Warshi

HM MTB /Vosper 70ft - by David Cobb Rol RSMA

 10 Downing Street
Whitehall
30th May,1943

I have noted with admiration the work of the light coastal forces in the North Sea, in
the Channel and, more recently, in the Mediterranean.
Both in offence and defence the fighting zeal and the professional skill of officers and
men have maintained the great tradition built up by many generations of British seamen.
As our strategy becomes more strongly offensive, the task allotted to the coastal forces
will increase in importance, and the area of their operations will widen.
I wish to express my heartfelt congratulations to you all on what you have done in the
past, and complete confidence that you will maintain the same high standards until
complete victory has been gained over all our enemies.
WINSTON CHURCHILL

Acknowledgements
As far as I am aware no previous attempt has been made to
summarise in this fashion the short MTBs of World War II.
Whatever spirit they engendered, materially they grew,
flourished and shrank to nothing overnight. Moreover, their
most recent service was rendered over 25 years ago.
As a result I am deeply indebted to those who have
contributed so generously with encouragement, help and
knowledge from memories so much better furnished than
mine. In particular I would like to mention:
Commander P. Du Cane OBE RN (retd) the designer of the
70ft MTB; Commander C. W. S. Dreyer DSO DSC RN (retd) ;
Captain P. Dickens DSO MBE DSC RN (retd) ; Commander
J. P. G. Brooks RN (retd) of Vosper Ltd; M. Arnold
Forster Esq DSO Dsc; P. J. Liddell Esq DSc; G. Hudson
Esq; Frank Webster Esq; John Wingate Esq DSC; Captain
B. H. Kent RN, co HMS Mercury; Commander P. C. E.
Richardson DSc, HMS Vernon; Commander G. M. K.
Brewer RN, HMS Excellent; The Imperial War Museum;
The Admiralty Compass Observatory.
Despite their best endeavours all errors of fact and judg-
ment are wholly mine.
Profile Publications Ltd, are grateful for the permission
of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum to reproduce
the photographs in this Warship Profile.
MTB 66 lying in Portsmouth during trials (Vosper Ltd)

HM MTB/Vo sp e r 70ft
by David Cobb Rol RSMA

The Motor Torpedo Boats overlooked by a victorious enemy, whose plans for
invasion were checked by the epic air battle of that
The British are not a martial race. Not relishing war, autumn. The Navy found itself without vessels of the
they seldom prepare for it; all too often the British kind needed to re-exert its lost sea-power, even resort-
serviceman by his conduct has had to make good the ing to motor yachts and pilot-boats to provide anti-
shortcomings of his material. In any case, his principal invasion patrols in the Straits of Dover.
defence, the warship, is an unsuitable instrument for The only craft suited (though not specifically
conquest, though a strong influence for curbing it in designed) for such a task was an embryonic group of
others. assorted MTBs negligible in numbers, without bases,
In 1940, that traditional defence was disrupted by operational experience or staff. Since all potentially-
the new influence of air power. No longer could the hostile coastlines lay apparently beyond their opera-
conventional warship control the narrow seas now tional range, such craft hadjustified no tactical existence

145

WO
Bow view ofstemhead prior to planking- up. Engine bearers, looking forward. (Centre-engine shaft
(VosperLtd) and coupling just visible in foreground) (VosperLtd)

Thornycroft C.M.B. 70 ft of World War l design, used also for cloak and dagger work in World War l/

MTB 66 showing back of unarmoured bridge MTB 66 0 5-inch turret, safety arc on forward side
(VosperLtd) (Vosper L td)

146
in the Royal Navy. Now the Admiralty hurried to
espouse what hitherto it had rejected; thus the nation
reaped where private energy, capital and design skill
alone had sown.
So it came about that the crews of these few,
minute, complex warships were translated overnight
from obscurity to offensive sea war. Their commitment
to this undivided purpose was a distinction they shared
with only one other branch of the Navy, the sub-
marines, whose personnel, training and material were
a byword of excellence. Nightly, in all possible weather
conditions, the MTBs began to search the enemy coast
in a wholly novel and specialised game of blind-man's-
buff. In time the sum of experience slowly mounted.
The dribble of improved material was turned to every
aspect of skill in its use.
By 1943, a greatly expanded and, by now, sophisti-
cated force had gained the initiative wherever it
operated. The following year its competence was a
major factor in the safe installation and guarding of the
D-day fleet in one of the battle areas it had contested
for so long.
This Warship Profile studies the one type of MTB
which operated basically unaltered from 1939 to 1945,
so it covers, if briefly, the complete pattern of this MTB 66 bridge controls. Torpedo firing levers and sight-
base to port, latermoved to starboard (C.0 s) side
wholly novel type of sea war.
(VosperLtd)
In retrospect, the MTB seems to have drawn its
spirit from the fast vessels which have (if for diverse
warship could pose no threat to a major one. The
reasons) sought the cloak of darkness to conduct their
invention of the torpedo, whether delivered by boat or
business.
submarine, ended this era.
Inescapably, the activities of the boats of all types are
The submarine for long defied counter-measures,
linked in the minds of those that knew them with the
but the torpedo-boat led to the torpedo-boat-destroyer
distinguished services in various theatres of war of
(TBD) with which it then merged identity to set the
many men, not only from Britain, but from the
pattern of the small fast warship which carried a
Commonwealth and Allied Nations. The almost total
disproportionately destructive weapon.
omission of their names, if deeply regretted. is inevit-
If the early TBD was very small compared with a
able in a book of this size.
cruiser or battleship, it had both to defend and attack
't'his short history is dedicated to the memory of those
fleets of such vessels, and thus be large enough to
who gave their lives in this service.
keep to the open sea for long periods.
Part /: THE WEAPON The Coastal Motor Boat of 1914-1918 (CMB)
resulted from taking the torpedo to sea and mounting
The MTB Concept it on a minimal planing hull driven at very high speed
\Vith few exceptions, such as the use of fireships, by petrol engines. Like all its MTB successors, the boat
throughout naval history it was axiomatic that a minor had much more in common with an aircraft than

1939 Extension Programme boat. General view showing MTB 57 wheelhouse showing original 'armoured
twin rudders and cavitation plates, also squared rudder- conning tower' concept, with steering, E/R controls.
heads to carry hand-steering emergency tiller torpedo firing levers, and armour-plate screens to cover
(Vosper Ltd) windows (Vosper L td )

147
 MTB 66 wheelhouse, all controls transferred to bridge MTB 66E/R starboard side looking forward (Vosper Ltd)
(VosperLtd)

deep-draught naval vessels; but within the building be at the focus of the work for the next five years.
and engine techniques of its period, it was an un- In 1948, Vospers were awarded £35,000 by a Royal
doubted success, for it obtained sufficient power from Commission in recognition of their contribution to the
the relatively heavy Thornycroft, Fiat and Green war effort. It might have been better invested in
petrol engines to lift the hull and its torpedoes into a them 15 years earlier.
planing position. As with 'MMTBs, aircraft engines also
were adapted to this purpose. and the CMBs if less 70ft VOSPER DESIGNS BUILT UNDER LICENCE
seaworthy were fully as fast as their successors. 1940-43 201-212 S. White, Cowes
246-251
Such activities as the CMB performed were crowned 1942-44 275-306 Built in U.S., made available under Lend/
in 1918 by sinking a Russian battle-cruiser, which 363-378 Lease to R.N. (363-370, 400-449, 661-730
3'i6-411 transferred to Russia)
showed very clearly the boat=s potentialities but, with 1943 347-362 Built by sub-contractors in U.K.
the post-war reduction of armament, further British
development petered out.
70ft VOSPER CLASS OF 1940:
It was not until 1934 that the Admiralty re-con- Data & Equipment
sidered at all the need for such small fighting craft, and Tonnage: 47
L.O.A.: 72' 6" (including rudders)
1937 before the first flotilla of six MTBs was formed. In Beam: 19' 3"
that year the entire British Commonwealth had only Draught: 2'9" x 5'6"
Engines: Isotta Frascini (3 bank 1 8-cyl.)
these six boats, with seven building; in 1938 an Ad-
B H P 3600/3450-40/42 knots
miralty Fleet Order invited volunteers for service in Hall Scott (V-12 cyl.)
MTBs. BHP 1800 -27 knots
Packard (V-12 cyl.)
The story of the Vosper 70' MTB began in 1937 when BHP 4050/3600-38/40 knots
a 68' experimental boat, No. 102, built as a private Sterling Admiral (V-12 cyl.)
BHP 3360 35 knots
venture, developed 40 knots while carrying two 21" Fuel: 2750 gallons 100-octane
torpedoes; in 1939, the first 70' boat was accepted, the Water: 50 gallons
Steering: hydraulic, hydraulic-assisted hand
unwitting progenitor of some 200 succeeding 70' boats
Crew: 2 officers, 913 men
which, built in the U.S.A. as well as in Britain, were to Armament: Torpedo Tubes (TT) 2x21" A.R.T.S. (angled
outboard 7I--°)
Torpedoes MK IV", V, XX", Vill' (post 1943)
alternatively
V-8 auxiliary drive with lsotta-Frascini marine engines
4 mines
(VosperLtd) 'A' MK 1, 2, 3 or 4 dia. 18", length 9;'. Magnetic or
acoustic pistols
Vickers MK V M.G. 0 5" twin, in power-operated
turret
Fitted and supplied subsequently:
Twin 20mm Oerlikon hand-operated (vice twin
05")
Single 20mm Oerlikon (foredeck)
Twin Vickers K 0303" (amidships, on tubes)
Lanchester carbines
Stripped Lewis M.G. 0303"
Hand grenades
Depth Charges: 4 x M K VII in single chutes aft
Smoke Apparatus: C.S.A., Type B, 12 min., Total wt. 48016.
Illuminants. 2" Rocket Flare Projectors 1943 onwards, fitted
on T.T. each side of bridge
W/ T.- TGY/607-CW/RT 375-500kcs 1.2-8 3mcs
R/T: T C S CW/RT 1.5-12mcs
R.D.F.: Type 286 (fixed dipoles)
Type 291 (rotating dipoles)
A.WIS. W.I
Type 252
1. F. F. f
D/FPosition-
finding equipment: OH 1,QH2. Fr. 20/85 Mc/ s. Range (appr.) 1 50m.

148
Fire equipment: Fixed Methyl Bromide in Engine Room (ER) and
Tank Space, alternate operation Bridge/ER
Portable: Foamite, Nuswift, Pyrene
Navigational: Compasses (2) Pattern 111 51 A
Kelvin Hughes E/S
Signals: Naval Code signalling flags
Aldis 24V
Lamp pact 1038
Verey Pistol 2-star cartridges
Hydrophone: Rudimentary, various

SPEED TABLE
Approximate Speed Table- Packard
Revolutions per minute Boost (lb/Sq") Speedknots
1 engine 800 -8 7
2 engines 800 -8 9
3engines 800 -8 12
1000 -6 15
1200 -4 18
1400 -2 22
1600 0 26
1800 +2 30
2000 +4 34
2200 +6 36 MTB 66 E/R starboard side aft, looking forward
2400 +8 38-40 (VosperLtd)

length, were arrived at on the premise of use in service

NOTES ON HULL , ENGINES of very high or very low speed, as in the silent attack on,
AND EQUIPMENT and swift escape from, a sheltered fleet anchorage;
The Hull not as it turned out (and the difference is profound)
The frames and planking of the double diagonal wood the attack of escorted vessels in the open sea off a
hull were strengthened longitudinally by a girder distant coast.
framework which included the metal engine bearers. As used in service, the intermediate speeds of 12-18
The shape was evolved by a series of tank tests and the knots proved frequently necessary, when the shape of
building of hulls in the early 1930s of increasing size for the forward sections made the boats very wet. However
various utilitarian purposes. no design change was permitted at a time of such need,
The characteristic diamond-shape of the 70' Vesper and it was not until 1944 that the 73' Vosper entered
foredeck resulted from torpedo development trials, service with this much-needed modification. This boat
when the tubes were angled outboard and the foredeck had otherwise an identical bottom shape to permit the
each side pared away to ensure a clear launch. use of existing cradle facilities, but the bow sections
The forward hull sections which affect so closely the were refined to improve sea-going throughout the
behaviour of a fast planing boat, and also the overall whole range of speeds.

MTB 66 WIT and Radar Office, looking aft down steps

from wheelhouse (VosperLtd) MTB 66 WIT installation (VosperLtd)

149
MTB 66 Pattern 286 R. D. F. ( Vosper Ltd ) MTB 66 Wardroom, looking aft from galley hatch
(Vosper L td)
Engine Room a speed of 30 knots, giving a maximum range of some
400 miles on the 2725 gallons of fuel, some 16 hours of
The high power of MTB engines was exceptional only steaming. In effect, the longest passage to a patrol
in its economy of weight and space. No suitable position would not exceed some 140 miles, or five-
British-made engine being available for Vosper and-a-half hours running at 25 knots.
development, three supercharged Isotta Frascini The Vosper 1942 programme was fitted with Ford
1150hp marine engines were fitted. Italian entry into V-8 wing auxiliary engines. At the cost of the delay
the war forced the robbery of the centre engine for the needed to declutch the main engines and engage these
spares it could provide and the substitution of American auxiliaries, the boat could proceed economically and
supercharged Hall-Scott until 1250hp Packards be- entirely silently at some 7-9 knots, but, to low speed and
came available. The effect was to reduce the top speed relatively poor control from twin rudders, was added
of boats so mutilated to a mere 26-27 knots. the often embarrassing pause needed to re-engage
Thereafter, as it became available, the Packard main engines. To muffle the strident main exhaust,
remained standard for the 47-ton Vosper short MTB. and for simplicity, at first only the centre engine was
Each engine consumed roughly one gallon a minute at silenced but finally all three engines were similarly
MTB 66 wheelhouse, aft starboard side, showing multi-
purpose E/R telegraph to transmit a variety of orders.
(Normal E/R voice-pipes would have been totally MTB 66 forward mess-deck, looking aft. Water-tight
inaudible) (Vosper Ltd) door open (Vosper L td )

150
silenced at will. Use of these dumbflow silencers
caused slight back pressure and loss of power, but the
ability to use main engines continuously was a great
advantage.
The sense of speed from three such engines at
maximum power was an exhilarating experience not
easily forgotten.
Wing-engines drove directly, with planet-type
reverse gears, the centre engine through a V-drive.
From rest, full speed could be reached in some 10-12
seconds, and in emergency the boat slumped to a stop
almost instantly. The engines were maintained at sea
and serviced in harbour by engine-room staff (and base
staff when required) on a regular schedule entered in
the engine-room register. More extensive maintenance
took place at set intervals, until either some defect
arose which required an engine to be changed, or the
statutory 500 hour limit for replacement was reached. M T B 6 6 galley (Vosper L td)
Being of aircraft origin, delicate and highly-tuned. the
engines were not wholly suitable, and installed in small 18. C.S.A. Apparatus. Do the valves work freely? Is the nozzle clear?
planing hulls driven at speed they performed a duty in Are the bottles (air and acid) charged? Is the set covered ?
19. Combustible material is to be safely stowed. Any rags or waste
adverse circumstances. lying about? Hand torches are not permitted. Are they being used ?
Major maintenance routines were planned to co- 20. Are the alternative gun pump systems fully understood ?
At the weekly inspection of Engine Room Registers, ask to see
incide with periodic slipping of boats to clean and the daily registers for the previous seven days. Take special regard
paint the bottom, and to give leave to the crew. The of hours run at speeds of 2000 R.P.M. and in excess. Is the
average lubricating oil consumption increasing ?
method of hauling out varied with the facilities
Fuel tank compartments should be inspected weekly.
available at different bases, but at each it was a matter
of skill and care by the shore staff to settle the boat
precisely upon the shaped supporting chocks of the Torpedoes
cradle. The torpedoes were fired (usually simultaneously
Whenever boats were in harbour, shore-lighting was unless ordered otherwise) by a 15 oz. cordite impulse
connected to relieve the drain on batteries and conse- charge released into an expansion chamber bolted to
quent need to run charging auxiliaries. the tail of the tube. All had a safety range within which
Re-fuelling and re-arming was normally carried out the firing pistol on the warhead was inactive, and in
immediately on return from sea, when the boats were deciding a suitable firing range the torpedo had also
restored to full readiness and their state reported to to be given sufficient distance to assume its correct
the operating authority. setting for depth. If launched at high speed it dived
The following questionnaire gives an idea of the deeply, which limited the scope of firing conditions in
specialised knowledge required of any, Commanding shoal water.
Officer inspecting his engine room: Depth-settings could be altered with the torpedo in
the tube, but normally these were selected prior to the
Engineer Training Officer, commencement of the patrol at depths appropriate to
H.M.S.'BEE'
21st November 1943
the probable targets.
ENGINE ROOM ROUNDS The correct running of the complex torpedo was
Inspection Sheet for Commanding Officers naturally a matter of acute concern. While the majority
1 . Bilges. Are they dry ? Are there any leaks?
2. Bilge suction valves. Do they workfreely? ran true, due to prior damage or perhaps the shocks of
3. Echo Sounding Tank. Is it free from oil ? sea-going, in early days there were a number of failures
4. Ventilators. Is the mechanism rusted? Can the ventilators be
rotated and blanked off ? to hit in circumstances difficult to explain. Even in the
5. Fuel Tanks. Are the valves closed on the bulkhead ? worst conditions of sea, the torpedo track was revealed
6. Petrol Filters. When were they last cleaned ?
at night by phosphorescence.
7. Dumbflows. Are they in open position?
8. Exhaust manifold drain cocks. Are they open ? An important item of torpedo maintenance was the
9. Main engine air filters. If exposed to open vent port or hatch, internal dryness of the tubes. Only a small accumula-
has the cover been placed over the filter? Muster all air filter
covers. tion of oil in the tube, draining from the engine of the
10. Check levels of fluids in torpedo, could cause a bright flash at the moment of
(a) Lockheed service tanks.
(b) Main engine distilled water headers. discharge.
(c) Main engine lub. oil service tanks.
(d) Aux. Eng. sump and gearbox oils. MTB 73 on trials in Solent. Observe draught-marks on
(e) Distilled water reservelzrik. stem and side amidships; also the easy planing attitude of
(f) Lub. oil reserve tank.
(g) Reduction gearbox oil tank or 'V' drive. a new boat at speed (VosperLtd)
11. Gauges. Any faulty ?
12. Main engine starter batteries. Tops clean? Terminals tight and
greased ? Specific gravity 0. K. ?
13. Inspection lights. Have they guards? Is the wiring frayed ?
14. M ester tools.
15. Fire Extinguishers. Is there clearance between striker and
knob ? Are the bottles full ? When were they last tested ?
16. Chain steering. Are chains and sprockets in after tiller flat lub-
ricated daily?
17. Slave steering mechanism. Are the steering rods bright? They
should be lubricated with Lockheed fluid only.

151
 Mines
The original Vosper design allowed for the substitution
of four ground mines for the two torpedoes. The chutes
for these were fitted aft of the tubes, two on each side.
The weight distribution when carrying mines was
located too far aft for satisfactory planing but, short of
removing the tubes entirely, no other position was
possible.
The mine clocks were set at the moment of release,
which was timed to seconds between the boats con-
cerned. On return to harbour the appropriate number
of mine toggles was mustered to show that the mines
were live when released.
MTB 33 at Flathouse, Portsmouth, her stern blown out
and resting on the bottom at low tide. The watertight
compartments appear to have kept the boat afloat at the
Smoke
oil-mark on the topsides (Vosper L td)
Smoke could be used both offensively and defensively.
Gunnery A strip could be laid through which to attack, or
through which an enemy force would have to steam
The original Vosper armament consisted of 'a hydraul- while the unit waited on the far side. Such use was very
ically driven, revolving HA/LA (High Angle/Low rare. It could be effective only in suitable wind
Angle) gun turret in which were mounted twin 0.5" conditions, and risked losing enemy contact altogether.
Vickers machine guns with an effective range of 500 Defensive smoke was used frequently after an attack
yards. They fired belted ammunition of A.P. (Armour not only to hide disengaging craft, but also to provide
Piercing) tracer, each at 700 rounds a minute, controlled short strips which showed up well under star-shell, and
for elevation and training by the gunner seated in the often diverted a high proportion of enemy fire.
turret, using a single control column and a cartwheel C.S.A. was a strong acid in liquid form discharged as
sight. The power was supplied from a mechanical vapour by compressed air; this vapour was highly toxic
pump in the engine room; maintenance called for the if inhaled, but at times this drawback was regarded
use of no less than 37 special tools. lightly compared with its advantages.
Gunners were trained in surface action to fire only
short bursts before re-sighting the target. Control of
fire and shifts of target were indicated from the bridge,
but necessarily much initiative lay with the gunners. Illuminations
Habitually, all guns were tested on leaving harbour. The faculty of night vision only develops fully after an
As the war progressed and material shortages eased, average of some 20-30 minutes spent in total darkness.
further guns were fitted, both to strengthen the Vosper The moment the eye is exposed to light of any brilliance
ability to defend itself and to acquire some offensive this faculty is lost; moreover, in such a condition the
gun capacity, but the layout of the original design eye is easily, if temporarily, dazzled.
never allowed any radical re-distribution of weaponry, Hence, a volume of enemy fire-power consisting of
and the boat remained in essence what it was originally, well-placed star shell, mortars, variegated tracer shell,
a torpedo boat armed for self-defence. multi-barrelled automatic guns and heavy breach-
The total weight of added armament and am- loaded weapons could, and frequently did, blind an
munition, the men to operate it, the heavy splinter- attacking force, or at least make it impossible to sight
mats to protect them, plus the inevitable weight of its target clearly.
water soaked into the hull combined in time to Thus, from 1943 onwards, parachute rocket laun-
immerse the hull even more deeply, so that in time chers (R.F.Ps) were fitted abreast the bridge astride
the short MTB (as with many other -Naval craft) lost the torpedo tube with which to illuminate enemy
both the edge of its high performance and the clean- surface craft. Depending on the setting, these flares
liness of outline which characterised the original design. rose to 2000-2500 feet at a distance of 14-2 miles and
a series were fired usually in an arc to silhouette the
enemy from the far side.
MTB 29 Torpedo firing trials in HMS Vernon (Vosper Ltd) Naturally, their use removed the element of surprise,
but frequently the need for them arose from prior
detection of the attacking MTBs.

Depth Charges
Though these were seldom used by torpedo boats,
once torpedoes had been fired they remained the one
supply of bulk high explosive. As such they could be
used to discourage pursuit. and in the event of a gun
action at close quarters they could be dropped at
shoal settings (sometimes with extra buoyancy attached)
close ahead of an adversary to explode beneath it. They
had the advantage that their release was virtually
impossible to detect.

152
 ■
MTBs (Fairmile 'D' coming alongside, Vosper 70 ft in White-built Vosper with 20mm Oerlikon on foredeck,
foreground) working up at HMS Bee, Holyhead, 1943, waiting to come alongside at Holyhead. Jan-Feb 1944
after Weymouth was taken over for invasion preparations (Author's Collection)
(Author's Collection)
Signals direction-finding equipment, the burden facing the
Continuous W/T watch was kept by all boats at sea. A navigator in thick weather was weighty.
voice pipe linked W/T office and bridge, and the An added duty, essential to the successful firing of
navigator in the wheelhouse was in easy reach of the torpedoes, was the methodical plotting on the chart
W/T operator. Normal Minor War Vessels code-books of an enemy ships' course and speed, obtained either
were used, but at sea and on patrol W/'1' silence was by visual or radar shadowing. The development of this
maintained except for action reports and matters of technique was the first step which rationalised MTB
operational urgency. firing tactics. Prior to its development, the best torpedo
R/T (Radio Telephone) handsets came into use as firing data could rest only on guesswork.
the supply position eased, and units used plain language
and the simple provisions of the Coastal Force Signal Camouflage
Pamphlet (C.F.S.P.) to direct and report their affairs. It was essential to minimise the sighting range at night
Visual signalling was rare in a force which operated of an MTB and early in the war a number of patterns
almost wholly by night, communication being confined of camouflage were adopted to distort their appear-
to hoisting pendants leaving and entering harbour. ance. In time it was realised that they were most
Morse by lamp was customary, but only briefly and of commonly illuminated by starshell from overhead, so
absolute necessity when on patrol or outside friendly it was desirable that the consequent shadows should, as
waters. far as possible, be artificially neutralised. Thus was
adopted the pattern of camouflage shown in the
Navigation coloured illustration of MTB 66 in which all upward-
With the early transfer of the controls to the bridge, facing surfaces were painted darker, and all downward-
the wheelhouse became the chartroom. The First facing spaces lightest of all.
Lieutenant, who was also the Navigator, kept track of Thus in 140 years the cycle of camouflage turned full
the boat's movements while at sea by means of compass circle, for it was well-recognised in the time of the
and engine revolutions. This was a skilled performance, Napoleonic wars that pale or white boats were excep-
particularly for the Senior Officer's navigator on whose tionally difficult to see at night, so such treatment for
accuracy the whole unit depended both for its landfall small craft suited for smuggling was prohibited by law,
on the enemy coast, for intercepting a moving enemy and all apprehended craft were forfeit.
and for return to the MTBs' home port, after, maybe, a The sighting range of a boat seen end-on was only
night of continuous movement. about a third of that when seen on the broadside, so a
There could be no reliance on sighting coastal lights boat kept almost stationary, pointing towards its
on the occupied coastline and, until the fitting of target until the last minute, stood three times the chance

Early Vesper (not yet fitted R.D.F. etc) practice firing in Weymouth Bay (HMS Bee) speed 15-18 knots checked
momentarily by discharge of torpedoes (Author's Collection)

153
Late Vosper at 35 knots, crossing leader's pressure wave Late Vosper off Harwich. Rocket flare projectors on
to close station . Twin manual 20mm Oerlikon replaces tubes, rockets in racks visible on side of bridge. Oerlikon
0-5-inch Vickers turret. Identification lights visible at surrounded by bandstand. Loud- hailer at aft end of
starboard yardarm (/WM) bridge. FittedAWandSW (/WM)

of remaining unperceived by eye against one which mean continuous wear and tear on both men and mach-
steered a broadly converging course and revealing its inery, for normally no boat which could run remained
full length. Even if the boat itself was not visible, the in harbour, though naturally there was a limit to the
white line of its stern wash against a dark sea drew the number of consecutive nights which a boat and crew
eye to its point of greatest intensity, namely the MTB could spend at sea and yet remain efficient. It was a
herself. policy which, if it wore out boats, also wore out the
enemy.
Base Staff One consequence of this pressure was that flotillas
To maintain such complicated craft at high efficiency were accustomed to sudden changes of pattern. A
required the continuous services of a large number of senior officer whose boat developed a major defect on
specialist staff at each base. They covered the entire passage transferred forthwith to another, often the
scope of MTB equipment: engines, electrical gear, junior boat present, where his experience could be of
torpedoes, guns, radar, etc. and took a personal pride most benefit. Such instant flexibility had compensations.
in the efficient working at sea of the material they cared It welded a flotilla together, and no finer example
for with such earnest attention in harbour. Any and could exist than the total inter-changeability of Allied
every aspect of MTB activity relied on this basis of and British units, between whom there was complete
shore help, without which the boats could not keep confidence.
running, still less fight successfully. Naturally it was no A similar spirit was shown by the Base Staff who
small support to the morale of a gunner, after an action, maintained the boats, engineer officers coming to sea
to have the performance of weapons and ammunition to watch at work their delicate machinery, and
checked by an efficient and solicitous member of the occasionally, officers from other services who came for
W.R.N.S.. experience.
The severe physical strain of rough weather had its
Part //: THE OPERATIONAL BOAT silver lining. Unlike, for example, the destructive
weariness of watch-keeping aboard small convoy
THE 70 ' VOSPER escorts at sea for two to three consecutive weeks in the
Domestic Economy fury of the North Atlantic winter, the short MTB
All foreseeable events in the life of a British warship could remain at sea only as long as its limited fuel
are provided for by a document called, The Watch and permitted, perhaps 12 to 18 hours, and due to operat-
Quarter Bill, which lays down the various duties of tional limitations, even less in summer. But, apart from
each man. Compared with almost every other class of fuel and operational factors, sustained vigilance also
vessel, that of an MTB was of spartan simplicity. One had very definite limits.
point of difference made it unique: it issued no direc-
tions for `Action Stations'; with only minor relaxations, GENERAL FEATURES & PRACTICE
the boats assumed this state on putting to sea, and re- Handling
tained it until return to harbour. Throughout its life only two basic changes were made in
A second invisible point, not confined to MTBs but the 70' Vosper boat. Those boats of the 1939 prog-
essential to their mode of life, was the practice of exer- ramme were of 5' less beam and were fitted with two
cising ratings and officers in all capacities, so that no hydraulically-operated linked rudders, sited between
duty was unfamiliar. Gunners could handle engines, the three screws. Later boats were fitted with three
and engineers handle guns. rudders, each in line with a propeller, which improved
In general it was a volunteer branch of the Service, control of direction at slow speed, and tightened the
sought after by many. At times, particularly during the turning circle when planing. The vulnerable hydraulic
long nights of winter with its capricious weather, the operation was replaced by a hand/power-assisted system.
physical strain merely of uneventful patrol work on a A minor change was the armouring of the open
distant coast could be very great, so the average age of bridge instead of the wheelhouse, caused by the
`short-boat' crews was young. abandonment of the dual steering position down below.
The inability to work in sustained adverse weather This original `Armoured conning tower' conception
contrasted with the heavy burdens which arose from never challenged the sensitive collusion of Coxswain
prolonged conditions fit for patrolling. This could and Commanding Officer standing side by side in the

154
open bridge, the former at the wheel, the latter with
engine-room controls and torpedo firing gear at hand.
The ahead/astern telegraph settings of `Stop', `Slow',
`Half', `Full' were used by the Commanding Officer in
manoeuvring, to provide `standard' revolutions agreed
with the engine room. From the time a unit formed
into station outside harbour, the Commanding Officer
would usually ring up, `Half Ahead', and thereafter
assume personal control of the engine revolutions by
means of his bridge throttles to adjust and maintain
station.
The ambling gait of the Vosper at low speed was
replaced at 1000-1200 revs by a labouring, bows-up
attitude as power was increased. This created a heavy,
broad wash, and brought thick spray aboard which
continued until, at some 1600 revs and 22-23 knots, the
hull began to plane, the supercharger boost checked in Leaving for patrol (probably winter). Note emergency
steering rigged aboard foreground boats, additional
its rise and the hull took up its proper running trim.
Carley rafts, and increased capacity C.S.A. container on
Thence upwards through its speed range, steering was
nearest boat. S.O. is embarked, and undisturbed water
positive, the plume of the power thrust dropped away, suggests use of V-8 auxiliaries, i.e. boat is an early
and the boat moved easily. pattern prior to main engine silencing (/WM)
The performance of the three engines was indicated
not only in the engine room by supercharger gauges and the leader ' s speed was less easily observed , and, though
revolution counters but by their repeaters on the bridge it was customary on passage to signal such an alteration
for the Commanding Officer; and by a third set of rev. beforehand (' I' flashed for increase , ` R' for reduce)
counters in the chart house for the information of the when on patrol or in contact , boats automatically
navigator. Each reading of revolutions had a theoretical followed any manoeuvre or speed change.
correspondence with its boost gauge; if the boost was Line-ahead formation also suffered the drawback of
low, the performance was good; if high, it could an accumulated slip-stream thrust from the leading
presage some incipient defect. boats which required the third or fourth boat in line
To obtain proper performance, each engine had to to run at unduly high engine revolutions to maintain
deliver its full power. The loss of one engine cut the speed of the unit. To obviate this, station could
performance by a third; and two, to a quarter. Wing either be opened to allow the thrust to dissipate between
engines only were used to manoeuvre, the centre boats or a quarter - line or arrow - head formation could
engine being cut-in later, but all engines were warmed be adopted . This was an easier formation for following
through and checked before leaving harbour for boats to sustain, as it allowed a better perspective view
patrol. In emergency, it was possible to `trail in' (or of those ahead , and was used commonly by boats on
start) a third engine by use of two, or to relieve the passage.
starter-motor load of a second engine by steaming ahead In any disposition, the sea conditions governed the
on a single engine. (Engine room staff usually wore labour of keeping station. Head seas of any kind caused
ear-plugs for they shared a compartment some pounding , and, above winds of Force 5-6 the use of
Y x 15'x 20' with nearly 4000 horsepower.) high speed could cause hull damage and mechanical
defects. Reduction in speed lowered to some extent the
Sea-going Characteristics velocity, but not the volume of water which swept into,
Good station-keeping was an essential requirement of all and over , the bridge. Keeping close watch and station
units at sea, to retain both touch and flexibility of in such conditions, particularly in winter , was a severe
movement. In fine weather on patrol, distance was trial. Life below decks, if somewhat drier , was violent
some 70 yards from stem to stem. In daylight after
exercises or `off-duty', boats sometimes closed up to Middle-period Vosper (armoured bridge) on cradle at
an exuberant 5 6'. In rough conditions, station had Felixstowe (IWM)
to be opened. High atmospheric humidity caused the
water-cooled exhausts to emit not only their normal
unique flavour of 100-octane but also dense clouds of
vapour which the Vosper discharged on each broadside
to a distance of some 10-15 feet. In the dark this arti-
ficial fog commonly tended to obscure the shape of the
wash, which was the most prominent feature used by
those astern by which to keep station. The hull itself
merged with night sky, but shaded sternlights were
used when only absolutely necessary.
-A patrol adopted the cruising formation decided by
the Senior Officer, whose boat invariably led the unit.
Boats in line ahead enjoyed directional flexibility, for
a change of the leader's course was instantly evident
and could be followed in succession by those astern,
without altering the formation. But a major change of

155
Section through officer's wardroom and crew quarters, looking forward

and noisy, as well it might be under the impact of Force 4, precision in such small craft could not be
water hitting the bottom at some 50-70 lb. per square achieved, however low the speed.
inch. In very quiet weather it was sometimes possible for
Beam seas were less troublesome. Big quartering seas a following boat in quarter-line to run for hours without
made for wildness on the helm, particularly if boats touching the throttles. The method was to put the boats
came off the plane and dug a chine into the back of a inside quarter on the outside of the leader's pressure
wave, when they would career off against full helm, to wave. Any tendency to gain station was checked by
recover course with equal violence. Following seas loss of its lift to the stern; any tendency to drop back
needed care to prevent a surf-ride into the next ahead. was cured by a corresponding gain. A good coxswain
But torpedo firing required, above all, steadiness on the knew this fact, and used it. Such calm conditions, at
helm and, in sea conditions caused by winds above dusk and dawn, provided scenes of extreme beauty,
with a taut group of boats carving effortlessly across a
MTB 80 at HMS Bee, Weymouth (one of the first group
satin sea.
of Packard-engined boats). Moving up into quarterline at
40 knots, the boat is just coming down outside the leaders
pressure-wave. R.D.F. 291 trained abeam. 1FF aerial
attached to foreside of mast. Single Vickers K on stanchion
type mounting abreast wheelhouse (/WM) Formations and Tactics
Simplicity was the keynote of all formations adopted
when in contact with an enemy force, whether or not
action had been joined. The formations resulted from
turns made by a line of boats either simultaneously, or
in succession, depending on circumstances but most of
all upon a high degree of mutual understanding
between the Senior Officer and his Commanding
Officers. As time went by, this developed to a marked
degree, and the results were codified into flotilla stand-
ing orders. By 1943/44 such orders comprised an
extremely sophisticated document.

158
I

SECTION THROUGH ENGINE ROOM

SECTION THROUGH FORECASTLE
LOOKING AFT

Section through engine room looking aft Section through forecastle looking forward

Signals and Identification also be set by feel in total darkness by counting the
`clicks' made by the passage of the speed sight along the
Signals between a patrol at sea and its area C-in-C were
enemy course bar.
exchanged by W/T but, since the source of transmission
But a hit depended also on the target maintaining the
could be located by enemy direction-finding equip-
correctly judged course and speed , for, if either was
ment, outgoing traffic from the boats was confined to
altered, it would distort the triangle of velocities and
essentials such as enemy reports and action details.
the torpedo would miss. Herein lav the whole thinking
Signals between boats in company were made in
behind the .I1TB concept-the very small attackers whose
daylight by Aldis, by shaded lamp at night and latterly
presence might pars unnoticed, if not altogether, until it was
by R/T. Simplicity was the keynote of the codes.
too late for enemy evasive action to be effective . The ideal
Recognition between friendly forces depended on
attack , therefore was undetectedfrom start to finish.
two systems: a flashed challenge-and-reply, and on a
The fate of the whole operation depended on these
system of vertical coloured lights hoisted on the
few minutes prior to an MTB torpedo attack ; whether
yardarm, both of which altered character at fixed
made at the end of prolonged shadowing movements
intervals to preserve security. All signal codes were
with their risk of premature discovery , or whether in a
contained in weighted books to ensure that they sank
snap ' attack made in the face of opposition to prevent
when jettisoned.
the escape of a target.
Despite these varied resources, wherever possible,
The best position from which to fire was 60 °- 70° on
boats stopped in close proximity, almost alongside, to
the bow of the target. The desirable range was clearly
settle domestic matters by using the one wholly
as close as possible, consistent with the torpedo out-
infallible resource aboard the human voice and a
running its safety range and with the target and torpedo
megaphone. Such a device had a two-way use, for the
meeting at right angles; but scarcely ever was it pos-
noise of the side exhausts of the Vosper boats made
sible to remain unobserved at such very close proximity,
conversation difficult; the megaphone could then be
say 200 yards . so hits were sought usually at two or
held to the ear and so become a directional amplifier,
three times this range . Special circumstances could
and, on a quiet night, was also of service to detect the
sound of distant engines, perhaps the first sign of the Boats alongside at Ferry Dock , Dover. Stoker in fore-
enemy. ground is sounding fuel tanks . Note early type unarmoured
bridge ( probably an Isotta-engined boat ) protected by
splinter mats, and DICs attached to empty oil - drums to
Torpedo Attack: delay rate ofsinking (1WM1
The Mathematical Problem
Compared with the shell fired from a gun, the torpedo
is abysmally slow-some 40 knots only. Against this,
if it hits, the impact is decisive, and possibly final.
To achieve a hit, (i) the target's course and speed
had to be estimated correctly, and set on the torpedo
sight; (ii), the boat's firing course had to be held pre-
cisely in accordance with the sight, and (iii), the torpedo
had to run precisely in accordance with its settings for
direction, at a depth appropriate for the target.
The torpedo sight mounted on the bridge just in
front of the C.O. was a device of arresting simplicity.
It represented in a mechanical diagram the triangle of
velocities and directions: the known torpedo speed and
the estimated course and speed of the enemy; it could

159
 an attack, and only occasionally to the tactical
requirements of gaining bearing on a distant fast-
moving target.

Patrol Conditions
Clear, calm nights of full moonlight made an unobser-
ved approach difficult. In such conditions the boats
were often visible up-moon beyond torpedo-range-
unusual phosphorescence was also a hazard. And when
wind was a factor, it produced two effects. Enemy
lookouts were less effective facing the wind, but they
could hear more easily any sounds of engines it carried
produce hits at 1000-1500 yards, as will be observed to them. To leeward, the factors were reversed. The
in the action report which terminates this Profile. ideal night had little or no moon, a light breeze, and a
just-visible horizon.
Size of Patrols At all times when approaching a patrol position, or
In early years, the number of units on patrol was when on patrol, speed was kept to a minimum. High
dictated by the number of available boats, and these speed meant conspicuous wash, and sacrifice of the
were often only two or three; but if these small forces ability to hear. Often patrols stopped at their patrol
could be in the right place at the right time, their position (usually sited off a harbour, or on an enemy
weakness was more apparent than real. Easily control- swept channel), moving only at intervals to compensate
led, inconspicuous and flexible, their torpedoes were for the drift of wind and tide. When stopped, the boats
no less effective. Later, with more boats available, the lay beam to wind and sea, drifting to leeward at about
10°a of the wind speed.
early addiction to small patrols persisted, the extra
boats separating into neighbouring areas whence they
could stage movements in mutual support to provide Detection of the Enemy
diversionary or seconclary attacks. A simple hydrophone, lowered over the boat's side on a
rod, was fitted in 1942 to detect distant propeller noise.
The hydrophone was effective up to two-three miles,
Contact with Enemy but only in relatively smooth sea conditions.
Before it was possible to detect a distant enemy by radar, Radar, with dipoles rotated by hand from below
the chief operational constraint to contact was the very decks, came in 1942-43, but its usefulness was some-
limited sea area visible to a lookout in a small boat on times offset by the enemy's introduction of search-
a really dark night. It was hide and seek on a titanic receivers which registered the bearing of radar trans-
scale, over hundreds of miles of sea in which opposing mission, causing a patrol to be located much earlier
forces could approach within a few hundred yards than they would have been if preserving radar silence.
before sighting each other. The first visible warning
might be the bow waves announcing, with only a few
seconds notice, the arrival of a bellicose but worthwhile Action Conditions
target. To attack immediately risked at best a miss due The sudden translation of a pitch-dark night into a
to inadequate data; yet to try to slide away unseen in blinding firework display was characteristic of MT B
order to gain bearing for a planned attack risked the action. The number of resulting hits might bear little
loss of opportunity. relation to the awe-inspiring display of enemy fire-
Targets ranged from fast destroyers and minesweepers, power but, in turn, a single hit could, in such a small
through merchant ships of all sizes, to escort vessels: and fragile craft, do damage out of all proportion to
and down to specially armed anti-MTB patrols sent the calibre of shell.
out to destroy the MTBs before they could use their A boat disabled was at once the focus of enemy fire
main weapori. and the urgent object of succour, provided usually by a
It was a popular illusion that the high speed of MTBs curtain of smoke laid by other boats of the unit behind
was connected with their methods of attack. In fact it which there was, if little else, a welcome sense of obs-
was confined almost completely to disengagement after curity.

U.S.-built lease-lend Vosper in Mediterranean 1943-44.

Early Vosper, preparing for practice shoot ( all guns Oerlikons fore and aft, tall and short RIF whip aerials P/S
trained on Green 45). The heavy bow-wave formation at bridge, identification lights hoisted, modified type C.S.A.
12-15 knots is well sho wn (l WM ) container, lifelines rigged aft (IWM)

160
U.S.-built lease-lend Vosper in Mediterranean 1943-44. Loading torpedoes at Felixstowe Dock. Note tackle on
Single Oerlikon, towing pendant fitted to starboard deck ready to launch torpedo into tube. Tow-rope stowed
chine (IWM) roundE/R ventilators (IWM)

The Tactical Battle depth-charges dropped immediately under the enemy

In 1942, an increasing scale cf MTB damage without bow. This was a period of experiment and innovation,
commensurate success brought about the development nourished by experience, which brought forth a high
of varied diversionary tactics, including the co-opera- level of practical co-operation. It led also to added
tion of aircraft, and occasionally destroyers, but most armaments to each class of boat to give it a dual role,
often in conjunction with the recently-created forces gun and torpedo.
of Motor Gun Boats (MGBs).
These units might attack the escort on one quarter Damage Control
of the convoy, to distract attention from the approach The control of damage consisted of first-aid to the
of MTBs from another direction. wounded, and extempore repairs to the ship. The
Occasionally, at this period, the MGB would find Vosper hull was divided into six watertight compart-
itself with a torpedo target and attempt an attack with ments, but the unarmoured boat bore a huge quantity

MTB and MGB flotillas in Felixstowe Dock. Packard-Vosper 70 ft in first trot, Packard and lsotta-Frascini in second trot,
early B. P. B. 71 ft 61n. MG Bs in third and B. P. B. 70 ft MG Bs in fourth (/WM)

161
 could be operated from the bridge to sink the boat and
prevent her falling into enemy hands.
A Carley raft was carried on the foredeck, and all
members of crews wore inflatable life-belts when at sea
on patrol. Each had also a small water-tight red light
attached to his lifebelt to assist location in the dark.
(When reminded, they also wore their 'tin-hats' when
action w'as imminent.)
Small scaled packets contained such aids to survival
and escape as money, a small compass, tablet food,
benzedrine tablets, maps, etc, for use in the event of
getting ashore undetected.

Part///: CAMEO OF MTB TACT/CS

Enemy Tactics
In the Channel, the enemy was scarcely more prepared
than the British for the tactical situation created in
1940. He had, however, a most effective and well-
developed counterpart of the MTB in the fast diesel-
A deck scene at 30 knots. Oilskin overalls were standard engined E-boat. More relevant to this study, due to
wear for all deck personnel, with added quilted lining for the nature of his own coastline and his special sea
winter work. 0-5-inch cartwheel sight is well shown strategy, he had numbers of excellent small escort
(Author's Collection) vessels, and a variety of destroyers and fast mine-
sweepers which could be concentrated to defend the
of complex machinery, hydraulic and electrical circuits,
relatively small amount of shipping he wished to escort.
armaments required for full efficiency and, moreover, (This contrasts sharply with the British scarcity of
her crew was largely unprotected.
escorts for far too many ships.) Compared with the
Most vulnerable of all were the tanks of 100-octane
world-wide role demanded of any British warship, the
fuel. These were coated with a self-sealing compound
enemy was able to specialise his naval architecture
capable of expanding to fill a modest size of puncture. with excellent effect.
Should fire break out, there were methyl-bromide
extinguishers operated by remote control for both tank
space and engine room, but their use in the engine
Exercise of Sea-power
room was a decision of some gravity, for the gas
Normally neither side was able to operate offensively
obsorbed all oxygen, and meanwhile, however incon-
with any wars} p in daylight, due to the devastating
venient it might be, all staff had to evacuate the engine-
effect of air-pos -r.
room and the boat was wholly immobilised.
The British could continue to wage war if a sufficient
There was little to obstruct any hits, which often
merchant tonnage reached the country from overseas,
went unhindered right through the boat, but more
but they could not win it by offensive operations until
severe hull damage was repaired by quick thinking and
they had sufficient force of all arms, and control of the
extempore methods, the sole aim being to keep her
waters and air-space which this invasion force must
afloat and get her home by any possible means.
traverse.
Towing between boats was catered for by perman-
The British purpose, therefore, was to exercise the
ently rigged, strong wire pendants, fore and aft, which
maximum offensive sea-and air-power against the
were stopped into position, ready for instant use.
hostile force occupying the European coast, leading to
If all efforts at salvage failed, demolition charges
total control of the Channel before any invasion could
Gunner climbing into 0 5-inch turret. Winter time, boat hope to succeed. It is against this simple fact that the
doing 30 knots (Author's Collection) five-year sea battle must be judged.

Enemy Defensive Measures

The first purpose of the enemy was to pass shipping
along his greatly-extended coast so, faced with an
increasing scale of MTB interference, his natural
reaction was to increase massively the scale of his escort
forces, both in numbers and fire power. However, the
result was not so uneven as might appear, for a numer-
ous flotilla of escorts surrounding one or two merchant
ships carried with it the seeds of its own destruction.
Such a force might be impossible to attack straight-
forwardly. but it was easily confused as to which was.
and which was not, an'_ IT13.
Not infrequently the result was that, by luck,
judgment. or both, even an inconclusive encounter

162
with attacking M'IBs could develop into a brisk battle
between the neighbouring screens of the escort:
enlivcned, if in range, by coastal batteries which cer-
tainly- could not distinguish friend from foe. To an
MTB patrol, such fruits, if they could not be precisely
counted, tasted no less sweet.
Most intractable of all were the anti-MTB patrols.
Scarcely of a type to justify torpedo attack, they were
nevertheless of a size to carry an arsenal of automatic
and other weapons. Happily, their arrival coincided
with the full stature of the MGB, to whom they presen-
ted a suitable, if often ardent, opponent.
Various formations of enemy escort were adopted to
provide early warning of torpedo attack, and these
could be countered only by experiencing their nature
and devising counter measures. To reconstruct an
accurate picture of an involved action was never easy:
the MTBs of two units, and the MGBs of two more
might weave and turn, stop and start, glimpse and
lose each other, or the enemy, among patches of smoke
or shell bursts. Yet, if no clear narrative and pattern
could be assembled from varying accounts, there could
be no useful lesson for the future.
Tactically, the enemy torpedo targets developed one
move which was most difficult to detect. It was simple.
At the moment torpedoes were seen to be fired, the
enemy stopped : all vessels appeared to be continuing in
formation with the same course and speed, yet all
torpedoes missed ahead-it was a puzzling result.

Surface Control of MTBs

To overcome the drawbacks of MTB radar, it was Toroedoman bringing port tube to the 'Ready'. Speed
desirable to provide entire independent radar coverage 30 knots (IWM)
for the battle area. Such coverage from the shore had
existed prior to 1944 in the Dover area, latterly in the Exercises off Weymouth. D/C released from MGB
Channel, and was finally provided also by aircraft; exploding at shoal setting (P. J. Liddell)
but with the D-day landings in prospect, some effective
surface system of MTB control was needed to guard
remote beaches from seaborne attack.
This requirement was met by the excellent radar
performance of the British-manned DE-type American
ASS frigates, a number of these vessels being disposed
to seaward, at intervals of some six miles along a con-
tinuous patrol line, and whose radar coverage entirely
sealed offthe area.
Each frigate had attached to her two or more groups
of radar-silent MTBs or MGBs (by then the armament
made them more or less interchangeable), under the
R/'I' orders of a Control Officer who worked from the
plot-room of the frigate. From this vantage point, any
approaching enemy force was visible on the radar
screen, and suitable forces could be detached to
intercept, fully briefed with enemy course, speed, and
numbers, and also with the inestimable advantage of
surprise.
The existence of such an independent authority
within the hierarchy of a warship was novel, for most
Control Officers were ex-MTBs. often reservists and
necessarily junior to the C.O.s from whose ships they
issued orders. Moreover, occasions arose not infre-
quently when the control ship took action at the
urgent behest of the Control Officer. In practice this
ill-defined framework of authority worked flawlessly,
much to the credit of the senior C.O.s of the controlling
ships, who were nothing loth to join action if opportunity
occurred, some of them being themselves ex-'slfBs.

163
Early 1943, recovery of torpedo after practice firing. Portland. Smoke is from tell-tale Holmes light in dummy head.
Pendant number (between 201-212) obscured for security reasons (P. J. Liddell)

Mine-laying by short MTBs predictable within fine limits. If present, the customary
A fact often overlooked is that the Vesper design from minesweeping force ahead of the convoy would be
its inception provided for the replacement of the two allowed to pass, and in the very brief interval before the
torpedoes by four ground mines, and the total laid in leading escorts of the convoy arrived, the minelaying
the course of the war ran into hundreds. Often a mine- unit, steaming close alongside each other to hear
laying unit included one boat armed with torpedoes shouted directions, would release in succession their
to cope with a suitable target should one appear. line of mines across the line of the approaching convoy.
Mine-laying was of two types, `speculative' and This process, calling for no less skill than the use of
tactical, both of which (like all mine-laying) required torpedoes, required a flawless technique and co-
precise navigation to ensure that the mines were sited ordination between boats to create undetected the
exactly in the chosen position where an enemy vessel geometrically regular pattern of mines on the sea-bed.
was judged most likely to pass. Moreover the type of As in torpedo tactics, the ideal was one of total incon-
mine was selected to minimise the chances of its being spicuousness; the shadow in the dark corner, the
swept. Such types had magnetic or acoustic pistols, stiletto behind the arras.
and sank to the sea-bed. A mine-laying sortie which found itself involved with
A lay detected was almost certainly a lay wasted, enemy surface forces had to decide quickly whether
which ruled out the most obvious places such as the to jettison the mines and disengage, or whether to
very entrance to a harbour, however desirable it was. withdraw in the hope of making a fresh approach when
Hence the `speculative' lay on the open coast in the the lay position was clear.
centre of a known swept channel, in the hope of the Tactical Skill
mines becoming live in the interval between the passage
As well as tactical competence there were certain per-
of enemy mine-sweepers.
sonal qualities which became identified with the
The tactical lay was aimed at a particular enemy con-
successful handling of MTBs. Most important of these
voy known to be on passage, and whose route was also
was a capacity to interpret swiftly the data obtained on
the enemy, whether by visual sighting or other means,
Passing tow-rope after recovering torpedo. Care was and thus to form quickly a complete and correct
needed to prevent torpedo getting beneath chine, picture, the bird's-eye view on which to develop, delay
particularly in anysea at night, andholing the hull
or reject an attack. For example, small escorts such as
(P. J. Liddell)
R-boats sighted at 500 yards could be indistinguishable
from major warships at five times the distance, yet the
two different identifications created entirely different
situations. It was a problem similar to that facing the
Commanding Officer of a submarine, whose data was
also restricted, but needed equally urgent and correct
interpretation to make possible a successful attack.
Close to this talent, and a necessary adjunct, was the
freedom enjoyed by the Senior Officer of a unit to
develop and pursue his plan without necessarily issuing
detailed orders to the following boats. These had often
to be left to respond correctly on their own initiative to
a wide variety of situations. But such co-operation
could only be developed through contact with the

164
enemy, and here there was no chance to rectify
mistakes. No number of exercises and sessions on
attack-teachers could represent the situations met at
sea; and unlike, for example, the escorting of Atlantic
convoys, there was no disengaged part of the friendly
force to observe, deduce and later report on events
which they could watch freely. The isolated operations
took place on a distant coast, between dusk and dawn,
unwitnessed except by the participants.
To allow a force to reform after the normal disen-
gaging movements, a standard rendezvous position
(usually 3-4 miles seawards from the action position)
was included in the flotillastanding orders.

Cloak and Dagger

A further MTB duty was the delivery and collection of
commandos and secret agents on the enemy-occupied
coast. It was a secretive business carried out at night Torpedo staff. HMS Hornet Gosport 1944. Torpedo
by single MTBs using dinghy and raft, in which the withdrawn partially from tube for maintenance routines.
strained anxiety of those who waited long hours offshore, Note R.F.P.s on boat astern (P. J. Liddell)
often at anchor, contrasted oddly with the high spirits
of their passengers. When the stakes were so high,
ran off course) at an enemy force which invariably
nobody asked questions, and even now, 30 years
sank in a series of spectacular explosions.
afterwards, there are remarkably few answers.
In fact, the lessons were bought slowly at a high
price. Even when learned, they could not guarantee
MTB Training success; only diminish mistakes.
Inevitably, at intervals, skilled and experienced
At first there was no traditional well of experience and
units under excellent operational directions, could find
expertise on which to draw. MTB personnel learned
themselves in trouble. Even the most promising
war solely by fighting it. But in time individual theory
situation could be reversed with devastating sudden-
and practice were standardised, and training bases
ness.
established. To HMS Bee, the training base at Wey-
A single shell in the bridge of the leading boat could
mouth (later moved to Holyhead), were sailed all
send it veering out of control to cross the firing line of
newly-commissioned MTBs and MGBs to rehearse in
its consorts. At times there seemed no limit to the
every detail their future role; and into a comprehensive
disasters which piled upon one another, with successive
syllabus was fed a continuous stream of data from the
boats crippled, knocked out or set on fire. In these
operational flotillas, directed by officers of accom-
conditions it required much concentration to exclude
plishment and sea experience.
the surrounding distractions and continue the attempt
to fire torpedoes; and perhaps even more resolution to
A SUMMARY withdraw prior to making a fresh attempt, knowing
In Home Waters MTBs and MGBs of all types fought that the enemy was alert and shooting well.
464 actions; in other areas, 316. The 464 resulted in the Yet, time and again, an 1\lI'B which nad been
sinking of 269 enemy ships, for the loss of 76 of our own, severely damaged or immobilised in the track of a
and in summarising this, as in any other campaign, passing convoy was found by its consorts and given
it is tempting to dwell on the skill of the victor rather succour, often, while still under fire. It was at such
than the vanquished. times that the Senior Officer, who carried total
But MTBs had no monopoly of skill, and the enemy responsibility. suffered his greatest anxieties, adding.
was rarely caught off guard. Yet no branch of any maybe, to the failure of his attack the virtual certainty
service can succeed without an experienced staff to of damage and casualties in his unit.
plan and analyse its operations, and at first there Even so, a number of boats which could well have
existed no such staff. In the absence of any deeper sunk were nursed successfully home, perhaps under
understanding, the early boats were expected to exhibit tow, but sometimes solo, with a crippled engine-room
the same clockwork precision as all other warships, and and bailing parties hard at work. If such events were
when it proved difficult to reassemble the disordered
jig-saw of their chance encounters with the enemy, the
Four-tube 73 ft Vospers on passage to Dutch coast
inference too often drawn was one of costly and un- Christmas Eve 7944. Note the raised chine and easy flow
reliable incompetence. Of no other warship in history, of the bow-wave in these laterpattern boats
manned often by virtual amateurs and launched (P. J. Liddell)
hurriedly into complicated and often violent night
actions, was so little known, and perhaps so much
expected.
Such interest as they attracted inside the Navy and
among the public was of an uninformed type, evoking a
picture on the one hand of operational haphazardness,
and on the other, of a shell-torn midget manned by
heroes hurling its torpedoes (which never misfired or

165
Four-tube 73 ft Vospers on passage to Dutch coast Four-tube 73 ft Vospers on passage to Dutch coast
Christmas Eve 1944. Note the raised chine and easy flow Christmas Eve 1944.
of the bow-wave in these later pa ttern boats
not habitual, they seemed inevitable sooner or later, 3. In the first engagement .. .
and posed the question of how long the luck could hold 4. In the second engagement it is considered that the
(and for many, happily, it never broke) but, if not, Senior Officer of Unit No. 3, Lieutenant M. Arnold-Forster,
n.S.c., R.N.V.R., showed good judgment in choosing his
whose turn came next?
position for attack. The unobserved attack which resulted in
Naturally, there was no shortage of narrow escapes.
the destruction of an enemy ship was a well deserved success.
Naturally, too, in such conditions of stress, perhaps
5. The causes of the premature explosion of MTB 209's
the events lived on more for their comedy than for torpedo . . . are being fully investigated and will be the
their drama. The report of the crippled MTB which, subject of disciplinary action.
before making her escape, circled tightly at some CHARLES LITTLE,
200 yards range within the turning circle of an enemy ADMIRAL.
destroyer, whose outward heel alone prevented her guns
The Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth
depressing sufficiently to hit this had a rueful
Reports of the Senior Officers, 14th and 13th MTB
humour which could be savoured best, and perhaps
Flotillas of the action on the night of 23rd/24th May 1944,
only, by those who felt they had earned the right to are submitted in accordance with C.A.F.O. 1734/43 and
laugh. Gin-C. Portsmouth No. 0/9683/21.
At the end of every operation the Senior Officer 2. I consider that it was a well executed torpedo attack,
wrote his report. Often it was a bare record of an with MTB 208 scoring a hit on one of the enemy's ships.
uneventful night at sea, sometimes rough. sometimes 3. With reference to paragraph 5(f) of the Senior Officer,
smooth, leavened only by navigational data and 13th MTB Flotilla's report, the heavy explosion ahead of
observations of the enemy coast. Sometimes it was a MTB 209 was probably caused by one of her torpedoes
hitting the bottom. A report by the Torpedo Officer of this
complicated lengthy document reporting an action.
base is attached ...
which included track charts, narrative, signal log,
M. MURRAY,
action damage, recommendations, items of interest, H.M.S. Hornet CAPTAIN.
casualties and torpedo firing records. 1st June 1944.
The following is an example of one of many hundreds
of similar documents containing its meed of success, and HM MTB 212-25th May 1944
disappointment, but notable for its thoughtful lucidity. Sir,-I have the honour to submit the following report of the
proceedings of Unit M.3 (MTB 209 Sub-Lieutenant
Technical interest focuses on the very long range at
J. Ferguson, R.A.N.V.R., with Senior Officer embarked, and
which torpedoes were fired to hit, due primarily to the
MTB 208 Lieutenant P. J. Liddell, R.N.V.R.) under my
speed of the target being plotted by shore radar, and command on the night of 23rd/24th May 1944. This report
passed to the unit on patrol as it watched the approach- covers the period from 0138 onwards when Units M.2 and
ing force being attacked from the air. This distracting M.3 parted company.
factor also had its effect. Duty: Torpedo Attack.
Forces: Unit M.3, MTBs 209 (S.O.) and 208.
WARSHIP SERIES EDITOR:
Orders: Covering Force for Operation KN8.
JOHN WINGATE, DSC Weather: Wind 0, Sea 00. Fine and clear.
Appendix Narrative: Unit M.3 parted company from Unit M.2 in
MTB Action of Night of 23/24 May 1944 E.P. 128° TT 14.1 at 0138. Course was set for position
FROM The Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. 142° TT 18.8 at 10 knots. Unit stopped at 0159 and
DATE 21siJune 1944. confirmed E.P. by bearings of C. de la Heve, Ouistreham
TO The Secretary of the Admiralty. and Pt. de Ver. At 0200 a number of starshell burst to the
[Copies to ... etc.] Eastward. It seemed likely that M.2s presence was suspected.
Be pleased to lay before their Lordships the attached and it was decided not to proceed further inshore for the
reports of actions by units of Coastal Forces on the night of time being.
23rd/24th May in amplification of Portsmouth 242006B/ C.-in-C. Portsmouth's 0210 showed that Plot 2 would pass
May. close S. of the Unit's position at about 0315. The prospects
2. Two distinct operations took place: the first an inter- of an attack from inshore in this area did not seem good.
ception by Unit F of a group of E-boats 30 miles N.E. of Air attacks were taking place over the land as well as on
Point de Barfleur, the second an attack on 8 enemy warships, Plot 2, and the flares and H.A. fire which resulted lit up the
consisting of 5 torpedo boats and 3 M-class minesweepers whole area between the Unit and the coast on several
eastbound across the Baie de la Seine, by 4 MTBs divided occasions between 0200 and 0300. It was therefore decided
into two units of two (M2 and M31. to attack from seaward, and a signal to this effect was made

166
at 0321 for the benefit of Unit M.2. This was addressed to
Portsmouth WIT to avoid the use of TI.2's call sign.
At 0255 course was srt for position 146: TT 14.9, i.e.
one mile to seaward of the target's expected 0310 position.
This was as far West as it was considered safe to go without
entering the area in which air attacks were taking place.
At about 0300 aircraft echoes were picked up to starboard
by MTB 209, which soon faded at ranges between 8 and 10
miles. Several surface echoes were picked up from 0310
onwards on the anticipated bearing of the enemy, seven of
which entered the ground wave at 0317. These were con-
sidered to be small craft-probably leading escort. The craft
themselves were not sighted and it is now thought that these
echoes may well have been spurious. However, the Unit Two-tube 73 ft Vospers, armed with power-operated
stopped at 0308 to allow them to pass. In the meanwhile a 6-pdrs, in quarterline off Culver, 1945 (P. J. Liddell)
group of three echoes was picked up at a range of 4200' by
MTB 208 and 6000x by MTB 209, which were considerably MTB 209 fired torpedoes. t'his was undoubtedly due to his
larger. Both boats reported that only two of these echoes recent experience of air attack, and it was some seconds
could be picked up after the attack. Mean plotted course of before he realised his error.
these echoes was between 080° and 100° but target's speed MTB 209 altered course to starboard to N. mag. after
was difficult to assess. Range of the group had closed to firing, while MTB 208 made smoke to cover the retirement
2000' at 0321 and 1400x at 0335. and took station on MTB 209 in ORDER 1, both boats
Although the enemy's late arrival in the Unit's vicinity increasing speed to 32 knots. The smoke screen provided
indicated a mean speed of less than 15 knots, it was con- good cover for both boats and an excellent target for the
sidered that this speed (given in C.-in-C. Portsmouth's 0210) enemy who eventually concentrated a considerable volume
probably still held good, the delay being accounted for by of fire upon it, using 37nun and above. He also appeared to
the air attacks which had been seen. Both boats were be using some form ofmortar or other weapon with a low m.v.
therefore ordered to set enemy speed to 15 knots. The projectiles showed white traces and appeared to burst
At 0319 MTB 208 reported enemy in sight, bearing S.5°E. with a white flash on hitting the water. A certain amount of
at mean radar range of 3400x. Neither the Commanding A.P. shells or rockets burst above the unit during the with-
Officer of MTB 209 nor I had by then sighted the enemy. drawal, but the enemy soon transferred his whole attention
The visibility was too good to allow of any delay in carrying to the smoke screen, and neither boat was hit. Starshell
out the attack, and I instructed the Commanding Officer, continued to burst until daylight.
MTB 208, to lead in at once. At 0320 MTB 208 proceeded Unit proceeded to the R/V position which was reached at
to close the enemy on a mean course of S.15°E. While 0403. R/T contact was made with V.13 in Unit M.2 who re-
MTB 209 kept station on her in open order. Almost immed- ported that hewas not in need ofassistance and gave permission
iately the enemy vessels were sighted by the commanding for M.3 to proceed. Course was set for E.A.3 buoy which was
officer of MTB 209 and myself and were seen to consist of one reached at 0627. Unit entered harbour at 0726.
vessel, probably a large R-boat, followed at some distance by It is submitted that the Commanding Officer, MTB 208,
two larger vessels very close together. The latter were low in carried out his attack deliberately and well. His decision to
the water and appear to be at least 200 ft long. Other small attack from 1400, while still unobserved was in my opinion
craft were later sighted on the port quarter of the main the correct one in view of the excellent visibility, and the
group. accurate information available as to the enemy's course and
At 0325 MTB 208 fired both torpedoes at the combined speed.
silhouette of the two larger vessels from a radar range of The attack carried out by the Commanding Officer, MTB
14001. Ship's head S.11°E. Mag., Track Angle set 112°, 209, was equally deliberate and in my opinion would have
enemy speed 15 knots. MTB 208 then turned short round stood an equal chance of success had the explosion referred to
180° to starboard and stopped to observe results. At 0327 a in para. (f) above had not taken place. The same enemy
heavy explosion was seen, felt and heard on the second ship speed settings were used by both boats and it is a source of
in the enemy line by both boats. This was accompanied by some disappointment that further results were not obtained
flame and a large cloud of black smoke which remained
The crew of MTB 208 (a sister ship to 246 illustrated)
visible for a considerable period. This vessel was not seen
on paying-off The insignia on the ensign refer to services
again. At 03272' MTB 209 fired both. torpedoes at the third
in the Channel between October 1943 and September
ship in the enemy line from a radar range of 1400,. Ship's
1944. All but the Coxswain were civilians in peace time.
head S.10°E. Mag., Track Angle set 90°, enemy speed
MTB 208 features in the attached action report
15 knots. At 0328 a very heavy underwater explosion took (P. J. Liddell)
place close ahead of MTB 209 which caused considerable
damage below decks to electrics and pipelines and also to
gun mountings, although main engines were not immed-
iately affected. It is difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to
the cause of this explosion, but it is considered probable
that it was caused by MTB 209's torpedoes colliding or
hitting the bottom. (paragraph f
But in any case it is considered that the running of MTB
209's torpedoes must have been affected to a serious degree
and had this explosion not taken place I consider that MTB
209's torpedoes stood every chance of hitting, as they were
fired with virtually the same sight settings as those of MTB
208 and weather conditions were good enough to rule out
any possibility oflarge sighting error. Owing to the explosion;
and to the fact that the enemy had already opened fire,
results could not he observed.
Enemy commenced firing into the air shortly before

167
 auxiliary ignition circuits), the full extent of which has not
yet been ascertained. Port Vickers guns were blown ofl
mounting.
Lights, etc. observed: C. do la Herr. Ouistreham. Pt. de Ver.
Grandchamps. All showed normal characteristics. Two
unidentified lights were sighted near the entrance to the
port of Le Havre.
Items of interest: DITB 208's attack was unobserved, and the
enemy were still under the impression that they were being
bombed when 209 fired. After M.3 had withdrawn, the
MTB 102-the 68 ft experimental lsotta-engined Vosper
enemy kept up a very gratifying exchange of fire between
MTB which in 1937 reached 40 knots loaded, and 48
themselves for a considerable period.
knots light (P. J. Liddell)
Recommendations and conclusions: MTB attacks carried out
immediately after air attacks are bound to cause con-
siderable confusion. It is suggested that a similar operation
for this reason. Both radar operators carried out their duties carried out in the reverse sequence would also stand a
efficiently and provided accurate information throughout. good chance of success.
Casualties: Nil. List of signals: Appendices I, 11, III, IV, V, VI, VII.
Damage: MTB 208: Nil. MTB 209: Turret pipe lines and M. ARNOLD-FORSTER,
oil pipes in engine room fractured by underwater explosion. LIEUTENANT R.N.V.R.
Considerable damage to electric circuits (including both Senior Officer. 13th MTB Flotilla.

DETAILS AND PENDANT NUMBERS OF VOSPER - BUILT 70ft MTBs ( A total of some 200 were built)
Date Numbers Crew Length ft Engines Torpedoes Guns etc Other
1939 29 and 30 9 70 3 lsotta Fraschini 2x 21 in. 2x Quad 0-303m. W/T
2 Vosper/Ford V8s
1939-40 31-40 10 71 3lsotta Fraschini (31-40) 2x21 in. 1 -twin 0 5in. W/T, radar
218-221 3 Hall Scott. 2 Vosper/Ford V8 orA/S
(remainder)
1939-42 57-66 10 70 3 Packard 2- 21 in. 1 -twin 0 5in. W/T, radar
347-363 2 Vosper/ Ford V8 depth charges CAS smoke
1940 69-70 7 70 3 lsotta Fraschim (69) 2x21 in. 2x quad 0-303m. W/T
2 Isotta Fraschini (70)
2 Vosper/Ford V8
1940 Royal 5 and 7 60 2 lsotta Fraschini 2 x 18in. 1 twin 0'303in. W/T
Norwegian Navy 71 and 72 2 Vosper/Ford V8 4 depth charges
1940-41 73 3 Packard 4M 2500 1 -twin 0'5in. CSA, Radar
75-98 10 70 2 Vosper/Ford V8 2x21 in. 4 depth charges W/T
222-245

LATER DEVELOPMENT
1943 379-395 12 73 3 Packard 4x 1 8in. 1 -twin 20mm CSA, Radar
1 Vosper/FordV8 Oerlikon W/T
2xtwin 0'303in.
Vickers
2 Rocket projectors
1944 510 24 100 4 Packard 2 x 18in. 1 6 Pdr. 1 twin 20mm CSA, Radar
2twin05in. W/T
1 rocket projector
depth charges
1944 523-530 16 73 3 Packard 1 -twin 20mm CSA, Radar
532-533 1 Vosper/Ford V8 2x18in. 2xtwin0'303in. W/T
1x6Pdr.
1 rocket projector
70ft MTB WATCH & QUARTER BILL
Part of Ship Harbour Prepare for sea Boarding Station Fire Abandon Ship
Station
Coxswain Supervise work Wheel Test communications At wheel As required Carley raft
Check each man ' s duty
Telegraphist! W)Tgear Test W/T, T.C.S. Echo/sounder Fire detonators
W/T office Pendants Provide S.P.s and Recogs. Remain closed-up As required Carley raft
Wardroom flat Ditch S.P.s
Telegraphist l! Provide and test Aldis, Responsible below Assist Tel I
Cook/Galley Fo'c'sle Binoculars, 1038 lamp Pistol forward mess-deck cushions
pistols and cartridges
Seaman- F. mess deck Fenders Check T.T. and Torpedoes Provide hand grenades E/R deck Foamite Star. Life-buoy
Torpedoman and heads forward Test lights Stand by tubes Rubber dinghy
Detach shore-lighting
Trainedmanl Star. Bunk Q.D. Rig Lifelines Lanchester Carbine E/R deck Nuswift Port Life-buoy
space Rig hand steering I/Condeck Rubber dinghy
Trained man l! Bridge and Fenders Provide carbines and Close upon 0303" Bridge messenger Open W/T door
Wheelhouse aft ammunition Vickers Bridge Foamite Carley raft
Place revolvers in Wheelhouse
Gunner! Oerlikon Fo'c'sle Prepare Oerlikon magazines Lanchester Carbine Remain closed-up Provide heaving-
Port Vickers Prepare 0303" magazines lines
Gunner!! 0 5" turret Q. D. Prepare 0-303" magazines 0 5"turret Remain closed-up Wooden lockers aft
Star. Vickers Check R.F.P.s Rubber dinghy
Test 0 5" turret with E/ R
Radar-Operator W/R and W/R Test 286 Remain closed-up on W/T office Destroy set
heads Q. D. Test Q. H.2 all-round sweep Pyrene Supply mess-deck
Test Hydrophone cushions
Motor-Mechanic E/R E/R Set C.S.A. E/ R E/R gear as Detonators
Warm through main engines necessary Rubber dinghy
Stoker! E/R E/R E/R Lanchester Carbine E/R Puncturetanks
Carley raft
Stoker!! E/R E/R E/R E/R E/R Puncture tanks
Carley raft

168
 Navel pipe the hole fitting on the forecastle through which the anchor
GLOSSARY
cable runs to the hawse pipe and down to the cable locker.
AA (or HA ) Anti-aircraft (or High Angle) Pelorus a gyro compass fitted with a bearing ring and mounted on the
Abaft nearer the stern than the object referred to, e.g . abaft the
bridge.
capstan.
Pendant a long shaped flag which is narrower at the outer end;
Abeam at right angles to the fore and aft line amidships.
usually numerals , manoeuvring or special pendants to indicate the
A-Cockbill when the anchor is hung by only the anchor ring.
various stages in weighing and anchoring.
Aft towards the stern.
Port the left hand side of the ship looking forward.
Aloft up the mast or in the rigging.
Profile the shape of a ship as seen from her side.
Asdic Anti Submarine Detection Device
Astern in the rear. Quarter the after part of the ship' s side near the stern.
Athwart across or from side to side. Quarterdeck the part of the upper deck which is, at the stern.
Athwartships across the ship; at right angles to the fore and aft line. Rake the angle of a funnel or mast from the perpendicular in the tore
Aweigh the moment when the anchor is broken from the ground. and aft line.
Ballast extra weight stowed in a ship for added stability. Ratlines ropes seized horizontally on to the shrouds in order to form
Beam the breadth of the ship. a ladder.
Bilge the part of the ship inboard near the keel. Running rigging rigging which runs through blocks.
Body plan the drawing indicating the athwartship section. Scantlings the dimensions of timber used in the building of a ship.
Bollard an upper deck fitting with two heads to which wires and Scotchman a length of steel or wood used to prevent chafing.
hawsers are secured. Scupper holes in the bulwarks which allow the water to drain from
Boot - topping the line between wind and water which is usually the upper deck.
painted with anti-fouling of different colour. Scuttles circular 'windows' or port-holes in the ship's side.
Bow the parts of the ship's sides most near to the stem. Section unless otherwise defined, a section is the shape of a vessel
Bower anchor the main anchor. as if she were cut through athwartships.
Braces wire or rope rigging controlling a yard in the horizontal plane. Sheer the curve of the deck at the head and stern above the midship
Brail a wire or rope which encircles a sail or net for gathering-up portion.
purposes. Sheer plan the shape of a vessel as viewed from the side.
Bulkhead a vertical partition between decks which separates one Shrouds the wire ropes supporting a mast in the athwatrshipsdirection.
compartment from another. Standing rigging fixed rigging such as the shrouds and stays.
Bulwarks the plating around the edge of the upper deck which Stanchion a vertical metal support for guard rails , awnings, etc.
prevents men or gear being washed overboard. Starboard the right hand side of the ship looking forward.
Capstan a machine driven either electrically or by steam with which Stay the wire ropes supporting a mast in the fore-and-aft direction.
to weigh anchor or to haul in a hawser. Stem the foremost part of the ship.
Chains the platform extending on either side of the ship, generally on Stern the aftermost part of the ship.
the upper deck abreast the bridge, on which the leadsmen stand to Taffrail the rail around the stern.
heave the lead when taking a sounding. Topgallant forecastle a small deck lying above the upper deck and
Con to direct the steering of the ship. above the forecastle.
Cutter a fore -and-aft rigged boat with one mast, a mainsail and Topgallant mast a small mast fitted above the topmast.
foresails. Topmast the upper part of a mast, generally a separate spar.
DCT Director Control Tower Triatic stay a wire rope between the foremast and mainmast mast-
Deadlights the plates which fit over the scuttles to strengthen the heads.
ship's side and to prevent light from showing otuboard when the ship Trim how a ship floats in the water.
is darkened. Truck a small circular horizontal fitting on the extreme top of the mast.
Deck head the surface beneath the deck. Tumble home if the sides of a ship incline inwards near the upper deck
Derrick a spar which is fitted with tackles for lifting purposes. they are said to 'tumble home'.
Displacement the weight of a ship. Underway when a ship is neither made fast or aground, she is said to
DNC Director of Naval Construction be under way.
Draught the depth of the lowest point of the keel below the ship's Up and down the anchor cable is 'up and down' when it is vertically
water-line. taut from the anchor to the bow.
Eyes of the ship the extreme fore-ends of the ship near the navel Vang a rope or wire controlling the outboard end of a gaff.
pipes. W/T Wireless/Telegraphy
Fairlead an upper deck fitting through which a rope is rove in order Waist the part of the upper deck amidships which lies between the
to alter the lead. fo'c'sle and the quarter deck.
Falls the boat's falls are the tackles used for hoisting a boat. Yard Horizontal spars set athwartships on the mast to carry signal
Flare the curve outwards of the ship's side forward. halyards and W/T aerials, etc.
Flush deck when the deck is a continuous unbroken line from stem
to stern.
Fore and aft line the line from stem to stern in line with the keel.
Forecastle or fo ' c'sle that part of the upper deck which lies forward.
Forefoot that part of the stem lying between the water line and the
fore end of the keel.
Foul anchor when the anchor is snarled by the cable or has picked
up a wire.
Foremast the forward mast.
Freeboard the height of a ship's side above the water line.
Gaff a spar secured to a mast in a fore and aft line and at an angle.
In a warship, the battle ensign is flown from here when at sea.
Gang plank a plank stretching between two ships, or from a ship to
the jetty, upon which to walk.
Gripes matting with thimbles and lanyards with which to secure a
boat at the davits.
HA (or AA) (see AA)
Hawse pipe the pipe leading to the cable locker through which the
anchor cable runs.
Heel of the ship the angle of a ship from the perpendicular.
Housed the mast is housed when partly lowered down.
Jury mast a temporary mast fitted in an emergency.
Kedge anchor an auxiliary and lighter anchor.
Knot measurement of speed. 1 knot=1 nautical mile (6080 ft.) per
hour.
Lanyard a short rope, generally used for setting up rigging.
Lazy guy an additional guy which is fitted to a boom for securing
purposes when the ship rolls.
List if a ship heels permanently she is said to have a 'list on'.
L.W.L. load water line: the line to which the vessel is trimmed when
normally loaded as intended by the designer.
Mainmast the mast abaft the foremast.
Mast head the top of the mast.
Midships the centre part of the ship.
Mizzen mast the aftermost mast.
Wahip series
The most ambitious series so far conceived and produced by Profile Publications Limited. This new inter-
national series will span the era of the modern fighting ship from the launching of the Dreadnought in 1906
up to the present day ship-a complex of floating electronics, weaponry and technology. Profile have created
a team of international experts in naval history backed by a first rate group of researchers and consultants.
This new series will continue to reflect the high standard of the Profile series already published. Presen-
tation will follow the format which has proved so popular with the other series with first rate text,
supported by many superb black and white illustrations and of course, the famous Profile colour centre
spread which will show complete side and plan views of each warship and, where applicable, additional
information such as ships' badges, camouflage schemes, cross sections and details of ships' fittings.
The Publishers intend issuing one part per month and the initial programme which at this stage is subject to revision
will be asfollows:

1. HMS Dreadnought 8. Kriegsmarine U- 107

The first all-big-gun ship who heralded the new The life history of a German World War II sub-
era that was to last for fifty years: by John Wingate, marine, described in detail by the world's leading
D.S.C., Warships' Series Editor. authority on U-boat warfare, Dr. Jurgen Rohwer,
Head of Modern Historical Section, Bibliothek fur
2. HMS Cossack Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart.
Tribal Class Destroyer. The class of super-destroyers 9. USS Charles Ausburne (DD-570)
which were to serve with such distinction in World
Fletcher Class destroyer, flagship of Admiral
War II: by Lieutenant David Lyon, R.N.R., M.A.,
Arleigh (31 knot) Burke's famous Destroyer
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
Squadron 23. This fighting destroyer saw twenty-
five months' combat service off the Solomons,
3. USS Hornet (CV 8)
Philippines and Okinawa during World War II.
Aircraft carrier who, with a life of only 372 clays, She was pulled out of the Reserve Fleet in 1960
launched Doolittle's raid on Tokyo before she and loaned to the German Federal Navy for seven
finally paid the penalty: by Commander W. H. more years of active service.
Cracknell, USN, former observer in the US Navy.
10. HMS Illustrious
4. Kriegsmarine Admiral Graf Spee Aircraft Carrier, 1939-1942. The history of this ship
Pocket Battleship, the first class of all-welded will appear as two Profiles during the same month:
diesel-powered capital ships, specifically designed From design stage to her major refit in America.
as commerce raiders. The Battle of the River This phase includes her attack on Taranto (the
Plate sealed her fate: by Kapitan ziir See Gerhard first carrier-borne attack on a major fleet in
Bidlingmaier, lately Naval Historian of the Federal history, to be copied later by the Japanese at Pearl
German Navy, Navigating Officer of Tirpitz Harbour) and her terrible punishment suffered off
during World War II. Malta at the hands of the Luftwaffe: by Lieuten-
ant David Lyon, R.N.R., M.A., author of Warship
5. HMS Campbeltown ( USS Buchanan) Profile Cossack.
One of the `four-stackers' to be turned over by the 11. HMS Illustrious
USN to the RN. Her life ended gloriously during Aircraft Carrier, 1942-1946. Following the US refit,
the Raid on St Nazaire in 1942: by John Wingate, through the Madagascar landings to her final recall
D.S.C., Warships' Series Editor. after her active service in the Pacific theatre of
war: by J. D. Brown, a former Royal Naval
6. Kriegsmarine Prinz Eugen aviator, author of Aircraft Profile 224, Supermarine,
Heavy Cruiser. She took part in some of the most Walrus & Seagull variants and `Carrier Operations
dramatic actions of World War II: by Fregat- of World War Two'.
tenkapitan a.D. Paul Schmalenbach who was her
12. IJN Kongo
Gunnery Officer and is now a naval historian.
The Imperial Japanese Navy Battleship whose life
7. HM Motor Torpedo Boats: span lasted through two world wars: by Commander
M. Chihaya IJN Retired.
THE VOSPER 70ft BOAT
This class of boat formed the backbone of Coastal 13. HMS Exeter
Forces' Motor Torpedo Boats during World War 8-inch-gun Cruiser, 1928-1942. Her life includes
II. The development of the boat, the resultant the Battle of the River Plate against Admiral Graf Spec,
tactics and strategy and the action reports are (Warship Profile No. 4) and the Battle of the Java
described by the author, David Cobb, R.o.t., Sea: by Robin Tonks, M.A., Assistant Director of
R.S.M.A., the marine artist, who was himself a Studies and Head of History Department, Britan-
Commanding Officer and MTB Controller. nia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth.

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