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END OF THE INNOCENCE: The 1954 CIA Coup in Guatemala

Research · December 1999

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22220.16001

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 END OF THE INNOCENCE:
The 1954 CIA Coup in Guatemala
Michael Lehman
ENG 106
Dec. 2, 1999

The 1954 coup that deposed the democratically elected government of

Guatemala has long been acknowledged to have been the result of CIA
covert action. Recently declassified documents have shown a new, and more
sinister light, on the CIA’s involvement in an action that gave birth to some
of the most brutally dictatorial regimes in modern history (see the CIA
documents in the bibliography.) No one at this point will dispute the
original involvement, but there are still those who maintain that this is all
water over the dam of history and that the US has not had direct
responsibility for the actions of a Guatemalan government since the 1954
coup. (Evans-Pritchard)

I intend to outline the background of the political circumstances that lead to

the coup. This will include Guatemala, the US and the world scene at the
time, when anti-communism contended with communism as state ideologies.

I will contend that the coup was all but inevitable in the prevailing political
climate of 1954. But that still doesn’t make it right. We have been finding
out for nearly half a century how wrong it was. Opinions have always
varied with the positions of their adherents, but I believe there is one thing
that can no longer be disputed: the CIA catalyzed a turn for the worse, even
to the inhuman, for many Latin American governments by its actions in
managing the Guatemalan coup. They provided the essential weapon for the
modern national security state, the knowledge of how to organize an
efficient apparatus of state repression and terror.

‘The wink and the nod’ that it was all somehow acceptable to your primary
sponsor caused many a dictator to adopt these methods to take and maintain
power. Only recently have internal CIA documents become available,
allowing researchers to begin to look inside the CIA itself. Partial as these
releases are, they supply valuable insight into the machinations of this
secretive organization. These documents outline the beginning of the Terror;
let’s hope we are seeing the end of it.
The early 1950s was a time of tension and uncertainty in the world. The
Cold War replaced ‘hot’ war. Humankind had gone from the terror of actual
war to the terror of the potential of nuclear war. The situation was
aggravated by the ongoing conflict in Korea which pitted the forces of the
‘Free World’ against the specter of international Communism.
Anticommunist hysteria gripped the US political scene, mirroring many of
the excesses of the Stalinist enemy that it was in struggle with in the
international arena.

The New York Times of the era carried news about a newly discovered
Communist threat almost daily. Sen Eugene McCarthy would even accuse
(although he could never prove) the CIA and other units of the Federal
government of harboring 130 Communist infiltrators in their midst. (NYT,
6/3/54) J. Robert Oppenheimer, a leader of the US effort to build nuclear
weapons, was accused of holding back the development of the hydrogen
bomb and being insufficiently loyal. (NYT, 6/17/54) Subversive literature
from Russia was said to be “clogging” the Customs Service. (NYT, 6/6/54)
An ominous headline in the wake of Memorial Day 1954 read “Memorial
Events Made More Somber By Soviet Menace”. (NYT, 6/1/54) The
dissenting voices were few, with only the muted protest of warnings about
an “anti-intellectual fervor impeding” US scientists, as if the only criticism
allowed of McCarthyism was that sometimes its wild accusations might
slow down defense preparations. (NYT, 6/8/54)

The day after the Times reported the coup in Guatemala, it ran a notice that
signs ordering civilians off the roads in the event of an air attack were to be
taken down. Now that the Soviets had the hydrogen bomb the only hope for
city dwellers was to flee to the countryside as quickly as possible. The
editorial section had a cartoon, depicting Communism as a rabid dog in the
manger of Peace, baring its fangs at the Free World, which was a frightened
looking horse. (NYT, 6/20/54) As the coup wound to its quick conclusion
the next week, an air raid test was announced for the lower East Side that
posited an atomic weapon dropped within New York City. (NYT, 6/24/54)

Nearly every aspect of American culture was penetrated by this fear of ‘Reds
under every bed’ and it particularly influenced how we viewed
developments in the area of international relations. Our views of other
countries were almost wholly defined by our perception of whether they
were ‘with us or against us’ in the struggle against Communism.

Guatemala had experienced a revolution in 1944, which overthrew General

Jorge Ubico, a corrupt, brutal dictator. Democracy took root there, but the
country as a whole suffered from severely unequal development and was
dominated by the US company, United Fruit (UFCO). UFCO sought to
maintain the position of privilege that it had enjoyed under Ubico, who had
gifted the company with large tracts of land and vigorously suppressed labor
organizations. (CIAPBS, pg. 3) Indeed, the company viewed any change as
a direct “assault on free enterprise.” (CIAPBS, pg. 8)

UFCO was supported in this view by an arm of the CIA called the Office of
Policy Coordination (OPC). The OPC was directed by Frank Wisner and
was formed in 1948 to undertake “covert propaganda and antisubversive
operations.” As early as August 1950, the OPC warned “that Guatemala may
become a central point for the dissemination of anti-US
propaganda.” (CIAPBS, pg. 10) Wisner would later be appointed to head
the 1954 PBSUCCESS plan that would solve the problem of knocking down
the ‘straw man’ he had set up in Guatemala. Wisner’s involvement in the
creation and definition of the ‘problem’, and then in its ‘solution’, illustrates
the enormous possibilities for abuse built into the CIA’s charter. (CQ) Its
abuse of this rather self-serving system is a recurrent theme in US politics.

The Guatemalan Revolutionary government, while acknowledged by the US

Embassy as having “an unusual reputation for incorruptibility”, was a thorn
in the side of UFCO continuing business as usual. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, a
leader in the Army, was elected president of Guatemala in 1951 and
continued the Revolution’s moderate course. Arbenz had made his fame in
the army by helping to put down an abortive coup attempt in 1949 by old
guard officers of the army. (CIAPBS, pg. 5)

Among the plotters was Lt. Carlos Castillo Armas, who was captured, only
to later escape to Honduras. The CIA would pick up his care and feeding and
build the rebel army around his ‘leadership.’ (CIAPBS, pg. 5) Castillo
Armas quickly became the CIA’s favorite candidate to replace Arbenz. There
were several contenders for leadership of the opposition forces that the CIA
manipulated to its benefit. Although he lacked combat experience, his
“readiness to take fullest advantage of future CIA aid and assistance”
ensured that he would be their man. (CIAPBS, pg. 33)

When Arbenz was elected in 1950, the State Dept. saw him as an
“opportunist”; in other words, someone they thought they could deal with.
(Immerman, pg. 107) UFCO continued pressing the State Dept. and the CIA
for action. Neither organization seemed much inclined initially to take
action, but the CIA quickly came around based on the views of the OPC.
The OPC viewpoint quickly became the official one of the CIA, which
pressured those in the State Dept. to come around in its views on Guatemala.

The propaganda campaign against Guatemala had an unintended

consequence. Instead of intimidating Arbenz, it simply strengthened his
coalition and allowed him to face down the demands that the US had made
to purge his government of elements they didn’t approve of.

UFCO was pushing hard for action, perhaps unaware that powerful forces
were already at work behind the scenes. The first fruits of the situation
actually fell into its lap quickly. The US Justice Department had been
investigating the company since 1919 (the wheels of justice turn slowly) for
antitrust violations related to its Latin American operations. Ironically, these
violations, relating to its ownership of all shipping and railroads in several
countries in addition to Guatemala, dovetailed with the criticisms that the
Guatemalans themselves had made. This legal action was put on hold
because the National Security Council worried that it might weaken efforts
to contain Communism. The case was pursued after the coup, suggesting
that the US government clearly wanted to use UFCO as part of it strategy in
the short term and that the benefit to UFCO was mostly coincidental.
(CIAPBS, pg. 11)

Meanwhile, planning for action against Guatemala moved into high gear. It
is clear that action against Guatemala was contemplated under Pres. Truman.
(see CIA documents dated 1952 in bibliography) As early as Jan. 26, 1952,
the CIA was seeking a list from its operatives of the communist leaders that
a new Guatemalan government would “eliminate” in the wake of a
successful coup.(CIA#49) A list that the CIA had already made was
included for confirmation. This was followed up with a request for a list of
those to imprison (CIA#50) and an inquiry about additions to be made to
lists already sent.(CIA#51) A $50,000 cash shipment is also detailed.
(CIA#557) Tons of weapons were shipped to Nicaragua and
[REDACTED] , which was most likely a location in Honduras. (CIA#559
and 560)

The plan the CIA had developed under Truman, codenamed PBFORTUNE,
fell apart. This occured after the plan, under the pressures of inadequate
planning and the US Presidential election already, was undercut by dictator
Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua revealing the CIA’s involvement. He
bragged of their assistance to him, as the quid pro quo for his help, to other
politicians in the region. This blew the cover of the operation as a “Latin
American” movement.. (Immerman, pg. 120-122)
Rather than see its goals frustrated so easily, the CIA put the assets it
controlled on ice until after the upcoming election.(CIAPBS, pg. 20) There
is some controversy on the timing of the decision to act against Guatemala
under the Eisenhower Administration. Some argue that no decision was
made to carry out a coup until after a process of fact-finding and analysis
resulted in a decision in late summer 1953.(Immerman, pg. 135) The official
“General Plan of Action” is dated Sept. 11, 1953.(CIA#59)

I believe that the process was well underway in 1952 and it was the CIA’s
own institutional concerns that caused the cancellation of the action in 1952.
In an era that condemned any perceived failure in the fight against
Communism, I believe the CIA was loathe to take the chance of a failure
which a new president could use as an excuse to clean house. Bureaucratic
self preservation may well be why the coup was canceled, rather than the
official excuse of Somoza’s big mouth.(CIAPBS, pg. 19) It would be better
for them to proceed with the plan under a new president whose own prestige
would be tied to the portrayal of the operation, and whatever its outcome, as
a success.

UFCO continued its attacks, waging an intense public relations campaign to

portray the Guatemalans as having come under control of Communists,
simply because Arbenz, as the US Embassy noted, had refused to remove
Communists who held posts in his coalition government. The ruling
coalition was dominated by moderates, with the tiny Guatemalan
Communist party, the PGT, holding just four of the 61 seats the congress.
(CIAPBS, pg. 12) The Communists held only a few posts in the Guatemalan
government and, while valued for their support and assistance of Arbenz’
program, they served as lightning rods for US disapproval.(CIAPBS, pg. 8)

The struggles of the revolutionary government to provide a more secure

economic future for the people of Guatemala resulted in Decree 900, of June
17, 1952. The objective of the decree was to distribute some of UFCO’s ill-
gotten lands into the hands of small farmers by providing the peasants with
low-interest loans with which to purchase the land. Ironically, even though
UFCO had obtained the land under questionable circumstances, it would be
compensated with bonds to be valued based on UFCO’s own assessment of
its worth. (Immerman, pg. 79-82) The CIA’s own history states that “Decree
900 [was seen] as a moderate, capitalist reform,” similar to other programs
that the CIA itself was promoting in Latin America. What really counted to
the CIA was the fact that this program was seen as being under the control of
Communist-inspired forces.(CIAPBS, pg. 13 and 16)
 Many have noted the very close connections between the US State
Department, the CIA and UFCO that came about after the 1952 election
resulted in the Republicans winning the White House. Newly elected Pres.
Dwight Eisenhower appointed brothers John Foster Dulles, to Secretary of
State, and Allen Dulles, to head the CIA, as key members of his foreign
policy team. They shared intense feelings in favor of “free enterprise”, anti-
communism and a background as attorneys for UFCO and other
international corporations. John Foster Dulles had even drawn up one of the
agreements that provided Jorge Ubico with legal cover for his “gift” to
UFCO of hundreds of square miles of Guatemalan public lands.(Immerman,
pg. 124)

Many have taken the simplistic view that the Dulles brothers simply acted as
agents of UFCO when they advanced the US government policies that
coincidentally served UFCO’s interests. The real truth is that the company
needed no special pleading to have its interests served. The CIA’s own report
on the operation opens with a quote from Manuel Fortuny, a leader of the
Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT). “They [the US CIA] would have
overthrown us even if we had grown no bananas.”(CIAPBS, pg. 1) Business
and government interests have been seen as inextricably intertwined by most
mainstream analysts of modern society, begging the question of the
American people’s interest. This is a trend which continues to today, as the
World Trade Organization meets to consolidate corporate domination of the
world’s economy with the blessing and encouragement of the US
government.

At least one source notes that Eisenhower actually approved the plan to
overthrow the Guatemalan government, to be called PBSUCCESS,
immediately after taking office in Jan. 1953.(Blum) It would appear that the
CIA moved immediately to put Guatemala back on the front burner of covert
operations and Eisenhower was already inclined to do so. This would put
the internal machinations in the State Department and CIA in the following
months more into the class of window dressing for a predetermined plan,
than an actual decision-making process. Charles David (C.D.) Jackson, of
the State Dept., headed up the Jackson Committee, which recommended a
plan at the end of the first month of the Eisenhower Administration to roll
back “Soviet aggression.” (Immerman, pg. 130-132)

It is known with some certainty that Pres. Eisenhower had the expectation
that covert action could take the place of direct military confrontation in the
dangerous circumstances of the Nuclear Age.(CIAPBS, pg. 22-23) One
danger that only gradually became apparent was the circumstances of the
CIA’s birth, when it was granted the twin responsibilities of intelligence and
covert action. The US government as a whole has always relied on a system
of checks and balances to insure accountability.

Yet the CIA has largely evaded these restrictions. It could make intelligence
assessments that largely supported the aims of its covert action programs.
The CIA could be both the prosecutor and judge of policy. During the 1950s
and 1960s, the covert action department was clearly in charge of policy and
manipulated the collection and analysis of intelligence to advance their aims.
The temptation to see the world in self-serving terms would later lead the
CIA astray and into disaster at the Bay of Pigs, but the roots of this flight
from reality were in PBSUCCESS operation against Guatemala.(CIAPBS,
Foreword)

A few in the State Dept. still counseled a policy of constructive engagement

with the Arbenz government. Their arguments were quickly pushed aside by
the Jackson Committee. It may be said that the CIA’s targets for
disinformation included the US government bureaucracy, by requiring them
to persuade the State Dept. of the wisdom of a policy that they had already
received permission for from the President. It is known that the ranks of
ambassadors to Guatemala and the rest of Central America were rearranged
to put a special team into place which would serve to assist the CIA, an
effort which began as early as April 1953. The new group was hand-picked
and had previous experience coordinating with the CIA in other State Dept.
posts.(Immerman, pg. 136-138)

It should be noted here that Mr. Jackson was on leave from Time, Inc. to
serve as a special adviser in charge of Cold War policy. This is a
demonstration of the close ties between the US government and big business
that fed the corporate group ethic that pervaded official US Government
views throughout the Cold War and beyond. It didn’t overthrow the
Guatemalan government to serve UFCO’s interest, but rather the general
interest of international, corporate power.(Immerman, pg. 130)

All doubt about the inevitability of the coup is removed by a document from
January, 1954 which makes clear that invasion plans are in their final stage.
(CIA#29) Kits containing the latest technology clandestine radios are noted
to be on schedule to arrive by mid-March.(Leach)

Time magazine itself demonstrated the public myopia that was willingly
encouraged by the corporate insiders. It had continual, brief essays on the
‘dire’ situation in Guatemala during the run-up to the coup in June 1954,
placed in the “Hemisphere” section of the magazine. This emphasized the
pervading US view that our relations with Latin America did not quite rise to
the level of “Foreign Affairs”, which was an entirely separate section of the
magazine. Rather, their view of our relationship with the hemisphere
assumed it was our ‘backyard’, with the US having a special dispensation to
dictate acceptable policy to our neighbors. The Time of the day faithfully
repeated this view without question or nod toward a more balanced and
thoughtful journalism that the ‘Free World’s’ moral superiority allegedly
conferred.(Immerman, pg. 7-8)

This journalistic approach dominated all the national media of the US,
leading me to conclude that once the decision was made to conduct the coup,
it became inevitable. The media acted more as cheerleaders for official
policy, than as the dispassionate observers and critics of policy.(NYT, May-
June, 1954 and TIME, May-July, 1954) The only notable partial exception to
this trend was Sidney Gruson’s reporting for the New York Times. Having
been previously expelled by the Arbenz government for his reporting, he
was allowed to return in May 1954. His balanced reporting on a shipment of
arms to allow Guatemala to defend itself in the face of the threat of invasion
by the coup forces lead to his removal at the apparent behest of the CIA.
(Immerman, pg. 235-236)

As part of the disinformation and covert action plan that the CIA conducted
prior to the coup, Guatemala had its traditional sources of weapons in
Europe cut off by the US. In the midst of a massive propaganda campaign, it
was under constant threat by the coup plotters. When Guatemala turned to
Soviet bloc sources as a last resort, the CIA propaganda masters made the
most of it as ‘proof’ of the Guatemalan government’s betrayal of the
hemisphere to Communist aggression.(Immerman, pg. 146-151, 155)

This was exactly the result the CIA sought, as it gave the color of
hemispheric “self-defense” to the reality of US aggression against a
sovereign state. This perception, upon which the success of PBSUCCESS
turned, was carefully cultivated by the CIA propaganda machine as a
counterweight to the traditional, more realistic Latin view, based on bitter
experience, that Uncle Sam was not to be trusted.(Immerman, pg. 153)

Without going into the details of the coup itself, it is important to note an
important fact about CIA covert operations that persists to the present day.
The most critical aspect of these operations is not the actual overt or
clandestine military force available. A memo from Nov., 1953 summarizes
the plan for PBSUCCESS. In two-and-a-half pages, it details extensive
planning for propaganda, disinformation and economic warfare. Military
affairs take up two short paragraphs of the document.(CIA#61) Information
warfare, the manipulation of public opinion, in particular US public opinion,
is the final determinant of the success of an operation. In this sense, it can be
said that the US public is one of the main targets of the CIA in any covert
action. (Immerman, pg. 114) This level of organizational hubris, combined
with the cloak of secrecy, render the CIA as a threat to the continuation of
our democratic system.

It may seem that the release of the first (we hope) batch of declassified CIA
documents only ties up a few loose ends if you were to read the report, “CIA
and Guatemala Assassination Proposals 1952-1954,” (CIA#3) declassified
and released with approximately 750 other documents in 1997. Written in
1995, it serves as an interesting review of how the CIA wishes it will be
portrayed in history, rather than a careful analysis of what the documents it
was released with contain. These original source documents contain material
that directly contradicts many of the assertions of “CIA and Guatemala
Assassination Proposals 1952-1954” and shines new light on other parts of
the historical record. I wish to examine several assertions of historical
revisionism, in relation to the coup, of different ideological strains, that turn
up repeatedly. A quick study of the CIA’s own words will reveal their fallacy.

The first is the conclusion of the “CIA and Guatemala Assassination

Proposals 1952-1954” report. (CIA#3) After concluding that “(p)roposals for
assassinations pervaded both PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS” it asserts
that “no covert action plan involving assassinations of Guatemalans was
ever approved or implemented.” Perhaps the CIA itself never did so, but the
teaching contained within “A Study of Assassination,” (CIA#35) along with
the fact that “assassins were selected, training began, and tentative ‘hit lists’
were drawn up” shows that the students learned well. (CIA#3)

A sign of their success is a list, of six pages, that is plainly noted to be

“Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military
Operations”. Although age would have already felled most of those who
were unfortunate enough to have appeared on it, I rather doubt that most of
those listed died natural deaths. Every name on the pages is blanked out.
Why else after all this time would the CIA have redacted the names of these
‘Communists’? I would imagine that, rather than being concerned with the
privacy of these people, or out of concern about revealing sources and
methods, there is something else that causes the CIA to be so reticent. I’m
sure that it would reveal the bloody ‘efficiency’ of the client state they
created.(CIA#52)

Many of the techniques mentioned in the “Study of Assassination” were

subsequently applied with vigor and refined to ever higher levels of brutality
in the drive to crush ‘Communism’. I believe this lead directly to the
inhuman excesses of Central American governments in the following
decades. There is that old saying about ‘give a man a fish and he eats today-
teach a man how to fish and he will always eat’ seems to have been the
actual result of the CIA’s plotting. Moral responsibility in such cases rests
with the teacher, as much as with the student.

The conclusion of that argument leads us to the next, related argument. This
one asserts, as in “They Didn't Need the CIA,” that the governments of Latin
America, Guatemala in particular, have always been well versed in brutality.
(Evans-Pritchard) There is a certain amount of truth to that on a individual
basis, as there often is in societies dominated by what are near feudal
property relationships. However, prior to the CIA’s counsel, the other nations
of the hemisphere didn’t generally make systematic efforts to kill off their
opposition. Labor organizers and other leftists spent a lot of time in jails,
but, with the exception of El Salvador’s La Mantanza of 1932, there was
rarely the kind of efficiency of effort that the Guatemalan conspirators were
taught by the CIA.

This lesson, and its subsequent war on the common people of the
countryside, was birthed from the obsessive political control mechanisms
promulgated by the CIA. Providing better management techniques for
repressive regimes requires one to share a moral responsibility for the
outcome. I believe that the CIA cannot escape this responsibility for its
actions in 1954, even leaving aside the fact that there would continue to be
CIA aid, assistance, and money supplied to the repressive Guatemalan
regimes of the next few decades.

The assertions of Communist dominance in the Guatemalan government

before the coup still seem to serve to many as a justification for what
occurred. Pres. Eisenhower claimed at the Illinois State Fair that, “(i)n
Guatemala, the people of the region rose up and rejected the Communist
doctrine...” (Immerman, pg.178) Yet the evidence shows otherwise. Even
after the coup resulted in the capture of extensive collections of documents,
which were reviewed by the CIA, precious little evidence of Communist
participation in the government was revealed that wasn’t already public
knowledge.(Immerman, pg. 183-185) To put it simply, the Communists
were operating as a legal participant in a democratic system. It was the CIA
that transgressed the rule of law.

Follow-up reports by both Congress and the State Department right after the
coup simply repeated the unsupported allegations that had been used for its
initial justification. A telling quote by a newspaper editor friend of Pres.
Eisenhower’s, who visited Guatemala right afterward, sums things up.
“Yes, Guatemala has a very small minority of Communists, but not as many
as San Francisco.”(Immerman, pg. 183)

On the Left are those that claim the coup was simply a product of quid pro
quo for UFCO. That idea should be quickly put to rest by the CIA’s
“Operation PBSUCCESS” report.(CIAPBS, pg. 11) The climate of the
times, exemplified by the coverage in the New York Times and Time, was
such that no reasonable argument could be made against intervention and
that the specter of a Communist foothold in the Western Hemisphere was
more than enough to motivate the coup. No corporate profits need be
directly involved. Immediately after the coup, both houses of Congress
passed resolutions (unanimously, except for a single vote) stating that the US
would not tolerate Communism in the hemisphere. It was a thinly veiled
threat to anyone else contemplating progressive changes in their countries
that might displease the US.(Immerman, pg. 174)

Another argument is that the most significant action that the CIA took in this
affair is the military aid that was given to the plotters. While this aid was
important, the most crucial aspects of covert operations are the information
warfare components. Of overriding importance is how the public perceptions
of strength play out. The forces of Castillo Armas were weak and his tiny air
force was piloted by American mercenaries in the service of the CIA. All
observers agree in retrospect that the rebel forces would have been
incapable of winning a direct confrontation with the Guatemalan Army.
(Immerman, pg. 162 and 168) Yet the CIA’s effective use of propaganda,
combined with the overt diplomatic offensive by the US, caused the
Guatemalan Army to turn on the Arbenz government, demanding his
resignation, in what they saw as the only way to stop a mostly phantom
attack.(Immerman, pg. 162) However, it should be noted that some military
officials had been suborned by the CIA and may have simply waited for the
opportune moment to what they may have known in private to be a little
threat, but an abundant excuse, to betray their country.

I wish to conclude by saying that we, as Americans, all share a responsibility

in the excesses of the CIA. The old ways die hard, as was clearly
demonstrated in following decades. The continued existence of the CIA in
its present form has become a threat to democracy, not just in other
countries, but here in this country. The Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s is
perhaps the most familiar example, so far, of this ‘backdraft’ effect
antidemocratic approaches to international problems can have. There are
many, including myself, who feel that the election of an little known
governor from a insignificant state to the Presidency is a product of this
situation, its own quid pro quo, for his assistance in their time of need.
(Reed/Cummings)

Arkansas was one of the major staging and training points for the Contra
operation. Rumors of cocaine flowing into the US and cash flowing back to
the CIA under the protection of then-Governor Clinton are quite possibly a
reasonable explanation of his rise from obscurity. In the world of shadows,
only the insiders know for sure. The rest of us will have to make educated
guesses, until such time as the files of the CIA are thrown open, like the files
of the East German Stasi were opened, to the disinfectant of daylight.

END OF THE INNOCENCE: The 1954 CIA Coup In Guatemala

--Mike Lehman—

Annotated Bibliography

A Brief Note
I have added several additional sources to the bibliography, primarily from CIA original
source documentation.

What I Didn’t Include

I am personally familiar with a great deal of material on Guatemala. Even so, I found the
vast amount of information that I hadn’t seen to be both inspiring and intimidating. By
concentrating on the actual facts of history itself, I’ve managed to come to grips with the
ugly truth of the US legacy in Guatemala.

There is plenty of opinion out there on the subject. Much of it could be considered as
partisan in some way and I’ve included representative samples here. I’m familiar with, or
have read, much of it. My own bias is toward the Left, but I am quite familiar with much
of the Right’s viewpoint. I come from a military family and was involved with political-
military analysis during the height of conflict in Central America in the bloody decade of
the 1980s. That was when Washington’s witch’s brew of counter-insurgency and covert
action came to a head, with the slaughter of over 100,000, mostly Mayan, Guatemalan
citizens, by their own government. These horrendous events crushed a growing
insurgency against one of the most repressive regimes in modern history.

Opinion, coupled with often highly partisan eyewitness reports, was all that most writers
on this subject had to go by in writing of the circumstances of the time. This reason,
coupled with lack of time, caused me to concentrate my efforts on what is now in the
factual record, by using original source documents. Recent, partial declassifications have
given us a look inside the Central Intelligence Agency’s operations during the period
leading up to the 1954 coup. Such classics as “Bitter Fruit” had to be passed over, but are
still highly recommended for background for those unfamiliar with the issues.

Language was another barrier. The Internet turned up much information in Spanish, but
my personal limitations in that language do not allow me to examine this interesting
trove.

I also found references to the more general state of affairs during the early 1950s. Anti-
communism was, for all practical purposes, a state religion in the US during this time.
The French were under great pressure in Vietnam and Senator McCarthy saw Reds in
places like the CIA, the Army, and throughout unions and academia. The threat of
nuclear war was ever present. This is an interesting time in history. We will use it as
background, but not to belittle its importance to the argument. It is crucial to appraise the
tone of the era, but time and space constraints preclude the inclusion of anything but brief
references to the tenor of the times.

A number of academic theses were also intriguing, particularly the ones that seem to take
a businessman’s point of view, but will have to be saved for another time, for lack of
time. Recent news articles I’ve noted are good for their viewpoints, but lack the laser-
like accuracy of the original documents that I’ve included in the annotated bibliography.

A monogram by a scholar at the USAF Air Command and Staff College would make for
a good night’s read, but is unlikely to yield significant new insight. Finally, an
unattributed tome, called “The Story of Pres. And Mrs. Castillo Armas of Guatemala”,
strikes me as most likely to be CIA-source among my original list. I’ll have to look that
one up, some day.

SOURCES

Blum
Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Intervention Since World War II
 Common Courage Press, 1995

I didn’t read this, but it sounds like a good book to do, whenever I have
time to read again. I quoted off of the advertising e-mail I received
recently for it. I would like to examine his evidence for Eisenhower’s
Jan. ‘53 decision to act against Guatemala more closely.

CIA Documents- The CIA documents I referenced are available at the following
website:
http://www.foia.ucia.gov/
-click on the Popular Document Collection
-go to the Guatemala documents by clicking twice, where you will find a
list of 756 documents. I will refer to them by their document number at
this site.

CIA#3
CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals 1952-1954
CIA History Staff Analysis, Gerald K. Haines, June 1995 (Declassified
1997)

This is a key document, a great, ironic mea culpa, but in the end leaves
smoking guns, begging questions, from Washington to Guatemala City.

CIA#29
GENERAL CONCEPT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH (DELETED) PREPAIRING HIM
FOR FORTHCOMING CA
Declassified Covert Action Document, January 22, 1954, Declassified
May 15, 1997

This document contains a comprehensive strategic and tactical plan to

overthrow the Guatemalan Government. Details of the plan demonstrate
that the date of the plan is its most damning testimony. It clearly shows
that the CIA was determined to depose the government, regardless of
diplomatic and political developments, by late January 1954.

CIA#35
A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION (ESTIMATED PUB DATE)
CIA Covert Action Document, December 31, 1953, Declassified May 15,
1997, http://www.foia.ucia.gov/frame2.htm, click on “Guatemala” twice,
then click on Document #36

This is where things get down and dirty. There can be no dispute about
the nature or intentions of this document. Many of the described methods
became very familiar throughout Latin America, so it’s crucial to
remember where and by whom they were introduced. Except for 1932 in
 El Salvador, most leftists and Communists in Latin America were
tolerated, except for frequent trips to prison, before the CIA became
closely involved with their governments. The CIA brought ‘Norte
Americano’ efficiency to the ‘lackadaisical’ Latin approach to political
repression that existed prior to 1954.

CIA#49
CABLE TO (DELETED) REQUESTING LIST OF LIST TOP FLIGHT COMMUNISTS
TO BE ELIMINATED
Jan. 26, 1952; Declassified May 15, 1997

The title pretty much explains things. They almost couldn’t wait to start
the killing.

CIA#50
CABLE TO (DELETED) REQUESTING LIST OF COMMUNISTS AND/OR
SYMPATHIZERS WHOM WOULD DESIRE ENCARCERATED(sic)
Jan. 29, 1952; Declassified May 15, 1997

Follow-up to preceding cable. I wonder how they decided between who

kill and who to lockup. Did being on this list mean you weren’t a good
(enough) Communist?

CIA#51
CABLE FROM (DELETED) REQUESTING THE ADDITION OF THE FOLLOWING
(DELETED) BE ADDED
Jan. 29, 1952; Declassified May 15, 1997

‘Let’s be sure we don’t miss anyone.’ Concern is expressed that if these

folks aren’t at least deported, any government the CIA might impose
in Guatemala won’t be able to stand for long.

CIA#52
GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PERSONNEL TO BE DISPOSED OF DURING
MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
CIA Covert Action Document, September 17, 1952 (note-actual date on
document is Sept. 18, 1952), Declassified May 15, 1997

This is not the original list, but one that updated the original one
the CIA supplied to Castillo Armas. He had a few additions of his own. It
is interesting mainly because most of it is redacted. Even after all these
years, the CIA isn’t willing to say who they wanted dead. Maybe a
comparison of who survived being listed, in the long run, to those who
died under questionable circumstances in later years, would reveal that
 this whole process was not as benign as the June 1995 report made it out
to be?

CIA#59
GUATEMALA--GENERAL PLAN OF ACTION
Sept. 11, 1953; Declassified May 15, 1997

Ever wonder what a CIA playbook looks like? The budget is even
included.

CIA#61
SUMMARY OF DIRECTIVES AND INSTRUCTIONS ON PBSUCCESS
Nov. 5, 1953, Declassified May 15, 1997

‘Sticks and stones may break your bones,’ but it’s the words that kill you.

CIA#552
REVOLT AGAINST THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT IMMINENT
Jan. 19, 1952; Declassified May 15, 1997

The CIA starts to get excited about Castillo Armas’ ‘potential.’

CIA#557
CABLE RE FUNDS TRANSFER
June 23, 1952; Declassified May 15, 1997

Money makes the world go round. It doesn’t seem like it now, but $50,000
in 1952 was a lot of money.

CIA#559
CABLE RE SHIPMENTS TO MANAGUA AND PUERTO CABEZAS
Oct. 6, 1952; Declassified May 15, 1997

Somoza does his part. The first installment (8 tons) of arms will be sent
by air to Managua.

CIA#560
CABLE REQUESTING LOCATION OF SHIP TO USE FOR SENSITIVE CARGO
SHIPMENT
Oct. 20, 1952; Declassified May 15, 1997

They didn’t have C-5 aircraft in 1952. The other 73 tons to go by sea, once
the CIA can find a “fishing or pleasure” boat that can carry a load like
that. It must have been one hell of a bass boat.
CIAPBS
OPERATION PBSUCCESS; THE UNITED STATES AND GUATEMALA 1952-1954
Dec. 31, 1993; declassified May 15, 1997

This is actually CIA#756, page numbers as noted. Since I found it to be

very useful and insightful, I used it as a major supplement to Immerman’s
book. It’s interesting to note that this study makes major use of
Immerman’s book itself. Immerman must have got it right. They also use
“Bitter Fruit” and another good reference, Piero Gleijeses’ “Shattered
Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954”.

Leach
RS-1 CIA Radio Set
Warren Leach, webpage, April 16, 1996
http://www.bluesky.com/warren/radios/spyradios.html

This is included as more of a physical exhibit, than an actual

reference. It does demonstrate that the RS-1 radios mentioned in the
invasion planning were (at the time) state-of-the-art equipment. The CIA
spared no expense, or technology, to make this thing work. These radios
were also, conveniently enough, compatible with equipment that
contemporary US military forces were using. If you’re in the CIA, it
doesn’t hurt to have back-up. Look what happened at the Bay of Pigs a
few years later.

CQ
The New CIA, Congressional Quarterly, Dec. 11, 1992
The CQ Researcher, http://library.cq.com/cgi; keyword*1954

This is a straightforward document. It doesn’t go into detail, but it

does outline the congenital failure of the CIA’s birth and existence- the
conflict between developing accurate, unbiased intelligence and covert
action. Most Americans have come to see these two as inseparable, but
experts will acknowledge the inherent skewing of both by their interaction
with each other. Even if you think the CIA is a generally good idea, this is
an issue that keeps getting papered over, to the continued detriment of the
US and the rest of the world. The more things change, the more they stay
the same

Not Quoted
Reforming the CIA, Congressional Quarterly, Feb. 2, 1996
The CQ Researcher, http://library.cq.com/cgi - keyword*Guatemala*
 My main issue with this item is that the no-doubt highly paid staff
at the CQ doesn’t know the difference between “expropriate” and
“appropriate”. One definition serves as a fairly accurate, but overly
concise, definition of the actual 1954 situation in Guatemala. The other
serves as nothing more than anti-Communist propaganda. Guess which
one they choose. I wonder what they were(are) still so afraid of in
1996(1999)?

Evans-Pritchard
They Didn't Need the CIA
Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose; American Spectator (Mar 20, 1999)
ISSN: 0038-6952, Accession No: 04206350

This is a fairly standard example of what much of the Right feels

about the moral correctness of the CIA and the American Empire. “If it
wasn’t for the CIA, those gol-durned foreigners would kill each other in
even more brutal ways!” The idea of the CIA as the leading light of
Western Civilization pretty much died in the early 1960s, after the Bay of
Pigs. Evans-Pritchard does the best he can to revive the myth, but leaves
himself wide open, to the cruel reality of the facts as now admitted to, by
those he takes as nothing more than good public servants, just doing their
job.

Immerman
The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention
Immerman, Richard H.; Austin, Texas; University of Texas Press; 1982
ISBN 0-292-78045-1

This book forms the heart of my argument in the sense that it

formed many of my opinions about the situation. It was written
contemporaneously with “Bitter Fruit”, but I’ve always felt it to be the
better book. Immerman goes to the heart of the matter. The CIA
conducted a coup to overthrow a democratically elected government to
serve the internal policy of the United States. While United Fruit’s
interests were well served by the events, it was more coincidence, than
fate, that the Dulles brothers, and their close relationship to UFCO,
happened to serve in the government at the time of the coup.
Combined with the recently declassified CIA documents, it forms a
damning case for the Agency’s complicity for the murderous policies that
characterized affairs of state in much of Latin America in following
decades.

NYT
 New York Times, various issues May 18 to June 30, 1954

What more is there to say about “the newspaper of record”?

Plenty, and that is what I began to write this paper on. I then realized that,
in some ways, the internal affairs of the Times are often as arcane as those
of the CIA. And I didn’t know them nearly as well. And a treasure trove of
recent declassifications is now available on the Internet. James Reston’s
papers recently came to rest at the University of Illinois; maybe there will
be more revealing developments soon. What we can say right now is that
the Times served the CIA at a crucial moment, in a direct sense, and
supported the CIA’s efforts more generally by maintaining a sophisticated,
yet party-line, worldview. To analyze this phenomenon is beyond the
scope of this paper, but sounds like an inviting subject. I will use it, in the
main, as background and timeline.

Reed/Cummings
COMPROMISED: Clinton, Bush and the CIA
Clandestine Publishing, 1995
Perhaps the definitive book on what Iran-Contra really meant in our
country. You may not believe it, but Terry Reed, a pilot/operative for the
the CIA, seems to know what he’s talking about. He seems to make sense
of the unexplainable by telling you the unbelievable.

TIME
Time Magazine, various issues, May 10 to August 9, 1954

Time is even more scandalously imperialist in its views of

Guatemala than the New York Times. There are “World Affairs” and then
there is the “Hemisphere”, making it something very closely akin to “our
backyard” in the eyes of the editors. There’s not really all that much there,
and it’s not that good. It serves mainly as a contemporaneous version of
Evans-Pritchard’s argument. It serves to remind one why it is important to
study history, before our self-delusion leads us astray again.

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