CANON III

FIDELITY

Section 54. Termination of engagement by the client. — The lawyer-client

engagement may be terminated by the client at any time upon loss of trust and
confidence.

The termination of the engagement shall not relieve the client from full payment of all
professional fees due to the lawyer. If the engagement has been reduced to writing, the
lawyer shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated,
unless found by the court, tribunal or other government agency to be unconscionable or
unreasonable under Canon III, Section 41 of the CPRA.

For the payment of the compensation, the lawyer shall have a charging lien upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgment, rendered in the case where the lawyer’s services had been retained by the
client.

Section 55. Termination of engagement upon death. — The death of the lawyer or
client shall terminate the lawyer-client relationship. The death of such lawyer shall not
extinguish the lawyer-client engagement between the law firm and the client handled by
such law firm.

Section 56. Accounting and turn over upon termination of engagement. — A

lawyer who is discharged from or terminates the engagement shall, subject to an
attorney’s lien, immediately render a full account of and turn over all documents,
evidence, funds, and properties belonging to the client.

The lawyer shall cooperate with the chosen successor in the orderly transfer of the legal
matter, including all information necessary for the efficient handling of the client’s
representation.

A lawyer shall have a lien upon the funds, documents, and papers of the client which
have lawfully come into his or her possession and may retain the same until the fair and
reasonable fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof.

CANON IV
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

A lawyer professionally handling a client’s cause shall, to the best of his or her ability,
observe competence, diligence, commitment, and skill consistent with the fiduciary
nature of the lawyer-client relationship, regardless of the nature of the legal matter or
issues involved, and whether for a fee or pro bono.

Section 1. Competent, efficient and conscientious service. — A lawyer shall provide

legal service that is competent, efficient, and conscientious. A lawyer shall be thorough
in research, preparation, and application of the legal knowledge and skills necessary for
an engagement.

Section 2. Undertaking legal services; collaborating counsel. — A lawyer shall only

undertake legal services he or she can deliver.

With the prior written consent of the client, a lawyer may secure the services of a
collaborating counsel.

Section 3. Diligence and punctuality. — A lawyer shall diligently and seasonably act
on any legal matter entrusted by a client.

A lawyer shall be punctual in all appearances, submissions of pleadings and documents

before any court, tribunal or other government agency, and all matters professionally
referred by the client, including meetings and other commitments.

Section 4. Diligence in all undertakings. — A lawyer shall observe diligence in all

professional undertakings, and shall not cause or occasion delay in any legal matter
before any court, tribunal, or other agency.

A lawyer shall appear for trial adequately familiar with the law, the facts of the case, and
the evidence to be presented. A lawyer shall also be ready with the object and
documentary evidence, as well as the judicial affidavits of the witnesses, when required
by the rules or the court.

Section 5. Prompt and objective assessment of the merits. — A lawyer shall, after
reasonable inquiry, promptly give an objective assessment of the merits and probable
results of the client’s case.

A lawyer shall explain the viable options to the client to enable an informed decision
regarding the matter.

Section 6. Duty to update the client. — A lawyer shall regularly inform the client of the
status and the result of the matter undertaken, and any action in connection thereto,
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Section 7. Extension of time to file. — A lawyer shall avoid asking for an extension of
time to file any pleading, motion, or other court submission, except when allowed by the
Rules of Court or for good cause.
When an extension is obtained, the lawyer shall not let the period lapse without
submitting the pleading, motion, or other court submission, except upon the client’s
decision not to pursue the case any further or for other justifiable cause.

Section 8. Lifelong learning. — A competent lawyer engages in lifelong learning

through the continued development of professional skills.

Section 9. Practice of law concurrent with another profession. — A lawyer who is

engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall
expressly provide in the pertinent contract the nature of the services the lawyer is
engaged to perform.

The practice of another profession or occupation shall not jeopardize such lawyer’s
competence, integrity, probity, and independence in rendering legal services.

Section 10. Non-legal activities. — A lawyer who is engaged in business or other non-
legal profession shall likewise observe the ethical duties and responsibilities of a lawyer
under the CPRA.

CANON V
EQUALITY

Every lawyer shall adhere to the principle of equality and hold firmly the belief that every
person, regardless of nationality or ethnicity, color, sexual orientation or gender identity,
religion, disability, age, marital status, social or economic status, and other like
circumstances, has the fundamental right to equal treatment and representation.

As such, the lawyer shall accord equal respect, attention, dedication and zeal in
advancing the client’s cause, regardless of personal opinion, religious or political beliefs
pertaining on the personal circumstances of the client, except for justifiable reasons.

Section 1. Non-discrimination. — A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person

solely on account of the latter’s nationality or ethnicity, sexual orientation or gender
identity, religion, disability, age, marital status, social or economic status, political
beliefs, or such lawyer’s or the public’s opinion regarding the guilt of said person, except
for justifiable reasons.

Section 2. Treatment of vulnerable persons. — In dealing with a client who belongs

to a vulnerable sector, a lawyer shall be mindful and sensitive of, and consider the
client’s special circumstances, as well as the applicable laws and rules.

The lawyer shall observe a higher standard of service suited to the particular needs of
the vulnerable person and shall assert such person’s right to meaningful access to
justice.
A vulnerable person is a person who is at a higher risk of harm than others, and shall
include children, the elderly, the homeless, persons with disability, persons deprived of
liberty, human rights victims, victims of domestic violence, victims of armed conflict,
those who are socio-economically disadvantaged, those who belong to racial or ethnic
minorities, or those with debilitating physical or mental conditions.

Section 3. Indigent person. — A lawyer shall not refuse the representation of an

indigent person, except if:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(a) the lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently due to
a justifiable cause;
(b) the lawyer will be placed in a conflict-of- interest situation; or
(c) the lawyer is related to the potential adverse party, within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to the adverse counsel, within the fourth degree.

An indigent is any person who has no money or property sufficient for food, shelter and
other basic necessities for oneself and one’s family.

Section 4. Standard of service. — A lawyer shall observe the same standard of

service for all clients, regardless of remuneration, except for the higher standard
required for representation of vulnerable persons.

Dacanay v. Baker and Mckenzie - A.C. No. 2131

Facts:

• Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified
complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.
• In a letter, Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which
contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of
87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
• In Atty. Dacanay’s reply, he denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel
• He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker &
McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law
office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

Issue: WON Baker and Mckenzie, an alien law firm, can practice law in the PH?

Ruling: NO

• We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in
the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the
 respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates
in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are
members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
• As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker
& McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they
could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed.,
p. 115.)

Mercado v. Vitriolo - A.C. No. 5108

Facts:

• Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged
that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public
document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained
from their attorney-client relationship.
• Complainant – Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards
• Respondent - Deputy Executive Director IV of CHED
• Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v.
Rosa C. Francisco," for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court,
and the dismissal became final and executory
• Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died.
• Respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel informing the RTC of
Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in
substitution of Atty. de Leon.
• Respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Pasig City.
• Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of
Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically,
complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is
married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G.
Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
• Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied
using any other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has
gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
• Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or
decided upon by other tribunals:

(1) Libel suit – Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City

(2) Administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession
without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and
violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the then
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(3) Complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found
guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without
pay; and,
(4) The Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as
amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.

• Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of

public document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil
case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel.
• This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She
claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should
be disbarred.
• Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss where he alleged that the
complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all
the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies.
• Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for
disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. He
also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct
and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is
on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of
simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.
• In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the
falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and
in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of
respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to
him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing
was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her
two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED
and are accessible to anyone.
• Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
 • IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner
Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
• Complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation,
wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after
the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who
have wronged her.

Issue: WON respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his
former client

Ruling: YES

• A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client
and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is
in order.
• In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers
of trust and confidence.
• Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary.
• The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required
by necessity and public interest.
• Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose
his confidence in an attorney.
• The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is
an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
• Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to
the administration of justice.
• One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an
attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse
them.
• Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's secrets and confidence outlasts
the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and continues even after the
client's death.
• It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended
on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his
rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the
lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.
• With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate
legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or
the prosecution or defense of the client's cause.
• In fine, the factors are as follows: (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship,
or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication.
• Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain
the lawyer or the latter declines the employment
• The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged
or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client.
• On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for
some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation
is not privileged.
• The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.26 The client must intend the communication to be confidential
• A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far
as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given
• Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction
of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for
settlement,30 or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.
• The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for
mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as
to his rights or obligations.
• The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the
purpose of seeking legal advice
• If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and
not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for
such purpose.
• Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record
fails to substantiate complainant's allegations.
• We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in
confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general
terms and lacked specificity.
• She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication
when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public
documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil
case for annulment then handled by respondent.
• She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint.
• Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP.
• Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if
not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication.
• Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule
on privileged communication between attorney and client.
• It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.
• The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party
asserting the privilege.