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The Radical Right
Biopsychosocial Roots
and International Variations
Klaus Wahl
The Radical Right
Klaus Wahl
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland
AG 2020
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Preface
federal election the nationalist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) was
the third largest party and the overall winner in parts of East Germany,
where there were also movements like the anti-Islamist PEGIDA
(Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) with aggres-
sive gestures and slogans against parliamentarians and journalists. In
2017, too, a constitutional referendum in Turkey opened the way for an
autocratic system under nationalist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In
2018, the right-wing populist Italian party Lega formed a coalition gov-
ernment with the populist Five Star Movement in Italy. In 2019, Brazil’s
far-right president Jair Bolsonaro took office and several military officers
were appointed to his cabinet. In the same year, a right-wing extremist
in New Zealand killed 50 Muslim worshippers. This list could
be expanded.
The shadow of the radical right haunting the world feels like déjà vu.
There have been similar specters—from right wing populism to extrem-
ism—as parts of the history of many countries. To name but a few: the
nineteenth and twentieth century saw battles of the North American
right (Protestant groups, Ku Klux Clan, etc.) against racial, ethnic, and
cultural pluralism as well as against political, economic, and cultural
elites. In the twentieth century, Germany’s National Socialists left blood,
death, and devastation in many countries. Even after the Holocaust, rac-
ism and nationalism remained strong ideologies in large parts of the
world. In recent decades, somewhat more moderate forms of the radical
right have spread throughout both sides of the Atlantic—the populist
right. In the twenty-first century, in particular, the terrorist attacks dur-
ing and after 9/11, the financial and economic crises, and the flows of
refugees and immigrants to western countries seem to have been crucial
events that continue to shape the socio-political landscape on the right
side of the political spectrum with radical right-wing parties and move-
ments and influencing the whole political system.
There is a lot of media coverage of populist and radical right parties,
movements, anti-Semitism, anti-Islamism, hate speech, and racially
motivated crimes. Many scientists from history, political science, and
sociology present empirical studies on these phenomena. However, the
question remains—does this amount of research in different countries
(e.g., in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe and the United States)
Preface vii
particularly in Europe and the United States, I was very glad to gain the
support of experts on these countries. Actually, Britta Schellenberg with
her profound knowledge of the European variations of the radical right
gave me so much helpful information for the chapter on Europe and
comments on other parts of the book that she should have been a co-
author. I was also very glad to gain the support of Heather Painter with
her first-hand knowledge of the United States. She contributed to the
chapter on the United States and improved my English through-
out the book.
During the endless process of writing, authors are isolated at their desk
using a stack of books, papers, memos, a notebook, and the memory
areas of their brains. However, I also received many suggestions: to
explore the causes of political phenomena in a vertical or interdisciplinary
dimension, that is on the different layers of the psyche and societies, in my
research in recent decades I have been working with political scientists,
historians, sociologists, statisticians, psychologists, educationalists,
behavior scientists, brain researchers, and biologists in studies on xeno-
phobic and right-wing extremist violent offenders and on the develop-
ment of aggression and prejudice among children and adolescents. In
addition, in a horizontal or international dimension, lots of ideas, ques-
tions, and criticism from conferences and discussions with scientists,
politicians, ministry officials, police officers, representatives of NGOs,
from university seminars, courses for kindergarten and school teachers,
and social workers from Moscow to Washington, DC and from Stockholm
to Brasília have left their mark on this text. I am deeply grateful to Lerke
Gravenhorst, Uwe Haasen, Melanie Rhea Wahl, and the anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments on draft versions of parts of this book.
Last but not least, I want to thank Sharla Plant and Poppy Hull at Palgrave
Macmillan for supporting this project and for helping me throughout the
publishing stages from proposal to final publication.
ix
x Contents
Index369
About the Authors
xiii
List of Figures
xv
1
The Radical Right: More than a Topic
of Political Science
Some authors locate the dissatisfaction with the democratic system (Foa
& Mounk, 2017) in the larger development of a global recession of
democracies since 2006 and a deepening of authoritarianism (Diamond,
2015). Could it be that racist and authoritarian attitudes and political
preferences for populist right-wing parties have reached a critical mass in
quite a number of countries, a tipping point, whereby sufficiently large
minorities can change political cultures (Centola, Becker, Brackbill, &
Baronchelli, 2018)? Others criticize this pessimistic view (Levitsky &
Way, 2015).
For a long time, political science, history, sociology, psychology, and
even biological sciences have tried to find obvious conditions, not so
obvious preconditions, and deeper causes of these right-wing manifesta-
tions with divergent research paradigms and unconnected findings,
which have resulted in questionable proposals for prevention. Therefore,
this book has several aims:
c ultures of the countries, but they usually do not cover deeper indi-
vidual psychological and biological factors (Chaps. 5, 6 and 7).
• Fourth, the book will confront empirical research findings with some
of the “usual suspects” of the causes of the radical right, which are fre-
quently discussed in public: are the main culprits only “hard” factors
such as globalization with the consequences of low wages, unemploy-
ment, or economic inequality? How important are “soft” factors like
emotions, views of life, and cultural change? To what extent do objec-
tive and subjective aspects affect political processes? In addition, there
are some short glances to other parts of the world and to the differ-
ences between the radical right and the radical left. Finally, the book
offers—along the various levels of our biopsychosociological model—
a sketch of possible approaches to political and pedagogical measures
for the prevention of xenophobia and right-wing ideologies (Chap. 8).
Historically, the political distinction between left and right began with the
seating arrangements of the delegates in the National Assembly during
the French Revolution. For Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and Linz (1962,
1 The Radical Right: More than a Topic of Political Science 5
1.2.2 Populism
Populism
„The people“
tional ways to distinguish groups like Aryans, Jews, and so on, and could
still influence some peoples’ current associations of the word. Unlike the
word “race” in US usage, the German word “Rasse” is discredited in
Germany, the category has been disputed as relevant or real. Altogether,
in Continental Europe, the word “race” seems to maintain an unbreak-
able tie to the history of racism, and thus the term as an analytical tool to
describe American or other societies would be problematic (Berg, Schor,
& Soto, 2014).
1.2.5 Neoliberalism
The economic policy program of the radical right is often associated with
neoliberalism, a term that has changed its meaning historically. Originally,
neoliberalism referred to economic ideas that grew out of debates of
French, German, Austrian, and other economists and intellectuals in the
late 1930s. They wanted to create a new liberalism in contrast to social-
ism and laissez-faire liberalism, with free enterprise and competition as
well as a strong impartial state. Later this was also called the “social mar-
ket economy”, the basis for the German economic miracle
(Wirtschaftswunder) after World War II. Since the early 1980s, however,
neoliberalism became a term to describe the wave of market deregulation,
privatization, and welfare-state withdrawal that swept the world. At that
time, Chile’s Pinochet regime was influenced by the “Chicago Boys” and
became something like the neoliberal laboratory, a test case for policies
inspired by radical laissez-faire capitalist ideas that were later reproduced
around the third world. Nowadays, the term neoliberalism is used across
many social science disciplines except in economics where it has disap-
peared. Furthermore, it is often used as a pejorative term to criticize many
manifestations of modernity or capitalism (Venugopal, 2015) or even as
a signifier simply for “things we don’t like” (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, &
Primrose, 2018, p. xxvii). In the focus of most definitions, at least, neo-
liberalism seems to be a set of ideas and policies aimed at installing mar-
kets as the main mechanism for coordinating societies (Birch, 2015).
Such a simple definition should suffice, if one calls the economic-political
ideas of the radical right parties “neoliberal”, because it allows many vari-
1 The Radical Right: More than a Topic of Political Science 11
ations. Indeed, the economic policies of these parties have ranged from
libertarian to socialist. Nowadays, most populist right parties support a
hybrid socio-economic agenda, which combines calls for fewer rules and
lower taxes with economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism (protec-
tion of the national economy, support for welfare provisions primarily for
“natives”). They accept inequality, as a “natural” phenomenon, which
should not be “legislated away” by the state (Afonso & Rennwald, 2018;
Bobbio, 1997; Mudde, 2017, p. 5).
Besides the political parties of the radical right, there are social move-
ments, organizations, and subcultures like groups of neo-Nazis or local
movements against mosques (Minkenberg, 2011, pp. 45–46, 2013,
pp. 13–16) or the anti-Islamist German PEGIDA.
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey tried to estimate party positioning on
policy issues for national parties in a variety of European countries
(Hooghe & Marks, 2017). In a similar way and using proposals from
several authors, we suggest working definitions for the broad spectrum of
ideologies and organizations studied here, which are arranged on a scale
of increasing radicalism and violence:
pp. 12–13). Other authors add that the main topics of this political camp
are the attempts to offer solutions for socio-political crises: first, a crisis of
distribution concerning the welfare of the lower and lower middle class;
second, a crisis of political representation as a critique of the corrupt politi-
cal elite by the “man in the street”; third, a crisis of identity in the face of
globalization and immigration. The radical right reacts to these crises by
making use of social issues, by painting politics as corrupt and by propagat-
ing ascriptions of national identity (Langenbacher & Schellenberg, 2011).
We summarize the considerations of many political scientists and soci-
ologists in the following working definition: ideologies of the radical right
emphasize social and economic threats in the modern and postmodern
world (e.g., globalization, immigration). The radical right also promises
protection against such threats by an emphatic ethnic construction of
“we”, the people, as a familiar, homogeneous in-group, anti-modern, or
reactionary structures of family, society, an authoritarian state, national-
ism, the discrimination, or exclusion of immigrants and other minorities
(cf. Wahl, Ottinger-Gaßebner, Kleinert, & Renninger, 2005, p. 19).
While favoring traditional social and cultural structures (traditional fam-
ily and gender roles, religion, etc.) the radical right uses modern tech-
nologies and does not ascribe to a specific economic policy; some parties
tend toward a liberal, free-market policy, and others more to a welfare
state policy. Finally, the radical right can be scaled by using different
degrees of militancy and aggressiveness from right-wing populism to rac-
ism, terrorism, and totalitarianism.
All in all, the radical right can be seen as a revolt against parts of social
modernity, but not against all forms of economic and technical modernity.
Seen in this way, it’s about a halved anti-modern ideology.
Radicalization of ideology
Increasing acceptance or use of violence
Conservatives (and The populist right favors The extreme right rejects The violent and the terrorist The totalitarian right is
particularly ultra- well-being of the majority of liberal democracy, right use threat, physical nationalist, racist,
conservatives) favor “hard working ordinary pluralism, immigration, and violence, or terrorist attacks authoritarian, anti-
continuity and stability, want people” against immigrants parts of parliamentarianism. against the government, democratic (does not
to retain the traditional and a “corrupt elite.” Claims Favors nativist nationalism, elites, minorities, or any accept concept of
social order and culture a guiding traditional national authoritarian law and order persons to reach extremist democracy and elections).
(traditional families, culture (“Leitkultur”) against against people outside of its goals. Propagates aggressive
religion). Defend a guiding influences from abroad and own norms. Uses some Examples: Historical Ku exclusion of foreigners and
national culture (“Leitkultur”) sub-cultures (LGBT, etc.). democratic means of Klux Klan, Norwegian mass social minorities. Wants to
against influences from Favors law and order and political participation, e.g. killer Breivik, German control all sectors of a
abroad, but they are in favor referenda. Economic contesting elections. National Socialist society. Has a dictatorial
of international exchange policies from neoliberalism Examples: Former Italian Underground cell. leader.
and cooperation (EU). to protectionism. Skepticism Social Movement, Greek Example: Former
Economic policies from about supranational Golden Dawn; Hungarian National Socialist German
neoliberalism to social organizations (UN, EU). Jobbik; Bulgarian Ataka; Workers’ Party.
market economy. Examples: French National Democratic Party
Examples: United States’ National Front/National of Germany.
Republican Party; British Rally; Freedom Party of
Conservative Party; Austria, Swiss People’s
German Christian Social Party, Alternative for
Union. Germany.
1 The Radical Right: More than a Topic of Political Science
© K. Wahl 2019
the radical right are quite independent of this scale. Some parties tend
toward a liberal, free-market policy, and others more to a welfare state
policy, and some adopt a mixture of both. While favoring traditional
social and cultural structures (traditional family and gender roles, reli-
gion, etc.) the radical right uses modern technologies (social media, etc.).
Since there have been various attempts to define phenomena on the
right-wing political side, and since there is a broad spectrum of such
political phenomena, we pragmatically propose a broad but graduated
scale. We call the part of the political spectrum at the right side of conser-
vatism degrees of the radical right. The gradations are based on the degrees
of ideological radicalism and militancy (against outsiders, democratic prin-
ciples, nativism instead of cosmopolitism, etc.) as well as the degree of
approval or use of violence. Center-right and conservative programs and
parties will only be mentioned in passing in this book.
We have to add that there is no consensus among authors about how to
categorize many of the political parties of the political right as conservative,
populist, radical, or extreme parties. On the one hand, this is due to the
mixture of positions in the political programs of the parties; on the other
hand, politicians of the same party can speak and act more or less mili-
tantly in contrast to the party’s program. In other words, the same political
party is described as populist by some authors but as extremist by others.
In order not to overstretch the scope of this book, we focus on the
widespread political ideologies, parties, and movements of the populist and
extremist right. Phenomena of the violent, terrorist, and totalitarian right
are only secondary topics.
Throughout this book “the radical right” is used as a shorthand term cover-
ing all variations from the populist to the totalitarian political right, if there
is no other specification. When referring to specific authors, however, usually
their own terms are used without re-categorization.
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2
Fear, Hate, and Hope:
A Biopsychosociological Model
of the Radical Right
The ideologies of the radical right are clearly expressed by their leaders.
Geert Wilders, the chairman of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands,
warned against the dangers of Islam: “The reality is that Islam commands
its followers to make all nations submit to Islamic Sharia law, wherever
and whenever they have the power and the opportunity to do so. If neces-
sary through the use of violence and terror. The reality is that Sharia law
is a mortal danger to our way of life, our Constitution, our laws, and our
liberties. It is a matter of our existence and the survival of our free society
(…) We should not be so tolerant that we open the door to the horror of
intolerance” (Wilders, 2015).
Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front in France, blamed global-
ization and immigration for the economic decline of her country: “We
are in a world where globalization, which is an ideology, has forgotten,
and put aside (…) the people’s interests, aspirations, and dreams. (…)
The economic state of France is as if we had suffered a war (…), with
great economic losses, entire sectors have disappeared, the toy industry,
the clothing industry, the jewelry industry, all of it has collapsed (…)
What is sure, is that France has been a victim of an absolutely anarchic
immigration. An absolutely massive immigration, for decades now” (Le
Pen, 2016).
Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, warned against terror-
ists, who would come as immigrants: “Nowhere do human rights pre-
scribe national suicide. Terrorists are also arriving in Europe among the
illegal immigrants, and as a result in a number of European countries
innocent people have died (…) We shall protect our country’s borders,
we shall protect our own lives, and we shall protect the security of our
everyday lives (…) The migration pressure on Hungary’s borders will not
end within the next few years. There are hundreds of millions of people
standing ready to follow those who have been setting out in the hope of
a better life” (Orbán, 2016).
In his inaugural address, Donald J. Trump, President of the United
States, also warned of influences from abroad and promised a golden
future: “For too long, a small group in our nation’s capital has reaped the
rewards of government while the people have borne the cost (…) Mothers
and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities; rusted-out factories
scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation (…) and the
crime and gangs and drugs that have stolen too many lives and robbed
our country of so much unrealized potential. This American carnage
stops right here and stops right now (…) We must protect our borders
from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our
companies, and destroying our jobs (…) We will bring back our jobs. We
will bring back our borders. We will bring back our wealth. And we will
bring back our dreams” (Trump, 2017).
The inaugural address of Jair Messias Bolsonaro, President of Brazil,
was like an echo of Trump’s speech: “I stand before the whole nation, on
this day, as the day when the people began to free themselves from social-
ism, the reversal of values, state gigantism and the politically correct.
Elections gave voice to those who were not heard (…) We cannot allow
disastrous ideologies to divide the Brazilians. Ideologies that destroy our
values and traditions, destroy our families, the foundation of our society
(…) For a long time, the country was governed according to party
2 Fear, Hate, and Hope: A Biopsychosociological Model… 23
interests other than that of Brazilians. Let’s restore order in this country”
(Bolsonaro, 2019, translated by the author).
Mass immigration, Islam, Sharia, terrorists, millions of people waiting
behind the borders, collapsed industries, destroyed jobs and families,
disastrous ideologies, widespread poverty, crime, and drugs—it is a
threatening world painted by populist and extremist right-wing politi-
cians. And it is a golden future they are promising when in power. Why
are these accusations and hopes so persuasive for many people?
Invoking fear, hate, and hope is the winning formula of the populist and
extremist right. While it is not restricted to this political family, it is done
here with missionary zeal, triggering strong emotions and menacing
psycho-social mechanisms like xenophobia, scapegoating, and possibly
violence against foreigners and other social minorities. “The tendency to
convert issues into ideologies, to invest them with moral color and high
emotional charge, invites conflicts which can only damage a society”
(Bell, 1955, p. 27). What are the mechanisms that connect the structures
and processes of economy, society, culture, and the political system with
the political motives of the individuals? How do these mechanisms func-
tion? Why do they have such a power to influence the feelings, thoughts,
and political behavior of people?
How and why do certain social situations trigger politically relevant
emotions? How do radical right politicians exploit these triggers? What
makes the radical right dangerous? These questions cannot simply be
answered on the level of political phenomena, factors, and relations. The
analyses also have to include pre-political levels.
As human beings and political citizens, we like to think we are edu-
cated, well-informed, rational, calculating, planning, and moral per-
sons, considering a wide horizon of facts, norms, and values in order
to shape our political preferences and prepare our decisions, for exam-
ple, to vote for a specific political party, or to enter politics—the
ideal of Homo politicus. However, in contrast to widespread wishful
thinking, in most spheres of everyday life—including the political
behavior of ordinary citizens—humans are rarely deliberately, rational
thinkers, and actors. A great deal of our daily behavior is based on
2 Fear, Hate, and Hope: A Biopsychosociological Model… 25
From an evolutionary point of view, affects and basic emotions serve for
survival and can help to pass on genes: we are sexually attracted by a
potential partner and fall in love in order to realize reproduction; we fear
in order to flee from a threat; we get angry in order to fight against an
aggressive enemy. Besides such basic emotions there are many others,
including learned cultural variations (e.g., romantic love; hate against
people with different faith).
In terms of evolution, fear is a basic emotion motivating the avoidance
of risks. Studies have found fear and anxiety circuits in the brains of ani-
mals and humans to deal with threats in their environments, originated
as responses to predators, cliff edges, and other environmental dangers.
While fear is a response to clear and present environmental dangers, anxi-
ety is a response to situations with uncertain, unpredictable, or uncon-
trollable environmental threats (Kurth, 2016; LeDoux, 2012). During
the long time of evolution, animals and humans also developed social
emotions to conspecifics, which involved reproductive advantages: on the
one hand, the security of an in-group was associated with positive emo-
tions toward close relatives and other familiar persons within the group.
On the other hand, there were ambivalent emotions against unfamiliar
people, strangers, and out-groups: first, risk-avoiding skepticism or xeno-
phobia with selective advantages through avoiding dangerous pathogens
in contact with strangers as well as risky social conflicts; second, situa-
tions of being threatened by strangers or offering a chance of domination
or gaining resources could result in combating strangers (xenoktonia);
and third, curiosity and interest for strangers could lead to exchange,
2 Fear, Hate, and Hope: A Biopsychosociological Model… 27
• On the one hand, they evoke or refer to negative emotions: threat, fear,
anxiety, frustration, disorientation, and resentment in the modern and
postmodern social world triggered by economic crises, low wages,
unemployment, immigration, and further possibly negative impacts of
globalization, European integration, social change, value pluralism,
and so on. Furthermore, the radical right accuses persons, groups, or
institutions of causing these threats (e.g., foreigners, an incapable gov-
ernment, the establishment, or “corrupt elites”). They do not only
frame society by emphasizing (at least some) inequalities between peo-
ple, genders, ethnic groups, races, nations, and religions, but also dis-
criminate and exclude out-groups (xenophobia, anti-Semitism,
anti-Islamism, etc.), and exhibit hostility towards ethnic, cultural, reli-
gious, economic, and LGBT minorities. They criticize modern values
(individualism, universalism, pluralism) and degrade—with variable
degrees—achievements of modern democracies like civil rights, equal-
ity before the law, and power sharing.
• On the other hand, radical right-wing ideologies promise positive emo-
tions, well-being, identity, and hope: protection against social threats,
feelings of security, nostalgia for the good old days, longing for pre-
modern social structures, for example, familiar in-groups with social
cohesion and solidarity, traditional morals, law and order, and a simple
world view. They offer hope for a better future for losers of socio-
economic processes by simple policies favoring the in-group (ethno-
centrism, nationalism) and a homogeneous national community, as
well as by pushing away immigrants from the labor market and the
benefits of the welfare state. They favor law and order and an
authoritarian state with a strong leader as sources of security. Parts of
the radical right allow the use of violence to attain their goals, which is
attractive for persons who like to act on aggressive impulses.
2 Fear, Hate, and Hope: A Biopsychosociological Model… 29
Mechanisms for coping with risks and tensions in the psyche or the brain,
with conflicts between different needs, emotions, or cognitions, as well as
between personality and society, within and between groups have been
developed during evolution and are still serving for motivating the behav-
ior of modern humans in risky situations. Such mechanisms have been
discussed for a long time in psychology and sociology.
In psychology, Sigmund Freud (Freud and Strachey, 1964) and Anna
Freud (1993) considered defense mechanisms (regression, repression, etc.)
as protecting the ego against threat and anxiety. The list of mechanisms
and similar theoretical concepts was extended by Bischof ’s “Zurich model
of social motivation” with biopsychic homeostasis mechanisms providing
individual security by controlling the behavior toward social objects.
Specific behavior (distance vs. contact with strangers) depends on the
object’s degree of familiarity and implies according reactions to fear
(Gubler & Bischof, 1991). The fear-affiliation hypothesis (Schachter,
1959) assumed, based on results of social experiments, that in case of
threat and fear persons tend to affiliate with other persons. Whereas this
fear-triggered mechanism refers to the in-group, another mechanism
stimulated by fear relates to out-groups: persons with high degrees of
social fear have more negative out-group opinions (e.g., anti-immigration
attitudes) (Hatemi, McDermott, Eaves, Kendler, & Neale, 2013).
In sociology, an important starting point to consider psychosocial pro-
cesses was the Thomas theorem: “If men define situations as real, they are real
in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572), that is, even
threats, which are only imagined or caused by belief of political propaganda
30 K. Wahl
can motivate behavior. Later, Parsons, and Shils proposed coping mecha-
nisms in case of (social) threat: dominance, submission, aggression, and
withdrawal accompanied by Freudian defense mechanisms for the benefit
of ego’s personality (Parsons & Shils, 1962, pp. 140–141). Bühl, in his
evolutionary theory of social behavior, suggested that new and complex
social manifestations should be explained “from below” and “from the
past”: Starting from evolutionary early, simple, primordial, or prototypical
social forms, roles, situations, etc. that serve as placeholders for later forms.
This should be supplemented by new evolutionary developments at new
levels (Bühl, 1982, p. 2, 1987, pp. 110–111). Wahl combined several
approaches: first, the subjective-orientated social research following the
Thomas theorem (behavior depends on the subjective perceptions of the
world) (Wahl, Honig, & Gravenhorst, 1982); second, similar to Bühl’s
intentions, a biopsychosociological or “depth sociological” approach that sug-
gested a cybernetic model of social behavior as an extension of Bischof’s
“Zurich model” by including mechanisms from evolutionary biological
remnants (fight, flight, cooperation, etc.) up to factors of the social and
cultural situations and their perceptions (norms, emotion codes, role expec-
tations, perceptual patterns, etc.) (Wahl, 2000, pp. 341–359, 2002b). Such
collections of biotic, psychic, and social mechanisms to cope with situa-
tions of (real or imagined) threat lend themselves to construct a theoretical
multilevel model to explain a great deal of radical right phenomena.
According to these preliminary works, we hypothesize that reactions to
social threat can be arranged in several clusters with evolutionary back-
grounds deeply rooted in brain circuits (associable with elements of right-
wing ideologies):
Trochilus polytmus.
Trochilus polytmus, Linn.
Ornismya cephalatra, Less.—Ois. M. xvii.
[23] Male. Length 10¼ inches, expanse 6³⁄₈, tail, longest feather 7½,
outmost feather 1¾, flexure 2⁶⁄₁₀, rictus 1, tarsus ²⁄₁₀, middle toe ⁵⁄₂₀.
Irides black; beak coral-red, the tip black; feet purplish-brown, soles
paler. Crown, hind head, and nape deep velvety black, very slightly
glossed; back, rump, wing and tail-coverts, rich golden-green; wings
purplish-black, the outer edge of the first primary whitish; second primary
longest; tail deep black, with bluish gloss, the uropygials, and the outer
edges of the others glossed with golden-green, varying in intensity. The
tail is slightly forked, the feathers regularly graduating from the uropygials
outwards, save that the outmost but one is exceedingly lengthened.
Throat, breast, and belly gorgeous emerald-green, extending to the
thighs; vent and under tail-coverts, purpled black. The plumage of the
hind head long and loose, descending in two lateral tufts upon the nape,
which are to some extent erectile.
Female, 4¹⁄₈ inches, tail 1⁶⁄₁₀, flexure 2²⁄₁₀. Irides dark brown; beak dull
reddish-brown, black at edges and tip; feet nearly black. Front and crown
dusky brown, scaled, gradually becoming green on the hind head,
whence the whole upper plumage is rich golden-green. Tail blue black,
the exterior two feathers on each side broadly tipped with white:
uropygials golden green; the feathers graduate uniformly. Wings as in the
male. Under parts white, the feathers having round tips of metallic green
on the sides of the neck, and being mingled with green ones on the sides
of the body. The plumage on each side of the nape, erectile, as in the
male, but somewhat shorter.
The young male, when ready to leave the nest, has the throat and
breast metallic-green as above, the belly-feathers blackish, with
large tips of green; the tail black with green reflections, untipped. A
male which I obtained in May, and which I take to be the young of
the preceding winter, has the green on the head, mingled with black,
the disks of the feathers being green with a black border. The
emerald green of the breast is partial in its extent, reaching to the
belly only in isolated feathers, separated by large spaces of
brownish-drab; while on the throat and breast, the feathers have
merely large round disks of the emerald-colour, with narrow edges of
brown.
The tongue of this species, (and doubtless others have a similar
conformation,) presents, when recent, the appearance of two tubes
laid side by side, united for half their length, but separate for the
remainder. Their substance is transparent in the same degree as a
good quill, which they much resemble: each tube is formed by a
lamina rolled up, yet not so as to bring the edges into actual contact,
for there is a longitudinal fissure on the outer side, running up
considerably higher than the junction of the tubes; into this fissure
the point of a pin may be inserted and moved up and down the
length. Near the tip the outer edge of each lamina ceases to be
convoluted, but is spread out, and split at the margin into irregular
fimbriæ, which point backward, somewhat like the vane of a feather;
these are not barbs, however, but simply soft and flexible points,
such as might be produced by snipping diagonally the edge of a strip
of paper. I conjecture that the nectar of flowers is pumped up the
tubes, and that minute insects are caught, when in flowers, in these
spoon-like tips, their minute limbs being perhaps entangled in the
fimbriæ, when the tongue is retracted into the beak, and the insects
swallowed by the ordinary process, as doubtless those are which are
captured with the beak in flight. I do not thoroughly understand the
mode by which liquids are taken up by a Humming-bird’s tongue,
though I have carefully watched the process. If syrup be presented
to one in a quill, the tongue is protruded for about half an inch into
the liquor, the beak resting in the pen, as it is held horizontal: there is
a slight but rapid and constant projection and retraction of the tubes,
and the liquor disappears very fast, perhaps by capillary attraction,
perhaps by a sort of pumping, certainly not by licking.
All the Humming-birds have more or less the habit when in flight of
pausing in the air, and throwing the body and tail into rapid and odd
contortions; this seems to be most the case with Mango, but perhaps
is more observable in Polytmus from the effect that such motions
have on the beautiful long feathers of the tail. That the object of
these quick turns is the capture of insects I am sure, having watched
one thus engaged pretty close to me; I drew up and observed it
carefully, and distinctly saw the minute flies in the air, which it
pursued and caught, and heard repeatedly the snapping of the beak.
My presence scarcely disturbed it, if at all.
The neck in these birds is very long; but appears short, because it
forms a sigmoid curve downward, which is concealed by the feathers
of the breast: the trachea is therefore long, and its appearance is
singular, because the dilatation from which the bronchi divide, is near
the middle of the whole length, the bronchi being full half an inch in
length; they run down side by side, however, and are in fact soldered
together for about half of their length: though the tubes are still
distinct, as appears by a transverse section. Our two other species I
have proved to have the same conformation.
When I left England, I had laid myself out for the attempt to bring
these radiant creatures alive to this country: and after a little
acquaintance with the Jamaican species, Polytmus seemed, from its
beauty, its abundance, its size, its docility, and its mountain habitat,
to be the species at once most likely to succeed, and most worthy of
the effort. My expectations were disappointed: yet as the efforts
themselves made me more familiar with their habits, the reader, I
trust, will pardon some prolixity of detail in the narration of these
attempts. Very many were caught by myself and my lads: the narrow
path on Bluefields peak already mentioned, was the locality to which
we resorted on these expeditions. A common gauze butterfly-net, on
a ring of a foot in diameter and a staff of three or four feet, we found
the most effective means of capture. The elaborate traps
recommended by some authors, I fear would suit the natural history
of the closet, better than that of the woods. We often found the
curiosity of these little birds stronger than their fear; on holding up
the net near one, he frequently would not fly away, but come and
hover over the mouth, stretching out his neck to peep in, so that we
could capture them with little difficulty. Often too, one when struck at
unsuccessfully, would return immediately, and suspend itself in the
air just above our heads, or peep into our faces, with unconquerable
familiarity. Yet it was difficult to bring these sweet birds, so easily
captured, home; they were usually dead or dying when we arrived at
the house, though not wounded or struck. And those which did arrive
in apparent health, usually died the next day. At my first attempt in
the spring of 1845, I transferred such as I succeeded in bringing
alive, to cages immediately on their arrival at the house, and though
they did not beat themselves, they soon sunk under the confinement.
Suddenly they would fall to the floor of the cage, and lie motionless
with closed eyes; if taken into the hand, they would perhaps seem to
revive for a few moments; then throw back the pretty head, or toss it
to and fro as if in great suffering, expand the wings, open the eyes,
slightly puff up the feathers of the breast, and die: usually without
any convulsive struggle. This was the fate of my first attempts.
In the autumn, however, they began to be numerous again upon
the mountain, and having, on the 13th of November, captured two
young males sucking the pretty pink flowers of Urena lobata, I
brought them home in a covered basket. The tail-feathers of the one
were undeveloped, those of the other half their full length. I did not
cage them but turned them out into the open room in which the daily
work of preparing specimens was carried on, having first secured the
doors and windows. They were lively, but not wild; playful towards
each other, and tame with respect to myself, sitting unrestrained for
several seconds at a time on my finger. I collected a few flowers and
placed them in a vase on a high shelf, and to these they resorted
immediately. But I soon found that they paid attention to none but
Asclepias curassavica, and slightly to a large Ipomea. On this I again
went out, and gathered a large bunch of Asclepias, and was pleased
to observe that on the moment of my entering the room, one flew to
the nosegay, and sucked while I held it in my hand. The other soon
followed, and then both these lovely creatures were buzzing together
within an inch of my face, probing the flowers so eagerly, as to allow
their bodies to be touched without alarm. These flowers being placed
in another glass, they visited each bouquet in turn, now and then
flying after each other playfully through the room, or alighting on
various objects. Though occasionally they flew against the window,
they did not flutter and beat themselves at it, but seemed well
content with their parole. As they flew, I repeatedly heard them snap
the beak, at which times, they doubtless caught minute flies. After
some time, one of them suddenly sunk down in one corner, and on
being taken up seemed dying: it had perhaps struck itself in flying. It
lingered awhile, and died. The other continued his vivacity;
perceiving that he had exhausted the flowers, I prepared a tube,
made of the barrel of a goose-quill, which I inserted into the cork of a
bottle to secure its steadiness and upright position, and filled with
juice of sugar-cane. I then took a large Ipomea, and having cut off
the bottom, I slipped the flower over the tube, so that the quill took
the place of the nectary of the flower. The bird flew to it in a moment,
clung to the bottle rim, and bringing his beak perpendicular, thrust it
into the tube. It was at once evident that the repast was agreeable,
for he continued pumping for several seconds, and on his flying off, I
found the quill emptied. As he had torn off the flower in his
eagerness for more, and even followed the fragments of the corolla,
as they lay on the table, to search them, I refilled the quill and put a
blossom of the Marvel of Peru into it, so that the flower expanded
over the top. The little toper found it again, and after drinking freely,
withdrew his beak, but the blossom was adhering to it as a sheath.
This incumbrance he presently got rid of, and then, (which was most
interesting to me,) he returned immediately, and inserting his beak
into the bare quill, finished the contents. It was amusing to see the
odd position of his head and body as he clung to the bottle, with his
beak inserted perpendicularly into the cork. Several times, in the
course of the evening, he had recourse to his new fountain, which
was as often replenished for him, and at length about sunset betook
himself to a line stretched across the room, for repose. He slept, as
they all do, with the head not behind the wing, but slightly drawn
back on the shoulders, and in figure reminded me of Mr. Gould’s
beautiful plate of Trogon resplendens, in miniature. In the morning, I
found him active before sunrise, already having visited his quill of
syrup, which he emptied a second time. After some hours, he flew
through a door which I had incautiously left open, and darting
through the window of the next room, escaped, to my no small
chagrin.
Three males, captured on Bluefields peak on the 22nd of April,
were brought home alive. They at once became familiar on being
turned into the room, and one, the boldest, found out immediately a
glass of sugar-syrup, and sipped repeatedly at it. One of them
disappeared in the course of the next day, doubtless by falling into
some obscure corner behind the furniture. The others, however,
appeared quite at home, and one soon became so familiar, even
before I had had him a day, as to fly to my face, and perching on my
lip or chin, thrust his beak into my mouth, and suck up the moisture.
He grew so bold, and so frequent in his visits, as at length to become
almost annoying; and so pertinacious as to thrust his protruded
tongue into all parts of my mouth, searching between the gum and
cheek, beneath the tongue, &c. Occasionally, I gratified him by
taking into my mouth a little of the syrup, and inviting him by a slight
sound, which he learned to understand; and this appeared to please
his palate. Bouquets of fresh flowers they did not appear much to
regard; but one or two species of Lantana seemed more attractive
than the rest. I expected that the honeyed and fragrant bunches of
blossom of the Moringa, which on the tree is perpetually visited by
them, would tempt my captives, but after a brief trial, they
disregarded them. Perhaps it was because they could sate their
appetite more freely and fully at the syrup glass, which they
frequently visited, but only sipped. They always clung to the glass
with their feet, and very often to the flowers also. Each selected his
own places of perching; there were lines stretched across the room,
for drying bird-skins; and from the first each took a place on one of
the lines, distant from the other, where he then invariably roosted,
and rested. Each selected also one or two other stations for
temporary alighting, but each adhered to his own, without invading
his neighbour’s. So strong was this predilection, that on my driving
one away from his spot, he would flutter round the room, but return
and try to alight there again, and if still prevented, would hover round
the place, as if much distressed. This preference of a particular twig
for alighting is observable in freedom, and will suggest an analogy
with the Flycatchers. I have not observed it in our other species. It
gave us a means of capturing many, in addition to the net; for by
observing a spot of resort, and putting a little birdlime on that twig,
we could be pretty sure of a bird in a few minutes. The boldest was
rather pugnacious, occasionally attacking his gentler and more
confiding companion, who always yielded and fled; when the
assailant would perch and utter a succession of shrill chirps, “screep,
screep, screep.” After a day or two, however, the persecuted one
plucked up courage, and actually played the tyrant in his turn,
interdicting his fellow from sipping at the sweetened cup. Twenty
times in succession would the thirsty bird drop down upon the wing
to the glass,—which stood at the edge of a table immediately
beneath that part of the line, where both at length were wont to
perch,—but no sooner was he poised in front and about to insert his
tongue, than the other would dart down with inconceivable swiftness,
and wheeling so as to come up beneath him, would drive him away
from his repast. He might fly to any other part of the room
unmolested, but an approach to the cup was the signal for an instant
assault. The ill-natured fellow himself drank long and frequent
draughts. I noticed that no sooner had this individual recovered his
boldness than he recovered his voice also, and both would screep
pertinaciously and shrilly, almost without intermission. When they
were accustomed to the room, their vivacity was extreme,
manifested in their upright posture, and quick turns and glances
when sitting, which caused their lovely breasts to flash out from
darkness into sudden lustrous light like rich gems;—and no less by
their dartings hither and thither, their most graceful wheelings and
evolutions in the air; so rapid that the eye was frequently baffled in
attempting to follow their motions. Suddenly we lose the radiant little
meteor in one corner, and as quickly hear the vibration of his
invisible wings in another behind us: or find him hovering in front of
our face, without having seen, in the least, how he came there. It is
worthy of observation that Polytmus in flying upward, keeps the
feathers of the tail closed, but in descending they are expanded to
the utmost, at which time the two long feathers, quivering with the
rapidity of their motion, like a streamer in a gale, form about a right
angle. I cannot tell why there should be this difference, but I believe
it is invariable.
From that time to the end of May, I obtained about twenty-five
more, nearly all males, and with one or two exceptions captured on
the Bluefields ridge. Some were taken with the net, others with bird-
lime; but though transferred to a basket or to a cage immediately on
capture, not a few were found dead on arrival at home. This sudden
death I could not at all account for: they did not beat themselves
against the sides, though they frequently clung to them: from the wild
look of several that were alive when arrived, sitting on the bottom of
the cage, looking upwards, I suspect terror, at their capture and
novel position, had no small influence. Many of those which were
found alive, were in a dying state, and of those which were turned