Acta Astronautica 214 (2024) 137–146

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Acta Astronautica
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/actaastro

Interoperable data exchange for safe and efficient launch and re-entry
operations in an international environment
Sven Kaltenhaeuser *, Carmo Kluenker, Dirk-Roger Schmitt
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. (German Aerospace Center, DLR), Lilienthalplatz 7, 38108, Braunschweig, Germany

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The frequency of commercial space launch and re-entry operations is increasing worldwide. Current regulations
Commercial space integration and procedures ensure safe operations by temporarily closing large volumes of airspace where risks to aircraft
Space traffic management would exist in case of non-nominal events during launch or re-entry operations. To maintain the safety of air
Air traffic management
traffic as the number of space operations rises, effectively providing the right information to the right stake­
Launch and Re-Entry operation
SWIM
holders at the right time is key. Through a cooperative agreement, the FAA and DLR are sharing their unique
capabilities using the Commercial Space Integration Lab and Air Traffic Validation Center, located in the USA
and Germany respectively, to improve situational awareness through real-time data exchange. The project seeks
to answer whether U.S. and European ANSPs can respond adequately to a non-nominal event during a launch or
re-entry operation that presents a hazard to the airspace system. It leverages existing international data standards
and infrastructures by using a data exchange approach based on System Wide Information Management (SWIM).
Within the project an initial assessment of the processes, roles and responsibilities for implementing launch and
re-entry events in the air traffic systems on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as the requirements for basic
functions and performance parameters of a SWIM-based integration, have been completed. The project devel­
oped a demonstration model across all system levels as far down as to the ANSPs, namely to the air traffic
controllers. Through a series of demonstrations, covering launch scenarios from the U.S. with possible effects on
European airspace and vice versa, the project evaluated the technical and operational feasibility of the concept.
The key data parameters identified during the analyses shall enable information sharing among various users
within the U.S. and European global airspace system. It has been shown, that the systems on both sides of the
Atlantic could be connected via standardized protocols und used successfully for exercises in different scenarios.
Further research on the best integration of the processes in international Air Traffic Management (ATM) net­
works and domains will be the follow-on.

1. Introduction scope and scale. The vehicles cross territorial, national and airspace
boundaries on their way to and from space. While it may take a vehicle
The DLR (Deutsches Zentrum fuer Luft-und Raumfahrt / German just a few seconds to move across these boundaries, the effects on the
Aerospace Center) and the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) airspace below can linger for minutes or even hours in the event of a
initiated the 2018 DLR-FAA Data Exchange Project (DEP) in support of non-nominal occurrence.
identifying and validating solutions for safely and efficiently integrating Timely, efficient and effective data sharing across participating en­
commercial space launch and re-entry operations into the global tities is a critical enabler to effectively prepare and execute their re­
airspace system. The collaborative nature of this work has been sponsibilities for safe and efficient airspace management, particularly in
formalized through a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) in the non-nominal scenarios.
development of commercial space transportation, which has been signed
October 24, 2019 by the DLR and the FAA Office of Commercial Space 2. Problem description
Transportation (FAA AST).
Launches to orbit and re-entries from orbit are operations of global The number and type of commercial space launches and re-entry

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected] (S. Kaltenhaeuser).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2023.10.021
Received 25 February 2023; Received in revised form 28 July 2023; Accepted 12 October 2023
Available online 20 October 2023
0094-5765/© 2023 IAA. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
S. Kaltenhaeuser et al. Acta Astronautica 214 (2024) 137–146

operations is continuously increasing at a global level. In order to ensure and interoperable manner.
the safety of air traffic, the spacecraft is separated from other aircraft The objective of the project therefore was to develop and demon­
over a wide area. This is not only to ensure sufficient separation between strate mechanisms for cross-border exchange of real-time information.
the respective vehicles, but also to take into account a higher probability With the help of this information exchange, potentially affected air
of failure compared to air traffic standards. Thus, air traffic (and also traffic control facilities are to be enabled to clear endangered airspaces
people and infrastructure on the ground) must be protected from po­ quickly and reliably. To this end, suitable information systems based on
tential debris in the event of a non-nominal situation. digital data exchange are to increase the situational awareness of the
In principle, a non-nominal event can occur during the entire flight involved stakeholders and enable reliable decision-making. The data
phase, for example, anywhere along the ascent trajectory. Risk calcu­ made available digitally should be capable of providing all the infor­
lations provide information on how high the resulting damage proba­ mation needed to implement the measures required to clear the affected
bility is and what consequences are to be expected. The occurrence of airspaces via the decision-making levels involved, right up to the air
potential damage events can be prevented by closing off large segments traffic controller.
of airspace along the flight trajectory and the potential debris trajectory.
However, this has a massive impact on air traffic operation and leads 3. Conceptual approach
to enormous disruptions in the airspace such as flight delays and
reroutes [1]. Moreover, hazard areas in oceanic airspace cannot be Addressing this challenge, the DEP set itself the goal to demonstrate a
closed but merely designated as danger areas. In order to reduce the way of integrating Space Traffic Management (STM) into Air Traffic
need for preventive airspace closures, they instead will be limited to Management (ATM) by exploring space data exchange on an interna­
areas for where there is insufficient time to guide aircraft out of the risk tional level between operators and air navigation service providers
zone when a non-nominal event occurs. Airspace restrictions required (ANSPs) to increase situational awareness and the ability to respond to
for this purpose will be communicated in advance via Notice to Airmen non-nominal events during space operations thus improving efficiency
(NOTAM) and will include areas around the spaceport and along the and safety.
initial flight path, as well as around the area expected for the return of The basic safety concept follows the procedure model outlined
burned-out rocket stages or fairing. The size of these areas will be below:
calculated in advance as part of safety analyses using detailed models. For a rocket launch, suborbital flight or re-entry, a trajectory is
For all other areas potentially affected by a non-nominal event, it must planned in advance and a safe flight corridor is determined. A set of
be determined whether they pose an unacceptable risk to other airspace criteria and parameters characterize a nominal flight path. Potential
users or not. If it is the case, concepts have been developed to allow air trajectories outside this range represent a non-nominal event. Not every
traffic control to warn and guide potentially affected aircraft out of an such non-nominal event must be catastrophic (for example, a loss of
affected area in the event of an accident [2]. signal that is subsequently reacquired). In the event of a catastrophic
On the FAA side, the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia during its re- event in which the spacecraft is destroyed and debris is created, po­
entry in 2003 was a trigger for the development of such procedures [3]. tential hazard areas are precalculated for each point in the flight path. As
The evaluation of this accident had shown that aircraft had flown several part of the licensing process, it is usually checked that the risks associ­
times through the danger area of the debris cloud that had been created, ated with these hazardous areas do not exceed the permissible limits. To
and that there was neither sufficient information on the side of air traffic ensure this, however, they may have to be cleared of people or traffic.
control to recognize the dangers nor established procedures to be able to For air traffic, this is done, for example, by temporary flight restrictions
react to them. The procedures subsequently developed and implemented or by dynamic procedures for clearing an affected area. In the event of a
were a prelude to improved dynamic integration of space events into air non-nominal event, these areas are calculated on the basis of the last
traffic management in the United States. Models and procedures for state vector received and reported to air traffic control so that it can
calculating Aircraft Hazard Areas (AHAs) were improved and their maintain and ensure the safety of air traffic in the relevant airspace. For
computational speed increased, so that information about an AHA can this purpose, air traffic controllers issue the necessary instructions to
be derived from the last available position report of a spacecraft and aircraft pilots to safely leave the affected area or to stay away from it.
transmitted to air traffic control. For some time, work has been under­ This is a time-critical operation, as the resulting debris will fall into the
way to convert the initially established manual processes, which were affected area at high speed.
based among other things on telephone transmissions of AHA descrip­ The specific focus of the project was therefore to address air traffic
tive coordinates, into digital processes and to accelerate them [4,5]. Part safety during launch and re-entry operations by increasing situational
of the reason for this is to respond to the massive increase in launch awareness through information exchange. The first evaluation intent
frequency at U.S. spaceports. was to focus on the data exchange during non-nominal events. The
Other nations and spaceports, such as the European Spaceport at second evaluation intent was broken up into the following key
Kourou, also use similar processes where, if necessary, concerned air questions:
traffic control facilities are notified by telephone about areas affected by What data should be exchanged for commercial space launch and re-
a non-nominal event such as an on-trajectory explosion of the space entry operations?
vehicle.
However, with the increase of commercial space launch and re-entry • Capture an international perspective, assuming cross-border
operations, the frequency of space flights traversing the airspace also operations.
used by others is growing. The former special event of a space launch has • Identify the information needed by the different involved
become daily business. Due to the nature and physical requirements of stakeholders
space operations, the impact of a non-nominal situation cannot always
be limited to national boundaries and jurisdictions. This must be In what timeframe (prior, during & after commercial space launch
considered when adapting processes that simultaneously permit a rapid and re-entry operations) does the data need to be exchanged?
response capability to incidents to ensure safety, while maintaining the
necessary airspace capacity for air traffic. Efficient and reliable provi­ • Identify the different information requirements that exist for each of
sion of all information required for this purpose is crucial. Due to the these timeframes
global nature of spaceflight events, national solutions are not sufficient • Address the problem of time criticality that is present during
in this respect today. Affected and involved stakeholders must be operations.
included in future concepts for addressing this issue in a cross-border

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• Enable timely availability of data to ensure more efficient use of

airspace during launch and re-entry operations

What is the utility of the data exchanged?

• With information being available, how can it utilize the planning and
decision-making process?
• Who will be able to utilize the information?
• Can we use the information to act on it – effectively and efficiently?

3.1. Data selection and communication format

Starting with the data exchange itself, first of all the data or
respectively information that was to be shared and exchanged had to be
identified. The way these data can be shared had to be addressed in
parallel, as the type and categories of data might influence communi­
cation methods and formats.
Existing (standardised) methods of data sharing for aeronautical
information were used as a starting point. Here, System Wide Informa­
tion Management (SWIM) is becoming an increasingly important and Fig. 1. R&D SWIM LRVTSS message example.
applied standard. The FAA research and development (R&D) environ­
ment provides SWIM capabilities which were available to be used within They can be used to distribute information during planning and execu­
the project. Furthermore, DLR already demonstrated dynamic and tion of a flight. This is reflected also in the different types of AHAs:
secure data exchange of airspace restrictions based on SWIM solutions, Planned, Contingency and Refined. In this sequence they are usually
together with the Embry-Riddle university, using the Florida NextGen getting more precise (and therefore also smaller) with respect to the
Testbed in Daytona [6]. The prototypical data exchange demonstration actual flight event. The AHAMS contains information about the position
setup therefore expanded on this experience and used the available ca­ of the hazard area (coordinates) and also its vertical dimension (upper/
pabilities. It should already be noted that SWIM might only be a part of lower limits), the time it has been calculated (generated) for and when
later implemented solutions, as sharing mission critical data will most the AHA is expected (!) to be cleared again. The message also contains
likely require other dedicated ways of data communication. Neverthe­ additional information about the related vehicle and mission they are
less, SWIM is providing very specific capabilities which were of good use generated for. Table 2 shows the complete list of data types used with
for testing the concept developed in this framework. the AHAMS. Fig. 2 shows an example of the related R&D SWIM message
Using SWIM to share the data dictated to some extent the format to format.
be used and led to two specific SWIM-messages: Launch Reentry Vehicle
Tracking and Status Service (LRVTSS) and Aircraft Hazard Area Message
Service (AHAMS), which have been developed as extensions to previous 3.2. Data exchange timeframe and information needs
existing definitions.
The LRVTSS basically provides vehicle status and positioning infor­ After the content and format of the data exchange has been deter­
mation. It is used to follow the trajectory of the spacecraft and it can mined, the timeframes in which the information should be exchanged
further be used to extract the last known state vector of the vehicle in and made available to the different stakeholders have to be defined.
case of a non-nominal event. Essential information included within the Three major timeframes have been identified with respect to launch and
LRVTSS is data about the vehicle type and ID, vehicle and flight status re-entry operations – prior, during and after the operation takes place.
information and position, altitude and speed. Table 1 shows the com­ Those data exchange timeframes and the respective information needs
plete list of data types used within the LRVTSS. Fig. 1 shows an example which have been identified are shown in Table 3.
of the related R&D SWIM message format. Information exchange PRIOR to launch and re-entry operations can
The AHAMS provides information about potential hazard areas. be achieved by various documents and files. A standardized information
set might be beneficial. While mission briefing and information like the
Table 1
Launch reentry vehicle tracking and status service data types. Table 2
Aircraft hazard area message service data types.
Launch Reentry Vehicle Tracking and Status Service

Number Data Type

Aircraft Hazard Area Message Service
1 Vehicle Name
Number Data Type
2 Mission Type (Launch/Re-entry)
3 Vehicle Type ID 1 AHA Type (Planned, Contingent or Refined)
4 Vehicle Type Element 2 AHA Generation Time
5 Vehicle Status (Nominal/Non- nominal) 3 Mission Type (Launch/Re-entry)
6 Sensitivity (All, Restricted, 4 Vendor ID
Department of Defense A/R/D) 5 Flight ID
7 Position (Latitude-Long) 6 Vehicle Type
8 Airspeed (Knots) 7 Vehicle Type Element
9 Altitude (Meters) 8 All Clear Time
10 Timestamp (Vehicle and Message) 9 Sensitivity
11 Velocity (NED in m/s) 10 Begin and End Time
12 Flight Status 11 Upper and Lower Limits (Feet)
13 Flight Identification 12 Position (Latitude-Long)
14 Operator 13 Timestamp (AHA Generation and Message)

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management, particularly for preparing for and responding to a non-

nominal event.
The provision of the identified information aims at improving situ­
ational awareness of all involved parties, in particular air traffic flow
management, air traffic control centers and air traffic controllers. It is
intended to assist them in taking action when a non-nominal event oc­
curs, and to maintain the safety of air traffic at all times during launch
and reentry.
This means that both planning information on potential hazard areas
and real-time data on hazard areas in case of a non-nominal event must
be fed into the air traffic management systems and be displayed to the
air traffic controllers responsible for the sectors concerned. The data
received must be acquired, displayed, and used in an appropriate
manner supported by procedures to be defined accordingly.
Because of the high speeds and high altitudes during launch and re-
entry operations, time is a critical factor. If the information required to
act can be provided in near real time to the responsible actors, it will
enable greater efficiency and effectiveness in handling non-nominal
situations and can improve the integration of space operations into the
air traffic system.
The transmission of information via a digital exchange should ensure
that the required data is provided in real time, and in a secure and
reliable manner. For a non-nominal event, at a minimum, the vehicle’s
Fig. 2. R&D SWIM AHAMS message example. position, status, and associated hazard area information must be
captured and transmitted.
Making this information available in digital and structured form
Table 3 (compared to previous analog transmission methods) is also a prereq­
Data exchange timeframes. uisite for more advanced functions in ATM and ATC systems. Thus, the
Data exchange timeframes and information needs described data exchange is a prerequisite and basis for intelligent
PRIOR DURING AFTER functions for decision support as well as for higher degrees of
automation.
• Mission Briefing • Actual Trajectory • Data analysis focusing on the
• Mission Name • Key Mission Event speed of the data exchange
• Operator • Refined Hazard Area (timelines) and the SWIM 3.4. Technical setup of a functional data exchange prototype
• Launch Site (RHA) in case of a connection (producer-
Launch Date non-nominal event consumer)
•
To realize a functional environment of the real-time data exchange,
• Launch Time • Lessons Learned
• Planned FAA and DLR developed a setup facilitated by available infrastructures
Trajectory and prototype tools. Using specific capabilities of the FAA-AST Com­
• Key Mission Event mercial Space Integration Lab at the FAA William J. Hughes Technical
List Center (WJHTC) and the DLR Air Traffic Validation Center of the
• Contingency
Hazard Areas
Institute of Flight Guidance, systems were connected for real-time data
(CHAs) communication, transmitting LRVTSS and AHAMS data packages, using
the FAA R&D SWIM installation at the WJHTC. The DLR systems were
connected via VPN with the WJHTC R&D SWIM.
mission name, operator, launch site, -date and -time might be summa­ As the demonstration scenarios, described later in section 4, required
rized in a readable mission briefing package. A provision in machine- data flows with different directions, allowing to cover operations from
readable format can help in the future to make this information the U.S. with potential effects on European airspace and operations from
directly available in data processing systems for connected stakeholders. Europe with potential effects on U.S. airspace, the technical setup and
The planned trajectory is provided by a data set. Its formatting can, for the initiated data flows varied accordingly. Typically, the space vehicle
example, correspond to the same formalism as is used for the LRVTSS trajectory was simulated using a real-time simulation replay or an excel
messages. Information about the CHA, in turn, can use the formatting of trajectory re-player. The state vector information was processed and
the AHAMS message type. A Key Mission Event List should also be LRVTSS messages generated and transmitted. CHAs for planned trajec­
provided in a standardized manner. tories were calculated beforehand and provided through information
DURING the launch and re-entry event, the information exchange exchange prior to the simulated operation. Refined Hazard Area (RHA)
uses the LRVTSS and AHAMS messages, as described in section 3.1, in coordinates were calculated based on actual state vector data and
addition to some other information, e. g. key mission events like the transmitted via an AHAMS message.
staging of the rocket. On the FAA side, Hazard Risk Assessment and Management (HRAM)
AFTER the operation has taken place, the performance of the data capabilities were used to calculate the resulting RHA, in association with
exchange can be evaluated. Also, information should be shared which functionalities provided by the Space Data Integrator (SDI) prototype,
allows an analysis with respect to the performance indicators relevant which was also used for visualization of the vehicle trajectory, flight
for this kind of operation. progress information, related AHA and other related status information.
On the DLR side, a generic Spacecraft Hazard Area Server produced
3.3. Utilization of exchanged data RHA information when required.
On the receiving end of the data exchange, the information was
As described earlier, timely, efficient, and effective data sharing processed, verified and visualized. Through the visualization, using
among the involved stakeholders is a critical prerequisite for effective either the FAA SDI or the DLR Space Operations Dashboard (SOD,
preparation and execution of actions for safe and efficient airspace Fig. 3), participating stakeholder – like an ATC center supervisor - were

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Fig. 3. Space operations dashboard (SOD).

able to follow the flight progress and potentially affected areas (CHAs); Four different non-nominal event scenarios have been generated:
in case of a non-nominal event, stakeholders could assess the affected
region of the resulting RHA and decide on initiating appropriate miti­ • Loss of Signal (LOS), with a re-acquisition of the signal later in the
gation measures. flight
As part of the DLR setup, RHA information could be forwarded from • Diversion (for the suborbital flight – similar to a change of landing
the SOD workstation, when confirmed by the Supervisor, to an air traffic site for a horizontal re-entry vehicle)
Controller Working Position (CWP). The technical setup involved a • Abort (with crew capsule landing)
coupling with the DLR air traffic control simulator (Air Traffic Man­ • On-trajectory explosion
agement and Operations Simulator – ATMOS), allowing an air traffic
controller to react on getting the RHA displayed at the prototype radar The SpaceLiner scenario represents a special case here, especially
display (Traffic & Trajectory Visualization - TTV), where he was con­ since assumptions must be made about the possible operational inte­
trolling simulated air traffic. Similar evaluations addressing the utili­ gration of such a hypersonic suborbital vehicle. The SpaceLiner concept
zation of the data exchange has been performed by FAA using a traffic has been developed by the Space Launcher Systems Analysis (SART)
simulation tool. group of DLR. Its basic idea is to enable sustainable low-cost space
Fig. 4 shows the data flow which has been established for the U.S.-to- transportation to orbit. At the same time, it revolutionizes ultra-long-
Europe scenarios. distance travel between different points on Earth. As a future high-
speed intercontinental passenger transport vehicle, it is designed as
4. Experiments and demonstration rocket-propelled, two staged suborbital reusable launch vehicle (RLV)
[7,8]. The SpaceLiner can service ultra-long-haul distances (e.g. Europe -
4.1. Scenarios North West America) in slightly more than 1 h. The general baseline
design concept of the SpaceLiner consists of a fully reusable booster and
For demonstrating the data exchange, a number of scenarios have passenger stage arranged in parallel. During the launch phase orbiter
been designed. Those scenarios were then used to simulate the launch and booster stage are firing until separation, which will take place at
event and execute the data exchange using the system setup which has approx. Mach 12.5. The reusable booster stage will return to the launch
been described in 3.4. site. The orbiter stage will proceed with its power flight until MECO with
The scenarios consisted of three different flight profiles: a maximum speed of around 7.1 km/s at an altitude of 69 km. The
propulsive phase is directly followed by hypersonic gliding, through
• Simulated launch from Cape Canaveral spaceport Florida for an which the vehicle would travel almost outside of the atmosphere at very
assumed cargo or crew supply to the ISS low drag. The orbiter will approach its destination entering controlled
• Simulated launch from Kourou spaceport at French Guiana into a airspace at an approx. distance of 70 km, with its speed being already
polar/sun-synchronous orbit less than Mach 3 below FL600. The orbiter will decelerate below Mach 1
• Simulated suborbital A-to-B flight from Europe (Germany) to the U.S. by approx. FL360 [9]. For the DLR-FAA Data Exchange Project dem­
west coast based on the DLR SpaceLiner concept [7]. onstrations a flight between a launch site in northern Germany (Nord­
holz) and a destination in California, USA which ends at the US west
The flight profiles were combined with a number of event scenarios, coast was named as reference flight trajectory. During the demonstra­
representing both nominal and non-nominal flights. Table 4 shows the tion only the trajectory segment past MECO has been simulated.
matrix of the different flight profiles combined with nominal and non- The associated non-nominal event simulated a diversion from the
nominal flight progress scenarios. nominal SpaceLiner reference trajectory, caused for example by weather

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Fig. 4. U.S. to Europe data flow.

mission planning. It is assumed that potential alternate landing site(s)

Table 4
are able to host the deviating SpaceLiner and will be prepared to
Overview of the nominal and non-nominal scenarios used during the
accustom the vehicle into their operations (based on adequate infor­
demonstration.
mation, e.g. also supported by a SWIM service). During the diversion to
US-to-EU EU-to-US
the alternate landing site, the SpaceLiner orbiter operator representative
NOMINAL Rocket Launch(Crewed) Soyuz(Cargo) Kourou provided verbal indication via the hotline of the SpaceLiner orbiter and
Cape Canaveral SpaceLiner(Crewed) Germany – US the intended alternate landing site.
West Coast
During the scenario runs, data was exchanged in real-time via the
NON- Loss of Signal (Crewed) Loss of Signal (Cargo)
NOMINAL On-Trajectory Explosion On-Trajectory Explosion (Cargo) described message formats. To cover also the „analogue“ part of
(Cargo) Kourou communication, which is an essential part of the process to maintain
Abort (Crewed) Diversion(Crewed) Germany – US situation awareness and communicate decisions fast and in real-time,
Cape Canaveral West Coast
certain roles were defined and brought together via a telephone con­
ference. Depending on the scenario team members were representing
or flight system anomaly. The diversion trajectory would not be known the Joint Space Operations Group (JSpOG) on the U.S. side of the op­
in advance, but alternate landing site(s) would be communicated by the erations, representatives of the launch and/or re-entry vehicle operator,
SpaceLiner orbiter operator and would be available already during air traffic network operations supervisor and also Air Traffic Controllers

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(ATCO) (for parts of the scenarios at which the utilization of exchanged called internal and external demonstrations, addressing the extended
information was analysed up to the CWP). FAA and DLR teams as well as interested international stakeholders.
In the following, using the US-to-Europe On-Trajectory Explosion During the so-called external demonstration, a total of 40 participants
scenario, the execution of the individual scenarios is explained and the from European air navigation service providers, aviation authorities,
resulting implementation and demonstration of the concept is described space agencies and spaceports (Germany, France, Italy, United
in more detail: Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Finland as well as Eurocontrol) partici­
In the named scenario a generic space vehicle launch from Cape pated, during which several scenario re-runs have been performed and
Canaveral is simulated. The launch trajectory traverses the Atlantic stakeholder feedback has been collected.
Ocean, with potential debris hazards over European airspace in case of a As part of the project and to further reach out to the public, addi­
non-nominal event late in the launch. For the scenario it is therefore tional demonstration for students in STEM based courses (Science
assumed that European ANSPs, especially en-route ATCOs are to be Technology Engineering Math) have been performed on both sides (U.S.
involved in the event. The airspace directly around the launch site gets and Europe) using the developed setup.
temporarily restricted during the launch window. Airspace further Due to the fact that the exercise execution and the described dem­
downrange below the flight trajectory is not restricted, hence air traffic onstrations had to be performed between end of 2020 and mid-2021, the
is operating normally. technical setup had to be adapted to accommodate for COVID-19 related
During pre-mission analysis, CHAs have been calculated, providing restrictions, preventing the project team to use FAA and DLR in­
indications of potentially impacted areas in case of non-nominal events frastructures as planned. The system setup had to be changed in a way
for the whole launch. During launch, telemetry and status information is that allowed the team to operate and execute the exercises out of the
monitored by the FAA, using the SDI. Within the developed concept, that respective Home Offices. Fig. 5 gives an impression of this alternate
information is as well shared on the European side, using SWIM for data execution setup.
exchange, showing information on the SOD.
569 s into the launch an on-trajectory explosion occurs. This gen­ 5. Results and discussion
erates debris, which will pass through the atmosphere and controlled
airspace down to the ground. The hereby caused Loss of Signal (LOS) 5.1. Exercise execution and data transmission
and changed status is recognized by the SDI as well as the SOD. The
event triggers an RHA calculation, performed with FAA tools. The RHA Detecting a non-nominal situation usually starts with a LOS. The
is specific to the last received state vector and the atmospheric condition situation is getting evaluated, which has been covered in the simulation
at the day of operation. It is therefore smaller than the CHA. The RHA is through communication on a hotline between launch operator, JSpOG
transmitted via AHAMS message to the SOD on the European side (with and launch operation supervisor. In this process, LOS time and last state
DLR in this simulation representing the European ATM stakeholders), vector gets confirmed by the launch operator. The calculation of a RHA
where the situation is getting evaluated. Before the debris reaches alti­ is initiated already in parallel, based on the last received state vector,
tudes of controlled airspace, ANSP decision makers are able to relay the and then transmitted via an AHAMS message to the connected receiving
RHA information to the responsible Area Control Centers (ACCs) and facilities. The times for generating the RHA and receiving the RHA at the
from there to the CWPs. The ATCOs can now react to the received in­ other facility are shown in Table 5.
formation and the RHA displayed on their radar screen and clear the The duration of the sequence between the LOS and the receipt of the
concerned airspace. By the time the debris falls through the airspace RHA on the part of the participating stakeholders varied between 37 and
where air traffic operates, air traffic control should have already cleared 62 s. Within this timeframe, the generation and transmission of the RHA
the RHA-area. itself only consumed an amount of 1–2 s.
During the exercises and the following data analysis an issue
4.2. Exercises regarding the message reception through SWIM was discovered. Lost
messages between producer and consumer occurred. During several
To evaluate the developed concept, a number of exercises have been scenarios, the SWIM R&D system dropped every third message. If the
performed, applying the described scenarios with the technical imple­ AHAMS message was part of the dropped messages, a time stamp for the
mentation for real-time data exchange. RHA reception could not be generated (thus the missing times in Table 5
Through a number of technical exercises, the functionality of the for the EU-to-US scenarios). The SWIM issues have been investigated in
data exchange, required CHAs and RHAs calculations, message gener­ the follow up of the exercise runs and the error could be isolated,
ation and reception, data processing and visualization has been verified. identified and corrected. Later test showed correct data handling using
Functional exercises then evaluated the feasibility of the concept and the SWIM setup.
the procedures accompanying the technical data exchange. For each Further data analysis showed that data transmission worked equally
scenario all required roles were occupied by team members from DLR fast into both directions (<1 s), data processing from LOS to RHA
and FAA. Each scenario had a detailed script covering all involved roles, reception was comparable for both directions and for all tested
the expected data exchange events and the procedures being performed, scenarios.
including the communication via the running hotline. Each scenario
started with the final minutes of the launch countdown and ran through
the complete launch operation prior to orbital insertion (or the scripted
event), except the SpaceLiner scenarios which started mid-flight to avoid
unnecessary waiting times of an otherwise uneventful 90-min flight
progress.
During the performance of each exercise, data transmissions have
been recorded and events have been logged, allowing for analysis of data
transfer times and reaction times based on available information pro­
vided via hotline and data exchange.

4.3. Demonstration

Following the performed exercises, the project concluded with so- Fig. 5. Home Office execution setup.

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Table 5 5.2. Utilization of RHA information at the CWP

Time difference between LOS and RHA reception (time stamps in hh:min:ss).
US-to-EU EU-to-US To analyse the potential of utilizing data exchange all the way to the
air traffic controller, DLR has developed a concept to visualize infor­
LOS On- Abort LOS On-
Trajectory Trajectory mation at the CWP [10]. This should enable the controller to initiate
Explosion Explosion appropriate measures to protect aircraft from falling debris. The concept
LOS detected 13:54:30 14:54:30 15:19:29 15:28:15 15:58:20
has been implemented and evaluated at DLR’s Air Traffic Validation
Generate 13:55:23 14:55:31 15:20:05 15:29:08 15:58:47 Center and used during the DEP exercises.
RHA If airspace is, due to falling debris, temporarily restricted for aircraft,
Receipt of 13:55:25 14:55:32 15:20:06 – – controllers need three critical pieces of information: First, where the HA
RHA
is located; second, when the area is active; third, which aircraft are at
Time 55 s 62 s 37 s - -
Difference risk. The Human Machine Interface (HMI) developed makes this infor­
mation accessible through four additional elements on the radar screen:
a button to display the CHA, a representation of the RHA, time in­
It has to be emphasised that – after issues in the SWIM R&D system dications relating to the RHA and an algorithm that identifies aircraft at
setup had been solved – the communication using SWIM worked well risk and highlights them. Fig. 6 shows a screenshot of the ATCO HMI
throughout the data exchange demonstration. Nevertheless, in general, used during the DEP exercise runs, with the airspace controlled by the
data communication setups for mission critical data have to be evalu­ ATCO in a darker blueish grey and the transmitted RHA shown as a
ated against all relevant reliability and security criteria. The important dotted line segment.
result from the perspective of the DEP is, that by using adequate tech­ Evaluation of the visualization concept has been performed in
nical means to exchange launch and re-entry operational data, relevant separate experiments, which have confirmed the general approach,
information can be provided in real time to ATM stakeholders involved functionality and layout decision, but also pointed out the need for
in mission critical decision making. further research. This has to address specifically the coordination pro­
In addition, it must be noted that RHA calculation usually started cesses between controllers, as it may results in new requirements for
immediately with the LOS being detected and that the calculation time such a concept [10].
itself depends on the tool and algorithms used to determine the RHA. During the DEP exercises, US-to-EU scenarios resulted in an RHA
Very fast prediction algorithms usually tend to be less accurate, but location south of Ireland (partly) within the simulated Shannon sector,
uncertainties are always compensated “to the safe side”, resulting in the participating air traffic controller (a former ATCO now working as
potentially larger areas to be protected. research associate at DLR) had no issues clearing the related airspace
As frequent short disruptions in the data stream might occur during segment and keeping it clear of air traffic during the scenario runs. It has
real operations, additional buffer times might be considered to distin­ to be pointed out that due to the non-nominal situation occurring late in
guish a LOS event from those effects. Nevertheless, a timely initiation of the flight, the resulting RHA was rather long but relatively narrow in size
the RHA calculation is critical to provide required data asap when (see Fig. 6), causing less issues in keeping it clear of air traffic but
needed. resulting in relatively long trajectory extensions to circumnavigate the
affected region. These effects were noted but were not in the focus area

Fig. 6. DLR ATCO HMI (TTV) showing transmitted RHA (dotted line segment in the center -).

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of the DEP. It is recommended nevertheless to evaluate such effects impacted stakeholders. For example, in a scenario that does not directly
during follow up activities. affect Europe (no debris falling through European airspace), how is
On the FAA side, potential utilization benefits of the exchanged data traffic entering the concerned airspace region from Europe affected and
and transmitted RHA by air traffic control has been performed offline how does European ANSPs and airspace users need to be involved?
using recorded data sets with a traffic simulation tool. Based on the As pointed out during the discussion, the definition and establish­
location of the RHA and simulated traffic for the chosen exercise sce­ ment of communication interfaces between STM and ATM in the Euro­
nario, the potential to clear the affected airspace segment from present pean framework will be required. In the meantime, first projects like the
aircraft has been evaluated. European SESAR ECHO [12] have started to address these issues.

5.3. Stakeholder demonstration feedback 6. Conclusions

The developed concept, the functional prototypes and the exercise The results of the DLR-FAA DEP demonstrations highlighted the need
setup and scenarios have been demonstrated via an online event on July for pre-mission planning and real-time mission status updates for
15th, 2021. While the demonstration had been previously planned as an increased preparedness, increased situational awareness, and an
on-location event, COVID-19 travel restriction made it necessary to increased ability to maintain a common operating picture across the
perform the demonstration online. Through screen sharing and video participants.
representation of the previously performed exercises, stakeholders were The exercises and demonstrations performed within the project have
asked to provide feedback to the concept itself and to point out potential shown that commercial space data can be exchanged and utilized for
follow up steps based on the achieved results. launch and re-entry operation and air traffic management. They also
Several questions were used to channel stakeholder feedback, like: confirmed the importance of providing all relevant information to the
stakeholders in need to make decisions related to the safety and effi­
• What data should be exchanged for commercial space launch and re- ciency of operation – in the air and in space.
entry operations? While the scenarios created for the purpose of evaluation and
• In what timeframe does the data need to be exchanged? demonstration of the developed concept were based on connecting U.S.
• Who needs the data in a nominal and in an off-nominal case? and European stakeholders, the concept is transferable to many other
missions and launch and re-entry operational situations involving other
In general, the developed concept and its elements received positive geographical regions and their stakeholders. This becomes obvious for
feedback, especially the digital data exchange via SWIM and the ability example, when considering launches affecting airspaces controlled by
to provide CHAs as initial information, updated then by an RHA when multiple ANSPs within a European environment or also on a global level.
calculated. Similarities between the CHAs and the SESAR concept of The DEP results have therefore been a valuable input for the DLR project
Dynamic Mobile Areas (DMA) [11] were pointed out. SpaceTracks, which intends building functions and mechanisms for a
The use of SWIM for the provision of time critical data was discussed, Launch Coordination Center (LCC) that can provide services for efficient
some stakeholders consider dedicated data communication protocols to integration of launches and re-entries into the air traffic system for all
be preferred, but SWIM use is as likely being a key component of ATM at types of launch and re-entry operations [13,14].
all altitudes for diverse airspace users. The implemented data exchange using SWIM showed the feasibility
Stakeholder feedback also indicated an interest into more detailed of the chosen technical approach for connectivity and data distribution.
analysis of the traffic impact of the exercise scenarios performed in the Since the time criticality and reliability requirements are high for the
DEP simulations, determining how many aircraft had to be diverted due examined purpose, the use of only SWIM based communication might
to drop zones or an incoming RHA. prove insufficient and dedicated communication protocols and in­
Furthermore, the stakeholder feedback included suggestions and frastructures might be required as well. Nevertheless, SWIM may be
recommendations within and beyond the scope of the DEP itself, such as: used to provide information to other airspace users, enhancing infor­
mation currently provided through NOTAMS, and adding dynamic
• A determination and creation of regulations with exact term defini­ functions.
tions is necessary to create international equality and situational Follow up activities have been identified on the basis of the achieved
understanding for the integration of STM into ATM. results. For example, the data exchange has to be implemented into
• Models are needed to accurately calculate RHAs, CHAs and the existing or new processes, e. g. within European network operation and
Instantaneous Impact Point (IIP), where the focus should be on the air traffic control itself. When exchanging information about hazard and
timing. These must be unambiguous and known to all stakeholders risk contours, international harmonization of risk assessment methods
and involved airspace users. and hazard area calculations become more important and might even
• Conduct validation as well as quantification of the DEP concept to become a pre-requisite for interoperability, especially when considering
underscore feasibility. An implementation of the concept in shadow licensing of launch and re-entry operations. For cross-border operations,
mode was advocated. international agreements on how such a concept can be applied to real
• Determining the exact response time available to the debris case is of operations have to be elaborated, including and involving all related
high interest. stakeholders.
• The difference between oceanic and traditional radar control must be
considered for operational use. The implementation of (satellite Declaration of competing interest
based) ADS-B is future-oriented and preferable.
• The framework of the DEP could be expanded: In addition to avia­ The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
tion, other stakeholders potentially affected by launches should also interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
be involved in data sharing (for example, shipping). Who else can the work reported in this paper.
benefit from the data and results obtained from the DEP? The feed­
back confirmed this open research question. Acknowledgements

Addressing the international coordination, the exchange with The authors would like to thank all team members of the FAA-DLR
potentially involved and affected stakeholders showed that there is yet a Data Exchange Project for their competent and dedicated work. For
lack of awareness and data on the difference of directly and indirectly the FAA team Dan Murray, James Hatt, Magda Batista-Carver, Emily

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Sisneros, Ruth Galaviz-Schomisch, Dan Bogdan (CTR), Mark Conaway [8] M. Sippel, S. Stappert, L. Bussler, S. Singh, S. Krummen, Ultra-fast passenger
transport options enabled by reusable launch vehicles, Monopoli, Italy, in:
(CTR), Kirk Hanson (CTR) and Shawn Torti (CTR). For the DLR team
Internationale Konferenz für Flugfahrzeuge, Aerothermodynamik und
Tim Rambau, Andre Tews, Frank Morlang and Jolin Neuβ. Wiedereintrittsmissionen und -technik (FAR) 30, 2019.
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commitment on starting a collaboration with DLR on the topic of com­ Sustainable Commercial Space Transportation through an Efficient Integration into
Air Traffic Management, Mary Ann Liebert Inc, New Space, 2017, https://doi.org/
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and to Magda Batista-Carver for her tireless pursuit of our project goals. [10] Kluenker, Carmo sonja; enhanced controller working position for integrating
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