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Introduction
to Emergency
Management
Seventh Edition
George D. Haddow
Jane A. Bullock
Damon P. Coppola
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without permission in writing from the publisher. Details on how to seek permission, further
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as the Copyright Clearance Center and the Copyright Licensing Agency, can be found at our website:
www.elsevier.com/permissions.
This book and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by the
Publisher (other than as may be noted herein).
Notices
Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience
broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical
treatment may become necessary.
Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating
and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such
information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including
parties for whom they have a professional responsibility.
To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume
any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability,
negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas
contained in the material herein.
ISBN: 978-0-12-817139-4
It has been my privilege to be a part of the emergency management community over the
course of my career and to encourage students to become a part of addressing issues that
are very important to our citizens and our communities. These issues involve how we
work together to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters. I have dedi-
cated my professional and personal career working with communities on these issues.
I had the privilege to serve as FEMA Director from 1993-2001 under President
Clinton, who recognized that it was important that citizens could count on the govern-
ment to be there in the aftermath of a disaster to provide help when it was most needed.
During that time, with the support of a dedicated staff, we rebuilt FEMA into one of
the most trusted agencies in the federal government. We learned a lot and were tested
by an unprecedented number of disasters from record-breaking floods and tornadoes,
hurricanes that concurrently impacted multiple states, a major urban earthquake, and
the terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City. With each event, we studied the lessons to
be learned and incorporated them into our professional practices. This included the
predisaster reduction of community hazard risk. Project Impact, a community-based
mitigation program we initiated in partnership with the private sector, was the embodi-
ment of these efforts which sought to prevent disasters before they happen.
Since leaving FEMA, I have worked with diverse communities in the public and
private sectors and with governments of other countries to promote emergency man-
agement, hazard mitigation and the improvement of long-term recovery from disas-
ters. I have worked to improve building codes at the International Code Council and
helped to guide recovery from Hurricane Katrina and numerous other domestic disas-
ters (including the California wildfires and hurricanes in Houston, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands). While rewarding, it has also proved to be a troubling and hectic time. It
has become clear to me that our nation faces several critical hazard-related challenges
that will require expansion in the expertise and involvement of the emergency manage-
ment community. The most significant of these is climate change and the impacts it is
having on the severity, frequency, and multiplicity of disasters. Climate change is the
challenge of this century. Emergency management plays a large and growing role in
addressing and mitigating the impacts of climate change for the future.
This textbook, written by seasoned emergency management practitioners, pro-
vides a primer on the history, evolution, and disciplines of emergency management.
It offers practical advice on what has worked and what has not, supported by case
studies and critical thinking. It also recounts many stories about how emergency
management has impacted the lives of the people we serve.
Emergency managers have a difficult job, but it is some of the most fulfilling works
an individual can pursue. Emergency management makes a difference in people’s lives,
not just in times of disaster but also in the mitigation and preparedness efforts undertaken
before disasters strike. Emergency managers, by their actions, contribute to the safety
and the economic and social stability of our neighborhoods and communities every day.
James Lee Witt
xiii
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank the following individuals for their continued help and
insight: Jack Harrald, Greg Shaw, Joseph Barbera, Irmak Renda- Tanali, Ollie
Davidson, Sarp Yeletaysi, Garrett Ingoglia, Ryan Miller, Rene van Dorp, Erin
McConnell, Wayne Blanchard, Sanjaya Bhatia, Liz Maly, Gerald Potutan, Gulzar
Keyim, Tim Wilcox, Pam Chester, Amber Hodge, Paul Gottehrer, Todd Green, Nate
McFadden, Brad Gair, Ehren Ngo, Fran McCarthy, Caroline Brassard, Betsy Millett,
Sara Scott, Pem McNerney, Travis Trueblood, Erin Hughey, Todd Bosse, Cassie
Stelow, Joseph Green, Chani Goering, Jane Rovins, Eric Chapman, Ines Pearce,
Steven Carter, David Gilmore, Jack Suwanlert, Barbara Johnson, Wendy Walsh,
Tawnne O’Connor, Matt Foster, Tyson Vaughn, Bob McCreight, Adam Jachimowicz,
Sara Wade-Apicella, Ana Thorlund, and Audra Kiesling.
We also thank the many professors, students, and practitioners who gave us valu-
able feedback on different aspects of the book and provided suggestions to make the
text more relevant and useful.
xv
Introduction
xvii
xviii Introduction
direction, and federal-level operations—even though many feel it is stifled under the
umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security which is so heavily focused on
the singular goal of reducing threats to national security. Compared with its years as
an independent, Cabinet-level agency, FEMA remains subject not only to indirect
access to the president and a diminished decision-making authority, but also the need
to conform to a strategic focus held by an agency whose fundamental mission is
markedly different from its own.
In 2005, we saw a national system of emergency management—once regarded as
one of the most effective and emulated systems in the world—proven incompetent
in responding to an event that had been long predicted, planned for, and studied:
Hurricane Katrina. Almost 15 years later, FEMA has made considerable progress in
salvaging that reputation even in the face of a contentious Hurricane Maria recovery
in Puerto Rico. This edition will examine how FEMA has evolved as a result of the
legislation enacted in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, obstacles identified in the
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, and various changes in leadership and policy within
and outside the agency.
While the book emphasizes the US domestic system of emergency management,
many of the experiences discussed, lessons learned, and emerging trends are repli-
cable to emergency management systems around the world. Emergency management
in the United States has experienced every form of disaster: natural, human-made,
and intentional. The lessons learned from these experiences, the changes made in
response to these events, and how the system continues to evolve because of climate
change and other emerging threats provide a solid landscape to examine what emer-
gency management is or could be.
However, this book is not exclusively focused on FEMA. State and local emer-
gency management organizations are the subjects of many of the included case stud-
ies, and their collaborative affiliations with FEMA are discussed at length throughout
the text. One full chapter, in fact, is dedicated to how emergencies are managed at the
international level when the capacity of whole countries or regions falls short of what
is required to manage the disaster at hand. With greater frequency, events such as the
2004 Asian earthquake and tsunami, Cyclone Nargis in Burma in 2008, the Sichuan
and Haiti earthquakes, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and other more recent events
have highlighted the need for a more robust international emergency management
system. Through their own domestic efforts, and the efforts of the United Nations
system vis-à-vis the 2016 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, govern-
ments across the globe are focusing more attention on the issue.
A brief summary of the contents and special features of this edition follows:
• Chapter 1, “The Historical Context of Emergency Management,” includes a
brief discussion of the historical, organizational, and legislative evolution of
emergency management in the United States by tracing the major changes trig-
gered by disasters or other human or political events, including the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security. This chapter includes an analysis of the
Introduction xix
xxi
CHAPTER
Introduction
Emergency management has its roots in ancient history. Early hieroglyphics depict
cave dwellers trying to deal with disasters. The Bible speaks of the many disasters that
befell civilizations. In fact, the story of Noah warning his neighbors about an impend-
ing flood, and his subsequent building of an ark to preserve the planet’s biodiversity,
could be interpreted as a very early lesson in risk control. As long as there have been
disasters, individuals and communities have tried to find ways to fix them. However,
organized attempts at disaster recovery did not occur until much later in modern history.
This chapter discusses the historical, organizational, and legislative history of
modern emergency management in the United States. Some of the significant events
and people that have shaped the emergency management discipline over the years
are reviewed. Understanding the history and evolution of emergency management is
important because at different times, the concepts of emergency management have
been applied differently. The definition of emergency management can be extremely
broad and all-encompassing. Unlike other, more structured disciplines, it has expanded
and contracted in response to events, congressional desires, and leadership styles.
Since the turn of the current century, formative events and selections in leader-
ship, more than anything else, have spurred dramatic changes to emergency manage-
ment in the United States. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to massive
organizational changes and programmatic shifts in emergency management. Many
believe that these changes undermined the effective national system of emergency
management that had evolved during the 1990s and led to the profound failure of all
levels of emergency management in response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
president, FEMA continued with a low profile in DHS until a series of hurricanes
impacting Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico brought a lackluster federal response to
the disasters. This chapter will discuss how the agency, FEMA, and emergency man-
agement evolved, the individuals and leadership that shaped it, and the events that
precipitated change.
The Cold War and the Rise of Civil Defense: The 1950s
The next notable timeframe for the evolution of emergency management was dur-
ing the 1950s. The era of the Cold War presented the principal disaster risk as the
potential for nuclear war and nuclear fallout. Civil defense programs proliferated
across communities during this time. Individuals and communities were encouraged
to build bomb shelters to protect themselves and their families from nuclear attack
from the Soviet Union.
Almost every community had a civil defense director and most states had
someone who represented civil defense in their state government hierarchy. By
profession, these individuals were usually retired military personnel, and their
operations received little political or financial support from their state or local
governments. Equally often, their civil defense responsibilities were in addition
to other duties.
4 CHAPTER 1 The historical context of emergency management
Federal support for these activities was vested in the Federal Civil Defense
Administration (FCDA), an organization with little staff or financial resources,
whose main role was to provide technical assistance. In reality, the local and state
civil defense directors were the first recognized face of emergency management in
the United States.
A companion office to the FCDA, the Office of Defense Mobilization, was estab-
lished in the Department of Defense (DOD). The primary functions of this office
were to allow for quick mobilization of materials and production and stockpiling
of critical materials in the event of a war. It included a function called emergency
preparedness. In 1958, these two offices were merged into the Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization.
The 1950s were a quiet time for large-scale natural disasters. Hurricane Hazel,
a Category 4 hurricane, inflicted significant damage in Virginia and North Carolina
in 1954; Hurricane Diane hit several mid-Atlantic and northeastern states in 1955;
and Hurricane Audrey, the most damaging of the three storms, struck Louisiana and
North Texas in 1957. Congressional response to these disasters followed a familiar
pattern of ad hoc legislation to provide increased disaster assistance funds to the
affected areas.
As the 1960s started, three major natural disaster events occurred. In a sparsely
populated area of Montana, the Hebgen Lake earthquake, measuring 7.3 on the Richter
scale, was proof that states other than California were at risk for severe earthquakes.
Also in 1960, Hurricane Donna hit the west coast of Florida, and Hurricane Carla
blew into Texas in 1961. The incoming Kennedy administration decided to make
a change to the federal approach to such disasters. In 1961, it created the Office of
Emergency Preparedness inside the White House to deal with natural disasters. Civil
defense responsibilities remained in the Office of Civil Defense within the DOD.
cost prohibitive. These discussions eventually led to the passage of the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, which created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
Congressman Hale Boggs of Louisiana is appropriately credited with steering
this unique legislation through Congress. Unlike previous emergency management/
disaster legislation, this bill sought to do something about the risk before the disaster
struck. It brought the concept of community-based mitigation into the practice of
emergency management. In simple terms, when a community joined the NFIP, in
exchange for making federally subsidized, low-cost flood insurance available to its
citizens, the community had to pass an ordinance restricting future development in
its floodplains. The federal government also agreed to help local communities by
producing maps of their community’s floodplains.
Additional Research
In October 2006, a report entitled Costs and Consequences of Flooding and the Impact of the
National Flood Insurance Program was issued, which provided an overview of what the NFIP had
accomplished. It is available at http://bit.ly/29s6ulo.
Critical Thinking
Can you think of any positive or negative aspects of disaster-driven evolutionary
changes in the United States’ emergency management system? What about changes
that occur in the absence of initiating disaster events?
6 CHAPTER 1 The historical context of emergency management
accident brought national media attention to the lack of adequate off-site prepared-
ness around commercial nuclear power plants and the role of the federal government
in responding to such an event.
On June 19, 1978, President Carter transmitted to Congress the Reorganization
Plan Number 3 (3 CFR 1978, 5 US Code 903). The intent of this plan was to con-
solidate emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response activities into one federal
emergency management organization. The president stated that the plan would estab-
lish the (FEMA) and that the FEMA director would report directly to the president.
Reorganization Plan Number 3 transferred to FEMA the National Fire Prevention
Control Administration (Department of Commerce), the Federal Insurance
Administration (HUD), the Federal Broadcast System (Executive Office of the
President), the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (Department of Defense), the
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (HUD), and the Federal Preparedness
Agency (GSA). The following emergency preparedness and mitigation functions
were also transferred to FEMA:
● oversight of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (Office of Science and
Technology Policy);
● coordination of dam safety (Office of Science and Technology Policy);
weather-related emergencies;
● coordination of natural and nuclear disaster warning systems;
terrorist incidents.
Reorganization Plan Number 3 articulated the following fundamental organiza-
tional principles:
1. Federal authorities who were to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to major
civil emergencies should be supervised by one official who is responsible to the
president and given attention by other officials at the highest levels.
2. An effective civil defense system requires the most efficient use of all available
resources.
3. Whenever possible, emergency responsibilities should be extensions of federal
agencies.
4. Federal hazard mitigation activities should be closely linked with emergency
preparedness and response functions.
Subsequent to congressional review and concurrence, FEMA was officially estab-
lished by Executive Order 12127 of March 31, 1979 (44 FR 19367, 3 CFR, Comp.,
p. 376). A second Executive Order, 12148, mandated the reassignment of agencies,
programs, and personnel into the new entity, FEMA.
Creating the new organization made sense, but integrating the diverse programs,
operations, policies, and people into a cohesive operation was a much bigger task
than realized when the consolidation began. It would take extraordinary leadership
and a common vision. The consolidation also created immediate political problems.
The Steps Leading to the Katrina Debacle 19
coast more vulnerable to hurricanes. Design and construction decisions on the levee
system and inadequate maintenance of that system contributed to the impacts of
Katrina.
The storm challenged the capacities and capabilities of emergency management
operations at all levels of government. The lack of planning for the Superdome as the
designated shelter of last resort for New Orleans and the subsequent problems that
occurred in that facility provided the most visible demonstration of the failed capaci-
ties. Many of the problems of the immediate response exposed the impacts of priority
focus on terrorism and homeland security in recent years and may have contributed
to the decrease in these capacities and capabilities.
Elected officials at all levels of government stumbled badly as they tried to
provide leadership in the face of this disaster. The business community, voluntary
agencies, and nongovernmental organizations stepped up to provide extraordinary
services to storm victims. The general public, corporations, unions, and foundations
donated billions of dollars for disaster relief.
Additional Research
In the aftermath of Katrina, both houses of Congress held extensive hearings on what went wrong.
The Senate report “The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared” provides insight into the results of the hearings and
deliberations.
http://bit.ly/29B4wCd.
More than 1800 people died from Hurricane Katrina, and tens of thousands were
displaced and suffered for days in places like the Superdome, on freeway ramps, and on
the tops of roofs while waiting to be rescued. Thousands lost their homes and were sepa-
rated from loved ones. The dislocation, chaos, and desperation that lingered for months
after the storm were direct results of the failure of government at all levels to plan, pre-
pare for, and respond aggressively to the storm. Failure can be assessed at all levels, but
when President Bush signed the federal declaration of disaster and announced it before
Katrina even made landfall, the federal government, through DHS/FEMA, assumed the
primary responsibility for the stewardship of the response to this storm’s aftermath. And
by any objective evaluation of the response, it was a colossal failure.
Dedica Pag. V
Intendimenti dell’Opera VII
Introduzione 1
Pag. lin.
4 17, vi morisse e Stazio e Silio
Italico e altri
illustri vi si
ispirassero
6 ultima linea: S’intromette il S’intromette il
Tirreno. Tirreno infuriato
13 19, mi do dovea mi dovea
28 12, dice chè dice che
41 17, horrendum, horrendum,
ingens informe, ingens
44 24, dovendo dovendo
poggiare appoggiarsi
71 5, soggetta ligia persona
persona
74 6, Lucio Lucio Cornelio
Cornelio congiunto
parente
76 11, non veridiche non sempre
veridiche
79 9, la dissenzione la dissensione
81 22, patrizii e i patrizii e i plebei
plebei
203 15, distici di distici che
Ovidio erroneamente
alcuni dissero di
Ovidio
325 in fine del La pena
sommario dell’adulterio —
Avvocati e
Causidici
NOTE:
3. Già Casina Reale, avente a lato sinistro il Castel dell’Ovo che si avanza
in mare, donata da Garibaldi dittatore ad Alessandro Dumas; ma
rivendicata poscia — non da Garibaldi — venne venduta e convertita
nell’attuale Albergo di Washington, tra i primarj della città.
14. Sono gli uomini di questo villaggio che vengono più specialmente
reclutati per la difficile e perigliosa pesca del corallo sulle coste di
Barberia, e così possono ricondursi di poi in patria con un bel gruzzolo
di danaro.
15. La misurazione dell’elevazione del Vesuvio sopra il livello del mare varia
nelle scritture dei dotti che la vollero fissare. Nollet nel 1749 la disse di
593 tese; Poli nel 1791 di 608 tese; il colonnello Visconti nel 1816 di
621; Humboldt dopo l’eruzione del 1822 la rinvenne di 607 tese, e nel
settembre 1831 l’altezza della punta più alta del cono risultò di tese 618.
La tesa, antica misura di Francia, era lunga sei piedi; la nuova tesa
francese si chiama doppio metro e per conseguenza contiene 6 piedi, 1
pollice, 10 linee. Siffatta varietà di misure non da altro procede che dagli
elevamenti e dalle depressioni, le quali si avvicendano secondo le
diverse eruzioni.
17. «Partito Ercole di poi dal Tevere, seguendo il lido italiano si condusse al
Campo Cumeo, nel quale è fama essere stati uomini assai forti, ed a
cagione di loro scelleratezze, appellati giganti. Lo stesso Campo del
resto, denominato Flegreo, dal colle che vomitando sovente fuoco a
guisa dell’Etna sicula, ora si chiama Vesuvio, e conserva molte vestigia
delle antiche arsioni.»
22. L’eguale fenomeno si avverò sul Vesuvio nella eruzione del 79. Ecco le
parole di Plinio: Nubes (incertum procul intuentibus ex quo monte;
Vesuvium fuisse postea cognitum est) oriebatur: cujus similitudinem et
formam non alia magis arbor, quam pinus expresserit. Nam longissimo
velut trunco elato in altum, quibusdam ramis diffundebatur, etc. Epist.
XVI. Lib. VI.
27. Sylv. 2
28. Satir. Lib. II. Sat. 1. v. 35. Così traduce Tommaso Gargallo:
29. Secondo Esiodo, Gerione era il più forte di tutti gli uomini nell’isola
d’Eritia presso Gade o Cadice sulla costa della Spagna. I poeti venuti di
poi ne hanno fatto un gigante con tre corpi, che Ercole combattendo
uccise, menandone seco i buoi. Coloro i quali ridur vorrebbero tutta la
scienza mitologica ad un solo principio, cioè, al culto antico della natura,
pretesero Ercole un essere allegorico e non significar altro che il Sole.
Questa impresa vinta su Gerione sarebbe il decimo segno che il sole
trascorre, vale a dire i benefizj d’esso che, giunto al segno equinoziale
del Toro, avviva tutta la natura e consola tutte le genti. Vedi Dizionario
della Mitologia di tutti i Popoli di Gio. Pozzoli e Felice Romani. Milano
presso Gio. Pirotta.
30. La Mitologia chiama i Dioscuri figliuoli di Giove e afferma essere il
soprannome di Castore e Polluce. Glauco fu il primo che così li chiamò,
quando apparve agli Argonauti nella Propontide (Filostr. Paus.). È stato
dato questo nome anche agli Anaci, ai Cabiri, e ai tre fratelli che
Cicerone (De Natura Deorum 3, c. 53) chiama Alcone, Melampo ed
Eumolo. Sanconiatone conserva l’identità dei Dioscuri coi Cabiri, che
Cicerone vuol figli di Proserpina. Ritornerò su tale argomento nel
capitolo I Templi.
33. Secondo la più probabile opinione, Caudio era situato dove ora il borgo
Arpaja, e le Forche Caudine in quell’angusto passo donde si discende
ad Arienzo, specialmente nel sito che si chiama pur oggi le Furchie.
34. Ora Lucera delli Pagani, nella Puglia Daunia, volgarmente Capitanata,
provincia di Foggia, nel già reame di Napoli.
36. Dante, Paradiso c. VII. 47. Qui parla il Poeta di Manlio Torquato che
comandò, come più sopra narrai, la morte del figliuolo per inobbedienza,
e parla di Quinzio Cincinnato.
43. Quid ergo indicat, aut quid affert, aut ipse Cornelius, aut vos, qui ab eo
hæc mandata defertis? Gladiatores emptos esse, Fausti simulatione, ad
cœdem, ac tumultum. Ita prorsus: interpositi sunt gladiatores, quos
testamento patris videmus deberi. Cic. Pro. P. Sulla cap. XIX.
47. In Toscana l’aveva alle falde degli Appennini e dalla regione in cui era
situata si dicea Tusci; in Romagna l’aveva sul litorale del Mediterraneo
fra le due città di Laurento e di Ostia, e per esser più vicina a quella città
chiamavala Laurentino e l’abitava nel verno; in Lombardia due ne
possedeva lungo le ridenti sponde del Lario una nel paesello di Villa e si
nomava Commedia, e l’Amoretti nel suo Viaggio ai tre laghi credette
riconoscerla nel luogo ove v’ha la villeggiatura dei signori Caroe,
pretendendosi persino di vederne tuttora i ruderi contro l’onde del lago;
l’altra, detta Tragedia, in altra località che forse fu presso Bellagio. Lo
che valga a rettifica dell’opinione volgare che crede la Commedia fosse
dove ora è la Pliniana, così detta unicamente perchè vi si trovi la fonte
da lui descritta nell’ultima Epistola del libro IV e dell’opinioni di taluni
scrittori che la assegnano in altra parte del lago. Alla Pliniana, venne
fabbricato da Giovanni Anguissola, altro degli uccisori di Pier Luigi
Farnese, nè prima di lui vi si riscontrarono ruderi che accusassero
antecedenti edificazioni. Della prima, in Toscana, fa una magnifica
descrizione nella lettera 6 del lib. V; della seconda in Romagna, nella
lettera 17 del lib. II.
52. Tacito nel libro XV degli Annali c. XVII non fa che accennare sotto
quest’anno un tanto disastro: «Un terremoto in Terra di Lavoro rovinò
gran parte di Pompeja, terra grossa.»
54. Aulo Gellio trova la etimologia del municipio a munere capessendo; più
propriamente forse il giureconsulto Paolo: quia munia civilia capiant. E
l’uno e l’altro accennano al diritto o dono conferito della cittadinanza, a
differenza di quelle altre località che erano solo fœderatæ, ricevute dopo
vinte e a condizione inferiore, che non acquistavano la podestà patria,
nè le nozze alla romana, nè la capacità di testare a pro’ d’un romano
cittadino, o d’ereditarne, nè l’inviolabilità della persona.
56. Il laticlavo era una striscia di porpora che orlava la toga di porpora,
scendendo dal petto fino a’ ginocchi. Essa era alquanto larga a
distinzione della striscia de’ cavalieri, che però dicevasi augusticlavo.
Come basterebbe oggi dire porporato per intendersi cardinale, allora
dicevasi laticlavius per senatore; onde leggesi in Svetonio (in August., c.
38): binos laticlavios præposuit, per dire due senatori.
59.
62. Vedi Plinio epistola 12 del lib. II: Implevi promissum, priorisque epistolæ
fidem exsolvi, quam ex spatio temporis jam recipisse te colligo. Nam et
festinanti et diligenti tabellario dedi. Vedi anche dello stesso Plinio
l’epistola 17 del lib. III e 12 del VII e la nota alla prima lettera del suo
volgarizzatore Pier Alessandro Paravia. Venezia Tip. del Commercio
1831.
66. Tra i papiri latini si conta un frammento di poema sulla guerra di Azio.
68. Ad retia sedebam: erant in proximo non venabulum aut lancea, sed
stilus et pugillares. Così Plin. loc. cit. Vedi anche Boldetti, Osserv. sopra
i Cimelii, l. 2, c. 2.
69.
74.
78.
79.
83. Ne’ possedimenti di Giulia Felice, figlia di Spurio, si affittano dalle prime
idi di agosto alle seste idi per cinque anni continui un bagno, un
venereo, e novecento botteghe colle pergole e co’ cenacoli. Se taluno
esercitasse in casa (o il condannato) lenocinio, non è ammesso alla
conduzione.
La formula invece, quale è ristabilita dal sen. Fiorelli, vorrebbe dire: se
trascorrerà il quinquennio, la locazione ai riterrà tacitamente rinnovata.
Altri poi, leggendo aggiunta alla iscrizione surriferita anche le parole
SMETTIVM . VERVM . ADE, pretendono interpretare le sigle in
questione nella seguente maniera: si quis dominum loci ejus non
cognoverit, — se alcuno non conosca il padrone di questo luogo, si
rivolga a Smettio Vero.
84. Veggasi: Della Patria dei due Plinii, Dissertazione di Pier Alessandro
Paravia indirizzata al cav. Ippolito Pindemonte, edita nell’appendice al
Volgarizzamento delle Lettere di Plinio il Giovane dello stesso Paravia,
già altre volte da noi citato. Il Paravia prova, a non più lasciar ombra di
dubbio, i Plinii essere stati di Como.
87. «Le mofete, scrive Giuseppe Maria Galanti, formano molti fenomeni
curiosi. Terminate le grandi eruzioni sogliono esse manifestarsi sotto le
antiche lave e ne’ sotterranei, e qualche volta hanno infettata tutta
l’atmosfera. Non sono che uno sviluppamento di acido carbonico. Circa
quaranta giorni dopo l’ultima grande eruzione del 1822 comparvero le
mofete nelle cantine ed altri luoghi sotterranei delle adiacenze del
Vulcano. L’aria mofetica cominciava all’altezza del suolo superiore, e
spesso infettava anche l’aria esterna. In alcuni sotterranei si
manifestarono rapidamente, in altri lentamente: dove durarono pochi
giorni e dove sino a due mesi. Dopo l’eruzione del 1794 molte persone
perirono per mancanza di precauzione contro queste mofete. Esse si
sviluppano più assai nei luoghi dove terminano le antiche lave, cioè nei
luoghi prossimi alla pedementina del Vulcano, forse perchè il gas acido
carbonico che si svolge in copia nell’interno del Vulcano, si fa strada
negli interstizi delle lave, le quali partono tutte dal focolare vulcanico.»
Napoli e Contorni, 1829. — Vedi anche La storia de’ fenomeni del
Vesuvio di Monticelli e Covelli. Napoli, 1843.