The Capital Structure of Venture Capital Firms in Indonesia

Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 15, Number 2—Spring 2001—Pages 145–168
The Venture Capital Revolution
Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner
V enture capital has developed as an important intermediary in financial

markets, providing capital to firms that might otherwise have difficulty
attracting financing. These firms are typically small and young, plagued by
high levels of uncertainty and large differences between what entrepreneurs and
investors know. Moreover, these firms typically possess few tangible assets and
operate in markets that change very rapidly. Venture capital organizations finance
these high-risk, potentially high-reward projects, purchasing equity or equity-linked
stakes while the firms are still privately held. The venture capital industry has
developed a variety of mechanisms to overcome the problems that emerge at each
stage of the investment process. At the same time, the venture capital process is also
subject to various pathologies from time to time, which can create problems for
investors or entrepreneurs.
The primary focus of this article is on drawing together the empirical academic
research on venture capital and highlighting what is still not known. With this focus
in mind, four limitations should be acknowledged at the outset.
First, this paper will not address the many theoretical papers that examine
various aspects of the venture capital market, much of it examining the role that
venture capitalists play in mitigating agency conflicts between entrepreneurial firms
and outside investors.1 Second, this article does not focus on the intricacies of the
1
For a starting point to this theoretical literature on venture capital, the interested reader might begin
with the following: Cornelli and Yosha (1997), Hellmann (1998), and Marx (1994) focus on the active
monitoring and advice that is provided by venture capitalists; Amit, Glosten and Muller (1990a), (1990b)
and Chan (1983) focus on the screening mechanisms employed; Bergloff (1994) looks at the incentives
to exit; Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) consider the proper syndication of the investment; and Berge-
mann and Hege (1998) model the staging of the investment.
y Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner are Professors of Business Administration, Graduate School
of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, and Research
Associates, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
146 Journal of Economic Perspectives
venture financing process from a practitioner point of view, nor on the legal and
institutional considerations associated with raising venture financing. For discus-
sion in this area, see Bartlett (1995), Halloran et al. (1998), and Levin (1998).
Third, this paper will focus on the venture capital industry, and not on the
economic function played by venture capitalists. In other words, we will not seek to
address all methods of financing high-risk young firms. Along with venture capital,
banks, individual investors (or “angels”), and corporations are among the other
providers of capital for these firms. Our understanding of many of the alternative
forms of finance— especially “angel” investing—is highly incomplete (Lerner,
1998). Thus, we will focus here on venture capital, defined as independent,
professionally managed, dedicated pools of capital that focus on equity or equity-
linked investments in privately held, high growth companies.
Finally, venture capital itself is a very young industry, which has been changing
rapidly. Thus, while we can discuss the economics of venture capital in past years
and today, the extent to which these insights will continue to apply to the venture
industry of tomorrow remains unclear.
The Origins of the Venture Capital Industry
The first true venture capital firm was American Research and Development
(ARD), established in 1946 by MIT President Karl Compton, General Georges F.
Doriot, who was a professor at Harvard Business School, and local business leaders.
This small group made high-risk investments in emerging companies that were
based on technology developed for World War II. The success of the investments
ranged widely: almost half of ARD’s profits during its 26-year existence as an
independent entity came from its $70,000 investment in Digital Equipment Com-
pany in 1957, which grew in value to $355 million. ARD was structured as a publicly
traded closed-end fund. A closed-end fund is a mutual fund whose shares trade
from investor to investor on an exchange like an individual stock. These funds raise
capital up front by selling shares to investors. If investors no longer desire to hold
the investment, they can sell the shares on a public exchange to other investors.
This provision allowed the fund to invest in illiquid assets, secure in the knowledge
that they would not need to return investors’ capital in an uncertain time frame.
Because it was a liquid investment that could be freely bought or sold, Security and
Exchange Commission regulations did not preclude any class of investors from
holding the shares. Institutional investors showed little interest in these shares,
citing the risks associated with such an unproven new style of investing. As a result,
shares in ARD were marketed mostly to individuals (Liles, 1977).
The few other venture organizations begun in the decade after ARD’s forma-
tion were also structured as closed-end funds. The publicly traded structure,
however, was soon found to have some significant drawbacks. In a number of cases,
brokers sold the funds to inappropriate investors: for example, to elderly investors
who had a need for high current income rather than long-term capital gains. When
Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner 147
the immediate profits promised by unscrupulous brokers did not materialize, these
investors vented their frustration at the venture capitalists. In fact, much of General
Doriot’s time during the mid-1950s was spent addressing investors who had lost
substantial sums on their shares of American Research and Development during
these years.2
The first venture capital limited partnership, Draper, Gaither, and Anderson,
was formed in 1958. Unlike closed-end funds, partnerships were exempt from
securities regulations, including the exacting disclosure requirements of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940. The set of the investors from which the funds could
raise capital, however, was much more restricted. The interests in a given partner-
ship could only be held by a limited number of institutions and high net-worth
individual investors.
The Draper partnership and its imitators followed the template of other
limited partnerships common at the time: for example, those that had been formed
to develop real estate projects and explore oil fields. In such cases, the partnerships
had predetermined, finite lifetimes (usually ten years, though extensions were
often allowed). Thus, unlike closed-end funds, which often had indefinite lives, the
partnerships were required to return the assets to investors within a set period.
From the days of the first limited partnerships, rather than selling successful
investments after they went public and returning cash to their investors, the venture
capitalists would simply give investors their allocation of shares in the company in
which the venture firm had invested. In this way, the investors could choose when
to realize the capital gains associated with the investment.
In the 1960s and 1970s, although limited partnerships became more common,
they still accounted for a minority of the venture pool. During this time, most
venture organizations raised money either through closed-end funds or Small
Business Investment Companies (SBICs), which were federally chartered risk cap-
ital pools that proliferated during the 1960s. Spurred by fears of lagging American
technological competitiveness after the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in
1957, the federal government had launched the SBIC program to encourage the
development of the venture capital industry. Applicants who were able to secure a
small amount of private capital received generous marching funds (or loan guar-
antees) from the government (for an overview, see Noone and Rubel, 1970). The
SBIC program was poorly designed. The extensive regulations soon discouraged
most established venture capitalists from participating in the program. Meanwhile,
the limited scrutiny of applicants led to the entry of unscrupulous operators who
invested either in firms with poor prospects or in outright fraudulent enterprises,
typically controlled by friends or relatives. In a scenario that foreshadowed the
savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, most of the SBICs collapsed in the late 1960s
and 1970s.
Activity in the venture industry increased dramatically in late 1970s and early
2
A pattern of venture capital funds trading at a substantial discount to asset value also has frequently
been observed in closed-end funds holding publicly traded securities (De Long and Shleifer, 1992).
Figure 1
Commitments to the Venture Capital Industry (billions of 1999 dollars)
Note: Commitments are defined as the amount of money that is pledged to U.S. venture capital funds
in that year.
Source: Venture Economics and Asset Alternatives.
1980s. Figure 1 shows the total amount raised by venture partnerships since the late
1960s. The sources of funding have also shifted over time. In 1978, when $424
million was invested in new venture capital funds, individuals accounted for the
largest share, 32 percent, while pension funds supplied just 15 percent. In 1979, the
U.S. Department of Labor clarified its “prudent man” rule in a way that explicitly
allowed pension fund managers to invest in high-risk assets, including venture
capital. Eight years later, when more than $4 billion was invested, pension funds
accounted for more than half of all contributions.3
When venture capital disbursements are divided by industry, about 60 percent
in 1999 went to information technology industries, especially communications and
networking, software, and information services. About 10 percent went into life
sciences and medical companies, and the rest is spread over all other types of
companies. When venture capital disbursements are viewed geographically, a little
more than one-third of venture capital went to California. A little less than one-
third went to Massachusetts, Texas, New York, New Jersey, Colorado, Pennsylvania,
and Illinois, combined. The remaining third was spread between the other 42
states. The concentration on high technology industries and in California and
3
The annual commitments represent pledges of capital to venture funds raised in a given year. This
money is typically invested over three to five years starting in the year the fund is formed.
The Venture Capital Revolution 149
Figure 2
Average Annual Rate of Return that Investors in U.S. Venture Capital Funds
Received
Note: Returns are net of fees and profit-sharing. See the text for a discussion of the limitations of
these return calculations.
Source: Compiled from Venture Economics data.
Massachusetts has been a consistent feature of venture capital investments since at

least the mid-1960s.4
The past two decades have seen both very good and very trying times for
venture capitalists. On the one hand, venture capitalists backed many of the most
successful high-technology companies during the 1980s and 1990s, including Apple
Computer, Cisco Systems, Genentech, Microsoft, Netscape, and Sun Microsystems.
A substantial number of service firms (including Staples, Starbucks, and TCBY) also
received venture financing.
At the same time, commitments to the venture capital industry were very
uneven. As Figure 1 shows, the annual flow of money into venture funds increased
by a factor of ten during the early 1980s, peaking at just under $6 billion (in 1999
dollars). From 1987 through 1991, however, fundraising steadily declined. This
fallback reflected the disappointment that many investors encountered with their
investments. As Figure 2 shows, returns on venture capital funds declined in the
mid-1980s, apparently because of overinvestment in various industries and the entry
of inexperienced venture capitalists. As investors became disappointed with re-
turns, they committed less capital to the industry.5
4
The breakdown of venture capital is from authors’ calculations based on unpublished data from
Venture Economics and VentureOne. For detailed information on venture capital disbursements over
the past four decades, see Kortum and Lerner (2000).
5
These return data must be interpreted with caution. See the discussion below in the section, “What We
Don’t Know About Venture Capital.”
This pattern reversed dramatically in the 1990s, which saw rapid growth in
venture fundraising. The explosion of activity in the market for initial public
offerings and the exit of many inexperienced venture capitalists led to increasing
venture capital returns. New capital commitments rose in response, increasing
twenty-fold between 1991 and 2000. As Table 1 shows, much of the recent growth
in fundraising was fueled by pension funds, whether those of private companies
such as the General Motors Investment Management Company or public agencies
like the California Public Employees Retirement System, many of which entered
venture investing for the first time in a significant way. While previous investment
surges have been associated with depressed venture capital returns, the most recent
expansion in fundraising has seen a rise in the returns to venture funds.
Corporate investments in venture capital, whether investments in independent
partnerships or direct investments in privately held firms, also increased substan-
tially in the 1990s. While the late 1960s and mid-1980s had seen extensive corporate
experimentation with venture funds, the late 1990s saw an unprecedented surge of
activity. One reason is that the high degree of publicity associated with the success-
ful venture investments of the period, such as eBay and Yahoo!, triggered the
interest of many CEOs, who sought to harness some of the same energy in their
organizations.
But the substantial increase in corporate venture capital spending also re-
flected some more fundamental shifts as well. Many corporations were rethinking
the way in which they managed the innovation process. Established mainline
corporations that had relied on central R&D laboratories for new product ideas
during most of the century were exploring alternatives, including joint ventures,
acquisitions, and university-based collaborations. Managers and academics alike
had realized that management difficulties led to corporations extracting only a
small amount of the value from centralized R&D facilities. Many of the best ideas
languished unused or were commercialized in new firms founded by defecting
employees. A number of fast-growing technology firms such as Cisco Systems, which
relied on acquisitions rather than internal R&D for the bulk of their new ideas,
made it apparent that outside venture capital might be a practical alternative—
even a superior alternative—to an internal, centralized R&D process.6
The growing diffusion of the Internet and an understanding of its implications
also triggered the increasing corporate interest in venture capital. A wide range of
media, service, and manufacturing firms realized the potential of the Internet to
challenge their traditional ways of doing business— but they had few internal
resources to address the new communications technology. A corporate venturing
effort provided one way to grapple with these new technologies and their
implications.
Finally, interest in corporate venturing programs was intensified by a growing
receptiveness to corporate collaborations by independent venture capital groups.
6
See, for instance, the discussions in Jensen (1993) and Rosenbloom and Spencer (1996).
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Venture Capital Fund-raising by Independent Venture
Partnerships
1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 a
First closing of funds

Number of funds 27 147 112 34 84 204
Size (billions of 1999 $) .53 6.01 5.93 1.69 4.60 37.46
Sources of funds
Private pension funds 31% 26% 27% 25% 38% 9%
b b
Public pension funds 5% 12% 17% 9%
Corporations 17% 12% 10% 4% 2% 16%
Individuals 23% 21% 12% 12% 17% 19%
Endowments 10% 8% 10% 24% 22% 15%
Insurance companies/banks 4% 12% 15% 6% 18% 11%
Foreign investors/other 15% 16% 14% 12% 3% 22%
Independent venture partnerships as a share of
the total venture pool c 68% 78% 80%
a
In 2000, there were 228 funds raised with total committed capital of $67.7 billion.
b
Public pension funds are included with private pension funds in these years.
c
This series is defined differently in different years. In some years, the Venture Capital Journal states that
non-bank SBICs and publicly traded venture funds are included with independent venture partnerships.
In other years, these funds are counted in other categories. It is not available for 1979 and after 1994.
Source: Compiled from the unpublished Venture Economics funds database and various issues of the
Venture Capital Journal. The numbers differ slightly from Lerner and Gompers (1996) due to continuing
emendations to the funds database.
In earlier years, corporate interest in venture capital had waxed and waned with
seemingly little reason, and so traditional venture capital firms had been quite wary
of entering into financial arrangements with corporate groups. But as the venture
capital arena became increasingly crowded in the late 1990s, the venture commu-
nity’s attitudes began subtly changing. Relationships with corporations were in-
creasingly seen as a source of differentiated competitive advantage. Venture groups
were increasingly willing to consider working with these investors, not only accept-
ing money from them as limited partners, but also in structuring various types of
collaborations. For example, the venture capital firm Softbank set up a joint
venture with K-Mart for the purpose of providing regular customers of the retailers
with free Internet access, discounted shopping, and services from Yahoo! (a com-
pany in which Softbank was an early investor). The venture capital firm Kleiner
Perkins set up the Java Fund as a mechanism for a variety of corporations interested
in stimulating demand for software written in the Java language to invest in
companies with potential new applications.
Although the limited partnership form continues to dominate the venture
capital industry, the 1990s have also seen a revival of the publicly traded venture
fund. This revival has occurred despite the troubled historical record noted above
and the increasing severity with which the Securities and Exchange Commission
sought to enforce regulatory provisions related to such funds. This renaissance has
included the emergence of organizations that were pure venture funds, such as the
Internet Capital Group, as well as hybrids that combined a venture fund with
operating companies (for instance, CMGI put together under a single corporate
umbrella a number of operating Internet business and a substantial venture capital
fund, @Ventures) and operating companies that included an “incubator” for new
firms (examples include Idealab! and Divine InterVentures).
The renewed appeal of public venture funds stemmed from the desire of
individual investors to put some of their money into venture capital and the
inaccessibility of traditional venture funds to these investors. More and more
workers were managing their own savings in the form of 401(k) plans and other
“defined contribution” plans. But for these investors, obtaining access to traditional
venture funds was virtually impossible. Securities regulations restricted the funds to
individuals who met stringent tests of “sophistication,” which were based on levels
of net worth and income tests well beyond those of the average middle-class family.
The venture capital firms, mindful of requirements that a limited partnership
should not have too many investors, typically set minimum investment levels in the
millions or tens of millions of dollars. Indeed, many of the most established funds
did not accept any capital at all from new investors: there was sufficient demand
from existing investors who had “grandfather rights” to invest in subsequent funds.
In the years to come, it is likely that increasing experimentation will seek to match
medium-scale individual investors with venture funds.
What We Know About Venture Capital Activity
To understand the venture capital industry, one must understand the whole
“venture cycle.” The venture capital cycle starts with raising a venture fund; pro-
ceeds through the investment in, monitoring of, and adding value to firms; con-
tinues as the venture capital firm exits successful deals and returns capital to its
investors; and renews itself with the venture capitalist raising additional funds. The
organization of this section mirrors this cycle, highlighting research that has been
done on each topic.7
Fundraising
Commitments to the venture capital industry have been highly variable over
the past 30 years. One topic of continuing interest to researchers has been inves-
tigating the determinants of this variability.
The impact of variations in the capital gains tax rate has received particular
attention (for example, Poterba, 1987, 1989). The bulk of venture capital funds are
from tax-exempt investors, who are not directly affected by a higher or lower capital
7
Each aspect of the venture cycle is related to each other. One inevitable consequence of our
organizational scheme is that the exiting of venture capital investments has an important influence on
the raising of venture funds and venture capital investing.
gains tax rate. In regression analyses, however, Gompers and Lerner (1998b) find
that lower capital gains taxes seem to have a particularly strong effect on the
amount of venture capital supplied by these tax-exempt investors. The empirical
results suggest that the impact of the capital gains tax does not arise through its
effect on those supplying venture capital, but rather by spurring corporate employ-
ees to become entrepreneurs, leading to more demand for venture capital.
Some other factors already mentioned include regulatory changes such as the
Department of Labor’s shift in ERISA policies which eased investment restrictions
in venture capital and recent past returns of venture funds (for more discussion, see
Gompers and Lerner, 1998b).
Black and Gilson (1998) argue that the health of the venture capital market
depends fundamentally on a vibrant public market that allows new firms to issue
shares. For example, few firms went public in the 1970s and very little venture
capital was raised. The growth of the venture capital industry in the early 1980s, the
decline in such fundraising in the late 1980s and the unprecedented growth in
venture capital fundraising in the 1990s were matched by a rise, then a fall, and
then a rise in initial public offering market activity.
A second major research question in this area focuses on whether an inde-
pendent venture capital limited partnership has organizational advantages over the
typical American corporation with dispersed shareholders ( Jensen, 1993; Porter,
1992). The key elements of the research inspired by these claims focus on under-
standing the conditions that govern the relationship between investors (limited
partners) and the venture capitalist (general partner) during the fund’s life and the
incentives that these conditions create.
Gompers and Lerner (1999a) examine the nature of venture capitalists’ in-
centive compensation in 419 venture partnership agreements and “offering mem-
oranda” for funds formed between 1978 and 1992. They find that compensation for
older and larger venture capital organizations is more sensitive to performance
than the compensation of other venture groups. For example, the oldest and
largest venture groups command about a 1 percent greater share of the capital
gains from their investment than do their less established counterparts. This
greater profit share matters little if the fund is not successful, but can represent a
4 percent or greater increase in the net present value of total compensation if the
fund is successful. These differences are statistically significant. Gompers and
Lerner do not, however, find any relationship between the incentive compensation
and the subsequent performance of the fund.
The most plausible explanation for these empirical patterns appears to be a
learning model in which neither the venture capitalist nor the investor initially
knows the venture capitalist’s ability. A venture capitalist who is just getting started
will work hard even without explicit pay-for-performance incentives, because if the
fund can establish a good reputation either for selecting attractive investments or
adding value to firms in its portfolio, the venture capitalist will gain additional
compensation in later funds. These reputation concerns lead to lower pay-for-
performance for smaller and younger venture organizations, and explains the
apparent lack of a relationship between incentive compensation and performance.
In addition to the incentives provided by the high-powered compensation,
covenants and restrictions that govern the relationship between investors and
venture capitalists often play an important role in limiting conflicts. Such restric-
tions might include, for instance, prohibitions against the venture capitalists raising
another fund until this fund is fully invested; investments in areas where the
venture capitalist is not expert (for example, in securities of publicly traded firms);
and investments in companies where one of the venture capitalists’ earlier funds
had invested. A single limited partnership agreement governs the relationship
between the limited and general partners over the fund’s life of a decade or more.
Unlike other agreements, like employment contracts or strategic alliances, these
contracts are rarely renegotiated.
Gompers and Lerner (1996) examine a sample of 140 executed partnership
agreements from a major endowment and two investment managers that select
venture capital investments for pension funds and other institutional investors. The
evidence illustrates the importance of general market conditions on the restrictive-
ness of venture capital limited partnerships. Fewer restrictions are found in funds
established during years with greater inflows of new capital, funds in which limited
partners do not employ investment managers, and funds where general partners
enjoy higher levels of compensation. Thus, in settings when venture capitalists have
relatively more bargaining power, the venture capitalists are able to raise money
with fewer strings attached.
This research has given us a better understanding of how venture capitalists
differ from corporations. For instance, corporate middle managers are very un-
likely to receive a substantial share of the wealth that the innovations they cham-
pion produce. Similarly, corporations do not face the discipline of needing to
return their capital to shareholders and to finance new projects through the raising
of additional funds. This research, however, can shed only limited light on the
relative strength of the venture capital organization as a mechanism for funding
innovation. We will revisit that issue later in this paper.
Venture Investing
A lengthy literature has discussed the financing of young firms. Uncertainty
and informational asymmetries often characterize young firms, particularly in
high-technology industries. If the firm raises equity from outside investors, the
manager has an incentive to engage in wasteful expenditures (like lavish offices)
because the manager may benefit disproportionately from these but does not bear
their entire cost. Similarly, if the firm raises debt, the manager may increase risk to
undesirable levels ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If all the outcomes of the entre-
preneurial firm cannot be foreseen, and effort of the entrepreneur cannot be
ascertained with complete confidence, it may be difficult to write a contract
governing the financing of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore,
1998).
These problems are especially difficult for companies with intangible assets
and whose performance is difficult to assess, such as early stage, high technology
companies with a heavy reliance on R&D.8 Entrepreneurs might invest in strategies,
research, or projects that have high personal returns but low expected monetary
payoffs to shareholders. For example, a biotechnology company founder may invest
in a certain type of research that brings great personal recognition in the scientific
community, but provides little return for the investor. Entrepreneurs may receive
initial results from market trials indicating little demand for a new product, but may
want to keep the company going because they receive significant private benefits
from managing their own firm. In addition, entrepreneurs have incentives to
pursue highly volatile strategies, such as rushing a product to market when further
testing may be warranted, because they benefit from success but do not actually
suffer losses from failure. As a result, external financing for these firms is costly or
difficult to obtain.
Specialized financial intermediaries, such as venture capital organizations, can
alleviate these information gaps and thus allow firms to receive the financing that
they cannot raise from other sources. The tools that venture capital firms have to
address these information issues are to scrutinize firms intensively before providing
capital and then to monitor them afterwards. The monitoring and information
tools of venture capitalists include: meting out financing in discrete stages over
time; syndicating investments with other venture capital firms; taking seats on a
firm’s board of directors; and compensation arrangements including stock options.
A number of studies have investigated how venture capitalists employ these tools.
Staged capital infusion may be the most potent control mechanism a venture
capitalist can employ (Sahlman, 1990). Staged capital infusion keeps the owner/
manager on a “tight leash” and reduces potential losses from bad decisions. The
venture capitalist can increase the duration of funding and reduce the frequency of
reevaluation as the company becomes better established and conflicts with the
entrepreneur appear more likely.
Gompers (1995) uses a random sample of 794 venture capital-financed com-
panies to examine how venture capitalists use staged infusions of capital and other
types of monitoring. In fact, venture capitalists do concentrate investments in
early-stage companies and high technology industries where informational asym-
metries are likely to be most significant and monitoring most valuable. When
venture capitalists learn negative information about future returns, the project is
cut off from new financing. Firms that go public (these firms yield the highest
return for venture capitalists on average) receive more total financing and a greater
number of rounds than other firms (which may go bankrupt, be acquired, or
remain private). Early-stage firms receive significantly less money per round. In-
creases in asset tangibility increase financing duration and reduce monitoring
intensity. As the role of future investment opportunities in firm value increases (as
8
These insights fit with the substantial finance literature that has argued that substantial firms with high
market-to-book ratios are more susceptible to agency costs (for example, Myers, 1977).
measured by higher market value-to-book value ratios or R&D intensities), firms are
refinanced more frequently.9
In addition to the staged capital infusions, a venture capitalist who originates
a deal will often look to bring in other venture capital firms. This syndication serves
multiple purposes. By syndicating investments, each venture capital firm can invest
in more projects and largely diversify away firm-specific risk. Involving other ven-
ture firms also provides as a second (and third and fourth) opinion on the
investment opportunity, which limits the danger that bad deals will get funded.
Lerner (1994a) tests this “second opinion” hypothesis in a sample of 271
biotechnology venture capital investments. He finds that in the early rounds of
investing, experienced venture capitalists tend to syndicate only with venture
capital firms that have similar experience. This finding supports the second opin-
ion hypothesis, since a venture capitalist looking for a second opinion would want
to get a second opinion from a firm of similar (or better) ability, rather than just
looking for money from any other firm.
The advice and support provided by venture capitalists is often embodied by their
role on the firm’s board of directors. In keeping with the approach of Fama and Jensen
(1983) and Williamson (1983), who hypothesize that the composition of the board
should be shaped by the need for oversight, Lerner (1995) examines whether the
representation of venture capitalists on the boards of the private firms in their portfo-
lios is greater when the need for oversight is larger. Specifically, Lerner examines
changes in board membership around the time that a firm’s chief executive officer is
replaced, since the replacement of the top manager at an entrepreneurial firm is likely
to coincide with an organizational crisis and to heighten the need for monitoring
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Lerner finds that an average of 1.75 venture capital-
ists are added to the board between financing rounds when the firm’s chief executive
officer is replaced in the interval; between other rounds, 0.24 venture directors are
added. No differences are found in the addition of other outside directors.
Lerner (1995) also finds evidence that board service is driven by a need to
provide monitoring, showing that geographic proximity is an important determi-
nant of venture board membership. Organizations with offices within five miles of
the firm’s headquarters are twice as likely to be board members as those more than
500 miles distant. Over half the firms in his sample have a venture director with an
office within 60 miles of their headquarters. The transaction costs associated with
frequent visits and intensive involvement are likely to be reduced if the venture
capitalist is geographically nearby.
Yet another mechanism utilized by venture capitalists to influence managers and
critical employees is to have them receive a substantial fraction of their compensation
in the form of equity or options, which tends to align the interests of employees and
investors. Baker and Gompers (2000) find that fixed salaries are lower and the size of
9
Consistent evidence regarding the strength of contractual terms in these agreements—including cash
flow rights, voting rights, board rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights—is found in Kaplan
and Stromberg’s (2000) analysis of 130 venture partnership agreements.
the equity stake held is higher for venture capital-backed chief executive officers, when
compared to similar companies not financed by venture capital.
The venture capitalist also employs additional controls on compensation. For
example, they usually require vesting of the stock or options over a multiyear
period, so that the entrepreneur cannot leave the firm and take his shares.
Similarly, the venture capitalist can significantly dilute the entrepreneur’s stake in
subsequent financings if the firm fails to realize its targets. This means that an
entrepreneur who wishes to maintain the relative size of the personal stake in the
firm will need to meet the agreed-upon targets.
Until this point, this section has highlighted the ways in which venture capi-
talists can address agency problems. The argument is often made by venture capital
practitioners, however, that the quality of the investment process changes with the
amount of money flowing into the industry.
When a surge of money enters the venture capital industry, but there are only
a certain number of worthy projects to finance, the result can be a substantial
decline in the returns on investment in the industry. The phrase “too much money
chasing too few deals” is a common refrain in the venture capital market during
periods of rapid growth. Sahlman and Stevenson (1987) describe this situation
arising in the disk drive industry in the early 1980s,10 and similar stories are often
told concerning investments in software, biotechnology, and the Internet.
Gompers and Lerner (2000) examine these claims through a dataset of over
4000 venture investments between 1987 and 1995 developed by the consulting firm
VentureOne. They examine the effect of the inflow of funds into the venture
capital industry on the valuations that venture capitalists paid when investing in
young firms. They control for various firm attributes that might affect firm valua-
tion, including firm age, stage of development, industry, public market values for
firms in the same industries, and average book-to-market and earnings-to-price
ratios. While other variables also have significant explanatory power—for instance,
the marginal impact of a doubling in public market values was between a 15 and
35 percent increase in the valuation of private equity transactions—the inflows
variable is significantly positive. A doubling of inflows into venture funds leads to
between a 7 and 21 percent increase in valuation levels.
The results are particularly strong for specific types of funds and funds in
particular regions. Because funds have become larger in real dollar terms, with
more capital per partner, many venture capital organizations have invested larger
amounts of money in each portfolio company. Firms have attempted to do this in
two ways. First, there has been a movement to finance later-stage companies that
can accept larger blocks of financing. Second, venture firms are syndicating less.
10
Lerner (1997) suggests, however, that these firms may have displayed behavior consistent with
strategic models of “technology races” in the economics literature. The rewards from success may have
been large enough that it made sense for many firms to enter, even knowing that relatively few would
survive. This view suggests that it may have indeed been rational for venture capitalists to fund a
substantial number of disk drive manufacturers.
Figure 3
Number of Venture-backed IPOs and Total Number of IPOs by Year in the United
States
Sources: Barry et al. (1990), Ritter (1998), and various issues of Going Public: The IPO Reporter and the
Venture Capital Journal.
This leads to greater competition for making later-stage investments. Similarly,

because the majority of money is raised in California and Massachusetts, competi-
tion for deals in these regions has been particularly intense and venture capital
inflows have had a more dramatic effect on prices in those regions.
Gompers and Lerner (2000) is based on data only through the mid-1990s, but
it seems unlikely that adding data through the end of the 1990s would alter the
conclusion that inflows of venture capital tend to raise valuations. After all, in the
late 1990s, a surge of money into venture capital funds was accompanied by lofty
valuations. In the past, overinvestment by venture capitalists led to too many
projects at too high valuations resulted in low returns. Indeed, one reason for the
very low returns of venture capital funds from about 1985 to 1990 (as shown in
Figure 2) is that the surge of venture capital funds at this time (shown in Figure 1)
exceeded the productive projects to be financed. The next few years will show
whether information technology companies can absorb very large increases in
venture capital from 1998 to 2000, or whether the inflow of venture funds has
overwhelmed the number of profitable opportunities.11
11
For our predictions regarding the future evolution of the venture capital industry, the interested
reader is referred to Chapter 10 of Gompers and Lerner (2001).
Figure 4
Dollar Volume of Venture-backed IPOs and All IPOs By Year in the United States
Sources: Barry et al. (1990), Ritter (1998), and various issues of Going Public: The IPO Reporter and the
Venture Capital Journal.
Exiting Venture Capital Investments

To make money on their investments, venture capitalists need to turn illiquid
stakes in private companies into realized return. Typically, the most profitable exit
opportunity is an initial public offering, in which the company issues shares to the
public.
Figures 3 and 4 summarize the trends in initial public offerings, both those
that originated in venture capital investments and others. The proportion of all
initial public offerings that are backed by venture capitalists rose from under
10 percent in the 1980s to about 31 percent in the 1990s—and a remarkable
56 percent in 1999. Interestingly, the share of money raised by initial public
offerings that are backed by venture capital has not increased as much. Although
the share jumps around a lot, about 17 percent of all funds raised by initial public
offerings in the 1980s went to just under 20 percent in the 1990s—and almost all
of this increase can be traced to the very large amount of venture-backed initial
public offerings in 1999.
Initial empirical research in this area focused on the structure of venture-
backed initial public offerings. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990)
established a broad array of facts about the role of venture capitalists in initial
public offerings, using a sample of 433 venture-backed and 1123 non-venture initial
public offerings between 1978 and 1987. They document that venture capitalists
hold significant equity stakes in the firms they take public (on average, the lead
venture capitalist holds a 19 percent stake immediately prior to the initial public
offering, and all venture investors hold 34 percent), and control about one-third of
the board seats. They continue to hold their equity positions in the year after the
initial public offering. Unlike non-venture initial public offerings, the typical
venture-backed offering is not yet profitable at the time it goes public. Finally,
venture-backed initial public offerings have less of a positive return on their first
trading day. The authors suggest that this implies that investors need less of a
discount to purchase these shares (that is, the offerings are less “underpriced”),
because the venture capitalist has monitored the quality of the offering.
Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that because venture capitalists repeatedly
bring firms to the public market, they can credibly stake their reputation that the
firms they bring to market are not overvalued. They test this idea using a matched
set of 640 venture-backed and non-venture initial public offerings between 1983
and 1987. They confirm the finding that the underpricing of venture capital-
backed initial public offerings is significantly less than the underpricing of non-
venture initial public offerings. Some of their other findings offer an explanation
for this pattern. For example, they show that the underwriters of venture-backed
firms are significantly more experienced than the underwriters of comparable
non-venture offerings. Venture-backed initial public offerings have significantly
lower fees than non-venture initial public offerings. Venture capitalists also retain
a majority of their equity after the initial public offering, which serves as a com-
mitment device. These factors help to explain yet another of their findings, that
institutional investors—who may be presumed to be especially knowledgeable—
have larger holdings of venture-backed firms after the initial public offering than
they do of comparable non-venture companies.
More recent research in this area has examined the timing of the venture
capitalist’s decision to take firms public and the timing of the decision to liquidate
the venture capitalists’ holdings, which frequently occurs well after the initial public
offering.
Several potential factors affect when venture capitalists choose to bring firms
public. One of these is the relative valuation of publicly traded securities. Lerner
(1994b) examines when venture capitalists choose to finance a sample of 350
privately held venture-backed biotechnology companies with another private round
versus taking the firm public. He shows that the venture capitalists take firms public
at market peaks, relying on private financings when valuations are lower. Seasoned
venture capitalists appear more proficient at timing initial public offerings. The
results are robust to the use of alternative criteria to separate firms and to the
addition of controls for the firms’ quality.
The superior timing ability of established venture capitalists may be in part due
to the fact that they have more flexibility as to when to take companies public.
Less-established groups may be influenced in this decision by other considerations.
For instance, Gompers (1996) argues that young venture capital firms have incen-
tives to “grandstand”: that is, they take actions that signal their ability to potential
investors. Specifically, young venture capital firms bring companies public earlier
than older venture capital firms in an effort to establish a reputation and raise
capital for new funds. He examines a sample of 433 venture-backed initial public
offerings between 1978 and 1987, as well as a second sample consisting of the first
initial public offerings brought to market by 62 venture capital funds. Young
venture capital firms have been on the initial public offering company’s board of
directors 14 months less and hold smaller percentage equity stakes at the time of
initial public offering than the more established venture firms. The initial public
offering companies that they finance are nearly two years younger and more
underpriced when they go public than the companies backed by older venture
capital firms. Rushing companies to the initial public offering market, however,
imposes costs on the venture firm: a shorter duration of board representation is
associated with a greater degree of underpricing and a lower percentage equity
stake for the venture capitalist.
The typical venture capital firm does not sell its equity at the time of the
initial public offering, since this would send a negative signal to the market that
the insiders are “cashing out.” Indeed, most investment banks require that all
insiders, including the venture capitalists, do not sell any of their equity after
the offering for a pre-specified period, usually six months (Brav and Gompers,
2000). Once that lock-up period is over, venture capitalists can return money to
investors either by selling shares on the open market and paying the proceeds
to investors in cash or by making distributions of shares to investors in the
venture capital fund.
These distributions to investors have several features that make them an
interesting testing ground for an examination of the impact of transactions by
informed insiders on securities prices. Because they are not considered to be
“sales,” the distributions are exempt from the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation
provisions of the securities laws. In addition, transactions are not revealed publicly
at the time of the transaction. To identify the precise date of these transactions, one
needs to rely on the records of the partners in the fund.
Gompers and Lerner (1998a) construct a representative set of over 700
transactions by 135 funds over a decade-long period, based on the records of
four institutional investors. The results are consistent with venture capitalists
possessing inside information and of the (partial) adjustment of the market to
that information. As depicted in Figure 5, after significant increases in stock
prices prior to distribution, abnormal returns immediately after the distribution
are a negative and significant -2.0 percent, which is comparable to the market
reaction to publicly announced secondary stock sales. The cumulative excess
returns for the months following the distribution are negative, but the signifi-
cance of the long-run returns is sensitive to the benchmark used. Moreover,
distributions that occur in settings where information asymmetries may be
greatest— especially where the firm has been taken public by a lower-tier
underwriter and the distribution is soon after the initial public offering— have
larger immediate price declines.
Figure 5
Stock Price around Distribution of Equity by Venture Capitalists
Note: The graph plots the cumulative abnormal return from 60 days prior to distribution to 60 days
after distribution by U.S. venture capital funds.
Source: Gompers and Lerner (1998a).
Many institutional investors have received a flood of these venture capital

distributions during the past several years and have grown increasingly concerned
about the incentives of the venture capitalists when they declare these transfers.
The evidence on a run-up of returns before the distribution and decline after the
distribution suggests that they are right to be concerned.
What We Don’t Know About Venture Capital
While financial economists know much more about venture capital than they
did a decade ago, many unresolved issues would reward future research. In this
final section, we highlight three of these issues.
Understanding Risk and Return

Many institutions, like public and private pension funds, have increased their
allocation to venture capital and private equity in the belief that the returns of these
funds are largely uncorrelated with the public markets. It is natural to see how they
reached this conclusion. Firms receiving capital from venture capital funds often
remain privately held for a number of years after the initial investment. These firms
have no observable market price. To present a conservative assessment of the
portfolio valuation, venture capitalists often refrain from marking portfolio firm
values to market, preferring to maintain the investments at book value until the
company goes public. Thus, reported returns during years with many initial public
offerings are biased upwards: had the portfolio been marked to market, many of
the gains would have been realized in the years before the initial public offering.
Similarly, returns in years with few initial public offerings are biased downwards.
But the accounting practice of using unvarying book values, of course, does
not demonstrate that the market value of these investments is uncorrelated with the
stock market. As discussed throughout this analysis, there appear to be many
linkages between the public and private equity market values. Thus, the stated
returns of venture capital funds may not accurately reflect the true evolution of
value, and the correlations reported by Venture Economics (2000) and other
industry observers may be deceptively low. In a preliminary analysis using data from
one venture group, Gompers and Lerner (1997) find that the correlation between
venture capital and public market prices increases substantially when the underly-
ing venture portfolio is “marked-to-market.” An alternative approach is to examine
the relatively modest number of publicly traded venture capital funds, as is done by
Martin and Petty (1983). These authors showed that eleven publicly traded funds
had superior returns relative to the market during the years 1974 through 1979 (a
period of strong returns to the venture capital industry as a whole, as Figure 2
notes).
To ignore the true correlation may lead to incorrect investment decisions. This
inaccuracy may only have been a modest problem when venture capital was only a
minute fraction of most institutions’ portfolios. Today, endowments and pension
funds are allocating 10 percent, 20 percent, or even 50 percent of their portfolios
to illiquid investments such as venture capital. Not to think carefully about the risk
and reward profile of venture capital is thus fraught with potential dangers.
The Internationalization of Venture Capital

Until very recently, there has been little venture capital activity abroad. For
instance, in 1996, the U.S. venture capital pool was about three times larger than
the total venture capital pool in 21 other high-income nations ( Jeng and Wells,
2000). Moreover, about 70 percent of the venture capital in the rest of the world
was in three countries with especially strong ties to the U.S. economy: Israel,
Canada, and Netherlands.12 This pattern raised questions of why such differences
existed, and whether they were permanent.
Black and Gilson (1998) argue that the key source of the U.S. competitive
advantage in venture capital is the existence of a robust market for initial public
offerings. Because of this market, venture capitalists can commit to transfer control
back to the entrepreneur when a public equity market for new issues exists. They
point out that this commitment device is unavailable in economies dominated by
bank financing, such as Germany and Japan.
12
One potential source of confusion is that the term venture capital is used differently different in
Europe and Asia. Abroad, venture capital often refers to all private equity, including buyout, late stage,
and mezzanine financing (which represent the vast majority of the private equity pool in most overseas
markets). In the United States, these are separate classes. Here, as in the rest of the paper, we confine
our discussion to venture capital using the restrictive U.S. definition.
This argument, however, has diminished in credibility in the past two years.
There has been a surge in venture capital investment, particularly relating to the
Internet, in a wide variety of nations across Asia, Europe, and Latin America. While
local groups (many recently established) have made some of these investments,
much of the activities have been driven by U.S.-based organizations.
In a pioneering study, Jeng and Wells (2000) examine the factors that influ-
ence venture capital fundraising internationally. They find that the strength of the
initial public offering market is an important factor in the determinant of venture
capital commitments, echoing the conclusions of Black and Gilson (1998). Jeng
and Wells also find, however, that the initial public offering market does not seem
to influence commitments to early-stage funds as much as later-stage ones. Another
provocative finding from the Jeng and Wells analysis is that government policy can
have a dramatic impact on the current and long-term viability of the venture capital
sector. In many countries of continental Europe, entrepreneurs face numerous
daunting regulatory restrictions, a paucity of venture funds focusing on investing in
high-growth firms, and illiquid markets where investors do not welcome initial
public offerings by young firms without long histories of positive earnings.
Many nations are interested in encouraging greater venture capital invest-
ment, but only very recently have researchers begun to examine the ways in which
policymakers can catalyze the growth of venture capital and the companies in which
they invest. The recent initiatives along these lines undertaken both in the United
States and abroad are summarized in Lerner (1999) and Gompers and Lerner
(1999b). (Other analyses are in Irwin and Klenow, 1996, and Wallsten, 2000.) But
while this work represents an important initial step, much more remains to be
explored regarding the impact of government on venture capital and the extent to
which these actions can explain or change the international patterns of venture
capital.
The Real Effects of Venture Capital

Many policymakers have a perception that venture capital organizations have
had much to do with the rising leadership of U.S. firms in high-technology
industries (which can be measured through patent counts or more qualitative
measures). But demonstrating a causal relationship between the presence of ven-
ture capital investment and innovation or job growth is a challenging empirical
problem.
For example, one straightforward approach is to look at regressions across
industries and time and examine whether, controlling for other potentially impor-
tant factors like the level of R&D spending, venture capital funding has an impact
on the number of patents or other measures of innovation. But this approach is
quite likely to give misleading estimates. Both venture funding and patenting could
be positively related to a third unobserved factor—the arrival of technological
opportunities. To date, only two papers have attempted to address these challeng-
ing estimation issues.
In the first of these papers, Hellmann and Puri (2000) distributed a questionnaire
to a sample of 170 firms in Silicon Valley, including both venture-backed and non-
venture firms. They find that firms pursuing what they term an “innovator strategy” (a
classification based on the content analysis of survey responses) are significantly more
likely to obtain venture capital, and to receive such financing at a younger age. The
presence of a venture capitalist is also associated with a significant reduction in the time
taken to bring a product to market, especially for innovators. Further, innovators are
more likely to list obtaining venture capital as a significant milestone in the life cycle of
the company, as compared to other financing events. Their results suggest that venture
capital may be especially important for innovative companies. They devote only modest
attention, however, to concerns about causality: the possibility remains that more
innovative firms select venture capital for financing, rather than venture capital causing
firms to be more innovative. Furthermore, the small size and concentrated location of
the sample, as well as the sampling procedure employed, raise concerns about the
generality of the results.
Kortum and Lerner (2000) examine whether these patterns can be discerned
on an aggregate industry level, rather than on the firm level. They address concerns
about causality in two ways. First, they focus on the surge of venture capital funds
that occurred after 1978, when the U.S. Department of Labor freed pensions to
invest in venture capital. This change in venture capital funding is unlikely to be
related to the arrival of entrepreneurial opportunities and so can be taken as
exogenous. As a second approach, they estimate the impact of venture capital on
the ratio of patents to R&D spending, rather than on patenting itself. In a simple
model, they show that dividing by R&D spending acts as a control for the arrival of
technological opportunities that are anticipated by economic actors at the time.
After addressing these causality concerns, the results suggest that venture funding
does have a strong positive impact on innovation. The estimated coefficients vary
according to the techniques employed, but on average, a dollar of venture capital
appears to be three to four times more potent in stimulating patenting than a dollar of
traditional corporate R&D. The estimates therefore suggest that venture capital, even
though it averaged less than 3 percent of corporate R&D from 1983 to 1992, is
responsible for perhaps 10 percent of U.S. industrial innovations in this decade.
Ultimately, the goal must be to see the role that venture capital plays in an
economy’s overall process of innovation. For example, as venture capital funding
has increased in recent years, central R&D facilities of large corporations have also
been redirected toward more applied problems. Determining the extent to which
these changes are related, and how both are related to other R&D management
innovations, is worthy of further investigation.
Wrapping Up
Empirical research into the venture capital industry has made considerable
strides over the past decade. The manners in which venture capital funds are raised
and structured, the capital is invested in young firms, and these investments are
concluded are now much better understood.
But at the same time, much remains to be learned. In some cases, the
unanswered questions have been posed for years, but lack of access to data has
proved to be a major barrier. For instance, confidentiality concerns have made a
thorough understanding the risk and reward characteristics of venture capital
elusive. In other cases, new research questions have been posed by the recent rapid
changes in the venture capital industry. For example, the impact of the dramatic
growth in the industry over the past two decades on venture capital organizations
and the high-technology companies they fund remain quite uncertain. These and
other questions should reward research in the years to come.
y This article is based in part on Gompers and Lerner (1999c, 2001). We thank Brad
De Long, Timothy Taylor, and Michael Waldman and seminar participants at Harvard for
helpful comments.
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701. Hyoung Goo Kang, Rich M Burton, Will Mitchell. 20⒓ How Potential Knowledge Spillovers
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70⒐ Salim Chahine, Samer Saade. 20⒒ Shareholders' Rights and the Effect of the Origin of Venture
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7⒒ Yan Alperovych, Georges Hübner. 20⒒ Explaining returns on venture capital backed companies:
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7⒙ Britta Klagge, Carsten Peter. 20⒒ Changes in the German Urban System—A Financial-Sector
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72⒊ David B. Audretsch, T. Taylor Aldridge, Mark Sanders. 20⒒ Social capital building and new business
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72⒋ Ann-Kristin Achleitner, Reiner Braun, Karsten Kohn. 20⒒ New venture financing in Germany:
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72⒍ Lucia Silva Gao. 20⒒ Portfolio Industry Strategy in Venture Capital Investments. The Journal of
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72⒎ Dave Valliere. 20⒒ Venture Capitalist Signaling of Screening Skill. The Journal of Private Equity
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72⒏ Alessandro Rosiello, Gil Avnimelech, Morris Teubal. 20⒒ Towards a systemic and evolutionary
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74⒍ Andrea Masini, Emanuela Menichetti. 20⒒ The Impact of Behavioral Factors in the Renewable
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75⒌ Cécile Carpentier, Jean-Marc Suret. 20⒑ The Canadian public venture capital market. Strategic
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75⒍ Pontus Braunerhjelm, Simon C. Parker. 20⒑ Josh Lerner: recipient of the 2010 Global Award for
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75⒏ Mirjam Knockaert, Bart Clarysse, Andy Lockett. 20⒑ Are technology VC investors a distinct species
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76⒊ Arvin Sahaym, H. Kevin Steensma, Jeffrey Q. Barden. 20⒑ The influence of R&D investment on
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76⒌ Andrew Wong. Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital 71-1⒑ [Crossref]
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76⒐ Stefan Fölster, Johan Nyström. 20⒑ Climate Policy to Defeat the Green Paradox. AMBIO 39:3,
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77⒋ Vladimir I. Ivanov, Fei Xie. 20⒑ Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value to Start-Up Firms?
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77⒌ Barry Unger, Virginia A. Greiman, Stephen A. Leybourne. 20⒑ A Study of Postinvestment
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77⒍ Horst Feldmann. 20⒑ Venture Capital Availability and Labor Market Performance in Industrial
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78⒊ Sebastian Schäfer, Cornelia Storz. Rigidity and Change in the Japanese Venture Economy 39-5⒏
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78⒍ Thomas Keil, Markku V.J. Maula, Cameron Wilson. 20⒑ Unique Resources of Corporate Venture
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78⒏ Ola Bengtsson, David H. Hsu. 20⒑ How Do Venture Capital Partners Match with Startup Founders?.
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79⒊ Andrew Metrick, Ayako Yasuda. 20⒑ Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey. SSRN
79⒋ Roger Svensson. 20⒑ Publicly-Funded R&D Programs and Survival of Patents. SSRN Electronic
79⒌ Caio Ramalho. 20⒑ Toward a Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship Model in Brazil. SSRN
79⒍ José Martí, Susana Menéndez Requejo, Olaf Matthaeus Rottke. 20⒑ The Impact of Venture Capital
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79⒎ Roger Svensson. 20⒑ New Start-Up Firms among Swedish Patent Holders. SSRN Electronic Journal
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79⒏ Fabio Bertoni, María Alejandra Ferrer, José Martí Pellón. 20⒑ Financial market imperfections,
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79⒐ Gary Dushnitsky, Zur Shapira. 20⒑ Entrepreneurial finance meets organizational reality: comparing
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80⒊ Joern Block, Philipp Sandner. 200⒐ What is the effect of the financial crisis on venture capital
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80⒋ Andy Cosh, Douglas Cumming, Alan Hughes. 200⒐ Outside Enterpreneurial Capital. The Economic
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80⒌ Gary Dushnitsky, J. Myles Shaver. 200⒐ Limitations to interorganizational knowledge acquisition:
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80⒍ Xubo Zhang, Chengbo Zhang. Private equity investment selection decision-making base on fuzzy
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80⒎ John W. Cooney, Thomas Moeller, Mike Stegemoller. 200⒐ The underpricing of private targets.
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80⒏ Alessandro Rosiello, Stuart Parris. 200⒐ The patterns of venture capital investment in the UK bio-
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80⒐ ELI GIMMON, EYAL BEǊAMIN, LIORA KATZENSTEIN. 200⒐ RADICAL STRATEGIC
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8⒑ Miguel Meuleman, Mike Wright, Sophie Manigart, Andy Lockett. 200⒐ Private Equity Syndication:
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8⒔ Sofia Avdeitchikova. 200⒐ False expectations: Reconsidering the role of informal venture capital in
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8⒘ Yu Gu, Song Chen. Service-oriented or control-oriented management in venture capital: Multi-agent
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822. Alicia Robb, David T. Robinson. 200⒐ The Capital Structure Decisions of New Firms. SSRN
82⒊ Joern Hendrich Block, Philipp G. Sandner. 200⒐ What is the Effect of the Financial Crisis on Venture
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82⒋ Cristiano Antonelli, Morris Teubal. 200⒐ Venture Capitalism, New Markets and Innovation-Led
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82⒌ Sharon Belenzon, Tomer Berkovitz, Patrick Bolton. 200⒐ Intracompany Governance and Innovation.
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82⒎ Jai Bhatia. 200⒐ The Impact of Insolvency Laws on the Venture Capital Industry. SSRN Electronic
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82⒐ Fabio Bertoni, Massimo G. Colombo, Diego D’Adda, Luca Grilli. Venture Capital Financing and the
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84⒋ ###. 200⒏ The Development of Venture Capital Industry and the Role of Government in Korea:
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84⒐ G. Avnimelech, M. Teubal. 200⒏ FROM DIRECT SUPPORT OF BUSINESS SECTOR R&D/
INNOVATION TO TARGETING VENTURE CAPITAL/PRIVATE EQUITY: A CATCHING-
UP INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY LIFE CYCLE PERSPECTIVE. Economics of
Innovation and New Technology 17:1-2, 153-172. [Crossref]
850. A. Bozkaya, B. Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie. 200⒏ WHO FUNDS TECHNOLOGY-BASED
SMALL FIRMS? EVIDENCE FROM BELGIUM. Economics of Innovation and New Technology
17:1-2, 97-122. [Crossref]
851. Kasper Meisner Nielsen. 200⒏ Institutional Investors and Private Equity*. Review of Finance 12:1,
185-2⒚ [Crossref]
852. Alexander W. Butler, M. Sinan Goktan. 200⒏ On the Matching of Companies and Their Financial
Intermediaries: Evidence from Venture Capital. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
85⒊ Alexander A. Popov, Peter Roosenboom. 200⒏ On the Real Effects of Private Equity Investment:
Evidence from New Business Creation. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
85⒋ Kasper Meisner Nielsen. 200⒏ The Return to Pension Funds' Private Equity Investments: New
Evidence on the Private Equity Premium Puzzle. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
85⒌ Mariarosa Scarlata, Luisa Alemany. 200⒏ Philanthropic Venture Capital: Can the Key Elements of
Venture Capital Be Applied Successfully to Social Enterprises?. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
85⒍ Christian Keuschnigg. 200⒏ Tax Policy for Venture Capital Backed Entrepreneurship. SSRN
85⒎ Massimo G. Colombo, Luca Grilli. 200⒏ Does it Take Two to Tango? Founders' Human Capital,
Venture Capital and the Growth of High-Tech Start-Ups. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
85⒏ Nancy Vu, Andrew C. Worthington, Phillip Laird. 200⒏ The Pricing and Performance of Initial
Public Offerings in Australia, 1996-2007: A Comparison of Ordinary, Venture Capital and Private
Equity-Backed Issues. SSRN Electronic Journal 41. . [Crossref]
85⒐ Joshua Aizenman, Jake Kendall. 200⒏ The Internationalization of Venture Capital and Private Equity.
860. Daniel Hobohm. 200⒏ Investors in Private Equity Funds: Large-Scale Performance Analysis and the
Question if Location Matters. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
861. Carlos Mauricio S. Mirandola. 200⒏ Finding the Way to Shambala: How to Intelligently Use the Tarp
and Rescue the Financial System without Getting Lost in Myths. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
862. George Geronikolaou, George A. Papachristou. 200⒏ Venture Capital and Innovation in Europe.
86⒊ Mari Sako. 200⒏ Organizational Diversity and Institutional Change: Evidence from Financial and
Labour Markets in Japan. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
86⒋ Alexandra Dawson. 200⒏ Investigating Decision-Making Criteria of Private Equity Investors in
Family Firms. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
86⒌ Cristiano Antonelli, Morris Teubal. 200⒏ Venture Capital as a Mechanism for Knowledge Governance:
New Markets and Innovation-Led Economic Growth. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
86⒍ Maĳa Renko. 200⒏ The Role of Market Knowledge in Recognizing and Exploiting Entrepreneurial
Opportunities in Technology Intensive Firms. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
86⒎ Pehr-Johan Norbäck, Lars Persson. 200⒏ The Organization of the Innovation Industry:
Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists, and Oligopolists. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
86⒏ Rebecca Zarutskie. 200⒏ The Role of Top Management Team Human Capital in Venture Capital
Markets: Evidence from First-Time Funds. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
86⒐ Vinish Kathuria, Vandita Tewari. Venture Capitalist's Role in Choosing Entrepreneurs: A Study of
Indian Biotechnology Industry 125-14⒌ [Crossref]
870. Gil Avnimelech, Dafna Schwartz, Raphael Bar-El. 200⒎ Entrepreneurial High-tech Cluster
Development: Israel's Experience with Venture Capital and Technological Incubators. European
Planning Studies 15:9, 1181-119⒏ [Crossref]
871. Eric Nasica, Dominique Dufour. 200⒎ Incertitude, rationalité et confiance dans les choix
d’investissement : Une analyse de la relation entre marchés financiers et capital-risque. Revue
d'économie industrielle :n°119, 103-12⒋ [Crossref]
872. Roger Svensson. 200⒎ Commercialization of patents and external financing during the R&D phase.
Research Policy 36:7, 1052-106⒐ [Crossref]
87⒊ Chun-Hao Li, Yuan-Wei Du. An Approach to Select Pareto-Optimal VC Project Portfolios
4162-416⒎ [Crossref]
87⒋ Bart Clarysse, Mirjam Knockaert, Andy Lockett. 200⒎ Outside Board Members in High Tech Start-
ups. Small Business Economics 29:3, 243-25⒐ [Crossref]
87⒌ Marina Balboa, José Martí. 200⒎ Factors that determine the reputation of private equity managers in
developing markets. Journal of Business Venturing 22:4, 453-480. [Crossref]
87⒍ Massimo G. Colombo, Luca Grilli, Cinzia Verga. 200⒎ High‐tech Start‐up Access to Public Funds
and Venture Capital: Evidence from Italy. International Review of Applied Economics 21:3, 381-402.
[Crossref]
87⒎ Annaleena Parhankangas, Tomas Hellström. 200⒎ How experience and perceptions shape risky
behaviour: Evidence from the venture capital industry. Venture Capital 9:3, 183-20⒌ [Crossref]
87⒏ Bruce Kogut, Pietro Urso, Gordon Walker. 200⒎ Emergent Properties of a New Financial Market:
American Venture Capital Syndication, 1960–200⒌ Management Science 53:7, 1181-119⒏ [Crossref]
87⒐ Isin Guler. 200⒎ Throwing Good Money after Bad? Political and Institutional Influences on
Sequential Decision Making in the Venture Capital Industry. Administrative Science Quarterly 52:2,
880. Massimo G. Colombo, Luca Grilli. 200⒎ Funding Gaps? Access To Bank Loans By High-Tech Start-
Ups. Small Business Economics 29:1-2, 25-4⒍ [Crossref]
881. Rainer Lauterbach, Isabell M. Welpe, Jan Fertig. 200⒎ Performance differentiation: cutting losses and
maximizing profits of private equity and venture capital investments. Financial Markets and Portfolio
Management 21:1, 45-6⒎ [Crossref]
882. Douglas Cumming. 200⒎ Government policy towards entrepreneurial finance: Innovation investment
funds. Journal of Business Venturing 22:2, 193-23⒌ [Crossref]
88⒊ ANDREW J. LEONE, STEVE ROCK, MICHAEL WILLENBORG. 200⒎ Disclosure of Intended
Use of Proceeds and Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Accounting Research 45:1,
88⒋ Dominique Demougin, Oliver Fabel. 200⒎ Entrepreneurship and the Division of Ownership in New
Ventures. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 16:1. . [Crossref]
88⒌ Peter Thompson. 200⒎ Founder Quality and Firm Performance: Implications for Local Development
Strategies. Australian Economic Review 40:1, 97-10⒌ [Crossref]
88⒍ Yuen-Ping Ho, Poh-Kam Wong. 200⒎ Financing, Regulatory Costs and Entrepreneurial Propensity.
Small Business Economics 28:2-3, 187-20⒋ [Crossref]
88⒎ Andreas Oehler, Kuntara Pukthuanthong, Marco Rummer, Thomas Walker. Venture capital in
Europe 3-⒘ [Crossref]
88⒏ Rachel A. Campbell, Roman Kraeussl. A survey of the venture capital industry in Central and Eastern
Europe 51-70. [Crossref]
88⒐ Luisa Alemany, José Martí. Productivity growth in Spanish venture-backed firms 101-1⒕ [Crossref]
890. Tereza Tykvova. German banks as venture capitalists 331-341. [Crossref]
891. Cécile Carpentier, Jean-Marc Suret. 200⒎ On the usefulness of tax incentives for informal investors.
Venture Capital 9:1, 1-22. [Crossref]
892. Roger Svensson. 200⒎ Commercialization of Patents and External Financing During the R&D-Phase.
89⒊ Olga Khessina, Elaine Romanelli. 200⒎ Regional Industrial Identity and Spatial Arrangements in the
U.S. Biotherapeutics Industry, 1976-200⒋ SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
89⒋ Jackie Krafft, Jacques-Laurent Ravix. 200⒎ The firm and its governance over the industry life-cycle.
Corporate Ownership and Control 5:1, 233-242. [Crossref]
89⒌ Tereza Tykvová. 200⒍ How do investment patterns of independent and captive private equity
funds differ? Evidence from Germany. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management 20:4, 399-4⒙
[Crossref]
89⒍ Gil Avnimelech, Morris Teubal. 200⒍ Creating venture capital industries that co-evolve with high
tech: Insights from an extended industry life cycle perspective of the Israeli experience. Research Policy
35:10, 1477-149⒏ [Crossref]
89⒎ Massimo G. Colombo, Luca Grilli, Evila Piva. 200⒍ In search of complementary assets: The
determinants of alliance formation of high-tech start-ups. Research Policy 35:8, 1166-119⒐ [Crossref]
89⒏ Douglas Cumming, Sofia Johan. 200⒍ Is it the Law or the Lawyers? Investment Covenants around
the World*. European Financial Management 12:4, 535-57⒋ [Crossref]
89⒐ Dirk De Clercq, Vance H. Fried, Oskari Lehtonen, Harry J. Sapienza. 200⒍ An Entrepreneur's Guide
to the Venture Capital Galaxy. Academy of Management Perspectives 20:3, 90-1⒓ [Crossref]
900. Erik E. Lehmann. 200⒍ Does Venture Capital Syndication Spur Employment Growth and
Shareholder Value? Evidence from German IPO Data. Small Business Economics 26:5, 455-46⒋
[Crossref]
901. Joseph A. LiPuma. 200⒍ Independent venture capital, corporate venture capital, and the
internationalisation intensity of technology-based portfolio firms. International Entrepreneurship and
Management Journal 2:2, 245-260. [Crossref]
902. Marco Da Rin, Ulrich Hege, Gerard Llobet, Uwe Walz. 200⒍ The Law and Finance of Venture Capital
Financing in Europe: Findings from the Ricafe Research Project. European Business Organization Law
Review 7:2, 525-54⒎ [Crossref]
90⒊ Rajagopal. 200⒍ Innovation and business growth through corporate venturing in Latin America.
Management Decision 44:5, 703-7⒙ [Crossref]
90⒋ Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel, Oliver Heneric. 200⒍ What kind of German biotechnology start-ups
do venture capital companies and corporate investors prefer for equity investments?. Applied Economics
38:5, 505-5⒙ [Crossref]
90⒌ Moren Lévesque, Maria Minniti. 200⒍ The effect of aging on entrepreneurial behavior. Journal of
Business Venturing 21:2, 177-19⒋ [Crossref]
90⒍ Andreas Hack, Erik E. Lehmann. The role of venture capitalists in IPO performance 311-322.
[Crossref]
90⒎ Cécile Carpentier, Jean-Marc Suret. 200⒍ Bypassing the financial growth cycle: Evidence from Capital
Pool Companies. Journal of Business Venturing 21:1, 45-7⒊ [Crossref]
90⒏ Douglas Cumming, Grant Fleming, Armin Schwienbacher. 200⒍ Legality and venture capital exits.
Journal of Corporate Finance 12:2, 214-24⒌ [Crossref]
90⒐ Astrid Romain, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. On the Relationship Between Patents and
Venture Capital 222-23⒎ [Crossref]
9⒑ 200⒍ Comments. Asian Economic Papers 5:1, 64-72. [Crossref]
9⒒ Gil Avnimelech. 200⒍ Investment Patterns and Performance of Organizations Involved in the VC
Market Evidence from the Israeli Venture Capital Market. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
9⒓ Gil Avnimelech, Morris Teubal. 200⒍ Microeconomic Insights from Israel's Venture Capital
Emergence: Towards a Theory of Evolutionary Targeting of Infant Industries. SSRN Electronic
9⒔ Federico Munari, Robert Clive Cressy, Alessandro Malipiero. 200⒍ The Heterogeneity of Private
Equity Firms and its Impact on Post-Buyout Performance: Evidence from the United Kingdom. SSRN
9⒕ Maik Piehler, Bernhard Schwetzler. 200⒍ Exit Control, Capital Structure and Financial Contracts in
Venture Capital - a Comment on BerglöF 199⒋ SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
9⒖ Stephan Gundel, Achim Hecker, Eva Muthmann. 200⒍ Incentive, Control and Firm Boundaries in
the Music Industry: Explaining the Recent Downturn. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
9⒗ Mike Wright, Miguel Meuleman. 200⒍ Industry Concentration, Syndication Networks and
Competition in the UK Private Equity Market for Management Buy-Outs. SSRN Electronic Journal
. [Crossref]
9⒘ Alexander Bassen, Maik Kleinschmidt, Christine Zöllner. 200⒍ Corporate governance of German
growth companies. Empirical analysis of the corporate governance quality and the structure of
supervisory boards of companies listed on TEC-DAX. Corporate Ownership and Control 3:3, 128-13⒎
[Crossref]
9⒙ Gary Dushnitsky, Michael J. Lenox. 200⒌ When do firms undertake R&D by investing in new
ventures?. Strategic Management Journal 26:10, 947-96⒌ [Crossref]
9⒚ Pino G. Audia, Christopher I. Rider. 200⒌ A Garage and an Idea: What More Does an Entrepreneur
Need?. California Management Review 48:1, 6-2⒏ [Crossref]
9⒛ Colin Mayer, Koen Schoors, Yishay Yafeh. 200⒌ Sources of funds and investment activities of venture
capital funds: evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the United Kingdom. Journal of Corporate
Finance 11:3, 586-60⒏ [Crossref]
921. Rajeev K. Goel, Iftekhar Hasan. 200⒌ An IT professional’s dilemma: be an entrepreneur or a
consultant?. NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking 7:1, 17-2⒌ [Crossref]
922. David B. Audretsch, Erik E. Lehmann. 200⒌ The Effects of Experience, Ownership, and Knowledge
on IPO Survival: Empirical Evidence from Germany. Review of Accounting and Finance 4:4, 13-3⒊
[Crossref]
92⒊ Gil Avnimelech, Morris Teubal. 200⒌ Evolutionary Innovation and High Tech Policy: What Can We
Learn from Israel's Targeting of Venture Capital?. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
92⒋ Douglas J. Cumming, Sofia A. Johan. 200⒌ Is it the Law or the Lawyers? Investment Fund Covenants
Across Countries. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
92⒌ Marina Balboa, José Martí. 200⒌ Factors that Determine the Reputation of Private Equity Managers
in Developing Markets. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
92⒍ Puliyur Sudi Sudarsanam. 200⒌ Exit Strategy for UK Leveraged Buyouts: Empirical Evidence on
Determinants. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
92⒎ Andreas Kemmerer, Tom Weidig. 200⒌ Reporting Value to the Private Equity Fund Investor. SSRN
92⒏ Yuen Ping Ho, Poh Kam Wong. 200⒌ Availability of Financing, Regulatory Business Costs and
National Entrepreneurial Propensity. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
92⒐ Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H Phan, Jonathan Linton. 200⒋ The relationship between governance
structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms. Journal of Business
Venturing 19:6, 831-84⒐ [Crossref]
930. David B. Audretsch, Erik E. Lehmann. 200⒋ Financing High-Tech Growth: The Role of Banks and
Venture Capitalists. Schmalenbach Business Review 56:4, 340-35⒎ [Crossref]
931. Peggy M. Lee, Sunil Wahal. 200⒋ Grandstanding, certification and the underpricing of venture capital
backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics 73:2, 375-40⒎ [Crossref]
932. Kenneth Husted, Christian Vintergaard. 200⒋ Stimulating innovation through corporate venture
bases. Journal of World Business 39:3, 296-30⒍ [Crossref]
93⒊ Rajeev K. Goel, Iftekhar Hasan *. 200⒋ Funding new ventures: some strategies for raising early finance.
Applied Financial Economics 14:11, 773-77⒏ [Crossref]
93⒋ Christian Keuschnigg, Soren Bo Nielsen. 200⒋ Start-ups, venture capitalists, and the capital gains
tax. Journal of Public Economics 88:5, 1011-1042. [Crossref]
93⒌ John Armour. 200⒋ Personal Insolvency Law and the Demand for Venture Capital. European Business
Organization Law Review 5:1, 87-1⒙ [Crossref]
93⒍ Holger von Daniels. Private Equity im Kontext von Theorie und Praxis 11-5⒋ [Crossref]
93⒎ Ansgar Belke, Andreas Schaal. Venture Capital Investment and Labor Market Performance: New
Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries 267-28⒊ [Crossref]
93⒏ Grant Fleming. 200⒋ Venture capital returns in Australia. Venture Capital 6:1, 23-4⒌ [Crossref]
93⒐ Gil Avnimelech, Martin Kenney, Morris Teubal. 200⒋ Building Venture Capital Industries:
Understanding the U.S. and Israeli Experiences. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
940. Gil Avnimelech, Morris Teubal. 200⒋ Strength of Market Forces and the Successful Emergence of
Israel's Venture Capital Industry. Revue économique 55:6, 126⒌ [Crossref]
941. Vesa Kanniainen, Christian Keuschnigg. 200⒊ The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture
capital finance. Journal of Corporate Finance 9:5, 521-53⒋ [Crossref]
942. Marc Goergen, Joseph A McCahery, Luc Renneboog. 200⒊ The Impact of Stock Exchange
Regulation on Corporate Performance of the European New Markets. Journal of Corporate Law Studies
3:2, 379-39⒐ [Crossref]
94⒊ John Callahan, Steven Muegge. Venture Capital's Role in Innovation: Issues, Research and
Stakeholder Interests 641-66⒊ [Crossref]
94⒋ Gil Avnimelech, Morris Teubal. 200⒊ Evolutionary Venture Capital Policies: Insights from a Product
Life Cycle Analysis of Israells Venture Capital Industry. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
94⒌ Erik E. Lehmann, Karen Boschker. 200⒊ Venture Capital Syndication in Germany: Evidence from
IPO Data. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
94⒍ Jennifer E. Bethel, Laurie Krigman. 200⒊ A Rational Incentives-Based Explanation for Booms and
Busts: The Case of Roll-Ups. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
94⒎ Kasper Meisner Nielsen. 200⒊ Institutional Investors and Private Equity. SSRN Electronic Journal
. [Crossref]
94⒏ José Martí, Marina Balboa. 200⒊ Characterization of the Reputation of Private Equity Managers:
Evidence in Spain. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
94⒐ Patrick Bolton, Jos� A. Scheinkman, Wei Xiong. 200⒊ Executive Compensation and Short-termist
Behavior in Speculative Markets. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
950. Christian Keuschnigg. 200⒊ Optimal Public Policy for Venture Capital Backed Innovation. SSRN
951. Douglas J. Cumming, Jeffrey G. MacIntosh. 200⒊ Mutual Funds that Invest in Private Equity? An
Analysis of Labour Sponsored Investment Funds. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
952. Christian Keuschnigg, Soren Bo Nielsen. 200⒊ Taxation and Venture Capital Backed
Entrepreneurship. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
95⒊ Bernard Guilhon, Sandra Montchaud. 200⒊ Le capital à risque et les jeunes entreprises innovantes :
problématique et eǌeux. Revue internationale P.M.E. 16:3-4, 53-7⒊ [Crossref]
95⒋ Walter W. Powell, Kenneth W. Koput, James I. Bowie, Laurel Smith-Doerr. 2002. The Spatial
Clustering of Science and Capital: Accounting for Biotech Firm-Venture Capital Relationships.
Regional Studies 36:3, 291-30⒌ [Crossref]
95⒌ Karl F. Morawski. 2002. Overview of Global Private Equity Investments. The Journal of Alternative
Investments 4:4, 81-8⒍ [Crossref]
95⒍ Douglas J. Cumming. 2002. Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance. SSRN Electronic Journal
. [Crossref]
95⒎ Colin Mayer, Koen J.L. Schoors, Yishay Yafeh. 2002. Sources of Funds and Investment Activities of
Venture Capital Funds: Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK. SSRN Electronic Journal
. [Crossref]
95⒏ Douglas J. Cumming, Grant A. Fleming, Armin Schwienbacher. 2002. Legality and Venture Capital
Exits. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
95⒐ Victor Scheibehenne, Jan Ising, Dirk Schiereck. Erfolgreiches Venture Capital Fundraising in der
Biotechnologie: Erfolgsfaktor Management vs. Produkt 217-240. [Crossref]
960. Christian Keuschnigg, Søren Bo Nielsen. Public Policy, Start-up Entrepreneurship and the Market
for Venture Capital 227-25⒎ [Crossref]
961. . Begriffsbildung 16-4⒋ [Crossref]
962. . Methodik 9-2⒋ [Crossref]
96⒊ . Conclusion and Implications 233-24⒎ [Crossref]
96⒋ Thomas H. Allison, Aaron F. McKenny, Jeremy C. Short. Entrepreneurial Rhetoric and Business
Plan Funding 21-3⒌ [Crossref]
96⒌ Olimpia Meglio, Matteo Rossi, Arturo Capasso. Opening the Black Box of the Venture Capital-
Entrepreneur Relationship 110-12⒎ [Crossref]
96⒍ Yannis Pierrakis. Public Policies and Public Programs With a Regional Impact in Promoting
Entrepreneurship 128-15⒏ [Crossref]

The Capital Structure of Venture Capital Firms in Indonesia

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Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 15, Number 2—Spring 2001—Pages 145–168

The Venture Capital Revolution

Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner

V enture capital has developed as an important intermediary in financial

The Origins of the Venture Capital Industry

Massachusetts has been a consistent feature of venture capital investments since at

1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 a

First closing of funds

What We Know About Venture Capital Activity

This leads to greater competition for making later-stage investments. Similarly,

Exiting Venture Capital Investments

Many institutional investors have received a flood of these venture capital

What We Don’t Know About Venture Capital

Understanding Risk and Return

The Internationalization of Venture Capital

The Real Effects of Venture Capital

Gompers, P. 1995. “Optimal Investment, “The Determinants of Board Composition.”

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