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 INDIA–AFRICA RELATIONS

This book explores the emergence and assertion of Africa as a significant

actor and stakeholder in global affairs and the transformation of the India-
Africa relationship.
Beginning from this strategic perspective, the book presents an in-depth
exploration of the India-Africa partnership in all its critical dimensions. It
delineates the historical backdrop and shared colonial past to focus on and
contextualise the evolution of the India-Africa engagement in the first two
decades of the 21st century. The book scrutinises the unfolding international
competition in Africa in depth, which includes global actors such as the EU,
the US and Japan, among others, focusing especially on China’s growing
influence in the region. Further, it dissects objectively the continental,
regional and bilateral facets of India-Africa relations and offers a roadmap
to strengthen and deepen the relationship in the coming decade.
This volume will be very useful for students and researchers working in
the field of international relations, foreign policy, governance, geopolitics
and diplomacy.

Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House, Mumbai, India. He

served as India’s High Commissioner to Kenya, South Africa and Lesotho
and as Ambassador to Myanmar and Mexico. He was Director General of
the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) from 2012–15 and Visiting
Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) from 2011–13.
He is an illustrious scholar-diplomat, an active figure in India’s strategic
community and a prolific commentator on foreign policy. His previous two
books, India in Global Affairs: Perspectives from Sapru House (2015) and
India-Myanmar Relations: Changing contours (2016), drew critical acclaim.
“Rajiv Bhatia offers, in a capsule, the Afro-Indian fusion that has
evolved over millennium, which is undoubtedly shaping future global
dynamics. A must read for any scholar, policymaker and strategist keen
on trends that will define our tomorrow.”
Ambassador Dr. Monica Juma, EGH, Cabinet Secretary for Defence,
Republic of Kenya

“Diplomat-scholar Rajiv Bhatia presents a masterly dissertation on the

past, present and future of the India-Africa relationship. His passion
for Africa is transparent. Bhatia offers thoughtful strategic choices for
India as it confronts the multiple challenges and opportunities of the
21st century.”
Lalit Mansingh, former Foreign Secretary, Government of India

“In this eminently readable study, Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia has cap-
tured the essence of multilayered and multi-dimensional nature of
complex ties between India and Africa since the past two decades. As
a scholar-diplomat, the author’s passionate and praxiological commit-
ment to promote Indo-African ties has incontestably made this exer-
cise uniquely worthy of consideration by scholars, policy makers and
graduate students.”
Rajen Harshé, leading Indian scholar in African and international
relations studies and former Vice Chancellor of the Central University
of Allahabad

“This beautifully written account of relations between two increasingly

important actors – Africa and India – captures both Bhatia’s passion for
Africa and his deep knowledge of a continent he experienced firsthand.
His sharp and frank analysis scrutinises not only the relationship but
also how it plays out in the context of the growing interest of other
actors in Africa, not least China.”
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive, The South African Institute
of International Affairs (SAIIA)
INDIA–AFRICA
RELATIONS
Changing Horizons

Rajiv Bhatia
First published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
business
© 2022 Rajiv Bhatia
The right of Rajiv Bhatia to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-0-367-48970-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-07672-0 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-04455-0 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003044550
Typeset in Sabon
by SPi Technologies India Pvt Ltd (Straive)
 Dedicated
To Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations whose visionary
leaders and scholars were my inspiration,
and
To our grandchildren – Tavishi, Saisha and Kairav
 CONTENTS

List of tables viii

Foreword by Krishnan Srinivasan ix
Preface xiii
Acknowledgements xvi
List of abbreviations xviii

1 Africa in transition 1

2 India-Africa relations in 20th century 14

3 Africa, dancing with global actors 29

4 Africa-China tango 57

5 India-Africa engagement in 21st century 71

6 Continental dimensions 88

7 Regional dimensions 107

8 Bilateral aspects 125

9 Sociocultural and people-related bonds 162

10 Africa 2020, an assessment 181

11 The next decade 195

Bibliography 206
Index 211

vii
 TABLES

5.1 Visits by Indian VVIPs to Africa – 2015–19 81

9.1 Population of Overseas Indians in Africa 164

viii
 FOREWORD

Rajiv Bhatia calls India and Africa ‘two soulmates, friends and partners,’
but a book dealing with India-Africa relations is a rare occurrence, which in
itself states an obvious truth, that this is an understudied and undervalued
aspect of India’s foreign relations. Bhatia’s book is therefore especially
welcome.
Should Africa be treated as a choate entity? As a continent, its 54 mem-
bers are not only land-based but stretch far East into the Indian Ocean –
Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles – and West into the
Atlantic with Cabo Verde. And can India as a single country be compared
in any sense to the vast continent of Africa? Bhatia makes the relevant point
that the populations are roughly similar, but is there not a degree of
presumption in comparing any single country, however big and important,
with an entire continent? Many African countries, though grouped in a
‘Union,’ are as distinct from each other in race, customs, religion, language,
attire and economic development as any two countries in Asia. An obvious
four-way split is Arabic-speaking Africa, English-speaking Africa, French-
speaking Africa and Lusophone Africa, besides which Bhatia identifies eight
regional economic communities. And yet, the author would legitimately
argue, to break down India’s relations with Africa sector-wise, subject-wise
or region-wise, despite the availability of material, would necessitate several
volumes which would defeat his purpose of coherently presenting the
relevant history and his broad conclusions.
The Indian independence movement held great attractions for African
leadership striving for freedom; Congress was thus a name adopted into the
nomenclature of many African political parties, though Gandhian non-
violence, despite lip service, was never the favoured method of struggle for
any liberation movement even in South Africa. Consistent Indian support
for racial equality and freedom movements, culminating in the AFRICA
Fund, left little downstream impact and has been consigned to archival
memory.
The Indian community in Africa is not uniform in history, closeness to the
‘mother’ country or current occupation. This community was initially
brought to Africa by the British Empire which moved large masses of

ix
 F oreword

subject people across the world for economic reasons. Indians in the 19thand
early 20th centuries were brought as menial workers in railways and in fields
and others later arrived to set up small businesses – the dukkawalas, who
later moved into extension of credit and moneylending, which did not
redound to their popularity. Jawaharlal Nehru’s sage advice in the early
years of Indian independence to the effect that the Indian community should
identify with local aspirations fell on deaf ears, and the community was
caught between the hammer of local white domination and the anvil of
legitimate African aspirations. In time, some of these businesses became
prosperous and the once self-effacing dukkawalas dominated the distributive
trade. Ugandan President Idi Amin’s expulsions on the grounds of economic
exploitation masked a deep sociological problem, the bitter resentments
among the African population, not the least of their grievances being that
the Indians did not ‘mix’ and few inter-marriages took place.
After numerous African nations became independent in the 1960s,
many Indians in the professional classes served in Africa in countries like
Ethiopia and Nigeria as instructors in schools and universities, railways,
mines, the military and hospitals. Such persons were not settlers but were
seeking to put their skills towards creating personal financial security.
Others saw opportunities in the African marketplace for entrepreneurism
and acquired rapid fortunes in import trading without regard to the pro-
motion of local skills or exports. Some African leaders made alliances with
these Indian local tycoons for personal and political monetary heft but
hardly any joint enterprises were an equal partnership in terms of input
and benefits. In South Africa, where the number of Indian origin persons
is largest in the continent, the descendants of indentured labour became
educated and upwardly mobile and gained merit as doctors and lawyers
during the freedom movement in defending the cause of African political
prisoners.
Bhatia rightly emphasises convergences rather than differences, but the
total landscape inevitably comprises both. Among all African countries –
and recalling that the main impetus to independence came post-1960 – only
Ethiopia and Nigeria etc. supported India against China in the 1962 war.
What would be the case if African nations confronted a similar choice
today? On Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, Nigeria, fearing its own
secession problems, was the last important country to recognise the new
nation despite insistent Indian urgings.
One feature of international relations in which Africa is exemplary is in
regard to border disputes. The OAU decided in 1964 that borders inherited
from the colonial era at independence were considered to be final;
accordingly, the continent suffers few of the tensions on this score that
persistently plague Asia and Latin America.
Bhatia stresses more than once that the prevailing sentiment is one of
optimism for Africa. There is a new scramble for Africa, not only by China

x
 F oreword

but less endowed countries like USA, Turkey and India. France concentrates
on Francophone Africa, Turkey on Islamic Africa and China is backed by
considerable resources in finance and manpower. The West criticises China
as predatory and exploitative and warns about ‘empty promises and tired
platitudes,’ but itself has the unwelcome legacy of centuries of European
expansion and America’s sustained support for racist regimes during the
Cold War period.
The population explosion in Africa will comprise over half of the global
growth rate by 2050, and currently there are waves of emigration from
most regions of Africa to Europe, which has the benefits of propinquity
along with shortages of labour for the foreseeable future. Africa possesses
60% of the world’s arable land but corruption, bad governance and
unemployment have resulted in this illegal refugee exodus, with the world
still searching for a humane solution that balances demand and supply.
The Africans with justification regard relations with non-African
countries as victimhood, since they have been exploited for centuries.
Therefore, a fundamental psychological reserve exists that has to be
overcome, which can only be done with great sensitivity. Africans are poorly
represented at high echelons of international organisations and while this
situation is starting to change, more requires to be done, including
recognition of Africa’s right to be permanently represented on the UN
Security Council.
Africans are the leading recipients of Indian technical assistance with
over 2000 allocated positions a year, but the assessment is that while they
benefitted thereby, there is little residue of nostalgic affection for India or
Indians. This is not dissimilar to African attitudes towards training
programmes in Russia and China, and there is no doubt that racial factors
in the host country play a major role in these negative reactions, though
exceptionally many Africans in the Indian football leagues have a wide fol-
lowing and celebrity status.
This book covers the activities of major countries in Africa, among them
USA, the EU, Japan and Russia and demonstrates increasing interest in
African opportunities, along with an illuminating and objective chapter on
China-African relations. In detailing the growth of bilateral relations,
however, Indian activities in Africa must not be viewed in competition with
China, since the skill sets and attributes of each country are completely
different.
In narrating the historical record of Indian-African ties, Bhatia concludes
that there is currently unprecedented engagement at continental, regional
and bilateral levels, a result of which is that India is the third highest
destination for African exports and fifth biggest investor in Africa. Whether
in riposte to China or otherwise, Bhatia invites attention to the pleasing
development that Indian engagement in Africa has expanded to non-
traditional countries and unaccustomed terrains of activity.

xi
 F oreword

In this kaleidoscope of diverse aspects, Bhatia deftly traverses the ground

with skill, candour, detail, scholarship and deep insight, making many
practical suggestions which deserve to be taken forward. This book will
enlighten and instruct, not only in India and Africa but everywhere it is
deservedly read.
Krishnan Srinivasan
Former Foreign Secretary
July 2021

xii
 PREFACE

Even after spending a quarter century in the Indian diplomatic service, I had
not yet served in Africa. The call came in 1998. Together with my wife
Kumkum, I travelled from Toronto via Frankfurt to reach Kenya. Our flight
landed in Nairobi in the late evening. The drive from the airport to ‘India
House,’ the high commissioner’s official residence, was enveloped in dark-
ness – or so it seemed to us, our eyes having been used to the well-lit high-
ways of Canada’s metropolitan towns. As the sun rose the next morning,
Africa’s natural beauty, abundantly present in the luxuriant garden of our
new home, revealed itself in full glory. More was to come our way as we
embarked on our discovery of Kenya and indeed Africa – its people, places
and challenges as well as its history, culture, arts, economy, diplomacy and
beyond.
Four years later, we proceeded to other continents. But fortunately, we
were not yet through with Africa. A few years later, the call came again. We
now headed to Pretoria, arguably the most important assignment in Africa
for an Indian diplomat. Three years spent purposefully there, nurturing
India’s ties with South Africa as well as its small, landlocked neighbour,
Lesotho, educated and enriched us deeply.
During my three years at Sapru House after retirement from the Indian
Foreign Service, it was fascinating for me to explore and fathom the depths
of Asia-Africa relationship. As Director General of the Indian Council of
World Affairs (ICWA), it was my privilege to promote the cause of closer
India-Africa cooperation through numerous conferences, lectures and other
intellectual interactions among a cross-section of experts. Then began my
valuable association with Gateway House which enabled me to pursue my
Africa-centred studies further. My regular commentaries in the media on
developments in Africa through op-eds, articles, interviews and public
lectures helped me to remain focused on the Africa dossier.
While on our annual family visit to Seattle and Toronto in the summer of
2019, the urge to write a book on India-Africa relations overtook me. For
the next 24 months, I researched, reflected and wrote. The result: this book
is in your hands now!

xiii
 P reface

An African proverb states: ‘If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want
to go far, go together.’ In its essence, this book relates the story of an
enduring and enriching journey of two soulmates, friends and partners –
India and Africa – in the changing global context. ‘Africa and India have
come a long way,’ aptly observed an expert, ‘and have a long path into the
future in which we are emerging and rising players.’1
This work places a special focus on the evolution of India-Africa
relationship during the past two decades. Thirty years after the Cold War
ended, the India-Africa engagement stands transformed in terms of
character, depth, salience and scope. A country and a continent began to
mean much more to each other than before.
This process unfolded as India’s world view and Africa’s role in and
approach to the world underwent a significant transformation in the post-
Cold War period. A holistic perspective on the changing relationship needs
to be presented to both national and international audiences. Why? Because
the stakes are enormously high: the two sides represented 34% of the
world’s population in 2019. By 2050, India and the African continent will
be home to 4.1 billion people, accounting for 42% of humankind.2 How
they relate to and cooperate with each other in the coming decades is a
subject of global interest.
The book attempts to cover all relevant aspects of its central theme.
Chapter 1 opens with an analysis of Africa in transition as the 20th century
drew to a close, delving into its past journey and hinting at its future
trajectory. Chapter 2 traces the evolution of India’s relationship with Africa
through the 20th century. Chapter 3 places Africa in the global context,
explaining how an array of nations from around the world have been
engaged in forging ties with it. Chapter 4 goes into the depth of ‘Africa-
China tango,’ a popular subject for Africa watchers.
The next four chapters undertake a detailed examination of the India-
Africa partnership in the 21st century, focusing attention on the three critical
levels – continental, regional and bilateral. Chapter 9 takes the story beyond
the domains of government and business to shed light on sociocultural and
people-related bonds. Chapter 10 wraps it all up, by evaluating developments
till the end of 2020, including the impact of COVID-19. The last chapter,
Chapter 11, comprises two subsections: the first presents an objective
comparison between the approaches of China and India towards Africa,
while the second offers a set of thoughtful recommendations on how the
India-Africa relationship may be strengthened in the next decade.

1 T.S. Tirumurti, Secretary (Economic Relations), Ministry of External Affairs, at the

roundtable discussion on ‘India-Africa Partnership in a changing world,’ held at the
Indian Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) on 29 May 2019.
2 In 2019, the world population was 7.5 billion, whereas the population of India and Africa
each was 1.3 billion. UN projections indicated that in 2050, the world population would
total 9.7 billion. Of this, Africa would be 2.4 billion and India will be 1.7 billion.

xiv
 P reface

This work is not merely the result of years of desk work. It also draws
heavily from my experience of having worked, travelled and lived in
different parts in Africa. It is designed to appeal not only to scholars but
also to the larger community of policymakers and practitioners. The
author’s fundamental purpose is to pass on his passion for Africa to the
next generation of Africanists in the world and all those who are interested
in Africa of the present and the future. A particular target comprises Indian
scholars, political and business leaders as well as diplomats who fly India’s
flag on the continent. They will shoulder the responsibility to take this
relationship forward in the coming decades. Hopefully, this volume helps
them a little in their important mission.

xv
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Studying Africa has to be a lifelong affair, imbued with abiding interest and
passion. In my case, it began in my university days when as a Masters stu-
dent of Political Science (and, as its part, International Relations) at the
University of Allahabad, I became acquainted with African history, the
Congress of Berlin, the continent’s colonialisation and eventually the begin-
nings of its liberation in the 1960s. I am grateful to the Indian Foreign
Service (IFS) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) for choosing me
to serve in three senior diplomatic positions in Africa – in Kenya, South
Africa and Lesotho – lasting a total of over seven years. This invaluable
opportunity helped shape my view of Africa and Africa-India relations. The
people I interacted with ranging from workers and farmers, through mem-
bers of the middle class and elite, to business, social and political leaders as
well as ministers and presidents were instrumental in my appreciation of
Africa in all its dimensions.
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Gateway House, especially its two
Founding Directors – Ambassador Neelam Deo, an Africa expert and
Manjeet Kripalani, who is also the Executive Director. They strongly
encouraged me to pursue my research interests relating to Africa. My
heartfelt thanks go to Asha Rani, librarian at Gateway House, who is a
researcher with incredible acumen. She leveraged her IT skills to mine rare
gems of information, data and commentaries that enriched this work.
I am grateful to Ambassador Krishnan Srinivasan, former foreign
secretary, for writing the Foreword as well as his valuable encouragement
and guidance in my study of international affairs.
I also wish to warmly thank all my fellow Africanists in India. They are
just a small community, working in various universities, think tanks,
industry chambers, business houses and media organisations. Others are
former diplomats, enjoying quiet retirement after their postings in African
capitals. They all were accessible to me with their advice and guidance. It is
a matter of pride that Indian institutions have now begun producing the
next generation of experts on Africa.
My colleagues at Routledge and I developed a strong bond. Shoma
Chaudhury, commissioning manager, who helped me with my first book

xvi
 A cknowledgements

India—Myanmar Relations: Changing contours, was a source of constant

support this time too. Her assistant, Shloka Chauhan, was immensely
helpful on various aspects of this book project. I thank all my editors as well
as the four anonymous reviewers who went through the book proposal and
the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions.
Two respected sages of our time and outstanding leaders of the Chinmaya
Mission – Swami Tejomayananda and Swami Swaroopananda – blessed me
with spiritual guidance, while encouraging my deep interest in African
affairs. They visited us during our postings, contributing enormously to the
well-being of the Indian diaspora.
Emotional energy came aplenty from the unrestricted love and
appreciation of our two children and their wives: Siddharth-Mridula and
Kanishk-Vijiti.
What my IT-savvy wife Kumkum, a sharp editor in her own right, did
was even more consequential: she helped me and my – our – book at every
stage. Simply put, without her, this work may not have seen the light of the
day!

xvii
 ABBREVIATIONS

AAGC Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

AASM Associated African States and Madagascar
ACNE African Commission on Nuclear Energy
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific
AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area
Afreximbank Africa Import-Export Bank
AFRICA Fund Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid
Fund
AFRICOM United States Africa Command
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act
AIM Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy
AINTT ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks
AMD Africa's Maritime Domain
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
ANC African National Congress
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
ASA African Studies Association
ASSOCHAM Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India
AU African Union
AUPG AU Partners Group
B2B Business-to-Business
B2G Business-to-Government
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
C4IR Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution
CAR Central African Republic
CCIT Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
CCP Communist Party of China
CDRI Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States

xviii
 A bbreviations

CEPGL Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries

CFTA Continental Free Trade Area
CII Confederation of Indian Industry
CEMZA Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa
CNS Chief of the Naval Staff
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COP Conference of Parties
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease-2019
CwA Compact with Africa
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFTP Duty Free Tariff Preference
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DSSI Debt Service Suspension Initiative
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FNLA The National Front for the Liberation of Angola or Frente
Nacional de Libertação de Angola
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique or Frente de
Libertação de Moçambique
FTA Free Trade Agreement
G20 Group of 20
G2G Government-to-Government
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNA Government of National Accord
HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HIC High-Income Country
HRD Human Resource Development
IAF Indonesia-Africa Forum
IAFS India-Africa Forum Summit
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCR Indian Council for Cultural Relations
ICG International Crisis Group
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
ICWA Indian Council of World Affairs
IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices
IFIs International Financial Institutions
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

xix
 A bbreviations

IGADD Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development

IGN Intergovernmental Negotiations
IIM Indian Institute of Management
IIT Indian Institute of Technology
IMF International Monetary Fund
IN Indian Navy
INC Indian National Congress
IOC Indian Ocean Commission
IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association
IOR-ARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation
IR International Relations
ISA International Solar Alliance
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISS Institute for Security Studies
ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KAF Korea-Africa Forum
KNAC Kwame Nkrumah Pan-African Centre
KOAFEC Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation
KOAFIC Korea-Africa Industry Cooperation
LDC Least Developed Country
LOC Line of Credit
LSE London School of Economics
MACIC Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MDM Mozambique Democratic Movement
MEA Ministry of External Affairs
MIC Middle-Income County
MONUSCO United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo
MoUs Memorandums of Understanding
MP-IDSA Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
MPLA People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola or the
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MRU Mano River Union
MSMEs Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NAASP New Asian-African Strategic Partnership
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NAMA Non-Agricultural Market Access
NAPSA New Approach for Peace and Stability in Africa
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NIATT Network of India-Africa Think Tanks

xx
 A bbreviations

NRIs Non-Resident Indians

OAU Organization of African Unity
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONUC Opération des Nations Unies au Congo
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
ORF Observer Research Foundation
P2P People-to-People
PAP Pan-African Parliament
PIOs Persons of Indian Origin
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PMO Prime Minister’s Office
PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PPP Public-Private Partnership
PRC People’s Republic of China
RECs Regional Economic Communities
RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance or Resistência Nacional
Moçambicana
RIS Research and Information System for Developing Countries
ROK Republic of Korea
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
SACP South African Communist Party
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAGAR Security and Growth for All in the Region
SAIIA South African Institute of International Affairs
SAMRC South African Medical Research Council
SCAAP Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SGR Standard Gauge Railway
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organisation
TEAM-9 Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement
TFTA Tripartite Free Trade Area
TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola or the
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPA United Progressive Alliance
USAID US Agency for International Development
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

xxi
 A bbreviations

VIF Vivekananda International Foundation

WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union
WANA West Asia and North Africa
WASU West African Students’ Union
WHA World Health Assembly
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization

xxii
Map I: A
 frica and India, neighbours across the ocean
Courtesy of Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
New Delhi

xxiii
 1
AFRICA IN TRANSITION

Ex Africa semper aliquid noui – Out of Africa (comes)

always something new.1

Introduction
Africa is often hailed as ‘the continent of the future.’ Its future cannot be
delinked from its past and present.
This book embarks on an exploration of diverse aspects of India-Africa
partnership, but it purposely begins with an endeavour to examine the pro-
cess of transformation that unfolds in Africa at many levels. This under-
standing is of crucial importance in appreciating the depth and range of a
lasting and multidimensional relationship linking India with Africa.
As a vast and complex continent composed of 54 countries, Africa is
passing through, at any given point of time, multiple transitions, not a
single one.2 The conscious use of ‘transition’ in the title above indicates
the phenomenon of change – political, economic, social and cultural – that
African society has undergone in the modern era. It is observed that parts of
the continent are still anchored in the 19th century, even as most of its other
segments have moved into the 21st century. The fact that more Africans have
access to mobile phones (93%) than piped water (63%) or sewerage (30%)
tells its own story.3
Even with nearly 60% of the world’s arable land, Africa’s contribution
to global agricultural production is very low. If this does not change, Africa
and the world will have a problem. In 2019, Africans represented 15% of
the global population, but come 2030, one in five persons on the planet will
be an African. Besides, Africa will account for 54% of the growth of world
population (2.4 billion) by 2050. According to the UN, Africa will add
1.3 billion people, thus more than doubling its population of 1.2 billion,
between 2015 and 2050.4 What happens on this continent is therefore of
immense relevance to the world.
The story of Africa needs to be heard from Africans themselves – their
leaders, scholars and experts. The importance of listening to African voices
is, therefore, self-evident. But there is also ample place for the views and

DOI: 10.4324/9781003044550-1 1
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

assessments of those who study, watch and evaluate developments in Africa

from the outside. Hence, a holistic view should be developed, which can
emerge only from a careful consideration of different and divergent percep-
tions, both internal and external to the continent. This is what is attempted
below in detail.

Voyage through history

Africa’s past before the 1960s relates to slave trade, colonial conquest and
rule and a long, tragic saga of deprivation, exploitation, subjugation and
injustice done to African people. Generations suffered. The impact of suf-
fering continues until today in various ways, with Africa lagging behind
other continents on the matrix of socio-economic development. The dismal
legacy of colonialism was the drawing of contested borders that triggered
conflicts subsequently. Most importantly, foreign rule resulted in the searing
of the African mind: it was opposed to the superiority of the white race, yet
reconciling to it in a deeper manner than is often realised. It thus became a
herculean task to liberate people – politically and economically as well as
emotionally and intellectually.
The 1960s brought Africa into the ‘Age of Hope.’ As more and more
states gained their freedom and colonialism retreated, it seemed that Africa
might at last advance on the path of reform, renewal and development. The
establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was one of the
most hopeful signs of the period. Even though it fell far short of the maxi-
malists’ (such as Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana) concep-
tion of ‘the United States of Africa,’ it served as a practical instrument to
promote the cause of freedom, development and integration.
However, the ‘Age of Hope’ gave way to the ‘Lost Decades,’ the period
from the 1970s to the 1990s. This was the time when Africa became syn-
onymous, in the world’s mind, with poverty, disease, hunger, dictatorship,
corruption and conflict. It also suffered from neocolonialism and imperial-
ist policies followed by the Cold War rivals – the US and the Soviet Union.
Much of the 20th century’s last decade was dominated by the vagaries of
massive violence and strife in Somalia and Rwanda, which defied interna-
tional efforts to negotiate and put in place sensible peace arrangements.
The shining feature, though, was South Africa, which emerged from the
dark shackles of apartheid and racial discrimination into the sunshine of
democracy, rising as a new ‘rainbow nation.’ Nelson Mandela’s elevation
from prisoner to president (and what followed it) was about the best devel-
opment that came out of not just South Africa but indeed the whole African
continent, in a long time.
Mandela’s successor Thabo Mbeki, the second president of South Africa,
was among a handful of African leaders who championed ‘the need for
Africa to take control of its destiny’ and the notion of ‘African solutions
for African problems.’ From this mindset, focused advocacy and real

2
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

statesmanship arose two major political endeavours: the replacement of

OAU by the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD). As the new century opened, the two institutions
were in place and running, generating unprecedented enthusiasm for
Africa’s future prospects. Globalisation had arrived, and it benefitted Africa
too. The world’s mood shifted from Afro-pessimism to Afro-optimism.
The first two decades of the 21st century saw more democracy, peace and
economic development descend on Africa. The outside world began to con-
sider Africa important and showed much greater interest in forging coop-
eration with it. The emerging economies, such as China and India, led the
charge. Yet, the old challenges persisted. It was in this backdrop that those
arguing for Afro-realism proved convincing; their principal conclusion was
that Africa was performing well, but it needed to do much better.

Assessing Africa
For obtaining a realistic and balanced assessment of Africa’s situation,
Africans themselves and serious African watchers may be relied upon.
Dr. Mohammed ‘Mo’ Ibrahim, an enlightened business leader who con-
tributed much towards reform and change of Africa’s image, presented a
candid evaluation in a short piece for CNN in April 2014. Noting that the
narrative on Africa had shifted from Afro-pessimism to Afro-optimism in
the past 20 years, he observed, ‘The truth lies somewhere in between.’ He
put forward a strong plea for Afro-realism and for ‘sound policies based on
honest data, aimed at delivering results.’5
Ibrahim listed several positives regarding Africa: it was seen as the
world’s last ‘New Frontier’ or a kind of ‘it-continent,’ it would have more
working age population than China or India by 2035, it harboured most of
the world’s proven mineral resources and 16 African countries experienced
GDP growth of over 5%. While all this was ‘promising,’ he added, Africa
was still ‘a long way from realising our potential.’6
He presented the negatives too in a frank manner: Africa did not yet have
its common market, single currency, supranational bodies and common and
shared budget; the real building blocks for integration such as free move-
ment of people, goods and financial services were still lacking; Africa expe-
rienced a rise in social tension, domestic unrest and transnational problems
even as the major regional conflicts of the former century were resolved.
Besides, the young were unemployed and out of step with the demands of
the labour market.
Ibrahim’s conclusion was that Africa needed to ‘focus less on interna-
tional support and more on African unity.’ Regional integration, reduction
of inequality between and within countries and employment of the young
and better governance of natural resources were the key priorities. ‘Our
continent,’ he stressed, ‘has secured its political independence. It is time to
build our autonomy.’7

3
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

Others also argued that just as the extreme pessimism about Africa at the
century’s turn was unjustified, a growing wave of optimism a decade later
demanded scrutiny. The two trends were symbolised by the Economist:
in 2000 its cover story was ‘The hopeless continent,’ whereas in 2011 it
changed to ‘Africa Rising.’ Summing up a 2012 report for the World
Economic Forum, Catherine Kende-Robb, of the secretariat of a high-pro-
file panel that authored the report, observed, ‘What we are trying to do is
balance the picture of Africa between the hopeless continent of the past
decade and the overly euphoric optimism that we see in the press today.’8
Speaking around the same time – in May 2014 – Christine Lagarde, man-
aging director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), presented a clear
enunciation of her views on ‘Africa Rising.’ Africa was taking off, she said,
with two-thirds of the Sub-Saharan countries having enjoyed ‘ten or more
years of uninterrupted growth.’ Economic growth brought rise in educa-
tion levels and decline in infant mortality. Africa was a growing investment
destination both for advanced and emerging economies. ‘And yet the tide
of growth has not lifted all boats.’ Referring to more negatives, she pointed
out that poverty remained stuck ‘at unacceptably high levels,’9 that benefits
of growth needed to be shared more broadly. Lagarde spoke about ‘Near-
term worries’ which included slower growth in bigger economies that were
major trading partners of Africa, lower prices for some commodities and
tightening financial conditions and potentially increased market volatility
as monetary policy was normalised. She also drew attention to long-term
challenges relating to demography, technology and environment.
Legarde’s prescription for Africa encompassed three policy priorities:
building infrastructure, institutions and people, which was feasible through
‘governance, transparency and sound economic framework.’ Africa needed
more energy, roads and technology grids. ‘Over the past three decades,
per capita output of electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa remained virtually
flat.’ Only 16% of roads were paved. On institutions, governance needed
significant improvement, especially of the mining sector where ‘the rents
from extractive industries are captured by just a few.’ Regarding people, she
empathised the need to invest in building ‘children, youth, workers, and in
particular, women.’ She concluded, ‘…Africa Rising will benefit the lives on
the continent. Beyond that Africa Rising will benefit the world.’10
Writing a year later – in May 2015 – Dr. Christian Kingombe, an expert on
NEPAD, drew a similar conclusion. Excitement about Africa was ‘because
of the size of the untapped opportunities.’ He pointed out that for about
two decades Africa experienced sustained growth ‘in proportions that par-
allel the Asian tigers,’ while stressing that many challenges remained unre-
solved.11 Unemployment for the educated was a significant worry. Besides,
fast economic growth did not result in improved livelihoods for the major-
ity of Africans. The author cited Donald Kaberuka, president of the African
Development Bank who stated, ‘You can’t eat GDP,’ Kingombe, therefore,
concluded that unless political leaders focused on promoting longer-term

4
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

growth and prosperity, instead of short-term personal gain, ‘the past 10

years of economic and political progress, which is neither linear nor irre-
versible, could be in danger.’12 That Africa stood at a crossroads was his
message.

A peep into the future

In August 2017, five scholars of South Africa’s prestigious think tank – the
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) – published a policy brief entitled African
futures: key trends to 2035.13 In fact, it was a summary of the findings from
a comprehensive report detailing the likely development trends by 2035.14
Delving into the main observations and forecasts of the brief should be
instructive to appreciate where Africa is heading in the next decade and a
half. Summarised below are its key points:

Population: The rate of growth of Africa’s population is the fastest in

the world. The population is expected to grow from the current 1.2
billion to 1.8 billion in 2035, thus surpassing both India (1.6 billion)
and China (1.4 billion). This means that the demand for services such
as education, healthcare, housing and infrastructure will rise dramati-
cally and if it is not met, the society could experience considerable
stress. Further, much of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
will be young: By 2035, half of its citizens will be under 21 years old.
Hence investment in and expenditure on skill development and job
creation would have to be enormous.
Economic growth: Africa will experience growth but is likely to lag
behind South Asia as the fastest growing region in the world. The SSA
is likely to settle at an average annual growth of about 4 to 4.5%.
Regional variations will continue. Economic growth, however, can-
not insulate Africa from vulnerability to global developments such as
price shocks. The brief was clear on the overall impact:

Most of sub-Saharan Africa’s economies are unlikely to grow fast

enough to keep pace with the continent’s extremely rapid popula-
tion growth and the associated pressure on education, healthcare and
other basic services.15

Integration: The authors noted that Africa ‘remains relatively isolated

– both from the global economy and across its regions.’ Considering
that its contribution to global economy was only 3% in 2016, which
is expected to grow to about 4% in 2035, it was suggested that
increasing trade between African countries may be the most promis-
ing avenue to promote economic growth in Africa. Only about 16%
of Africa’s exports were directed to African countries in 2017. The
continent’s ability to take part in global trade will be shaped by the

5
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

ability of its economies ‘to go up the value chain and whether some
can reduce their reliance upon commodity exports.’16
Urbanisation: Stating flatly that ‘Africa's future is urban,’ the authors
pointed out that Africa’s urban population has been growing the fast-
est in the world. In about two decades, half of Africans are likely to
live in a town or city. By 2030, of the world’s 41 mega cities, six will
be in Africa: Cairo, Lagos, Kinshasa, Johannesburg, Luanda and Dar
es Salaam, each with over 10 million inhabitants. Rapid urbanisa-
tion carries both risks and opportunities, and it underlines the need
for proper governance. The brief rings an alarm bell by noting that
uncontrolled urbanisation, especially when viewed in the context of
‘pervasive poverty, inequality, large youthful populations and lack of
economic opportunities,’ does not bode well for future sustainability
of Africa’s towns and cities.17
Conflict: High-fatality violence is significantly lower today than dur-
ing the post-Cold War period. This establishes that conflict in Africa
is causing fewer fatalities than during the 1990s. But an increase in
the number of violent incidents largely caused by riots and protests
has been noted. Most armed conflicts were ‘clustered’ in four regions:
North Africa, the Sahel and West Africa, the Horn, and the Great
Lakes region. The brief highlights an interesting fact: battles between
armed groups and the use of remote violence (through the use of
IEDs) are ‘currently the most common conflict types.’18
Democracy: The brief’s forecast indicates that the number of democra-
cies in Africa is likely to increase and levels of democracy are expected
to continue to improve, though slowly and from a relatively low
base. Moreover, public support for democracy is particularly strong.
However, democracy on the continent rests on ‘fragile foundations.’
According to a useful graph included in the brief (Service: Polity IV,
2015 data), 38% of African population lived in democracies, 61% in
anocracies and 1% in autocracies.19

The conclusion of the ISS brief is crystal clear: in overall terms, ‘Africa’s
story reveals a positive trend. Yet this trend is neither stable nor even.’ The
vital need is to strengthen governance. In Africa, ‘the ongoing transitions
each come with opportunities which political leaders must seize to transform
Africa’s potential into tangible improvement for human development.’20

Aspirations and goals

Whatever may be the realities of the present and likely trends in the future,
it is also important to take into account what the African people, through
their leaders and governments, are committed to achieving in the coming
decades. In this respect, perhaps more than any other continent, Africa has
been impressively clear and articulate about its aspirations and goals.

6
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

As the 21st century opened, African leaders became intensely engaged in

the task to define the kind of future they wished to build for their people.
They settled on the NEPAD. At the inaugural assembly of the AU, held in
Durban in June 2002, they took a clear position on the work accomplished
by the NEPAD heads of state and government implementation committee,
established at the OAU summit in Lusaka in July 2001. The AU Declaration
on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate governance conceded
frankly that Africa faced ‘grave challenges,’ the most urgent of them being
the imperative need for the eradication of poverty and attainment of socio-
economic development. The leaders decided that the NEPAD process would
be principally focused on this goal. Hence, they declared their resolve
‘to work together in policy and action’ in pursuit of four key objectives,
namely, democracy and good political governance; economic and corpo-
rate governance; socio-economic development; and the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM).21
An integral element of NEPAD, APRM is a voluntary arrangement among
willing African states to allow peer states to evaluate their policies and prac-
tices of governance. A total of 33 African countries agreed to participate in
APRM, of which 17 were reviewed by 2013.22 Specifics about the structure
and processes of APRM were worked out, but the outcome of its assess-
ments and practicality of taking corrective measures did not quite match the
level of enthusiasm generated initially. A more recent and candid appraisal
showed that APRM made progress in its second decade, but it encountered
problems that are getting addressed under the AU’s reform agenda.23
The architects of NEPAD claimed that it was founded on ‘a hard-headed
assessment of the political and socio-economic realities in Africa today.’ Its
slow but steady integration into the work processes of AU in the past two
decades has been an important feature of the growing continental integra-
tion. NEPAD may be considered as a mixed success.
While celebrating NEPAD’s tenth anniversary, its planning and coordi-
nating agency produced a self-assessment. Its self-congratulatory tone was
apparent but understandable. The document spelt out accountability and
regional integration as NEPAD’s ‘key dimensions.’ It listed several suc-
cesses such as the formulation of continental policy frameworks relating
to agriculture, infrastructure, science and technology, and environment.
Africa seemed keen to move beyond aid in order ‘to achieve self-sustaining
private sector-led inclusive growth and development.’ Through its APRM,
NEPAD contributed to ‘encouraging good governance and democratisation
in Africa.’ But the document also noted that Africa’s challenges remained to
be tackled, particularly inadequate infrastructure development, weak social
policy and labour reform. ‘Africa remains a continent in transition with
some success stories,’ it concluded, while adding that its challenges needed
‘strong African actions and partnership support.’24
NEPAD’s framers seem to understand Africa best, as evident from what
the declaration, referred above, stated in its para 27:

7
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

No African country is a replica of another and no African society is a

mirror image of another. However, we believe that the variety within our
oneness can be enriching. It is part of the purpose of this Declaration to
mobilize all those enriching qualities to build African unity, in respect
of the specific of our countries.25

As the OAU/AU institutional structures completed 50 years of operation

in 2013, African governments developed their plan of action for the next
five decades. Through ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want,’ they spelt out
their version of the future as well as the way to reach there. A close look
at the popular version of this document, issued in September 2015, may be
instructive.26
At the outset, it stated that Agenda 2063 is rooted in Pan-Africanism
and African Renaissance and it provides ‘a robust framework for address-
ing past injustices and the realisation of the 21st Century as the African
Century.’ It reflects Africa’s re-dedication to the Pan-African vision of ‘an
integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and
representing a dynamic force in the international arena.’ It lists seven key
aspirations mentioned below:

1. A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable

development.
2. An integrated continent, politically united based on the ideals of Pan
Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance.
3. An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights,
justice and the rule of law.
4. A peaceful and secure Africa.
5. An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and
ethics.
6. An Africa, whose development is people-driven, relying on the poten-
tial of African people, especially its women and youth and caring for
children.
7. Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and
partner.27

While the rest of the document contains a detailed elaboration of these

aspirations, a few of its important assertions need to be highlighted here.
First, Africa’s collective GDP will be ‘proportionate to her share of the
world’s population and natural resource endowments.’ Second, ‘Africa shall
be an integrated, united, peaceful, sovereign, independent, confident and
self-reliant continent.’ Third, Africa aspires to be the continent where demo-
cratic values and human rights are ‘entrenched.’ Fourth, Africa will be ‘a
peaceful and secure continent with harmony among communities starting
at grassroots level.’ Finally, Africa aspires to be a ‘major social, political and
economic force in the world, with her rightful share of the global commons

8
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

(land, oceans and space),’ and an ‘active and equal participant in global
affairs, multilateral institutions …’28

Reality check
Here a quick reality check should be factored in; it was provided by the
World Bank’s assessment of Africa's economic outlook at the end of 2019.
As a region, Africa consists of a variety of economies ranging from low,
lower-middle, upper-middle and high-income countries. Eighteen African
countries were rated as ‘fragile or conflict-affected.’ The assessment indi-
cated that, while the continent was poised ‘to create an entirely new devel-
opment path harnessing the potential of its resources and people,’ Africa's
average growth rates did not ‘yet reflect this sentiment.’ Growth in the SSA
was projected to be 2.6% in 2019, a slight increase from 2.5% in 2018.
Yet, four of the fastest growing economies in the world belonged to Africa;
they were Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana and Rwanda. Slow growth was
attributed to both global uncertainty and national factors. The World Bank
stressed that several challenges – rising debt levels, unemployment, gender
gaps – were holding back progress. Besides, it added pertinently, ‘… and
416 million Africans still live in extreme poverty.’29
Another optimistic-realistic evaluation of Africa’s economic potential and
the vast challenges faced by it was provided by Alex Liu who spelt out some
implications of the digital revolution. Referring to three positive develop-
ments during 2019, that is, the launch of the African Continental Free
Trade Area (AfCFTA), opening by the South African government of a new
affiliate of the World Economic Forum’s Centre for the Fourth Industrial
Revolution (C4IR) and the launch of the Africa Growth Forum (by the
World Economic Forum), he noted that Africa was well placed ‘to get start-
ups off the ground, but it also has a higher-than-average failure rate due
to insufficient support and infrastructure.’ The Africa Growth Forum was
designed to help start-ups compete internationally. Over 400 technology
hubs were hosted in the continent, with Lagos, Nairobi and Cape Town
emerging as ‘internationally recognised technology centers.’30
But Liu aptly introduced a note of stark realism by highlighting the con-
clusions of the Future of Production Report 2018,31 which showed that of
the 25 African countries that were assessed for their preparedness to capi-
talise on emerging technologies, as many as 22 were ‘classified as having a
low level of readiness for the future, due to lack of the necessary enabling
conditions.’32
In view of the substantial gap between aspirations for the future and
achievements so far, it may be tempting for some to mock or dismiss
Africa’s prospects. However, a respectful and empathetic attitude is rec-
ommended. In view of Africans’ sufferings in the past, wealth of natural
resources, expanding population and aspirations and goals set at the high-
est collective level, the international community – especially its enlightened

9
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

sections – cannot but appreciate where Africans are raring to go. It should
be inclined to assist them in getting there. The world will benefit from
Africa’s success.

Africa and the world

In contrast to the second half of the 20th century, the first two decades of the
present century demonstrated a sharp rise and widening of the world’s interest
in Africa. In the previous era, the external interest was confined to the European
powers, particularly the former colonial nations and the two superpowers – the
US and USSR. A mix of economic, political and strategic imperatives governed
their Africa policies. Throughout this period, Africa remained a passive object
rather than an active actor, with the exception of its limited endeavours to
assert its will through platforms such as the UN, NAM and G77.
Changes were inevitable after the Cold War. The Soviet Union disap-
peared and was, therefore, no longer a factor in Africa. America’s inter-
est waned, with other regions becoming priorities. The European Union
(EU), however, continued its interest and engagement, while always strug-
gling to overcome the colonial taint of some of its members. In the 1990s,
Japan emerged as a new player, ready to offer generous doses of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to many African countries.
The real change came with China reinventing its past role which was
moulded by the communist ideology and strategic competition with the two
superpowers. It launched a new policy approach towards Africa, driven by
its own unprecedented economic success and riding on a novel platform
of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Its first ministerial
conference was held in October 2000 in Beijing. In two decades, China
emerged as a top economic partner of Africa, using all possible levers –
aid, loans, trade, investment, diplomacy, peacekeeping and soft power – to
forge new relationships and strengthen old ties with African countries in
all the five regions. Other emerging economies – India, Brazil and eventu-
ally Russia – followed suit. Yet others like Turkey, UAE, South Korea and
Indonesia joined in, with a view to expanding their politico-economic coop-
eration with the African partners of their choice.
In an invaluable study entitled ‘Emerging Powers in Africa,’ LSE Ideas pre-
sented a critical assessment of ‘an increasingly consequential role’ of emerging
powers, examining this development in the broader context of ‘the shifting bal-
ance of wealth and power away from the U.S. and Europe to the rapidly grow-
ing economies.’ Its conclusion focused attention on the implications of ‘the
New Multi-polarity’ for Africa. The authors argued that Africa reacted to the
interest shown by the new partners in two different ways. The first approach
was ‘adaptive, aimed at learning the lessons of emerging power development
success and grafting them onto African policies.’ The second response was one
of ‘critical distance to emerging powers,’33 stemming from some of the adverse
experiences with companies or governments of these powers.

10
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

This study rightly emphasised the importance of ‘African agency’ or

autonomous decisions by African governments and business actors to
choose their partners wisely and develop ‘genuinely sustainable partner-
ships.’34 What, however, is evident is that Africa is pleased with the diver-
sity of choices available now. This privilege was denied to it in the past.
‘The African continent is open to cooperation with all its partners,’ asserted
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, president of Egypt and chair of AU.35

Conclusion
It is unimportant to pinpoint as to when Africa's political and economic
transition began: in 1957 when Ghana became the first country to win free-
dom; in 1963 when the OAU was established; in 1989–91 when the Cold
War finally ended; in 2002 when the OAU was transformed into AU; or in
the second decade of the 21st century when the world’s interest in Africa
attained an altogether new level. All these have been significant milestones
on Africa’s journey to secure its full potential. And the journey continues.
Speaking at the World Economic Forum on Africa in September 2019,
Cyril Ramaphosa, president of South Africa, observed:

The future is great, it looks very bright for the African continent, and if
there was ever a time when Africa can definitely be said (to be) on the
rise, this is the time … This is Africa's century, and we want to utilize
it to good effect.36

In words that contrasted with this rosy optimism, Albert Zeufack, the
World Bank’s chief economist for Africa, added a touch of caution, ‘Having
a youthful continent is a huge opportunity, but a huge threat as well.’37
Clearly Africa’s leadership and elites need to shoulder the primary responsi-
bility to pilot its all-round development. This is where Africa’s agency assumes
importance. But the world too has a special responsibility to assist Africans
secure their goals. Mutuality of interest dictates a deeper partnership.
Leaders and informed citizenry alike, especially in India and elsewhere,
are becoming increasingly curious to learn about Africa and are inclined
to support Africans’ relentless quest for a better future. The next chapter
trains limelight on how the India-Africa relationship developed during the
previous century.

Notes
1 Gaius Plinius Secundus, commonly known as Pliny the Elder, is credited with
coining the Latin phrase. Pliny seems to be referring to Aristotle, ‘The History of
Animals’, Book VII, section 28. For more details, read Italo Ronca, "Ex Africa
Semper Aliquid Noui: The Ever Surprising Vicissitudes of a Pre-Aristotelian
Proverb". Latomus 53, no. 3 (1994): 570–93. http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/41541562 (accessed on 3 October).

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 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

2 Julia Bello-Schünemann, Jakkie Cilliers, Zachary Donnenfeld, Ciara Aucoin and

Alex Porter, African futures, Key trends to 2035, Policy Brief 105, August 2017,
Institute for Security Studies, Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, p. 1. https://issafrica.
s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief105.pdf (accessed on 3 January 2020).
3 John Mckenna, ‘6 numbers that prove the future is African’. World Economic
Forum, 2 May 2017. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/africa-is-ris-
ing-and-here-are-the-numbers-to-prove-it/ (accessed on 3 January 2020).
4 Ibid.
5 Mo Ibrahim ‘Mo Ibrahim: Now is the time for Afro-realism’, CNN, 11 April 2014.
https://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/11/world/africa/mo-ibrahim-now-is-time-afro-
realism/index.html (accessed on 4 January 2020).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Louise Redvers, ‘No longer the hopeless continent’, Mail & Guardian, 11 May
2012.
9 Christine Lagarde, ‘Africa Rising - Building to the Future’, Keynote Address,
Managing Director, IMF
29 May 2014, International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/News/
Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp052914 (accessed on 4 January 2020).
10 Ibid.
11 Christian Kingombe. ‘The shift in perception of Africa as seen through the prism
of the middle class’, The Tutwa Brief, February 2015. http://www.tutwaconsult-
ing.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/150511_TUTWA-brief_02_2015_
PROOF-3.pdf (accessed on 4 January 2020).
12 Ibid.
13 Julia Bello-Schünemann, Jakkie Cilliers, Zachary Donnenfeld, Ciara Aucoin and
Alex Porter, African futures, Key trends to 2035, Policy Brief 105, August 2017,
Institute for Security Studies, p. 1. Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa. https://
issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief105.pdf (accessed on 4
January 2020).
14 Ibid. Mentioned in references to the Brief.
15 Ibid., p. 3.
16 Ibid., p. 5.
17 Ibid., p. 6.
18 Ibid., p. 6.
19 Ibid. Please see p. 8.
20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 ‘Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance’,
NEPAD. https://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/documents/official-documents/39-
atkt-declaration-dem-pol-eco-cor-gov-2002-en/file (accessed on 4 January 2020).
22 Kingsley Ighobor, ‘African Peer Review Mechanism comes of age’, Africa
Renewal, December 2013. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/decem-
ber-2013/african-peer-review-mechanism-comes-age (accessed on 9 January
2020).
23 Yarik Turianskyi, ‘African peer review: progress is being made, but there are
problems’, The Conversation, 13 March 2019. http://theconversation.com/afri-
can-peer-review-progress-is-being-made-but-there-are-problems-113048
(accessed on 9 January 2020).
24 ‘Africa’s Decade of Change: Reflections on 10 years of NEPAD’, NEPAD
Planning and Coordinating Agency, August 2012. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.370.2542&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed on 9
January 2020).

12
 AFRICA IN TRANSITION

25 ‘Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance’,

NEPAD. https://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/documents/official-documents/39-
atkt-declaration-dem-pol-eco-cor-gov-2002-en/file (accessed on 4 January 2020).
26 ‘Agenda 2063, African Union Commission, 2015’. https://au.int/sites/default/
files/documents/36204-doc-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf (accessed on
4 January 2020).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 ‘Overview: The World Bank in Africa’, The World Bank, 15 October 2019.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview (accessed on 4 January
2020).
30 Alex Liu, ‘Africa's future is innovation rather than industrialization’, 1 September
2019, World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/
africa-innovation-rather-than-industrialization/ (accessed on 4 January 2020).
31 ‘Readiness for the Future of Production Report 2018’, 12 January 2018, World
Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/reports/readiness-for-the-future-
of-production-report-2018 (accessed on 4 January 2020).
32 Alex Liu, ‘Africa's future is innovation rather than industrialization’, 1 September
2019, World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/
africa-innovation-rather-than-industrialization/ (accessed on 4 January 2020).
33 ‘Emerging Powers in Africa’, LSE IDEAS. http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/
Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-Emerging-Powers-in-Africa.pdf (accessed on 4
January 2020).
34 Ibid.
35 ‘Russia-Africa Summit’, 24 October 2019. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/61893 (accessed on 4 January 2020).
36 Robin Pomeroy, Anna Bruce-Lockhart, ‘This is Africa's century’ – what we
learned at the World Economic Forum in Cape Town 2019’, 6 September 2019,
World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/world-
economic-forum-africa-2019-ramaphosa-gender-violence-youth/ (accessed on 4
January 2020).
37 Ibid.

13
 2
INDIA-AFRICA RELATIONS IN
THE 20 TH CENTURY

India has always mattered to Africa.

Meles Zenawi1

Introduction
Among Africa’s external partners, India rightly claims to enjoy long-
lasting links that go back to centuries, probably millennia. How old this
relationship is and how it evolved through the ages are themes that have
been explored by historians. What is relevant here to appreciate is that
these ties, rooted in history, are marked by mutual familiarity, experience
and knowledge. These traits, blended with a strong measure of empathy
that Indian and African peoples – as fellow victims of colonialism – felt
for each other, turned the relationship into a special and unique one. A
strong awareness of this reality was present among the generations born
during the colonial period. It needs to be transmitted to their grand-
children. Only then will a continued reaping of rich dividends from this
ancient friendship be ensured.
This chapter is not designed as a history lesson. It rather attempts a tour
d’horizon of key developments to demonstrate how the trajectory of the
India-Africa relationship through the 20th century was moulded by a pleth-
ora of political, intellectual and human factors as well as powerful leaders.
It brings the story to the stage where, at the century’s end, the relationship
seemed ready to enter a new phase, yearning for a major renewal.
The period under discussion may be classified in several different ways.
The neatest way is to divide the 20th century into two parts, with 1947
as the marker between the colonial period and the post-colonial era. This
was the year India attained independence, heralding the end of the British
Raj for one partner and serving as a strong catalyst for political change in
Africa, the other partner.

14 DOI: 10.4324/9781003044550-2
 I N D I A - A F R I CA R E L AT I O N S I N T H E 2 0 TH C E N T U RY

Pre-1947 phase
In discovering the sea route from Europe to India, Vasco da Gama travelled
through the Cape of Good Hope, hugging Africa’s coastline to reach Calicut
(in modern-day Kerala) in May 1498. While traversing African waters and
touching African shores, he learnt about Indian traders’ regular visits and
presence there. In fact, he is understood to have been assisted by a sailor in
Malindi (in Kenya) who, as an expert on monsoon winds, served as his pilot
and showed the best and safest way to India. Scholars differ on the sailor’s
identity: he could be a Gujarati, Christian, Muslim or Arab.2
History, archaeology and people’s collective memories combined to
transmit stories of sea voyages to Africa, undertaken by Indians for cen-
turies for the purpose of trade and cultural interaction. They went to the
islands situated between India and the African continent and to the lat-
ter’s south-eastern shores through the Indian Ocean route. Besides, they
reached the regions of West Asia and North Africa through the Gulf route.
They were drawn by a mixture of curiosity, a sense of adventure, a quest
for fortune and a desire for trade and exchange of crafts and culture. But
notably none sought to capture African lands nor conquer Africans in order
to establish foreign rule. Colonisation was alien to the travelling Indians’
way of thinking.
The arrival of European explorers and colonialists proved a turning point
for Africa. Exploitation of African lands would begin soon and continue
for a long time. As colonial rule began to set down its roots in African soil,
there arose the need for Indian labour. As a result, Indians moved in large
numbers, whether under compulsion as indentured labour or on free will,
to African countries (viz. South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mauritius
and Mozambique etc.), particularly during the last decades of the 19th cen-
tury. Indians toiled on farms and built roads and railway lines. They also
became traders or dukawallas and provided a skilled workforce to run
administration, schools and private firms.3
The Indian community passed through many trials and tribulations dur-
ing the colonial era. Once independence began to come to African coun-
tries, Indians flourished, but they also faced new challenges. In countries
such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, Indians settled for a long time were
viewed as threats to new economic opportunities opening for the indig-
enous people. When multiracial democracy arrived in South Africa in the
1990s, Indians complained that earlier they were regarded as ‘not white
enough’ and now they were seen as ‘not black enough’ to merit full equality
in the system. By the time the 20th century ended, the Indian community was
2.6 million-strong, according to the report of the High-Level Committee on
Indian Diaspora, set up by the Indian government. Spread to 34 countries,
it represented 12% of the Indians settled in various regions of the world
(outside India).4

15
 I N D I A - A F R I CA R E L AT I O N S I N T H E 2 0 TH C E N T U RY

Gandhi’s legacy
The role of Indians in the evolution of Africa-India partnership may have
remained a mere footnote but for an extraordinary Indian – Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi. He single-handedly turned it – the presence of and
problems faced by Indians in South Africa – into a bold headline and a
powerful theme in history books. He emerged both as the philosopher and
architect of their struggle against injustice and racial discrimination. In the
process, his life, work and teachings became an enduring source of inspira-
tion not only to Indians in South Africa and other African countries but
also to the peoples of the world, Africa and indeed India. He spent over 21
years (1893–1914) on African soil. He once described himself as born in
India and made in South Africa. Nelson Mandela offered the unforgettable
portrayal of Gandhi by pointing out that India sent a lawyer to South Africa
which returned a Mahatma.
Gandhi spent a quarter of his life in South Africa. In his sojourn, there
were two major turning points. One came early – on 7 June 1893, when he
was travelling on a train from Durban to Charlestown, near the Transvaal
border. At Pietermaritzburg railway station, he was unjustly thrown out of
the first-class compartment due to the prevalent practice of blatant racial
discrimination. Hurt and humiliated, he spent the cold night in a small room
at the railway station. Later he recalled his inner struggle of the moment:

I was afraid for my very life… What was my duty, I asked myself.
Should I go back to India, or should I go forward, with God as my
helper, and face whatever was in store for me? I decided to stay and
suffer. My active non-violence began on that date.5

Gandhi chose to stay on and fight injustice and thus made history.6
During my tenure as India’s high commissioner in South Africa, it was
a privilege for me to visit the railway station. For a few minutes, I stood
silently before the memorial plaque commemorating the historic incident.
I deeply felt that it represented the veritable source from where emerged a
new vision and vibrant energy that pushed forward India’s fight for freedom
under Gandhi’s amazing leadership. ‘This incident,’ noted Dhruba Jyoti,
‘is almost universally described as the moment of the Mahatma’s political
awakening.’7
The other date was 11 September 1906 when, at a public meeting at the
Empire Theatre in Johannesburg, Gandhi issued a powerful, inspiring call
for peaceful resistance against racial discrimination and oppression. This
received massive public support from the Indian community. Traversing
through the various stages of his work, both before and after 1906, Gandhi
developed an armoury of his unique weapons of Truth, Non-violence and
Satyagraha (passive resistance based on the force of Truth) and deployed
them to advance immensely the cause of Indians’ welfare. Subsequently,

16
 I N D I A - A F R I CA R E L AT I O N S I N T H E 2 0 TH C E N T U RY

emerging as the front-ranking leader of India’s freedom movement, he drew

heavily from his experiences in South Africa and imparted a decisive direc-
tion to the biggest mass movement against the British Raj. Thus, through
the high principles he practiced steadfastly, Gandhi became a beacon of
hope for all time to come. Lauding his contribution, Mandela observed:

…at a time when the colonized had ceased to think and control, he
dared to think and control; and when the ideologies of the colonized
had virtually disappeared, he revived them and empowered them with
a potency that liberated and redeemed.8

Gandhi’s contribution to deepening the acquaintance and friendship

between Africa and India needs to be appreciated by stepping out of the
comfort zone of traditional adoration for him. Two aspects should be noted
here.
First, critics pointed out that his struggle in South Africa was restricted
to protecting the interests of the Indian community only; thus, he ignored
the blatant oppression to which native Africans were subjected. Gandhi
was conscious of this criticism. Partially he accepted it, and partially he
defended himself. He wrote that his sympathies were with the Africans,
but he did not have the power to help them or to do anything for them. He
reckoned that he was not strong enough nor disciplined enough. He also
sensed that South Africans – and Africans in general – would have to throw
up their liberators from amongst themselves. He proved right on this score.
Second, despite countless halls named after him and statues, busts and
portraits of Gandhi adorning the length and breadth of the African conti-
nent, voices of dissent and criticism of his views and role in South Africa
have been heard from time to time. Reports of students in Ghana and
Malawi protesting over his statues and demanding their removal appeared
in the recent past. Gandhi’s sojourn in South Africa made him ‘another
problematic colonial figure,’ claimed the critics.9 Accusations that he dis-
played racism, called Africans ‘kaffirs,’ and considered them as uncivilised
and Indians as superior to them were highlighted. A book by two South
African Indians, published in 2015, argued that Indian authors, in portray-
ing Gandhi’s role in Africa in glowing terms, tended to ignore Africans’ role
in their own liberation.10
But Africa’s top leaders consistently expressed nothing but deep admira-
tion for Gandhi. Mandela rightly insisted that Gandhi’s stand on issues
facing Indians and Africans should be viewed in the context of his time.
Gandhi figured prominently in a memorable conversation I had with
Mandela in March 2007. He spoke with a deep feeling about the Indian
leader in consonance with the positive spirit in which he wrote about him
on numerous occasions.11
Writing in a similar positive vein, Professor Ernest Aryeetey, who as vice
chancellor of the University of Ghana had accepted the gift of a Gandhi

17
 I N D I A - A F R I CA R E L AT I O N S I N T H E 2 0 TH C E N T U RY

statue from the Indian government, noted, ‘I have come to view the experi-
ences of Gandhi as very similar to the transformation of Saul into Paul in
the Bible. Once I accept the conversion of Paul, I can easily forgive the early
Gandhi.’12
While critically evaluating Gandhi’s legacy in Africa, Dileep Padgaonkar
observed:

What alone matters in retrospect … are his indefatigable efforts to get

justice for the downtrodden (black and brown alike), his exercises in
community living on the Phoenix and Tolstoy farms, his novel methods
to challenge colonial authority, the moral dimension he gave to public
life and, not least, his own impeccable character.13

Nehru, the lasting link

While Gandhi’s work in South Africa brought Africa on the radar of think-
ing Indians in the colonial era, it was Jawaharlal Nehru who, as the emerg-
ing Congress leader, became strongly interested in the plight of subjugated
peoples in Africa and Asia. He invested much effort and energy in studying
and understanding the problems created by colonialism in Africa as well
as in helping the world to appreciate their gravity. Making a distinction
between the contribution of Gandhi and Nehru, Hari Sharan Chhabra aptly
observed:

Even though Mahatma Gandhi valiantly pioneered the cause of the

Indians in South Africa before him, the credit for making India and the
world “Africa-conscious” must undoubtedly go to Nehru.14

It may be useful to trace select milestones in Nehru’s journey of following

developments in Africa and interaction with its representatives. In 1912,
while attending the Congress session at Bankipore, Nehru heard about
Gandhi’s activities in South Africa from Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Gandhi’s
mentor. Nehru’s early political activity was to raise funds for Gandhi’s pas-
sive resistance movement, which the former undertook as the joint secretary
of the United Provinces South African Committee. This took him to meet
Gandhi at the Lucknow session of Congress in 1916, the man who would
become his lifelong mentor.
A seminal turn came with Nehru’s visit to Europe (from March 1926 to
December 1927) during which he participated in the International Congress
against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism held in Brussels as the only
representative of the Indian National Congress (INC). This is where he met
an array of representatives of nationalist organisations of Asian and African
regions, ranging from Java to Palestine and Egypt to other parts of Africa.
Nehru’s address at this conference laid bare the evils of British rule in India
and how it impacted adversely on other colonised countries. ‘I do submit,’

18
 I N D I A - A F R I CA R E L AT I O N S I N T H E 2 0 TH C E N T U RY

he stated, ‘that the exploitation of India by the British is a barrier for other
countries that are being oppressed and exploited.’15 From this outlook
emerged his core belief that the struggle of Indians and other peoples were
interlinked, that India’s liberation would remain incomplete without other
countries of Asia and Africa too securing their freedom. At the Brussels con-
ference, he met a few Africans; he praised their energy and eloquence. He
also began to develop and express his views on the role of Indians in Africa
as well as the misuse by the British of Indian police and army to suppress
peoples of foreign lands.
At age 40, Nehru became the president of INC at the Lahore session in
1929, for the first time. In his presidential address, he spoke about Egypt
and South Africa, although no direct or detailed reference was made to
the challenges facing Africa. During 1935, he visited Europe again. While
in England, he met V.K. Krishna Menon who served as his London-
based aide, counsellor and confidante from October 1935 onwards. After
Independence, Menon would become his envoy to the UN and later a min-
ister in his cabinet and help him in advancing the cause of Africa’s decoloni-
sation.16 In 1938, Nehru interacted with George Padmore, a future advisor
to free Ghana’s top leader Kwame Nkrumah, as part of his continuing
endeavour to comprehend the evolving situation on the African continent.
Nehru delivered the presidential address at the international conference on
Peace and Empire in London in June 1938 where he notably remarked, ‘…
I do think we must not forget the countries of Africa, because probably
no people in the world have suffered so much, and have been exploited so
much in the past as the people of Africa.’17
Writing in The Discovery of India, first published in 1946, Nehru asserted,
‘Large parts of Asia and Africa consist of an awakened, discontented, seeth-
ing humanity, no longer prepared to tolerate existing conditions.’18 Except
Egypt, Nehru had not visited an African country yet. His strong empa-
thy for the African people stemmed from his deep understanding of world
history and his frequent meetings with intellectuals and political leaders
of Africa. This perspective would influence his policy and action, once he
assumed power in independent India – or even a little earlier.

Post-1947 phase
This phase – largely the second half of the 20th century – may be divided
into three periods: i) Nehru as PM (1947–64), ii) post-Nehru years (from
the mid-1960s to end-1980s) and iii) the last decade.

Nehru as PM
As a matter of fact, his era began – for the purpose of this discussion – from
September 1946 when, well before independence dawned on 15 August
1947, India’s interim government was formed in which Nehru became the

19
 I N D I A - A F R I CA R E L AT I O N S I N T H E 2 0 TH C E N T U RY

vice president of the Executive Council. Two notable developments deserve

mention here. First, India took the question of racial discrimination against
Indians in South Africa to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
in June 1946.19 Besides, the Indian government took the decision to severe
trade links with South Africa and to withdraw its high commissioner from
Pretoria. Second, the Asian Relations Conference was hosted by the Indian
Council of World Affairs (ICWA), with the government’s support, in March–
April 1947. Speaking from this prestigious platform, Nehru observed:

Asia stretches her hand out in friendship to Europe and America as well
as well as to our suffering brethren in Africa. We of Asia have a special
responsibility to the people of Africa. We must help them to their right-
ful place in the human family.20

The nearly 17-year-long stewardship of Nehru as the first prime minister

of India was remarkable for its forward-looking foreign policy that was
anchored in his world view. Its three principal pillars were Afro-Asian unity;
faith in non-alignment as an effective ‘third way’ in global politics polarised
between two military blocs; and imperative need to preserve global peace
in a nuclear era. Independent India provided an active leadership to secure
progress in the decolonisation of Asia and Africa.
Scholars have dissected the contribution of Nehru’s diplomacy in one
African country after another, ranging from Kenya, Algeria, Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe), the Congo, Portuguese colonies and concerning developments
in South Africa and those relating to the Suez crisis in which Egypt was
the chief protagonist. The political and diplomatic synergy created at the
Bandung conference in April 1955 was particularly noteworthy. Here too
Nehru drew the world’s attention to ‘the infinite tragedy of Africa ever since
the days when millions of Africans were carried away as galley slaves to
America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galley.’21
A blend of favourable factors viz. utter exhaustion of colonial powers
caused by World War II, discovery of neocolonialism as a better strategy,
compulsions of the Cold War and impact of liberation movements in Africa
were responsible for decolonisation. In this process, Nehru’s clear and sus-
tained advocacy of Africa’s cause, backed by his charisma and global stand-
ing, made a significant contribution.
In his book A Life in Diplomacy, Maharaja Krishna Rasgotra presented
an eye-witness account of how the Indian delegation to the UN worked
proactively in the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee to push forward
Africa’s decolonisation. He recalled that there was no ‘clear-cut division in
the Fourth Committee between the colonial powers and their supporters on
one side of the aisle and the supporters of decolonisation on the other.’22
Those advocating rapid decolonisation received support from the US and
Canada and several European and Latin American nations. Consequently,
the Fourth Committee produced two important documents: one was the

20
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
en smalle tong, met hoogstens drie rijen plaatjes, waarvan de
middelste breed en aan den achterrand met scherpe tandjes bezet
zijn. Al deze slakken zijn vleescheters en bezitten dus, volgens
bladz. 119, een sipho, die in een gleuf of kanaal of ook in een
insnijding van de schelp gelegen is. De laatste is altijd gewonden en
van een deksel voorzien.
Hiertoe behooren vele bekende en deels zeer fraaie soorten. In
fig. 12 zien wij de p l o o i s l a k (Voluta scapha), genoemd naar de
schuine p l o o i e n aan den rand van de spil der schelp, die
tolvormig, buikig en van boven verbreed is, met roodbruine, hoekige,
overlangsche lijnen of vlekken geteekend en zeer groot is. De voet is
groot en breed, de voelers, aan wier basis de oogen zitten, zijn
driehoekig. Zij ontbreken in Europa en leven in de tropische zeeën.
Bij een andere soort: de m u z i e k - of n o t e n s l a k , gelijken de
donkere lijnen eenigszins op notenbalken.
Een zeer fraaie smaltongige slak is die van fig. 22, in vorm en
kleur eenigszins op een olijf gelijkend, en daarom o l i j f - of
d a d e l s l a k (Oliva) genoemd. Het zeer gladde en glimmende,
langwerpig eironde huisje heeft een zeer korte winding, doch een
bijzonder langen en smallen mond, met insnijding voor de sipho. De
kleur is olijfgeel, met eenige bruine golven, grootte als op de plaat,
doch de p o r f i e r s l a k van Brazilië wordt wel 9 tot 12 centim.
Daarentegen zijn de r i j s t k o r r e l s (Oliva oryzae), die wit van kleur
zijn en in vorm en grootte aan rijst doen denken, niet langer dan 5-9
millim. Het dier zelf heeft een kleinen kop en de oogen staan op het
midden der voelers. De voet is zeer groot en zijn breede zijlobben
kunnen om den rand der schelp naar boven geslagen en tot
zwemmen gebezigd worden. Het zijn zeer levendige, snel kruipende
dieren, die op zandige gronden in de warme zeeën leven.
Verwant aan de vorige is de b i s s c h o p s m u t s (Mitra
episcopalis) van fig. 19, die bij de Philippijnen voorkomt. Het fraaie
en zeer gladde huisje is ongeveer 8 centim. lang, hoog en spits
kegelvormig, als een bisschopsmijter, wit van kleur, met hoogroode,
in dwarse rijen geplaatste, bijna vierhoekige vlekken. De mond van
de schelp is klein, van een uitsnijding voor de sipho voorzien. Het
dier zelf is spiraalvormig, met kleinen voet en kop, doch zeer langen
slurf. Het deksel ontbreekt. In de zeeën van Indië leven honderden
soorten, waaronder ook één, die, naar den vorm, p a u s e l i j k e
k r o o n (Mitra papalis) genoemd wordt.
De f u i k h o r e n s l a k (Nassa reticulata), fig. 15, eenigszins op een
palingfuik gelijkend en 3 centim. hoog, komt algemeen op
slibgronden van de Noordzee en de westelijke Oostzee voor en is
dikwijls met kolonies van poliepen bezet. Er is een kanaal, met diepe
insnijding voor de sipho, de slurf komt, als een roode buis, uit den
mond en boort zich in het vleesch van de prooi. Een na verwant
familielid van deze slak is de bekende w u l k of k i n k h o r e n
(Buccinum), waarvan de fraaie en wijdmondige, groote horens (9
centim.) veel aan onze kusten aanspoelen en door oude visschers
verkocht worden. Ook behoort tot deze groep het d u i f j e
(Columbella mercatoria) van fig. 11, met een ei-kegelvormig huisje
van 1,5 centim., dat dwarsgegroefd en met witte en bruine
zigzagvormige dwarsbanden geteekend is. Het kleine deksel is
hoornachtig, de voet klein en aan de geringde voelers staan de
oogen. Zij komt in den Atlantischen oceaan voor.
Als laatste voorbeeld van de smaltongigen bespreken wij nog de
interessante p u r p e r s l a k (Purpura lapillus), fig. 5, insgelijks
verwant aan de k i n k h o r e n s , met een eivormig, vrij groot, dwars
gegroefd huisje, z o n d e r s t e k e l s , waardoor zij zich onderscheidt
van de stekelpurperslak (zie bladz. 110). Het huisje is groenachtig
geel, met witte banden, het gewonden gedeelte is kegelvormig, met
bolle windingen en de monding, die met een hoornachtig deksel kan
gesloten worden, is groot, met zeer kort kanaal. De voet is breed,
vooruitstekend, van voren tweelobbig. Het dier leeft in de Noordzee
en heeft een „purperklier”, wier kleurstof in de oudheid veel gebruikt
werd voor het verven van mantels en gewaden, waartoe in Tarente
in Italië en in Tyrus in Phoenicië zich talrijke purperfabrieken
bevonden. Nog heden ten dage wijst men, bij Tarente, den bezoeker
den zoogenaamden „Monte-Testacea”, dat is: den berg der
schelpen, die alleen bestaat uit de schelpen van de purperslak,
welke men daar, na het uittrekken van de verfstof, sedert eeuwen
opgehoopt heeft.
Twee zeeslakken op de plaat: de k e g e l s l a k van fig. 9 en de
s c h r o e f s l a k van fig. 21, behooren tot de vierde groep der
kamkieuwigen: de pijltongigen, bij welke de tong bezet is met twee
rijen lange, spitse p i j l e n , wier steek voor de levende prooi doodelijk
is. De g e m a r m e r d e k e g e l s l a k (Conus marmoratus), fig. 9,
heeft een prachtig gemarmerde schelp, zwart van kleur, met
ongeveer driehoekige witte vlekken, die den vorm heeft van twee,
met de basis op elkaar staande, kegels, waarvan de kleinste, lagere
het gewonden gedeelte, de veel grootere en hoogere alleen de
laatste winding voorstelt. De mond van de schelp is zeer lang en
smal, met een kleine groef aan de basis. Het deksel is geel, met
zwarte strepen. Het smalle, afgeplatte en opgerolde dier heeft een
kleinen voet en een lange sipho, die door de insnijding uitgestoken
wordt. Er is een duidelijke kop met 2 voelers, waarop halverwege de
oogen zitten en een lange slurf met korte tong, gewapend met
pijlvormige weerhaken. De schelpen behooren tot de bekendste en
gezochtste van de verzamelaars en worden vooral in de warme
Indische zeeën, als bewoners der koraalriffen, aangetroffen.
Sommige soorten hadden vroeger een groote waarde.
Een eveneens zeer fraaie schelp is die van een andere pijltongige
slak: de g e v l e k t e s c h r o e f s l a k (Terebra maculata) van fig. 21.
Het huisje is zeer lang en spits, toren- of naaldvormig, met kleinen
mond, scheeve gedraaide spil en een kort kanaal. Het wordt 20
centim. hoog, is geelachtig van kleur en heeft op elke winding twee
rijen van bijna rechthoekige, grijsachtig bruine of roodbruine vlekken.
De voet is klein, de sipho lang, de oogen zijn onduidelijk. Deze soort
leeft in den Indischen Oceaan; vele kleine soorten zijn uiterst sierlijk
en hebben veel waarde voor verzamelaars.
Tot de laatste groep der kamkieuwigen, de waaiertongigen,
genoemd naar de vele, waaiervormig geplaatste, zijplaten langs den
rand der middelplaten van de zeer samengestelde tong, behooren
nog drie soorten op onze plaat, waarvan de twee eerste een groote
ademhalingsholte hebben, met een kieuw, die uit twee bladen
bestaat. Zij zijn plantetend en houden zich bij voorkeur op tusschen
zeewieren op het strand. De eerste soort is de G r i e k s c h e
s l e u t e l g a t h o r e n (Fissurella graeca), fig. 4, die ook op onze
kusten voorkomt, met straalvormig elliptische schelp en een
ademopening boven in het midden. De schelp is roodachtig grijs van
kleur en heeft straalvormige overlangsche en concentrische dwarse
ribben. De slurfvormige mond heeft twee kegelvormige voelers, aan
wier basis de oogen liggen. De tweede waaiertongige slak is de
r o n d m o n d - s l a k (Turbo pica), fig. 8, die in de warme zeeën leeft,
vooral in die van den Atlantischen oceaan. De schelp is t o l v o r m i g ,
rond en buikig, het gewonden gedeelte kegelvormig, de oppervlakte
is glad, wit van kleur, met zwarte vlekken of strepen, de monding der
schelp is rond, het deksel dun en hoornachtig.
Ten slotte zien wij op de plaat nog een derde voorbeeld van de
waaiertongigen, namelijk: de u i t s n i j d i n g s s l a k (Emarginula), fig.
1, aldus genoemd naar de ondiepe insnijding over het midden der
schelp, die van den voorsten rand uitgaat. Zij is ongeveer 1,5 centim.
lang, geelachtig wit, eivormig en tralievormig gestreept. Het dier
zuigt zich aan rotsen vast.

XIII.
 PLAAT XIII.
UIT HET RIJK DER SCHELPDIEREN.
Het tooneel dezer plaat verplaatst ons weer in het gebied van een
andere klasse der weekdieren: de plaatkieuwigen of schelpdieren,
waarvan wij vroeger eenige voorbeelden uit het zoete water ontmoet
hebben, terwijl wij thans met een groote verscheidenheid van
zeebewoners zullen kennis maken. Verschillende soorten daarvan
zijn in elk zee-aquarium, zoo ook in dat te Amsterdam,
vertegenwoordigd.
De algemeene organisatie van de s c h e l p d i e r e n of m o s s e l s
werd, reeds bij die vroegere gelegenheid, uitvoerig door ons
besproken en wij kunnen dus den lezer slechts aanraden om, vóór
wij verder gaan, die beschrijving op bladz. 10-15 nog eens
aandachtig over te lezen, waarbij de afbeeldingen B en C op bladz.
12 en 13 weer goede diensten zullen bewijzen. Thans willen wij dus
nog slechts, in het kort, een paar hoofdpunten in herinnering
brengen.
Binnen de beide, uit koolzure kalk en conchyoline bestaande,
s c h e l p k l e p p e n , die door een s l o t , meestal van tandjes
voorzien, beweeglijk verbonden zijn en van buiten door een
veerkrachtigen s l o t b a n d uiteengetrokken worden, liggen vooreerst
de beide bladen van den m a n t e l , die aan zijn buitenoppervlakte de
schelp heeft afgescheiden en binnen welke de m a n t e l h o l t e
gelegen is. Het levende dier kan de beide schelpkleppen stevig
aaneen doen sluiten door het samentrekken van é é n of t w e e
s l u i t s p i e r e n , die aan de binnenzijde van de kleppen vastgehecht
zijn en waarvan de aanhechtingsplaatsen of „spierindrukken” later
nog steeds zijn te zien (zie fig. C op bladz. 13, bij gg). Binnen den
mantel liggen verder weer de platte bladen van twee paren (zelden
één paar) k i e u w e n , naar welke men deze klasse de
plaatkieuwige weekdieren noemt.
 Voorts zagen wij, dat bij geen enkel schelpdier ooit „het hoofd kan
omloopen”, noch „het hoofd op hol” kan gaan, want bij allen
ontbreekt de kop volkomen: het zijn k o p l o o z e w e e k d i e r e n .
Toch is de onmisbare m o n d aanwezig, die bij het ééne uiteinde der
schelp gelegen is, doch die alle organen voor het fijnwrijven van het
voedsel, die wij bij de slakken aantroffen, mist, daar de schelpdieren
zich slechts voeden met mikroskopische diertjes of plantjes, die, met
het naar de mantelholte stroomende, water meegevoerd worden. Bij
het tegenovergestelde uiteinde van de schelp ligt de aarsopening en
tusschen deze en den mond een vrij volledig d a r m k a n a a l , terwijl
ook het h a r t en de b l o e d s o m l o o p goed ontwikkeld zijn, evenals
het z e n u w s t e l s e l , dat uit 3 paren zenuwknoopen bestaat,
waarvan zenuwdraden naar de verschillende organen en zintuigen
uitgaan. Onder de laatste zijn g e h o o r o r g a n e n voorhanden en
niet zelden zelfs o o g e n , die aan den rand van den mantel liggen.
Als bewegingsorgaan dient, zooals bij alle weekdieren, de v o e t ,
in de buurt van den mond gelegen, een stevige, dikke spier (zie fig.
B op bladz. 12, bij F), die, door beurtelingsche samentrekking en
uitzetting, het lichaam, met de schelp, voortbeweegt of in het zand
graaft. Het is trouwens een armzalig soort van beweging, want de
rivier-parelmossel, die wij vroeger, bij de zoetwater-mosselen,
ontmoet hebben (zie bladz. 31), heeft niet minder dan een half uur
noodig, om een weg af te leggen, zoo lang als haar eigen schelp en
als zij grooten spoed maakt, komt zij, in 9 uren tijds, niet meer dan
80 centim. vooruit. Onpartijdigheidshalve moeten wij er echter
bijvoegen, dat er uitzonderingen zijn; sommigen kunnen, door middel
van dat primitieve bewegingsorgaan, tamelijk snel zwemmen,
andere, zooals de zandschelp, zelfs zekere akrobatische sprongen
doen.
Nog dient opgemerkt, dat de beide randen van den mantel geheel
open kunnen zijn of voor een groot deel onderling kunnen
vergroeien; in het laatste geval blijft er slechts een opening in den
mantel vrij voor het doorlaten van den voet, benevens een onderste
en bovenste opening voor den toevoer en afvoer van water en
voedsel, wier randen dan dikwijls vergroeid en tot a d e m b u i z e n of
s i p h o ’ s verlengd zijn (zie bladz. 14). Vele schelpdieren groeien
eenvoudig met hun schelp aan andere voorwerpen vast; velen
hebben echter, onder den voet, een s p i n k l i e r of b y s s u s k l i e r ,
waarmede zij een bundel „b y s s u s d r a d e n ”, ook „b a a r d ”
genoemd, spinnen, om zich aan steenen of rotsen vast te hechten.
Naar gelang van de aanwezigheid van één of twee s l u i t s p i e r e n ,
verdeelt men de schelpdieren in twee orden: de éenspierigen en de
tweespierigen. Wij zullen eerst kennis maken met eenige
vertegenwoordigers der

EENSPIERIGEN,
bij welke steeds slechts de indruk van één enkele groote sluitspier in
het midden der schelpkleppen te zien is, terwijl deze laatsten
onregelmatig en ongelijk van vorm zijn en de mantel steeds geheel
gesloten en aan den rand van franjes of papillen voorzien is. Wij
beginnen met den edelsten van dit gilde, de kostelijkste gave voor
de fijnproevers, waarvan wij reeds op bladz. 11 iets verteld hebben,
namelijk: den g e w o n e n o e s t e r (Ostrea edulis, d.i. eetbare
oester), die in fig. 21 afgebeeld is. De schelpkleppen zijn hier rond-
eivormig, aan het slot smaller toeloopend; de bovenste klep is vlak
en ondiep, van buiten bladerig, de onderste dieper en dikker, van
buiten met gevouwen overlangsche ribben bedekt. Het slot is puntig,
zonder tanden en de kleine slotband is, aan weerszijden van het
slot, in een kleine groef bevestigd. Het dier zelf is eivormig,
langwerpig en zeer glad, de randen van den mantel zijn dik. De
indruk van de sluitspier is onduidelijk. De voet ontbreekt, als
volkomen overbodig, daar de dieren met de geheele onderste,
dikkere schelpklep aan den bodem of aan andere schelpen
vastgegroeid zijn. Er bestaan veel verscheidenheden in vorm,
grootte, smaak en vastheid van het vleesch, zooals Zeeuwsche,
Texelsche, Engelsche koroesters enz., doch deze zijn alleen aan de
wijze van behandeling te danken en geenszins verschillende
soorten.
De oesters komen aan de verschillende Noordzeekusten voor op
een diepte van 18 tot 36 meters, liefst op steen- of kleiachtigen, niet
op zandigen bodem. De voortplanting heeft in het voorjaar en den
zomer plaats en in dien tijd worden de dieren niet gevangen, daar zij
dan mager, schraal en taai zijn. Men neemt als regel aan, dat de
oesters alleen deugdelijk zijn in de maanden, wier naam een R
bevat, dus van September tot April, omgekeerd als bij den kreeft
(bladz. 61). Het aantal eieren, dat gelegd wordt, is ontzaglijk groot,
dikwijls voor één oester meer dan een millioen, waarvan er echter
slechts enkelen tot ontwikkeling komen. Uit de eitjes komen eerst
larven, het „o e s t e r z a a d ”, doch de jonge oesters zijn lang niet zoo
hokvast als de oudelui; zij zwemmen lustig en vrij in het water rond
en zetten zich eerst later met de diepere schelpklep vast, waarna de
voet, als overbodig, bijna geheel verdwijnt. De dieren beminnen de
gezelligheid; zij leven altijd in grooten getale bij elkaar, op
zoogenaamde o e s t e r b a n k e n .
Na het vangen zijn de oesters nog niet voor het gebruik geschikt;
zij moeten eerst nog, zooals men dat noemt, „g e s p e e n d ” worden
in de o e s t e r p u t t e n , die men bij ons vooral in Zeeland aantreft en
die bestaan uit groote, met planken of gekalkte dakpannen gevulde,
ruimten, waarop de dieren zich vasthechten en waardoor men, bij eb
en vloed, door middel van sluizen herhaalde malen versch zeewater
laat in- en uitstroomen. De dieren s p u w e n dan, zooals de
technische term luidt, dat is: door het zeewater worden alle
onzuiverheden weggespoeld en daardoor wordt het vleesch van den
oester blank en smakelijk.
Bij de familie der hamerschelpen vormt de slotrand bijna een
rechte lijn en heeft naar voren en naar achteren oorvormige
aanhangsels, zoodat de schelp een eenigszins hamervormige
gedaante verkrijgt, zooals vooral het geval is bij den P o o l s c h e n
h a m e r uit den Indischen Oceaan, minder duidelijk, maar toch
zichtbaar, bij de twee soorten van fig. 1 en 2. Fig. 1 is de
p a a r l e m o e r s c h e l p (Avicula), insgelijks uit den Indischen
Oceaan, wier mantel geheel open is en slechts twee franjeachtige
spleten heeft, in plaats van de adembuizen of sipho’s. De sluitspier,
in het midden van de schelpkleppen gelegen, is zeer groot. De voet
is klein, tongvormig en van byssusdraden voorzien (bladz. 133), die
door een insnijding van de rechterklep naar buiten treden. De kleur
is grijsachtig bruin.
 De echte p a r e l s c h e l p of p a r e l m o s s e l (Meleagrina
margaritifera), fig. 2, heeft een afgerond vierhoekige, zeer dikke
schelp, die zeer bladerig en van scherpe randen voorzien en
uitwendig groenachtig grijs van kleur is, met witte stralen, terwijl de
binnenzijde paarlemoerachtig glinstert. Het slot heeft noch tanden,
noch lijsten. De dieren leven in den Indischen Oceaan en de Roode
zee en hechten zich op groote diepten met hun baarddraden aan de
klippen vast, zoodat de visschers of duikers zich, voor de vangst,
aan een touw naar beneden laten zakken, om zooveel mogelijk
schelpen tegelijk los te snijden. De binnenwand der schelp levert
paarlemoer en daarin vormen zich de schoone en kostbare e c h t e
p a r e l e n , zooals dit op bladz. 31 voor de onechte verklaard werd.
Tot de éénspierigen zonder adembuizen behoort verder de familie
der k a m - of m a n t e l s c h e l p e n , aldus genoemd naar den vorm
der schelp, die porseleinachtig en niet afgebladerd is en eenigszins
op een haarkam of een uitgespreiden mantel gelijkt. Daarvan zien
wij in fig. 17 den S i n t J a c o b s m a n t e l (Pecten Jacobaeus), met
ongelijke kleppen, waarvan de bovenste plat is, 14 tot 16 kantige
ribben vertoont en roodbruin van kleur is, terwijl de veel diepere
onderste klep straalvormige, overlangsche groeven heeft. Slottanden
ontbreken; het dier zelf is rondachtig, heeft een open mantel, met
zeer dunne draadjes omzoomd en de voet is klein, gesteeld en
knotsvormig. Met deze soort, die in de Middellandsche zee tehuis is,
komen vier inlandsche soorten zeer veel overeen, waarvan de
p e l g r i m s s c h e l p of k a m s c h e l p (Pecten maximus), ten
onrechte ook wel eens J a k o b s m a n t e l genoemd, vooral bekend
en wegens zijn fraaiheid door verzamelaars hoog gewaardeerd is.
Het is het grootste van onze inlandsche schelpdieren (tot 16
centim.). De diepe onderschelpen verschijnen bij ons als „schelpen”
op tafel voor allerlei vleesch- en vischschoteltjes; in Engeland
worden de dieren zelf gegeten en in het noorden van Europa wordt
de vlakke bovenschelp door de Groenlandsche schoonen als kam in
het haar gedragen.
De kamschelpen zijn niet vastgehecht, kunnen zich zelfs, door het
openen en dichtkleppen van hun schelpen, vrij snel door het water
voortbewegen, als zij vervolgd worden. En daarmede staat een
hoogst merkwaardige bijzonderheid in verband: om den vijand te
kunnen ontvlieden, moeten zij hem kunnen z i e n en hoewel oogen
bij de schelpdieren wel meer voorkomen, zijn zij hier toch
buitengewoon volkomen en met kwistige hand, ten getale van 60 tot
80, soms wel meer dan 100, als prachtig groenachtig glinsterende
punten, langs den rand van den mantel verspreid, zoodat zij het
gevaar werkelijk van alle kanten „onder de oogen zien”.
Op dergelijke wijze beweegt zich ook de k l a p s c h e l p of
L a z a r u s k l e p (Spondylus gaederopus) van fig. 13 voort, die ook
overigens veel met de vorige overeenkomt. Hier zijn de kleppen
ongelijk, ruw, straalsgewijze geribd, 7-8 centim. lang, fraai rozerood
van kleur en sierlijk van vorm door een aantal groote, dorenachtige
uitsteeksels van den rand, waartusschen verscheidene rijen van
kleinere stekels. Het slot heeft van binnen twee groote, stompe
tanden, die zoo volkomen passen in de groeven van de andere klep,
dat zij alleen door het afbreken dier tanden van elkaar gescheiden
kunnen worden. Daartusschen is de slotband bevestigd. Ook deze
soort heeft oogen op den rand van den mantel. De dieren leven in de
Middellandsche zee en de schelpen, die met de rechterklep aan
rotsen zijn vastgegroeid, zijn door verzamelaars zeer gezocht.
Al de tot nog toe genoemde éénspierige schelpdieren zijn
gekenmerkt door het ontbreken van eigenlijke adembuizen of
sipho’s. Thans volgen een paar soorten, die als een overgang van
de vorige tot de schelpdieren met volkomen sipho’s kunnen
beschouwd worden, doch waartoe trouwens ook verschillende
tweespierigen behooren. Zij hebben namelijk geen of een zeer korte
sipho, doch de mantelranden zijn geheel vergroeid en er blijven
slechts drie openingen vrij: één voor den voet, één voor den toevoer
van versch water en voedsel en één voor den afvoer van water en
uitwerpselen. Wij laten daarvan een viertal soorten volgen.
Tot de grootste van alle schelpdieren behoort de r e u z e n s c h e l p
(Tridacna gigas) uit de Roode zee en den Indischen Oceaan, die in
fig. 15 afgebeeld is. Deze schelp kan tot 1,5 meter lang en 250 tot
300 kilogr. zwaar worden. Zij is wit van kleur, dwars-eivormig, met 8
à 10 groote, geschubde ribben; die schubben zijn kort, gewelfd en
staan naar buiten uit. De mantel van het levende dier vertoont, als
de schelp open is, de prachtigste kleurschakeeringen. Bij Celebes
vindt men deze dieren in menigte tusschen de koralen en zij worden
door de inlanders gaarne gegeten, vooral de kolossale sluitspier, die
zij op een drievoet braden en dan in stukken snijden. Een dier van
middelbare grootte levert een behoorlijken maaltijd voor 4 of 5
personen. De schelpen zelf worden tot allerlei vaatwerk gebezigd en
bij ons wel in tuinen gebruikt, om er planten in te plaatsen. De
grootere dienen ook als wijwaterbakken, de kleinere, op een voet
bevestigd, als aschbakjes.
Tot die overgangsvormen behooren verder nog: de a s t a r t e
(Astarta), fig. 3, in de noordelijke zeeën, eirond, bruin of zwart van
kleur, 4 à 5 centim. lang, met twee tanden aan elke klep en een
bruinrooden voet, en het o s s e n h a r t of de n a r r e n k a p
(Isocardia), fig. 9, met eigenaardige schelp, die uit twee gelijke bol-
hartvormige kleppen bestaat, wier toppen, als een kap, spiraalvormig
naar binnen omgebogen zijn. De deels geopende mantel heeft twee
franje-achtige ademopeningen, doch geen eigenlijke sipho’s. De
kleine voet is eivormig. De kleur van de schelp is roodachtig
roestkleurig, met witte kronkelingen en fijne strepen. Zij komt op
rotsen en zandigen bodem in de Middellandsche zee en den
Indischen oceaan voor.
Thans gaan wij over tot de schelpdieren, die t w e e sluitspieren
bezitten: de

TWEESPIERIGEN
en ook onder dezen ontmoeten wij reeds dadelijk een goede en
trouwe, zeer gewaardeerde bekende, vooral voor ons, bewoners der
Noordzeestranden, waar zij zelfs het meest bekende van alle
schelpdieren is, namelijk:
de g e w o n e m o s s e l (Mytilus edulis, d. i. eetbare mossel), fig.
10, die het naast verwant is aan de, vroeger besproken, riviermossel
uit onze binnenwateren. De mossel behoort ook weer tot de,
zooeven genoemde, overgangsvormen, want ook bij haar is de
mantel nog bijna geheel gespleten en is de adembuis of sipho kort
en weinig ontwikkeld. Daarentegen zijn deze eigenlijke mossels
gekenmerkt door het bezit van een sterk ontwikkelde b a a r d - of
b y s s u s k l i e r (zie bladz. 15 en 133) aan de basis van den dunnen,
ronden voet. Met de talrijke, daardoor afgescheiden,
b y s s u s d r a d e n spint het dier zich aan steenen enz. vast.
De gewone mossel komt aan alle kusten van Europa voor, doch
het smakelijkst is die van de Noord- en Oostzee. De dieren leven
gezellig in groote massa’s bij elkaar en aan onze kusten ziet men de
langwerpig ronde, blauwzwarte schelpen van 6-20 centim., bij
duizenden vastgesponnen aan de steenen hoofden en aan de palen
der zeeweringen. De mossel is, na den oester, het belangrijkste
eetbare schelpdier; wel is de smaak minder fijn, maar daartegenover
staat de veel lagere prijs, die haar, in zekere mate, tot een
volksvoedsel maakt, vooral in ons land, Duitschland, Italië en
Frankrijk. De smaak is het beste in den herfst en den winter. De
mossel is veel beweeglijker dan de oester en het bewegingsorgaan,
den voet, zien wij meestal ver buiten de schelp uitsteken. Ook ziet
men daarbuiten de franjevormige aanhangsels van den mantel. Het
slot heeft vier tandjes. Het dier zelf is langwerpig eirond, oranjegeel
van kleur.
Met de vorige komt zeer veel overeen: de s t e e k m o s s e l (Pinna
nobilis), fig. 11, die vooral in de Middellandsche zee voorkomt. De
schelp is zeer groot, tot 30 centim., scheef driehoekig van vorm en
eenigszins waaiervormig, puntig toeloopend. Met die punt wordt de
schelp in den bodem gestoken en met de byssusdraden aan
omringende voorwerpen vastgehecht. De schelp is roodachtig bruin
van kleur, straalvormig gestreept en van buiten dicht bezet met ruwe,
holle schubben. De randen van den mantel zijn volkomen vrij. De
voet is kegelvormig en gegroefd en in de buurt daarvan ligt een
groote byssusklier, waaruit zeer fijne, fraai goudachtig glinsterende
byssusdraden gesponnen worden. Deze worden in Italië, vooral in
de buurt van Tarente, reeds sedert eeuwen verzameld en, met zijde
vermengd, tot handschoenen, kragen, beurzen enz. geweven.
Hierbij sluit zich aan het dier van fig. 6, de m o d i o l a (Modiola),
welks schelpkleppen zeer dun, fijn en doorschijnend, langwerpig van
vorm en naar boven in een bocht samengedrukt zijn. De kleur is wit,
met bruine stralen, doch de schelp gelijkt uiterlijk zeer veel op die
van de mossel. Het dier komt in de Europeesche zeeën voor, doch
het ontbreekt op onze kusten.
Tot de familie der mossels behooren ook de a r k s c h e l p e n , naar
den vorm aldus genoemd, en waarvan in fig. 5 de g e b a a r d e
a r k s c h e l p (Arca barbata), afgebeeld is. De schelpen zijn lang en
vlak, eenigszins uitgebogen en kruiswijs gestreept. De overlangsche
strepen zijn korrelig en de oppervlakte gebaard. De kleur is in het
midden wit, aan de kanten roodbruin. Het rechte slot bestaat uit
talrijke, in een rij geplaatste tandjes, de slotband is uitwendig. De
randen van den mantel zijn geheel vrij, de voet is zeer kort, dik en
stomp. Het dier komt in de Europeesche zeeën voor, waar het zich,
onder het slib, aan rotsen vasthecht.
Nog twee andere soorten moeten tot deze groep gebracht worden:
het n o o t j e of de p a a r l e m o e r n e u t (Nucula rostrata) fig. 18, die
in de Noord- en Oostzee voorkomt en een langwerpig bolle, fijn en
dwarsgestreepte schelp heeft, waarvan de langere en smallere
voorzijde snavelachtig toeloopt, terwijl het slot uit vele tandjes
bestaat, die een hoek vormen—en de g e m a r m e r d e
k a m s c h e l p (Pectunculus glycymeris), fig. 19, niet te verwarren
met de eigenlijke kamschelpen (blad. 136), doch die bijna rond,
gelijkzijdig en tamelijk bol is, met stevige dikke kleppen, wier spitsen
duidelijk uitsteken. De kleur is lichtgeel of bleekrood, met
donkerroode zigzagstrepen en fijne stralen. Het bochtig gekromde
slot heeft aan elke zijde 6-12 scheeve tanden en een uitwendigen
slotband. Men vindt het dier in de Middellandsche en Noordzee, ook
aan onze kusten.
Bij de mossels sluit zich verder nog aan: de s t e e n d a d e l
(Lithodomus dactylus), fig. 8, welks schelp wel iets op een
gedroogde dadel gelijkt, lang uitgerekt, vingervormig en glimmend
bruin van kleur en aan de beide uiteinden stomp en overlangs en
dwars gestreept is. De byssus is zeer klein en gaat later verloren en
daar het dier dan geen houvast meer heeft, boort het zich—
waarschijnlijk met behulp van zuren, die het afscheidt—in
kalksteenen en zelfs in hard marmer, soms ook wel in de schalen
van andere schelpdieren. Zij leeft in de Middellandsche zee.
Bekend is de merkwaardige wijze, waarop de steendadels
geboord hebben in de zuilen van den Serapistempel van Puzzuoli bij
Napels. Deze zuilen zijn, over een hoogte van 3 tot en met 5 meters
boven den zeespiegel, geheel en al door deze schelpen doorboord,
hetgeen een gewichtig bewijs is voor de geologische theorie van een
a f w i s s e l e n d e rijzing en daling van den bodem, op dezelfde
plaats. Want eerst moet de bodem, met den tempel, natuurlijk tot
eenige meters onder de oppervlakte van den zeespiegel gedaald
zijn, in welken tijd de steendadels zich in de zuilen vastboorden en
daarna moet de kust zich weer, tot een aanzienlijk bedrag,
opgeheven hebben.
Een, ook in ons land, algemeen bekende familie van
tweespierigen zijn de h a r t - of z a n d s c h e l p e n , waarvan aan onze
kusten het meest bekend is de e e t b a r e z a n d s c h e l p (Cardium
edule) van fig. 4. Bij deze familie zijn de twee gelijke schelpkleppen
dik en sterk gewelfd, hartvormig, met 24 tot 26 dwarsgerimpelde,
weinig verheven, straalvormig loopende ribben, waartusschen zich
op het midden der schelp smalle voren, aan de randen diepe en
breede groeven bevinden. De mantel is van voren gespleten, van
achteren met franjes bezet en loopt in twee zeer korte sipho’s uit.
Merkwaardig voor deze familie is de aanzienlijke grootte en kracht
van den voet, die bovendien knievormig gebogen is, zoodat de
dieren daarop vrij handig vooruit kunnen springen. Elke klep der
schelp heeft twee slottanden onder de scherpe en sterk gebogen
spitsen. De kleur van deze soort is vuilwit, soms met roestbruine tint.
Van deze, en nog eenige andere soorten van zandschelpen,
worden er door onze visschers aanzienlijke massa’s gevangen,
dikwijls tot 100000 kilogram per jaar en zij zouden, ook hier te lande,
wegens den smaak en de voedingswaarde, een uitnemend
volksvoedsel kunnen zijn, doch worden bij ons, helaas, nog veel te
weinig genuttigd. Bijna alles wordt, onder den naam van „k o k k e l s ,
k o k h a n e n of h a r t s c h e l p e n ”, op groote schaal naar België en
Engeland verzonden. Verder worden de schelpen, evenals die van
de, straks te bespreken, strandschelpen, op onze badplaatsen door
de visschers of hun vrouwen voor het versieren van allerlei
snuisterijen: speldekussens, doozen enz. gebezigd, om die aan de
bezoekers te verkoopen. Van beide schelpsoorten worden verder
millioenen aan onze kusten opgevischt voor de kalkovens en het
verharden van wegen en paden.
Nog een bekende groep van tweespierigen zijn de
p l a t s c h e l p e n , met langwerpige of ronde, vlakke, gelijkschalige
schelpen, wier bewoners vier kieuwplaten bezitten, en twee kortere
of langere sipho’s. Van het geslacht p l a t s c h e l p komen in het zand
van alle zeeën, ook in ons land, verschillende soorten voor, van
welke een bekende op de plaat afgebeeld is, n.l. de d u n s c h a a l
(Tellina virgata), fig. 20. Deze schelp is dwars-eivormig, naar
achteren kantig en gestreept, in de jeugd fraai lichtrood van kleur,
later rood met witte of geel met roode stralen. De mantel is half open
en aan zijn breeden rand komt de lancetvormige voet te voorschijn;
de sipho’s zijn gescheiden en zeer lang. Hierbij sluit zich aan: de
p e p e r s c h e l p (Scrobicularia piperata) van fig. 22, van de kusten
der Adriatische en Middellandsche zee, die aldaar, wegens den
gepeperden smaak, veel gegeten wordt. De schelp is 4 tot 6 centim.
lang, plat eivormig, wit van kleur en dwarsgestreept, met kleine
slottandjes en zeer lange, wormvormige witte sipho’s.
Tot de platschelpen behoort ook de bekende s t r a n d s c h e l p
(Mactra solida), fig. 16, die aan alle Europeesche kusten zeer
algemeen is en ook bij ons, met nog andere soorten van dit geslacht
en met de zandschelpen, voor het vroeger genoemde doel
opgevischt worden (zie bladz. 141). De schelp is afgerond
driehoekig, dik, geelachtig of grijsachtig van kleur en met blauwe of
grijze banden geteekend. Elke klep heeft een platten, gevouwen
slottand, die in een groef van de andere past. De zoom van den
mantel is franjeachtig, de sipho’s zijn matig van lengte, afgeplat en
de voet is smal.
Nog drie andere platschelpen zijn op de plaat afgebeeld. In fig. 25
zien wij de m a a g d e l i j k e Ve n u s s c h e l p (Venus virginea), die,
met een paar andere soorten, ook aan onze kusten voorkomt. De
schelp is eivormig, naar achteren stomphoekig, roodachtig van kleur.
Het dier is eetbaar, houdt zich meestal in het slib op en heeft twee
sipho’s en een afgeplatten voet, die tot kruipen dient. Verder: de
l u c i n a s c h e l p (Lucina jamaicensis), fig. 26, uit den Atlantischen
oceaan, met rondachtige, ongelijkzijdige kleppen, die vuilgroen, van
binnen gestippeld en diep gestreept, van buiten bladerig gegroefd
zijn, met concentrische lagen. Aan onze kusten leven een paar
andere soorten. En als derde verwante soort zien wij in fig. 14 de
e c h t e Ve n u s s c h e l p (Cytherea Dione), die in Oost- en West-
Indië voorkomt. De schelp is 3 tot 5 centim. lang, scheef hartvormig,
met concentrische lagen, fraai licht vleeschkleurig, bij het slot rood.
Aan den rand staan, bij het slot, eenige kranswijs geplaatste stekels.
De mantel is aan den rand van franjes voorzien. De sipho’s zijn lang,
min of meer vergroeid en afgeplat.
Thans is de eigenaardige familie der „g a p e r s ” of
„g a p e r s c h e l p e n ” aan de beurt, aldus genoemd, omdat de schelp
aan de beide uiteinden steeds een weinig open blijft, „g a a p t ”. De
oorzaak daarvan is, dat deze dieren steeds blijvend in het zand of
slib ingegraven zijn en zich weinig bewegen; daarom komt, door een
insnijding van den mantel, aan het ééne open uiteinde der schelp de
voet naar buiten, waarmede zij zich loodrecht in het zand graven en
aan den anderen kant komt de vergroeide, zeer lange, slurfvormige
adembuis er uit, die boven het zand of slib uitsteekt (fig. 23), met
een vuilbruine huid bedekt is en niet binnen de schelp
teruggetrokken kan worden; bij dreigend gevaar graaft het dier zich
geheel in het zand.
Op onze kusten, en in alle zeeën van midden- en Noord-Europa,
tot in de IJszee, komen twee soorten zeer algemeen voor, waarvan
er één, de s t o m p e g a p e r (Mya truncata) in fig. 23 afgebeeld is,
het zoogenaamde „kussentje” van de Zuid-Hollandsche
strandbewoners. De vuilwitte schelp is eivormig of elliptisch, zeer
bol, dwars gestreept en van achteren stomp afgerond. De voet is
klein en lancetvormig. De tweede soort, die te zamen met de vorige
voorkomt, de s t r a n d g a p e r (Mya arenaria) is iets grooter (9
centim.) en kan haar slurfvormige adembuis tot het dubbele van die
afmeting verlengen. De dieren leven in massa’s gezellig bij elkaar en
vormen in het noorden een hoofdvoedsel van de walrussen.
Eigenaardige gaperschelpen zijn de m e s h e f t e n , met lange,
smalle en platte, mesvormige schelpen, die aan de beide uiteinden
weer sterk gapen en met korte sipho’s, die binnen de schelp
teruggetrokken kunnen worden. Zij boren met den bijlvormigen voet
loodrechte gaten van meer dan een voet diep in het zand of slib,
waarin zij zich, bij het minste gevaar, bliksemsnel zoo afdoende
terugtrekken, dat men ze meestal niet meer uit kan graven. In ons
land komen drie soorten van m e s h e f t e n voor, waarvan in fig. 24
de m e s s c h e e d e (Solen vagina) voorgesteld is, die een zeer lange
en smalle, bijna rechte schelp heeft, in den vorm van een zeer
platgedrukten cylinder van 12 centim. lang, die aan de beide
uiteinden—doch aan het ééne schuin—afgesneden schijnt. De
schelpen, die men in menigte aan het strand vindt, hebben een
groenachtig bruine opperhuid, met roode strepen daaronder. De
mantel is van voren gesloten. De beide andere inlandsche soorten
zijn: de z w a a r d s c h e e d e (Solen ensis), met een zeer gebogen,
plat cylindrische schelp en het t a f e l m e s (S. siloqua), de grootste
van onze mesheften, met platte rechte schelp.
Wij komen thans nog tot een paar tweespierige schelpdieren, die,
in tegenstelling van de meeste der vorige, den mensch niet van nut
zijn, doch daarentegen groot onheil stichten. Het zijn de
b o o r s c h e l p e n of p h o l a d e n , die de verderfelijke gave bezitten,
om in hout, steen enz. van de zeeweringen te boren en deze te
vernielen.
De g e w o n e p h o l a d e of s t e e n b o o r d e r (Pholas dactylus),
fig. 12, naar den vorm ook wel v i n g e r s c h e l p genoemd, heeft zelf
een zeer kort en dik lichaam, dat geheel omsloten kan worden door
de geelachtig witte, wigvormige, concentrisch gegroefde, 8 centim.
lange schelp, die van voren schuin afgestompt en snavelvormig
verlengd is. De mantel komt buiten de kleppen uit en slaat zich met
zijn rand daar omheen, de voet is dik van voren afgeplat en komt
aan den kant van den mond te voorschijn, terwijl aan de
tegengestelde zijde twee zeer groote sipho’s te voorschijn komen.
De schelp gaapt aan de uiteinden en mist de slottanden en den
slotband. De randen der schelpkleppen zijn met zeer scherpe en
harde tandjes bezet, die, bij het openen en sluiten der kleppen,
tegen het hout, den steen of de rotsen, waarin de dieren leven,
wrijven en die stoffen tot een fijn poeder afraspen en zoo de
woonruimte voor het dier vergrooten. Daar het boren echter reeds
begint, als de dieren nog zeer klein zijn, is het begin van het boorgat
veel nauwer en zijn zij gedoemd, gedurende hun gansche leven, te
blijven, waar zij zijn. Tot hun geluk kunnen zij echter de zeer lange,
gedeeltelijk vergroeide sipho’s tot buiten de woning in het water
uitstrekken en zoo voor de ademhaling en voeding zorgen.
Men vindt de pholaden in alle Europeesche zeeën en ook veel aan
onze kusten. Eigenaardig is, dat men in Zuid-Holland de schelpen
der r u w e p h o l a d e (Ph. crispata), die echter meer in hout en klei
boren, naar den vorm „wiegjes” en op Walcheren „boerinnehoedjes”
noemt, alsmede dat deze dieren, wegens den peperachtigen smaak,
wel gegeten worden en van den p a a l w o r m , dien wij nu gaan
bespreken, wordt wel beweerd, dat hij zelfs de fijnste oesters in
smaak en bouquet overtreft.
Deze p a a l w o r m of b o o r w o r m (Teredo navalis), fig. 7, is nog
oneindig veel schadelijker dan de pholaden. Onnoodig te zeggen,
dat dit dier volstrekt geen worm is, doch slechts zoo genoemd wordt
naar het buitengewoon lang uitgerekte, wormvormige lichaam, dat
geheel naakt en alleen aan het voorste uiteinde van een uiterst klein
schelpje voorzien is, een orgaan echter, dat, hoe nietig en klein ook,
de grootste onheilen aan onze kostbare zeeweringen aanricht.
De paalworm is reeds lang bekend, hoewel het dier eigenlijk in
den Indischen oceaan inheemsch is en vandaar in het hout der
schepen naar Europa overgebracht werd. Aanvankelijk meende men
dan ook, dat het alleen in schepen voorkwam en Linnaeus, de
beroemde Zweedsche natuuronderzoeker uit de 18e eeuw, noemde
het destijds: calamitas navium, dat is: het verderf der schepen,
waarop ook de Latijnsche naam navalis wijst. Doch reeds spoedig
moest men ondervinden, dat de schade zich niet tot de schepen
bepaalde, doch dat deze booswicht ook de grootste gevaren
opleverde voor de houten zeeweringen, palen, bruggehoofden,
sluisdeuren enz., waardoor aan de kusten der Noordzee reeds
herhaaldelijk dijkbreuken hadden plaats gehad.
De oorzaak van al dat onheil is het onnoozele wormvormige diertje
van fig. 7, welks schelpje niet slechts uiterst klein is, doch bovendien
geheel en al naar het voorste uiteinde van het lichaam verhuisd is en
de beide schelpkleppen vormen hier datgene, wat men gewoonlijk
voor den „kop” van het dier houdt. Ook de mantel, die het
wormvormige lichaam insluit en de mantelholte, waarin de kieuwen
gelegen zijn, heeft zulk een uitgerekte, buisvormige gedaante. Hij is
aan de beide uiteinden open en van voren heeft hij een spleet voor
het doorlaten van den voet, terwijl hij van achteren eindigt in twee
zeer dunne buisjes, de sipho’s, die steeds buiten den boorgang in
het water uitkomen, voor het in- en uitstroomen daarvan. Door den
mantel en door de geheele buitenvlakte van het lichaam wordt een
kalkachtige stof afgescheiden, waarmede de boorgang van binnen
bekleed wordt, doch waarin het dier zich, als in een koker, vrij kan
bewegen.
Evenals de pholaden, begint ook de paalworm zijn heilloozen
arbeid reeds als jeugdige boosdoener en is de ingang van het
boorgat dus zeer dun, terwijl de gang, naarmate het dier groeit en
verder in het hout doorboort, ook wijder wordt, zoodat de worm niet
weer terug kan. Eerst in volwassen staat gaat hij te gronde, doch
eerst nadat hij terdege voor een buitengewoon groot nageslacht
gezorgd heeft. Daarin is juist het groote gevaar gelegen, want reeds
de nakomelingschap van één enkel dier maakt in het hout een
ontelbaar aantal gangen, die het in alle richtingen doorkruisen,
zoodat het er ongeveer gaat uitzien als een honingraat en dus niet
den minsten weerstand meer biedt. En zelfs de hardste houtsoorten
worden niet gespaard, behalve eenige bijzonder harde,
oliehoudende Australische soorten, zooals dat van den
Eucalyptusboom.
Waarmee boort de paalworm nu eigenlijk? Vroeger heeft men wel
gemeend, dat hier een chemische invloed in het spel was en dat het
dier, evenals de steendadel (zie bladz. 140), een scherp zuur vocht
zou afscheiden, waarin de houtstof oploste. Doch onze landgenoot,
profr. Harting, heeft later aangetoond, dat het proces louter van
mechanischen aard is en dat het zagen uitsluitend geschiedt met de
beide, uiterst kleine schelpklepjes, waarvan in fig. L de rechterklep,
op vergroote schaal, afgebeeld is.
Hier is S de eigenlijke schelpklep, waaraan, onder een rechten
hoek, een aanhangsel of tand A bevestigd is. F is de voet,
waarmede het dier zich aan het hout vastzuigt. Het voornaamste
onderdeel vormen echter de wrijfvlakken Z, die, onder den
mikroskoop gezien, bezet blijken te zijn met een groot aantal zeer
ingewikkelde rijen van uiterst fijne en scherpe tandjes; dergelijke
rijen van tandjes vindt men ook op het aanhangsel A, doch deze zijn
 loodrecht op die van de
wrijfvlakte Z geplaatst. Door het
openen en sluiten van de
kleppen worden de tandjes tegen
het hout gewreven, waarbij zij
door den voet F daartegen
aangedrukt worden en alzoo de
gangen uitgraven. Dit geschiedt
buitengewoon snel en somtijds
wordt in één zomer al het
paalwerk van een zeewering
totaal verwoest.
Tot vóór korten tijd stond men
volkomen machteloos tegenover
Fig. L. dit kwaad, hoewel men alles
Rechter schelpklep van den paalworm beproefde: drenken met teer,
(vergroot). omwikkelen met zeildoek,
beslaan met koper, doch geen middel mocht baten, er scheen geen
kruid gewassen tegen deze kwaal. Aan onze kusten is men toen,
reeds lang geleden, overgegaan tot het beslaan der palen met
groote, breedkoppige ijzeren spijkers, hetgeen alleen behoefde te
geschieden in de ruimte tusschen eb en vloed, omdat de dieren daar
alleen leven. Dit middel heeft nog het best aan de verwachtingen
beantwoord. In den nieuweren tijd brengt men, rondom het gedeelte
der palen, waar de dieren kunnen boren, buizen of een vast
omhulsel van beton aan, dat de oppervlakte der palen volkomen van
het water afsluit en de dieren doodt. In ons land heeft men verder,
vooral voor sluisdeuren, zeer bevredigende uitkomsten verkregen
met het Demarara-greenhearthout.