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Journal of
AsiaNet Humanities &
PAKISTAN
Social Sciences
University of Peshawar JHSS XIX, No. 2, 2011

The Rise of Religious Politics in Pakistan:

A Case Study of October 2002 Elections in KP (NWFP)

Abdul Raufa and Mohammad Ayazb

a Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, Pakistan
b Kohat University of Science and Technology, Kohat, Pakistan

______________________________________________________________________
Abstract

The impressive gains of the six-piece religious party alliance, the MMA (Muttahida
Majlis-i-Aml), in October 2002 Elections in Pakistan represent a mass
mobilization in the name of Islam on a scale not seen since the creation of
Pakistan. The cry of ‘Islam in danger' was raised both against foreign, i.e.,
American neo-imperialism and against what were seen as ‘un-Islamic forces’
within the society. The concept of political Islam and its manipulation by the
Isalmists stirred the political will of the masses. October 2002 polls marks the
ever first time experience of the NWFP (now KP), at least in the post-
independence period, where a pre-electoral religio-political parties’ alliance (the
MMA) ruled the province with apparently no threat from the central government.
The replacement of political forces/parties in certain regions (dominating by
them since 1937) with relatively inexperienced religious leaders, unexposed to
modern western education required the attention of all the stakeholders,
including the international actors, now very active in the region. In this paper, we
try to look into and analyse religion, politics and ethnicity with particular
reference to the causes of and factors for the success of the MMA in the Pakthtun
dominated areas in Pakistan.

Keywords: 2002 General Elections; MMA; religion; politics; ethnicity; KP (NWFP)

______________________________________________________________________

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Introduction

The incident of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent counter-terrorist strikes
on Afghanistan had enormous impacts for Pakistan body politics. It affected the
outcome of the October 2002 election results as well. The Pakistan Muslim League
Quaid-i-Azam group (PML-Q) won 118 national assembly seats out of 342
followed by 80 seats of Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People Party Parliamentarians
(PPPP). The astonishing development in Pakistan’s political history was the
landmark victory of the religio-political alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Aml (the
MMA)1 which won 30 out of 36 National Assembly seats in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP). Having total sixty one seats in the national assembly,
the MMA emerged the third largest party in the national assembly. The MMA
successfully grabbed the position of the leader of opposition for Mawlana Fazlur
Rahman, head of the Jamiat ul ulama-i-Islam-F.2 Winning 53 out of 99 general
seats, the MMA formed its government in the NWFP, while in Baluchistan it
became a partner in the coalition government with the PML-Q.3 The entrance of
the religio-political parties in the government needs a scholarly attention as it re-
emphasise the role of religion in politics in certain societies. For a proper
understanding of this phenomenon background knowledge of the region in terms
of political dynamics is necessary.

Islam and Afghanistan as Determining factors in NWFP Politics

The ethnic-cum religious nationalism and happenings in Afghanistan usually

remained dominant factors in the NWFP. politics. The people of the NWFP.
strongly oriented toward religion. Pakhtun viewed Islam as one of the principal
constituents of their Pakhtun self-definition. To them, Muslim ways of life and
Pakhtun culture are not opposite rather complementing each other. They were
always ready to rise in support of religion particularly if it is not contradictory to
some of their cultural traits.4 Secondly politics of the province had always been
affected by the happenings in neighbouring country Afghanistan. This is true for
the past as well as for the present political dynamics of the region. Historically
speaking, the Anglo-Afghan wars of 19th century, and the final one in 1919,
perturbed Pakhtun in the NWFP. In late 1920s, Pakhtun were unhappy over the
political turmoil in which Amanullah Khan5 was expelled by a Tajik, Habibullah
Kalakani (known as Bachai Saqao) from Kabul. Pakhtun intellectuals in the NWFP
saw the secret hand of the British intelligence in the king’s exit. Pakhtun in the
NWFP showed sympathy and solidarity with anti-British elements in Kabul, and
even supported them financially.6
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 107

In the aftermath of the 1929 events in Kabul, the Pakhtun leadership in the NWFP
decided to launch an organised movement. In the year 1929 Abdul Ghaffar Khan
(better known as Bacha Khan) and his associates started Khudai Khidmatgar
(servants of God) for the uplift of Pakhtun community and against the British
imperialism.7 Khudai Khidmatgar broadly based its philosophy on bringing
reformism in the primordial and customs ridden Pakhtun society through
persuasion and modern education. Khudai Khidmatgar, Bacha Khan and his
brother Dr. Khan Sahib dominated politics of the province in the days to come.
story, tail
Certain historical events and anecdotes related to British India also had concern
for the people of Afghanistan. The flight of students from Lahore to Kabul (during
World War I) in protest against the British antagonistic policies towards the
Ottoman Empire; the ‘Silk Handkerchief Conspiracy’ movement of the ulama of
Deuband in 1915-16; the Mujahidin movement8 of the later followers of Sayyed
Ahmad Shahid (1786-1831); and the Indian Hijrat movement of 19209 are
occasions where Afghanistan share its sympathies with the people of British India
particularly with Pakhtun of the NWFP.

The Afghan factor remained intact in the post-independence days of Indo-Pak

subcontinent also. In the early days, Afghanistan rejected Pakistan’s claims of
British inherited legacy at least on the question of its Durand Line. Kabul
government strongly reacted when the One Unit Scheme10 was adopted in 1955.
The use of force in the tribal areas by General Ayub Khan in 1960s was also
resented by Kabul. Z. A. Bhutto’s government crackdown against Pakhtun
nationalists in mid 1970s once again created distance between Kabul and
Islamabad. These strained relations sometime led to break of diplomatic relations.
The political developments in Kabul also responded reactions from the people in
the NWFP. The overthrow of Zahir Shah and coming of Sardar Dawud got a mixed
reaction but Soviet intervention in 1979 affected more then anything else the
economic, political, social and cultural life of the NWFP.

Pakhtun commitment to religion as described earlier does not mean their

adherence to the religious political parties headed by mullah at least in the
elections. Most of the Pakhtun consider adherence to Islam and obedience to
mullahs, the stakeholders of Islam, entirely two different and fully separable
entities. According to Pakhtun nationalists, traditionally mullah has had an
inferior place in Pakhtun society. They were considered as members of a
professional group, never very high in society and used to have four main duties:
to sit in the mosque and lead prayers; to give azan in the ear of a newborn baby as
a ritual of initiation; to ensure performance of the funeral ceremony, i.e. to
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correctly place the dead body in the graveyard with the appropriate words of
blessing; and to perform nikah (a contractual bond) of marriages.11 The political
role of the mullah was largely circumscribed by other political parties and landed
interests groups.

The role of clergymen greatly changed in the end of 20th century in Pakhtun
society, primarily due to implicit and explicit external influences and
interventions. The traditional leader in prayers became active in the newly
created political stage. The formation of a religio-political government (after
October 2002 elections) was unprecedented in the history of the NWFP.12 This
was the ever first time since the partition of India in 1947, that the NWFP was
placed under a pre-electoral alliance government and composed of clerics.

The rise of religious activities in Pakhtun regions begins with the arrival of Soviet
forces in Afghanistan in 1979. Those who resisted the Soviets in the guise of
mujahidin became strategic partner of the military and security agencies in
Pakistan. They got the real taste of power when the three major sources of power
Allah, Army and America combined to contain the 'infidel' USSR by waging an
international jihad.13 The US and its Arab allies financial providence strengthened
religious elements in Pakistan in general and N.W.FP particular. The role of Iran
after 1979 revolution in fomenting religious enthusiasm and fanaticism in
Pakistan cannot be ignored.14 There were only 30 religious parties, organisation
and groups in Pakistan in 1979 which increased to 245 in 2003.15 The number of
madrasas also increased to a substantial level. According to the ICG Report Official
estimate indicates that 151 new madaris were opened during 1979-82 and 1000
during 1982 to 1986. 16 These developments gave rise to jihad culture in society in
1980. Pakistanis fought shoulder to shoulder with the Afghans against the Soviets.
Those who were killed their martyrdom was celebrated by the Jihadi
organisations. A conspicuous number of Pakhtun trained with sophisticated arms
entered in the social and economic fold. The whole phenomenon is locally
described as ‘Kalashnikov Culture’ means the accumulation of weapons and
increase of use of force for achieving ones objectives particularly in educational
campuses. In 1988, the main architect of this policy, Zia ul Haq died in an air
crash. But the sympathisers of jihadis continue to enjoy a proportionate chunk in
the legal, political, economic and educational structures of the country. The
democratic governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 1990s were un-
willing or were not allowed to roll back the well-entrenched infrastructure of
Jihad. However the religious elements/forces failed to muster electoral support of
the masses primarily due the active involvement of established political leaders in
the society.
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 109

After the 1999 military coup d’état of General Musharraf, the national political
leadership had no other way but to leave the country. The prolong absence of
these political leadership affected the social stratum of the NWFP which was very
much vulnerable to the religious catchwords. Weaknesses of moderate
mainstream political parties17 at the social level further the shattering of the
Pakhtun social fibre and created a leadership vacuum.18 This vacuum was filled by
the religious parties, having a widespread backup of mosque and madrasa
network.19 Musharaf military government is also blamed for a covert support to
religious elements. In the wake of religious fanaticism in Pakistan he would have
pose himself to the West particularly to the US as the only alternative to counter
the religious fanaticism in Pakistan. He had enough reasons to look to US for
support as he was lacking constitutional and democratic legitimacy.

Another factor which contributed to the religiosity of Pakhtun is the growing

strength of the Tabligh-i-Jama‘at in the province.20 Other provinces particularly
Punjab have a large portion of Barelvis, who are opponents to the Tabligh-i-
Jama’at, while the NWFP is more or less Deobandi, having a soft corner for the
Tabligh-i-Jama‘at. In the last few years, Pakhtun tilt to religion is successfully
exploited by this movement while explicitly professing no political agenda. In the
annual gathering of the Tabligh-i-Jama‘at, Pakhtun participation is greater than
any other community. The NWFP is the most suitable bastion for the Tabligh-i-
Jama‘at, as this province had hardly any population having divergent views to
Jama‘at's theological legacies.

The MMA and the October 2002 Elections

The analysis of factors/causes of the success of the MMA and failure of other
political parties in October 2002 elections would not only help to understand a
major turn in the NWFP. politics but would also enlighten us in religious and
political dynamics of one of the most volatile region of the world. These factors/
causes have been divided into three categories: Core Factors, Supportive Factors,
and the Catalyst.

CORE FACTORS

Core factors refer to those which contributed directly to the achievement of better
results by the MMA in the October 2002 election in Pakistan.
110 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

1. Unification of Religious Parties and Schools of Thought

Alliance of the religious parties was one of the major factors/causes that led to the
victory of the MMA in the October 2002 General Elections. However, alliance of
the religio-political parties was not an easy job when we look to Pakistan’s
chequered political history. Before the electoral alliance, certain developments
inside and outside the country obliged the religio-political parties to came under
one umbrella. One such development was Deuband Conference hosted by JUI-F in
Peshawar in April 2001.21 The conference was publicised through posters and
wall-chalking, as well as through the electronic and print media. It may be
regarded as the first leg of the religio-political parties’ election campaign, and it
came in the wake of a strictly enforced ban on political activities in the country.
The conference was attended by religious scholars and leaders from a number of
Muslim countries, including India, Afghanistan, Iran, UK, UAE, Libya and Saudi
Arabia. This conference attracted nearly one million people, and filled up
Peshawar’s roads and streets for three days. The most prominent figures who
attended this conference were Mawlana Marghoobur Rahman and Qari
Mohammad Usman chief and deputy chief of Darul uloom-i-Deoband respectively
and Mawlana Asad Madni, leader of Jamiat ul Ulama-i-Hind. Taliban Afghan
government was represented by Mullah Mohammad Hussain, deputy foreign
minister and Mullah Abdul Manan, governor of Badghis province. Mawlana Ishaq
Madni and Syed Mohammad Rizvi, advisors to the Iranian president, headed the
Iranian delegation. The Libyan delegation was led by Abdullah Jibran who read
out a special message sent by Colonel Muammar Qazafi. The most important
episode was the audio messages of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, who
criticised the west for their antagonistic policies toward the Muslims. This
conference boosts feelings of all religious elements in Pakistan in general and in
the NWFP particular to confront all elements who could not aligned with them
under one umbrella.

Prior to the MMA, there had also been two such alliances; Milli Yakjehti Council
(MYC), formed in 1995 to curb sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. It was eventually
derailed due to differences between the JUI (F) and the JUI (S) over the
distribution of the alliance offices and Islami Muttahida Inqilabi Mahaz (IMAM), a
29 religious party’s alliance led by the JUI (F) in early 2000. Unity of the religio-
political parties the MMA was originally not for electoral purposes but to block
what they viewed as incursion of ‘western ideology and culture’ in the guise of
certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially in Baluchistan and the
NWFP.22 In the post-9/11 political scenario, these parties shifted their concerns to
the defence of Pakistan and Afghanistan which was endanger as they perceived by
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 111

the US. The religio political parties now started demonstrations and called for
strikes for the safeguard of Pakistan and Afghanistan particularly in the wake of
Musharaf’s decision to side the Americans in their ‘War against Terror’.
Maintaining a consistent stride, the religio-political parties’ alliance protest
campaign was finally converted into an electoral campaign when the then
government announced general elections to be held in October 10, 2002.

In the year 2001 the MMA was formed23 consisting of six religio-political parties.
It was considered a good omen on the part of the religio-parties to the people of
Pakistan. In Pakistan’s political arena, masses had often criticised political clergy
by asking ‘If, as they say, they work for the sake of Islam and the Islamic system of
government, then why there are different religious parties and sects?’
Consequently, the clerics had usually failed to mobilise public support for them in
elections.

Pakistan’s religious population is divided into various groups dominated by

Deobandis and Barelvi, and Shia. The first two groups belong to the Sunni school of
thought. The former is ‘an orthodox religious movement professing its loyalties
with some puritanical tinge to the Hanafi school of Muslim fiqah.’24 They
demystify the role of saints and believe in simple ceremonies, and lays stress on
getting rid of all types of heresies. The Barelvis are primarily aligned against the
neo-traditionalist Wahabi’ interpretation of fundamental Islam. Its leader and
founder, Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921), tried to recast the Prophet’s sunnah
(tradition of prophet) according to his own perception of the Fiqh-i-Hanfi.25 The
Barelvi tendency is more inclusive, follows cultural sufism, and celebrates ‘urs
(death anniversaries of saints).26 The two factions of the JUI are followers of the
Deobandi school of thought, while the followers of the JUP belong to the Barelvi
School. The Shia sect is having many views divergent to the majority Sunnis
including a special reverence and religious authority to the house of holy prophet
which they called Ahl-i-Baiat. Islami Tehrik Pakistan (ITP), formerly known as
Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Ja‘faria Pakistan was the only Shi‘a political party in the
MMA. The JI, which consists of the urban educated, professional and business
classes, is considered to be more orthodox than other religious groups. Its
recruitment is largely drawn from modern educational institutions, rather than
the traditional madrasas. The JI worked as a bridge between different schools of
thought now united under the MMA. The Jami‘at Ahl-i-Hadith, which follows the
Prophet’s tradition and disavows any particular school of thought as such, is
associated with the Wahabi sect in popular parlance. Though Ahl-i-Hadith
themselves claim that they are not Wahabis, since Wahabis generally follow the
Hanbali school, while the Ahl-i-Hadith do not follow any school rather traditions of
112 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

the prophet. This process of unification of these groups had advantages; the unity
of the MMA was above sectarianism, which remained a serious social problem of
the 1980s and 1990s, and has created a situation of agreement between self-
identified allies on most issues. Secondly through a unified forum, the MMA
constituent parties become able to pool votes into one basket. Otherwise, the vote
bank of the religious parties would have been dispersed in different factions, sects
and parties. Thirdly, majority of people, ambivalent about making a choice among
various religious parties, were now convinced enough to accept a combined
appeal of the religious parties under a common electoral symbol, book.

2. Political Fallout of Crackdown on Seminaries/Jihadi Network

Pakistan’s educational system lacks uniformity. Along with modern educational

institutions, a parallel system exists primarily to impart learning, teaching, and
training in certain traditional and religious disciplines. These institutions get
financial support from the wealthy man and families through their zakat and
other donations. In terms of administration country’s leading religious parties,
sponsor most of these schools. Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the then federal
minister of religious affairs, reported that there are about 10,000, dini madaris
(religious seminaries) boarding 1.7 million students in 2002.27 Majority of the
militants, who fought alongside Al-Qaida and Taliban troops in Afghanistan, had
been educated in these religious seminaries under the auspices of CIA-ISI joint
mission. These seminaries were increasingly seen as breeding grounds for the
‘foot-soldiers of militant Islam’, motivated and trained to wage jihad, be it against
communism in Afghanistan, or the Hindu-India domination in Kashmir.

In the beginning of 2002, military government started to reform the religious

schools and issued the ‘Madaris Registration and Regulation Ordinance’. Aim was
to bring these institutions into the mainstream educational system. The ulama
thought that the reform scheme was brought on the behest of the US and other
western countries to curtail the religious sentiments among the people.
Government failed to remove this impression. Most of the religious leaders and
organisations rejected the government’s orders requiring religious seminaries to
register, and to reform their curricula in accordance with the ordinance. By and
large the government failed to bring any change in madrasas and religious groups
became more adamant to government authority. The inability of government in
implementation of its policies weakened state functionaries while on the other it
strengthened the position of religious leaders in society.
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 113

the MMA’s election strategy was implemented with a strong and effective network
of madrasas and jihadi organisations. These madrasas having more than one
million students became functionally useful in election. They provided street
power and organisational support to the MMA, which seems to be another factor
enabling the MMA to have a wholesale electoral campaign with a common
electoral agenda. They were successful in pooling the otherwise divided votes into
a single box in October elections. In the wake of 9/11 and the attack on
Afghanistan, Musharraf banned several terrorist outfits such as the Sipahi-i-
Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-i-Jangvi (LJ), Tahrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shari‘at-i-
Muhammadi (TNSM), the Tahrik-i-Ja‘faria (TJ), Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LT), and Jaish-
i-Mohammad (JM). However, their activists were released and they took part in
the elections as they were now organised under different names. Such a network
immensely helped the MMA and gave them an extra edge over other political
parties in the elections which were dysfunctional due to General Musharaf
military rule.

3. People's Thirst for Sharia Rule

Despite all internal contradictions among religious parties, classes and sects of the
society with strongly opposing viewpoints, the MMA patched up their rift by
providing a common agenda, a common cause: sharia, the ‘Islamic system of
governance’. In the elections campaign of October 2002, the MMA leaders
continuously excited the masses against the establishment, constantly criticised
the policies of the military regime in Pakistan. Furthermore, they concluded that
the plight of the Muslims all over the world was due to the failure of the ummah to
establish a socially just and Islamic system of governance which in there eyes was
Sharia.28 The thirst for Sharia rule was also evident in the movement launched in
1977 by PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) against Z. A. Bhutto which finally
concluded in the overthrow of Bhutto and imposition of martial law General by
Zia ul Haq. He exploited the Islamic sentiments of the people. He has been
commonly blamed for using the process of Islamization as tool for prolongation of
his rule in Pakistan.

4. Ethnic Factor

The the MMA won majority seats in Pakhtun dominated areas of the NWFP and
Baluchistan. The MMA won 27 out of 29 National Assembly seats in these areas,
while the remaining two seats went to PPP (Sherpao Group) as both parties had a
pre-electoral seat adjustment.29 In the Pakhtun areas of Baluchistan, such as Zhob,
Pashin, and Loralai, the MMA achieved better results than the Baluch dominated
114 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

areas. The Pakhtun population in Karachi (a cosmopolitan city of Pakistan) also

contributed to better results of the MMA in constituencies where Pakhtunwere
considerable in numbers.30 Top leadership of three integral component parties of
the MMA i.e. JUI (F), JUI(S) and JI were Pakhtun such as Mawlana Fazlur Rehman,
Mawlana Sami-ul-Haq and Qazi Hussain Ahmad. They understood well the psyche
and mentality of the Pakhtun voters. They addressed the people in their own
mother tongue, and thus fully utilised the situation better than the other political
parties and leaders.

The Pakhtun factor was far more important for victory of the MMA in the Pakhtun
belt of the NWFP and Baluchistan. For example, the destruction caused by the war
in Afghanistan after 9/11 created an impression that the war was Pakhtun-
specific, which incited Pakhtun against the attackers, the government and the
political parties who supported the war on terror in Afghanistan. The Pakhtun
living in the two provinces of Pakistan had deep fraternal relations with those
suffered under laser-sights and daisy cutter bombs in Afghanistan. Anti-war and
anti-government sentiments among the Pakhtun increased yet more when the
wounded and dead bodies of Pakhtun taking part in jihad in Afghanistan returned
to the country. Thousands of Pakhtun under Mawlana Sufi Muhammad, leader of
the TNSM, crossed Pak-Afghan border to take part in Jihad against the US forces. A
large number of people is still missing or in a precarious conditions in the jails of
Afghanistan. The fact that the Pakhtun-nationalist ANP party, supporting the
attacks on Taliban, could not catch the Pakhtun sentiments in the 9/11 election
campaign, helped the religious parties in winning seats in the Pakhtun belt.31 the
MMA was the most fitting and appropriate party in both time and space, had a
deep sympathy with the Taliban and Afghans, and launched anti-government
campaign that ultimately did catch the sentiments of the Pakhtun in Pakistan.

5. Voters' Grievances Against other Political Parties

Pakistan’s politics revolves greatly around the leaders and personalities of the
political parties. Over the years, the disenchantment of the public with the PPP
and the PML-N has increased because of widespread charges of corruption,
embezzlement, nepotism, and miss-governance, publicised by the military
government. Poor performance of these political parties was substantially
attributed to the absence of main national leaders from the country. This absence
tarnished their image in the eyes of the people, who start considering their self-
exile as an act of cowardice because of their fear of imprisonment or threat to
their life. Such lack of resoluteness in their character undermined the credentials
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 115

of the other political parties, and strengthened the locus standi of the mullahs.
Upon such a situation Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, a leading political scientist said,

Never have the people of Pakistan voted in such a large numbers in

favour of religious parties before…Again, this change is not confined to
the old, ignorant, rural people, but young, urban and professional class
seems to be tilting toward the religious parties…But the trend is visible
and, if the mainstream political parties continue to ignore the
fundamental issues of good governance, good state and society, the
general public including the middle class may embrace the fold of
religious parties.'32

The the MMA, in contrast to other political parties, had been very vocal
against America’s high-handed tactics in Afghanistan and its interference
in Pakistan’s policies, actively mobilised the people against Musharraf
government, and never hesitated to go behind bars. Compared to the
issue-driven campaign of the MMA, the conduct of the non-religious
parties appears to most observers as vacuous and spineless.

6. The the MMA Election Symbol ‘the’ Book

The the MMA was allocated book as an electoral symbol in the election 2002. In
the election campaign, leaders and supporters of the religious parties emphasised,
in their Friday sermons, orations, and public speeches, that it was mandatory
upon Muslims to cast their votes in favour of ‘the’ book. ‘The’ book, they said,
meant nothing other than the Holy Qur’an itself. Posters, pamphlets, broachers,
leaflets, charts printed for election campaign explicitly symbolised the Holy Quran
as a ballot icon.33 They termed the election as a battle between Islam and kufr
(infidelity)34. They further assured the people that in case they obtained enough
public support in the elections, the MMA would enforce a true Islamic system in
the country, ensure speedy justice as enunciated in the holy Quran. It is plausible
that some of the masses did indeed take the election symbol, ‘the Book’, as the
holy Qur’an itself as majority of the population particularly among Pakhtun are
illiterate. There is likelihood of people, on the polling day, who were yet
undecided due to the vacuum caused by the absence of the mainstream political
game players, stamped their votes on ‘the’ book, considering it a token of
reverence for the holy Qur'an and an act to beautify not only this life but the other
world also. That is why the non-the MMA political parties and candidates accused
the MMA and its candidates for playing with the people's loyalties to their faith
and making political capital out of it.35
116 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

Supportive Factors

The role of socio-political conditions and environment in the emergence and

growth of political leadership cannot be ignored particularly in the third world
countries. The MMA and its leadership is no exception. There are certain factors
which provided a favourable environment for the MMA to attract Pakistani voters
in the 2002 election. Some of these factors have its origin in the regional and
international events happened in and around Pakistan, while others were result of
the policies adopted by the then Musharaf government ostensibly for its own
benefits. All these factors are grouped as supportive factors for the success of the
MMA in the 2002 election.

1. Musharraf Earnest Quest for legitimacy

Since his military takeover in October 1999, Musharraf had promised an end to
religious extremism and promotion of a moderate Islam. His decision to join the
international coalition against terrorism after September 11, 2001 did bolster his
image as a reformist and a secular leader in the international community.
However, he also needed to have legitimacy for his rule not only at the
international level but also in home. It was thought that Western governments'
support to his policies was not enough. The public still considered Musharaf as a
military dictator. Only elections in Pakistan could have provided such legitimacy
to his rule. He needed a result showing his popularity and strength among the
masses in the proposed elections. Parties like Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N and Benazir
Bhutto’s PPP were sensed to be the real threat to his design of legitimising his rule
through election. Thus Musharaf opted to follow his military predecessors by
forging alliances of convenience with religious entities in order to counter his arch
political adversaries. Musharaf has been reported, in his three-hour long meeting
with Qazi Hussain Ahmad, to have expressed his determinations to block the
PPP’s return to power, and thus wanted all anti-PPP forces to join hands.36 The
threat of Nawaz Sharif’s PML was subsided with cutting it down after creating
PML-Q headed by Choudry Shujaat Hussain once interior minister in Nawaz Sharif
government.

To bring his blue eyed politicians and certain political parties inside the
parliament, Musharaf regime cannot be exempted from charges of political
manoeuvring. The anti-Musharraf parties’ particularly PML-N and PPPP
complained about rigging in the October elections. Some of these complaints have
been endorsed by the European Union Observers Mission (EUEOM). The mission
noted official interference in favour of the pro-government ‘King’s Party’ i.e. PML
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 117

(Q) and to some extent the MMA before and on the polling day.37 In one of the pre
polling manipulation of results, PPP claimed that in the month of September, just
before the elections, 140 election officers were moved from their places.38 These
transfers and postings traditionally benefit those who are in government in
Pakistan. Even before the elections, PPP proclaimed pre-poll riggings and voiced
that in the forthcoming elections, religious parties would have been given favour.
For example, the government did not provide enough time for the election
campaign as there was ban on political activities and it continued for too long. Its
repeal was announced on August 28, 2002 and become effective only on
September 01, 2002, thus giving very little time for the political parties to address
its electorates effectively. On the other hand, the MMA was allowed to hold
processions and rallies even in Rawalpindi, where the military headquarters are
located, while the Muslim League (Nawaz) and the PPP were denied the same
permission of such public gatherings.39 Furthermore, for mobilization of mass
support the MMA launched a train march from Karachi to Lahore to Peshawar on
August 28, 2002 without any restriction of the then government. These religio-
political parties already had pulpits in the mosques from where they could openly
discuss political issues with their electorates.

2. Political Unrest and Alternative Government

Since 1998 Pakistan was facing sever economic crisis due to economic sanctions
after the nuclear test. The Kargil Crisis (1998-99) and the retreat of Pakistan
military from the Tiger Hill further increased the distance between military and
political leadership.40 Nawaz Sharif was made responsible for this humiliating
retreat. The country was passing through a period of serious economic crises as a
result of economic sanctions by the international community after the nuclear test
in 1998. The political instability, government-opposition tussle and religious
fanaticism all had their origins in the short-term political expediency and charge
of corruption of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto’s elected governments in the
past eight years make these governments unpopular.41 The fragile political system
of Pakistan aggravated when General Musharraf ousted the elected Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999. Pakistan once again slipped away
from democratic norms42 and the response of the international community was
seriously condemning and censorious in the beginning.

In early 2002, India, imitating the United States, declared a preemptive strike
policy on the ‘terrorist groups’ in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and piled one
million troops on Pakistan’s eastern boundary.43 They campaigned to equate the
movement of freedom fighters in Kashmir with international terrorism, and
118 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

suggested the US-led war against terrorism should be fought in Kashmir as well.
On the western border of Pakistan, the US military deployment in Afghanistan was
felt by the public as to be inching towards insecurity. People watched the removal
of the friendly Taliban regime with suspicion, and doubted the sincerity of the
American friendship towards Pakistan.

Mainstream parties and politicians had either been discredited or had lost their
good reputations among the masses because of their failure to deliver the goods
to the masses. People were generally fed up with political parties and their
leadership and thus wanted a change in the political-cum-administrative spheres.
The MMA, which run better electoral campaign and held huge public meetings in
Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, attracted the masses as to be a
serious alternative contender of power in Pakistan.44

3. New Electoral Rules 2002

The Government announced a new eligibility criterion for candidates in the

election. Accordingly, one of the pre-requisite was that a candidate must have
certain educational qualification to contest election for the assemblies. The Chief
Executive's Order (No.7 of 2002) stated that ‘a person shall not be qualified to be
elected or chosen as a member of Majlis-i-Shora (Parliament) or a Provincial
Assembly unless he is at least a graduate possessing a bachelor degree in any
discipline or any degree recognized as equivalent by the University Grants
Commission under the University Grants Commission Act, 1974 (XXIII of 1974)’.
Certificates issued by religious seminaries (madrasas) called Shadat al Aalmiya
were equivalent to a university degree by the then University Grants Commission
and thus accepted for contesting the October polls by the mullahs whereas many
veteran politicians, including Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan,45 the leader of the
Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), were debarred to take part in
the election. Consequently, many politicians were disqualified on one ground or
another from taking part in the elections. The provision greatly benefited the
religio-political parties as they had enough persons in each constituency to qualify
for contesting elections.

4. Government Media Policy

The role of media particularly the electronic media is important in making people
perceptions and views including political likes and dislikes. Media plays a very
crucial role for the neutral or undecided voters to reach a decision about a
candidate or political party in the election campaign. As Pakistanis had little
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 119

access to private media reports, thus they have to rely on the state run media
apparatus. Secondly for the people in rural areas which constituted 70 % of the
total population, Radio Pakistan and Pakistan Television are the only accessible
means to information. In October 2002 election, coverage in the government
controlled media was also biased towards mainstream political parties.
Government favoured PML-Q and the MMA in media coverage. These parties have
been provided more coverage on Pakistan Television (PTV), the only state-run
channel, then the PPP and PML-N. According to a survey, in the first phase of the
campaign, the MMA received an average of seven minutes and 48 seconds of
coverage, while the largest party, the PPP, received only two minutes and 53
seconds in the state-controlled television news bulletin Khabarnama (national
news bulletin).46

The Catalyst: 9/11 & Pakistan’s Entry in the US-led War In Afghanistan

International politics, economics, national interests, and diplomatic relations

among various states took a sudden and immediate turn when the twin cities of
America came under terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. In Pakistan, the
response of the religious parties was a little more ambivalent in its combinations
of expressions of satisfaction, sorrow, and other emotions over the attacks on
America. Shah Ahmad Noorani, chairman of JUP supreme council, termed it ‘the
wrath of heaven brought about by the wails and cries of the oppressed nations’.
Qazi Hussain Ahmad, president of JI, denounced it as open terrorism and ruled out
Muslim involvement in the event. He reminded the US the event of the Oklahoma
city bombing, for which they held Muslims responsible, and even arrested
Muslims, while later investigations proved that these allegations were false.47
Mawlana Fazlur Rahman of the JUI condemned the attacks, but labelled them ‘a
lesson’ for US policy makers. He advised them to stop their cruelties against
innocent people in third world countries. Mawlana Azam Tariq of the SSP stated
that the US should realise that when its cruelties are boundless, the reaction
would be equally dreadful. Leaders of the Mujahidin fighting in Kashmir avoided
giving any comments over the events. Mawlana Samiul Haq of the JUI-S ruled out
Osama’s involvement in the attacks, and expressed his fear that the US would use
Pakistan’s soil as a base to target Afghanistan. He warned that people of Pakistan
would not tolerate the use of its soil, airspace, or intelligence of Pakistan against
the neighbouring country.48

Soon after 9/11, the US administration concluded that Osama Bin Ladin and Al-
Qaida, operating from Afghanistan, were behind the attacks, and that any
successful counter strikes would not be possible without the support of Pakistan.
120 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

Addressing the American nation, President George W. Bush plainly declared “we
will make no distinctions between those who planned these acts and those who
harbour [the ones responsible].” Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State,
addressing the national security meeting at the White House, asserted ‘We have to
make it clear to Pakistan and Afghanistan [that] this is show time’.49 Consequently,
Pakistan joined the US-led coalition against war on terror in Afghanistan. The
immediate entry of Pakistan into the alliance and the subsequent heavy
bombardments and air strikes on the people of Afghanistan, aroused public
opinion against both the US and the military regime in Pakistan. This played the
role of catalyst in the wining of the MMA in the October polls.

Prior to the 9/11 events, Pakistan pursued a pro-Taliban policy,50 recognised

Taliban government in Afghanistan followed by Unites Arab Emirate and Saudi
Arabia. Taliban had its roots in the religious madrasas in the NWFP. Two of the
important religious parties of Pakistan JUI-S and JUI-F had very close relations
with Taliban government. These parties in their propaganda machinery
successfully glorified some aspects of Taliban government such as simple life of
government officials, peace and speedy justice in society. These were at the lowest
ebb in the pre-Taliban governments in Afghanistan. The citizens of Pakistan were
not required to have a passport or visa while travelling to Afghanistan. This
provided an opportunity for outsiders to get a look at the socio-economic and
political conditions of the Afghans, and above all, the Taliban brand of Islamic
government. During the last days of the Taliban regime, the trade activities
between Afghanistan and Pakistan increased to a considerable level which was
satisfactory for the Islamabad. Pakistan military establishment was also satisfied
with a decreased role of the Indian lobby in Kabul. However the post 9/11 US
policy threatened the Taliban government in Afghanistan of dire consequences if
it did not fulfiled US demand of handing over Usama Bin Laiden the US, the main
accuser for 9/11 incident in New York.

Around the same time, Pak-Afghan Defence Council (PADC), carrying 35 religious
parties under the chairmanship of Mawlana Sami ul Haq, declared that if the US
attack Afghanistan, the religious parties would wage jihad against the US; and the
whole Islamic Community would be bound to support the religious decree of
jihad. Musharraf was characterised as traitor of the Muslim Nation and Taliban
were termed as 'a symbol of Islam'. Mufti Nizamudin Shamzai, the chief Mufti of a
Ja’amiat-ul-Islamia seminary in Karachi and leader of JUI declared as ‘Musharraf
openly supported the US and its allies against Taliban. And under the Islamic law
if any Muslim cooperate with infidel against Muslims, he must be ex-
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 121

communicated from religion.’51 The presence of FBI agents in Pakistan’s soil was
propagated as being a serious threat to the sovereignty of the country.

Religious parties under the banner of the MMA exploited the impacts of the
ongoing war in Afghanistan, and termed it a crusade war against the Muslims.
They held public rallies throughout the country, and went to the roads and streets
in protest, describing the crises as ‘Islam in danger.’ According to the PEW survey,
81 percent of Pakistanis opposed the anti-terrorism move in Afghanistan.52 In the
9/11 context, Islamabad’s U-turn policy disgruntled many stakeholders in
Pakistan. With the sudden changes in Pakistan’s foreign policy, without a
concurrent change in mass opinion or interest, alienated pro-Taliban religious
hard liners in Pakistan. The anger of these well-organised groups and clerics
excited the sentiments of the Pakhtun and turned a broad spectrum of interests
into a religio-political matter in public debate. The government used force to
prevent anti-US rally and arrested many of the activists. 53

The the MMA’s political strategy and public popularity increased even more when
the US unseated President Saddam Hussain, on the pretext of WMDs, ensuring
public freedom and promoting democracy. After the rise of the religious right in
Pakistan in the October elections, Juan Cole of Michigan University criticised the
foreign policy of the US aimed at curbing extremism, promoting democracy,
beating the drums of war, and supporting dictatorial regimes friendly to the
United States. He remarked in the following way:

When we hear that Iraqis will dance in the streets on being liberated by
American forces, we should remember that the Pakhtun ethnic group in
Pakistan have not celebrated the fall of Taliban, when we hear that US is
trying to impose a strong ruler on Iraq for the initial perception of
democracy, we should remember that Pakistani electorate has
resoundingly rejected strongman Gen. Pervez Musharraf. When we hear
that to overthrow and marginalize the secular nationalist regimes of the
Middle East, we should remember Pakistan, where side lining moderate
mainstreams parties gave an opening to fundamentalists and radical
Islamists who look kindly on Al-Qaida. And when we hear that Iraq would
be a beacon to the rest of the Middle East, we should remember that
democratising Pakistan has largely returned anti-American candidates.54

Feeling unsafe, the religious political parties categorically explained in their

orations that the decline of Muslims all over the world is due to their un-Islamic
practices. They worked out a plan, a panacea for the uplift of Muslims through the
122 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

Islamisation of state and society and recalled in their orations the glorious past of
the Muslims under the caliphate.

However, all the other factors related to the rise of the MMA have had precedents
in Pakistan’s history, perhaps not all at once. In all previous circumstances,
religious parties gained only a marginal role in positions of real power. What was
different this time? First, it is fact that all these events took place at once, a
coincidence of history. And secondly, it is the events of September 11, and the
subsequent highly aggressive change in American foreign policy especially
towards the Muslim world, caused anger among the people. It roused anti-
Americanism and anti-Westernism and thus swung the political pendulum to right
in Pakistan. The MMA exploited these sentiments against Musharraf regime and
its pro-government candidates and political parties in October 2002 Elections and
successfully converted it into political victory for the religio-political parties never
happened in the history of Pakistan.

Conclusion

The NWFP, a volatile region lying between the Central Asia and the South Asia,
remained a hub for the activities of international actors since the Great Game of
the 19th century and thus affected the society and the culture of the Pakhtun. The
Afghan internal affairs also influenced the trajectory of politics as people of the
NWFP. are having ethnic affinity with the people of Afghanistan. Till 1970s, the
Afghan affairs manipulated Pakhtun nationalist slogans. But the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 liquefied Pakhtun nationalists’ euphoria and
caused rise of Islamic jihadi culture in the province of course with the overt and
covert support of some vested international actors. In the final analysis the
American intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 drastically affected the economic,
social and political landscape of the province. In such a situation 2002 general
elections were held in Pakistan. Pakhtun, unlike the past, expressed their support
to religious political parties. This decision was mainly based on the feelings of
hatred against the American policies in the Middle East in general and in
Afghanistan in particular. Convergence of interests with the military junta also
made it possible for the MMA to encounter the main political parties in a befitting
manner. However, unity of religious parties under the banner of the MMA and the
capabilities of the religious demagogues to muster the entire situation into an
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 123

electoral victory played decisive role in the success of the MMA in the NWFP and
in Pakhtun-dominated areas in Baluchistan. The international scenario, military
will, and unity of the religious parties together made the entrance possible for the
MMA into the power echelon, for the first time in Pakistan. The study can be
concluding to remind that mobilisation of people and articulation of interests on
religious emblems is still relevant in the political studies. It should not be dealt as
an obsolete idea and it should be taken as in integral part of policy making process
at least in some parts of the third world.
124 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

End Notes

1The the MMA was a conglomerate of Six religio-political; Jamat-i-Islami, Jamiat ul

Ulama-i-Islam (F), Jamiat ul Ulama-i-Islam (S), Jamiat ul Ulama-i-Pakistan, Jamiat Ahl-
i-Hadith and the only Shia party, Islami Tehrik Pakistan (ITP), formerly known as
Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Ja‘faria Pakistan (TNFJ).
2 Makhdom Amin Fahim of the PPPP blamed the government for favouritism to the

MMA as he was leader of the largest opposition party in the parliament.

3In the provincial Assembly of Baluchistan the MMA won 15 seats while Muslim

League-Q won 19 seats. As no party has a clear majority, hence the MMA-Muslim
League coalition government came into existence.
4 These traits include keeping women under their strict observance, practically in

isolation from all social activities. They are even reluctant to give due rights to women
entrusted to them by Islam; for example a share in inheritance.
5 Amanullah Khan was successful in bringing out Afghanistan from the British

influence in 1919.
6 Abdul Rauf, “The Role of Khilafat Committee in the NWFP. Politics (1925-30)’’,

Pakistan Historical Society, Volume XLVII, No.3 July-September 1999. p.68.

7Syed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, And Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-

West Frontier Province 1937-47 (Karachi: Oxford University Press 1999), p.167.
8See for details Abdul Rauf, "The British Empire and the Mujahidin Movement in the

NWFP of India, 1914-1934", Islamic Studies, Islamic Research Institute, International

Islamic University, Islamabad, Autumn 2005, pp.400-39.
9See for detail Abdul Rauf, “Hijrat Movement in the North West Frontier Province—A

Historical Perspective”, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, University of the

Punjab, Lahore, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, October 1999.
10 In this scheme the NWFP was merged in West Pakistan and thus lost its separate

entity.
11Interview with Ms Bagam Nasim Wali Khan, leader of Awami National Party,

November 12, 2004.

12 Though early in 1970s Mawlana Mufti Mehmud, father of Mawlana Fazlur Rahman,

headed the provincial government but that was equally shared by NAP (National
Awami Prarty) a non religious political party.
13Shahid Anwar,, “Lal Masjid Deepens the Ideological Faultline”, Dawn, Karachi, July

21, 2007.
14 In the early days of Islamic revolution, Iran expressed its eagerness to export its

revolution to other countries as well.

15 Amir Rana, “245 Religious Parities in Pakistan”, Daily Times, Lahore, April 17, 2003.

16 International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No. 36, July 29, 2002,. p.9.

17 In Pakistan, political parties have never been properly organised for obvious

reasons. For example only ANP and Jamat-i-Islami are the two parties having regular
elections for their office bearers.
Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126 125

18Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A study of 2002 Elections

(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 196.
19 Mohammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam-Custodian of Change

(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.235.

20See for details, M. Anwarul Haq, Faith Movement Mohammad Ilyas (London: Georg

Allend Unwin Ltd, 1972) and Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in Faith-
Studies of the Tablighi Jam’at as Transactional Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal
(Brill, 2000).
21 It is interesting to note that the NWFP. chapter of the Jamiat ul ulama-i-Hind was the

only organisation in pre-partition India which hosted the 8th annual conference of JUH
in Peshawar in 1927. None of the political organisations including INC and AIML could
do that in the entire period of freedom struggle.
22 Herald, Karachi, November 2002, p. 46.

23 Qazi Hussain Ahmad claims that the alliance was founded at a meeting of the six

religious parties at his Islamabad residence in Jun 17, 2001. Herald, Karachi:
November 2002. p. 63.
24Zia-ul-Hussan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore,

Progressive Books, n.d.), p.vii.

25 Mujeeb Ahmad, Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan. 1948-79 (Islamabad: National Institute of

Historical and Cultural Research), p. xiv.

26 Whom they consider as intermediaries to communicate with the prophet and God.

27 Khalid Khokhar, “Pakistan’s Continued Effort to Fight Terrorism”,

http://dailymailnews.com/200601/27/dmcolumnpage.html access on July 15, 2008.
28Dawn, Karachi,, 17 Oct. 2002. “the MMA to Enforce Shariat Laws” online:
www.dawn.com/2002/10/17/nat8.htm
29 Some of the MMA leaders expressed regrets as if they would have known the

popularity of the MMA they would have not done this seat adjustment with the PPP
(Sherpao group).
30 Waseem, p 58.

31Shafiq Ahmad, “Anti-Taliban Policy Caused ANP Defeat” Dawn, Karachi, October 13,

2002.
32The News, Islamabad, November 29, 2002.

33 Field observation.

34 “the MMA Using Religion to Woo Voters”, The News, Islamabad, October 01, 2002.

35Waseem, p. 96.

36Dawn, Karachi, August 16, 2002.

37“John Cashnahan Rejects EU Media Report”, The News October 01, 2002. See also

“Pakistan Rejects EU Poll Criticism” on

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2322745.stm. Accessed March 3, 2007.
38 Herald, Karachi, November 2002, p 10.

39International Crises Group (ICG) Asia Report, No. 36, July 29, 2002, p.16.

40 After returning from his Washington visit, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the

army to step back and vacate a number of military posts held at the time by the army.
126 Rauf, A. & Ayaz, M. / JHSS, XIX, No. 2 (2011), 105-126

41 Khalid Mehmood Sheikh, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Lahore: Emporium Publishers,

2002), pp.41-42.
42 Pakistan had already witnessed three military rulers before then: General Ayub

Khan (1958-69), General Yahya Khan (1969-71) and General Zia ul Haq (1977-88).
43After the bomb explosion in the Indian parliament in December 2001, India put

pressure on Pakistan and brought its army close to the border of Pakistan. It withdrew
her army back in December 2002.
44Interview with Rahimullah Yousafzai, an expert on the region, February 15, 2005.

45 Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan scornfully commented that if a member of the

parliament was required to be a graduate degree holder then the president of the
state must have a PhD. (most of the military officers who were the then rulers of
Pakistan were even not graduates).
46Leading up to Election Day, the news bulletin devoted six hours and twenty minutes

to the elections. The the MMA was given 36 minutes, following the highest, 44
minutes, received by PML-Q; while the PPP hardly got 29 minutes. See Pakistan
Liberal Forum. Media Monitoring Elections October 2002, Islamabad.
47The News, Lahore, September 12, 2001.

48 Ibid. September 13, 2002.

49Hussan Abbas., Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, The Army and The American

War on Terror (New York: M. E. Sharp Inc, 2005), p. 217.

50 Some opined that the very movement of Taliban is the brainchild of Pakistan

establishment.
51Zaman, p.24.

52 PEW, December 2002, pp. 53-63.

53On 20th September the government used force to prevent people from participating

in an anti-US rally, and arrested around 100 students from college and universities
(Dawn, Karachi, September 21, 2001).
54Juan Cole, “Why Those Religious Results in Pakistan are Frightening” on line at

http://www.juancole.com/2002/10/history-news-network-httphnn.html.