $4.2bn.45 In 2009, CNPC announced that it would lend $5bn to
KazMunaiGaz and gained a stake in MangistauMunaiGas, a significant oil developer
in Kazakhstan.46 Crude oil imported from Kazakhstan in 2011 accounted for 4.39 per
cent of China’s total crude oil imports.47 Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev
has made to date 19 official visits to China,48 while Chinese leaders have also frequently
visited Kazakhstan. During President Xi’s visit in September 2013, a series of contracts
worth about $30bn were signed, including deals in the oil and gas sector.49 A China-
Kazakhstan Entrepreneurs Committee, the first of its kind in Central Asia, was also
founded.50
In Turkmenistan, its second-biggest trade partner in the region with rich deposits of
natural gas, China has intensified its engagement, especially over the past decade. An
agreement on Expansion of Natural Gas Supply was signed in November 2011. It was
preceded by the signing on 29 August 2008 of an agreement establishing an Inter-
governmental Cooperation Committee with four sub-commissions on economy and
trade, energy, humanities, and security. This resulted in the construction of a 1,830-km
gas pipeline, which was completed in December 2009, starting in Turkmenistan’s
eastern fields and crossing Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before connecting to the Chinese
grid. By end of February 2013, a total 46.77 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas had
been transported by the Central Asia–China pipeline with a total value of $15.72bn.51
During President Xi’s state visit to Turkmenistan in September 2013, bilateral relations
between China and Turkmenistan were lifted to a strategic partnership level.52 The two
sides agreed to further expand the gas pipeline in order to boost annual gas exports to
China to 65 bcm per year by 2016.53
In Kyrgyzstan, strategically located at the intersection of geopolitical interests in
Central Asia and a crucial port of entry for oil from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
Chinese companies are developing infrastructure, including important road networks
and power lines. A major railway connection linking China with Kyrgyzstan’s southern
provinces and Uzbekistan 54 is also under discussion. In July 2013, Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi was reported as saying that China would continue to provide
Kyrgyzstan with “all kinds of support” for Kyrgyz infrastructure projects.55 In September
2013, China–Kyrgyzstan relations were upgraded to a strategic partnership level.56
In the last two decades, trade with China has grown enormously and China has
become Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest trade partner, behind Russia.57 In the words of a
former Kyrgyz cabinet minister, “every small business in Kyrgyzstan is reliant on trade
with China.” 58 Particularly important is the re-export of Chinese consumer goods to
neighbouring Uzbekistan and to Kazakhstan and Russia.

44 CNPC Announces PetroKazakhstan Acquisition, Xinhua News Agency, 27 October 2005

45 CNPC secures PetroKazakhstan bid, BBC News, 26 October 2005
46 Melvin C, Chinese Foreign Policy: a Chronology April–June 2009, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Research &
Assessment Branch, February 2010, p 15
47 China’s crude oil imports by source, US Energy Information Administration, 4 September 2012, revised on 22 April 2013, p 9
48 CCTV, Xi Jinping holds welcoming ceremony for Kazak president’s state visit, 6 April 2013 http://news.cntv.cn/2013/04/06/
VIDE1365246481732905.shtml
49 The Economist, Rising China, sinking Russia, 14 September 2013; CCTV, China, Kazakhstan sign contracts worth $30 bn,
7 Sept 2013, http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20130907/103431.shtml
50 CCTV, Xi Jinping attends China-Kazakhstan Entrepreneurs Committee founding ceremony, 8 Sept 2013 http://english.cntv.
cn/program/newsupdate/20130908/100547.shtml
51 International Finance News, Gazprom Delays Construction of China Pipeline, 4 September 2013, http://paper.people.com.
cn/gjjrb/html/2013-09/05/content_1293947.htm
52 Xinhua, China, Turkmenistan lift bilateral ties to strategic partnership, 3 September 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/china/2013-09/03/c_132688667.htm
53 International Finance News, op. cit.; Makhmudov R, Global Times, Xi tour demonstrates a microcosm of Central Asian
cooperation, 18 September 2013, www.globaltimes.cn/content/812262.shtml
54 Smith G M, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project brings political risks, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 3 July 2012,
http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5731
55 Turkish Weekly, op cit
56 Xinhua, China, Kyrgyzstan lift ties to strategic partnership, 11 Sept 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-
09/11/c_132711657.htm
57 Nichol J, Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, 26 October 2012,
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-690.pdf
58 Pantucci R, Li L, Decision Time for Central Asia: Russia or China? Posted in Open Democracy, 28 January 2013,
http://raffaellopantucci.com/tag/china-kyrgyzstan/
12   CHINA’S ROLE AND INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

In Uzbekistan, China has made important investments in the strategic sectors of energy,
transport, and telecommunications and has become the second-biggest trading
partner and its biggest investor. A Memorandum of Understanding on the Expansion
of Trade and Investment and Financial Cooperation was signed on 16 June 2004,
while an agreement on establishing an Intergovernmental Cooperation Commission
was signed in October 2011. Bilateral trade volume reached $2.87bn in 2012, growing
almost 50 times since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992.59
In the same year, China had 35 direct investment projects in Uzbekistan with a total
investment of nearly $4bn.60 According to the data of State Statistics Committee of the
Republic of Uzbekistan, 347 companies with Chinese investors, including 57 with
100 per cent Chinese capital, operate in Uzbekistan.61 In 2012, Uzbekistan’s first deputy
prime minister confirmed that Chinese banks had supplied more than $5bn in favour-
able loans for industrial projects.62 Former Chinese President Hu and Uzbek President
Islam Karimov signed a joint announcement to establish a strategic partnership on
6 June 2012.63 During President Xi’s state visit in September 2013, the two sides agreed
to further strengthen their cooperation in the energy sector by ensuring long-term,
safe and stable operation of the China–Uzbekistan gas pipeline, promoting joint
exploration and development of oil, gas, and natural uranium, and tapping the coop-
eration potential in renewable energies.64 31 agreements to implement projects worth
a total of $15bn were reportedly signed.65
In Tajikistan, the poorest of the five Central Asian countries, but strategically important
given the long border with the Xinjiang region, China has developed roads, for example
the Dushanbe-Chanak highway, power lines, and hydropower plants. China is also a
vital source of credit. In 2004, Tajikistan received from China over $600m of a $900m
development loans package that had been offered to SCO member states.66 In June
2012, it was announced that ten new deals signed by the Tajik president in Beijing
“would bring Tajikistan about USD 1bn in new Chinese investment, loans and aid”.67
As a sign of the growing importance that China attaches to its relations with Tajikistan,
on 20 May 2013, President Xi and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon signed a joint
announcement to establish a strategic partnership aimed at boosting bilateral cooper-
ation between the two countries.68

5.2 Security There is a long list of security threats in Central Asia, from domestic grievances
engagement undermining stability to regional ethnic tensions and negative spillover effects from
Afghanistan. Currently, the biggest long-term security concern is related to the
planned withdrawal in 2014 of NATO troops from Afghanistan. The key question for
China is whether the region will become more unstable after NATO’s withdrawal.
The specific concern in this regard is whether separatist organisations operating in
Xinjiang may find a sanctuary, as well as financial, technical, and training support in
post-2014 Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan. The prospect of an increase in Islamic
insurgencies in the region, possibly coupled with terrorist activities within China’s
borders, is a very daunting prospect for Chinese leaders.

59 China.org.cn, Ambassador talks China-Uzbekistan milestone, 21 January 2012,

www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-01/21/content_24437462.htm
60 Ibid
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Cooperation of the Republic of Uzbekistan with the countries of the
Asia and the Pacific, Uzbek – Chinese Relations http://mfa.uz/eng/inter_cooper/uzbekistan_countries/uzb_asia_pacific/
62 Dzyubenko O, China to expand C. Asian presence with USD 10bn in loans, Reuters, 5 December 2012,
www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/05/china-centralasia-idUSL5E8N59DS20121205
63 Uzbekistan National News Agency, Uzbekistan, China Sign Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership, 6 June 2012,
http://uza.uz/en/politics/2769/
64 Xinhua, China, Uzbekistan vow to deepen strategic partnership, 9 September 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2013-09/09/c_125354570.htm
65 Uzbekistan National News Agency: Uzbekistan, China Aim for New Horizons of Strategic Partnership, 10 September 2013,
http://uza.uz/en/politics/3758/; The Economist, op cit
66 Pomfret R, Development Decisions – A critical examination of the Rakhmon government’s infrastructure development policy
in Tajikistan, Spring 2011
67 Tajikistan Monitor, Tajikistan secures new Chinese loans and investment, 18 June 2012, http://tjmonitor.wordpress.
com/2012/06/18/tajikistan-secures-new-chinese-loans-and-investment/
68 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-05/20/c_132395743.htm
 SAFERWORLD 13

More immediate threats deriving from domestic grievances, pervasive corruption,

transnational crime, socioeconomic problems, coupled with rising nationalism,
suspicion, and antipathy among the general public of China’s role in the national
economies, also make China’s investments vulnerable.69 One of the problems for
Chinese engagement in Central Asia is that despite efforts to develop ‘people-to-
people relations’ China’s engagement is predominantly the purview of official state-
to-state relations, meaning that the official discourse inevitably focuses on issues
related to national, rather than human, security. Without channels through which to
engage Chinese policy makers, alternative voices, especially from civil society, often go
unheard. In the extreme, it could lead to support on the part of China that essentially
only secures regime stability. Without any effective form of dialogue to connect with
host communities and operating in environments often characterised by “rising
nationalism, ingrained suspicions about Chinese expansionism and few tangible
grassroots benefits”,70 Chinese investments run the risk of having a political, but not
social, licence to operate, thus “becoming targets for local residents voicing a variety
of complaints.”71
Despite its massive economic footprint and its security concerns, China’s direct
engagement in the region’s security problems has been limited, deferring “for now to
Russia on Central Asian security and military issues”72 and showing no “immediate
interest in increasing its role outside a multilateral framework”.73 China has stated
“its determination not to deploy its military in Central Asia, regardless of the threat
to Chinese citizens or investment.” 74 What type of event would foreseeably trigger a
rethink of such policy and raise the possibility for China to deploy its military in the
region? Certainly, this did not happen during the 2010 unrest in Kyrgyzstan, which
nevertheless appeared to be of great concern to China,75 nor during the so-called 2005
‘Tulip Revolution’. But one may wonder whether a direct threat to a flagship energy
project in the region may be such an event.76
The SCO is the only intergovernmental body addressing security issues that involves
China. It helps China strengthen its political ties with Central Asian states and stabilise
the neighbourhood of Xinjiang and to establish a collective discourse on the common
non-traditional security threats they face, including terrorism, transnational crime,
and natural disasters. At the first SCO summit in 2001, SCO member states signed the
Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism,77 which
identifies the fight against the “three evil forces” as the major task of the organisation.
Since then, SCO member states have signed various security cooperation documents,
such as the SCO Convention Against Terrorism, the Anti-drugs Cooperation Agree-
ment, and the Agreement on Joint Fight Against Crimes. The security portfolio of the
organisation has gradually expanded in broader areas including strategic security,
defence, law enforcement, information security, and the fight against transnational
organised crime. The SCO has two permanent agencies: the Secretariat located in
Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure headquartered in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan.
China’s military cooperation with other SCO countries focuses mainly on bilateral and
multilateral counter-terrorism exercises, which are conducted on a regular basis. The
first took place in 2002 with Kyrgyzstan and was followed by more than 20 bilateral

69 International Crisis Group, op cit p. 14

70 Ibid
71 Ibid
72 International Crisis Group, op cit p 22
73 Ibid
74 International Crisis Group, op cit p. 6
75 In 2010 a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: “We are deeply concerned over the developments of
situation in Kyrgyzstan and hope to see early restoration of order and stability in the country and that relevant issues can be
settled through the legal means. The Chinese Foreign Ministry and Embassy in Kyrgyzstan have launched the emergency
mechanism and follow the developments closely.” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference,
9 April 2010 www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t678446.htm
76 International Crisis Group, op cit p 6
77 Refworld, www.refworld.org/docid/49f5d9f92.html
14   CHINA’S ROLE AND INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

and multilateral exercises with other SCO members.78 For example, in the autumn of
2010, a joint anti-terror exercise involving 1,000 Chinese army and air force officers
and soldiers took place at the Matybulak base, near Gvardeisky in Kazakhstan, as part
of the SCO’s ‘Peace Mission 2010’.79 More recently, on 11 August 2013, China and
Kyrgyzstan held a joint anti-terror drill, under the auspices of the SCO. The exercises
took place along the border between the two countries. Around 460 armed police
from both countries took part, practising new weapons and manoeuvres. The drill
aimed to improve both countries’ abilities to cooperate in their response to terrorist
threats.80
Officially, China seems content with what SCO has agreed and its future prospects.
A more attentive analysis however reveals that Chinese leaders are also aware of the
fact that the multilateral security dimension within the SCO remains underdeveloped.
This has, in part at least, been recognised by some top Chinese officials who, for
example, have pointed out that SCO needs to “put in place a full-fledged system for
security cooperation” 81 and “coordinate and formulate common positions on major
international political, security, economic and financial issues, and become more
capable and efficient in preventing and managing crises.” 82 Other Chinese leaders have
pointed out the importance of strengthening security cooperation by enhancing the
SCO’s “capacity of resisting real threats”, in particular the “three forces” that “are getting
active again”,83 as well as drug trafficking and transnational organised crime at a time
when “the security situation in the region is more complex as regional and international
hotspot issues keep emerging.” 84 On a more practical level, there have been recom-
mendations from the Chinese side to
“establish a more comprehensive security cooperation system, actively implement the
Shanghai convention on fighting against the ‘three forces’, earnestly implement the
bilateral security cooperation agreements, deepen security dialogue and consultation and
information exchange, continue to hold regular joint anti-terrorism exercises, enhance
security cooperation on large events, strive to increase the organizational capacity for
action and rapid response capability, fiercely combat the ‘three forces’ and effectively curb
drug trafficking, arms smuggling and other transnational organized crimes to ensure
lasting peace and stability in the region”.85
At the 2012 annual SCO summit held in Beijing, a rule was adopted providing for a
collective response to events “threatening the peace, stability and security of a member
state of the SCO or the entire region.” 86 Theoretically, such a rule gives SCO member
states the right to intervene politically and diplomatically, although not militarily, in
each other’s internal affairs in the event of an outbreak of internal conflict. It was a not
insignificant development whose practical impact, however, remains to be seen.
Western analysts and commentators have been much less upbeat, if not utterly
pessimistic, about the achievements and future prospects of the SCO. They have pointed
out that there is a significant gap between the organisation’s declaratory statements and
the cooperative actions that need to be put in place to implement them. In particular,
SCO has failed to coordinate joint activities against drug trafficking, or to become a
forum to discuss water disputes. It has never managed to react to large-scale crises in
any one of its member states. Its silence during the Kyrgyz unrest of 2010 “underscored
the institutional weaknesses that limit its effectiveness as a security body.” 87

78 International Crisis Group, op cit p 20

79 Chinese Ministry of Defence, official web portal of Peace Mission 2010, SCO Joint Anti-terrorism Exercise,
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/SpecialReports/SCO%20Joint%20Military%20Exercises.htm
80 People’s Daily, China, Kyrgyzstan hold joint anti-terror exercises, 13 August 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/90786/8362119.html
81 Cheng G, op cit
82 Ibid
83 Wu B, op cit
84 Ibid
85 Ibid
86 Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, Regional affairs should be solved through regional consultations: SCO,
7 June 2012, www.gov.cn/misc/2012-06/07/content_2155909.htm
87 International Crisis Group, op cit p 5
 SAFERWORLD 15

It is difficult to predict how the SCO will evolve, given Russia’s integration projects
with the Central Asian republics. It appears unlikely that SCO, beyond declaratory
statements, will become any time soon an active international alliance, able to carry
out its own security interventions. Its future prospects hinge mainly on Sino-Russian
relations in the region. While in the last two decades China and Russia have made great
strides in energy, investment, high technology, and military technology cooperation,88
and share similar security concerns, and both wish to cooperate to counter US influence
in the region, the reality is that Russia also has a clear geopolitical objective of reassert-
ing control over Central Asia, especially through plans for a Eurasian Union, which, in
the long term at least, will run contrary to a deepening of the SCO and will hardly fit
with China’s expanding economic, political, and diplomatic presence. Although Russia
is a founding member of the SCO, it also uses another organisation in the region, the
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to further its political, security, and
military objectives. It remains unclear what practical cooperative engagement the two
organisations will be able to pursue in the future.
Any muscular military intervention in Central Asia, even attempts to have a military
footprint through setting up military bases, such as those that Russia and the US have,
would run contrary to China’s principle of non-interference and has been categorically
rejected by China. However, as its economic engagement in the region deepens, and
given the challenges posed by an insecure and unstable environment, it is hard to see
how China will be able to protect its interest without a more proactive engagement in
the stability and security of the region.

88 Open up a New Chapter for China-Russia Strategic Partnership of Coordination, Remarks by Hu Jintao, President of the
People’s Republic of China at the Concert Marking the 10th Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness,
Friendship and Cooperation Between China and Russia, Moscow, 16 June 2011, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t833497.
shtml
16  

6
Conclusions

driven by economic interests , especially the pursuit of resource security and

the desire to preserve stability and security in its Xinjiang region, China’s substantial
engagement with Central Asia has triggered what has been dubbed ‘The New Great
Game’89 in a region where the influence and interests of Russia, Europe, and the US
often collide. As China’s economic engagement in Central Asia continues to expand,
its relative influence in the region with respect to Russia and Western countries has
grown alongside it. There is no doubt that China’s economic dynamism and expansion
has the potential to be a ‘win-win’ arrangement that benefits China, as well as Central
Asian states for whom increasing Chinese trade and investments are a catalyst for
growth.
Through its diplomatic relations and growing economic engagement, China does have
an impact on the internal affairs of Central Asia. But China’s involvement and influence
on security issues has been very modest compared to its wider economic engagements,
mainly revolving around the SCO, China’s main multilateral tool in the region,
which has proved unable to act in times of crisis such as the 2010 ethnic conflict in
Kyrgyzstan. Although there is a concern shared by many in China that a worsening
security situation in the region resulting, for example, in mass emigration, Islamic
fundamentalism, drug trafficking and internal and regional conflicts, would endanger
economic and trade cooperation and ultimately threaten China’s own internal stability,
China has shown no willingness to intervene or mediate in major crises, while the
effectiveness of the SCO, very ambitious on paper, is limited by rivalry between China
and Russia.
Russia and China have different strategies, different interests, and different priorities
in Central Asia that at times appear irreconcilable with China’s emerging role. While
cooperation between them in energy, investment, high technology, and military
equipment has significantly increased over the past two decades, given Russia’s strategic
rapprochement to Central Asia it is too early to say whether the phenomenon of
collaboration/competition between Russia and China will lead to reaching an agree-
ment on jointly controlling the region, or whether the region will serve as a field of
confrontation between them. As Chinese and Western experts have pointed out,
China is not in a “position to outflank Russia and become the leader in the region in
the medium term”.90 What is certain, however, is that with more dependence on
Central Asian energy supplies, it will become increasingly important for China to
maintain influence in the region and to protect its interests, especially energy supplies
and billions of dollars of investments. Although China cannot solve alone any future
crises arising in Central Asia, in order to protect its own interests and in line with the

89 The New Great Game in Central Asia, European Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Centre, China Analysis, September 2011
90 Doyon J, op cit p 4
SAFERWORLD 17

slow evolution of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, it will inevitably

have to become more involved in Central Asia’s peace and security and move beyond
crisis reaction to a more proactive strategy for peace, security, and stability in the
region.
Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to
prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people
affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and
conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning
to improve local, national and international policies and practices that
can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe that
everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from
insecurity and violent conflict.

cover photo : Chinese trucks and petrol tankers are prevalent throughout Kyrgyzstan, with large
Chinese lorries from across the Irkeshtam and Torugurt passes occasionally replacing the traditional
Kamaz traffic. © karen wykurz

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