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 Chapter 7: Race and Ethnic Relations

Chapter 7
Race and Ethnic Relations

Chapter Outline

Minority Groups
Race and Ethnicity
Myths and Facts: About Race and Ethnicity
Racism

Sources of Prejudice and Discrimination

Social Sources
Ethnocentrism
Competition
Socialization
Institutionalized Discrimination
Psychological Sources
Stereotyping
Frustration and Aggression
The Authoritarian Personality
Consequences of Discrimination

Racial and Ethnic Minorities in the United States

African Americans
Hispanic Americans
American Indians
Asian Americans
Applied Research: Combating Prejudice and Discrimination
Arab Americans
Today’s Immigrants
The Social Construction of Minorities: Media Images

Future Prospects
Assimilation or Pluralism?
Race Relations Today: Race or Class?
Collective Protest and Civil Rights Legislation
Affirmative Action
Policy Issues: Should the Government Intervene To Improve Opportunities for
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Instructor’s Manual for Sullivan, Introduction to Social Problems, 10/e

Minorities?
International Perspectives: Switzerland: Cooperation in a Multiethnic Society
School Programs and Busing
Improving the Economy

Chapter 7 At-A-Glance

Detailed Instructor Print Media Professor

Outline Resources Supplements Supplements Notes
Minority Learning Obj.: Test Bank PPT for
Groups 1 Chapter 7 Chapter 7
Teach. Sugg.:
2, 3, 6, 9, 10
Sources of Learning Obj.: Test Bank PPT for
Prejudice and 2 Chapter 7 Chapter 7
Discrimination Teach. Sugg.:
2, 3, 5, 6, 9,
10, 11
Racial and Learning Obj.: Test Bank PPT for
Ethnic 3 Chapter 7 Chapter 7
Minorities in Teach. Sugg.:
the United 1, 3, 7
States
Future Learning Obj.: Test Bank PPT for
Prospects: 4 Chapter 7 Chapter 7
Teach. Sugg.:
4, 5, 7, 8

Learning Objectives

1. Define the terms minority group, race, and ethnic group as they are used by
sociologists, and explain what racism is.
2. Explain the social and psychological sources of prejudice and discrimination, and
elaborate on the consequences of discrimination for individuals and society.
3. Describe the major racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, explain their
current circumstances and opportunities, and show how the mass media shape the
images of minorities that are prevalent.
4. Describe and evaluate the various social practices and policies that are being
considered or implemented in the United States to alleviate problems relating to
minority groups.
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Copyright ©2016 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
 Chapter 7: Race and Ethnic Relations

Suggestions for Teaching and Discussion

1. It is always possible to lecture on racial or ethnic groups other than those discussed
in the text. Students are often interested in hearing about the experiences of white
ethnic groups in the United States, such as the Irish or the Scandinavians. Andrew
Greeley has two good works on this: Ethnicity in the United States (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1974) and The Irish Americans (New York: Doubleday, 1982). A
good summary of sociological approaches and research on white ethnic identity and
white racial identity are presented by Monica McDermott and Frank L. Samson,
“White Racial and Ethnic Identity in the United States,” in Karen S. Cook and
Douglas S. Massey, eds., Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 31 (Palo Alto, CA:
Annual Reviews, 2005). (Also look at the references they cite). These issues will
become especially salient as white ethnics become a smaller proportion of the U. S.
population.

2. One interesting vehicle for highlighting discrimination as a topic for class discussion
is to encourage students to think critically about how discrimination takes place.
Richard A. Zeller’s article, “On Teaching about Discrimination” (Teaching Sociology,
January, 1988: 61-66) provides a number of excellent suggestions for motivating
your students to think critically about discrimination. This device may also be used
during in-class discussions of gender inequality (Chapter 8). Dan J. Pence and J.
Arthur Fields describe an interesting field exercise to teach students about
institutionalized discrimination: “Teaching about Race and Ethnicity: Trying to
Uncover White Privilege for a White Audience,” Teaching Sociology 27 (April 1999:
150-158). Basically, the exercise involves sending white and black students out into
a variety of community settings to see if they are treated differently. It is a graphic
and effective way to teach white students about white privilege. Reba L. Chaisson
also suggested some teaching techniques that have proved effective for her in
encouraging majority students to take a critical approach toward their own views of
race and racism and to be more aware of their own position of privilege. Read her
article: “A Crack in the Door: Critical Race Theory in Practice at a Predominantly
White Institution,” Teaching Sociology, 32 (October 2004: 345-357). A related
approach is to give students actual experiences with other ways of life in order to
challenge any ethnocentric views they might have. Phyllis Puffer describes how she
did this by taking her sociology class to a fundamentalist African American Baptist
religious service: “Reducing Ethnocentrism: A Cross-Cultural Experience for
Sociology Classes,” Teaching Sociology, 22 (January 1994: 40-46). Kim
Schopmeyer and Bradley Fisher have also created some interesting instructional
techniques for exploring the concepts of ethnocentrism and cultural relativity. See

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Copyright ©2016 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Instructor’s Manual for Sullivan, Introduction to Social Problems, 10/e

their article: “Insiders and Outsiders: Exploring Ethnocentrism and Cultural Relativity
in Sociology Courses,” Teaching Sociology, 21 (April 1993: 148-153). Finally,
Lauren Dundes and Bill Spence suggest a classroom exercise that sensitizes the
student to the ways in which language can be a mechanism of discrimination. They
look at how the speech dialect of minority groups can be unfairly judged and
stigmatized: “If Ida Known: The Speaker Versus the Speech in Judging Black
Dialect,” Teaching Sociology, 35 (January 2007: 85-93). Students are shown how
black speech dialect is often stigmatized as inferior or uneducated despite the fact
that all speech dialects could be so characterized because of their sloppy and
sometimes irrational use of grammatical rules. Finally, a topic not addressed in the
text is the role of standardized testing and the discriminatory effect it can have on
particular racial and ethnic groups. Kenneth Laundra and Tracy Sutton do this in
their article: “You Think You Know Ghetto? Contemporizing the Dove ‘Black IQ
Test’,” Teaching Sociology, 36 (October 2008: 366-377). A lecture could explore the
issues and possibly involve an administration of some version of the “Black IQ Test”
to the students to give them concrete experience of a discriminatory effect.

3. Students are very interested in the topic of racism in sports, and there always
appear to be incidents and analyses that fuel the controversy. It is helpful to present
data to show whether or not blacks are discriminated against by being kept out of
certain playing or managerial positions in baseball, football, and basketball. Two
good sources for this data are Jay C. Coakley, Sports in Society: Issues and
Controversies, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009) and D. Stanley Eitzen and
George H. Sage, Sociology of North American Sport, 8th ed. (Paradigm Publishers,
2009).

4. The Civil Rights Movement is, of course, one of the most successful social
movements against racial discrimination and oppression in the United States in the
past century. Students today tend to know relatively little about the movement. An
excellent history of that movement is Aldon Morris’s The Origins of the Civil Rights
Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (New York: Free Press,
1984). It is helpful to outline the history of the movement, draw lessons from it,
analyze strategies and tactics, and so on. If instructors can get a hold of movies or
other visual materials to accompany the lecture, the impact on students can be
impressive.

5. In all likelihood, there will have been some recent discrimination or affirmative action
lawsuits at one’s university or in one’s community. Review the cases and discuss
them with the class. Invite some of the involved parties to class to tell their side of
the story. There are also classroom exercises that can help students to understand

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 Chapter 7: Race and Ethnic Relations

how institutionalized discrimination can contribute to social inequality and the role of
affirmative action programs in alleviating such discrimination. Brian Obach
describes one such set of exercises in his article “Teaching About Institutional
Discrimination and the Controversies of Affirmative Action,” Teaching Sociology, 28
(January 2000: 50-55). Susanne Bohmer and Kayleen Oka describe another
approach that combines classroom lectures and exercises to communicate about
affirmative action: “Teaching Affirmative Action: An Opportunity to Apply, Integrate,
and Reinforce Sociological Concepts,” Teaching Sociology, 35 (October 2007: 334-
349). Finally, the following article presents research on how affirmative action has
impacted on education and employment and how people and society as a whole
have responded to affirmative action over the decades: Shannon Harper and
Barbara Reskin, “Affirmative Action at School and on the Job,” in Karen S. Cook
and Douglas S. Massey, eds., Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 31 (Palo Alto, CA:
Annual Reviews, 2005). See also the references they cite.

6. As instructors are well aware, racial prejudice and stereotypes are often cast in the
form of jokes or humor. Have students write down jokes that they have heard that
have some ethnic or racial element to them. The students can read the jokes to the
class or instructors can collect them and read them out to the class. Analyze the
jokes for their consistent themes and their stereotyping elements. Use jokes
involving a wide range of racial and ethnic groups. Make sure to collect jokes from
minority students about white ethnic groups. Also, Chandler Davidson presents an
interesting idea for using ethnic jokes as a teaching device: “Ethnic Jokes: An
Introduction to Race and Nationality,” Teaching Sociology, 15 (July, 1987: 196-302).

7. Most communities have organizations whose goal is to protect the interests of

particular ethnic or racial groups (the NAACP, the Jewish Defense League, the
Mexican American Political Association, etc.). Invite representatives of such groups
that are large or powerful in one’s community to the class. This not only exposes
students to a broad range of views on this topic, but it also helps bring home to
them the extent to which these issues are grounded in the political process.

8. The text discusses issues surrounding school integration and busing and
recognizes that the issues of race, integration, and school achievement are
complicated. Theory and research on this topic is presented by Pat António
Goldsmith in “Schools’ Role in Shaping Race Relations: Evidence on Friendliness
and Conflict,” Social Problems, 51 (November 2004: 587-612). Goldsmith describes
the predictions of three theories about how interracial contact in the schools will
affect friendliness and conflict and then looks at data to test the predictions. This
can make a good lecture on the complex outcomes of such contact (it can be both

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Instructor’s Manual for Sullivan, Introduction to Social Problems, 10/e

positive and negative), and instructors can then encourage students to come up
with ideas on how the schools could take steps to promote the positive and
discourage the negative.

9. It can be enlightening, and also disturbing, for students to confront some of their
own misconceptions and prejudices. One way to do this is to have students fill out
the Bogardus Social Distance Scale or some equivalent. Marietta Morrissey
suggests an exercise for doing this in her article “Exploring Social Distance in Race
and Ethnic Relations Courses,” Teaching Sociology, 20 (April, 1992: 121-124).
Collect the responses and summarize them for the students. Then encourage them
to express why they would or would not want to marry a person of various races or
ethnic groups different from their own. Morrissey describes what tends to happen
and some drawbacks of the assignment. Pat António Goldsmith suggests another
way to approach student misconceptions in his article: “Learning to Understand
Inequality and Diversity: Getting Students Past Ideologies,” Teaching Sociology, 34
(July 2006: 263-277). Based on student writings, he explores four ideologies that
students commonly use to understand social inequality based on race and ethnicity
(instructors may come up with some different ideologies based on their students’
writings). These ideologies are then used as a beginning to exploring the
sociological understanding of such inequalities.

10. While genocide is only briefly discussed in the text, it is obviously an important topic
as far as race and ethnic relations in today’s world is concerned. An excellent
source of lecture material on genocide and the Holocaust is Deborah Abowitz’s
article “Bringing the Sociological into the Discussion: Teaching the Sociology of
Genocide and the Holocaust,” Teaching Sociology, 30 (January 2002: 26-38). Using
the material in her article and the references she cites, instructors can design some
excellent lectures that use sociological insights to understand such extreme social
behaviors.

11. Common-sense ideas about racial identity tend to be very simplified, whereas
sociological research shows the development of racial identities to be complex,
shifting, and socially situated. Kerry Ann Rockquemore and David L. Brunsma
describe their theorizing and research on this topic in their article “Socially
Embedded Identities: Theories, Typologies, and Processes of Racial Identity
Among Black/White Biracials,” Sociological Quarterly, 43 (Summer 2002: 335-356).
They describe an interesting typology of racial identity and test hypotheses about
how these identities are developed. Students find this topic interesting and can gain
insights from discussing how their experiences mirror or diverge from the research
results of Rockquemore and Brunsma. Another good source for material on this

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 Chapter 7: Race and Ethnic Relations

topic is a book by Stephen Cornell and Douglass Hartmann, Ethnicity and Race:
Making identities in a Changing World, 2d ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge
Press, 2007). They present a constructionist approach to issues of racial and ethnic
identity.

Suggested Films

Blacking Up: Hip-Hop’s Remix of Race and Identity (2010, 57m, California Newsreel):
This is an excellent video about the rise of hip-hop, its role in shaping culture and
ethnicity, and its appeal and impact on white youth.

Borderless: The Lives of Undocumented Workers (2006, 27m, Films for the Humanities
& Sciences): This program offers a sympathetic look at the difficulties and problems
confronted by undocumented workers in the United States as their labor supports the
lifestyles of well-to-do Americans.

Brazil in Black and White: Skin Color and Higher Education (2007, 58m, Films for the
Humanities & Sciences): This video will broaden the students’ perspective on issues of
race and ethnicity by looking at how these issues play out in higher education in Brazil.
It also has implications for the issue of how we define and identify “race.”

Caught in the Crossfire: Arab-Americans in Wartime (2002, 54m. First Run Icarus
Films): This film shows how the reaction to Arab Americans in the United States
became decidedly more hostile after September 11, 2001. It gives a new and immediate
twist to the experience of immigrants to this country when they get drawn into events
beyond their control.

Ethnic Cleansing: The Media and World Opinion (2001, 52m, Filmakers Library): This
intriguing video shows how the media can be used to influence public opinion about
issues related to race—in this case, whether particular incidents involved “ethnic
cleansing.”

Facing Up to Illegal Immigration (2004, 23m, Films for the Humanities & Sciences): This
documentary focuses on ways in which to reduce illegal immigration into the United
States, the difficulties in doing so, and whether the economy is so dependent on the
immigrants that may not want to stop them.

The Goose Creek Raid: Racially Motivated? (2004, 22m, Films for the Humanities &
Sciences): This video explores an incident where a high school principal called in a full
police drug raid on students in his school because of an alleged drug problem at the

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Instructor’s Manual for Sullivan, Introduction to Social Problems, 10/e

school. No drugs were found, most of the students targeted were African American, and
questions arose as to whether the raid was fueled by racism and racial stereotyping.

No More Smoke Signals (2009, 89m, Filmakers Library): This video is about a radio
station in South Dakota (Kili Radio—Voice of the Lakota Nation) which gives excellent
insight into issues of Native American identity and life on today’s reservations.

Overcoming Prejudice (2011, 30m, Films for the Humanities & Sciences): This video
explores the sources of prejudices and shows ways in which it can be reduced, if not
eliminated.

Racial Stereotypes in the Media (2008, 42m, Films for the Humanities & Sciences): This
video explores the ways in which subtle racial stereotyping can be found in today’s
media, propelled in part by the highly competitive, ratings driven media environment.

Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People (2006, 50m, Media Education
Foundation): This documentary explores the history of the representations of Arabs in
cinema over the decades and argues that these representations have been inaccurate,
degrading, and largely unchallenged by mainstream society.

Scarred Justice: The Orangeburg Massacre 1968 (2009, 57m, California Newsreel):
This video is about a confrontation in a college campus between African American
students and the police and National Guard, resulting in 3 students being shot to death
and 28 wounded. It explores the causes of this incident, the aftermath, and the role of
racism in these circumstances.

Skinheads USA: The Pathology of Hate (1993, 54m, Films for the Humanities &
Sciences): This provides a good analysis of an actual neo-Nazi Skinhead organization,
which is one of the forms in which white supremacy can be found in the U.S.

Then There Were None (1996, 26m, Pacific Islanders in Communications): This is a
highly personal account of Hawaii’s history focusing on how the indigenous peoples of
the islands have gradually lost their homeland.

Traces of the Trade: A Story from the Deep North (2008, 86m, California Newsreel):
This video explores how one contemporary American family learns how deeply their
ancestors were involved in the slave trade. It shows the complexity of race relations in
the United States and the key role that slavery and African Americans played in the
development of the United States.

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 Chapter 7: Race and Ethnic Relations

Tulia, Texas (2008, 54m, California Newsreel): This video recounts the arrest of 46
people, mostly black, on drug charges in Tulia, Texas in 1999. The story weaves
through issues of the “war on drugs,” due process in the criminal justice system, and the
deeply rooted beliefs that many Americans have about race and crime.

The Whole Enchilada (2010, 26m, Filmakers Library): This film looks at one of the most
important demographic shifts to occur in the U. S.: the growth and eventual dominance
of the Latino population. It explores the social, cultural, and political implications of this
transition.

53
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 B O O K X V.

CHAPTER I.

S TAT E O F T H E WA R I N S PA I N .

Northern Provinces. The invasion of Gallicia, which had 1811.

been arrested by the arrival of the allies on the Coa, would
have been a most serious calamity. Abadia, a weak man, with
troops, distressed for provisions and clothing, was on bad terms with
the chief of his staff Moscosa, whom he feared, and on worse terms
with the junta. The great road to Coruña was open, Appendix, No. V.
and although general Walker, seeing the danger, Section 1.
advised that Ferrol, which was indefensible, should be dismantled,
and the guns, amounting to fifteen hundred, with the timber and
vessels of war in the harbour, transferred to Coruña, neither that nor
any other useful measure was executed.
Before this, overtures had been made to the Spanish government,
to take Spanish troops into British pay after the manner of the
Portuguese; but the regency remembering the prodigality of Canning
demanded three millions yearly, besides arms and clothing, without
which they said the Spaniards could make no efficient exertions! To
introduce British officers into the service on any other terms was not
possible, because the Spanish military were indignant at what they
termed the degradation of such a proposal. The Perceval faction
finding it thus, and wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington,
on a scale commensurate with his talents, then turned their attention
to the encouragement of the Partidas, as being less expensive, and
affording an example to the continental nations of popular and
protracted resistance to France.
 Sir Howard Douglas, who succeeded general Walker as military
agent, (these officers must not be confounded with the military
agents originally sent out, and whose mischievous proceedings I
have had occasion to notice,) was directed to encourage those
bodies by increased supplies, and to combine their movements
better with each other and with the British squadron in the Bay of
Biscay. Lord Wellington at the desire of government, sent to the
guerilla chiefs, military presents, with a letter Sir H. Douglas’s
acknowledging the importance of their services, and Correspondence,
MSS.
this was not mere compliment, for he had indeed
derived great advantages from their exertions, and thought he had
derived more, because he only knew of their exploits by hearsay.
When he afterwards advanced into Spain and saw them closely, he
was forced to acknowledge that the guerillas, although active and
willing, and although their operations in general occasioned the
utmost annoyance to the enemy, were so little disciplined that they
could do nothing against the French troops unless the latter were
very inferior in numbers. If the French took post in a house or church
of which they only barricadoed the entrance, both regular troops and
guerillas were so ill equipped as military bodies, that their enemy
could remain in security until relieved. In like manner Napoleon
reprimanding his generals for suffering the Partidas to gain any
head, observed, that when cut off from communication with the
English ships they were a nullity!
Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne’s retreat enabled Sir H. Douglas’s
Abadia to resume his position on the frontier, but the Correspondence,
MSS.
army was in a miserable state; the wet season was
setting in upon men, destitute of even the necessaries of life,
although the province abounded in cattle and goods, which could be
easily procured, because money, although plentiful, was generally
hoarded, and commodities were therefore cheap, and could be
obtained in lieu of taxes at the market-price. An extraordinary
increase of the customs, arising from the trade of Santander and
Bilbao being transferred to Coruña by the war, also offered a
valuable resource; the harbour was filled with colonial goods, and as
the appetites of men generally stifle patriotism, and baffle power, a
licensed commerce was carried on with the enemy’s ports in Biscay;
yet without judgment as related to the war, for the return was iron, to
re-export to the colonies, whereas by an internal traffic of the same
kind, clothes and grain for the troops might have been had from
Castile and Leon. But confusion and corruption every where
prevailed, the exigences of the war were always the last things cared
for, and the starving soldiers committed a thousand excesses with
impunity, for where there is no food or pay, there can be no
discipline.
The people were oppressed with imposts, legal and illegal, and yet
the defalcation in the revenue was great, and the monopoly of
tobacco the principal financial resource, was injured by the
smuggling arising from the unsettled nature of the times. The annual
charge on the province was about £1,300,000, the actual receipts
were less than £500,000, and the junta endeavoured to supply the
deficiency by an extraordinary contribution from all property, save
that of day-labourers, which they expected would produce sixty
millions of reals (£750,000). But a corrupt and vexatious collection of
this tax tormented the people without filling the treasury; the clergy,
and the richer classes, were, as in Portugal, favoured, and it yielded,
in six months, less than a seventh part.
From this state of affairs two inferences may be safely drawn:—1º.
That England and not Gallicia had hitherto supported the war here,
as in other parts of the Peninsula. 2º. That as England had in 1808-9
paid to Gallicia three millions of hard dollars, and given other
succours sufficient for double the number of troops employed, the
deficiency of the revenue had been amply compensated, and the
causes of distress must be sought for in the proceedings of the
authorities, and in the anomalous nature of the war itself. The
successive juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were
always inert in the civil administration, and either too corrupt, or too
incapable, to apply the succours from England, justly or wisely. The
junta of this period was, like its predecessors, factious and intriguing;
it was hostile to the junta of Leon, unfriendly to that of Asturias,
jealous and contemptuous of the military leaders; in return these last
abhorred the junta, and were tormented with factions of their own.
The regular officers hated the guerillas, and endeavoured to get the
controul of the succours granted, by England, to the latter; and as
they necessarily lived by plundering their own countrymen, they
strenuously opposed the arming of the peasants, partly from fear lest
the latter should resist this license, partly because the republican,
and anti-English spirit, which was growing up in the cortes had also
reached this quarter.
The clergy clung to the peasantry, with whom they had great
influence, but the army, which had imbibed liberal words, rather than
principles, was inimical to them. A press had been established at
head-quarters, from whence issued political papers either original, or
repeated from the libels at Cadiz, in which, the Portuguese were
called slaves, for submitting to British influence; and it was openly
avowed that the French yoke was preferable to that of England; the
guerilla system, and the arming of the people were also attacked,
and these writings were met by other political papers from the civil
press at Coruña and St. Jago. The frequent changes of commanders
rendered all the evils more prominent; for the local government had
legal power to meddle with the military arrangements, and every
change of commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the junta
refused to acknowledge Abadia as their president during the
absence of Castaños, he in return complained alike of their neglect
and of their interference; and when they proposed to establish a
general depôt at Lugo he marched a part of his army there to
prevent it.
But the occult source of most of these difficulties is to be found in
the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet, to uphold, national
independence with internal slavery, against foreign aggression, with
an ameliorated government. The clergy who led the mass of the
people, clung to the English, because they supported aristocracy
and church domination; and they were also strongly for the Partidas,
because these were commanded by men who sprung directly from
the church itself, or from people who were attached to the church,
while the regular armies being officered by the friends of the cortes,
disliked the Partidas, both as interlopers and as political enemies.
The English ministers, hating Napoleon, not because he was the
enemy of England, but because he was the champion of equality,
cared not for Spain, unless her people were enslaved. They were
willing enough to use a liberal cortes to defeat Napoleon, but they
also desired to put down that cortes, by the aid of the clergy, and of
the bigoted part of the people: nevertheless as liberty will always
have more charms than slavery, they would have missed of both
objects, if the exigences of the continental system had not induced
the emperor to go to Moscow, where the snow destroyed him; and if
the very advocates of liberty in Spain had not in their madness,
resolved to oppress the Americans. The cortes, by discovering a
rabid love of power in practice, rendered their democratic doctrines
suspected, and lost partizans; but lord Wellington, in support of
aristocracy, used the greatest prudence in policy, and in his actions
was considerate and just.
In the first conference held at Coruña, after sir Howard 1811.
Douglas’s arrival, the junta, as the usual preliminary, Sept.
demanded more money from England; but he advised, instead, a
better management of their own resources, and pointed out the
military measures requisite to render the army efficient. He
recommended the adoption of the line of retreat upon Orense, rather
than upon Lugo and Coruña; and he endeavoured to establish a
permanent depôt in the island of Arosa, on the Vigo coast, as a
secure resource in the event of defeat; he also furnished the soldiers
with shoes and great-coats, the hospitals with blankets, and
completed the firelocks of the army to twenty-five thousand. There
were however abuses, which he could not remedy, and which would
seem rather to belong to the army of an Asiatic despot, than to an
European force fighting for independence. Innumerable baggage
animals devoured all the forage, and the personal servants and
cooks, who from custom never did duty, were above Appendix, No. I.
five thousand! a sixth part of the whole force! When Section 1.
the sick men were deducted, scarcely sixteen thousand infantry and
three squadrons of cavalry remained for service. Then there was so
little organization or arrangement that, although young, robust,
patient, and docile to the greatest degree, the troops could scarcely
be moved, even from one quarter to another, as a military body; and
the generals, unable to feed them on the frontier, more than once,
menaced, and in December did actually retire to Lugo, leaving the
province open to invasion.
Abadia at first exerted himself with activity, and appeared to enter
loyally into the ameliorations proposed. He gave the command of the
troops to Portasgo, repaired to Coruña himself, and organized the
province in seven military governments, under as many chiefs, one
for each division of the army. Every government was to raise a
reserve, and to supply and clothe the corresponding division on the
frontier. But in a little time this activity relaxed; he entered into
various intrigues, displayed jealousy, both of the peasantry and the
English, and no real improvement took place, save in that select part
of the army, which the Cadiz regency had destined for South
America, and had ordered him to equip from the English stores. This
was done at the very moment when a French army on the frontier
was again preparing to invade Gallicia, and sir Howard Douglas
vehemently opposed the disloyal proceeding; the junta also were
really averse to it, and Abadia pretended to be so; but he had a
personal interest in the colonies and secretly forwarded the
preparations. The regency, to evade Mr. Wellesley’s reproaches,
promised to suspend the embarkation of these troops, but the
expedition sailed from Vigo, and the organization of another, three
times its strength, including all the best artillery in the province, was
immediately commenced, and also sailed a few months later. This
then was the state of Gallicia in the latter end of 1811. She was
without magazines, hospitals, or system, whether civil or military, and
torn by faction, her people were oppressed, her governors foolish,
her generals bad: she had no cavalry, and the infantry were starving,
although the province easily supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal.
As a natural consequence, those famished soldiers were too
undisciplined to descend into the plains of Leon, and were
consequently of little weight in the general contest.
Under these circumstances, sir Howard Douglas had 1811.
nothing to work upon, save the Guerilla leaders, whose Nov.
activity he very considerably increased. His policy was to augment
the number of chiefs, but to keep the force of each low, lest, growing
proud of their command, they should consider themselves generals,
and become useless, as indeed had already happened to Campillo,
Longa, and Porlier, when they were made a part of the seventh
army. Nevertheless the advantage of this policy may be doubted, for
of all the numerous bands in the north, seven only were not
supported entirely by robbery. Mina, Pastor, Salazar, Pinto, Amor,
and the curate, whose united forces did not exceed Mr. Stuart’s Papers.
ten thousand men, were sustained by regular taxes, MSS.
customs, convent revenues, and donations; Longa supported his
from the produce of the salt-mines of Paza, but all the rest were
bandits, whose extinction was one of the advantages expected from
the formation of the seventh army.
It is now convenient to resume the narrative of military events.
In the Asturias, previous to Mendizabal’s arrival, and when Bonet
had marched to the Orbijo, Porlier surprised Santander, and
plundered some houses; but being followed by general Caucault, a
very active officer, he retired again to his strong-hold of Liebana. The
British cruizers, in concert with whom he acted, then destroyed
several coast-batteries, and the Iris frigate having arms on board,
came to the Bay of Biscay for the purpose of arranging an
intercourse with the Partidas of that province. But this was the period
when Reille and Caffarelli, were, as I have before noticed, chasing
Mina and Longa, whom they drove from the coast, into the
mountains of Leon, and thus marred the object of the Iris.
Nevertheless, when Mina was reinforced by the Valencians and
other fugitives from Catalonia, he returned to Navarre, and there
performed very considerable exploits, which, as belonging to other
combinations of the war, will be hereafter noticed.
While Caffarelli and Reille thus scoured the line of communication,
Dorsenne having the invasion of Gallicia in view, relieved Bonet on
the Esla, and sent him early in November, with eight thousand men
to re-occupy the Asturias as a preliminary measure. The Gallicians
foreseeing this, had detached Moscoso with three thousand five
hundred men to reinforce San Pol, who was at Pagares, below the
passes leading from Leon; and on the other hand Mendizabal uniting
the bands of Porlier and other chiefs, concentrated five thousand
men to the eastward on the Xalon. Eleven thousand men were
therefore ready to oppose the entrance of Bonet, but with the usual
improvidence of the Spaniards, the passes of Cubillas and Ventana,
to the westward of Pagares, were left unguarded. By these roads,
Bonet, an excellent officer, turned Moscoso, and drove him down the
Lena with loss and disgrace; then turning upon Mendizabal, he
chased him also in disorder from Lanes into the Liebana.
All the civil authorities immediately fled to Castropol, the Spanish
magazines fell into the hands of the French, and Bonet having
resumed his old positions at Oviedo, Gihon, and Grado, fortified
several posts in the passes leading to Leon, raised contributions,
and effectually ruined all the military resources of the Asturias. The
organization of the seventh army was thus for the time crushed, and
in Gallicia great mischief ensued. For the return of Moscoso’s
division and the want of provisions in the Bierzo, which had obliged
Abadia to retire to Lugo, while Dorsenne was menacing the frontier,
had thrown that kingdom into a ferment, which was increased by the
imposition of the new contributions. The people became exceedingly
exasperated and so unfavourably disposed, that it was common to
hear them say, “the exactions of a French army were a Sir H. Douglas’s
relief in comparison to the depredations of the Spanish Correspondence,
MSS.
troops.”
During these transactions in the north, Drouet had joined Girard at
Merida, and menaced the allies in the Alemtejo, hoping thus to draw
Wellington from the Coa; but the demonstration was too feeble, and
the English general thought it sufficient to reinforce Hill with his own
brigade from Castello Branco. These movements were undoubtedly
part of a grand plan for invading Portugal, if the emperor could have
arranged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move once more
against Lisbon, by Massena’s route, was not promising, unless the
northern provinces of Portugal were likewise invaded, which required
the preliminary occupation of Gallicia, at least of the interior. In the
south also, it was advisable to invade Alemtejo, simultaneously with
Beira; and the occupation of Valencia and Murcia was necessary to
protect Andalusia during the operation. The plan was vast,
dangerous, and ready for execution; for though the wet season had
set in, an attack on the northern parts of Portugal, and the invasion
of Gallicia, were openly talked of in Dorsenne’s army, Caffarelli was
to join in the expedition, and Monthion’s reserve, which was to
replace Caffarelli’s on the line of communication, was already six
thousand strong. Ney or Oudinot were spoken of to command the
whole, and a strong division was already in march to reinforce the
army of the south, arrangements which could have reference only to
Napoleon’s arrival; but the Russian war soon baulked the project,
and Wellington’s operations, to be hereafter noticed, obliged
Dorsenne to relinquish the invasion of Gallicia, and caused Bonet
once more to abandon the Asturias.
Thus, with various turns of fortune, the war was managed in the
northern provinces, and no great success attended the French arms,
because the English general was always at hand to remedy the
faults of the Spaniards. It was not so on the eastern line of invasion.
There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable of resisting him,
had continued his career of victory, and the insufficiency of the
Spaniards to save their own country was made manifest; but these
things shall be clearly shewn in the next chapter, which will treat of
the conquest of Valencia.
 CHAPTER II.

C O N Q U E S T O F VA L E N C I A .

In August, and the beginning of September, Suchet, while 1811.

preparing for this great enterprise, had dispersed the bands of August.
Villa Campa and the other chiefs, who during the siege of Taragona
vexed Aragon. He had sent his feeble soldiers to France, receiving
conscripts in their places, and although the harvest was very bad,
formed large magazines in Morella and Tortoza. Eight thousand men
had been left in Catalonia under general Frere, another eight
thousand were placed under general Musnier, to protect Aragon, and
twenty-four thousand of all arms remained for the invasion of
Valencia, but this force Suchet thought inadequate, and demanded a
reinforcement from the army of reserve, then in Navarre. Napoleon,
whose system of war, whatever has been said to the contrary, was
eminently methodical, refused. He loved better to try a bold push, at
a distant point, with a few men, than to make an overwhelming
attack, if he thereby weakened his communications; he judged
courage and enterprise fittest for the attack, prudence and force for
the support. And yet he designed to aid Suchet’s operations
vigorously when the decisive blow could be struck. Then not only the
divisions of the reserve were to march, but combined movements, of
detachments from nearly all the armies in the Peninsula, were
arranged; and we shall find, that if Wellington, by menacing Ciudad
Rodrigo, saved Gallicia, the French army of the north, in return, by
menacing Gallicia, fixed the allies on the Agueda, and so protected
Suchet’s invasion of Valencia.
Three roads led to the Guadalaviar, one from Tortoza by the 1811.
sea-coast, one by Teruel and Segorbe, and one by Morella Sept.
and San Mateo. That from Tortoza, and that by Teruel, were
carriage-roads, but the first only was fit for heavy artillery, and it was
blocked, partially by the fortress of Peniscola, and completed by the
fort of Oropesa. Wherefore, though the infantry and cavalry could
move on a bye-road to the right, the convoys and the guns, which
were at Tortoza, could not pass until Oropesa was reduced.
Nevertheless the French general, well knowing the value of boldness
in war, resolved to mask Peniscola, to avoid Oropesa, to send his
field artillery by Teruel, and uniting his troops near Saguntum, to offer
battle to Blake; and if the latter declined it, to reduce Oropesa and
Saguntum, trusting for subsistence to the “huerta” or garden of
Valencia, until the arrival of his convoys.
He had, however, organized his system of supply with care. From
Morella and Tortoza, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in
the British army, were to carry provisions to the troops, and sheep
and cattle were delivered to each regiment for its subsistence in
advance. This last plan, which sir John Moore had also projected in
his campaign, Suchet found advantageous; and I am persuaded that
the principle should be extended, so that all things requisite for the
subsistence, and fighting of troops should be organized regimentally,
and the persons employed wear the uniform of their different corps.
Jealousies between the functionaries, of different branches of the
service, would then be unknown; and the character of all subordinate
persons, being under the guardianship of the battalions to which they
belonged, would be equally praiseworthy, which cannot now be said.
While Suchet was thus gathering his strength, Valencia was a prey
to disorder. About the period of the siege of Taragona, Palacios,
notwithstanding his high monarchical principles, which caused him to
be dismissed from the regency, had been appointed captain-general
of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon; and he immediately raised a strong
party amongst the friars and other opponents of the cortes. When
after the dispersion of the Murcian army at Baza, Blake had rallied
the fugitives, and in virtue of his power as regent, assumed the chief
command at Valencia, Palacios’ faction opposed him, and
endeavoured to draw the soldiers and the populace to Capt. Codrington’s
their side, by proposing to inundate the plain of papers, MSS.
Murviedro, and to defend the strong country in advance. Blake,
however, resolved to act on the flanks of the French army by
detachments, and, in this view, sent C. O’Donnel, with the divisions
of Obispo and Villa Campa, to Albaracin, supporting them with four
thousand men at Segorbe and Liria. He charged Mahy, who
commanded five thousand infantry, and seven hundred cavalry of
the Murcian army, to surprise the French detachment of the army of
the centre, posted at Cuença. He detached Bassecour with two
thousand men to Requeña, and the same time, directed Duran and
the Empecinado, to unite, and invade Aragon; and it was to aid in
this expedition that Mina quitted the mountains of Leon.
Blake had, exclusive of Mahy’s and Bassecour’s divisions, about
twenty thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. Three thousand
five hundred men were placed in Saguntum, which was provisioned
for three months; two hundred were in Oropesa, and fifteen hundred
in Peniscola; and there were so many Partidas, that the whole
country seemed to be in arms, but the assembling of these people
being very uncertain, Blake could not depend upon Roche, MSS.
having a permanent partizan force, of more than eight
thousand. The Valencian army contained the Albuera Tupper, MSS.
divisions, St. Juan’s, Miranda’s, and Villa Campa’s Mr. Wellesley,
veterans; it was therefore, not only numerous, but the MSS.
best Spain had yet produced; and Valencia itself was exceedingly
rich in all things necessary for its supply: but there was Doyle, MSS.
no real power, the building, though fair enough
outside, had the dry rot within. The French had many Appendix, No. I.
secret friends, faction was as usual at work, the Section 3.
populace were not favourable to Blake, and that general had rather
collected than organized his forces, and was quite incapable of
leading them. He was unpopular, both at Cadiz and Valencia, and
the regency of which he formed a part was tottering. The Cortes had
quashed Mahy’s command of the Murcian army, and even recalled
Blake himself; but the order, which did not reach him until he was
engaged with Suchet, was not obeyed. Meanwhile that part of the
Murcian army, which should have formed a reserve, after Mahy’s
division had marched for Cuença, fell into the greatest disorder:
above eight thousand men deserted in a few weeks, and those who
remained were exceedingly dispirited. Thus all interest became
concentrated in the city of Valencia; which was in fact the key of all
the eastern coast because Carthagena required an army to defend
it, and could only be fed from Valencia, and Alicant was then quite
defenceless.
It was in this state of affairs, that Suchet commenced the invasion.
His army was divided into three columns, and, on the 15th of
September one moved by the coast-road, one by Morella and San
Mateo, and one by Teruel, where an intermediate magazine was
established; but this latter column instead of Suchet.
proceeding directly to Segorbe, turned off to its left,
and passed over the Sierra de Gudar to Castellon de la Plana,
where the whole three were united on the 20th. The Vacani.
main column, commanded by Suchet in person, had
masked Peniscola on the 15th, and invested Oropesa by a
detachment on the 19th; but as the road run directly under the fire of
the last place, the main body moved by the rugged route of Cabanes
to Villa Franca, leaving the battering-train still at Tortoza.
During these operations Blake appeared inclined to Roche, MSS.
fight, for he brought Zayas up in front of Murviedro,
and called in Obispo; Mahy, who had done nothing on the side of
Cuença, was also in march to join him; but all these divisions
marched slowly, and with confusion; and a slight skirmish at
Almansora, on the Mingares, where a few French dragoons put a
great body of Spanish infantry to flight, made Blake doubt the
firmness of his troops. He therefore left O’Donnel with four thousand
men on the side of Segorbe, and then retired himself with fifteen
thousand behind the Guadalaviar. Valencia was thus Tupper, MSS.
thrown into great confusion, but Bassecour’s division
was at hand, and Suchet fearing to attack so large an army in an
entrenched camp (which had cost two years to construct), while his
own communication with Tortoza was intercepted, merely dispersed
the armed peasants which had assembled on his flank, and then
turned against Murviedro.

SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.

This celebrated place, situated about four leagues from Valencia,

was a rocky mountain, covered with the ruins of the ancient city, and
the remains of Moorish towers and walls, which being connected by
modern works, formed four distinct posts covering the whole summit
of the rock: but in consequence of the usual Spanish procrastination
the heavy guns prepared to arm it were not yet mounted, and only
seventeen pieces of inferior size were available for defence. The
modern town of Murviedro, situated at the foot of the rock, was
covered by the river Palancia, and by a canal, and occupied by some
Spanish picquets; but the 23d Habert, having passed the water,
invested the rock on the east, while Harispe invested it on the west
and south, and a third division drove the Spanish posts from
Murviedro and entrenched itself in the houses. The rest of the army
was disposed in villages, on the hills to the north-west, and patroles
were pushed towards Valencia. Thus the rock of Saguntum was
invested, but it was inaccessible to the engineer, save on the west,
where the ascent, although practicable, was very rough and difficult.
It would have been impregnable, if the Spaniards had mounted their
large guns; for the French were obliged to bring earth from a
distance, to form the batteries and parallels, and to set the miner to
level the approaches, and their parapets were too thin to withstand
heavy shot.
The first point of resistance was an ancient tower called San
Pedro, and immediately above it was the fort of San Fernando,
which could not be attacked until San Pedro fell, and, from its height,
then only by the miner. But near the eastern extremity of the rock,
there were two ancient breaches which the Spaniards were still
engaged repairing, and had only stopped with timber; a large tank
offered cover for the assembling of troops close to these breaches,
and Suchet resolved to try an escalade. To effect this, three columns
were assembled before daybreak on the 28th in the tank, a strong
reserve was held in support, and a false attack was directed against
the San Pedro to distract the attention of the besieged: but in the
previous part of the night, the Spaniards having sallied were
repulsed, and the action having excited both sides, a French soldier
fired from the tank before the appointed time, whereupon the
columns rushing forward, in disorder, planted their ladders, and the
garrison would have carried the place by noise, but the garrison
thrust the ladders from the walls, and drove the stormers back, with
the loss of three hundred men. After this check, as the artillery was
still at Tortoza, Suchet ordered a part of his army to attack Oropesa,
employed another part in making a road, for the guns, to reach the
battery raised against the tower of San Pedro, and then turned his
own attention to the movements of Blake.
That general following his first plan of action against the French
flanks, had during the investment of Saguntum, sent C. O’Donnel
with Villa Campa’s division and St. Juan’s cavalry, to Betera, and
Beneguazil, and Obispo’s division to Segorbe; thus forming a half
circle round the French army, and cutting its communication with
Teruel, near which place Mahy had by this time arrived. Suchet
however caused Palombini to attack Obispo, whose whole division
dispersed after a skirmish with the advanced guard, and the Italians
then returned to the siege. The next night Harispe marched against
O’Donnel, who was well posted at Beneguazil behind a canal, having
his centre protected by a chapel and some houses; nevertheless the
Spaniards were beaten with loss at the first shock, and fled in
disorder over the Guadalaviar. During these events Blake remained
an idle spectator of the defeat of his division, although he had a large
body of troops in hand, and was within a few miles of the field of
battle.
The French train now advanced from Tortoza, and four 1811.
pieces were placed in battery against Oropesa. On the 10th Octobe
r.
Suchet took the direction of the attack in person, and the fort
situated upon an isolated rock, was breached in a few hours; but the
garrison of the King’s Tower (a separate work placed on a small
promontory, and commanding the harbour) refused to surrender, and
was carried off, on the 11th, under the French fire, by the
Magnificent. The French general having thus with a loss of only thirty
men opened the road for his artillery, returned to Saguntum and
pushed the siege of that place; but the difficulties were very great,
the formation of the road to the batteries was itself a work of pain,
and although his indefatigable troops had formed a breaching battery
on the 12th, while seven small mortars and howitzers, placed on the
right and left, had nearly silenced the Spanish fire, the muskets of
the besiegers alone brought down from fifteen to twenty men.
 On the 17th the breaching battery being armed, opened its fire
against the tower, and the new masonry crumbled away at once; yet
the ancient work resisted the guns like a rock. On the 18th the fire
recommenced, when the wall gave way to the stroke of the guns,
and the assault was ordered; but from the height of the tower, which
overlooked the works at a short distance, the preparations were
early discovered, the Spaniards collecting on the breach repaired it
with sand-bags, and regardless of the French fire, with loud cries
provoked the attack. At five o’clock, four hundred men rushed
forward as swiftly as the steepness of the ascent would permit.
Soon, however, the head of the column was checked, the rear began
to fire, the whole got into confusion, and when one-half had fallen
without making the slightest impression on the defenders, the
attempt was abandoned. After this signal failure the French erected a
second battery of six pieces, one hundred and forty yards from the
tower, and endeavoured to push the approach close to the foot of the
breach, yet the plunging fire of the besieged baffled them;
meanwhile Andriani the governor, having communication by signal
with the ships in the Grao, was encouraged to continue his gallant
defence, and was informed that he was already promoted for what
he had done. But to understand Suchet’s embarrassments, from the
protracted resistance of Saguntum, we must take a view of Lacy’s
contemporary operations in Catalonia, and the proceedings of the
Partidas against the French communications and posts in Aragon.

C ATA L O N I A .

It will be recollected that the blockade of Figueiras August.

produced sickness in M‘Donald’s army, and that the return of
Suchet to Aragon, and the parcelling of his troops on the lines, from
Lerida to Montserrat, Tortoza, and Taragona, had completely
extinguished the French power in the field; because the divisions of
the army of Aragon which still remained in Lower Catalonia, being
destined for the enterprize against Valencia, could not be employed
in harassing expeditions. Lacy was therefore enabled,
notwithstanding the troubles which followed the fall of Taragona, to
reorganize about eight thousand men in two divisions, the one under
Eroles, the other under Sarsfield; the junta also called out the tercios
of reserve, and arms and ammunition being supplied by the English
navy, Lacy was soon in a condition to act offensively. Thus the taking
of Montserrat was very injurious to the French, for it is generally
supposed that Friere’s division, if held together in the field, would
have prevented this reaction in the principality. Lacy at first
suggested to the British navy the recapture of the Medas Islands,
and it was effected in the latter end of August, by the Undaunted,
Lavinia, and Blossom, aided by a small party of Spaniards, the whole
under the command of captain Thomas. The enterprise itself was
one of more labour than danger, and the Spanish allies were of little
use, but the naval officers to whose exertions the success was
entirely due, were indignant at finding that colonel Green, who
served as a volunteer, endeavoured to raise his own Appendix, No. II.
reputation with the Catalans by injuring the character Section 2.
of those under whom he served.
Immediately after the fall of Montserrat, Lacy and the junta had
proposed the fortifying of Palamos or Blanes, to be held as a marine
depôt and strong-hold, in common with the British navy, but with a
strange folly expected that sir E. Pellew, who had no troops, would
defend them from the enemy while establishing this post. Finding
this scheme received coldly by the admiral, they turned their
attention inland, and blowing up the works of Berga, fixed upon the
position of Busa, as a place of strength and refuge. This remarkable
rock which is situated between the Cardener and Memoir upon Busa,
Bindasaes rivers and about twenty miles from by Capt.
Zeupfinning, MSS.
Cardona could be reached by one road only, and that
a very rugged one. The rock itself fourteen miles in circumference,
healthy and full of springs, is fertile, and produces abundance of
forage, and fuel. It is cut off from the rest of the world by frightful
precipices, and could neither be forced, nor starved into a surrender.
Busa, Cardona, Solsona, and Seu d’Urgel were therefore guarded
by the tercios of reserve and Lacy soon commenced offensive
excursions with the regular army, against the long lines of the French
communication.
 In September while the Somatenes interrupted the passage 1811.
of the convoys to Montserrat, Eroles made an unsuccessful Sept.
attack on the fort of Moncada near Barcelona; Lacy who had
returned from an incursion in the French Cerdaña where he had
gathered some booty, then united Eroles and Sarsfield’s troops, and
surprised the town of Igualada, where he killed two hundred French,
but not daring to attack the castle retired to Calaf, and from thence
again detached Eroles to Jorbas, to attack a French convoy coming
to Igualada. Eroles beat the escort, and captured the convoy, and
then the French quitted the fortified convent of Igualada, and joined
the garrison of Montserrat, when the whole, fearful of being invested
and so starved, abandoned that important point, and marched
through Barcelona to Taragona; the Spaniards immediately occupied
Montserrat, and recovered a large store of clothing and cavalry
equipments, which had been hidden in a vault and were
undiscovered by the enemy. Eroles, pursuing his success, forced the
garrisons of Belpuig, and Cervera, about five hundred in all, to
surrender, and thus the whole line of communication, between Lerida
and Barcelona, fell into the power of the Catalonians. The
confidence of the people then revived; Sarsfield occupied Granollers,
and the passes leading into the valley of Vich; Manso and Rovira
menaced the Ampurdan; and Eroles suddenly passing by Seu
d’Urgel into the Cerdaña, defeated, at Puigcerda, some national
guards commanded by general Gareau, who had been sent there
after Lacy’s invasion. He afterwards raised large contributions on the
frontier, burnt a French town, and returning with his spoil by the way
of Ribas, and Ripol, took post in the pass of Garriga, while Milans
occupied Mataro, and both watched to intercept a convoy which
M‘Donald was preparing for Barcelona.
Sarsfield at the same time embarked his division and sailed to the
coast of the Ampurdan, but the weather would not permit him to
land. Nevertheless the attention of the French general was
distracted, and the convoy did not move. Lacy then recalled
Sarsfield, and projected the surprise of Barcelona itself, but after
putting his troops in march, feared the execution and relinquished
the attempt. Meanwhile one swarm of the smaller Partidas menaced
the French communication between Mequinenza and Tortoza, and
another swarm settled on the plains about Lerida.
The state of Aragon was equally alarming. Duran and the
Empecinado had received Blake’s orders to unite near Cuença, for
the purpose of invading Aragon; but the secret junta of the district
were averse to the plan, and the troops of the latter chief refused to
move, and even came to blows with the junta’s people. In this
confusion general d’Armanac, who had retired from Cuença,
returned, and dispersed the whole. The Empecinado however
collected them again, and having joined Duran, their united powers
being about six thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred
horse, moved against Calatayud; Mina also acting in concert with
them, quitted the mountains of Leon and entered Navarre with about
five thousand men, and some minor partisans were already acting
against different parts of Aragon. The whole were in want of clothing
and ammunition, but Mr. Tupper, the consul at Valencia, having safe
means of communication with the interior supplied them.
General Musnier’s force was so scattered that he could not fight
either of the large Partidas, without exposing some important point to
the other, and the 29th of September the Empecinado took
possession of the pass of Frasno, while Duran invested the fortified
convent of Calatayud. This place was garrisoned by some French
and Italian troops, who differed upon the defence, and when the
explosion of two mines had killed a number of them they
surrendered. Musnier collected some men to succour the place, but
unable to force the pass of Frasno, retired; yet being reinforced on
the 5th, he again advanced, and a column sent from Navarre by
general Reille also came up; whereupon the Spaniards disappeared
until the French retired, and then reoccupied Calatayud. They were
now in full communication with Mina and a general plan of invasion
was discussed, but as Duran and Mina could not accord each acted
separately.
Severoli’s division eight thousand strong and just arrived 1811.
from Italy, then reinforced Musnier, and on the 9th driving the Octobe
r.
Spaniards from Calatayud pursued them on the roads to
Molino, Daroca, and Medinaceli. On the other side of the Ebro
however Mina fell on the post of Exca in the Cinco Villas; the
garrison broke through his investment in the night, but he pursued
them almost to the gates of Zaragosa, and then turning off towards
Ayerbe, attacked that post and menaced the communication by
Jaca. The commandant of Zaragosa had sent an Italian battalion to
look after the flying garrison of Exca, which was found at Zuera, and
the united forces amounting to eleven hundred infantry and sixty
cavalry followed Mina and came up with him at Ayerbe; the guerilla
chief instantly turned with a part of his troops, and the Italians
retreated towards Huesca, but having to cross a plain were all killed
or taken.
Reille and Musnier hearing of this misfortune spread their columns
in all directions to intercept Mina, but he evaded their toils, and
although sharply chased and several times engaged, reached
Motrico on the Biscay coast with his prisoners. The Iris frigate which
was then harassing the enemy’s coast line took some of them off his
hands, and the remainder, three hundred in number, were sent to
Corunna by the Asturian mountains, but only thirty-six arrived, the
rest were shot by the escort, under pretence that they made a noise
near a French post!
While these events were passing on the left of the Ebro,
Mazzuchelli’s brigade followed the Empecinado, and having
defeated him in a sharp action, at Cubiliejos de la Sierra, brought off
the garrison of Molino and dismantled that fort; but the smaller
Partidas infested the road between Tortoza and Oropesa, and in this
disturbed state of affairs reports were rife that an English force was
to disembark at Peniscola. Blake also sent Obispo’s division against
Teruel, which was thus menaced on all sides, for Mahy was still in
those parts. Thus the partizan warfare seemed interminable, and
Suchet’s situation would really have been very dangerous, if he had
been opposed by a man of ability. He had an inferior force and was
cooped up between the enemy’s fortresses; his communications
were all interrupted; he had just met with two signal failures at
Saguntum, and he was menaced by a formidable army which was
entirely master of its operations. Blake however soon relieved him of
his difficulties.