EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 240337. January 04, 2022 ]

FRANCIS O. MORALES PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CARANDANG, J.:

Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration1 of this Court's Resolution2 dated September 21,
2020, which affirmed the Decision3 dated March 15, 2018 and the Resolution4 dated June 22, 2018
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39341. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial

Court, Angeles City, Branch 56 in Criminal Case No. R-ANG-15-02275-CR (MTCC
Case No. 13-8513), which affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch III for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of two

(2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor;

2) The award of lost income for one (1) month at P400 per day, or the sum of
P12,000.00, to spouses Rico and Leilani Mendoza is DELETED and, in lieu thereof,
petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages in the amount of P8,000.00;

3) The award of lost income for one (1) week at P400 per day, or sum of
P2,800.00 to Myrna Cunanan is DELETED and, in lieu thereof, petitioner is
ORDERED to pay temperate damages in the amount of P2,000.00; and

4) The award of P350,000.00 to Noel G. Garcia representing the cost of the

repairs of the jeepney is DELETED and, in lieu thereof, petitioner is ORDERED to
pay Noel G. Garcia or his authorize[d] representative temperate damages in the
amount of P150,000.00.

SO ORDERED.5

Facts of the Case

On June 5, 2013, an information was filed against Francis O. Morales (petitioner) for the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property and Multiple Physical Injuries. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about 14th day of May, 2013, in the City of Angeles,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the driver of a Mitsubishi Delica
Van with Plate No. XKZ-528 owned and driven by Francis O.
Morales, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive
 and operate the said vehicle along Sto. Rosario St. corner San Jose
St., Brgy. San Jose, Angeles City, in a careless, reckless and
imprudent manner and in utter disregard of traffic laws, rules, and
regulations and without taking the necessary precaution and care to
avoid accident, thereby causing such recklessness and imprudence
to hit and bump a Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138 owned by a
certain Noel F. Garcia a resident of 333 Dela Paz Norte, CSFP and
driven by Rico M. Mendoza as a result thereof, the driver of said
Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138 sustained serious physical
injuries and the three (3) other passengers namely: Lailani
Mendoza, Myrna Cunanan and Albert Vital sustained slight physical
injuries, likewise said Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138
incurred damages in the estimated amount of THREE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P350,000.00), Philippine Currency to
the prejudice of said complainant.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.6 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution
presented three witnesses, namely Rico Mendoza (Rico), Leilani Mendoza7 (Leilani), and Myrna
Cunanan (Myrna). The defense presented petitioner as its sole witness.8

The witnesses for the prosecution alleged that on May 15, 2013 at around 3:00 a.m., Rico,
Leilani, and Myrna, together with Albert Vital (Albert; collectively, private complainants), were on
board a passenger jeepney with Plate No. CWR-138. Rico was driving the jeepney. They came from
Maimpis and were traversing the road of Sto. Rosario Street, Angeles City on their way to Angeles
City Market. They were on the right lane. Meanwhile, the Delica van driven by petitioner with Plate
No. XKZ-528 was on the opposite lane going to San Fernando. Petitioner suddenly overtook the
vehicle in front of him, causing him to occupy the lane of the jeepney. Rico tried to avoid the collision
to no avail as petitioner was driving in a fast speed. Petitioner bumped the jeepney resulting in
physical injuries to the passengers and driver as well as extensive damage to the jeepney
amounting to P350,000.00. Rico suffered a deep laceration in the forehead and a cervical strain. He
underwent suturing and hospitalization in the amount of P14,345.00. Leilani sustained skin and soft
tissue avaltion, posterior lateral aspect right forearm and sprain ankle, costing her hospitalization
expenses in the amount of P34,763.50. Myra suffered multiple physical injury and incurred damages
in the amount of P3,045.00. Albert incurred hospitalization expenses in the amount of P2,895.80.9

Petitioner countered that after a night of merry making, he and his friends decided to go to
a gotohan in Angeles City at the midnight of May 15, 2013. He rode his Delica van with his 13-year-
old son. They stayed at the gotohan until 3:00 a.m. On their way home, they passed Sto. Rosario
Street bound for San Fernando City. They occupied the inner lane of the road going to San
Fernando. The right side of the jeepney driven by Rico suddenly hit the Delica van. Petitioner and
his son were injured and brought to the Sacred Heart Medical Center. The Delica van also sustained
extensive damages.10

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

In its Decision11 dated June 30, 2015, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Angeles
City convicted petitioner of the crime charged, viz:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court finds accused Francisco

Morales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
multiple physical injuries and damage to property and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of one month and twenty one days to two months.

Likewise, Francisco Morales is ordered to pay the following indemnifications:

1. To Spouses Rico Mendoza and Leilani Mendoza:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P49,108.50;

b)Lost Income for one (1) month for P400 per day at a sum of P12,000.00;

c)Moral damages of P10,000.00 each spouse.

2. To Myra Cunanan:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P3,045.00;

b)Lost income for one (1) week for P400 per day at a sum of P2,800.00;

c)Moral damages of P10,000.00.

3. Albert Vital:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P2,895.00.

4. To Noel G. Garcia the registered owner of the passenger jeep with plate number CWR-138 or
any of his authorized representative, the amount of three hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P350,000.00) representing the cost of the repair of the damage of the passenger jeep.

SO ORDERED.12

The MTCC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the recklessness and negligence
of petitioner in driving his Delica van. Petitioner, in violation of Section 37 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
4136, as amended, hastily overtook the vehicle in front of him without first determining whether the
road was clear. He was also driving his van at a fast speed, as evidenced by the extent of damage
incurred by both vehicles in violation of the speed restriction stated in Section 35 of R.A. No.
4136.13

The MTCC ruled that it is undisputed that the jeepney driven by Rico was traversing along its
rightful lane when the van coming from the opposite direction suddenly overtook another vehicle and
encroached on the passenger jeep. The accident would not have happened had the accused stayed
on his lane and not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle, especially not at 3:00 a.m. while the
road is dark and not well lighted.14

The MTCC held petitioner liable for: (1) the lost income of spouses Rico and Leilani as well as
Myrna who, as vendors, were earning P400.00 to P500.00 per day; (2) the medical and hospital
expenses of Rico, Lailani, Myrna, and Albert; and (3) moral damages to Rico, Leilani, and Myrna.15

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the MTCC denied in its Order16 dated August 25, 2015.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision17 dated December 1, 2016, the RTC affirmed the ruling of the MTCC. It agreed
with the MTCC that petitioner's negligence in overtaking the vehicle in front of his without taking the
necessary precaution is the proximate cause of the injury and damage suffered by the private
complainants. It noted that the sketch of the incident showed that the point of impact was at the inner
lane occupied by the jeepney. This proves that petitioner encroached into the rightful lane of the
jeep. Evidence tending to illustrate the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the
accident tends to throw light on the issue of speed and direction of the vehicle's movement prior to,
and at the time of the accident. The RTC also sustained the MTCC's finding that petitioner was
speeding at the time of the accident, which very act is indicative of imprudent behavior.18

Undaunted, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision19 dated March 15, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC with modification as to the
penalty imposed and the damages granted.

Preliminarily, the CA upheld the conviction of petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple physical injuries and damage to property. It agreed with the RTC and the MTCC
that it was petitioner's act of overtaking the vehicle in front of his, without taking the necessary care
and precaution to ensure that he can safely do so, that was the proximate cause of the injury
suffered by Rico and his passengers. Petitioner was at fault because he was driving at the wrong
side of the road when the collision happened. As shown in the Traffic Accident Report (TAR) and the
testimonies of the witnesses, before the collision, the jeepney driven by Rico was cruising along its
rightful lane when the Delica van driven by petitioner, suddenly swerved and encroached its lane.
The accident would not have happened had petitioner driven his vehicle on its lane and did not
recklessly try to overtake another vehicle. Significantly, petitioner did not deny the fact that he
overtook another vehicle.20

The CA noted that petitioner is presumed to be negligent at the time of the mishap pursuant to
Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, since he was violating a traffic regulation, that is, he was driving
on the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident. Petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption.21

The CA also rejected petitioner's argument that Rico was at fault because the latter testified that
he saw the approaching van but failed to evade the same. It held that R.A. No. 4136, as amended,
provides that the one who is overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the
opposite direction know his/her presence and not the other way around as petitioner seems to
suggest. Likewise, the CA ruled that the last clear chance doctrine does not apply in the case
because it presupposes that both parties are negligent. Here, it was established that petitioner's
negligence caused the damage and the injury.22

With respect to the penalty imposed, the CA explained that the penalty prescribed for reckless
imprudence is dependent on whether the act, if committed with intent, would have resulted in a
grave felony, less grave felony, or light felony. The CA found that the evidence presented by the
prosecution shows that the injuries sustained by Rico, Leilani, and Myrna amount only to slight
physical injuries, which is a less grave felony. Per the Certificates of Confinement, Leilani was
confined for three to five days only, Rico for two to three days, and none was mentioned for Myrna.
No other proof was shown that they were incapacitated for labor or that they required medical
attendance for a longer period. Pursuant to Section 97 of R.A. No. 10951, the prescribed penalty for
reckless imprudence for an act, which if it had been intentional would have been a less grave felony,
is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or from one (1) month and one (1) day to four
(4) months. Since the maximum term of imprisonment in this case, four (4) months, does not exceed
one (1) year, the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law find no application. The CA ruled
that a straight penalty taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be
imposed. It meted the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor.23

As to the damages awarded, the CA sustained the grant of moral damages and actual damages
representing hospitalization expenses. However, on the award for lost income, Rico, Leilani, and
Myrna failed to present evidence sufficiently showing their respective income. Hence, the awards for
lost income should be deleted. Similarly, Noel G. Garcia failed to adduce competent proof of the
amount spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. The sum of P350,000.00 is merely a
cost estimate from a motor repair shop and not the actual amount expended to repair the jeep. Due
to the lack of documentary proof, the CA awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
since some pecuniary loss was suffered though its amount cannot be proven with certainty.24

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution25 dated June 22,
2018. He elevated the case before Us via a petition for review on certiorari. The People of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a comment.

Proceedings Before this Court

Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner raised the following: first, the CA erred in giving full faith and credence to the TAR,
which stated that petitioner was at fault when the collision happened because he was driving at the
wrong side of the road. Petitioner insisted that the TAR was prepared without his presence since he
and his child were then being treated at the hospital for the severe injuries they suffered. The TAR
was prepared at the instance of the private complainants; thus it does not provide a truthful account
of what transpired during the accident.26

Second, the object evidence, particularly the physical depression on the vehicles, showed that
Rico instead of steering the jeepney away from petitioner's approaching van, steered right into the
van's direction head on. The point of impact of the van and the jeepney was within petitioner's lane.
Rico admitted that he saw petitioner's approaching vehicle from the opposite direction, but he did not
evade it. Thus, it was Rico who was negligent in driving his vehicle. It was he who had the last
opportunity to reflect and deliberate on the impending danger of an overtaking vehicle from the
opposite direction of the road. More, the prosecution failed to establish the actual speed of
petitioner's vehicle and the circumstances of place and time immediately prior to the collision.
Neither did it prove that Rico was driving the jeepney with due diligence.27

Third, the award of temperate damages to the private complainants has no basis because
petitioner was not shown to have been negligent when he drove his vehicle prior to, or during the
collision. Private complainants failed to adduce evidence that they sustained substantial pecuniary
losses due to the accident or even establish their earning capacity.28

Fourth, the CA, applying Section 97 of R.A. No. 10951,29 imposed upon the petitioner the
straight penalty of two (2) months imprisonment, an increase from the lower court's-imposed penalty
of one (1) month and twenty (20) days to two (2) months of imprisonment. R.A. No. 10951 was
passed in 2017, while the alleged infraction was committed in 2013. Inasmuch as R.A. No. 10951 is
not favorable to him, the same should not be applied in the case.30
Arguments of respondent

The OSG maintained that the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution established all
the elements of the crime charged. The MTCC's finding of guilt was based on the evidence that
petitioner overtook the vehicle without checking whether the opposite lane was clearly visible from
incoming vehicle. It also considered the evidence that it was 3:00 a.m., the road was not well lighted,
and petitioner was driving at a fast speed. The RTC, meanwhile, based its ruling on a sketch which
showed that the impact occurred at the inner lane occupied by the private complainants' jeepney.
The CA anchored its findings on the unrebutted presumption of negligence that arose because
petitioner was violating a traffic regulation during the mishap. Thus, the CA did not rely solely on the
contents of the TAR. As for the award of damages, the OSG argued that that it was in conformity
with prevailing jurisprudence.31

In Our assailed Resolution32 dated September 21, 2020, We denied the petition for failure to
show any reversible error on the part of the CA as to warrant the exercise of Our discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed this present Motion for Reconsideration,33 repleading and reiterating
the arguments in his petition for review.

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether We should uphold petitioner's conviction.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm petitioner's conviction but modify the penalty imposed.

Petitioner was charged of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries and
damage to property. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence" and "negligence." It defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his/her employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.34

The Ivler Doctrine

In Ivler v. Hon. Judge Modesto-San Pedro35 (Ivler), We emphasized that simple and reckless
imprudence are distinct species of crimes, separately defined and penalized under the framework of
our penal laws. Reckless imprudence is not merely a way of committing a crime. We noted that: (1)
the object of punishment in quasi-crimes is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, while in intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; (2) the legislature intended to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses otherwise they would
have been subsumed under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent; and (3) the penalty
structure for quasi-crimes differ from intentional crimes in that the criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual wilful crime but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of
crimes.36 Thus, the correct way of alleging quasi-crimes is to state that their commission resulted in
damage, either to person or property, such as reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or simple
imprudence causing damage to property.37
 In Ivler, the accused was charged of two separate offenses arising from the same vehicular
accident, which are reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property. He pleaded guilty to the first charge and was meted
the penalty of public censure. He was tried for the second charge, but he moved to quash the
information on the ground of double jeopardy. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) denied the
quashal finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The RTC dismissed the accused's petition
for certiorari for lack of standing. The accused elevated the case before Us arguing that his
constitutional right against double jeopardy bars his prosecution for the second charge, having been
convicted previously in the first charge for the same imprudent act. He maintained that there is only
one offense of reckless imprudence, and the multiple consequences of such act are material only to
determine the penalty. We ruled in favor of the accused.

We recognized in Ivler that there are two approaches in the prosecution of quasi-crimes. The
first approach applies Article 48 of the RPC while the second approach forbids its application. Article
48 deals with complex crimes. It allows the single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either
of two categories, namely: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies;
and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Light felonies are excluded
in Article 48 and must be charged separately from resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
offense. In complex crimes, the accused will serve only the maximum penalty for the most serious
crime. It is a procedural tool for the benefit of the accused. In contrast, the second approach
sanctions a single prosecution for all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge,
regardless of their number and severity. After exhaustively discussing numerous case law, We
declared that Article 48 of the RPC is not applicable to quasi-crimes. We forbade the "complexing" of
a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except light felonies) to
keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional crimes. This way, the
splitting of charges under Article 365 which results to rampant occasions of impermissible second
prosecution based on the same act/s or omission/s are avoided. We explained Our ruling in this
wise:

A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government denying it

the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction
between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary
means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we
rejected the Solicitor General's argument that double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly
because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be
joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This
same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the
case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was

the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
 physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously
cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this

appellant ...by the Justice of the Peace ...of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where
both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the
appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the

splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity
of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible
second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources
are conserved and diverted to proper use. (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)38

Accordingly, We laid down the rule that there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365.
Only one information shall be filed regardless of the number or severity of the consequences of the
imprudent or negligent act. The judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven.39

Ivler Cannot Reverse a Prior

En Banc
Case Applying Article 48 to
Quasi-Offenses

While the 2010 case of Ivler comprehensively discussed the nature of Article 365 and the
inapplicability of Article 48 to quasi-offenses, it was decided by the Second Division of the Court and
not by the Court sitting En Banc. This finds significance considering the 2001 En Banc case
of People v. De los Santos40 (De los Santos), where We held that Article 48 applies to crimes
through negligence. De los Santos was among the string of cases stated in Ivler, referring to the
rulings which "complexed" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences, unless one consequence
amounts to a light felony, in which case charges where split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts, and
on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with first level
courts. Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc[.]" Thus, there is a need for the Court, sitting En Banc, to clarify
whether it subscribes to the view pronounced in Ivler, thereby abandoning De los Santos.
 The accused in De los Santos was charged with the complex crime of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in an Information filed in the RTC of Cagayan De
Oro City. The RTC convicted the accused as charged, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying
circumstance. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased and the victims of frustrated and attempted murder. On automatic review, We found
lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused, hence he cannot be held liable for intentional
felony. We convicted him of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide
with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries and 10 counts of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. We ruled that Article 48 applies in this wise:

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when

the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to
crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies
in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law"
committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault
(culpa). In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v.
Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted, in conformity with
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of
"homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence," and was sentenced to a single
penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed by
the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals, the accused was
convicted of the complex crime of "multiple homicide with damage to
property through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor boat to
capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.

The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other

victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been
intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies,
which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and
punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have,
therefore, been filed.

It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder,

multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed
with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record that
GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a motion to
quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived
such defect. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when
two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of
them.41 (Emphasis supplied.; citations omitted.)
 Thus, it appears that in De los Santos, reckless imprudence is not treated as a crime itself.
Rather, it is regarded as a way of committing a crime. There, We stated that "[s]ince Article 48
speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in
Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault
(culpa)."42 "Crimes through negligence" pertain to the offenses committed under Article 365.

Subsequently, Our ruling in De Los Santos was cited in Dayap v. Sendiong,43 where the
accused was charged with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less
serious physical injuries, and damage to property. However, We acquitted the accused on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. We affirmed the Municipal Trial Court's (MTC) finding that there
was no evidence proving that a crime has been committed and that the accused was the person
responsible for it.44

A survey of case law reveals that the last case which cited De los Santos is Ivler. However, as
previously stated, Ivler declared that a quasi-offense cannot be "complexed" with its resulting acts or
consequences. As opposed to De los Santos, Ivler sees reckless imprudence as a crime itself and
not as a modality or way of committing a crime. De los Santos' characterization of reckless
imprudence as a way of committing a crime traces its roots from the 1939 case of People v.
Faller45 (Faller), where We categorically ruled that, "[r]eckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It
is simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability."46 In Faller, the accused was charged with the crime of damage caused to another's
property maliciously and willfully. After hearing, the CFI found that damage was caused through
reckless imprudence. On appeal, We stated "[n]egligence being a punishable criminal act when it
results in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts
charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that he acted with negligence."47

Conversely, in the 1955 case of Quizon v. The Justice of the Peace of Pampanga48 (Quizon),
We rejected the earlier concept that reckless imprudence is simply a way of committing a crime. We
explained, viz:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal

Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our
Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In international crimes, the act itself
is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from
the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through
reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense
is, more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or
"simple imprudence causing damages to property".

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission

of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then
it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
 specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the
one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require
that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For
each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute a grave
felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all
the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can
be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crimes.49 (Emphasis supplied.)

Quizon is the bedrock of Ivler's dicta that simple or reckless imprudence are distinct species of
crime.

Meanwhile, at this juncture, We acknowledge the observation of Associate Justice Benjamin

Caguioa about the concerning volume of inconsistent jurisprudence relating to Article 365.50 Thus,
We shall finally settle in this case the conflicting rulings of the court on complex crimes and quasi-
crimes.

Case Law after Ivler

On its face, Ivler had already settled the nature, proper designation, and treatment of quasi-
crimes and their resulting act/s, but jurisprudence after it appears to be in disarray.

In Dumayag v. People51 (Dumayag), the accused was charged before the MTC of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries and damage to property. The MTC convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple homicide. The RTC affirmed the MTC with modification in that the accused was found
liable for the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and damage to property. The CA affirmed the RTC in
toto. On appeal before Us, We acquitted the accused of the crimes charged because his
recklessness was not the proximate cause of the damage. However, We did not take issue on the
characterization made by the RTC and the CA of the crime that the accused was charged and
convicted of, which is "complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide."52

In Gonzaga v. People53 (Gonzaga), We affirmed the accused's conviction of the "complex

crime" of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide with double serious physical injuries and
damage to property under Article 365 of the RPC in relation to Article 263 of the same Code.54

In Dr. Cruz v. Agas, Jr.,55 We affirmed the ruling of the CA that the Department of Justice did
not err in sustaining the dismissal of the complaint against Dr. Cruz for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence and medical malpractice.56 Similar to Dumayag, We did not take issue
or corrected the proper designation of the offense to be reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries.

In Senit v. People57 (Senit), We affirmed the CA, which convicted the accused of reckless
imprudence resulting to multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property.58 The CA
imposed the penalty of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor "since the petitioner has,
by reckless imprudence, committed an act which had it been intentional, would have constituted a
less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of the RPC."59

Conversely, in other cases, We applied Our pronouncement in Ivler, to wit:

In Sevilla v. People,60 We observed that the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed
by the accused as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence."61 We noted that
this is an inaccurate designation of the felony and emphasized that reckless imprudence is not
simply a modality of committing a crime but is a crime itself. Thus, the proper designation of the
offense is reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents.62

In Esteban v. People63 (Esteban), the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage to property. We agreed with the CA that: (1)
Article 48 of the RPC does not apply to acts penalized under Article 365 since the former is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes; and (2) prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed
from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences.64 Thus, the CA did
not err in affirming the RTC (with modification), which in turn sustained the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court's (MCTC) imposition of three separate penalties for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
serious physical injuries, and damage to property. The MCTC imposed the following penalties:

(a) for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, an indeterminate prison term

of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years
and ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision correcional as maximum; and to
pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Antonieto Manuel; P35,000.00 as
actual damages for funeral expenses; P602,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.65

(b) for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries, a straight

penalty of two month imprisonment.

(c) for damage to property, to pay the victim Librado Felix in the amount of
P42,996.40 as actual damages and a fine of P50,000.00.66

Penalties under Article 365

of the RPC

Article 365 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10951,67 reads:

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. – Any person who, by

reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period
shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall

commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
 periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall

have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three (3) times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000).

A fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) and

censure shall be imposed upon any person, who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their

sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or

lower than those provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

The penalties provided in Article 365 are clear and straightforward except for its third paragraph,
in instances where the imprudent or negligent act resulted not only to damage to property but also to
physical injuries. The third paragraph provides that when an imprudent or negligent act resulted in
damage to property only, the offender shall be punished by a fine. The question that arises is
whether the third paragraph still applies when there is also damage to persons. We answered in the
affirmative in the 1954 case of Angeles v. Jose68 (Angeles). There, We ruled that the third
paragraph applies to the resulting damage to property, and an additional penalty shall be imposed
on the resulting injury to person. The "additional penalty" pertains to the penalty scheme under
Article 365.69

In Angeles, the accused was charged before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the crime of
damage to property in the sum of P654.22 with less serious physical injuries through reckless
negligence. The CFI dismissed the case upon motion of the defense on the ground that the penalty
prescribed by Article 365 is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period, which falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court. However, the prosecution argued that the CFI has
jurisdiction because the fine that may be imposed on account of the damage to property is a sum
equal to the amount of damage to three times such amount, which in no case shall be less than
P25.00. We reversed the CFI and remanded the case for further proceedings. In effect, We held that
the CFI has jurisdiction because the fine for the damage to property should be considered in
determining jurisdiction.70 We also interpreted the third paragraph of Article 365 in this manner:

The respondent court, however, relies on the wording of the

third paragraph of said article, which reads as follows:
 "When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have
only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos."

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is

only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be
split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, for both the injuries and the damage committed
were caused by one single act of the defendant and constitute what
may be called a complex crime of physical injuries and damage to
property. It is clear that the fine fixed by law in this case is beyond
the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of the court of
first instance. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)71

Simply put, if the imprudent or negligent act covered by Article 365 results to both damage to
property and persons, a fine shall be imposed for the former and an additional penalty based on the
penalty scheme of Article 365 shall be meted for the latter. The information cannot also be split into
two – one for physical injuries and another for damage to property.

Nevertheless, in the 1998 case of Reodica v. Court of Appeals,72 which involved an Information
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries, We held that the
third paragraph of Article 365 does not apply since the reckless imprudence did not result in damage
to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365 which provides for arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods for an act committed through reckless imprudence which,
had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony.73

Significantly, in Ivler, We went back to Our pronouncement in Angeles that the third paragraph of
Article 365 applies even if the imprudent or negligent act resulted not only in damage to property but
also in damage to persons, in which case an additional penalty for the latter shall be imposed aside
from a fine.

Interestingly, We did not apply this in Gonzaga where despite a finding that the accused was
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to
property, no separate fine was imposed for damage to property. The same goes for Senit where the
accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property. There was no fine imposed for the resulting damage to property. In both these
cases, the imprudent acts and their consequences were treated as complex crimes.

Meanwhile, there is a seeming flaw in Angeles that We need to address. Angeles teaches that
an "additional penalty" should be imposed when the negligent or imprudent act resulted not only in
damage to property but also to physical injuries. Only one information shall be filed for both the
injuries and the damages. The reasoning stated in Angeles is because "the injuries and damage
committed were caused by one single act of the defendant and constitute what may be called a
complex crime of physical injuries and damage to property."74 Hence, on its face, Angeles is among
the case law which applied Article 48 of the RPC to quasi-crimes. Ivler, by citing Angeles, seems to
affirm a case which allows the "complexing" of quasi-crimes. We now clarify Our ruling in Angeles.
 The crux of the controversy in Angeles is the interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 365
in relation to determining the jurisdiction of courts. We ruled that the fine for damage to property and
the additional penalty for damage to persons should both be considered in ascertaining which court
has jurisdiction over the quasi-offense. While We referred to the "complex crime of physical injuries
and damage to property,"75 Our declaration that an additional penalty should be imposed for the
resulting physical injuries defies or disregards the sentencing formula under Article 48 for complex
crimes, which is the imposition of only one penalty – the penalty for the most serious crime, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.76 Thus, the contradiction in Angeles seems to be more
apparent than real. Angeles, in prescribing an additional penalty for the resulting damage to persons,
does not, in essence, allow the "complexing" of the resulting acts of a single quasi-crime.

In fine, the Angeles and Ivler interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 365 conform/dovetail
with the second approach that quasi-crimes should be prosecuted in one charge, regardless of their
number and severity, and each consequence should be penalized separately. We applied this
interpretation in the recent case of Esteban.

Jurisdiction of Courts over

Quasi-Crimes

In Angeles and the succeeding cases that cited it, both the fine for damage to property and the
penalty for damage to persons were considered in determining which court has jurisdiction. Hence,
in People v. Villanueva77 (Villanueva), which involved the complex crime of serious and less serious
physical injuries with damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00,78 We ruled that the CFI (now
the RTC) had jurisdiction, viz.:

Considering that it is the court of first instance that would

undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted
from appellant's imprudence were the damage to property in
the amount of P2,636.00, it would be absurd to hold that for the
graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries
combined with damage to property through reckless
imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the peace
court. The presumption is against absurdity, and it is the duty of the
courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results.
Our system of apportionment of criminal jurisdictions among the
various trial courts proceeds on the basic theory that crimes
cognizable by the Courts of First Instance are more serious than
those triable in justice of the peace or municipal
courts.79 (Emphasis supplied)

Villanueva was followed by People v. Malabanan.80 However, with the amendment of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129 by R.A. No. 7691 on March 25, 1994, the amount of fine in criminal
negligence resulting to damage to property is no longer relevant in determining which court has
jurisdiction. Section 32(2) of BP 129, as amended, reads:

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal

Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. –
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
 (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses

punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

Hence, the MeTCs, MTCs, MCTCs, and MTCCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal
negligence cases which results to damage to property, regardless of the imposable fine. Note that
prior to the amendment of BP 129, the first level courts only have jurisdiction when the imposable
fine does not exceed P20,000.00.

Similarly, BP 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts
over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from the crime. Thus, the first level courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over
acts penalized under Article 365 of the RPC. The most serious imposable penalty under Article 365
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum period or two (2) years, four (4) months, and one
(1) day to six (6) years of imprisonment. This is the imposable penalty, "[w]hen, by imprudence or
negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused."81 The
only exception is when the offender in the foregoing offense "fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in his/her hands to give,"82 in which case the penalty next higher in
degree shall be imposed.83 The penalty next higher in degree to prision correcional in its medium
and maximum periods is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods or six (6) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years of imprisonment. The jurisdiction for the qualified offense will now lie in the
RTC.

De los Santos is no longer a

good law.

We rule that Ivler is a good law, notwithstanding the few stray cases that allowed the
"complexing" of the effects of a single quasi-offense. Forbidding the application of Article 48 of the
RPC to quasi-offenses and their resultant acts/effects preserves the conceptual distinction between
quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under the RPC. We thus declare that De los Santos84 is
abandoned. We agree with Our pronouncements in Ivler. Article 48 does not apply to quasi-
offenses under Article 365 because reckless imprudence is a distinct crime and not a mere
way of committing a crime. Simple or reckless imprudence does not strictly fall under the
term "felonies" or acts or omissions committed by fault or culpa.

Applying what We had discussed in the present case, We find that the offense charged against
petitioner was properly designated as reckless imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries and
damage to property. The Information was also correctly filed before the MTCC.

The elements of the crime of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an
act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that
material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and
place.85

The prosecution was able to establish the foregoing elements beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner has exhibited, by his voluntary act, without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution in
overtaking the vehicle in front of him. He did not ensure that the road was clear and free of oncoming
traffic. Section 41 of R.A. No. 4136, also known as the "Land Transportation and Traffic Code," as
amended, provides that, "the driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a
highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for sufficient distance to permit such overtaking
or passing to be made in safety." As stated in the TAR86 and shown in the Sketch Plan,87 the point
of impact occurred at the inner lane occupied by the private complainants' jeepney. This proves that
petitioner encroached on the rightful lane of the private complainants. Petitioner was violating a
traffic regulation at the time of the collision as he was driving on the wrong side of the road.88 Under
Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, he is presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident, which
presumption he failed to rebut.89

The CA, the RTC, and the MTCC uniformly held that petitioner failed to observe the necessary
care and precaution required of a driver who abandons his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking
another vehicle, which recklessness resulted in the injuries sustained by the private complainants
and the damage to the jeepney. Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.90

Consequently, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable.
The said doctrine presupposes that both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably at a later point in time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose negligence or fault brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom.91 The documentary and testimonial evidence in this case show
that petitioner was at fault.

Accordingly, the courts a quo did not err in finding that petitioner's reckless act is the proximate
cause of the injuries and damage to property. However, the said courts failed to apply Ivler in
determining the imposable penalty. While they found that petitioner was guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting to both physical injuries and damage to property, they did not impose a
separate fine for damage to property, manifesting that they treated the single imprudent act and its
effects as a complex crime. The correct approach is to impose separate penalties for each
consequence of the imprudent act alleged and proven.

More, the CA found that the injuries sustained by Rico, Leilani, and Myrna from the collision
amounted to slight physical injuries only, yet it erroneously characterized it as a less grave felony in
its Decision dated March 15, 2018. The Certificates of Confinement92 presented by the prosecution
showed that the estimated days of confinement for Leilani is only 3-5 days; for Rico 2-3 days; and
none was mentioned for Myrna. Under Article 266 (1) of the RPC, as amended, the crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished by arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries
which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) to nine (9) days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period. Arresto menor has a duration of 1-30 days of
imprisonment. Hence, pursuant to Article 9 in relation to Article 25 of the RPC, as amended, slight
physical injuries is only a light felony.
The correct penalty for the
crime

The reckless driving of petitioner resulted in slight physical injuries to Rico, Leilani, and Myrna.
As previously stated, slight physical injuries is a light felony. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article
365,93 reckless imprudence resulting in a light felony is punishable by arresto menor in its maximum
period, that is, imprisonment of twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. On the contrary, if the reckless
act of petitioner was intentional, it would have been penalized under Article 26694 of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 10951, as a crime of slight physical injuries punishable by arresto menor or
imprisonment with a duration of one (1) to thirty (30) days.95 Evidently, the penalty under Article
266, had the act been intentional, is equal to or lower than that prescribed in the first paragraph of
Article 365. In this connection, the sixth paragraph of Article 365 provides that:

When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower

than those provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of this article, in
which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree
than that which should be imposed in the period which they may
deem proper to apply.

The underlying reason for this reduction in penalty is to preserve the difference between an act
wilfully performed from one committed through negligence.96 Otherwise, a reckless or imprudent act
would be punished with the same penalty imposable to an intentional act.

Thus, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public
censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. Since that the reckless act of
petitioner resulted in slight physical injuries to three persons (Rico, Leilani, and Myrna), the penalty
of public censure shall be imposed for each of the slight physical injuries committed.

With respect to the resulting damage to property, We concur with the CA that while it is evident
that the jeepney driven by Rico and owned by Noel G. Garcia (Garcia) was damaged, the
prosecution failed to present competent proof to establish the amount actually spent for the repair or
replacement of the wrecked jeep. The Vehicle and Equipment Work Order presented in the trial
court only provided for an estimated expense of P350,000.00. No representative from the
Maglanque Motor Shop testified to authenticate the document. Only Rico and Lailani testified that
they brought the jeep for repair to the shop and the cost of repair is P350,000.00. In any case, this
will not prevent Us from imposing temperate damages in favor of owner of the wrecked jeepney.
Under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with
certainty. Here, We rule that the amount of P150,000.00 which the CA awarded as temperate
damages to Garcia is fair and reasonable.

As to the amount of fine, petitioner should pay P150,000.00 conformably with the third
paragraph of Article 365 which states that, when the reckless act "resulted in damage to the property
of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of
said damages to three (3) times such value, but which shall in no case be less than Five Thousand
pesos (P5,000.00)."

Additionally, We agree with the CA that Rico, Leilani, and Myrna suffered some pecuniary loss
due to their physical injuries, which prevented them from working. However, aside from their bare
allegations they failed to present proof that they are earning P400.00 to P500.00 per day. Therefore,
the CA's award of temperate damages in the amount of P8,000.00 to Spouses Rico and Leilani, and
P2,000.00 to Myrna, are in order. All the monetary awards shall be subject to a legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the Resolution until fully paid.97

Lastly, for technical propriety, We shall correct the designation of the offense stated in the
dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 15, 2018 of the CA. It seems that the CA
inadvertently indicated that petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
and multiple serious physical injuries, whereas based on the evidence presented and the body of the
Decision, private complainants only suffered slight physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED. Our Resolution dated September 21,

2020 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:

(1) petitioner is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence

resulting in multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of public censure for each of the resulting slight
physical injuries committed to private complainants Rico Mendoza, Leilani Mendoza,
and Myrna Cunanan, and to pay a fine in the amount of P150,000.00 as penalty for
the resulting damage to property;

(2) petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages in the amount of

P8,000.00 to Spouses Rico and Leilani Mendoza and P2,000.00 to Myrna Cunanan;

(3) petitioner is ORDERED to pay Noel G. Garcia or his authorized

representative temperate damages in the amount of P150,000.00;

(4) all monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from the
finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez,
Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

Caguioa, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.

Lazaro-Javier,* J., no part.

Footnotes

* No part due to prior participation in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.

1 Rollo, pp. 202-207.

2 Id. at 200.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Socorro B. Inting; id. at 31-55.

4 Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court);
id. at 57-61.

5 Id. at 53-54.

6 Id. at 32-33.

7 Lalaine, Leilani, Lailanie, or Lailani in some parts of the rollo.

8 Id. at 33.

9 Id. at 33-34.

10 Id. at 34.

11 Penned by Judge Gemma Theresa B. Hilario-Logronio; id. at 85-91.

12 Id. at 91.

13 Id. at 88, 90.

14 Id. at 89.

15 Id. at 91.

16 Id. at 145.

17 Penned by Judge Irin Zenaida S. Buan; id. at 79-84.

18 Id. at 83-84.

19 Id. at 31-55.

20 Id. at 38-41.

21 Id. at 39-40.

22 Id. at 42-44.

23 Id. at 47-49.

24 Id. at 50-53.

25 Id. at 57-61.
26 Id. at 19-20.

27 Id. at 20-22.

28 Id. at 23.

29 An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is
Based, and the Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose
Act No. 3815, Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal Code," as Amended.

30 Rollo, pp. 23-24.

31 Id. at 191-193.

32 Id. at 200.

33 Id. at 202-207.

34 Article 365 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10951.

35 649 Phil. 478 (2010).

36 Id. at 491-492, citing Quizon v. The Justice of Peace of Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 345-346
(1955).

37 Id.

38 Supra note 35 at 507-509.

39 Supra note 35 at 509.

40 407 Phil. 724 (2001).

41 Id. at 743-744.

42 Id. at 743.

43 597 Phil. 127 (2009).

44 Id. at 142.

45 67 Phil. 529 (1939).

46 Id.

47 Id. at 530.

48 97 Phil. 342 (1955).

49 Id. at 345-346.

50 Separate Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, p. 1.

51 699 Phil. 328 (2012).

52 Id. at 335-336.

53 751 Phil. 218 (2015).

54 Id.

55 759 Phil. 504 (2015).

56 Id. at 511-513.

57 776 Phil. 372 (2016).

58 Id. at 388.

59 Id. at 379.

60 741 Phil. 198 (2014).

61 Id. at 203.

62 Id. at 207.

63 G.R. No. 209597 (Notice), April 26, 2017.

64 Id.

65 Id. Note that the CA modified the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide –
the petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, ten (10) months and twenty
(20) days of prision correccional as maximum; moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
is further awarded to the heirs of the deceased.

66 Id.

67 R.A. No. 10951 increased the amount of fines provided in Article 365.

68 96 Phil. 151 (1954).

69 Id. at 152.

70 Id. at 151-152.

71 Id. at 152.
72 354 Phil. 90 (1998).

73 Id. at 104.

74 Supra note 68 at 152. Underscoring supplied.

75 Supra note 68 at 152.

76 Supra note 35.

77 111 Phil. 897 (1961).

78 Id. at 900.

79 Id. 899-900.

80 112 Phil. 1082, 1084 (1961). Malabanan was charged in the CFI of the crime of double
serious physical injuries with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. Following
Angeles and Villanueva, We held that "there may be cases, as the one at bar, where the
imposable penalty for the physical injuries charged would come within the jurisdiction of the
municipal or justice of the peace court, while the fine, for the damage to property, would fall
on the Court of First Instance. As the information cannot be split into two, one for damages
and another for the physical injuries, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the
case must be determined not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged
but by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless
imprudence."

81 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 365.

82 Id.

83 Id.

84 Supra note 40.

85 Valencia v. People, G.R. No. 235573, November 9, 2020, citing Cabugao v. People, 740
Phil. 9, 21-22 (2014).

86 Rollo, p. 102.

87 Id. at 103.

88 Paman v. People, 813 Phil. 139, 147 (2017).

89 Id.

90 Mariano v. People, 738 Phil. 448, 457 (2014).

91 Phil. National Railways Corp. v. Vizcara, 682 Phil. 343, 358 (2012).
92 Rollo, pp. 104-106.

93 Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony,
the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

94 Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. - The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto mayor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) to nine (9) days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) and
censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the
offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical assistance.

3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five thousand
pesos (P5,000) when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any
injury.

95 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 27.

96 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, p. 1006. 1a⍵⍴h!1

97 Supra note 90 at 462, citing BSP Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 and Nacar v. Gallery
Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 281-283 (2013).