Succession Cases: Part I

Case No. 1 (Abdullah): Testate Estate of Ramirez vs Vda. De Ramirez (GR NO. L-27952,
Feb. 15, 1982)
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez (deceased), a Filipino citizen, died in Spain with only his widow,
Marcelle Ramirez (as compulsory heir). The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X
admitted his will to probate. The administratrix of the estate submitted a project of partition
giving one part (½) of the estate to the widow “en pleno dominio” in satisfaction of her legitime,
under Article 900 of Civil Code “If the only survivor is the widow/widower, she/he will be
entitled to ½ of the hereditary estate” while the other part of the “free portion” to his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez. Furthermore, one-third of the free portion is charged
with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining two-thirds ⅔ with a usufruct in favor of Wanda
Wrobleski. Based on the testamentary dispositions. Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed the
partition project, as well as the substitutions provided by the testator as to the usufructs of the
widow and Wanda. Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition stating that the
usufruct given to Wanda is valid on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession
by operation of law but also testamentary succession. Jorge and Roberto appealed before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the usufruct over real property in favor of Wanda violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ownership of lands by aliens.
Section 7, Article 12, 1987 Constitution
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individual, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise, any alien would
be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Filipino landowner in exchange for a
devise of a piece of land.
However, the Supreme Court upholds the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct,
does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Case No. 2 (Amerila): Maglasang vs. Heirs of Cabatingan (G.R. No. 131953)

Facts: The case involves the nullification of four Deeds of Donation made by Conchita
Cabatingan. The petitioners, Ma. Estela Maglasang, Nicolas Cabatingan, and Merly S.
Cabatingan, were the recipients of the donations. The Deeds of Donation stated that the
donations would become effective upon the death of the donor and would be rescinded if the
donee predeceased the donor. After Conchita's death, the respondents, heirs of Conchita, filed a
case seeking the annulment of the donations. The respondents argued that the donations were
void for failing to comply with the provisions of mortis causa. The Regional Trial Court ruled in
favor of the respondents, declaring the donations null and void. The petitioners appealed to the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the donations were inter vivos or mortis causa.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the donations were mortis causa. The court upheld the
decision of the trial court, declaring the Deeds of Donation null and void for failure to comply
with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments. Ratio: In a donation mortis causa, the
right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. The donations did
not contain any clear provision that intended to pass proprietary rights to the petitioners prior to
the donor's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" indicated that
the donor did not intend to transfer ownership during her lifetime. The provision on rescission in
case of the donee's death confirmed the mortis causa nature of the donations. The fact that the
donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" did not qualify
them as inter vivos, as transfers mortis causa can also be made for the same reason. Donations
mortis causa, being testamentary provisions, must be executed in accordance with the formalities
required for wills and testaments.

Case No. 3 (Anarna): Jutic vs. CA (G.R. No. L-44628 August 27, 1987)
CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO SEVILLE, TIBURCIO SEVILLE,
RAVELLO SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE, LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA SEVILLE,
NARACY SEVILLE, EMMANUEL SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN, and PACIFICO
MANICAN, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN,
TRINIDAD SULLAN, TERESITA SULLAN, ULYSSES SULLAN, ALEJANDRINO
SULLAN, BUENAVENTURA SEVILLE, and ZOILO SEVILLE, respondents.

FACTS: Vicente Sullan and other respondents filed a complaint with CFI Tagum against the
petitioners for partition and accounting of the properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging they are
heirs of the decedent. That during the lifetime of Arsenio Seville he executed an instrument
stating therein that in case he dies it is his desire to assign all his rights, interest, share and
participation over lot nos. 172 and 170 Cad-283 containing an area of 21.6361 has, to his brother
Melquiades Seville his brother.
On May 15, 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue and without any
debt. Thereafter Melquiades died and is survived by his children. Encarnacion is survived by her
children also, herein respondents. The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive
ownership of the properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument executed by
Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville and on their alleged actual possession,
occupation, and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172 since 1954 continuously and peacefully in
the concept of owner up to the time of Arsenio Seville's death.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondents. The petitioners appealed to the CA. Where
CA also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville.
RULING: No. The executed affidavit of Arsenio is not a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but
a mere declaration of an intention and a desire. Certainly it is not concrete and formal act of
giving or donating. There was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio Seville to
Melquiades at the time of the instrument’s execution. Petitioners claim that there is a valid
donation because it was accepted by them cannot be sustained, the affidavit could not transmit
ownership except in clear and express terms.

Case No. 5: Villanueva vs. Branoco (G.R. No. 172804 : January 24, 2011)

Facts: Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs, sued spouses
Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran to
recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte and collect damages.
Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro
Vere, who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970.

Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it. Respondents
similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia
Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The trial court rejected
respondents' claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which
Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in 1970. Thus, by the time
Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the CA found that the Deed as a
testamentary disposition was instead a donation inter vivos. Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale
between Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and
petitioner's predecessor- ininterest, Vere, void for Rodrigo's lack of title.

Issue: Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and Rodriguez is a donation or a devise

Held: It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos.
First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the Property will not
be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x xx Rodriguez," signaling the
irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim
title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance
of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3
May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not
in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property,
evident from Rodriguez's undertaking to "give one half x xx of the produce of the land to Apoy
Alve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on
Rodriguez upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigo's beneficial title.
 Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor's death, such as the donor's
love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises,
nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x xx inter vivos transfers." Thus, the CA
committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo's statement of "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding the petitioner cannot
capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of
ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal
uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners
to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of
passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing such
practice.
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in
1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor
of another." Thus, Rodrigo's postdonation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere's
successor- in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand,
respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's title which they may
invoke against all adverse.

Case No. 6 (Bataga): Del Rosario vs. Ferrer (G.R. No. 187056; September 20, 2010)

Facts: Spouses executed a document entitled “Donation Mortis Causa” in favor of two children
with a clause “irrevocable and shall be respected” by the surviving spouse.

Issue: W/N the deed is inter vivos or mortis causa.

Held: The deed is inter vivos. The irrevocability is a quality incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the act. The donors
in this case made the donation operative upon their death. However, such reservation in the
context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only benefecial ownership of the donated property while they lived. Three donees
signed their acceptance of the donation, a requirement only for donation inter vivos not mortis
causa.

Case No. 7 (Bejec): Austria-Magat vs. CA (G.R. No. 106755; February 1, 2002

FACTS: Basilisa Comerciante executed a deed of donation over a residential land and its
improvements in favor of her four children. The donation had an express irrevocability clause
and a prohibition on alienation of the property. Basilisa later executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
the property in favor of the petitioner, Apolinaria Austria-Magat. Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued in the petitioner's name.
ISSUE: Whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
RULING: The donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the donation is the
distinctive standard that identifies it as inter vivos. Other provisions in the deed of donation,
which seemingly make it mortis causa, do not go against its irrevocable character. The
prohibition on the donor to alienate the property during her lifetime is proof that naked
ownership over the property has been transferred to the donees. The prohibition on the donees
only means that they may not mortgage or dispose of the property while the donor is still alive.
The acceptance clause in the deed of donation further supports the conclusion that it is inter
vivos. The subsequent sale of the property by the donor does not operate as a valid revocation of
the donation. A formal case to revoke the donation must be filed. The act of selling the property
does not automatically revoke the donation.
Case No. 8 (Bernido): DKC Holdings vs. CA (G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000)

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U.

BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III,
respondents.

DKC Holdings Corporation seeks to enforce a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy against the
heir of the deceased lessor, as the court rules that the contract remains valid and binding even
after the lessor's death.

Facts: DKC Holdings Corporation (petitioner) and Encarnacion Bartolome entered into a
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. The contract allowed DKC to lease or lease with purchase
a parcel of land owned by Encarnacion Bartolome. DKC could take possession of the premises
for a period of six years, renewable for another six years, and pay a monthly rental fee. DKC
regularly paid the reservation fee to Encarnacion until her death in January 1990. After her death,
DKC continued to pay the reservation fees to Victor Bartolome, the sole heir of Encarnacion, but
Victor refused to accept the payments. DKC served notice to Victor that it was exercising its
option to lease the property, but Victor refused to accept the rental fee and surrender possession
of the property. DKC opened a savings account in Victor's name and deposited the rental and
reservation fees there. When DKC tried to register and annotate the contract on the title of the
property, the Register of Deeds refused to do so. DKC filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds.The trial court dismissed the complaint,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy was terminated upon the death
of Encarnacion Bartolome or if it binds her heir, Victor Bartolome.
2. W/N petitioner complied with its obligations under the contract and with the requisites to
exercise its option.

Held:
1. ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the
property he received from the decedent.
The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the case at bar, there is
neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the
contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are,
by their nature, transmissible.

According to Arturo Tolentino: "Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are
purely personal, either by provision of law, such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by the
very nature of the obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special personal
qualifications of the obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts
are not transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where
the client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving minor heirs, and the
lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the probate
court, substituted the minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract could not be
enforced against the minors; the lawyer was limited to a recovery on the basis of quantum
meruit."

In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of special
knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or other
personal qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and
terminates on the death of the party who is required to render such service."

It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the
death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the
promissors personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well
performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service
or act is of such a character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the contract,
by its terms, shows that performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the
contract or excuse nonperformance.

In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather,
the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to
petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be
performed by her heir Victor.

It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear provision
of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity of
interest between him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had
and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him.

2. The payment by petitioner of the reservation fees during the two-year period within which it
had the option to lease or purchase the property is not disputed. Petitioner also paid the
P15,000.00 monthly rental fee for five (5) months, despite the refusal of Victor to turn over the
subject property. Likewise, petitioner complied with its duty to inform the other party of its
intention to exercise its option to lease through its letter dated March 12, 1990, well within the
two-year period for it to exercise its option. Considering that at that time Encarnacion Bartolome
had already passed away, it was legitimate for petitioner to have addressed its letter to her heir. It
appears, therefore, that the exercise by petitioner of its option to lease the subject property was
made in accordance with the contractual provisions.

Case No. 10 (Butardo): Genato vs. Bayhon (G.R. No. 171035; Aug 24, 2009)

In the case of Genato v. Bayhon, the Supreme Court ruled that a dacion en pago was a simulated
contract and therefore void, and reduced the interest rate awarded by the trial court, resulting in a
total obligation of Php3,050,682.00 against Bayhon's estate.

Facts: Benjamin Bayhon obtained a loan from William Ong Genato and executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over a property. Bayhon claimed that the mortgage was conditioned upon the
personal assurance of Genato that it would not be notarized or enforced. Bayhon alleged that a
dacion en pago covering the property was a forgery. Genato denied the forgery claim and argued
that the execution of the dacion en pago was legitimate.

Issue:
1. Whether Benjamin Bayhon is liable to William Ong Genato for the amount of
Php5,647,130.00 in principal and interest.
2. Whether the Real Estate Mortgage and the Dacion en Pago are null and void.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications.
The Court ruled that the dacion en pago was a simulated or fictitious contract and therefore void.
It was found that Bayhon's wife, who allegedly signed the dacion en pago, was already dead at
the time of its execution. The Court held that while Bayhon's obligation was extinguished by his
death, the debt still exists against his estate. The heirs cannot be ordered to pay the debts left by
the deceased.
The Court further stated that the interest rate of 5% per month awarded by the trial court was
unconscionable and reduced it to 12% per annum. The total amount of the obligation against
Bayhon's estate was computed at Php3,050,682.00.

Case No. 11 (Cadungog): Nufable vs. Nufable (G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999)

NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE and AQUILINA NUFABLE, petitioners,vs.

GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE, MARCELO NUFABLE, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Facts: Rev. Fr. Esdras Nufable Rev. Fr. Esdras Nufable, owner of a parcel of land consisting of
948 square meters, more or less situated at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, died on
August 9, 1965, leaving his Last Will and Testament disposing his properties or estate in favor of
his four legitimate children, namely: Angel Custodio Nufable, Generosa Nufable, Vilfor Nufable
and Marcelo Nufable.
The settlement of said estate was then terminated in 1966. The herein heirs agreed that said
property would remain undivided.

However, spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina Nufable mortgaged the entire property to the
Development Bank of the Philippines without the knowledge of the other Nufable heirs. Said
mortgagors became delinquent for which reason the mortgaged property was foreclosed on
February 26, 1973 by DBP who ended up as the highest bidder.

Moreover, when Angel Custodio Nufable died on August 29, 1978, Nelson Nufable, his son
purchased said property from DBP.

The circumstance resulted Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo to file a suit annulling the sale of the
land to Nelson as such being contrary to law.

Issue: Whether or not the mortgage of the entire property to the Development Bank of the
Philippines by spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina Nufable valid.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

No. Angel Nufable, being one of the heirs, is entitled to mortgage only his pro-indiviso share
which is limited only to ¼ part of the property thereof. In this particular case, Angel has no right
to mortgage the entire property. Mortgage is valid only with respect to his share.

The Supreme Court also held that when Esdras Nufable died in 1965, his four legitimate children
had already acquired the successional rights over the said property pursuant to Article 777 which
provides that, “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.”

Case No. 12 (Chungsun): Balus vs. Balus (G.R. NO. 168970; Jan. 15, 2010

FACTS: On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security for a loan he obtained
from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the
mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed
by law. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Subsequently Rufo died. On
October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement also
contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the
soonest possible time.

ISSUES: I. Whether or not the questioned land is part of the Estate of Rufo.
II. Does petitioner have intention to redeem the subject property in question during the
redemption period allowed by law.

HELD: No. The subject land is not part of the estate of Rufo. ART 777 provides that the rights to
a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. The inheritance of a person
consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death,
as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. Rufo lost
ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death,
the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim.
Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.

No. There were several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but
he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to
re-sell the same to him but he ignored such offer.

Case No. 13 (Corpuz, Jezreel): Dela Merced vs. Dela Merced (G.R. No. 126707. February 25,
1999)

FACTS: Evarista dela Merced died intestate without issue, leaving five (5) parcels of land. She
was survived by three (3) sets of heirs, viz: (1) Francisco dela Merced, a brother; (2) Teresita, her
niece who is the only daughter of a dead sister; and (3) the legitimate children of another dead
sister. A year later, Francisco died survived by his wife and three (3) legitimate children.
The three (3) sets of heirs of Evarista executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate
adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of 1/3 pro-indiviso. Joselito
dela Merced, illegitimate son of Francisco, filed a petition for annulment of the extrajudicial
settlement made. Claiming successional rights, Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the
beneficiaries, to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of Evarista,
corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
The trial court: dismissed the petition. CA: reversed the decision of the trial court Hence, this
petition for review.

Issue: whether or not as Hier of Francisco, Joselito is entitled of one-third (1/3) share in the
Estate of Evarista.

RULING: Yes. Article 777 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her
brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs.
Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the
private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate
of Evarista.

Case No. 14 (Corpus, Jim): Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. CA (300 SCRA 345)
Facts: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti (married to Rosario Cuario), were co-owners of a
property in Lucena City. In 1986, Lourdes Sampayo died intestate. Relatives of Lourdes
Sampayo, represented by Lydia S. Reyes as their attorney-infact, filed an action for partition and
damages. Defendants, Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario, refused the partition, claiming that the
plaintiffs failed to prove their status as rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Ignacio Conti died
during the trial and was substituted by his children as party defendants. Plaintiffs presented
evidence to establish their relationship with Lourdes Sampayo, including baptismal certificates
and testimonies of witnesses. Defendants presented witnesses to dispute the plaintiffs' claims.
Trial court declared the plaintiffs as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and ordered the
submission of a project of partition.
Issue: Whether a prior settlement of the estate is necessary before heirs can demand partition.
Ruling: The Court held that a prior settlement of the estate is not necessary before the heirs can
commence any action pertaining to the deceased. This means that the heirs have the right to
demand partition of the property without the need for a prior settlement of the estate. No heir can
be compelled not to demand for partition of the property as the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decent in pursuance of Article 777 of Civil
Code.

Case No. 15 (Cortes): Mondonido vs. Roda (L-5561, Jan. 26, 1954)

Facts: Eduardo de Roda and Antonina Sepulveda were the grandparents of Ricardo de Roda.
In 1905, Eduardo died and left his children and grandchildren as heirs. Ricardo, representing his
father, inherited 3/24 of Eduardo’s properties. In February 24 and 27, 1929, Ricardo executed 2
contracts obligating himself to sell to Mondonido a portion of the land the former inherited from
his grandparents. He received P200 as advance payment from Mondonido. In 1950, Mondonido
filed a case against Ricardo, through his administrator Presca Vda.de Roda (defendant),
requesting compliance to the 2 contracts. The defendant argued that the contracts were null and
void because they pertained to future inheritance. The defendant also argued that the action filed
by Mondoñido seeking the fulfillment of the contracts was already prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not the contracts for the sale are null and void due to their nature as future
inheritance?

Ruling: No. Article 777 of the Civil Code states that the rights of the inheritance are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent. A sale of future inheritance is null and void. In
this case, the court explained that the rights to succession are transmitted by operation of law
from the moment of death. Therefore, Ricardo was already the owner of his share in the
inheritance since the death of Eduardo in 1905, which was considered a real and current
inheritance, not a future one. While it is true that “future” inheritance cannot be sold, it is valid
for an heir, after the testator’s death, to sell his share in the estate even pending its liquidation,
for here the inheritance is “present,” no longer “future.”

Case No. 17 (Dagmil): Hacbang vs. Atty. Alo (GR 191031, Oct. 5, 2015)
Facts: The case of Hacbang v. Alo involves a dispute over the ownership of a property left by
Bishop Sofronio. The deceased left a will that was probated in 1937. He left half of his properties
to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo, mother of Atty. Basilio
H. Alo, respondent.
The petitioners, Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo J. Hacbang, claim to be the rightful owners of
the subject property as representatives of their ascendants. They argue that since the settlement
proceedings of Bishop Sofronio's estate were archived and dismissed, intestate succession should
govern and the entire inheritance should have gone to their ascendants.
Issue: Whether or not the will left by the deceased be favored.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's
freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil
Code. Article 763 of the Spanish Code provides that a person without compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed
him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not
impair their legitime. This provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil
Code.
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate
succession has always been preferred over intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is
treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. Hence, there is
no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
Even though the CFI archived the settlement proceedings, there is no indication that it declared
any of the dispositions in the will invalid. The records are understandably bare considering the
probate proceedings were initiated as early as 1937. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court find no
reason to doubt the intrinsic validity of the will.

Case No. 18 (Dalumpines): Vda. De Villanueva vs. Juico (GR. No. L-15737, February 28,
1962)
Facts: Don Nicolas Villaflor left in his will that when he dies, his wife, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno and his brother, would have half each to his properties. His will the 6 th and 7th
clauses that stated that Doña Fausta Nepomuceno would be able to possess certain properties
while she was alive and if she did not remarry and an 8th clause which states that the properties
would go to his grand-niece, Leonor Villaflor. Don Nicolas Villaflor died without having
children with his wife. Doña Nepomuceno instituted Special Proceeding in CFI Zambales for the
settlement of her husband’s estate and got the properties mentioned and referred to in the 7th
clause of the will.
When Doña Fausta Nepomucena died without a second marriage and without a child. Her estate
is being settled in a special proceeding with Delfin Juico as the duly appointed and qualified
judicial administrator. While, Leonor Villaflor vda. De Villanueva tried to claim these properties,
admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his
“sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.” Further, contended that upon Doña Nepomuceno’s death, she
was vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by Don Villaflor to
clause 7 of his will, pursuant to the 8th clause. The trial court ruled in favor of Juico and decided
that the properties were now owned by Doña Fausta upon her death on account of the fact that
she never remarried.
Issue: Whether or not Villaflor inherits the properties from Don Villaflor’s will?
Held: Yes, Villaflor inherits the properties. The Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Don
Villaflor’s will would show that he never intended his widow to have ownership over the
properties by using the words “use and possession while alive”. The plain desire and intent of the
testator in clause 8 was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the 7th clause, subject to further condition that if the widow remarried, her rights
would cease, even during her won lifetime; That the widow was meant to have no more life
interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all as evident from the expressions used
by Don Villaflor “uso y, posesi mientras viva” which means “use and possession while alive.”
Don Villaflor did not give his widow full ownership of these particular properties, but only the
right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. In contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator’s
brother in clause 6.
The trial court disregarded the clause in the testament in the event that the widow
remarried in holding that Leonor Villaflor could succeed the properties by discarding the
expression “mientras viva” and considered the words “uso y, poseson” as equivalent to
ownership. The trial court violated Art. 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Sec 59 of
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed
in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, must be
settled in accordance by following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s words, unless it
clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.

Case No. 19 (Dimapalao): In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa (G.R. No. L-
14074 November 7, 1918)

FACTS: Jose Riosa left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of an
estate valued at more than P35,000. He died on April 17, 1917. The will was duly executed in
accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
provide that: “No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator
signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the
presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will
invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.”

However a year prior to the death of Jose Riosa and and before his the death, Section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure was amended by Act No. 2645 with additional formalities required such
as “The Will must be signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and
every page, and the attestation state these facts”

ISSUE: Which of the Two (2) laws will prevail, the existing law on the date of the execution of
a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator.

RULING: The will of Riosa is valid. The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the
validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its
execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. In the Philippine
Islands the law existing at the date of the execution of a will is controlling.

Furthermore, the general rule of statutory construction that “all statutes are to be construed as
having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect” applied
to the law of wills.

Case No. 20 (Flores) - In Re: Will and Testament of Sanch Abadia Severina A. Vda. De Enriquez
vs. Abadia
Facts: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. On January 14, 1943, he died in the
municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, as an evacuee. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one
of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some
cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.
The trial court found and declared the said document to be a holographic will and that
although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were
not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided
the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic
wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the
trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order
dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the document, as the Last Will and Testament of
Father Sancho Abadia.
Issue: Whether or not the Holographic Will executed by Father Sancho is controlling?
Ruling: No, the holographic will is not controlling.
Under Article 795 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that: "The validity of a will
as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above
provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the
time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the
court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that
although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression
at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed
act.
There is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling
factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry
out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death
of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent
statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in
force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of
the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested
right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in
the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a
will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be
regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the
heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate.

Case No. 21: Ancheta vs. Dalaygon (G.R. No. 139868)

Facts: Audrey O'Neill Guersey, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, had a will that
bequeathed her entire estate to her husband, Richard Guersey, who was also designated as the
executor. The will was admitted to probate in the United States. Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta was
appointed as the ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate in the Philippines.
Richard later married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon and had two children with her. When
Richard died, his will bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his rights and
interests over certain shares of stock. The will was also admitted to probate in the United States.
Atty. William Quasha was appointed as the ancillary administrator of Richard's estate in the
Philippines.
Atty. Ancheta filed a motion in Special Proceeding No. 9625 to declare Richard and Kyle
Guersey (Audrey's adopted daughter) as heirs of Audrey. Atty. Ancheta filed a project of
partition, which was approved by the trial court. The court ordered the transfer of the Makati
property and other assets to Richard and Kyle. Candelaria opposed the project of partition,
arguing that under the law of the State of Maryland (where Audrey was domiciled), Richard
should receive the entire estate. The trial court agreed with Candelaria and adjudicated Richard's
entire 3/4 undivided interest in the Makati property to her. Candelaria filed a complaint for the
annulment of the trial court's orders, alleging that Atty. Ancheta committed extrinsic fraud by
disregarding the laws of Maryland and distributing the estate contrary to Audrey's will.
The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled in favor of Candelaria, annulling the trial court's orders
and ordering the adjudication of the entire estate in favor of Richard's estate. Atty. Ancheta filed
a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's orders
had become final and executory and could no longer be annulled. Atty. Ancheta claimed that he
acted in good faith and did not commit fraud in the performance of his duties as ancillary
administrator.

Issue: Whether the trial court's orders can be annulled due to extrinsic fraud committed by Atty.
Ancheta in distributing the estate contrary to Audrey's will and the laws of Maryland.

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision to annul the trial court's orders and ordered
the adjudication of the entire estate in favor of Richard's estate.

Ratio: Atty. Ancheta's failure to distribute Audrey's estate according to her will and the laws of
Maryland amounted to extrinsic fraud. As an ancillary administrator, Atty. Ancheta had a duty to
introduce the pertinent law of Maryland and distribute the estate in accordance with Audrey's
will. His failure to do so resulted in a miscarriage of justice and deprived Candelaria of her full
successional rights. The Makati property, owned by Audrey and Richard, should be distributed
according to their respective wills. The intrinsic validity of Audrey's will, especially with regard
to the order of succession and the amount of successional rights, is governed by the law of the
State of Maryland.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court denied Atty. Ancheta's petition and affirmed the CA's decision
to annul the trial court's orders. It emphasized the importance of distributing the estate in
accordance with the testator's will and the applicable law. Atty. Ancheta was admonished to be
more diligent in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.

Being a foreign national, the national law of Audrey’s will especially with regard to who are her
heirs is governed by her national law as provided in Art. 16 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.”

However, in intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.

Art. 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
the nation of the decedent. Petitioner was duty bound to introduce evidence of the pertinent laws
of Maryland and the court cannot accept petitioner’s protestation of good faith. Given that the
pertinent law of Maryland has been brought to record before CA, and the trial court in the
settlement of Richard’s estate, and petitioner or any other interested person does not dispute the
existence or validity of the said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed
according to their respective will, and not according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent Dalaygon.

Case No. 22 (Julian-Torralba): Bellis vs. Bellis (20 SCRA358)

TESTATE OF AMOS T BELLIS (DECEASED), PEOPLES BANKANDTRUSTCOMPANY
(EXECUTOR), MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS, MERIAM PALMABELLISVSEDWARD A
BELLIS, ET AL. TOPIC: LAW THAT GOVERNS THE EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSSIC
VALIDITY(ART 795)- The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of
the law in force at the time it is made. PRINCIPLE: Art 16 (2) and Article 1039 of NCC render
applicable the National law of the decedent, in intestate and testamentary succession, with regard
to four items; 1. Order of succession, 2. Amount of successional rights, 3. Intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will, and 4. The capacity to succeed.

FACTS: AMOS BELLIS was born in the state of Texas, USA and a US national. He had a first
wife whom he divorced which he had five children where one predeceased him, then a second
wife with another three children, and lastly three illegitimate children namely Maria Cristina,
Meriam Palma, Amos, Jr all surnamed Bellis. On August 1952, Amos Bellis executed a will in
the Philippines where he intended to leave $240, 000 to his first wife, Mary E Mallen and P 40,
000.00 for each of his illegitimate children (P120,000.00). This is after all the obligation and
taxes has been settled. And another clause provided that after satisfaction of the foregoing, the
remainder will be divided in equal share to his seven legitimate children. On July 8, 1958 died,
and his will was admitted at the probate court of first instance at Manila. The Executor bank paid
the bequest of the decedent and satisfied such. When it is in the closing of the administration and
to divide now of what was left to the seven legitimate children of Bellis, Maria Cristina and
Meriam Palma opposed to the project partition as it impairs their right to legitimes.

ISSUE: W/N there is a deprivation of the right of legitimes

HELD: It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good custom may involve in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
Nationals. For it has chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent’s National Law. Specific provision must prevail over general ones. Art 16 (2) and
Article 1039 of NCC render applicable the National law of the decedent, in intestate and
testamentary succession, with regard to four items; 1. Order of succession, 2. Amount of
successional rights, 3. Intrinsic validity of the provision of the will, and 4. The capacity to
succeed.

Case No. 23 (Gandor): Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil. 867, Nov. 1, 1924)

Facts: In this case, Andre Brimo opposes the partition of the estate of left by his brother joseph
Brimo because the provisions of the will are not in accordance with the laws of Turkish
nationality.
The provisions of Joseph Brimo states that, “I like to desire to state that although I am Turkish
citizen, this citizenship having been conferred. It is my wish that the distribution of my property,
may will be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws of the Philippines”.
The institution of legatees in the will is conditional and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator’s will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws
of his nationality, but in accordance of Philippine laws.

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s will is valid.

Held: The provision is for being contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator’s
national law when according to Article 16 of the Civil Code such national law is one to govern
testamentary dispositions. As provided also in Article 795 of the Civil Code on the Intrinsic
Validity from the viewpoint of place or country that the estate must be accordance with the laws
of his country, Turkey and not in accordance with laws of the Philippines regardless of the place
of execution and the place of death.

Case No. 24 (Gonzaga): Aznar vs. Garcia (GR L-16749)

Facts: The deceased, Edward E. Christensen, was a citizen of California but domiciled in the
Philippines at the time of his death. He then came to the Philippines in 1913 and rarely returned
to California, only for short visits. At the time of his death, he was a citizen of California but
domiciled in the Philippines. His will, executed in 1951, declared that he was a citizen of
California and made provisions for his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen, and another individual
named Maria Helen Christensen.
Issues: Whether the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law or California
law.
Ruling: The domicile of the deceased, being the Philippines, should govern the validity of the
provisions in the will. The court applied the conflict of law rule in California, which refers back
the case to the law of the decedent's domicile. The court stated that if the question has to be
decided, the Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law rule of the
state of the decedent, California. The court also noted that the internal law of California provides
no legitime for natural children, while Philippine law recognizes them as legally acknowledged
forced heirs. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the lower court and instructed that the
partition of the estate be made in accordance with Philippine law on succession.

Case No. 25 (Guinid): Dorotheo vs. CA (G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999)

FACTS: Private respondents (Vicente and Jose Dorotheo) were the legitimate children of
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro’s death, petitioner (Lourdes
Dorotheo), who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding
for the probate of the latter’s last will and testament.
In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro’s will to probate. Private respondents did
not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a “Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void.”
The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of
the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo
as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes...”

An Order was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order on the
ground that the order was merely “interlocutory.” Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. Private respondents filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders. Aggrieved, the petitioner instituted a petition
for review.

ISSUE: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect?

RULING: NO. The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.

It should be noted that probate proceedings deal generally with the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated, particularly on the following aspects:
o whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
o compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
o the testamentary capacity of the testator;
o and the due execution of the last will and testament.

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and
was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly
prohibited by law from making a will.

ARTICLE 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited by law may make a will.

ARTICLE 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will.

ARTICLE 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the
time of its execution.

Intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after
the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid
last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the
testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or
rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions
thereof cannot be given effect. The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.

Case No. 26 (Hernandez): Bugnao vs. Ubag (G.R. No. 4445. September 18, 1909)

FACTS: Catalina Bugnao, the widow of Domingo Ubag, sought the probate of a document
purported to be the last will of Domingo Ubag. This probate was contested by Francisco Ubag
et al., who were the brothers and sisters of the deceased. They would inherit from Domingo
Ubag’s estate if the will were disallowed, as Domingo left no direct heirs. Their contention was
they challenged Domingo Ubag’s mental and physical capacity to create a will at the time of
its alleged execution. The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros initially admitted the will
to probate. This decision was appealed by the Ubag siblings to the Supreme Court, questioning
the testator’s capacity.

ISSUE: WON Domingo Ubag possessed the necessary mental and physical capacity to make
a will at the time of its execution.

HELD: The testator was of sound mind and memory and mentally capable of making the will.
It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an
advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that
he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself
to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he
could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental
incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing
witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear
recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out
therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the
will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is
strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.

Case No. 28 (Gadong): Neyra v. Neyra (76 Phil 333)

Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in
which the testator is engaged at that time, to recollect the property being disposed of, and the
persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him/her, and to comprehend the
manner in which the instrument will distribute his/her property. Where the mind of the testator is
in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact someone had to guide
his/her hand in order that he/she may sign, is sufficient to invalidate the will.

Facts:
Severo Neyra is the father of Encarnacion and Trinidad, and when he died he left his two
daughters several properties from his estate. The two sisters had serious quarrels regarding their
respective inheritances and this caused two main lawsuits between the two – the first being
where Trinidad assailed the annulment of the sale Encarnacion made on a property in Manila,
this was ruled in favor of the latter. The second case involved a demand on the part of Trinidad
from Encarnacion over the proceeds of the rent over the subject property in Manila; the case was
awarded in favor of Trinidad but also accorded Encarnacion ½ of the rent proceeds. An appeal of
this case is pending with the CA.
Origins of the 1939 Will
Because of this vicious feud, Encarnacion drafted a first will in 1939 which had no provision
whatsoever in favor of her sister Trinidad, and instead stipulated that a religious organization of
nuns and several other relatives (including the respondent oppositors Teodora Neyra, Pilar de
Guzman, and Maria Jacobo Vda. De Blanco) be the beneficiaries of her will. The religious
congregation declined the bequest, and so one week before her death Encarnacion summoned
one Atty. Ricardo Sikat in order to assist her in preparing a new will, but only a draft was
prepared in the form of a codicil which still named the religious organization as a beneficiary of
the estate. The codicil was sent to the nuns for their reconsideration and acceptance, but the they
would again reject and decline it but this was not made known to Encarnacion before her death.
Origins of the 1942 Will
Meanwhile Encarnacion became very ill with Addison’s disease (which caused her to sleep a lot
and remain bedridden) and on 1942 sent for her religious adviser and confessor Monsignor
Fernandez and requested for a mass to be said in her home. On November 1, 1942 mass was
solemnized in her home in Manila by Fr. Garcia, who after the mass, advised reconciliation
between Encarnacion and her sister Trinidad. On the same day, Trinidad went to Encarnacion’s
house and the two greeted each other affectionately and reconciled during their lengthy talk it
was decided that they would have the appeal pending before the CA dismissed and that the two
would renounce their mutual claims against one another. The two sisters also sent for Atty.
Alejandro Panis to prepare the necessary documents embodying their agreement, but Atty. Panis
came only on the next day. On November 2, 1942 Atty. Panis was instructed by Encarnacion to
prepare the document regarding her and Trinidad’s agreement the previous day and also, the
drafting of a new will and testament where she intended to include Trinidad a beneficiary of her
estate. The next day November 3, the documents were ready for signature and Atty. Panis read
the will in a loud voice in front of Encarnacion and also in the presence of Fr. Garcia, Dr. Abad,
and Trinidad. After which Encarnacion stated that the will was in accordance with her wishes
and express instructions and asked for the ink pad in order for her to place her thumb mark at the
end of the will. Her nephew, Trinidad’s son, helped her in doing so by guiding her hand from the
ink pad to the documents. The next day, Encarnacion died suddenly of a heart attack, after
battling Addison’s disease for two years.
Testimony of Oppositors Teodora and Other Witnesses
Teodora, together with other witnesses they presented, testified that when the thumbmark of
Encarnacion was affixed to the alleged revised will, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala of
the house while the supposed witnesses to the will were in the next room. They also averred that
Encarnacion’s thumbmark was only affixed on the morning of November 4, by Trinidad and
another person, when the former was already dead. Furthermore, the testimonies of the
oppositors insinuated that there could be no possible reconciliation between the two because of
the vicious feud that the two had over the course of several years. There main contentions are
that 1) at the time of the execution of the 1942 will, Encarnacion no longer had testamentary
capacity; 2) thumbmarks were procured through fraud by Trinidad, and that Encarnacion never
intended such document to be a will; 3) said 1942 will was not in conformity with formalities
required by law; and 4) that the 1939 will, which named oppositors as beneficiaries, was never
revoked nor amended in anyway whatsoever.
The lower court ruled to admit the 1942 will into probate while rejecting the 1939 will.

Issue:
Whether or not the 1942 will is valid and admitted to probation.

Held:
THE 1942 WILL IS VALID, and this will be the basis for the probate proceedings of
Encarnacion’s estate. The conclusion of the trial court that the decedent Encarnacion was of
sound mind and possessed testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the subject will
cannot be properly disturbed. The fact that Encarnacion was suffering from the late stages of
Addison’s disease does not by itself invalidate her actions with regard to the execution of her last
will and testament. The mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the
decedent in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they
enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients
suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the
moments of their death.
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, admitted that in the morning and
also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion talked to her and that
they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at
the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question. Where the mind of
the testator is in perfectly sound condition, the mere fact that someone had to assist her in
signing/affixing her thumbmark on the will is not sufficient to invalidate such execution.
The Court further found that the oppositors, who were the beneficiaries of the previous and now
defunct will, were banking on the “common belief that hatred amongst relatives is the most
violent” and that the two sisters were never realistically going to ever resolve their differences.
Furthermore, the oppositors as well as their principal witnesses were all interested parties while
on the other hand the witnesses for petitioner Trinidad were all found to be trustworthy men who
had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. The allegations of the oppositors
were found by the Court to be “preposterous” and the testimonies “contrary to
common sense and violates all sense of proportion”. They had testified brazen falsehoods and are
unworthy of belief, and as to the evidence they presented, the applicable rule falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything), applies.
In the present case, the Court cannot find any reason or justification to alter the conclusions set
forth decision of the lower court and will not reverse any findings of fact by said court made
upon conflicting testimony and depending largely upon the credibility of witnesses.

Case No. 29: Baltazar vs. Laza (G.R. No. 174489; April 11, 2012)

FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the
Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin,
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine.
Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to
know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.

Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she
resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will
remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with
the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of
Letters of Administration in his favor.

On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition.
Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to
Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being
“mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will
had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.

Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing
that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the
USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the
will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the
testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate
of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate.

HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even
the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they
question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said
act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of
being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of
the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making
the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and
the character of the testamentary act.”

Case No. 30 (Montebon): Acop vs. Piraso (G.R. No. 28946, Jan 16, 1929)

Facts: The Court of First Instance of Benguet denied the probate of the will because it was
written in English, a language that the deceased Piraso did not know. The appellant, Sixto Acop,
appealed the decision.

Issue: Whether the will should be admitted to probate.

Ruling: Article 804 of the Civil Code: Every will must be in writing and executed in a language
or dialect known to the testator. It is proven that Piraso knew no other language than the Igorrote
dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano.

Case No. 31 (Montevirgen): Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil. 476)

Forms of will under Article 804 “Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or
dialect known to the testator.”

FACTS: Ana Abangan executed a will in July 1916, consisting of two sheets. The will was
written in Cebuano, a dialect spoken in Cebu where the testatrix resided. The will was admitted
to probate by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on September 19, 1917. The opponents
appealed, claiming that there was no proof that the testatrix knew Cebuano.

ISSUE: Was there a presumption that the testatrix knew Cebuano?

RULING: YES. It is alleged the records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect in which
the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the
city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the
absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is
written.

Case No. 32 (Nandang): Teodoro v Cañeda v CA & William Cabrera (222 SCRA 781)

FACTS: By way of legacies and devisees, Mateo Caballero left his real and personal belongings
to individuals who did not seem to be related to him in his final will and testament.
The question of the testator's signature's authenticity was brought up by the petitioners in the
probate case. The probate court found the las will and testament to be in order.
On appeal, petitioners assert that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its
attestation clause is patently defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental
witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of another.

ISSUE: WON the above attestation clause in substantial compliance with the requirement of
the civil code.

RULING: No, among the requirements of the contents of the attestation under Art. 805 of the
Civil Code is that it must state that the attesting witnesses have witnessed the signing by the
testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Careful reading of the attestation clause shows that the same does not expressly state
therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed in their respective signatures to the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Thus, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforementioned defect in the
attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will on
the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance
rule.

Case No. 33 (Nunez): Taboada vs. Rosal (G.R. No. L-36033; Nov 5, 1982)

Legal Principle/Doctrine: Subscription and attestation Requirement of a Will

FACTS: Petitioner, Apolonio Taboada, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Dorotea
Perez. The alleged will and the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses was presented. The
trial
court disallowed the will for lack of formality in its execution. The will was signed at the bottom
of the page by the testatrix and at the left-hand margin by three instrumental witnesses. The
trial court interpreted Article 805 of the Civil Code to require that all three subscribing
witnesses must sign at the end of the will, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another.
The public defendant contends that the will also violated the attestation requirement. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and subsequent motion for the appointment of a
special administrator were also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the Subscription and Attestation Requirement
would
make the will invalid.

RULING: NO, the requirement of subscription was fully satisfied. Clearly, Art. 805 of the Civil
Code stated that the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator, or by the
testator’s
name written by another person in his presence, or by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another. However, the signatures of the witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the
will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due
execution of the will as embodied in the attestation.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those
things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the
testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, Subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names
upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was
executed by the testator.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the
will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

Case No. 34 (Omambong): Lopez vs. Liboro (GR L-1787; August 27, 1948)
FACTS: This case involves the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament of Don
Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83, almost 6 mos. after the doc in question was executed.
The said last will and testament was opposed unsuccessfully by the appellant, Agosto Liboro. He
specified five following grounds in impugning such, to wit:
1. That the deceased never executed the will
2. The signature appearing in the will was a forgery
3. That at the time of execution, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental
capacity due to advanced age
4. That, assuming he did ever execute the said will in question, it was not executed and
attested as required by law, and one of the instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as
such; and it was produced by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper
pressure on the part of the beneficiaries
5. That the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick These grounds are
supported by his contention that the will in question comprises two pages, each of which is
written on one side of a separate sheet.
The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant
believes, is a fatal defect. He also impugned the credibility of the witnesses as well as the
testator's way of affixing his thumbmark instead of signing his name.
ISSUE: WON the document in question is in compliance with the prescribed law
RULING: Yes. SC holds that the appeal lacks merit. The court also emphasized its reasons in
holding such, to wit:
1. As for the Thumbmark - The reason for this was that the testator was suffering from
"partial paralysis." SC holds that there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the
testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of
 taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is
satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.

Case No. 35 (Ondoy): De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona (53 Phil 108)
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner and appellant, vs. APOLINARIO GONZALES and
SINFOROSO ONA, opponents and appellants.
DOCTRINE: The witnesses, just like the testator, must sign the Will at the end thereof. In other
words: (a) the testator must sign the will in the presence of all the witnesses; and (b) the
witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
FACTS: On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a
niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November 1926, leaving no
heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will
for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the
ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix
of the estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and
made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the
delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession.
However, Sinforoso filed a motion asking that the appointment of Serapia de Gala as
special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead.It was
granted on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment
would simplify the proceedings. The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue
that the will in question was not executed in the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. The principal points raised by the appeal are (1)
that the person requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not
her own; (2) that the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the
testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the
witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the
will.

ISSUES:
• Whether the person requested to sign the name of the testatrix should sign only the latter's
name and not her own.
• Whether the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumbmark of the
testatrix in the will. If so, whether the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the
witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the
will is valid.
RULING: YES. The appointment' of a special administrator in a probate case lies in the sound
discretion of the court, and he may be removed without reference to section 653 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or
testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written signature but by the testator or
testatrix' thumbmark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original
meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting.
A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.
YES. It is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumbmark, but it
does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of
the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It
may be conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it
does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last clause of
the body of the will, it is clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no
possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.
In executing her last will and testament, the testatrix placed her thumbmark between her given
name and surname, written by another person. It was not mentioned in the attestation clause that
the testatrix signed by thumbmark, but the form of the signature was sufficiently described and
explained in the last clause of the body of the will. Held, that the signature was valid.

Case No. 36 (Osorno): Garcia vs. La Cuesta (90 Phil 489)

FACTS: Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano
dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator. The will also contained an attestation
clause which is signed by three witnesses. The attestation clause states:

“We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero
Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and
that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation
clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and
it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them were
signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the
testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.”

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero
Mercado, followed below by "A ruego del testador" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero
Mercado is alleged also to have written a cross immediately after his name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Antero Mercado is valid

RULING: No. The will of Antero Mercado is not valid.

The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction.

The cross appearing on the will is not the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the
ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the Court is not prepared to liken the
mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not
have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark. Thus, the cross cannot be considered a valid signature.

When somebody else writes the testator’s name for him, the mere placing by the testator of a
cross after his name, without there being in the will a statement that somebody had signed for the
testator, is not sufficient, and the will is considered void.
Case No. 37 (Palmones): Payad vs. Tolentino (G.R. No. L-42258 January 15, 1936)

FACTS: Leoncia Tolentino died testate where her will was denied probate by trial court for
grounds that the attestation clause did not follow the conformity with the requirements of law in
that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused Attorney Almario to write her name at her
express direction. However, Evidence shows that Atty. Almario only write the name of the
Testatrix where the latter placed her thumb mark. Atty. Almario did not sign in behalf of the
Testatrix.

ISSUE: Is the will in conformity with the requirements of law?

RULING: Yes, "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by
the testator's mark." (Quoted by this court from 28 R.C.L., p, 117; De Gala vs. Gonzales and
Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 108.), In the case at hand, the thumb mark of the testator is placed in lieu of
her signature, thus it is no longer required for the attestation stating that Atty. Almario was
expressly instructed to sign the will on behalf of the Testator.

Case No. 38 (Quinones): Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (GR 1641, 5 Phil 541)
Facts: The case involves the probate of the last will and testament of Macario
Jaboneta, the lower court denied the probate of the will because one of the
witnesses, Julio Javellana, did not sign the will in the presence of another
witness, Isabelo Jena. Evidence presented during the proceedings showed that
Jena signed the will first, followed by Aniceto Jalbuena and other witnesses,
Jena then left the room in a hurry and saw Javellana with the pen in his hand,
ready to sign, However, Jena did not actually see Javellana sign the will.
Issue: Whether Javellana's signature on the will was valid, considering that
Jena did not witness him sign it.
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of admitting the will to probate, The court held
that the true test of the presence of the testator and witnesses in the execution
of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they
could have seen each other sign, considering their mental and physical
condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of signing.
The court found that Javellana's signature was affixed in the presence of Jena
because Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand
and pen to sign the will.
Therefore, the court concluded that the statutory requisites for the
execution of the will were complied with, and the lower court erred in denying
probate.

Case No. 39 (Roquero): Avera vs. Garcia (42 Phil 145; 1921)

FACTS: Eutiquia Avera filed a petition for the probate of the will of Esteban Garcia. Marino
Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the guardian of minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia, contested the
petition on the ground that the signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses were placed on
the right margin instead of the left margin of each page as provided by the statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will with the signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses on right
margin instead of left, is invalid.

RULING: No, the will is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable
that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills
must be fully complied with.

By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated and
guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been protected by
being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted without
discovering the slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in one
margin or the other.

Case No. 40 (Salvador): Icasiano vs. Icasiano (G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964)
Facts: Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his
appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on
September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was
prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the
will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to
sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages
simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was
signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a
page is sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence.
Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not
intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since
the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will but the duly signed
carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of
the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the
purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and
there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.

Case No. 41 (Sario): Cagro vs. Cagro (92 Phil 1032)

Jesusa Cagro is the petitioner-appellee; Pelagio Cagro, et al., are the oppositors-appellants
Facts: Appellants’ main objection is that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation
clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. The signatures of the three witnesses to the will
do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is
signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin. Appellee contends that the signatures of the
three witnesses on the left-hand margin conforms substantially to the law and may be deemed as
their signatures to the attestation clause.
Issue: Whether or not the will is fatally defective when its attestation clause is not signed by the
attesting witnesses.
Ruling: An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. If an attestation
clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, it would be easy to add such
clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures.

Case No. 42 (Soberano): Azuela vs. CA (47 SCRA 119)

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO

substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006

SUMMARY:
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E.
Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal
recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert
a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident because of
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written
is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

FACTS:
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the RTC of Manila. The
petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E.
Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. The petitioner is the son of the cousin of the
decedent.

The will consists of two (2) pages and is written in the vernacular Pilipino. The three named
witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will,
but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.

The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent,
namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo. The petitioner prayed that the will be
allowed and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.

The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo, who represented herself as the attorney-in-
fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. She also argued that the will was not executed
and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear
on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is invalid as it does not contain an acknowledgement.

RULING: Yes. The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The
importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the
other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The
non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to
the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document
was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should
avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case,
the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though,
the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors
of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.

Yet even if considered that what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would
nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
"acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual
proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or
signed the will as their free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another
all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the
testator.

An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. The acknowledgment coerces the testator
and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and
subscribed to the will as their free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of
perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of
spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a
further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.

A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses
is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

Case No. 44 (Zoreta): Andalis vs. Pulgueras (59 Phil 643)

Facts: The herein case involves the admission to probate of an alleged will of Victor Pulgueras
who had passed away. During the trial, the testimony of one witness was presented. According to
the witness, six pages of the will were signed on the margin by the testator and the two witnesses
on January 4, 1931. Then on January 11, 1931, the three remaining pages were signed by the
testator and all three attesting witnesses. The third attesting witness signed all six pages on the
same date. The Court of First Instance initially admitted the will to probate.
Issue: Whether or not the acts constitute a valid act?
Ruling: No, the manner of executing the will was in violation of Article 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedures, as amended. The Court emphasized that the execution of a will is supposed to be one
act, and it cannot be legally effective if the participants sign on different days and in different
combinations of those present.

Case No. 45: Ortega v. Valmonte (GR 157451)

FACTS: Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he
wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss,
Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting
of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to
probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to the notary public who
notarized the testator’s will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he
wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him
time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary
public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The
formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the
typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.

Petitioner’s arguments: 1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83
years old and was no longer of sound mind. 2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the
3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the
varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.

HELD:

1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he
owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of
his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some
relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact,
in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for fraud, he would not have made.

The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing
of credible evidence of fraud.

Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict
between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, “because the law does
not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The
variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.

Case No. 46 (Buagas): Cruz vs. Villasor (54 SCRA 31 November 26, 1973)
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding
Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said deceased,
opposed the allowance of the will, alleging:
- That the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence;
- That the said instrument was executed without the testator having been fully informed of the
content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing
- That the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
In spite of her objection, the RTC Cebu allowed the probate of the said last will and testament.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari which was given due course.
ISSUE: Whether or not the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code:
1. the first, requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will
2. the second, requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary
public.
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Pañares, and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, was at the same time the
Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
As the third witness was the Notary Public himself, petitioner argued that it would be as if only
two witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. On the other hand,
private respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who was the supposed executor of the will,
following the reasoning of the trial court, maintained that there was substantial compliance with
the legal requirement of having at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted
as one of them, bolstering up his stand with 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227 which, insofar as
pertinent, read as follows:
It is said that there are, practical reasons for upholding a will as against the purely technical
reason that one of the witnesses required by law signed as certifying to an acknowledgment of
the testator's signature under oath rather than as attesting the execution of the instrument.
After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, the appellant’s argument was
sustained that the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent,
or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot
split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning
a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement, and such function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose
of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud (Report of Code Commission p. 106- 107),
would be thwarted.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would
be in contravention of the provisions of Article 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to
act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of
witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as
has been said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In
the circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from was reversed, and the probate of the
last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was declared not valid and set aside.