TERRORISM

(National)

Terrorism has evolved in its aims, forms, frequency, lethality, targets, and
operation methods at various intervals. The changes underscore the shifting
dynamics of terrorism, driven by global political shifts and technological
advancements.

The evolution of terrorism can be categorized into four waves — the

‘anarchist’ (1880-1920s), ‘anti-colonial’ (1920-1960), ‘new left’ (1960s
to end-century) and ‘religiously inspired’ (1979 onwards). A ‘wave of
terrorism’ represents a cycle of increased and decreased activity in a specific
time frame, characterized by phases of expansion and contraction.

The global nature of terrorism calls for enhanced international

collaboration, including the establishment of MOUs, mutual legal
assistance, and extradition treaties, as crucial measures for combating
terrorism and minimizing the influence of violent non-state entities.

A military check post in nearby Daraban (Daraban is a tehsil located in Dera Ismail Khan
District) was stormed by militants last December, causing over 20 fatalities
Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan, an alibi used by the banned TTP.

Overall, 2023 was a blood-soaked year, with some figures citing over 1,500
terrorism-related fatalities.

The challenge is two-tiered: to secure Pakistan and ensure no part of the

country is available for terrorist outfits to establish themselves, while the
other goal must be to prevent militants from creating sanctuaries in
Afghanistan.

The UN has validated Pakistan’s concerns about training camps on Afghan soil
used by Al Qaeda and the TTP to foment trouble in Pakistan.
Some 789 terror attacks and counter-terrorism operations resulted in
more than 1,500 deaths in 2023, including close to 1,000 civilian and
security forces lives lost in Pakistan.

The year 2023 saw a staggering 69pc increase in militant attacks over the
previous year. The enemies of Pakistan operated with near impunity, striking
53 times per month on average in 2023, compared to 32 times per
month a year earlier.

KP and Balochistan were the hardest hit, with 84pc of the attacks taking
place on their soil and accounting for 90pc of all deaths.

A cause for great worry for decision-makers responsible for security, as the
deepening fissures between the citizenry and the state owing to the
sociopolitical instability roiling the country are ripe to be exploited by
hostile elements.

By 2015, Pakistani law-enforcement authorities had succeeded in crushing

terrorist forces, through military operations in Swat, South Waziristan and
North Waziristan. A National Action Plan was adopted in 2015 to flush
out the remaining terrorist holdouts through intel-based operations. The
strategy worked well till 2019, with few terrorist incidents since 2020, the
terrorists have become active again.

TTP having launched a full-fledged war against Pakistan’s people. Since the
Taliban takeover of Kabul in 2021, there has been a 60 per cent increase
in terrorist incidents in Pakistan. TTP continues to have space in
Afghanistan to plan and carry out attacks in Pakistan. Ostensibly, the
objective is to dislodge the government of Pakistan from the Pakhtun
tribal belt in former Fata, and enforce the Taliban’s interpretation of
Sharia.

New Delhi’s role in a deadly 2021 car bombing in Lahore had been
prepared which was to be shared with the UN. In 2020, Pakistan had unveiled
a dossier documenting evidence of how New Delhi had used terrorism to
destabilise Pakistan. From Kashmir Singh (apprehended in 1973) to
Surjeet Singh (1982) and Sarabjit Singh (1990), India used a series of
intelligence agents to organise and bankroll terrorism in Pakistan. India
has also used the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) between 2002 and
2012 to create civil unrest in Balochistan. In 2016, Kulbhushan Jadhav, a
serving Indian officer, was apprehended in Balochistan, carrying a passport
bearing the name of Hussain Mubarak Patel. He confessed to committing
terrorism and spying for Indian intelligence.

Domestic factors have also contributed to the rise of terrorism here,

including vertical inequalities (gap between rich and poor) and
horizontal inequities (gap between the various regions of Pakistan).
Poverty levels have risen sharply, which makes it easy for detractors to recruit
potential terrorists.

The first policy option is to stay closely engaged with the Taliban
government on issues of effective border management, the rights of those
living on both sides of the border, bilateral and transit trade, the return
of undocumented refugees, and the need to shrink the space given to the
TTP. Unilateral actions on any of these issues should be the last option.

Pakistan needs to effectively counter India’s propaganda of ‘cross-border

terrorism’, and also watch closely the growing Indian interest in
regaining lost space in Afghanistan.

Addressing the root causes of poverty, social inequalities and under-

development in Balochistan is a pressing need. The people of Balochistan
must have full ownership of the development programmes in their
province. Setting up effective local governments is the answer to meeting
the demands of local population and countering BLA propaganda.

Political instability, living beyond means, resurgence of terrorism, bad

governance, unemployed youth, extremist outfits, and a mindset of
‘might is right’ are an explosive mix. No wonder, our people feel
despondent. Their hopes and belief in Pakistan can be revived by creating a
justice system that ensures equal rights for every citizen.
 Background

At its founding in 1947, the culturally and religiously diverse state of

Pakistan lacked a unifying force and was soon plunged into
political turmoil. Successive governments crumbled as corruption and
infighting weakened the central government, and provincial
leaders retained the real power. In 1958, the Pakistani military launched
its first coup and would centralize power over the next thirteen years, free
from the need to maintain a governing coalition. Though the generals
returned Pakistan to civilian rule in 1971, the country experienced two more
periods of military rule from 1977 to 1988 and 1999 to 2007. Even during
periods of civilian rule, when power would typically oscillate between the
Muslim League and the Pakistan People’s Party, the military remained the de
facto power broker, forging and dissolving alliances and governments
however best suited its interests. As a result, of Pakistan’s twenty-nine prime
ministers since independence, none have completed a full five-year term.

Separatist and extremist movements have exacerbated Pakistan’s struggle

to achieve political stability. Among them, the most prominent today is
the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban
for its links to the Afghan group.

The TTP is highly decentralized, and its factions often disagree on policy,
which has presented a challenge to the leadership, but its main objectives
have included fighting Pakistan’s security forces, resisting Western
forces in Afghanistan, and implementing Sharia law in areas it controls.

In June 2014, after former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to negotiate a
peace agreement with the TTP unraveled and militants attacked an
international airport in Karachi, the government launched the Zarb-e-
Azb Offensive against militant strongholds in North Waziristan. While
effective, the operation displaced over a million people and cost billions of
dollars. The TTP responded to the offensive with several attacks,
including a December 2014 attack on the Army Public School
in Peshawar that killed nearly one hundred fifty people, mostly school-
children, in the deadliest terrorist attack in Pakistan’s history.
In response, Pakistan’s political parties agreed on a
comprehensive National Action Plan to combat terrorism and extremist
ideology across the country.

Nearly five hundred Pakistani soldiers died in the clearing operations,

which killed roughly 3,500 militants. With support from U.S. drone
attacks and militant infighting, Pakistan’s tactics succeeded in
significantly weakening the TTP from 2014 to 2018.

March 2016 suicide bombing in a park in Lahore that targeted families

celebrating Easter, killing almost seventy people and wounding over
three hundred, and an August 2016 suicide bombing of a hospital
in Quetta that targeted a gathering of lawyers, killing nearly seventy-five
people and injuring at least one hundred.

The military is believed to have continued providing support to the Haqqani

network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other militant proxy groups that often
collaborate with the TTP. Furthermore, attacks claimed by the Islamic State
have raised concerns over its growing presence and influence in Pakistan.

The TTP targeted campaign rallies and polling places in the lead-up to the
elections, including an attack in Mastung in July 2018 that killed more
than one hundred forty people and wounded nearly two hundred others.

In June 2018, the leader of the TTP, Mullah Fazlullah, was killed in a drone
strike in Afghanistan; Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud was named the new leader of
the umbrella organization days later.

In August 2021, the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan gave the TTP a
major boost. Despite Pakistani support for the Taliban during their decades of
resistance, the Taliban has provided sanctuary for the TTP’s leadership
and militants. Therefore, since 2021, the TTP has strengthened and used
Afghanistan as a base for coordinating attacks in Pakistan. The Taliban
offered to mediate but still refuses to force the TTP out. After failed
negotiations, the TTP in April 2022 escalated attacks in a spring offensive
called Operation Al-Badr, carrying out a record fifty-four attacks in one
month.
In response, on April 21, 2022, Pakistan launched a slew of airstrikes on
suspected TTP bases in Afghanistan but killed dozens of civilians in the
process.

Overall, average TTP attacks per month increased from 14.5 in 2020 to
45.8 in 2022 and expanded in geographical scope, reflecting increased
operability and improved weaponry acquired when the Afghan government
collapsed.

As the TTP expands in Pakistan and security deteriorates, separatist

movements and other armed groups could regain strength. United or not,
these groups present a major challenge to a cash-strapped Pakistani
government. A destabilized Pakistan creates the risk for further
proliferation of militant groups in the region and a greater risk of them
holding territory and developing the capabilities to launch international
terrorist attacks.

Recent Developments

In January 2023, a suicide bomber attacked a Peshawar mosque, killing

at least one hundred people and wounding more than two hundred who
had gathered to worship. The Jamaat-ul-Ahrar faction of the
TTP initially claimed responsibility but a TTP spokesperson has since
denied their involvement.

The TTP has also expanded southward into Baluchistan, claiming to have
partnered with two militant groups there.

(International/Global)

THE deadly attack on a concert hall in Moscow last week, which left
around 140 people dead, marks the expansion in the terrorist
operations of the so-called Khorasan chapter of the militant
Islamic State group.
The attack has raised the profile of the IS-K as a global terrorist group that has
long been active in Afghanistan and the surrounding countries. The
suspects who were arrested are from the Central Asian region, which has
produced a large contingent of foreign fighters for the Islamic State in
the Middle East in the past. Many of them are now associated with its
Khorasan chapter after the routing of the transnational jihadi group in
Iraq and Syria.

In September 2022, IS-K claimed responsibility for a deadly

suicide bombing at the Russian embassy in Kabul. Moscow has long
been concerned about the rise of IS-K’s influence in the Central Asian states.

A resurgent IS-K has emerged as the most dangerous

transnational terrorist group.

An offshoot of the Middle East-based IS, the militant outfit, which

was formed in 2015, has been involved in a series of spectacular
attacks in Afghanistan and Iran. It was behind a bombing attack
earlier this year that killed over 80 people in the Iranian town of
Kerman during a memorial procession for Maj-Gen Qasem
Soleimani.

Just before the Moscow incident, the group had claimed responsibility for
a suicide attack in Kandahar, the second largest city of Afghanistan,
killing and injuring several people. The IS-K has also been responsible for
attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan province.

The first signs of the transnational militant group organizing itself in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region emerged in 2014. Early IS-K recruits
came from the ranks of splinter factions of the Pakistani Taliban, who had
been driven into Afghanistan after large-scale operations in the former tribal
region by the Pakistan Army.

In 2014, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost — a former Afghan Taliban

commander from Kunar province — was named organiser for the
group’s Khorasan chapter. With some high-profile defections from the ranks
of the Afghan Taliban, the group evolved a formal organisational structure.

In January 2015, the militants released a video proclaiming themselves the

administrators of an official wilayat (province) for IS in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The creation of the shura for Khorasan (the historical name
for the region including parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and
Central Asia) was endorsed by the IS supreme command.

The terrorist group also attacked Kabul’s international airport in 2021,

in which 13 US troops and a large number of civilians were killed
during the chaotic American withdrawal from the country.

THE Sahel, a vast stretch of land below the Sahara and extending from
Burkina Faso to Eritrea, has become the global epicenter of terrorism. The
Global Terrorism Index reports that in 2022, this region witnessed more
terrorism-related fatalities than both South Asia and the Middle East and
North Africa combined, underscoring a grim escalation in violence. A
staggering 65 per cent of terrorist attacks targeted 10 countries within the
Sahel, marking it as a focal point of global concern.

The year 2022 spotlighted the Sahel in the global terrorism landscape, with
four out of the 10 countries most affected by terrorism found in this region.
Terrorism fatalities in the Sahel accounted for 43pc of the global total, a stark
rise from just 1pc in 2007. Burkina Faso registered the largest increase in
terrorism-related deaths during the year, rising from 759 to 1,135. The
country, along with Mali, in particular, has become a hotbed of terrorism,
accounting for 73pc of terrorism-related deaths in the Sahel in 2022, and 52pc
of all such deaths in sub-Saharan Africa. Most attacks in the Sahel are
attributed to unknown groups, though both IS and JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-
Islam wa al-Muslimeen) are active there.

The complex challenges exacerbating the security situation/terrorism include

political instability, food shortages, ethnic tensions, rapid population growth,
environmental degradation, etc.

The political landscape in the Sahel has been further destabilised by a spate of
military coups, attributed to widespread dissatisfaction with governance and
economic conditions. These coups, while promising reform, often exacerbate
the underlying issues that fuel extremism and conflict.

The Sahel’s trajectory is a critical concern for both regional and global
security. For any long-term plan, preventing violent extremism is the best
antidote to defeat terrorism. The world must prioritise a coordinated,
comprehensive response that tackles the root causes of instability, from
governance failures to socioeconomic disparities, to reverse the tide of
violence and terror in the region.