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Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Ethics
Theory and
Contemporary Issues
Ninth Edition
Barbara MacKinnon
University of San Francisco, Professor of Philosophy, Emerita
Andrew Fiala
California State University, Fresno, Professor of Philosophy
Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States
Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, © 2018, 2015, 2012 Cengage Learning
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Print Number: 01 Print Year: 2016
Contents
Preface ix Ethics, Religion, and Divine

History of Ethics Time Line xiii Command Theory 25
Pluralism and the Golden Rule 28
The Problem of Evil and Free
Part One ETHICAL THEORY 1
Will 29
Secular Ethics and Toleration 31
—1— Ethics and Ethical Criticisms of Secularism and Global
Reasoning 1 Ethics 32
Why Study Ethics? 1 READING Euthyphro • Plato 35
What Is Ethics? 2 Letter to a Christian Nation • SAM
HARRIS 38
Ethical and Other Types
Religion and Truth • Mohandas K.
of Evaluation 3 Gandhi 39
Sociobiology and the Naturalistic
Fallacy 5 Review Exercises 42
Ethical Terms 6
Ethics and Reasons 7 —3— Ethical Relativism 44
Intuitionism, Emotivism,
Subjectivism, Objectivism 7 Descriptive versus Normative
Ethical Reasoning and Ethical Relativism 45
Arguments 9 Individual versus Cultural
The Structure of Ethical Reasoning Relativism 46
and Argument 9 Strong and Weak Relativism 47
Evaluating and Making Good Reasons Supporting Ethical
Arguments 10 Relativism 48
Ethical Theory 11 The Diversity of Moral Views 48
Types of Ethical Theory 12 Tolerance and
Can Ethics Be Taught? 13 Open-Mindedness 48
Moral Uncertainty 48
READING Ethical Judgments and Matters of Situational Differences 48
Fact • David Hume 14
Emotivism and Ethics • Are These Reasons
C. L. Stevenson 15 Convincing? 49
Review Exercises 19 The Diversity of Moral Views 49
Tolerance and
Open-Mindedness 50
—2— Religion and Global Moral Uncertainty 50
Ethics 20 Situational Differences 50
Is Relativism
Freedom, Cosmopolitanism, and the Self-Contradictory? 51
European Enlightenment 22 Moral Realism 52
Religion, Civic Life, and Civil Moral Pluralism 53
Disobedience 24
iii ❮❮
iv CONTENTS
READING Who’s to Judge? • Louis Pojman 55 —6— Deontological Ethics and

Relativism and Its Benefits • John Immanuel Kant 114
Lachs 62
Review Exercises 67 Deontology and the Ethics of
Duty 115
Immanuel Kant 117
—4— Egoism, Altruism, and the What Is the Right Motive? 117
Social Contract 68 What Is the Right Thing to Do? 118
Psychological Egoism 71 The Categorical Imperative 119
What Is Psychological Egoism? 71 The First Form 120
Is Psychological Egoism True? 72 The Second Form 121
Ethical Egoism 73 Evaluating Kant’s Moral
Theory 122
What Is Ethical Egoism? 73
Is Ethical Egoism a Good The Nature of Moral
Theory? 73 Obligation 122
The Social Contract 75 The Application of the Categorical
Imperative 122
The Moral Point of View 76 Duty 123
Why Be Moral? 77 Moral Equality and Impartiality 123
READING The Ring of Gyges • Plato 79 Perfect and Imperfect Duties 124
Self Love • Thomas Hobbes 85 Variations on Kant and
The Social Contract and Deontology 125
Altruism • Steven Pinker 88
READING Fundamental Principles of the
Review Exercises 92 Metaphysic of Morals • Immanuel
Kant 126
—5— Utilitarianism Review Exercises 137
and John Stuart Mill 93
Weighing Consequences 95 —7— Natural Law and Human
Historical Background 96 Rights 138
Jeremy Bentham and John Natural Law Theory 140
Stuart Mill 96 Historical Origins 141
The Principle of Utility 97 Evaluating Natural Law
Pleasure and Happiness 97 Theory 143
Calculating the Greatest Amount of Natural Rights 145
Happiness 98 Evaluating Natural Rights
Quantity versus Quality Theory 146
of Pleasure 100 Is There a Human Nature? 147
Evaluating Utilitarianism 101 READING On Natural Law • Thomas
Application of the Principle 101 Aquinas 149
Utilitarianism and Personal Second Treatise of Civil
Integrity 101 Government • John Locke 151
Ends and Means 102
Review Exercises 154
The Trolley Problem 102
Act and Rule Utilitarianism 103
“Proof” of the Theory 105 —8— Virtue Ethics 155
READING Utilitarianism • John Stuart Mill 107 Virtues and Everyday Life 156
Review Exercises 112 Aristotle 157
CONTENTS v
Virtue as a Mean 158 Combining the Types of

Nature, Human Nature, and the Euthanasia 213
Human Good 158 Making Moral Judgments About
Cross-Cultural and Contemporary Euthanasia 214
Virtue Ethics 160 The Moral Significance of
Evaluating Virtue Ethics 161 Voluntariness 214
READING The Nicomachean Active versus Passive
Ethics • Aristotle 163 Euthanasia 216
Review Exercises 170 READING The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia •
J. Gay-Williams 221
Active and Passive Euthanasia • James
—9— Feminist Thought and Rachels 224
the Ethics of Care 171 Review Exercises 228
Gender in Moral Reasoning and the Discussion Cases 230
Ethics of Care 174
Is There a Gender Difference in —11— Abortion 231
Morality? 176
The Source of Feminine Stages of Fetal Development 233
Morality 177 Methods of Abortion 235
Evaluating Gender-Specific Abortion and the Law 237
Approaches to Morality 178 Abortion: The Moral Question 240
Feminist Thought 179 Arguments That Do Not Depend
Evaluation of Feminist Thought on the Moral Status of the
and the Ethics of Care 181 Fetus 240
READING Caring • Nel Noddings 184 Utilitarian Reasoning 240
The Need for More Than Some Rights Arguments 241
Justice • Annette Baier 185 Arguments That Depend on
What Is Feminist Ethics? • Hilde the Moral Status of the
Lindemann 192
Fetus 242
Review Exercises 198 Method I 242
Method II 245
Part Two ETHICAL ISSUES 199 READING A Defense of Abortion • Judith Jarvis
Thomson 251
—10— Euthanasia 199 Why Abortion Is Immoral • Don
Marquis 252
Euthanasia for Infants The Value of Choice and the Choice
and the Disabled 201 to Value: Expanding the Discussion
Criteria for Death 203 About Fetal Life within Prochoice
Types of Euthanasia 206 Advocacy • Bertha Alvarez
Manninen 261
Active and Passive
Euthanasia 206 Review Exercises 275
Voluntary, Nonvoluntary, and Discussion Cases 276
Involuntary Euthanasia 207
Advance Directives 208
Physician-Assisted Suicide 209 —12— Sexual Morality 278
Pain Medication and Palliative
Sedation 211 Current Issues 280
Ordinary and Extraordinary Conceptual Problems: What Is and
Measures 212 Is Not Sexual 285
vi CONTENTS
Relevant Factual Matters 286 —14— Economic Justice 344

Sexual Morality and Ethical
Theories 287 Economic Inequality 346
Consequentialist or Utilitarian Poverty, Education, and Health
Considerations 287 Care 349
Non-consequentialist Conceptions of Social Justice 350
or Deontological Process Distributive Justice 352
Considerations 288 End-State Distributive
Natural Law Considerations 289 Justice 353
Same-Sex Marriage 291 Equal Opportunity 354
READING U.S. Supreme Court Decision June 26, Political and Economic
2015 • Obergefell v. Hodges 296 Theories 356
Law, Morality, and “Sexual Libertarianism 356
Orientation” • John Finnis 298 Capitalism 357
“It’s Not Natural” • John Corvino 306 Socialism 357
Review Exercises 307 Modern Liberalism 359
Discussion Cases 308 John Rawls’s Theory of Justice 360
Communitarianism 363
READING Justice as Fairness • John Rawls 367
Distributive Justice • Robert
—13— Equality and Nozick 368
Discrimination 309 Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal • Ayn
Rand 369
Discrimination 310
Evangelii Gaudium • Pope
Racial Discrimination 311 Francis 370
The Principle of Equality 316 Review Exercises 373
Justice 316 Discussion Cases 374
Social Benefits and Harms 316
Proof and Reality of
Difference 316 —15— Punishment
Relevant Differences 317 and the Death Penalty 375
Challenges to the Principle 318
The Nature of Legal
Current Issues and the Law 320 Punishment 377
Profiling 322 The Deterrence Argument 378
Hate Crimes 324 The Retributivist Argument 379
Affirmative Action and Preferential Punishment and
Treatment 325 Responsibility 381
Consequentialist Prisons 383
Considerations 326 Race 384
Non-consequentialist Restoration and Rehabilitation 385
Considerations 328
The Death Penalty 386
READING Five Faces of Oppression • Iris Marion
Legal Issues 386
Young 333
Exonerations 388
Racisms • Kwame Anthony
Racial Bias and Fairness 388
Appiah 334
Costs 389
White Privilege, Black Rights • Naomi
Deterrence Considerations 390
Zack 335
Retributivist Considerations 391
Review Exercises 342 Mercy and Restorative Justice 392
Discussion Cases 343 Humane Executions 394
CONTENTS vii
READING The New Jim Crow • Michelle Approaches to Animal Ethics 468
Alexander 400 Sentience, Equal Consideration,
Are Prisons Obsolete? • Angela Y. and Animal Welfare 469
Davis 401 Animal Rights 472
Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment
(1868) • John Stuart Mill 402 READING All Animals Are Equal • Peter
A Theory of Just Execution • Lloyd Singer 477
Steffen 406 The Case for Animal Rights • Tom
Regan 486
Review Exercises 415 Speciesism and the Idea of
Discussion Cases 416 Equality • Bonnie Steinbock 487
—16— Environmental Ethics 417 Discussion Cases 489
The Environment and Its

Value 419 —18— Biotechnology and
Anthropocentrism 420 Bioengineering 490
Cost–Benefit Analysis 421 Current Issues 492
Environmental Justice 422
Athletic and Cognitive
Ecocentrism 423 Enhancement 492
Deep Ecology 425 Stem Cell Research 493
Ecofeminism 426 Cloning 495
Genetic Engineering and Genetic
Current Issues 427
Screening 496
Climate Change 427 Genetically Modified Plants and
Ozone Depletion 431 Animals 499
Waste Disposal and
Pollution 431 Legal and Ethical Issues 500
Wilderness Preservation 433 Athletic and Cognitive
International Environmental Enhancement 501
Conventions 434 Stem Cell Research 502
Global Justice and the Tragedy of the Cloning 503
Commons 435 Genetic Engineering and Genetic
READING People or Penguins: The Case for Screening 506
Optimal Pollution • William F. Genetically Modified Organisms 509
Baxter 442 READING Transhumanist Declaration • Various
Deep Ecology • Bill Devall and George Authors 514
Sessions 443 Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls • Leon R.
Radical American Environmentalism Kass 515
and Wilderness Preservation: A Third In Defense of Posthuman
World Critique • Ramachandra Dignity • Nick Bostrom 525
Guha 449 Review Exercises 526
Review Exercises 455 Discussion Cases 527
Discussion Cases 456
—19— Violence and War 528
—17— Animal Ethics 457 Realism 531
Current Issues 460 Pacifism 533
Moral Vegetarianism 460 Just War Theory 534
Animal Experimentation 463 Jus ad Bellum 534
Endangered Species 466 Jus in Bello 536
viii CONTENTS
Current Issues 538 Justice 565

Terrorism 538 Rights 567
Targeted Killing and Drones 540 Practical Considerations 568
Weapons of Mass Global Inequality 568
Destruction 542 Levels of International Aid 569
War Crimes and Universal Human Causes of Global Poverty 570
Rights 544 Solutions and Progress 573
Torture 546
Globalization and Its Critics 573
READING Peace • Andrew Fitz-Gibbon 548
The Triumph of Just War Theory (and Economic Impacts 574
the Dangers of Success) • Michael Cultural Diversity 575
Walzer 554 READING The Singer Solution to World
Review Exercises 558 Poverty • Peter Singer 580
Living on a Lifeboat • Garrett
Hardin 584
—20— Global Justice and
Globalization 560
Moral Arguments About Global
GLOSSARY 593
Poverty 563
Self-Interest 565 INDEX 603
Preface
This ninth edition of Ethics: Theory and Contem- This edition offers expanded and continued cov-
porary Issues contains a substantial revision of the erage of the following topics: global (non-Western)
text and extensive update of the empirical mate- philosophy and religion, the prisoner’s dilemma
rial contained in the chapters focused on contem- and the tragedy of the commons, social justice and
porary issues. Andrew Fiala joined as coauthor on economic inequality, mass incarceration and decar
decar-
the eighth edition. In the ninth edition, we have ceration, restorative justice, environmental justice,
included new learning apparatus, especially tables biotechnology and bioengineering, gene editing,
that outline possible moral positions with regard vegetarianism and the ethics of hunting, circuses,
to the issues considered. As in past editions, each race and racism, pacifism, gay marriage, global pov-
chapter begins with a detailed, accessible intro- erty, LGBT and transgender issues, Black Lives Mat-
duction that prepares the student to read accom- ter, Syrian refugees, the precautionary principle, and
panying selections from important and influential climate change. This edition includes some famil-
philosophers. The book remains a comprehensive iar readings from previous editions and some new
introduction to ethics in theory and practice. It also additions. In some cases, older readings have been
continues to emphasize pedagogy through clear shortened to make room for new readings and short
summaries, engaging examples, and various study excerpts by a more diverse set of authors, includ-
tools—such as review exercises and discussion ing some emerging voices. New readings include:
cases. Each chapter begins with a list of learning John Lachs on relativism, Hilde Lindemann on femi-
objectives, and the book ends with an extensive nism, a new essay on abortion by Bertha Alvarez
glossary of key terms. Manninen, U.S. Supreme Court Obergefell Deci-
sion, Naomi Zack on Black Lives Matter, Iris Marion
ADDITIONS AND CHANGES Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression,” Pope Francis
Although the basic elements remain the same, this and Ayn Rand on economic issues, Michelle Alex-
new ninth edition includes the following additions ander on the New Jim Crow, Tom Regan on ani-
and changes from the eighth edition. Each chapter mal rights, the Transhumanist declaration, Andrew
in Part I has been revised to focus on readability. All Fitz-Gibbon on peace, and Garret Hardin on global
introductory and empirical material in each chapter poverty.
in Part II has been updated to incorporate the latest
information about contemporary issues and current Key Elements
affairs. These updates include recent statistics, rel- Each chapter of Ethics: Theory and Contempo-
evant cases, and contemporary examples. rary Issues contains an extended summary of key
ix ❮❮
x PREFACE
concepts and issues written in clear, accessible prose. Pedagogical Aids This text is designed as an acces-
These detailed summaries go beyond the short intro- sible, “user-friendly” introduction to ethics. To aid both
ductions found in most ethics anthologies to provide instructor and student, we have provided the following
students with a thorough grounding in the theory pedagogical aids:
and practical application of philosophical ethics.
As previously noted, these discussions have been
❯ a list of learning objectives at the beginning of
each chapter (new to this edition)
thoroughly updated to include detailed information
on current events, statistics, and political and cul-
❯ a real-life event, hypothetical dialogue, or
updated empirical data at the beginning of each
tural developments.
chapter
The theory chapters in Part I present detailed
❯ diagrams, subheadings, and boldface key terms
summaries of the theories and major concepts, posi-
and definitions that provide guideposts for read-
tions, and arguments. The contemporary issues
ers and organize the summary exposition
chapters in Part II include summaries of:
❯ study questions for each reading selection
❯ current social conditions and recent events, with ❯ review exercises at the end of each chapter that
special emphasis on their relevance to students’ can be used for exams and quizzes
lives ❯ a glossary of definitions of key terms (new to
❯ conceptual issues, such as how to define key this edition)
words and phrases (for example, cloning,
cloning ❯ discussion cases that follow each chapter in
terrorism, and distributive justice) Part II and provide opportunities for class or
❯ arguments and suggested ways to organize an group discussion
ethical analysis of each topic ❯ topics and resources for written assignments in
❯ tables outlining possible moral positions, linked the discussion cases
to normative theories and key authors. ❯ tables outlining moral positions (new to this
edition).
Throughout this text, we seek to engage read-
ers by posing challenging ethical questions and then A Digital Solution for Students and
offering a range of possible answers or explanations. Instructors:
The aim is to present more than one side of each issue MindTap for Philosophy for Ethics: Theory and
so that students can decide for themselves what posi- Contemporary Issues is a personalized, online
tion they will take. This also allows instructors more digital learning platform providing students with an
latitude to emphasize specific arguments and con- immersive learning experience that builds critical
cepts and to direct the students’ focus as they see fit. thinking skills. Through a carefully designed chapter-
Where possible throughout the text, the rela- based learning path, MindTap allows students to
tion of ethical theory to the practical issues is indi- easily identify the chapter’s learning objectives;
cated. For example, one pervasive distinction used draw connections and improve writing skills by
throughout the text is between consequentialist and completing essay assignments; read short, manage-
non-consequentialist considerations and arguments. able sections from the e-book; and test their content
The idea is that if students are able to first situate knowledge with critical thinking Aplia™ questions.
or categorize a philosophical reason or argument,
then they will be better able to evaluate it critically ❯ Chapter e-Book: Each chapter within MindTap
in their thinking and writing. Connections to related contains the narrative of the chapter, offering an
concepts and issues in other chapters are also high- easy to navigate online reading experience.
lighted throughout the text to help students note ❯ Chapter Quiz: Each chapter within MindTap
similarities and contrasts among various ethical ends with a summative Chapter Test covering
positions. the chapter’s learning objectives and ensuring
PREFACE xi
students are reading and understanding the ❯ Digital flash cards are premade for each chapter,
material presented. and students can make their own by adding
❯ Chapter Aplia Assignment: Each chapter images, descriptions, and more.
includes an Aplia assignment that provides auto-
MindTap gives students ample opportunities for
matically graded critical thinking assignments
improving comprehension and for self-evaluation to
with detailed, immediate feedback and expla-
prepare for exams, while also providing faculty and
nations on every question. Students can also
students alike a clear way to measure and assess
choose to see another set of related questions if
student progress. Faculty can use MindTap as a turn-
they did not earn all available points in their first
key solution or customize by adding YouTube videos,
attempt and want more practice.
RSS feeds, or their own documents directly within
❯ Ethics Simulations: Each chapter offers an
the e-book or within each chapter’s Learning Path.
interactive simulated ethical dilemma, allowing
MindTap goes well beyond an e-book and a home-
students to make decisions and see the implica-
work solution. It is truly a Personal Learning Experi-
tions of their choices.
ence that allows instructors to synchronize the reading
❯ Chapter Essay Question: Every chapter ends
with engaging assignments. To learn more, ask your
with essay prompts that ask students to explore
Cengage Learning sales representative to demo it for
and reflect on concepts from the chapter and
you—or go to www.Cengage.com/MindTap.
build writing and critical thinking faculties.
❯ KnowNOW! Philosophy Blog: The KnowNOW! Instructor’s Resources:
Philosophy Blog connects course concepts with
The Instructor’s Companion Site features an Instruc-
real-world events. Updated twice a week, the
tor’s Manual, PowerPoint Lecture Slides, and a
blog provides a succinct philosophical analysis of
robust Test Bank (Cengage Learning Testing pow-
major news stories, along with multimedia and
ered by Cognero).
discussion-starter questions.
The Instructor’s Manual provides useful sug-
MindTap also includes a variety of other tools that gestions for lectures and classroom activities, based
support philosophy teaching and learning: directly on the content in this book. Answers to
many review exercises or study questions are pro-
❯ The Philosophy Toolbox collects tutorials on vided, as well as questions for further thought.
using MindTap and researching and writing aca- The PowerPoint Lecture Slides offer a chapter-
demic papers, including citation information and by-chapter breakdown Cengage Learning Testing,
tools, that instructors can use to support students powered by Cognero, new to this edition, allows
in the writing process. instructors to author, edit, and manage Test Bank
❯ Questia allows professors and students to search content. Instructors can create multiple test versions
a database of thousands of peer-reviewed jour
jour- and instantly deliver them through their learning
nals, newspapers, magazines, and full-length management system right to the classroom.
books—all assets can be added to any relevant Interested instructors can find and access all this
chapter in MindTap, and students can content by adding the ninth edition of this book to
❯ Kaltura allows instructors to create and insert their bookshelf on Cengage.com.
inline video and audio into the MindTap platform.
❯ ReadSpeaker reads the text out loud to students IN SUMMARY
in a voice they can customize. We have sought to make this ninth edition of Ethics:
Ethics
❯ Note-taking and highlighting are organized in a Theory and Contemporary Issues the most compre-
central location that can be synced with Ever
Ever- hensive ethics text available. It combines theory
Note on any mobile device a student may have and issues, text and readings, as well as up-to-date
access to. empirical information about contemporary moral
xii PREFACE
problems. It is designed to be flexible, user-friendly, of South Carolina; Dusan Galic, College of DuPage;
current, pedagogically helpful, and balanced. Erin Anchustegu, Boise State University; Christina
Tomczak, Cedar Valley College; Susan Brown, Uni-
❯ The flexible structure of the text allows instruc- versity of West Florida; Philip Cronce, Chicago State
tors to emphasize only those theories and applied University; William Rodriguez, Bethune Cookman
ethical topics which best suit their courses. University; Robert Arp, Johnson County Community
❯ The text is user-friendly, while at the same time College; Jason Gooch, Yakima Valley Community
philosophically reliable. It employs pedagogical College; Jason Flato, Georgia Perimeter College; and
aids throughout and at the end of each chapter, Eric Severson, Seattle Pacific University.
and provides extensive examples from current Barbara MacKinnon especially wants to thank
events and trends. The exposition challenges the students in her classes at the University of San
students with stimulating questions and is Francisco. Over the years, they have contributed
interspersed with useful diagrams, charts, and greatly to this text by challenging her to keep up
headings. with the times and to make things more clear and
❯ The text not only provides up-to-date coverage more interesting. She also appreciates the support
of developments in the news and in scientific of her husband and fellow philosopher, Edward
journals but also on ethical issues as they are MacKinnon. She dedicates this book to her two
discussed in contemporary philosophy. wonderful daughters, Jennifer and Kathleen. Andrew
❯ It offers a balanced collection of readings, includ- Fiala is thankful for Barbara’s hard work throughout
ing both the ethical theories and contemporary the previous editions of this book and for the oppor-
sources on the issues. tunity to transform his classroom teaching experi-
❯ Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, ninth ence into a useful text for teaching ethics.
edition, is accompanied by a broad range of We also wish to acknowledge the many profes-
online and textual tools that amplify its teach- sional people from Cengage Learning and its ven-
ability and give instructors specific pedagogical dors who have worked on this edition, including:
tools for different learning styles. Debra Matteson, Product Manager; Adrienne Devlin,
Content Developer; Megan Garvey, Content Devel-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS opment Manager; Lauren MacLachlan, Production
We wish to thank the many people who have made Manager; Margaret Park Bridges, Senior Content
valuable suggestions for improving the ninth edi- Project Manager; Marissa Falco, Art Director; and
tion of the text, including Marie Gaudio-Zaccaria, Kritika Kaushik, Project Manager, at Cenveo Pub-
Georgia Perimeter College; K.C. Warble III, University lisher Services.
HISTORY OF ETHICS TIME LINE xiii
Ancient
500 B.C.E. 400 300 200 100 0 100 C.E. 200
Socrates Jesus
Sappho 469–399 Zeno ? 4 B.C.E.–C.E. 29 Plotinus
637–577 351–270 205–270
Plato Philo Judaeus
Buddha 427–347 20 B.C.E.–C.E. 40
557–477 Aristotle Sextus Empiricus
384–322 60–117
Confucius Marcus Aurelius
552–479 121–180
Medieval
C.E. 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300
Augustine Anselm Aquinas
345–400 1033–1109 1224–1274
Boethius
480–524 Abelard Scotus
Mohammed 1079–1142 1265–1308
570–632 Avicebron Ockham
1021–1058 1285–1347
Maimonides
1135–1204
Avicenna Averroes
980–1037 1126–1198
Modern
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
Bacon Locke Hume Kierkegaard Moore
1561–1626 1632–1704 1711–1776 1813–1851 1873–1958
Hobbes Leibniz Kant Marx Rawls
1588–1679 1646–1716 1724–1804 1818–1883 1921–2002
Spinoza Hegel Nietzsche Habermas

1632–1677 1770–1831 1844–1900 1929–
Rousseau
1712–1778 Mill Sartre Singer
1806–1873 1905–1979 b. 1946–
Gandhi Noddings
1869–1948 b. 1929–
Wollstonecraft
1759–1797 DeBeauvoir
1908–1986
Bentham James
1748–1832 1846–1910
Dewey
1859–1952
Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 1
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Describe the philosophical study of ethics. • Differentiate between instrumental and

• Discuss the difference between normative
•
intrinsic values.
Jack Hollingsworth/Photodisc/Getty Images

and descriptive claims. Distinguish consequentialist from
• Define key terms: intuitionism, emotivism,
objectivism, and subjectivism.
nonconsequentialist approaches to
ethics.
• Explain the difference between

metaethics and normative ethics.
• Use the distinctions among motives,
acts, and consequences to analyze
• Decide whether naturalistic explanations

of ethics commit the naturalistic fallacy.
ethical phenomena.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
WHY STUDY ETHICS?

It is clear that we often disagree about questions of value. Should same-sex marriage
be legal? Should women have abortions? Should drugs such as marijuana be legal-
ized? Should we torture terrorists in order to get information from them? Should we
eat animals or use them in medical experiments? These sorts of questions are sure to
expose divergent ideas about what is right or wrong.
Discussions of these sorts of questions often devolve into unreasonable name-
calling, foot-stomping, and other questionable argument styles. The philosophical
study of ethics aims to produce good arguments that provide reasonable support for
our opinions about practical topics. If someone says that abortion should (or should
not) be permitted, he or she needs to explain why this is so. It is not enough to say
that abortion should not be permitted because it is wrong or that women should be
allowed to choose abortion because it is wrong to limit women’s choices. To say
that these things are wrong is merely to reiterate that they should not be permitted.
Such an answer begs the question. Circular, question-begging arguments are falla-
cious. We need further argument and information to know why abortion is wrong
or why limiting free choice is wrong. We need a theory of what is right and wrong,
good or evil, justified, permissible, and unjustifiable, and we need to understand how
our theory applies in concrete cases. The first half of this text will discuss various
2 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
theories and concepts that can be used to help us basic ethical questions. In Chapter 2, we discuss the
avoid begging the question in debates about ethical world’s diverse religious traditions and ask whether
issues. The second half looks in detail at a number there is a set of common ethical ideas that is shared
of these issues. by these traditions. In this chapter, we clarify what
It is appropriate to wonder, at the outset, why we ethics is and how ethical reasoning should proceed.
need to do this. Why isn’t it sufficient to simply state
your opinion and assert that “x is wrong (or evil, WHAT IS ETHICS?
just, permissible, etc.)”? One answer to this ques- On the first day of an ethics class, we often ask stu-
tion is that such assertions do nothing to solve the dents to write one-paragraph answers to the ques-
deep conflicts of value that we find in our world. We tion, “What is ethics?”
know that people disagree about abortion, same- How would you answer? Over the years, there
sex marriage, animal rights, and other issues. If we have been significant differences of opinion among
are to make progress toward understanding each our students on this issue. Some have argued that
other, if we are to make progress toward establishing ethics is a highly personal thing, a matter of private
some consensus about these topics, then we have opinion. Others claim that our values come from
to understand why we think certain things are right family upbringing. Other students think that ethics
and others are wrong. We need to make arguments is a set of social principles, the codes of one’s soci-
and give reasons in order to work out our own con- ety or particular groups within it, such as medical
clusions about these issues and in order to explain or legal organizations. Some write that many people
our conclusions to others. get their ethical beliefs from their religion.
It is also insufficient to appeal to custom or One general conclusion can be drawn from these
authority in deriving our conclusions about moral students’ comments: We tend to think of ethics as
issues. While it may be appropriate for children to the set of values or principles held by individuals
simply obey their parents’ decisions, adults should or groups. I have my ethics and you have yours;
strive for more than conformity and obedience to groups—professional organizations and societies,
authority. Sometimes our parents and grandparents for example—have shared sets of values. We can
are wrong—or they disagree among themselves. study the various sets of values that people have.
Sometimes the law is wrong—or laws conflict. This could be done historically and sociologically.
And sometimes religious authorities are wrong—or Or we could take a psychological interest in deter-
authorities do not agree. To appeal to authority on mining how people form their values. But philosoph-
moral issues, we would first have to decide which ical ethics is a critical enterprise that asks whether
authority is to be trusted and believed. Which reli- any particular set of values or beliefs is better than
gion provides the best set of moral rules? Which set any other. We compare and evaluate sets of values
of laws in which country is to be followed? Even and beliefs, giving reasons for our evaluations. We
within the United States, there is currently a conflict ask questions such as, “Are there good reasons for
of laws with regard to some of these issues: some preferring one set of ethics over another?” In this
states have legalized medical marijuana or physi- text, we examine ethics from a critical or evaluative
cian assisted suicide, others have not. The world’s standpoint. This examination will help you come to
religions also disagree about a number of issues: a better understanding of your own values and the
for example, the status of women, the permissibil- values of others.
ity of abortion, and the question of whether war Ethics is a branch of philosophy. It is also called
is justifiable. And members of the same religion moral philosophy. In general, philosophy is a dis-
or denomination may disagree among themselves cipline or study in which we ask—and attempt to
about these issues. To begin resolving these con- answer—basic questions about key areas or sub-
flicts, we need critical philosophical inquiry into ject matters of human life and about pervasive and
Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 3
significant aspects of experience. Some philoso- Ethics, or moral philosophy, asks basic questions
phers, such as Plato and Kant, have tried to do this about the good life, about what is better and worse,
systematically by interrelating their philosophical about whether there is any objective right and wrong,
views in many areas. According to Alfred North and how we know it if there is.
Whitehead, “Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a One objective of ethics is to help us decide what
coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas is good or bad, better or worse. This is generally
in terms of which every element of our experience called normative ethics. Normative ethics defends
can be interpreted.” 1 Some contemporary philoso- a thesis about what is good, right, or just. Norma-
phers have given up on the goal of building a sys- tive ethics can be distinguished from metaethics.
tem of general ideas, arguing instead that we must Metaethical inquiry asks questions about the
work at problems piecemeal, focusing on one partic- nature of ethics, including the meaning of ethical
ular issue at a time. For instance, some philosophers terms and judgments. Questions about the relation
might analyze the meaning of the phrase to know, between philosophical ethics and religion—as we
while others might work on the morality of lying. discuss in Chapter 2—are metaethical. Theoretical
Some philosophers are optimistic about our ability to questions about ethical relativism—as discussed in
address these problems, while others are more skep- Chapter 3—are also metaethical. The other chapters
tical because they think that the way we analyze the in Part I are more properly designated as ethical
issues and the conclusions we draw will always be theory. These chapters present concrete normative
influenced by our background, culture, and habitual theories; they make claims about what is good or
ways of thinking. Most agree, however, that these evil, just or unjust.
problems are worth wondering about and caring From the mid 1930s until recently, metaeth-
about. ics predominated in English-speaking universities.
We can ask philosophical questions about many In doing metaethics, we often analyze the mean-
subjects. In the philosophical study of aesthetics, ing of ethical language. Instead of asking whether
philosophers ask basic or foundational questions the death penalty is morally justified, we would
about art and objects of beauty: what kinds of things ask what we meant in calling something “morally
do or should count as art (rocks arranged in a cer- justified” or “good” or “right.” We analyze ethical
tain way, for example)? Is what makes something language, ethical terms, and ethical statements to
an object of aesthetic interest its emotional expres- determine what they mean. In doing this, we func-
siveness, its peculiar formal nature, or its ability tion at a level removed from that implied by our
to reveal truths that cannot be described in other definition. It is for this reason that we call this other
ways? In the philosophy of science, philosophers type of ethics metaethics—
metaethics meta meaning “beyond.”
ask whether scientific knowledge gives us a picture Some of the discussions in this chapter are metaethi-
of reality as it is, whether progress exists in science, cal discussions—for example, the analysis of vari-
and whether the scientific method discloses truth. ous senses of “good.” As you will see, much can be
Philosophers of law seek to understand the nature learned from such discussions.
of law itself, the source of its authority, the nature
of legal interpretation, and the basis of legal respon- ETHICAL AND OTHER TYPES
sibility. In the philosophy of knowledge, called OF EVALUATION
epistemology, we try to answer questions about “That’s great!” “Now, this is what I call a delicious
what we can know of ourselves and our world, and meal!” “That play was wonderful!” All of these
what it means to know something rather than just to statements express approval of something. They do
believe it. In each area, philosophers ask basic ques- not tell us much about the meal or the play, but they
tions about the particular subject matter. This is also do imply that the speaker thought they were good.
true of moral philosophy. These are evaluative statements. Ethical statements
or judgments are also evaluative. They tell us what “That is a good knife” is an evaluative or nor-
the speaker believes is good or bad. They do not sim- mative statement. However, it does not mean that
ply describe the object of the judgment—for exam- the knife is morally good. In making ethical judg-
ple, as an action that occurred at a certain time or ments, we use terms such as good, bad, right,
that affected people in a certain way. They go further wrong, obligatory, and permissible. We talk about
and express a positive or negative regard for it. Of what we ought or ought not to do. These are evalu-
course, factual matters are relevant to moral evalua- ative terms. But not all evaluations are moral in
tion. For example, factual judgments about whether nature. We speak of a good knife without attribut-
capital punishment has a deterrent effect might be ing moral goodness to it. In so describing the knife,
relevant to our moral judgments about it. So also we are probably referring to its practical usefulness
would we want to know the facts about whether for cutting. Other evaluations refer to other systems
violence can ever bring about peace; this would of values. When people tell us that a law is legiti-
help us judge the morality of war. Because ethical mate or unconstitutional, that is a legal judgment.
judgments often rely on such empirical informa - When we read that two articles of clothing ought not
tion, ethics is often indebted to other disciplines such to be worn together, that is an aesthetic judgment.
as sociology, psychology, and history. Thus, we When religious leaders tell members of their com-
can distinguish between empirical or descriptive munities what they ought to do, that is a religious
claims, which state factual beliefs, and evaluative matter. When a community teaches people to bow
judgments, which state whether such facts are good before elders or use eating utensils in a certain way,
or bad, just or unjust, right or wrong. Evaluative that is a matter of custom. These various normative
judgments are also called normative judgments. or evaluative judgments appeal to practical, legal,
Moral judgments are evaluative because they “place aesthetic, religious, or customary norms for their
a value,” negative or positive, on some action or justification.
practice, such as capital punishment. How do other types of normative judgments
differ from moral judgments? Some philosophers
• Descriptive (empirical) judgment: Capital punish-
believe that it is a characteristic of moral “oughts”
ment acts (or does not act) as a deterrent.
in particular that they override other “oughts,” such
• Normative (moral) judgment: Capital punishment
as aesthetic ones. In other words, if we must choose
is justifiable (or unjustifiable).
between what is aesthetically pleasing and what is
We also evaluate people, saying that a person is morally right, then we ought to do what is morally
good or evil, just or unjust. Because these evalua- right. In this way, morality may also take prece-
tions also rely on beliefs in general about what is dence over the law and custom. The doctrine of civil
good or right, they are also normative. For example, disobedience relies on this belief, because it holds
the judgment that a person is a hero or a villain is that we may disobey certain laws for moral reasons.
based upon a normative theory about good or evil Although moral evaluations differ from other nor-
sorts of people. mative evaluations, this is not to say that there is no
Normative Judgments in Descriptive Judgments in
Ethics Law Aesthetics Religion Custom Sociology Psychology
relation between them. In fact, moral reasons often against simplistically deriving an ought from an is
form the basis for certain laws. But law—at least in Hume’s law. From this perspective, it is not logi-
the United States—results from a variety of political cal, for example, to base our ideas about how we
compromises. We don’t tend to look to the law for ought to behave from a factual account of how we
moral guidance. And we are reluctant to think that actually do behave. This logical mistake was called
we can “legislate morality,” as the saying goes. Of the naturalistic fallacy by G. E. Moore, an influ-
course, there is still an open debate about whether ential philosopher of the early twentieth century.
the law should enforce moral ideas in the context of Moore maintained that moral terms such as good
issues such as gay marriage or abortion. are names for nonempirical properties that cannot be
There may be moral reasons supporting legal reduced to some other natural thing. Moore claimed
arrangements—considerations of basic justice, for that to attempt to define good in terms of some mun-
example. Furthermore, the fit or harmony between dane or natural thing such as pleasure is to com-
forms and colors that ground some aesthetic judg- mit a version of this fallacy. The problem is that we
ments may be similar to the rightness or moral fit can ask whether pleasures are actually good. Just
between certain actions and certain situations or because we desire pleasure does not mean that it is
beings. Moreover, in some ethical systems, actions good to desire pleasure. As Moore suggested, there
are judged morally by their practical usefulness for is always an open question about whether what is
producing valued ends. For now, however, note that natural is also good.
ethics is not the only area in which we make norma- Now, not everyone agrees that appeals to nature
tive judgments. in ethics are fallacious. There are a variety of natu-
ralistic approaches to thinking about ethics. One
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE NATURALISTIC traditional approach to ethics is called natural law
FALLACY ethics (which we discuss in detail in Chapter 7).
The distinction between descriptive and norma- Natural law ethics focuses on human nature and
tive claims is a central issue for thinking about eth- derives ethical precepts from an account of what
ics. We often confuse these issues in our ordinary is natural for humans. Natural law ethicists may
thinking, in part because we think that what we argue, for example, that human body parts have
ordinarily do is what we ought to do. Many people natural functions and that by understanding these
are inclined to say that if something is natural to natural functions, we can figure out certain moral
us, then we ought to do it. For example, one might ideas about sexuality or reproduction. Opponents
argue that since eating meat is natural for us, we might argue that this commits the naturalistic fal-
ought to eat meat. But vegetarians will disagree. lacy, since there is no obvious moral content to be
Indeed, there is no necessary relation between what seen in the structure and function of our body parts.
is ethical and what is natural or customary. It is thus A more recent version of naturalism in ethics
not true that what is natural is always good. But focuses on evolutionary biology and cognitive sci-
people often make the mistake of confusing facts of ence. From this perspective, to understand morality,
nature and value judgments. Most of the time, we we need to understand the basic functions of our
are not attentive to the shift from facts to values, species, including the evolutionary reasons behind
the shift from is to ought. Consider an example used moral behavior. We also need to understand how
by the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, our brains function in order to explain how pleasure
who noticed that incest appears to be quite natural— works, why some people are psychopathic, and why
animals do it all the time. But human beings con- we struggle to balance egoistic and altruistic moti-
demn incest. If it is natural, why do we condemn it? vations. One version of this naturalism is known
Hume pointed out the problem of deriving an ought as sociobiology—an idea that was introduced by
from an is; philosophers after Hume named the rule the biologist E. O. Wilson. 2 “If the brain evolved
Dawkins’s idea is that our genes use our altruistic

and other behaviors to spread themselves. Thus,
when we cooperate within groups that share a
genetic endowment, we help to preserve the group
and help to disseminate our shared genetic char-
acteristics, often in competition with rival genetic
groups.4
In discussing sociobiology and interpreting bio-
logical evidence, we must be careful, however, not
to anthropomorphize.5 When we look at the natu-
ral world, we often interpret it in anthropomorphic
terms, seeing in animals and even in genes them-
selves the motivations and interests that human
beings have. In other words, we must be careful that
our value judgments do not cloud or confuse our
description of the facts.
While the naturalistic approach of sociobiology
Jeannette Katzir Photog/Shutterstock.com
is provocative and insightful, we might still worry

that it commits the naturalistic fallacy. Just because
altruistic behavior is natural and useful in the evo-
lutionary struggle for survival does not mean that
it is good, just, or right. To see this, let us return
to Hume’s example of incest. Incest might be useful
as a method for disseminating our genetic material—
so long as the negative problems associated with
Does animal behavior provide a guide for human inbreeding are minimized. We do inbreed animals in
ethical behavior? this way in order to select for desirable traits. But
it is still appropriate to ask whether incest is mor
mor-
ally permissible for human beings—the question of
by natural selection, even the capacities to select ought might not be settled by what is.
particular esthetic judgments and religious beliefs
must have arisen by the same mechanistic process,” ETHICAL TERMS
Wilson explained. 3 The basic idea of sociobiology You might have wondered what the difference is
is that human behaviors result from the pressures between calling something “right” and calling it
of natural selection. Understanding human moral- “good.” Consider the ethical meaning for these
ity involves understanding the adaptive advantage terms. Right and wrong usually apply to actions, as
of certain behaviors, which can be studied by com- in “You did the right thing,” or “That is the wrong
paring human behaviors with the behavior of other thing to do.” These terms prescribe things for us to
social animals—from insects to chimpanzees. do or not to do. On the other hand, when we say
Sociobiology attempts to understand altruism, for that something is morally good, we may not explic-
example, in terms of evolutionary processes. From itly recommend doing it. However, we do recom-
this perspective, altruistic concern develops through mend that it be positively regarded. Thus, we say
natural selection because altruistic animals will things such as “Peace is good, and distress is bad.”
help each other survive. Biologist Richard Dawkins It is also interesting that with “right” and “wrong”
explains a related idea in terms of “the selfish gene.” there seems to be no in-between; it is either one or
the other. However, with “good” and “bad” there is of making good judgments. Sometimes this is surely
room for degrees, and some things are thought to be true, as when we are overcome by anger, jealousy,
better or worse than others. or fear and cannot think clearly. Biases and preju-
Other ethical terms require careful consideration. dice may stem from such strong feelings. We think
For example, when we say that something “ought” prejudice is wrong because it prevents us from judg-
or “ought not” to be done, there is a sense of ing rightly. But emotions can often aid good deci-
urgency and obligation. We can refrain from doing sion making. We may, for example, simply feel the
what we ought to do, but the obligation is still there. injustice of a certain situation or the wrongness of
On the other hand, there are certain actions that we someone’s suffering. Furthermore, our caring about
think are permissible but that we are not obligated some issue or person may, in fact, direct us to more
to do. Thus, one may think that there is no obliga- carefully examine the ethical issues involved. How-
tion to help someone in trouble, though it is “mor- ever, some explanation of why we hold a certain
ally permissible” (i.e., not wrong) to do so and even moral position is still required. Simply to say “X
“praiseworthy” to do so in some cases. Somewhat is just wrong” without explanation, or to merely
more specific ethical terms include just and unjust express strong feelings or convictions about “X,” is
and virtuous and vicious. not sufficient.
To a certain extent, which set of terms we use
depends on the particular overall ethical viewpoint INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM,
or theory we adopt. This will become clearer as we SUBJECTIVISM, OBJECTIVISM
discuss and analyze the various ethical theories in Philosophers differ on how we know what is
this first part of the text. good. They also differ on the question of whether
moral judgments refer to something objective or
ETHICS AND REASONS whether they are reports of subjective opinions or
When we evaluate something as right or wrong, dispositions.
good or bad, we appeal to certain norms or rea- To say that something is good is often thought
sons. If I say that affirmative action is unjustified, I to be different from saying that something is yel-
should give reasons for this conclusion; it will not be low or heavy. The latter two qualities are empirical,
acceptable for me to respond that this is merely the known by our senses. However, good or goodness
way I feel. If I have some intuitive negative response is held to be a nonempirical property, said by some
to preferential treatment forms of affirmative action, to be knowable through intuition. A position known
then I will be expected to delve deeper to determine as intuitionism claims that our ideas about ethics
whether there are reasons for this attitude. Perhaps I rest upon some sort of intuitive knowledge of ethi-
have experienced the bad results of such programs. cal truths. This view is associated with G. E. Moore,
Or I may believe that giving preference in hiring whom we discussed earlier. 6 Another philoso-
or school admissions on the basis of race or sex is pher, W. D. Ross, thinks that we have a variety of
unfair. In either case, I will be expected to push the “crystal-clear intuitions” about basic values. These
matter further and explain why it is unfair or even intuitions are clear and distinct beliefs about ethics,
what constitutes fairness and unfairness. which Ross explains using an analogy with mathe-
Reason-giving is essential in philosophical eth- matics: just as we see or intuit the self-evident truth
ics. However, this does not mean that making ethi- of “2 + 2 = 4,” we also see or intuit ethical truths:
cal judgments is and must be purely rational. We for example, that we have a duty to keep our prom-
might be tempted to think that good moral judg- ises. As Ross explains,
ments require us to be objective and not let our feel- Both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain
ings, or emotions, enter into our decision making. crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that
Yet this assumes that feelings always get in the way we can know about the nature of numbers and the
nature of duty . . . we do not read off our knowledge of One worry, however, is that our emotions and
particular branches of duty from a single ideal of the feelings of sympathy or disgust are variable and rel-
good life, but build up our ideal of the good life from ative. Our own emotional responses vary depending
intuitions into the particular branches of duty.7 upon our moods and these responses vary among
A very important question is whether our intu- and between individuals. Emotional responses are
itions point toward some objective moral facts in the relative to culture and even to the subjective dis-
world or whether they are reports of something sub- positions of individuals. Indeed, our own feelings
jective. A significant problem for intuitionism is that change over time and are not reliable or sufficient
people’s moral intuitions seem to differ. Unlike the gauges of what is going on in the external world.
crystal-clear intuitions of mathematics—which are The worry here is that our emotions merely express
shared by all of us—the intuitions of ethics are not internal or subjective responses to things and that
apparently shared by everyone. they do not connect us to an objective and stable
Another view, sometimes called emotivism, source of value.
maintains that when we say something is good, we Other moral theories aim for more objective
are showing our approval of it and recommending it sources for morality. From this standpoint, there
to others rather than describing it. This view is asso- must be objective reasons that ground our subjec-
ciated with the work of twentieth-century philoso- tive and emotional responses to things. Instead
phers such as A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. But it of saying that the things we desire are good, an
has deeper roots in a theory of the moral sentiments, objectivist about ethics will argue that we ought to
such as we find in eighteenth-century philosophers desire things that are good—with an emphasis on
Adam Smith and David Hume. Hume maintains, for the goodness of the thing-in-itself apart from our
example, that reason is “the slave of the passions,” subjective responses. The ancient Greek philosopher
by which he means that the ends or goals we pursue Plato was an objectivist in this sense. Objectivists
are determined by our emotions, passions, and sen- hold that values have an objective reality—that they
timents. Adam Smith maintains that human beings are objects available for knowledge—as opposed
are motivated by the experience of pity, compassion, to subjectivists, who claim that value judgments
and sympathy for other human beings. For Smith, merely express subjective opinion. Plato argues that
ethics develops out of natural sympathy toward one there is some concept or idea called “the Good” and
another, experienced by social beings like ourselves. that we can compare our subjective moral opinions
Emotivism offers an explanation of moral knowl- about morality with this objective standard. Those
edge that is subjective, with moral judgments resting who want to ground morality in God are objectivists,
upon subjective experience. One version of emotiv- as are those who defend some form of natural law
ism makes ethical judgments akin to expressions of ethics, which focuses on essential or objective fea-
approval or disapproval. In this view, to say “murder tures of bodies and their functions. Interestingly, the
is wrong” is to express something like “murder— approach of sociobiology tends not to be objectivist
yuck!” Similarly, to say “courageous self-sacrifice is in this sense. Although the sociobiologist bases her
good” is to express something like “self-sacrifice— study of morality on objective facts in the world, the
yay!” One contemporary author, Leon Kass, whom sociobiologist does not think that moral judgments
we study in Chapter 18, argues that there is wisdom represent moral facts. Instead, as Michael Ruse
in our experiences of disgust and repugnance—that puts it,
our emotional reactions to things reveal deep moral Objective ethics, in the sense of something written on
insight. Kass focuses especially on the “yuck factor” tablets of stone (or engraven on God’s heart) external
that many feel about advanced biotechnologies such to us, has to go. The only reasonable thing that we, as
as cloning. sociobiologists, can say is that morality is something
biology makes us believe in, so that we will further The Structure of Ethical Reasoning
our evolutionary ends.8 and Argument
One of the issues introduced in Ruse’s rejection To be able to reason well in ethics you need to under
under-
of objectivity in ethics is the distinction between stand what constitutes a good argument. We can do
intrinsic and instrumental goods. Instrumental this by looking at an argument’s basic structure.
goods are things that are useful as instruments or This is the structure not only of ethical arguments
tools—we value them as means toward some other about what is good or right but also of arguments
end. Intrinsic goods are things that have value in about what is the case or what is true.
themselves or for their own sake. For example, we Suppose you are standing on the shore and a perper-
might say that life is an intrinsic good and funda- son in the water calls out for help. Should you try to
mentally valuable. But food is an instrumental good rescue that person? You may or may not be able to
because it is a means or tool that is used to sup- swim. You may or may not be sure you could rescue
port life. From Ruse’s perspective, morality itself is the person. In this case, however, there is no time
merely an instrumental good that is used by evolu- for reasoning, as you would have to act promptly.
tion for other purposes. Morality is, from this perper- On the other hand, if this were an imaginary case,
spective, simply a tool that helps the human species you would have to think through the reasons for
to survive. The selfish gene hypothesis of Richard and against trying to rescue the person. You might
Dawkins understands individual human beings conclude that if you could actually rescue the perper-
instrumentally, as carriers of genetic information: son, then you ought to try to do it. Your reasoning
“We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly might go as follows:
programmed to serve the selfish molecules known
as genes.” 9 This runs counter to our usual moral Every human life is valuable.
view, which holds that human beings have intrinsic Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life
or inherent value. The idea that some things have should be attempted.
My swimming out to rescue this person has a good
intrinsic value is an idea that is common to a variety
chance of saving his life.
of approaches that claim that ethics is objective. The
Therefore, I ought to do so.
intrinsic value of a thing is supposed to be an objec-
tive fact about that thing, which has no relation to
Or you might conclude that you could not save this
our subjective response to that thing. Claims about
person, and your reasoning might go like this:
intrinsic value show up in arguments about human
rights and about the environment. Do human
beings, ecosystems, or species have intrinsic value, Every human life is valuable.
Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life
or is the value of these things contained within our
should be attempted.
subjective responses and in their instrumental uses?
In this case, there is no chance of saving this life
This question shows us that the metaethical theories because I cannot swim.
are connected to important practical issues. Thus, I am not obligated to try to save him (although,
if others are around who can help, I might be
ETHICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTS obligated to try to get them to help).
It is important to know how to reason well in think-
ing or speaking about ethical matters. This is helpful Some structure like this is implicit in any ethi-
not only in trying to determine what to think about cal argument, although some are longer and more
controversial ethical matters but also in arguing for complex chains than the simple form given here.
something you believe is right and in critically eval- One can recognize the reasons in an argument by
uating positions held by others. their introduction through key words such as since,
because, and given that. The conclusion often con- what lying actually is. Must it be verbal? Must one
tains terms such as thus and therefore. The reasons have an intent to deceive? What is deceit itself?
supporting the conclusion are called premises. In a Other conceptual issues central to ethical arguments
sound argument, the premises are true and the con- may involve questions such as, “What constitutes a
clusion follows from them. In the case presented ear
ear- ‘person’?” (in arguments over abortion, for exam-
lier, then, we want to know whether you can save ple) and “What is ‘cruel and unusual punishment’?”
this person and also whether his life is valuable. We (in death penalty arguments, for example). Some-
also need to know whether the conclusion actually times, differences of opinion about an ethical issue
follows from the premises. In the case of the earlier are a matter of differences not in values but in the
examples, it does. If you say you ought to do what meaning of the terms used.
will save a life and you can do it, then you ought to Ethical arguments often also rely on factual
do it. However, there may be other principles that claims. In our example, we might want to know
would need to be brought into the argument, such whether it was actually true that you could save
as whether and why one is always obligated to save the drowning person. In arguments about the death
someone else’s life when one can. penalty, we may want to know whether such pun-
To know under what conditions a conclusion ishment is a deterrent. In such a case, we need
actually follows from the premises, we would need to know what scientific studies have found and
to analyze arguments in much greater detail than whether the studies themselves were well grounded.
we can do here. Suffice it to say, however, that the To have adequate factual grounding, we will want to
connection is a logical connection—in other words, seek out a range of reliable sources of information
it must make rational sense. You can improve your and be open-minded. The chapters in Part II of this
ability to reason well in ethics first by being able to book include factual material that is relevant to ethi-
pick out the reasons and the conclusion in an argu- cal decisions about the topics under consideration.
ment. Only then can you subject them to critical It is important to be clear about the distinction
examination in ways we suggest here. between facts and values when dealing with moral
conflict and disagreement. We need to ask whether
Evaluating and Making Good Arguments we disagree about the values involved, about the
Ethical reasoning can be done well or done poorly. concepts and terms we are employing, or about the
Ethical arguments can be constructed well or con- facts connected to the case.
structed poorly. A good argument is a sound argu- There are various ways in which reasoning can
ment. It has a valid form in which the conclusion go wrong or be fallacious. We began this chapter by
actually follows from the premises, and the prem- considering the fallacy of begging the question
ises or reasons given for the conclusion are true. An or circular argument. Such reasoning draws on
argument is poorly constructed when it is fallacious the argument’s conclusion to support its premises,
or when the reasons on which it is based are not as in “abortion is wrong because it is immoral.”
true or are uncertain. An ethical argument always Another familiar problem of argumentation is the
involves some claim about values—for example, ad hominem fallacy. In this fallacy, people say
that saving a life is good. These value-based claims something like, “That can’t be right because just
must be established through some theory of values. look who is saying it.” They look at the source of the
Part I of this book examines different theories that opinion rather than the reasons given for it. You can
help establish basic values. find out more about these and other fallacies from
Ethical arguments also involve conceptual and almost any textbook in logic or critical thinking.
factual matters. Conceptual matters are those that You also can improve your understanding of ethi-
relate to the meaning of terms or concepts. For cal arguments by making note of a particular type of
example, in a case of lying, we would want to know reasoning that is often used in ethics: arguments
from analogy. In this type of argument, one com-

pares familiar examples with the issue being disputed. Ethical Theory
If the two cases are similar in relevant ways, then
whatever one concludes about the first familiar case
one should also conclude about the disputed case.
For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (as discussed Ethical Principle
in Chapter 11) once asked whether it would be ethi-
cally acceptable to “unplug” someone who had been
attached to you and who was using your kidneys
to save his life. If you say that you are justified in Ethical Judgment
unplugging, then a pregnant woman is also justified
in doing the same with regard to her fetus. The reader
is prompted to critically examine such an argument
by asking whether or not the two cases were similar We can think of the diagram as a ladder. In prac-
in relevant ways—that is, whether the analogy fits. tice, we can start at the ladder’s top or bottom. At the
Finally, we should note that giving reasons to top, at the level of theory, we can start by clarifying
justify a conclusion is also not the same as giving for ourselves what we think are basic ethical values.
an explanation for why one believes something. We then move downward to the level of principles
A woman might explain that she does not sup- generated from the theory. The next step is to apply
port euthanasia because that was the way she was these principles to concrete cases. We can also start
brought up or that she is opposed to the death pen- at the bottom of the ladder, facing a particular ethical
alty because she cannot stand to see someone die. choice or dilemma. We can work our way back up the
To justify such beliefs, one would need rather to give ladder, thinking through the principles and theories
reasons that show not why one does, in fact, believe that implicitly guide our concrete decisions. Ultimately
something but why one should believe it. Nor are and ideally, we come to a basic justification, or the
rationalizations justifying reasons. They are usually elements of what would be an ethical theory. If we
reasons given after the fact that are not one’s true look at the actual practice of thinking people as they
reasons. Rationalizations are usually excuses, used develop their ethical views over time, the movement
to explain away bad behavior. These false reasons is probably in both directions. We use concrete cases
are given to make us look better to others or our- to reform our basic ethical views, and we use the basic
selves. To argue well about ethical matters, we need ethical views to throw light on concrete cases.
to examine and give reasons that support the con- An example of this movement in both directions
clusions we draw. would be if we start with the belief that pleasure
is the ultimate value and then find that applying
ETHICAL THEORY this value in practice leads us to do things that are
Good reasoning in ethics usually involves either contrary to common moral sense or that are repug-
implicit or explicit reference to an ethical theory. An nant to us and others. We may then be forced to
ethical theory is a systematic exposition of a par par-- look again and possibly alter our views about the
ticular view about what is the nature and basis of moral significance of pleasure. Or we may change
good or right. The theory provides reasons or norms our views about the rightness or wrongness of some
for judging acts to be right or wrong; it provides a particular act or practice on the basis of our theo-
justification for these norms. These norms can then retical reflections. Obviously, this sketch of moral
be used as a guide for action. We can diagram the reasoning is quite simplified. Feminists and others
relationship between ethical theories and moral deci- have criticized this model of ethical reasoning, partly
sion making as follows. because it claims that ethics is governed by general
principles that are supposedly applicable to all ethi- That was good because it helped Jim develop his
cal situations. Does this form of reasoning give due self-esteem—or it was bad because it caused Jim
consideration to the particularities of individual, to believe things about himself that were not true.
concrete cases? Can we really make a general judg- (Consequences)
ment about the value of truthfulness or courage that
will help us know what to do in particular cases in Although we generally think that a person’s motive
which these issues play a role? is relevant to the overall moral judgment about his
or her action, we tend to think that it reflects primar
primar-
TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY ily on our moral evaluation of the person. We also
In Part I of this book, we consider the following types have good reasons to think that the results of actions
of moral theory: egoism and contractarianism, utili-
utili matter morally. Those theories that base moral judg-
tarianism, deontological ethics, natural law, virtue ments on consequences are called consequentialist
ethics,, and feminist ethics. These theories differ in or sometimes teleological moral theories (from the
terms of what they say we should look at in mak- Greek root telos, meaning “goal” or “end”). Those
ing moral judgments about actions or practices. For theories that hold that actions can be right or wrong
example, does it matter morally that I tried to do the regardless of their consequences are called noncon-
right thing or that I had a good motive? Surely it sequentialist or deontological theories (from the
must make some moral difference, we think. But sup- Greek root deon, meaning “duty”).
pose that in acting with good motives I violate some- One moral theory we will examine is utilitari-
one’s rights. Does this make the action a bad action? anism. It provides us with an example of a conse-
We would probably be inclined to say yes. Suppose, quentialist moral theory in which we judge whether
however, that in violating someone’s rights, I am an action is better than alternatives by its actual or
able to bring about a great good. Does this justify the expected results or consequences; actions are then
violation of rights? Some theories judge actions in judged in terms of the promotion of human hap-
terms of their motive, some in terms of the character piness. Kant’s moral theory, which we will also
or nature of the act itself, and others in terms of the examine, provides us with an example of a non-
consequences of the actions or practices. consequentialist theory, according to which acts are
We often appeal to one of these types of reason. judged right or wrong independently of their conse-
Take a situation in which I lie to a person, Jim. We quences; in particular, acts are judged by whether
can make the following judgments about this action. they conform to requirements of rationality and
Note the different types of reasons given for the human dignity. The other ethical theories that we
judgments. will examine stress human nature as the source of
what is right and wrong. Some elements of these
theories are deontological and some teleological. So,
also, some teleological theories are consequentialist
Motive Act Consequences
in that they advise us to produce some good. But if
the good is an ideal, such as virtue or self-realization,
then such theories differ from consequentialist the-
ories such as utilitarianism. As anyone who has
That was good because you intended to make Jim
tried to put some order to the many ethical theories
happy by telling him a white lie—or it was bad
knows, no theory completely and easily fits one clas-
because you meant to deceive him and do him harm.
(Motive) sification, even those given here. Feminist theories
That was good because it is good to make people of care provide yet another way of determining what
happy—or it was bad because it is always wrong to one ought to do (see Chapter 9). In Part II of this
tell a lie. (Act) text, we will examine several concrete ethical issues.
As we do so, we will note how various ethical theo- Most moral philosophers think that a course on
ries analyze the problems from different perspectives ethics is ethically useful. It should help students
and sometimes reach different conclusions about understand the nature of ethical problems and help
what is morally right or wrong, better or worse. them think critically about ethical matters by pro-
viding conceptual tools and skills. It should enable
CAN ETHICS BE TAUGHT? them to form and critically analyze ethical argu-
It would be interesting to know just why some col- ments. It is up to the individual, however, to use
lege and university programs require their students these skills to reason about ethical matters. A study
to take a course in ethics. Does this requirement of ethics should also lead students to respect oppos-
stem from a belief that a course in ethics or moral ing views because it requires them to analyze care-
philosophy can actually make people good? fully the arguments that support views contrary to
When asked whether ethics can be taught, stu- their own. It also provides opportunities to consider
dents have given a variety of answers. “If it can’t be the reasonableness of at least some viewpoints that
taught, then why are we taking this class?” a stu- they may not have considered.
dent wondered. Another student responded, “Look In this opening chapter, we have learned some-
at the behavior of certain corporate executives who thing about what the philosophical study of ethics
have been found guilty of criminal conduct. They is. We have considered a few metaethical issues. We
surely haven’t learned proper ethical values.” Still have provided a description of ethical reasoning and
others disagreed with both views. Although certain arguments. We have briefly considered the nature of
ideals or types of knowledge can be taught, ethical ethical theories and the role they play in ethical rea-
behavior cannot be taught because it is a matter of soning. We will examine these theories more care-
individual choice, they said. fully in the chapters to come, and we will see how
The ancient Greek philosopher Plato thought that they might help us analyze and come to conclusions
ethics could be taught. He argues that “All evil is about particular ethical issues.
ignorance.” In other words, we do what is wrong The reading selections for this chapter come from
because we do not know or believe it is wrong; and David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, first pub-
if we truly believe that something is right, we should lished in 1739, and from C. L. Stevenson, a philoso-
necessarily do it. Now, we are free to disagree with pher associated with the Anglo-American tradition
Plato by appealing to our own experience. If I know in twentieth-century philosophy. The excerpt from
that I should not have that second piece of pie, does Hume discusses the problem of deriving normative
this mean that I will not eat it? Ever? Plato might claims from descriptive claims, the problem of deriv-
attempt to convince us that he is right by examining ing an ought from an is, with a particular focus on
or clarifying what he means by the phrase to know. the question of the morality of incest. Stevenson dis-
If we were really convinced with our whole heart cusses the difficulty of connecting ethics and natural
and mind that something is wrong, then we might science, while also outlining an emotivist approach
be highly likely (if not determined) not to do it. to understanding ethical terms.
However, whether ethics courses should attempt to
convince students of such things is surely debatable. NOTES
Another aspect of the problem of teaching ethics
concerns the problem of motivation. If one knows 1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality
something to be the right thing to do, does there still (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 4.
remain the question of why we should do it? One 2. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis
way to motivate people to be ethical may be to show (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
them that it is in their own best interest to do the 3. E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA:
right thing. Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 2.
4. See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: 6. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethics (Buffalo, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1989). Prometheus, 1903).
5. See Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of 7. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford:
Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 144–45.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 8. Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?
Also see Morton Hunt, The Compassionate Beast: (New York: Springer, 1985), p. 237.
What Science Is Discovering about the Human 9. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th
Side of Humankind (New York: William Morrow, Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford University
1990). Press, 2006), p. xxi.
R E A D I N G
Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact*
DAV I D H U M E
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Hume employ the fact of animal incest to advance his argument that morality does not consist merely
of “matters of fact” and that morality is not merely an “object of reason”?
2. Explain Hume’s idea that morality is a matter of feelings and sentiments.
3. Why does Hume have a problem with deducing an ought from an is?
I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human

species is criminal, and why the very same
action, and the same relations in animals have
or praise: But still this discovery supposes a separate
being in these moral distinctions, and a being, which
depends only on the will and appetite, and which,
not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity? If both in thought and reality, may be distinguished
it be answered, that this action is innocent in ani- from the reason. Animals are susceptible of the same
mals, because they have not reason sufficient to relations, with respect to each other, as the human
discover its turpitude; but that man, being endowed species, and therefore would also be susceptible of
with that faculty which ought to restrain him to his the same morality, if the essence of morality con-
duty, the same action instantly becomes criminal to sisted in these relations. Their want of a sufficient
him; should this be said, I would reply, that this is degree of reason may hinder them from perceiv-
evidently arguing in a circle. For before reason can ing the duties and obligations of morality, but can
perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and never hinder these duties from existing; since they
consequently is independent of the decisions of our must antecedently exist, in order to their being per
per-
reason, and is their object more properly than their ceived. Reason must find them, and can never pro-
effect. According to this system, then, every animal, duce them. This argument deserves to be weighed,
that has sense, and appetite, and will; that is, every as being, in my opinion, entirely decisive.
animal must be susceptible of all the same virtues
and vices, for which we ascribe praise and blame
From David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, (1739; Project
to human creatures. All the difference is, that our Gutenberg, 2010), bk. III, pt. 1, sec. 1, http://www.gutenberg.org/
superior reason may serve to discover the vice or files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm
virtue, and by that means may augment the blame *Title supplied by the editor.
Nor does this reasoning only prove, that moral- regarded as a considerable advancement of the specu-
ity consists not in any relations, that are the objects lative sciences; though, like that too, it has little or no
of science; but if examined, will prove with equal influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or
certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, concern us more, than our own sentiments of plea-
which can be discovered by the understanding. This sure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to
is the second part of our argument; and if it can be virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be req-
made evident, we may conclude, that morality is uisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour.
not an object of reason. But can there be any dif dif- I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an
ficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not mat- observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some
ters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? importance. In every system of morality, which I have
Take any action allowed to be vicious: Willful mur- hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the
der, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way
you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or
which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, makes observations concerning human affairs; when
you find only certain passions, motives, volitions of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of
and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,
case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you I meet with no proposition that is not connected with
consider the object. You never can find it, till you an ought, or an ought not. This change is impercep-
turn your reflection into your own breast, and find tible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as
a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, this ought, or ought not, expresses some new rela-
towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it tion or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be
is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in your- observed and explained; and at the same time that
self, not in the object. So that when you pronounce a reason should be given, for what seems altogether
any action or character to be vicious, you mean noth- inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduc-
ing, but that from the constitution of your nature you tion from others, which are entirely different from it.
have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the con- But as authors do not commonly use this precaution,
templation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and
compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert
according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that
objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this dis- the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely
covery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
R E A D I N G
Emotivism and Ethics
C. L. STEVENSON
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. What does Stevenson mean when he says that ethical terms are not (or not simply) descriptive?
2. How does the example of stealing illustrate Stevenson’s understanding of the meaning of ethical terms?
3. What does he mean by the “emotive meaning” of ethical terms?
I. FACTS AND VALUES accordingly an old branch of the subject; and writ-
I want to “place” [my work] within ethics as a ers on normative ethics have rarely been content to
whole—as I can best do by mentioning the three ignore it, simply because normative ethic has been
branches into which the subject is commonly thought to need the near-logical discipline that ana-
divided. lytical ethics has sought to provide. . . .
First, there is “descriptive” ethics, which studies The need of such a specialized approach to ethics
the moral practices and convictions that have been is readily seen when we say that so and so is good,
current among these or those peoples, and thus etc., we usually try to avoid dogmatism by giving
studies what has been implicitly or explicitly con- reasons for what we say, and in many cases we have
sidered good, obligatory, etc. At the present time a dependable half-knowledge of how to go about
this part of ethics is developed less by philosophers this. But we are not always aware of the potential
(though philosophers must of course study it) than complexity of the reasons, or of the extent to which
by social scientists. the reasons we manage to give can be supplemented
Second, there is “normative” ethics, which seeks by further reasons. Nor do we clearly understand
to reach conclusions about the justice of this or that just what is involved in saying that our reasons
law, for instance, or the value of this or that type “justify” our conclusions. An analytical study, tem-
of conduct, and which often (though not always) porarily letting us see our issues in a neutral per-
attempts to systematize these conclusions under spective, is needed to provide us with something
general principles, such as the greatest happiness rather more than this sort of half-knowledge—doing
principle of Bentham and Mill, or the categorical so not by attempting to give further support to some
imperative of Kant. Normative ethics differs from given conclusion, but rather by pointing out what
descriptive ethics in an obvious way: it does not general kind of support is possible.
seek conclusions about what others have implic- An unanalyzed half-knowledge may have one of
itly or explicitly considered good, etc., but instead two effects. It may lead us to an illusory conviction
seeks well founded conclusions that are intended to of having said the last word on a normative issue,
supplement, back up, or stand in opposition to what this conviction being attended by a contempt for
others have considered good. In a somewhat similar those who fail to see the “obvious cogency” of our
way, a research worker in medicine does not recount arguments. Or it may lead us, when controversies
what others have considered to be cures for a dis- attending our “last word” eventually become dis-
ease, but instead seeks well founded conclusions couraging, to a growing conviction that reasoning
that supplement, back up, or stand in opposition to about ethical matters is never really worthwhile.
what others have considered cures. Such convictions are not easily dispelled; but it is not
Third, there is a branch of ethics that surveys too much to say, I think, that they spring in good
normative ethic with the intent of clarifying its measure from ignorance, and from a kind of igno-
problems and its terminology, and with the intent, rance that analytical ethics can hope to correct. . . .
in particular, of examining the sorts of reasons by By what methods of argument or inquiry may
which its conclusions can be supported. It is called disagreement about matters of value be resolved? It
“analytical” ethics though it also goes under alterna- will be obvious that to whatever extent an argument
tive names such as “meta-ethics” and “critical” eth- involves disagreement in belief, it is open to the
ics. Socrates was engaged in analytical ethics when usual methods of the sciences. If these methods are
he asked, for instance, whether virtue is knowledge, the only rational methods for supporting beliefs—
whether virtue, like knowledge, can be taught. It is as I believe to be so, but cannot now take time to
discuss—then scientific methods are the only ratio-
From C. L. Stevenson, Facts and Values (New Haven, CT: Yale
nal methods for resolving the disagreement in belief
University Press, 1963), pp. v–vii; 6–8; 16–18; 21, 23–25. that arguments about values may include.
But if science is granted an undisputed sway in though both were possessed of the complete sci-
reconciling beliefs, it does not thereby acquire, with- entific truth. Whether this logical possibility is an
out qualification, an undisputed sway in reconciling empirical likelihood I shall not presume to say; but
attitudes. We have seen that arguments about val- it is unquestionably a possibility that must not be
ues include disagreement in attitude, no less than left out of account.
disagreement in belief, and that in certain ways the . . . I conclude, therefore, that scientific methods
disagreement in attitude predominates. By what cannot be guaranteed the definite role in the so-
methods shall the latter sort of disagreement be called normative sciences that they may have in
resolved? the natural sciences. Apart from a heuristic assump-
The methods of science are still available for tion to the contrary, it is possible that the growth
that purpose, but only in an indirect way. Initially, of scientific knowledge may leave many disputes
these methods have only to do with establishing about values permanently unsolved. Should these
agreement in belief. If they serve further to estab- disputes persist, there are nonrational methods for
lish agreement in attitude, that will be due simply to dealing with them, of course, such as impassioned,
the psychological fact that altered beliefs may cause moving oratory. But the purely intellectual methods
altered attitudes. Hence scientific methods are con- of science, and, indeed, all methods of reasoning,
clusive in ending arguments about values only to may be insufficient to settle disputes about values
the extent that their success in obtaining agreement even though they may greatly help to do so. For
in belief will in turn lead to agreement in attitude. the same reasons I conclude that normative ethics
In other words, the extent to which scien- is not a branch of any science. It deliberately deals
tific methods can bring about agreement on val- with a type of disagreement that science deliber-
ues depends on the extent to which a commonly ately avoids. Ethics is not psychology, for instance;
accepted body of scientific beliefs would cause us to for although psychologists may, of course, agree or
have a commonly accepted set of attitudes. disagree in belief about attitudes, they need not, as
How much is the development of science likely psychologists, be concerned with whether they agree
to achieve, then, with regard to values? To what or disagree with one another in attitude. Insofar as
extent would common beliefs lead to common atti- normative ethics draws from the sciences, in order
tudes? It is, perhaps, a pardonable enthusiasm to to change attitudes via changing people’s beliefs, it
hope that science will do everything—to hope that draws from all the sciences; but a moralist’s pecu-
in some rosy future, when all men know the con- liar aim—that of redirecting attitudes—is a type of
sequences of their acts, they will all have common activity, rather than knowledge, and falls within no
aspirations and live peaceably in complete moral science. Science may study that activity and may
accord. But if we speak not from our enthusiastic help indirectly to forward it; but is not identical with
hopes but from our present knowledge, the answer that activity.
must be far less exciting. We usually do not know, I can take only a brief space to explain why the
at the beginning of any argument about values, ethical terms, such as “good,” “wrong,” “ought,” and
whether an agreement in belief, scientifically estab- so on, are so habitually used to deal with disagree-
lished, will lead to an agreement in attitude or not. ment in attitude. On account of their repeated occur
occur-
It is logically possible, at least, that two men should rence in emotional situations they have acquired
continue to disagree in attitude even though they a strong emotive meaning. This emotive meaning
had all their beliefs in common, and even though makes them serviceable in initiating changes in a
neither had made any logical or inductive error, or hearer’s attitudes. Sheer emotive impact is not likely,
omitted any relevant evidence. Differences in tem- under many circumstances, to change attitudes in
perament, or in early training, or in social status, any permanent way; but it begins a process that can
might make the men retain different attitudes even then be supported by other means. . . .
II. THE EMOTIVE MEANING OF ETHICAL TERMS interests. This can be seen plainly from more general
. . . [Some traditional] theories hold that ethical observations. People from widely separated commu-
statements are descriptive of the existing state of nities have different moral attitudes. Why? To a great
interests—that they simply give information about extent because they have been subject to different
interests. (More accurately, ethical judgments are said social influences. Now clearly this influence doesn’t
to describe what the state of interests is, was, or will operate through sticks and stones alone; words play
be, or to indicate what the state of interests would a great part. People praise one another, to encour-
be under specified circumstances.) It is this emphasis age certain inclinations, and blame one another, to
on description, on information, which leads to their discourage others. Those of forceful personalities
incomplete relevance. Doubtless there is always some issue commands which weaker people, for compli-
element of description in ethical judgments, but this cated instinctive reasons, find it difficult to disobey,
is by no means all. Their major use is not to indicate quite apart from fears of consequences. Further influ-
facts, but to create an influence. Instead of merely ence is brought to bear by writers and orators. Thus
describing people’s interests, they change or intensify social influence is exerted, to an enormous extent, by
them. They recommend an interest in an object, means that have nothing to do with physical force
rather than state that the interest already exists. or material reward. The ethical terms facilitate such
For instance: When you tell a man that he oughtn’t influence. Being suited for use in suggestion, they
to steal, your object isn’t merely to let him know that are a means by which men’s attitudes may be led this
people disapprove of stealing. You are attempting, way or that. The reason, then, that we find a greater
rather, to get him to disapprove of it. Your ethical similarity in the moral attitudes of one community
judgment has a quasi-imperative force which, operat- than in those of different communities is largely this:
ing through suggestion, and intensified by your tone ethical judgments propagate themselves. One man
of voice, readily permits you to begin to influence, to says “This is good”; this may influence the approval
modify, his interests. If in the end you do not suc- of another person, who then makes the same ethical
ceed in getting him to disapprove of stealing, you will judgment, which in turn influences another person,
feel that you’ve failed to convince him that stealing is and so on. In the end, by a process of mutual influ-
wrong. You will continue to feel this, even though he ence, people take up more or less the same attitudes.
fully acknowledges that you disapprove of it, and that Between people of widely separated communities, of
almost everyone else does. When you point out to course, the influence is less strong; hence different
him the consequences of his actions—consequences communities have different attitudes. . . .
which you suspect he already disapproves of—these The emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of
reasons which support your ethical judgment are a word, arising through the history of its usage, to
simply a means of facilitating your influence. If you produce (result from) affective responses in people.
think you can change his interests by making vivid It is the immediate aura of feeling which hovers
to him how others will disapprove of him, you will do about a word. Such tendencies to produce affective
so; otherwise not. So the consideration about other responses cling to words very tenaciously. It would be
people’s interest is just an additional means you may difficult, for instance, to express merriment by using
employ, in order to move him, and is not a part of the interjection “alas”. Because of the persistence of
the ethical judgment itself. Your ethical judgment such affective tendencies (among other reasons) it
doesn’t merely describe interests to him, it directs his becomes feasible to classify them as “meanings”. . . .
very interests. The difference between the traditional . . . Consider the case of a mother who says to her
interest theories and my view is like the difference several children, “One thing is certain, we al1 like
between describing a desert and irrigating it. . . . to be neat”. If she really believed this, she wouldn’t
Thus ethical terms are instruments used in the bother to say so. But she is not using the words
complicated interplay and readjustment of human descriptively. She is encouraging the children to
like neatness. By telling them that they like neatness, A word must be added about the moral use of
she will lead them to make her statement true, so to “good”. This differs from the above in that it is about
speak. If, instead of saying “We all like to be neat” in a different kind of interest. Instead of being about
this way, she had said “It’s a good thing to be neat”, what the hearer and speaker like, it is about a stron-
the effect would have been approximately the same. . . . ger sort of approval. When a person likes something,
Strictly speaking, then, it is impossible to define he is pleased when it prospers, and disappointed
“good” in terms of favourable interest if emotive when it doesn’t. When a person morally approves
meaning is not to be distorted. Yet it is possible to of something, he experiences a rich feeling of secu-
say that “This is good” is about the favourable inter
inter-- rity when it prospers, and is indignant, or “shocked”
est of the speaker and the hearer or hearers, and that when it doesn’t. These are rough and inaccurate
it has a pleasing emotive meaning which fits the examples of the many factors which one would have
words for use in suggestion. This is a rough descrip- to mention in distinguishing the two kinds of inter
inter-
tion of meaning, not a definition. But it serves the est. In the moral usage, as well as in the non-moral,
same clarifying function that a definition ordinarily “good” has an emotive meaning which adapts it to
does; and that, after all, is enough. suggestion.
REVIEW EXERCISES
1. Determine whether the following statements about e. I ought not to turn left here because the sign says
the nature of ethics are true or false. Explain your “No Left Turn.”
answers. f. We ought to adopt a universal health insurance
a. Ethics is the study of why people act in certain ways. policy because everyone has a right to health
b. The solution to moral conflicts and ethical dis- care.
putes is to accurately describe the way the world 3. Discuss the differences between the ideas that ethics
actually is. is subjective and that it is objective.
c. The statement “Most people believe that cheating 4. Explain emotivism and intuitionism in ethical theory.
is wrong” is an ethical evaluation of cheating. 5. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using
2. Label the following statements as either normative naturalistic explanations in ethics.
(N) or descriptive (D). If normative, label each as ethics 6. As they occur in the following statements, label the
(E), aesthetics (A), law (L), religion (R), or custom (C). reasons for the conclusion as appeals to the motive
a. One ought to respect one’s elders because it is (M), the act (A), or the consequences (C).
one of God’s commandments. a. Although you intended well, what you did
b. Twice as many people today, as compared to ten was bad because it caused more harm than
years ago, believe that the death penalty is morally good.
justified in some cases. b. We ought always to tell the truth to others
c. It would be wrong to put an antique chair in a because they have a right to know the truth.
modern room. c. Although it did turn out badly, you did not want
d. People do not always do what they believe to be that, and thus you should not be judged harshly
right. for what you caused.
2 Religion and Global Ethics
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Describe the challenge of developing a

global ethical perspective.
• Differentiate between humanistic and
religious approaches to ethics.
• Explain the idea of universal human rights. • Apply the argument made in Plato’s
• Define key terms: cosmopolitan, civil
•
Euthyphro.
iStockphoto.com/Scott Hailstone
disobedience, pluralism, secularism, Defend your own ideas about ethics,

humanism, and Eurocentrism. religion, and global cultural diversity.
• Evaluate the divine command theory of
ethics.
W e live in an increasingly integrated world. With the click of the mouse, you
can instantly interact with people from a variety of cultures and religions. It is
inspiring to see how well we human beings get along despite our differences. But we
should also admit that diversity—especially religious diversity—can create tension
and difficulty.
Religious tension has become a major concern. Religious fundamentalists of vari-
ous denominations have asserted the supremacy of their preferred religious texts, tra-
ditions, and interpretations. Politicians have asserted claims of cultural and religious
supremacy. Some religious people have resorted to violence in defense of their faith.
Other religious people proclaim that religion ought to be tolerant and peaceful, despite
the intolerance of some radicals.
One solution to religious tension is respect for persons grounded on basic claims
about human rights, including the right to freedom of religious belief (we discuss
human rights in more detail in Chapter 7). The idea of religious freedom is enshrined
in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Religious freedom
is also featured in international agreements and institutions. In 1948, the United
Nation’s member nations ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
lays out a set of basic moral principles. The nations of the world are supposed to
share these principles despite our vast cultural, religious, and political differences.
Chapter 2 ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics 21
The preamble to the UN Declaration begins by which called for the death of novelist Salman Rush-
affirming the “inherent dignity” and “inalien- die in 1989 for writing a novel the Ayatollah con-
able rights” of all members of the human family. It sidered blasphemous. Meanwhile major political
explains that disregard for these rights has resulted candidates, such as Donald Trump, have called for
in barbarous acts that outrage the moral conscience a ban on Muslim immigration to the United States.
of mankind. It continues, “the advent of a world in And some religious leaders, such as the Reverend
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech Franklin Graham, have claimed that Islam is not
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been compatible with American values.2
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common While the example of Islam in the United States
people.” It goes on to state that the purpose of the has been in the forefront, we should understand that
United Nations is to promote universal respect for religious diversity is a challenge across the globe.
human rights and fundamental freedoms.1 There have been clashes between Sikhs and Hindus
The UN Declaration aims for global agreement in India, between Tibetan Buddhists and Chinese
about basic rights, the inherent dignity of human forces in Tibet, and between Israelis and Palestin-
beings, and equal rights for men and women, with ians. And in previous centuries, Christian sects
the broader goals of fostering world peace and harhar- fought against one another, while Jews were perse-
mony. As ongoing religious and cultural disputes cuted and exterminated. These examples suggest a
illustrate, however, there are outstanding disagree- serious clash of values, with the basic idea of free-
ments about the nature of these basic rights. The dom of expression and respect for religious diversity
UN document asserts the importance of freedom of running up against rigid religious convictions and
speech and freedom of religion. Article 18 of the religious bigotry. Religious differences continue to
UN Declaration explicitly states, “Everyone has the be flashpoints for conflict. From some religious per
per-
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; spectives, the basic ideas of toleration and freedom
this right includes freedom to change his religion or of religion may be seen as immoral. It might be that
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community the ideas we find in the First Amendment to the
with others and in public or private, to manifest his American Constitution or in the UN Declaration only
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and make sense within the context of Western secular
observance.” democracies. Are these values shared by people who
But does freedom of speech run up against a limit adhere to Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, or other
when such speech defames important religious fig- traditions in the world’s vast array of faiths? And
ures (say, when a cartoonist draws a caricature of which set of values is more fundamental: the secular
a saint or prophet)? Does freedom of speech hit a value of respect for religious liberty or the sectarian
limit when such speech advocates for practices and values that are dear to the religious faithful?
social arrangements that are viewed by religious This points to the important question of how
people as immoral (say, when it advocates abortion, ethics relates to religion. While recent events con-
gay marriage, or other practices that some religious tinue to bring these matters to the forefront, there
people reject)? In some parts of the world, freedom are deep historical precedents for this discussion.
of religion is viewed as leading to apostasy and blas- Socrates—the father of the Western philosophical
phemy, which is a punishable offense. In previous tradition—ran into trouble with the religious and
centuries, Christians burned witches and heretics political authorities of Athens. Socrates asked people
alive. And today, according to some interpretations how they defined moral terms, trying to understand
of Islam, blasphemy and apostasy are punishable ideas such as justice, courage, love, and friendship.
by death. One famous example of this is the fatwa But his philosophical inquiries were tinged with
or religious decree announced by the Iranian cleric skepticism. He questioned traditional religion, tradi-
and supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, tional political authority, and conventional wisdom.
He called himself a “gadfly,” by which he meant tend to tell a Eurocentric or Western-focused story
that he buzzed around Athens, nipping at and prob- about the development of tolerance, liberty, and
ing things. He believed that his effort would help individual rights.
Athenians understand morality and help to make That standard story often begins with Socrates,
them virtuous. Many Athenians found Socrates to his trial and execution, and the development of his
be offensive and even immoral. Some viewed him ideas by his student, Plato, and Plato’s student,
as a dangerously subversive figure. Eventually, he Aristotle. One of Socrates’s other followers was
was brought to court and formally charged with not Diogenes the Cynic, a free spirit who refused to
believing in the gods of the city and with corrupting conform to social conventions and had an antago-
its youth. Many suspected him of being an atheist. nistic relationship with the authorities of his time.
As a result, he was sentenced to death. One ancient legend explains that when Alexan-
der the Great was a young man, about to embark
FREEDOM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND on his conquest of the ancient world, he went to
THE EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT see Diogenes, who was lounging in the sun. After
The story of Socrates demonstrates the inherently demanding that the young prince stop blocking his
controversial nature of philosophical inquiry and sunbath, Diogenes asked Alexander what he was up
the complicated relationship between philosophy to. Alexander explained that he was about to depart
and religion. If it is difficult for us to imagine how with his armies to conquer the world. Diogenes
Socrates could have been sentenced to death for asked, “Then what?” and Alexander said that he
asking questions about Athenian morality and reli- supposed he would relax after that. Diogenes said,
gion, it is because we are used to extensive freedom “Why not sit in the sun with me now and relax, and
when it comes to religion and morality. Americans save yourself all of the trouble?” When the aston-
like to believe that our freedom is unique—a product ished Alexander asked Diogenes where he was from,
of a distinctly Western tradition of tolerance and plu- Diogenes replied, “I am a cosmopolitan,” which
ralism. However, we should be careful when mak- means a citizen of the world.
ing sweeping generalizations about history. There In this anecdote, Diogenes displays skepticism
have been many tolerant and open-minded epochs toward conventional authority, while asserting his
in the history of the world. The Buddhist emperor freedom and claiming independence from any partic-
Ashoka is known for sponsoring a tolerant regime, ular nation or culture—values that we have come to
as is the Muslim emperor Akbar. And under Confu- associate with the Western philosophical approach.
cianism, China was tolerant toward a variety of reli- This approach emphasizes individual freedom over
gious perspectives. We forget that China proclaimed traditional hierarchies and universal morality over
an “Edict of Toleration” in 1692, which permitted local customs and traditions. Like Diogenes, it makes
Christian missionary work—at around the same a cosmopolitan claim: it aspires for a single moral
time that Protestants were still being persecuted in community of humanity not bound by national, cul-
Europe. Indeed, at the time, the philosopher Leibniz tural, or, in many cases, religious traditions. And it
and other Europeans praised China and Confucian- questions many things we take for granted. Why
ism for its open and tolerant spirit. do we salute superior officers? Why do we drive on
Wo r l d h i s t o r y i n c l u d e s a n u m b e r o f f r e e the right? Why do we eat with knives and forks? Or,
thinkers—both within the lineage that follows after for that matter, why do we adopt certain religious
Socrates and in others of the world’s traditions. beliefs and practices rather than others? Is it simply
Nonetheless, much of our terminology for under under- a matter of where and to whom we were born?
standing these sorts of issues is rooted in Western While it is true that there are a variety of differ
differ-
thinking. The terms philosophy, politics, and ethics ences across the globe, including vast religious difdif-
come to us from the Greek language. And we still ferences, the cosmopolitan perspective holds that
certain ethical principles are universally valuable, liberty the law of the land (in the so-called “free
such as respect for life and for liberty. In the Western exercise” clause), while also prohibiting government
world, we have institutionalized these ideas in the from getting involved in religion (in the so-called
laws of the modern nation state. And a growing “establishment clause”). The American system can
body of international law, including the UN Decla- thus be seen to explicitly reject the kind of society
ration, emphasizes a set of basic ideas about indi- that executed Socrates, where an “established” state
vidual liberties and human rights. religion allowed the authorities to punish (by death)
Although we’ve noted that toleration and free- speech perceived to be blasphemous. We’ve come a
dom are not uniquely Western values, the usual long way from ancient Athens.
historical account emphasizes the development It should not be surprising that philosophers
of these values during the seventeenth and eigh- emphasize individual liberty. Philosophical specu-
teenth centuries in Europe. This era is known as the lation involves wide-ranging inquiry into an ever-
Enlightenment. It is the period during which many expanding set of topics. We cannot philosophize
of the philosophers we’ll discuss in the book were properly unless we are free to question, argue, and
active: Locke, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and others. think. Nor is it surprising that philosophical reflec-
These philosophers tended to think that liberty and tion on morality points in a cosmopolitan direction.
tolerance were key values. They were optimistic that When Jefferson claims that “all men are created
history was developing in a progressive direction. equal,” he implies that inalienable rights—of life, lib-
They thought that progress would occur through erty, and the pursuit of happiness—are the endow-
the employment of human reason. And they were ment of all people, from all cultures (despite the
interested in discovering common values and learn- sexist language that uses the word “men” for what
ing from other cultures. Also during this time, many we should properly call “humanity”).
philosophical ideas were put into practice in revolu- A quick glance at world history or today’s paper
tionary politics, as was the case in the American and makes it clear that no such consensus exists. For a
French revolutions. long time, even in the United States, there was a
The American Revolution can be seen to begin substantial disagreement about whether all “men”
with a famous phrase from the Declaration of Inde- really were created equal, with slavery, racism, and
pendence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, sexism as obvious problems. Even after slavery was
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed abolished, we continued to disagree about the status
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, of women. In the global context, these issues are far
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit from resolved.
of Happiness.” Drawing on the natural law tradi- Philosophical freedom can lead to conflicts with
tion as developed by John Locke (see Chapter 7), the authority, especially religious authorities. At around
Declaration enshrines individual liberties at the core the same time that the American revolutionaries
of American society. The Constitution of the United were fighting in the name of liberty, the German phi-
States goes further, detailing areas of individual lib- losopher Immanuel Kant defined enlightenment in
erty upon which government must not intrude. The terms of freedom. He thought that progress would
most important example, for our purposes, is the occur when we were permitted freedom to argue
First Amendment to the Constitution, which reads, and when we were courageous enough to use this
“Congress shall make no law respecting an estab- freedom to imagine ways to improve society. Kant
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise wrote,
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem- incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of one’s own understanding without the guidance of
grievances.” The First Amendment makes religious another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is
not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and by which individuals and societies strive to achieve
courage to use it without the guidance of another. moral maturity through rational inquiry. Like
The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere Socrates, King expresses faith in logical question-
Aude! (dare to know) “Have courage to use your own ing of accepted dogmas as a means of overcoming
understanding!”3 injustice. And like Kant, King also sees his efforts in
Kant thought that history would develop in a cos- explicitly cosmopolitan terms, as a quest for univer
univer-
mopolitan direction, with European nations forming sal justice. But King combined philosophical critique
a confederation based upon shared moral ideas. This with nonviolent civil disobedience. It is important
federation—an idea that foreshadowed the develop- to note, however, that advocates of civil disobedi-
ment of the United Nations—would ensure perpetual ence criticize existing traditions and institutions
peace. It would take two long centuries of war and while also demonstrating a kind of loyalty to those
misery for Europe and the rest of the world to finally traditions and institutions: they break the law—and
achieve Kant’s idea. And the idea still seems a bit accept punishment—as a way of pointing out injus-
naive, given remaining cultural and religious differ- tices and failures in the system. The critical stance
ences across the globe. and civil disobedience of the civil rights movement
was not merely negative. It had the positive goal of
RELIGION, CIVIC LIFE, AND CIVIL helping the United States realize the full promise of
DISOBEDIENCE its founding documents, while remaining faithful to
Like Socrates, Kant advocated gradual reform the moral ideals of American political, moral, and
through public argument about morality, politics, religious ideology.
and religion. This philosophical approach can seem
naive when faced with entrenched and powerful
unjust systems, such as slavery, serfdom, colonial-
ism, and apartheid. What if the rulers simply have
no interest in listening to the ruled?
After Kant, a variety of thinkers and activists—
from Henry David Thoreau to Mohandas K. Gandhi
to Martin Luther King, Jr.—concluded that principled
resistance to an unjust system required something
more than argument. Rather than advocate the vio-
lent overthrow of the regime, these thinkers called
for civil disobedience, the open, nonviolent refusal
to obey unjust law, with the intent of accepting the
penalty and arousing the conscience of the commu-
nity as a whole. King developed his ideas about non-
Bob Fitch/Take Stock/The Image Works
violent civil disobedience from Gandhi, the Indian

political activist and religious leader who advocated
ahimsa (or nonviolence) as a key to the struggle
for Indian independence. King also drew inspira-
tion from Jesus and from Socrates. King argues in
his “Letter from Birmingham Jail” that Socrates and
other philosophers are gadflies who nonviolently
point out conflicts within society. In King’s era, Martin Luther King Jr. in his Atlanta office,
those conflicts had a lot to do with racial injustice. In standing in front of a portrait of Mohandas K.
a sense, King is an heir to the Enlightenment dream, Gandhi.
This last point is particularly important to bear to categorize as “liberal” or “conservative.” Religion
in mind as we consider the relationship between is not one thing. There are a variety of sects and
philosophical inquiry and religious traditions and denominations, just as there are a variety of reli-
institutions. Sometimes, it might seem that the most gious people who belong to these sects and denomi-
serious impediment to free-ranging philosophical nations. And this reminds us of the importance of
criticism is religion—especially those forms of reli- religious liberty. Religious liberty along with the free-
gious belief that want to limit freedom in the name dom of philosophical inquiry is essential in a world
of conformity to the will of God. With regard to that includes a wide variety of people who disagree
morality, it is often thought that what is required about religious, political, and moral questions.
is obedience to God’s commandments, his laws, his
prophets, and the institutions that have developed to ETHICS, RELIGION, AND DIVINE
defend and disseminate the faith. (We will hear more COMMAND THEORY
about this view of morality in the next section.) And Many people get their ethical or moral views from
it may seem that philosophy has nothing to offer a their religion. Although religions include other ele-
faith-centered worldview, that it has no interest in ments, most do have explicit or implicit requirements
the sacred, and views human life in exclusively sec- or ideals for moral conduct. In some cases, they con-
ular terms. (A recent survey of nearly one thousand tain explicit rules or commandments: “Honor thy
philosophers indicates that 15 percent of the philos- father and mother” and “Thou shalt not kill.” Some
ophers surveyed accept or lean toward theism [belief religions recognize and revere saints or holy people
in the existence of god or gods], while 73 percent who provide models for us and exemplify virtues we
accept or lean toward atheism.4) should emulate. And most religions have a long his-
But such a stark opposition between philosophy tory of internal arguments and interpretations about
and religion ignores that, for most of human his- the nature and content of moral law.
tory, the two subjects have been deeply intertwined Most contemporary philosophers, however,
or even indistinguishable. Both are concerned with believe that ethics does not necessarily require a reli-
the most fundamental questions of human exis- gious grounding. Rather than relying on holy books
tence: Why are we here? What is the meaning of or religious revelations, philosophical ethics uses
life? How should we treat one another? And both reason and experience to determine what is good
have frequently challenged ruling powers and con- and bad, right and wrong, better and worse. In fact,
ventional ways of thinking. The example of Martin even those people for whom morality is religiously
Luther King is a case in point; King was a devout based may want to examine some of their views
Baptist minister who also thought that philosophi- using reason. They may want to examine various
cal critique was necessary to make moral progress. interpretations of their religious principles for inter
inter-
King drew his primary inspiration from Jesus’s nal consistency or coherence. Or they may want to
teachings on poverty, tolerance, and love. King also know whether elements of their religious morality—
valued Socrates’s example. It is not necessarily true some of its rules, for example—are good or valid
that philosophical ethics is atheistic or opposed to ones given that other people have different views of
religious belief. The philosophers mentioned here— what is right and wrong, and given that the prob-
Socrates, Locke, and Kant—remained committed to lems of contemporary times may be different from
some form of theistic belief. those of the past.
Religion remains at the center of many of the If right and wrong can only be grounded in reli-
applied ethical topics that we will discuss later in this gious belief, then nonbelievers could not be said to
text: same-sex marriage, euthanasia, abortion, the have moral views or make legitimate moral argu-
status of women, the death penalty, to name a few. ments. But even religious believers should want
Religious perspectives on such topics are not easy to be able to engage in constructive dialogue with
nonbelievers and evaluate their claims. In fact, even that atheists have no reason to be moral or to be
religious believers regularly make moral judgments concerned with doing the morally right thing. How-
that are not based strictly on their religious views ever, this is not necessarily so. For example, a reli-
but rather on reflection and common sense. gious person may be inclined to disregard the moral
Thinking further about religious morality also stakes of what occurs in this life if he or she thinks
raises challenges to it. A key element of many reli- of it as fleeting and less important than the afterlife.
gious moralities is the view that certain things are And an atheist who believes that this life is all there
good for us to do because this is what God wants. is may in fact take this life more seriously and care
This conception is often referred to as the divine more about living morally. Furthermore, religious
command theory. The idea is that certain actions and nonreligious people live together in contempo-
are right because they are what God wills for us. rary society and have pressing practical reasons to
The reading at the end of this chapter from Plato’s think clearly and reason well about morality.
dialogue Euthyphro examines this view. In this For at least three reasons, we should all seek to
dialogue, Socrates asks whether things are good develop our moral reasoning skills. First, we should
because they are approved by the gods or whether be able to evaluate critically our own or other views
the gods approve of them because they are good. of what is thought to be good and bad or just and
To say that actions are good simply because they unjust, including religious views. Second, believers
are willed or approved by the gods or God seems to of various denominations as well as nonbelievers
make morality arbitrary. God could decree anything ought to be able to discuss moral matters together.
to be good—lying or treachery, for example. It seems Third, the fact that many of us live in organized
more reasonable to say that lying and treachery are secular communities, cities, states, and countries
bad, and for this reason, the gods or God condemns requires that we be able to develop and rely on
or disapproves of them and that we should also. One widely shared reason-based views on issues of jus-
implication of this view is that morality has a certain tice, fairness, and moral ideals. This is especially
independence; if so, we should be able to determine true in political communities with some separation
whether certain actions are right or wrong in them- of church and state, where no state religion is man-
selves and for what reason. dated, and where one has freedom to practice a cho-
This argument does not imply, however, that reli- sen religion or practice no religion at all. In these
gion cannot provide a motivation or inspiration to settings, it is important to have nonreligiously based
be moral. Many believe that if life has some eternal ways of dealing with moral issues. This is one goal
significance in relation to a supreme and most per- of philosophical ethics.
fect being, then we ought to take life and morality The Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky pro-
extremely seriously. This is not to say that the only vides the kernel of one argument that is often
reason religious persons have for being moral or used in defense of divine command ethics. Dosto-
doing the morally right thing is so that they will be evsky’s writings contain the famous claim that, “If
rewarded in some life beyond this one. Such a view God is dead, then everything is permissible.”5 This
might be seen to undermine morality, since it sug- expresses the worry that if there were no God, then
gests that we should be good only if we are “bribed” there would be no morality. There are two concerns
to do so. Rather, if something is morally right, then here: one about religion as the source of morality
this is itself a reason for doing it. Thus, the good and another about religion as providing a motiva-
and conscientious person is the one who wants to tion for morality. The first concern is that without
do right simply because it is right. God as a source for morality, there would be no
Questions about the meaning of life, however, eternal, absolute, or objective basis for morality.
often play a significant role in a person’s thoughts We will deal with the first worry in more detail in
about the moral life. Some people might even think Chapter 3 when we consider relativism—which
is the claim that there are no eternal, absolute, or ethical. We turn to the issue of motivation in our
objective values. Theists often hold that God is the discussion of egoism in Chapter 4. In that chapter,
source of moral law, provided through the words of we consider a story from Plato about Gyges, a man
a prophet, such as Moses, who receives the moral who can literally get away with murder. If you were
law directly from God. Some theists worry that if able to do whatever you wanted without fear of get-
that prophetic origin of morality is denied, we are ting caught, would you commit immoral deeds? Or
left without any objective moral principles. Most do you think that we need some idea of a God who
of the rest of the first half of this book focuses on observes our deeds and punishes us or rewards us
providing an account of values that avoids this crit- accordingly?
icism; the ethical theories we will study try to pro- One of the most important problems for defend-
vide reasons and justifications for ethical principles ers of divine command ethics is the fact of religious
without reference to God. diversity. Even if we agree with Dostoevsky that
The second concern is that without a divine judge God is required for ethics, we still have to figure out
who gives out punishments and rewards in the which God or religious story is the one that provides
afterlife, there would be no motivation to be ethical. the correct teaching about morality. Saying that eth-
A version of this concern led Kant to postulate God ics is based in religion does not really help us that
and immortality as necessary for morality—so that much because we must also determine which reli-
we might at least hope that moral actions would be gion is the correct one. Given the incredible amount
rewarded (and immoral actions would be punished) of religious diversity in the world, it is easy to see
in an afterlife. In response, atheists might argue that that the divine command approach is not really very
the demands, rewards, and punishments of human helpful without a much broader inquiry into the
social life are sufficient to provide motivation to be truth of various religions.
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Pope Francis and the Dalai Lama represent the wide range of religious diversity in the world.
The problem of diversity holds even within spe- like the Golden Rule. John Hick argues that, “all
cific religious traditions. This problem was recog- the great traditions teach the moral ideal of gener
gener-
nized at the time of Socrates and Plato. Plato asks ous goodwill, love, compassion, epitomized in the
us to consider which versions of the Greek religious Golden Rule.” 7 The Tibetan Buddhist leader, the
stories are the correct or proper ones. The same con- Dalai Lama, put it this way: “All of the different reli-
sideration applies to contemporary religions. Not gious faiths, despite their philosophical differences,
only do we have to determine which religion is corcor- have a similar objective. Every religion emphasizes
rect, we also have to determine which version of this human improvement, love, respect for others, shar shar-
religion is the correct one. Consider, for example, ing other people’s suffering. On these lines every
that Christianity includes a range of denominations: religion has more or less the same viewpoint and
Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant the same goal.”8 The reading from Gandhi that fol-
(which includes a range of groups from Menno- lows at the end of this chapter makes a similar point.
nites and Quakers to Methodists, Presbyterians, and The religious pluralist idea is a friendly and optimis-
Southern Baptists). Similar diversity can be found tic one; it hopes to be able to reconcile the world’s
within Islam, Judaism, and the religious traditions religious traditions around an ethical core. Indeed,
that come out of South Asia. Even if we think that there is some evidence for such a convergence in the
ethics comes from God, how can we decide which existence of interfaith organizations that promote
account of God’s commands is the correct one? The
philosophical approach reminds us that we would
have to use reason and experience—including espe-
cially our own human insight into ethics—to decide
among the world’s religious traditions.
PLURALISM AND THE GOLDEN RULE

One approach to resolving the problem of diversity
is to look for common ground among the world’s
cultural and religious traditions. This general idea
is known as religious pluralism. A more specific
philosophical view is often called value pluralism,
which argues that there are multiple and conflict-
ing goods in the world, which cannot be reduced to
some other good. (We will discuss pluralism again
when we deal with relativism in Chapter 3.) Plu-
ralists about religion often make a different sort of
argument. Religious pluralists, such as John Hick,
claim that there is a common core of ideas found
among the world’s religious traditions. As Hick puts
eyepix/Alamy Stock Photo
it, quoting the Islamic poet Rumi, “the lamps are

many, but the light is one.”6
The usual candidate for this common core among
religions is something like the Golden Rule: “Do
unto others as you would have them do unto you”
In this image, American painter Norman Rockwell
or “treat others as you would like to be treated.” imagined that the common idea of all the world’s cultures
Many people have claimed that each of the world’s and religions was the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you
religious and cultural systems includes something would have them do unto you.”
religious diversity and pluralism. One example do we explain holy wars and religious violence? If
of this is the Parliament of the World’s Religions, all religions are basically variations on the theme of
which is a group dedicated to creating peaceful and love and compassion, then how do we explain reli-
harmonious relations between the world’s religions. gious texts and ideas that are not very compassion-
Unfortunately, this hopeful reconciliation must ate? Would a purely compassionate and loving God
ignore much; the very deep differences that exist destroy the earth with a flood, threaten punishment
among religions, the fact of apparently immoral ele- in Hell, or require gruesome tests of faith? Would
ments in some of the world’s religious traditions, the compassionate and loving religious believers stone
reality of religious conflict, and the moral importance adulterers and homosexuals and burn witches alive?
of our deep differences over metaphysical questions. While interpreters of religion can explain these
As religion scholar Stephen Prothero suggests, the things in various ways, the specific details of reli-
idea that all religions are basically the same “is a gious ethics matter as much as the general principle
lovely sentiment but it is dangerous, disrespectful, of compassion or love.
and untrue.”9
Consider for example, the Hindu idea of dharma, THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND FREE WILL
which is a complex concept that refers to laws of A further ethical question arises in the context of
natural order, justice, propriety, and harmony. The thinking about religion and ethics: the problem of
idea of dharma is connected to the traditional Indian evil. This issue provides a concrete example of the
caste system. Now there are parallels between the problem of religious diversity, since different reli-
idea of destiny and caste in India and medieval Chris- gions will deal with the problem of evil in different
tian ideas about natural law and the great chain of ways. How do we explain the presence of suffering
being. But the differences between these ideas are as and evil in the world? Buddhists explain that life is
important as the similarities. The end goal of Hindu characterized by suffering, or dukha. They explain
ethics is to attain some form of self-realization and that suffering comes from attachment to the fleet-
connection with the eternal soul of Brahman. While ing goods of this world and from wrongful actions.
this may sound like the kind of insight and beatifica- Christians also struggle with the problem of evil. But
tion (or holiness) that occurs in Christian unity with for Christians, the existence of evil creates a meta-
God, the differences are again quite important. Other physical problem. How can evil exist in a world
differences and similarities exist among the world’s that is supposedly created by a benevolent and all-
traditions. For example, Islam emphasizes zakat, or powerful God? The Christian tradition developed
alms-giving, as one of its five pillars. This includes a elaborate theodicies, or arguments that attempt to
universal duty to build a just society, help the poor, justify God as all-powerful and all-knowing, despite
and eliminate oppression. While this sounds quite a the problem of evil. Important thinkers such as
bit like the idea of charity and tithing in the Christian Augustine and Leibniz responded to this problem
tradition, zakat may be more important and more by focusing on sin and on freedom of the will. For
obligatory than mere charity—closer to a tax than Augustine, original sin is passed down from Adam
a gift. And so on. The differences are as important to the rest of us. Leibniz clarifies that God provided
and pervasive as the similarities among the world’s us with free will so that we might choose between
traditions. good and evil and argues that the best of all pos-
Optimistic religious pluralists want to reduce all sible worlds is one that contains both freedom and
of these differences to common values such as love, the related possibility of evil.
compassion, and the Golden Rule. But it is easy to Humanistic philosophers have subjected these
see that religious ethics is not simply about love and sorts of disputes to skeptical criticism. How do we
compassion. If all the world’s religions agree about know that all life is suffering and that suffering is
compassion, love, and the Golden Rule, then how caused by attachment? How do we know that there
is a God, that this God created freedom, and that results from the laws of karma, the law of continu-
original sin is passed down? The metaphysical com- ity between causes and effects: bad deeds lead to
plexities introduced by religion point toward myster
myster- suffering and good ones lead to reward—whether
ies and paradoxes that give humanistic philosophers in this life or the next. Whether the idea of karma
reasons to be skeptical. is compatible with free will is an open question.
Consider the question of free will. If we are not The Confucian and Taoist traditions also maintain
free, then we are not responsible for our actions— that human beings have the freedom to choose.
in which case, the enterprise of moral philosophy But Confucianism holds that such free choices are
begins to seem shaky. As the well-known atheist constrained by destiny or fate, while the Taoists
author Sam Harris explains, emphasize freedom experienced in harmony with
nature. In the Chinese traditions, there is, again, no
Morality, law, politics, religion, public policy,
intimate relationships, feelings of guilt and personal God who judges or punishes.
accomplishment—most of what is distinctly As noted, the idea of religious pluralism focuses
human about our lives seems to depend upon on the ethical “core” of the world’s religions. But it
our viewing one another as autonomous persons, is difficult to see how such radically different ideas
capable of free choice. . . .Without free will, sinners could converge. As Stephen Prothero acknowl-
and criminals would be nothing more than poorly edges, “the world’s religious traditions do share
calibrated clockwork, and any conception of justice many ethical precepts. . . . The Golden Rule can be
that emphasized punishment (rather than deterring, found not only in the Christian Bible and the Jewish
rehabilitating, or merely containing them) would Talmud but also in Confucian and Hindu books.” 11
appear utterly incongruous.10
But the Golden Rule is a very weak common link.
Despite this admission, Harris denies the idea Philosophers have also subjected the Golden Rule
of free will—based upon natural scientific account to criticism. One problem for the Golden Rule is that
of human beings—while still arguing that moral- if it tells us to love our neighbors as ourselves, we
ity makes sense. (We will read a brief excerpt from need a definition of “neighbors.” Does this mean
Harris regarding religion at the end of this chapter.) we should love only those who are related to us—
Philosophers have pondered the problem of free will our co-religionists, for example? Or do we have
for millennia. Some deny that there is free will in an obligations to distant human beings and future
entirely deterministic universe. Others have argued generations who do not live in our geographic (or
that free will remains compatible with determinism. temporal) neighborhood? Even if we all accept the
Free will is a puzzle even within Christianity, Golden Rule as a basic moral starting point, there
where there are questions about how much free- are still very difficult questions of application. How
dom we can have in a universe that is created by does the Golden Rule apply to sexual ethics, abor-
an omnipotent (all-powerful) and omniscient (all- tion, euthanasia, or the death penalty? And what
knowing) God. Different Christian denominations does the Golden Rule tell us to do about evil? Should
have different ideas about this issue, with some we punish evildoers? Or should we follow Jesus,
emphasizing the idea of predestination, by which who explained that in addition to loving our neigh-
God ordains things in advance, and others respond- bors, we should love our enemies and refrain from
ing to this issue differently. Other religions have returning evil for evil? The problem of respond-
responded to the problem of free will in a variety of ing to wrongdoing and evil is a complex moral
ways. Buddhists and Hindus, for example, appear issue, one that is subject to multiple interpretations
to believe in free will—although there are differ
differ- even within specific religious traditions. Different
ences within these vast and complex traditions. But traditions—even different sects and denominations
Buddhists, at least, do not believe in a God who within the same tradition—give divergent answers
punishes evil. Rather, they believe that suffering about these applied ethical issues, including the
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embryological process as an abridged repetition of the various states
through which the species has passed in its evolutionary career must
be definitively abandoned, and that, as a general law of organic
development, the biogenetic principle has been thoroughly
discredited. “This law,” says Karl Vogt of Geneva, “which I long held
as well-founded, is absolutely and radically false. Attentive study of
embryology shows us, in fact, that embryos have their own
conditions suitable to themselves, and very different from those of
adults.” (Quoted by Quatrefages De Breau, in his “Les Emules de
Darwin,” vol. II, p. 13.) “There can no longer be question,” says Prof.
M. Caullery of the Sorbonne, “of systematically regarding individual
development as a repetition of the history of the stock. This
conclusion results from the very progress made under the inspiration
received from this imaginary law, the law of biogenesis.” (Smithson.
Inst. Rpt. for 1916, p. 325.)
This collapse of the biogenetic law has tumbled into ruins the
elaborate superstructure of genealogy which Haeckel had reared
upon it. His series of thirty stages extending from the fictitious
“cytodes” up to man, inclusively, is even more worthless today than it
was when Du Bois-Reymond made his ironic comment: “Man’s
pedigree, as drawn up by Haeckel, is worth about as much as is that
of Homer’s heroes for critical historians.” (Revue Scientifique, 1877,
I, p. 1101.) Haeckel tried in vain to save his discredited law by
means of the expedient of cænogenesis, that is, “the falsification of
the ancestral record (palingenesis).” That Nature should be guilty of
“falsification” is an hypothesis not to be lightly entertained, and it is
more credible, as Wasmann remarks, to assume that Haeckel, and
not Nature, is the real falsifier, inasmuch as he has misrepresented
Nature in his “fundamental biogenetic law.” Cænogenesis is a very
convenient device. One can alternate at will between cænogenesis
and palingenesis, just as, in comparative anatomy, one can alternate
capriciously between convergence and homology, on the general
understanding of its being a case of: “Heads, I win; tails, you lose”—
certainly, there is no objective consideration to restrain us in such
procedure. “Such weapons as Cænogenesis and Convergence,”
says Kohlbrugge (in his “Die Morphologische Abstammung des
Menschen,” 1908) “are unfortunately so shaped that anyone can use
them when they suit him, or throw them aside when they do not.
They show, therefore, in the prettiest way the uncertainty even now
of the construction of the theory of descent. As soon as we go into
details it leaves us in the lurch; it was only while our knowledge was
small that everything seemed to fit together in most beautiful order.”
(Quoted by Dwight in “Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist,” p. 187.)
It is undeniable, indeed, that in many cases the young of higher
animals pass through stages in which they bear at least a superficial
resemblance to adult stages in inferior and less complex organisms.
Obviously, however, there cannot be any direct derivation of the
embryonic features of one organism from the adult characters of
another organism. This preposterous implication of the Müller-
Haeckel Law must, as Morgan points out, be entirely eliminated,
before it can merit serious consideration. Referring to the spiral
cleavage exhibited by annelid, planarian and molluscan eggs,
Morgan says: “It has been found that the cleavage pattern has the
same general arrangement in the early stages of flat worms,
annelids and molluscs. Obviously these stages have never been
adult ancestors, and obviously if their resemblance has any meaning
at all, it is that each group has retained the same general plan of
cleavage possessed by their common ancestor.... Perhaps someone
will say, ‘Well! is not this all that we have contended for! Have you
not reached the old conclusion in a roundabout way?’ I think not. To
my mind there is a wide difference between the old statement that
the higher animals living today have the original adult stages
telescoped into their embryos, and the statement that the
resemblance between certain characters in the embryos of higher
animals and corresponding stages in the embryos of lower animals
is most plausibly explained by the assumption that they have
descended from the same ancestors, and that their common
structures are embryonic survivals.” (Op. cit., pp. 22, 23.)
After this admission, however, nothing remains of the law of
“recapitulation” except simple embryological homology comparable,
in every sense, to adult homology, and adding nothing essentially
new to the latter argument for evolution. It is, therefore, ridiculous for
evolutionists to speak of branchial (gill) arches and clefts in man.
The visceral or pharyngeal arches and grooves appearing in the
human embryo are unquestionably homologous with the genuine
branchial arches and clefts in a fish embryo. In the latter, however,
the grooves become real clefts through perforation, while the arches
become the lamellæ of the permanent gills, thus adapting the animal
to aquatic respiration. It is, accordingly, perfectly legitimate to refer to
these embryonic structures in the young fish as gill arches and gill
clefts. In man, however, the corresponding embryonic structures
develop into the oral cavity, auditory meatus, ossicles of the ear, the
mandible, the lower lip, the tongue, the cheek, the hyoid bone, the
styloid process, the thymus, the thyroid and tracheal cartilages, etc.
There is no perforation of the grooves, and the arches develop into
something quite different than branchial lamellæ. Hence the correct
name for these structures in the human embryo is pharyngeal
(visceral) arches and grooves, their superficial resemblance to the
embryonic structures in the fish embryo being no justification for
calling them branchial. In short, the mere fact that certain embryonic
structures in the young fish (homologous to the pharyngeal arches
and grooves in the human embryo) develop into the permanent gills
of the adult fish, is no more significant than the association of
homology with divergent preadaptations, which is of quite general
occurrence among adult vertebrate types. In all such cases, we have
instances of fundamentally identical structures, diverted, as it were,
to entirely different purposes or functions (e.g. the arm of a man and
the flipper of a whale). Hence the argument drawn from
embryological homology is no more cogent than the argument drawn
from the homologies of comparative anatomy, which we have
already discussed in a previous chapter. The misuse of the term
branchial, to prejudge matters in their own favor, is in keeping with
the customary policy of evolutionists. It is intended, naturally, to
convey the impression that man, in the course of his evolution, has
passed through a fish-like stage. At bottom, however, it is nothing
more than a verbal subterfuge, that need not detain us further.
The theory of embryological recapitulation is often applied to man,
with a view to establishing the doctrine of his bestial ancestry. We
have seen one instance of this application, and we shall consider
one other, for the purpose of illustrating more fully the principles
involved. The claim is made by evolutionists, that man must have
passed through a fish or amphibian stage, because, in common with
all other mammals, he exhibits, during his embryological
development, a typical fish (or, if you prefer, amphibian) kidney,
which subsequently atrophies, only to be replaced by the
characteristic mammalian kidney. The human embryo, therefore,
repeats the history of our race, which must have passed through a
fish-like stage in the remote past. In consequence of this
phenomenon, therefore, it is inferred that man must have had fish-
like ancestors. Let us pause, however, to analyze the facts upon
which this inference is based.
In annelids, like the earthworm, the nephridia or excretory tubules
are arranged segmentally, one pair to each somite. In vertebrates,
however, the nephridial tubules, instead of developing in regular
sequence from before backwards, develop in three batches, one
behind the other, the anterior batch being called the pronephros, the
middle one, the mesonephros and the posterior one, the
metanephros. This, according to J. Graham Kerr, holds true not only
of the amniotic vertebrates (reptiles, birds, and mammals) but also,
with a certain reservation, of the anamniotic vertebrates (fishes and
amphibians). “In many of the lower Vertebrates,” says this author,
“there is no separation between the mesonephros and metanephros,
the two forming one continuous structure which acts as the
functional kidney. Such a type of renal organ consisting of the series
of tubules corresponding to mesonephros together with metanephros
may conveniently be termed the opisthonephros.” (“Textbook of
Embryology,” II—Vertebrata, p. 221.) If we accept this view, it is not
quite accurate to regard the mesonephros in man as a homologue of
the opisthonephros of a fish, seeing that the latter is composed not
only of mesonephridia (mesonephric tubules), but also of
metanephridia (metanephric tubules). A brief description of the three
nephridial systems of vertebrate embryos will serve to further clarify
their interrelationship.
(1) The pronephric system: This consists of a collection of tubules
called the pronephros, and a pronephric duct leading to the cloaca,
or terminal portion of the alimentary canal. The pronephros is a
functional organ in the frog tadpole and other larval amphibia. It is
also found in a few teleosts, where it is said to persist as a functional
organ in the adult. In other fishes, however, and in all higher forms
the pronephros atrophies and becomes reduced to a few
rudiments.[17]
(2) The mesonephric system: This consists of a collection of
nephridial tubules called the mesonephros (Wolffian body). The
tubules of the mesonephros do not develop any duct of their own,
but utilize the posterior portion of the pronephric duct, the said
tubules becoming secondarily connected with this duct in a region
posterior to the pronephridia (tubules of the pronephros). The
pronephric tubules together with the anterior portion of the
pronephric duct then atrophy, while the persisting posterior portion of
this duct receives the name of mesonephric or Wolffian duct. The
duct in question still terminates in the cloaca, and serves, in the
male, the combined function of a urinary and spermatic duct; but, in
the female, a special oviduct (the Müllerian duct) is superadded
because of the large size of the eggs to be transmitted, the Wolffian
or mesonephric duct subserving only the urinary function. The
mesonephros is functional in mammalian embryos, but atrophies and
disappears coincidently with the development of the permanent
kidney. The same is true of amniotic vertebrates generally, except
that in the case of reptiles the mesonephros persists for a few
months after hatching in the adult, the definitive kidney of the adult
being reinforced during that interval by the still functional
mesonephros. In anamniotic vertebrates, however, no separation
exists between the mesonephros and the metanephros, the two
forming one continuous structure, the opisthonephros, which acts as
the functional kidney of the adult.
(3) The metanephric system: In the amniotic vertebrates the
mesonephros and metanephros are distinct, the former being
functional in embryos and in adult reptiles (for a few months after
hatching), while the metanephros becomes the definitive kidney of
the adult. The metanephros is a collection of nephridial tubules
provided with a special urinary duct called the ureter, which empties
into the bladder (not the cloaca). The Wolffian or mesonephric duct is
retained as a sperm duct in the male (of amniotic vertebrates), but
becomes vestigial in the female. Only a certain number of the
nephridial tubules of the embryonic metanephros are taken over to
form part of the permanent or adult kidney (in mammals, birds, and
reptiles).
If, then, as we have previously observed, we follow Kerr in
regarding the fish kidney, not as a simple mesonephros, but as an
opisthonephros (i.e. a combination of mesonephros and
metanephros), there is no warrant for interpreting the embryonic
mesonephros of man and mammals generally as the fish-kidney
stage. But waiving this consideration, and assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the fish kidney is a perfect homologue of the human
mesonephros, the mere fact of the adoption by the human embryo of
a temporary solution of its excretory problem similar to the
permanent solution of that problem adopted by the fish, would not, of
itself, imply the common ancestry of men and fishes. Such a
coincidence would be fully explicable as a case of convergent
adaptation occurring in the interest of embryonic economy.
It is, indeed, a well-known fact that larval and embryonic
organisms are often obliged to defer temporarily the construction of
the more complex structures of adult life, and to improvise simpler
substitutes for use until such a time as they have accumulated a
sufficient reserve of energy and materials to complete the work of
their more elaborate adult organization. The young starfish, for
example, arising as it does from an egg but scantily supplied with
yolk, is forced, from the very outset, to shift for itself, in coping with
the food-getting problem. Under stress of this necessity, it
economizes its slender resources by constructing the extremely
simple digestive and motor apparatus characteristic of the larva in its
bilaterally-symmetrical Bipinnaria stage, and postponing the
development of the radially-symmetrical structure characteristic of
the adult stage, until it has stored up the wherewithal to complete its
metamorphosis.
From this viewpoint, there is no difficulty in understanding why
temporary solutions of the excretory problem should precede the
definitive solution of this problem in mammalian embryos. The
problem of excretion is urgent from the outset, and its demands
increase with the growth of the embryo. It is only natural, then, that a
series of improvised structures should be resorted to, in a case of
this kind; and, since these temporary solutions of the excretory
problem must, of necessity, be as simple as possible, it should not
be in the least surprising to find them coinciding with the permanent
solutions adopted by inferior organisms less complexly organized
than the mammals. Hence the bare fact of resemblance between the
transitory embryonic kidney of a mammal and the permanent adult
kidney of a fish would have no atavistic significance. We know of
innumerable cases in which an identical adaptation occurs in
genetically unrelated organisms. The cephalopod mollusc Nautilus,
for example, solves the problem of light-perception in the identical
manner in which it is solved by the vertebrates. This mollusc has the
perfect vertebrate type of eye, including the lens and all other parts
down to the minutest detail. The fact, however, that the mollusc
solves its problem by using the stereotyped solution found in
vertebrates rather than by developing a compound eye analogous to
the type found among arthropods, is wholly destitute of genetic
significance. In fact, the genetic interpretation is positively rejected
by the evolutionists, who interpret the occurrence of similar eyes in
molluscs and vertebrates as an instance of “accidental
convergence.” Even assuming, then, what Kerr denies, namely, a
perfect parallelism between the mesonephros of the human embryo
and the permanent kidney of an adult fish, the alleged fact that the
human embryo temporarily adopts the same type of solution for its
excretory problem as the one permanently employed by the fish
would not in itself be a proof of our descent from a fish-like ancestor.
In fact, not only is embryological homology of no greater value
than adult homology as an argument for evolution, but it is, on the
contrary, considerably inferior to the latter, as regards cogency.
Differentiation pertains to the final or adult stage of organisms.
Embryonic structures, inasmuch as they are undeveloped and
undifferentiated, present for that very reason an appearance of crude
and superficial similarity. “Most of what is generally ascribed to the
action of the so-called biogenetic law,” says T. Garbowski, “is
erroneously ascribed to it, since all things that are undeveloped and
incomplete must be more or less alike.” (“Morphogenetische
Studien,” Jena, 1903.) When we consider the fact that the metazoa
have all a similar unicellular origin, are subject to uniform
morphogenetic laws, and are frequently exposed to analogous
environmental conditions demanding similar adaptations, it is not at
all surprising that they should present many points of resemblance
(both in their embryonic and their adult morphology) which are not
referable to any particular line of descent. At all events, these
resemblances are far too general in their extension to enable us to
specify the type of ancestor responsible therefor. More especially is
this true of embryological homologies, which are practically valueless
as basis for reconstructing the phylogeny of any type. “That certain
phenomena,” says Oskar Hertwig, “recur with great regularity and
uniformity in the development of different species of animals, is due
chiefly to the fact that under all circumstances they supply the
necessary condition under which alone the next higher stage in
ontogeny (embryological development) can be produced.”
(“Allgemeine Biologie,” 1906, p. 595.) The same author, therefore,
proposes to revamp Haeckel’s “biogenetisches Grundgesetz” as
follows: “We must leave out the words ‘recapitulation of forms of
extinct ancestors’ and substitute for them ‘repetition of forms
regularly occurring in organic development, and advancing from the
simple to the more complex.’” (Op. cit., p. 593.)
Finally, when applied to the problem of man’s alleged genetic
connection with the ape, the biogenetic principle proves the exact
reverse of what the Darwinians desire; for as a matter of fact the
young apes resemble man much more closely in the shape of the
skull and facial features than do the adult animals. Inasmuch,
therefore, as the ape, in its earlier development, reveals a more
marked resemblance to man than is present in its later stages, it
follows, according to the “biogenetic law,” that man is the ancestor of
the ape. This, however, is inadmissible, seeing that the ape is by no
means a more recent type than man. Consequently, as applied to
man, the Haeckelian principle leads to a preposterous conclusion,
and thereby manifests its worthlessness as a clue to phylogeny.
Julius Kollmann, it is true, gives serious attention to this likeness
between young apes and men, and makes it the basis of his scheme
of human evolution. “Kollmann,” says Dwight, “starts from the fact
that the head of a young ape is very much more like that of a child
than the head of an old ape is like that of a man. He holds that the
likeness of the skull of a very young ape is so great that there must
be a family relationship. He believes that some differentiation, some
favorable variation, must occur in the body of the mother and so a
somewhat higher skull is transmitted to the offspring and is
perpetuated. Concerning which Kohlbrugge remarks that ‘thus the
first men were developed, not from the adult, but from the embryonic
forms of the anthropoids whose more favorable form of skull they
managed to preserve in further growth.’ ... Schwalbe makes the
telling criticism of these views of Kollmann that much the same thing
might be said of the heads of embryonic animals in general that is
said of those of apes, and that thus mammals might be said to have
come from a more man-like ancestor.” (Op. cit., pp. 186, 187.) All of
which goes to show that the “biogenetic law” is more misleading than
helpful in settling the question of human phylogeny.
§ 3. Rudimentary Organs
Darwin attached great importance to the existence in man of so-
called rudimentary organs, which he regarded as convincing
evidence of man’s descent from the lower forms of animal life.
Nineteenth century science, being ignorant of the functional purpose
served by many organs, arbitrarily pronounced them to be useless
organs, and chose, in consequence, to regard them all as the
atrophied and (wholly or partially) functionless remnants of organs
that were formerly developed and fully functional in remote ancestors
of the race. Darwin borrowed this argument from Lamarck. It may be
stated thus: Undeveloped and functionless organs are atrophied
organs. But atrophy is the result of disuse. Now disuse presupposes
former use. Consequently, rudimentary organs were at one time
developed and functioning, viz. in the remote ancestors of the race.
Since, therefore, these selfsame organs are developed and
functional in the lower forms of life, it follows that the higher forms, in
which these organs are reduced and functionless, are descended
from forms similar to those in which said organs are developed and
fully functional.
This argument, however, fairly bristles with assumptions that are
not only wholly unwarranted, but utterly at variance with actual facts.
In the first place, it wrongly assumes that all reduced organs are
functionless, and, conversely, that all functionless organs are
atrophied or reduced. Facts, however, prove the contrary; for we find
frequent instances of reduced organs which function, and, vice
versa, of well-developed organs which are functionless. The tail, for
example, in cats, dogs, and certain Catarrhine monkeys, though it
discharges neither the prehensile function that makes it useful in the
Platyrrhine monkey, nor the protective function that makes it useful
to horses and cattle in warding off flies, is, nevertheless, despite its
inutility or absence of function, a quite fully developed organ.
Conversely, the reduced or undeveloped fin-like wings of the
penguin are by no means functionless, since they enable this bird to
swim through the water with great facility.
To save his argument from this antagonism of the facts, Darwin
resorts to the ingenious expedient of distinguishing between
rudimentary organs and nascent organs. Rudimentary organs are
undeveloped organs, which are wholly, or partially, useless. They
have had a past, but have no future. Nascent organs, on the
contrary, are undeveloped organs, which “are of high service to their
possessors” (“Descent of Man,” ch. I, p. 28, 2nd ed.). They “are
capable of further development” (ibidem), and have, therefore, a
future before them. He gives the following examples of rudimentary
organs: “Rudimentary organs ... are either quite useless, such as
teeth which never cut through the gums, or almost useless, such as
the wings of an ostrich, which serve merely as sails.” (“Origin of
Species,” 6th ed., ch. XIV, p. 469.) As an example of a nascent
organ, he gives the mammary glands of the oviparous Duckbill: “The
mammary glands of the Ornithorhynchus may be considered, in
comparison with the udders of a cow, as in a nascent condition.”
(Op. cit., ch. XIV, p. 470.)
Darwin admits that it is hard to apply this distinction in the
concrete: “It is, however, often difficult to distinguish between
rudimentary and nascent organs; for we can judge only by analogy
whether a part is capable of further development, in which case
alone it deserves to be called nascent.” (Op. cit., ch. XIV, p. 469.) For
Darwin “judging by analogy” meant judging on the assumption that
evolution has really taken place; for he describes rudimentary organs
as being “of such slight service that we can hardly suppose that they
were developed under the conditions which now exist.” (“Descent of
Man,” ch. I, p. 29.)
He is somewhat perplexed about applying this distinction to the
penguin: “The wing of the penguin,” he admits, “is of high service,
acting as a fin; it may, therefore, represent the nascent state: not that
I believe this to be the case; it is more probably a reduced organ,
modified for a new function.” (“Origin of Species,” 6th ed., ch. XIV,
pp. 469, 470.) In other words, there is scarcely any objective
consideration by which the validity of this distinction can be checked
up in practice. Like homology and convergence, like palingenesis
and cænogensis, the distinction between rudimentary and nascent
organs is a convenient device, which can be arbitrarily manipulated
according to the necessities of a preconceived theory. It is “scientific”
sanction for the privilege of blowing hot and cold with the same
breath.
The assumption that atrophy and reduction are the inevitable
consequence of disuse, or diminution of use, in so far as this
decreases the flow of nourishing blood to unexercised parts, is
certainly erroneous. Yet Darwin made it the premise of his argument
from so-called rudimentary organs. “The term ‘disuse’ does not
relate,” he informs us, “merely to lessened action of muscles, but
includes a diminished flow of blood to the part or organ, from being
subjected to fewer alternations of pressure, or from being in any way
less habitually active.” (“Origin of Species,” 6th ed., p. 469.) As a
matter of fact, however, we have many instances in which use has
failed to develop and disuse to reduce organs in certain types of
animals. As an example in point, we may cite the case of right-
handedness among human beings. From time immemorial, the
generality of mankind have consistently used the right hand in
preference to the left, without any atrophy or reduction of the left
hand, or over-development of the right hand, resulting from this
racial practice. “The superiority of one hand,” says G. Elliot Smith, “is
as old as mankind.” (Smithson. Inst. Rpt. for 1912, p. 570.) It is true
that only about 6,000 years of human existence are known to history,
but, if one accepts the most conservative estimates of glaciologists,
man has had a much longer prehistory, the lowest estimates for the
age of man being approximately 30,000 years. Thus W. J. Sollas
tells us that the Glacial period, in which man first appeared, came to
an end about 7,000 years ago, and that the men buried at Chapelle-
aux-Saints in France lived about 25,000 years ago. His figures agree
with those of C. F. Wright, who bases his calculations on the Niagara
Gorge. The Niagara River is one of the postglacial streams, and the
time required to cut its gorge has been calculated as 7,000 years.
Gerard De Geer, the Swedish scientist, gives 20,000 years ago as
the end of glacial and the commencement of recent or postglacial
time. He bases his estimates on the sediments of the Yoldia Sea in
Sweden. His method consists in the actual counting of certain
seasonally-laminated clay layers, presumably left behind by the
receding ice sheet of the continental glacier. The melting is
registered by annual deposition, in which the thinner layers of finer
sand from the winter flows alternate with thicker layers of coarser
material from the summer flows. In warm years, the layers are
thicker, in colder years they are thinner, so that these laminated
Pleistocene clays constitute a thermographic as well as a
chronological record. De Geer began his study of Pleistocene clays
in 1878, and in 1920 he led an expedition to the United States, for
the purpose of extending his researches. (Cf. Science, Sept. 24,
1920, pp. 284-286.) At that time, he claimed to have worked out the
chronology of the past 12,000 years. His figure of 20,000 years for
postglacial time, while very displeasing to that reckless foe of
scientific caution and conservatism, Henry Fairfield Osborn, tallies
very well with the estimates of Sollas and Wright. H. Obermaier,
basing his computation on Croll’s theory that glaciation is caused by
variations in the eccentricity of the earth’s orbit about the sun, which
would bring about protracted winters in the hemisphere having
winter, when the earth was farthest from the sun (with consequent
accumulation of ice), gives 30,000 years ago as the date of the first
appearance of man on earth. Father Hugues Obermaier, it may be
noted, like Abbé Henri Breuil, is one of the foremost authorities on
the subject of prehistoric Man. Both are Catholic priests.
All such computations of the age of man are, of course, uncertain
and theoretical. Evolutionists calculate it in hundreds of thousands,
and even millions, of years. After giving such a table of recklessly
tremendous figures, Osborn has the hypocritical meticulosity to add
that, for the sake of precision (save the mark!) the nineteen hundred
and some odd years of the Christian era should be added to his
figures. But, even according to the most conservative scientific
estimates, as we have seen, man is said to have been in existence
for 30,000 years, and the prevalence of right-handedness among
men is as old as the human race. One would expect, then, to find
modern man equipped with a gigantic right arm and a dwarfed left
arm. In other words, man should exhibit a condition comparable to
that of a lobster, which has one large and one small chela. Yet, in
spite of the fact that the comparative inaction of the human left hand
is supposed to have endured throughout a period of, at least, 30,000
years, this state of affairs has not resulted in the faintest trace of
atrophy or retrogression. Bones, muscles, tendons, ligaments,
nerves, blood vessels, and all parts are of equal size in both arms
and both hands. Excessive exercise may overdevelop the
musculature of the right arm, but this is an individual and acquired
adaptation, which is never transmitted to the offspring, e.g. the child
of a blacksmith does not inherit the muscular hypertrophy of his
father. Disuse, therefore, has not the efficacy which Lamarck and
Darwin ascribed to it.
In fine, it must be recognized, once for all, that organisms are not-
molded on a Lamarckian basis of use, nor yet on a Darwinian basis
of selected utility. Expediency, in other words, is not the sole
governing principle of the organic world. Neither instinctive habitude
nor the struggle for existence succeeds in forcing structural
adaptation of a predictable nature. Animals with different organic
structure have the same instincts, e.g. monkeys with, and without,
prehensile tails alike dwell in trees; while animals having the same
organic structure may have different instincts, e.g. the rabbit, which
burrows, and the hare, which does not, are practically identical in
anatomical structure. Again, some animals are highly specialized for
a function, which other animals perform without specialized organs,
as is instanced in the case of moles, which possess a special
burrowing apparatus, and prairie-dogs, which burrow without a
specialized apparatus. Any system of evolution, which ignores the
internal or hereditary factors of organic life and strives to explain all
in terms of the environmental factors, encounters an insuperable
obstacle in this remorseless resistance of conflicting facts.
Another flaw in the Darwinian argument from rudimentary organs
is that it confounds, in many cases, apparent, with real inutility (or
absence of function). Darwin and his followers frequently argued out
of their ignorance, and falsely concluded that an organ was destitute
of a function, merely because they had failed to discover its utility.
Large numbers, accordingly, of highly serviceable organs were
catalogued as vestigial or rudimentary, simply because nineteenth
century science did not comprehend their indubitable utility. With the
advance of present-day physiology, this list of “useless organs” is
being rapidly depleted, so that the scientific days of the rudimentary
organ appear to be numbered. At any rate, in arbitrarily pronouncing
many important and functioning organs to be useless vestiges of a
former stage in the history of the race, the Darwinians were not the
friends of Science, but rather its reactionary enemies, inasmuch as
they sought to discourage further investigation by their dogmatic
decision that there was no function to be found. In so doing,
however, they were merely exploiting the ignorance of their times in
the interest of a preconceived theory, which whetted their appetite for
discovering, at all costs, the presence in man of functionless organs.
Their anxiety in this direction led them to consider the whole group
of organs constituting a most important regulatory and coördinative
system in man and other vertebrates as so many useless vestigial
organs. This system is called the cryptorhetic system and is made of
internally-secreting, ductless glands, now called endocrine glands.
These glands generate and instill into the blood stream certain
chemical substances called hormones, which, diffusing in the blood,
produce immediate stimulatory, and remote metabolic effects on
special organs distant from the endocrine gland, in which the
particular hormone is elaborated. As examples of such endocrine
glands, we may mention the pineal gland (epiphysis), the pituitary
body (hypophysis), the thyroid glands, the parathyroids, the islelets
of Langerhans, the adrenal bodies (suprarenal capsules), and the
interstitial cells of the gonads. The importance of these alleged
useless organs is now known to be paramount. Death, for instance,
will immediately ensue in man and other animals, upon extirpation of
the adrenal bodies.
The late Robert Wiedersheim, it will be remembered, declared the
pineal gland or epiphysis to be the surviving vestige of a “third eye”
inherited from a former ancestor, in whom it opened between the
parietal bones of the skull, like the median or pineal eye of certain
lizards, the socket of which is the parietal foramen formed in the
interparietal suture. If the argument is based on homology alone,
then the coincidence in position between the human epiphysis and
the median optic nerve of the lizards in question has the ordinary
force of the evolutionary argument from homology. But when one
attempts to reduce the epiphysis to the status of a useless vestigial
rudiment, he is in open conflict with facts; for the pineal body is, in
reality, an endocrine gland generating and dispersing a hormone,
which is very important for the regulation of growth in general and of
sexual development in particular. Hence this tiny organ in the
diencephalic roof, no larger than a grain of wheat, is not a
functionless rudiment, but an important functioning organ of the
cryptorhetic system. We have no ground, therefore, on this score for
inferring that our pineal gland functioned in former ancestors as a
median eye comparable to that of the cyclops Polyphemus of
Homeric fame.
In like manner, the pituitary body or hypophysis, which in man is a
small organ about the size of a cherry, situated at the base of the
brain, buried in the floor of the skull, and lying just behind the optic
chiasma, was formerly rated as a rudimentary organ. It was, in fact,
regarded as the vestigial remnant of a former connection between
the neural and alimentary canals, reminiscent of the invertebrate
stage. “The phylogenetic explanation of this organ generally
accepted,” says Albert P. Mathews, “is that formerly the neural canal
connected at this point with the alimentary canal. A probable and
almost the only explanation of this, though an explanation almost
universally rejected by zoölogists, is that of Gaskell, who has
maintained that the vertebrate alimentary canal is a new structure,
and that the old invertebrate canal is the present neural canal. The
infundibulum, on this view, would correspond to the old invertebrate
œsophagus, the ventricle of the thalamus to the invertebrate
stomach, and the canal originally connected posteriorly with the
anus. The anterior lobe of the pituitary body could then correspond
to some glandular adjunct of the invertebrate canal, and the nervous
part to a portion of the original circumœsophageal nervous ring of
the invertebrates.” (“Physiological Chemistry,” 2nd ed., 1916, pp.
641, 642.)
This elaborate piece of evolutionary contortion calls for no
comment here. We are only interested in the fact that this wild and
weird speculation was originally inspired by the false assumption that
the hypophysis was a functionless organ. As a matter of fact, it is the
source of two important hormones. The one generated in its anterior
lobe is tethelin, a metabolic hormone, which promotes the growth of
the body in general and of the bony tissue in particular. Hypertrophy
and overfunction of this gland produces giantism, or acromegaly
(enlargement of hands, feet, and skull), while atrophy and
underfunction of the anterior lobe results in infantilism, acromikria
(diminution of extremities, i. e. hands, feet, head), obesity, and
genital dystrophy (i. e. suppression of secondary sexual characters).
The posterior lobe of the pituitary body constitutes, with the pars
intermedia, a second endocrine gland, which generates a stimulatory
hormone called pituitrin. This hormone stimulates unstriated muscle
to contract, and thereby regulates the discharge of secretions from
various glands of the body, e. g. the mammary glands, bladder, etc.
Hence the hypophysis, far from being a useless organ, is an
indispensable one. Moreover, it is an integral and important part of
the cryptorhetic system.
The same story may be repeated of the thyroid glands. These
consist of two lobes located on either side of the windpipe, just below
the larynx (Adam’s apple), and joined together across the windpipe
by a narrow band or isthmus of their own substance. Gaskell
homologized them with a gland in scorpions, and Mathew says that,
if his surmise is correct, “the thyroid represents an accessory sexual
organ of the invertebrate.” (Op. cit., p. 654.) They are, however,
endocrine glands, that generate a hormone known as thyroxin, which
regulates the body-temperature, growth of the body in general, and
of the nervous system in particular, etc., etc. Atrophy or extirpation of
these glands causes cretinism in the young and myxoedema in
adults. Without a sufficient supply of this hormone, the normal
exercise of mental powers in human beings is impossible. The
organ, therefore, is far from being a useless vestige of what was
formerly useful.
George Howard Parker, the Zoölogist of Harvard, sums up the
case against the Darwinian interpretation of the endocrine glands as
follows: “The extent to which hormones control the body is only just
beginning to be appreciated. For a long time anatomists have
recognized in the higher animals, including man, a number of so-
called ductless glands, such as the thyroid gland, the pineal gland,
the hypophysis, the adrenal bodies, and so forth. These have often
been passed over as unimportant functionless organs whose
presence was to be explained as an inheritance from some remote
ancestor. But such a conception is far from correct. If the thyroids are
removed from a dog, death follows in from one to four weeks. If the
adrenal bodies are excised, the animal dies in from two to three
days. Such results show beyond doubt that at least some of these
organs are of vital importance, and more recent studies have
demonstrated that most of them produce substances which have all
the properties of hormones.” (“Biology and Social Problems,” 1914,
pp. 43, 44.)
Even the vermiform appendix of the cæcum, which since Darwin’s
time has served as a classic example of a rudimentary organ in man,
is, in reality, not a functionless organ. Darwin, however, was of
opinion that it was not only useless, but positively harmful. “With
respect to the alimentary canal,” he says, “I have met with an
account of only a single rudiment, namely, the vermiform appendage
of the cæcum. ... Not only is it useless, but it is sometimes the cause
of death, of which fact I have lately heard two instances. This is due
to small hard bodies, such as seeds, entering the passage and
causing inflammation.” (“Descent of Man,” 2nd ed., ch. I, pp. 39, 40.)
The idea that seeds cause appendicitis is, of course, an exploded
superstition, the hard bodies sometimes found in the appendix being
fecal concretions and not seeds—“The old idea,” says Dr. John B.
Deaver, “that foreign bodies, such as grape seeds, are the cause of
the disease, has been disproved.” (Encycl. Americana, vol. 2, p. 76.)
What is more germane to the point at issue, however, is that Darwin
erred in denying the utility of the vermiform appendix. For, although
this organ does not discharge in man the important function which its
homologue discharges in grain-eating birds and also in herbivorous
mammals, it subserves the secondary function of lubricating the
intestines by means of a secretion from its muciparous glands.
Darwin gives the semilunar fold as another instance of a vestigial
organ, claiming that it is a persistent rudiment of a former third eyelid
or membrana nictitans, such as we find in birds. “The nictitating
membrane, or third eyelid,” he says, “with its accessory muscles and
other structures, is especially well developed in birds, and is of much
functional importance to them, as it can be rapidly drawn across the
whole eyeball. It is found in some reptiles and amphibians, and in
certain fishes as in sharks. It is fairly well developed in the two lower
divisions of the mammalian series, namely, in the monotremata and
marsupials, and in some higher mammals, as in the walrus. But in
man, the quadrumana, and most other mammals, it exists, as is
admitted by all anatomists, as a mere rudiment, called the semilunar
fold.” (Op. cit., ch. I, pp. 35, 36.) Here Darwin is certainly wrong
about his facts; for the so-called third eyelid is not well developed in
the two lower divisions of the mammalian series (i.e. the
monotremes and the marsupials) nor in any other mammalian type.
“With but few exceptions,” says Remy Perrier, “the third eyelid is not
so complete as among the birds; (in the mammals) it never covers
the entire eye. For the rest, it is not really perceptible except in
certain types, like the dog, the ruminants, and, still more so, the
horse. In the rest (of the mammals) it is less developed.” (“Elements
d’anatomie comparée,” Paris, 1893, p. 1137.) Moreover, Darwin’s
suggestion leaves us at sea as to the ancestor, from whom our
“rudimentary third eyelid” has been inherited. His mention of birds as
having a well developed third eyelid is not very helpful, because all
evolutionists agree in excluding the birds from our line of descent.
The reptiles are more promising candidates for the position of
ancestors, but, as no trace of a third eyelid could possibly be left
behind in the imperfect record of the fossiliferous rocks (soft parts
like this having but slight chance of preservation), we do not really
know whether the palæozoic reptiles possessed this particular
feature, or not. Nor can we argue from analogy and induction,
because not all modern reptiles are equipped with third eyelids.
Hence the particular group of palæozoic reptiles, which are
supposed to have been our progenitors, may not have possessed
any third eyelid to bequeath to us in the reduced and rudimentary
form of the plica semilunaris. If it be replied, that they must have had
this feature, because otherwise we would have no ancestor from
whom we could inherit our semilunar fold, it is obvious that such
argumentation assumes the very point which it ought to prove,
namely: the actuality of evolution. Rudiments are supposed to be a
proof for evolution, and not, vice versa, evolution a proof for
rudiments.
Finally, the basic assumption of Darwin that the semilunar fold is
destitute of function is incorrect; for this crescent-shaped fold
situated in the inner or nasal corner of the eye of man and other
mammals serves to regulate the flow of the lubricating lacrimal fluid
(which we call tears). True this function is secondary compared with
the more important function discharged by the nictitating membrane
in birds. In the latter, the third eyelid is a pearly-white (sometimes
transparent) membrane placed internal to the real eyelids, on the
inner side of the eye, over whose surface it can be drawn like a
curtain to shield the organ from excessive light, or irritating dust;
nevertheless, the regulation of the flow of lacrimal humor is a real
function, and it is therefore entirely false to speak of the semilunar
fold as a functionless rudiment.
The coccyx is likewise cited by Darwin as an example of an
inherited rudiment in man. “In man,” he says, “the os coccyx,
together with certain other vertebræ hereafter to be described,
though functionless as a tail, plainly represents this part in other
vertebrate animals.” (Op. cit., ch. I, p. 42.) That it serves no purpose
as a tail, may be readily admitted, but that it serves no purpose
whatever, is quite another matter. As a matter of fact, it serves for the
attachment of several small muscles, whose functioning would be
impossible in the absence of this bone. Darwin himself concedes
this; for he confesses that the four vertebræ of the coccyx “are
furnished with some small muscles.” (Ibidem.) We may, therefore,
admit the homology between the human coccyx and the tails of other
vertebrates, without being forced to regard the latter as a useless
vestigial organ. It may be objected that the attachment of these
muscles might have been provided for in a manner more in harmony
with our ideas of symmetry. To this we reply that Helmholtz criticized
the human eye for similar reasons, when he said that he would
remand to his workshop for correction an optical instrument so
flawed with defects as the human eye. But, after all, it was by the
use of these selfsame imperfect eyes that Helmholtz was enabled to
detect the flaws of which he complained. When man shall have fully
fathomed the difficulties and obstructions with which organic
morphogeny has to contend in performing its wonderful work, and
shall have arrived at an elementary knowledge of the general laws of
morphogenetic mechanics, he will be more inclined to admire than to
criticize. It is a mistake to imagine that the finite works of the Creator
must be perfect from every viewpoint. It suffices that they are perfect
with respect to the particular purpose which they serve, and this
purpose must not be narrowly estimated from the standpoint of the

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Ethics: Theory and Contemporary

Issues 9th Edition Barbara Mackinnon

Ethics theory and contemporary issues Ninth Edition

Doing Ethics: Moral Reasoning, Theory, and Contemporary

(eTextbook PDF) for Doing Ethics: Moral Reasoning,

Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics 6th Edition

Rossian Ethics: W.D. Ross and Contemporary Moral Theory

Ethics: Selections from Classical and Contemporary

Ethics: Theory and Practice (11th Edition ) 11th

Issues and Ethics in the Helping Professions 10th

Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States

Printed in the United States of America

Preface ix Ethics, Religion, and Divine

READING Who’s to Judge? • Louis Pojman 55 —6— Deontological Ethics and

Virtue as a Mean 158 Combining the Types of

Relevant Factual Matters 286 —14— Economic Justice 344

The Environment and Its

Current Issues 538 Justice 565

Spinoza Hegel Nietzsche Habermas

• Describe the philosophical study of ethics. • Differentiate between instrumental and

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• Explain the difference between

• Decide whether naturalistic explanations

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WHY STUDY ETHICS?

Normative Judgments in Descriptive Judgments in

Ethics Law Aesthetics Religion Custom Sociology Psychology

Dawkins’s idea is that our genes use our altruistic

is provocative and insightful, we might still worry

from analogy. In this type of argument, one com-

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I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human

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• Describe the challenge of developing a

disobedience, pluralism, secularism, Defend your own ideas about ethics,

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violent civil disobedience from Gandhi, the Indian

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PLURALISM AND THE GOLDEN RULE

it, quoting the Islamic poet Rumi, “the lamps are

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