FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129329. July 31, 2001.]

ESTER M. ASUNCION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, MABINI MEDICAL
CLINIC and DR. WILFRIDO JUCO, respondents.

Philip A. Paredes for petitioner.

Jose C. Evangelista for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner was employed as an accountant/bookkeeper by the

respondent Mabini Medical Clinic. Sometime in May 1994, the DOLE'S-
NCR-Industrial Relations Division conducted a routine inspection of the
premises of respondent company and discovered, upon disclosure of
petitioner, violations of labor standards laws. Respondent company was
made to correct these violations. On August 9, 1994, the private
respondent, Medical Director Wilfrido Juco, issued a memorandum to
petitioner charging her with chronic absenteeism, habitual tardiness,
loitering and wasting of company time, getting the salary of an absent
employee without acknowledging or signing for it, disobedience and
insubordination. Petitioner was required to explain within two (2) days
why she should not be terminated based on the above charges. Three
days later, in the morning of August 12, 1994, petitioner submitted her
response to the memorandum. On the same day, respondent Dr. Juco
dismissed the petitioner on the ground of disobedience of lawful orders
and for her failure to submit her reply within the two-day period.
Petitioner filed a case for illegal termination before the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter found that the private respondents were unable to prove the
allegation of chronic absenteeism as it failed to present in evidence the
time cards, logbooks or record book which complainant signed recording
her time in reporting for work. On appeal, public respondent NLRC
rendered the assailed decision which set aside the Labor Arbiter's ruling.
Insofar as finding the private respondents as having failed to present
evidence relative to petitioner's absences and tardiness, the NLRC
agreed with the Labor Arbiter. However, the NLRC ruled that petitioner
had admitted the tardiness and absences though offering justifications
for the infractions.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the NLRC
and reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter. Private respondents
failed to present a single piece of credible evidence to serve as the basis
for their charges against petitioner and, consequently, failed to fulfill
their burden of proving the facts which constitute the just cause for the
dismissal of the petitioner. The Court found the handwritten listing and
unsigned computer print-outs submitted by the employer
unauthenticated and, hence, unreliable. The authenticity thereof is
highly suspect and devoid of any rational probative value especially in
the light of the existence of the official record book of the petitioner's
alleged absences and tardiness in the possession of the employer
company. The Court also considered that the two-day period given to
petitioner to explain and answer the charges against her was most
unreasonable, considering that she was charged with several offenses
and infractions (35 absences, 23 half-days and 108 tardiness), some of
which were allegedly committed almost a year before, not to mention
the fact that the charges leveled against her lacked particularity. The
NLRC decision was reversed and set aside, and the Labor Arbiter's
decision was reinstated. IDAESH

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; TERMINATION OF

EMPLOYMENT; EMPLOYER FAILED TO PRESENT A SINGLE PIECE OF
EVIDENCE TO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR THE CHARGES AGAINST
PETITIONER AND CONSEQUENTLY, FAILED TO FULFILL THEIR BURDEN
OF PROVING THE FACTS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE JUST CAUSE FOR
THE DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE. — In the case at bar, there is a paucity
of evidence to establish the charges of absenteeism and tardiness. We
note that the employer company submitted mere handwritten listing and
computer print-outs. The handwritten listing was not signed by the one
who made the same. As regards the print-outs, while the listing was
computer generated, the entries of time and other annotations were
again handwritten and unsigned. We find that the handwritten listing and
unsigned computer print-outs were unauthenticated and, hence,
unreliable. Mere self-serving evidence of which the listing and print-outs
are of that nature should be rejected as evidence without any rational
probative value even in administrative proceedings. For this reason, we
find the findings of the Labor Arbiter to be correct. In the case at bar,
both the handwritten listing and computer print-outs being unsigned, the
authenticity thereof is highly suspect and devoid of any rational
probative value especially in the light of the existence of the official
record book of the petitioner's alleged absences and tardiness in the
possession of the employer company. Ironically, in the memorandum
charging petitioner and notice of termination, private respondents
referred to the record book as its basis for petitioner's alleged
absenteeism and tardiness. Interestingly, however, the record book was
never presented in evidence. Private respondents had possession
thereof and the opportunity to present the same. Being the basis of the
charges against the petitioner, it is without doubt the best evidence
available to substantiate the allegations. The purpose of
the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention
of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and
withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the
presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and defeat.
Thus, private respondents' unexplained and unjustified non-presentation
of the record book, which is the best evidence in its possession and
control of the charges against the petitioner, casts serious doubts on the
factual basis of the charges of absenteeism and tardiness. We find that
private respondents failed to present a single piece of credible evidence
to serve as the basis for their charges against petitioner and
consequently, failed to fulfill their burden of proving the facts which
constitute the just cause for the dismissal of the petitioner.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO BASIS FOR THE CHARGE OF HABITUAL
ABSENTEEISM. — We do not subscribe to the findings of the NLRC that
the letter of petitioner dated August 11, 1994 amounted to an admission
of her alleged absences. As explained by petitioner, her alleged
absences were incurred on Saturdays. According to petitioner, these
should not be considered as absences as there was an arrangement
between her and the private respondents that she would not be required
to work on Saturdays. Private respondents have failed to deny the
existence of this arrangement. Hence, the decision of the NLRC that
private respondent had sufficient grounds to terminate petitioner as she
admitted the charges of habitual absences has no leg to stand on.
Neither have the private respondents shown by competent evidence that
the petitioner was given any warning or reprimanded for her alleged
absences and tardiness. Private respondents claimed that they sent
several notices to the petitioner warning her of her absences, however,
petitioner refused to receive the same.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TWO-DAY PERIOD GIVEN TO EMPLOYEE TO EXPLAIN
AND ANSWER THE CHARGES LEVELED AGAINST HER CONSIDERED
UNREASONABLE. — The Court, likewise, takes note of the fact that the
two-day period given to petitioner to explain and answer the charges
against her was most unreasonable, considering that she was charged
with several offenses and infractions (35 absences, 23 half-days and 108
tardiness), some of which were allegedly committed almost a year
before, not to mention the fact that the charges leveled against her
lacked particularity. Apart from chronic absenteeism and habitual
tardiness, petitioner was also made to answer for loitering and wasting
of company time, getting salary of an absent employee without
acknowledging or signing for it and disobedience and insubordination.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter found that actually petitioner tried to submit her
explanation on August 11, 1994 or within the two-day period given her,
but private respondents prevented her from doing so by instructing their
staff not to accept complainant's explanation, which was the reason
why her explanation was submitted a day later. The law mandates that
every opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee by
the management to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense.
In Ruffy v. NLRC, the Court held that what would qualify as sufficient or
"ample opportunity," as required by law, would be "every kind of
assistance that management must accord to the employee to enable him
to prepare adequately for his defense." In the case at bar, private
respondents cannot be gainsaid to have given petitioner the ample
opportunity to answer the charges leveled against her.
 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF LABOR RULE;
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — There are serious doubts in the
evidence on record as to the factual basis of the charges against
petitioner. These doubts shall be resolved in her favor in line with the
policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe
doubts in favor of labor. The consistent rule is that if doubts exist
between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was
for a justifiable cause. Not having satisfied its burden of proof, we
conclude that the employer dismissed the petitioner without any just
cause. Hence, the termination is illegal. SDHAEC

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J : p

In her petition filed before this Court, Ester Asuncion prays that the
Decision, dated November 29, 1996, and the Resolution, dated February
20, 1997, of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission,
Second Division, in NLRC CA. 011188 which reversed the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter, dated May 15, 1996 be set aside. EcDSTI

The antecedents of this case are as follows:

On August 16, 1993, petitioner Ester M. Asuncion was employed as
an accountant/bookkeeper by the respondent Mabini Medical Clinic.
Sometime in May 1994, certain officials of the NCR-Industrial Relations
Division of the Department of Labor and Employment conducted a
routine inspection of the premises of the respondent company and
discovered upon the disclosure of the petitioner of (documents)
violations of the labor standards law such as the non-coverage from the
SSS of the employees. Consequently, respondent Company was made to
correct these violations.
On August 9, 1994, the private respondent, Medical Director Wilfrido
Juco, issued a memorandum to petitioner charging her with the
following offenses:
1. Chronic Absentism (sic) — You have incurred since Aug.
1993 up to the present 35 absences and 23 half-days.
2. Habitual tardiness — You have late (sic) for 108 times. As
shown on the record book.
3. Loitering and wasting of company time — on several
occasions and witnessed by several employees.
4. Getting salary of an absent employee without acknowledging
or signing for it.
5. Disobedience and insubordination — continued refusal to
sign memos given to you. 1
 Petitioner was required to explain within two (2) days why she
should not be terminated based on the above charges.
Three days later, in the morning of August 12, 1994, petitioner
submitted her response to the memorandum. On the same day,
respondent Dr. Juco, through a letter dated August 12, 1994, dismissed
the petitioner on the ground of disobedience of lawful orders and for her
failure to submit her reply within the two-day period.
This prompted petitioner to file a case for illegal termination before
the NLRC. HTScEI

In a Decision, dated May 15, 1996, Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday

rendered judgment declaring that the petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The Labor Arbiter found that the private respondents were unable to
prove the allegation of chronic absenteeism as it failed to present in
evidence the time cards, logbooks or record book which complainant
signed recording her time in reporting for work. These documents,
according to the Labor Arbiter, were in the possession of the private
respondents. In fact, the record book was mentioned in the notice of
termination. Hence, the non-presentation of these documents gives rise
to the presumption that these documents were intentionally suppressed
since they would be adverse to private respondent's claim. Moreover,
the Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner's absences were with the
conformity of the private respondents as both parties had agreed
beforehand that petitioner would not report to work on Saturdays. The
handwritten listing of the days when complainant was absent from work
or late in reporting for work and even the computerized print-out, do not
suffice to prove that petitioner's absences were unauthorized as they
could easily be manufactured. 2 Accordingly, the dispositive portion of
the decision states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal and
ordering the respondent company to immediately reinstate her to her
former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay the
complainant's backwages and other benefits, as follows:
1) P73,500.00 representing backwages as of the date of
this decision until she is actually reinstated in the service;
CcAHEI

2) P20,000.00 by way of moral damages and another

P20,000.00 representing exemplary damages, and
3) 10% of the recoverable award in this case representing
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 3

On appeal, public respondent NLRC rendered the assailed decision

which set aside the Labor Arbiter's ruling. Insofar as finding the private
respondents as having failed to present evidence relative to petitioner's
absences and tardiness, the NLRC agrees with the Labor Arbiter.
However, the NLRC ruled that petitioner had admitted the tardiness and
absences though offering justifications for the infractions. The decretal
portion of the assailed decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE entered dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
However, respondents Mabini Medical Clinic and Dr. Wilfrido
Juco are jointly and solidarily ordered to pay complainant Ester
Asuncion the equivalent of her three (3) months salary for and as a
penalty for respondents' non-observance of complainant's right to
due process.
SO ORDERED. 4

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the public

respondent denied in its Resolution, dated February 19, 1997. Hence,
petitioner through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court seeks recourse to this Court and raises the following issue:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS DISMISSED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR A
JUST OR AUTHORIZED CAUSE.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Although, it is a legal tenet that factual findings of administrative
bodies are entitled to great weight and respect, we are constrained to
take a second look at the facts before us because of the diversity in the
opinions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. 5 A disharmony between the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and those of the NLRC opens the
door to a review thereof by this Court. 6
It bears stressing that a worker's employment is property in the
constitutional sense. He cannot be deprived of his work without due
process. In order for the dismissal to be valid, not only must it be based
on just cause supported by clear and convincing evidence, 7 the
employee must also be given an opportunity to be heard and defend
himself. 8 It is the employer who has the burden of proving that the
dismissal was with just or authorized cause. 9 The failure of the
employer to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is not
justified and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and
backwages. 10
In the case at bar, there is a paucity of evidence to establish the
charges of absenteeism and tardiness. We note that the employer
company submitted mere handwritten listing and computer print-outs.
The handwritten listing was not signed by the one who made the same.
As regards the print-outs, while the listing was computer generated, the
entries of time and other annotations were again handwritten and
unsigned. 11
We find that the handwritten listing and unsigned computer print-
outs were unauthenticated and, hence, unreliable. Mere self-serving
evidence of which the listing and print-outs are of that nature should be
rejected as evidence without any rational probative value even in
administrative proceedings. For this reason, we find the findings of the
Labor Arbiter to be correct. On this point, the Labor Arbiter ruled, to wit:
 . . . In the instant case, while the Notice of Termination served
on the complainant clearly mentions the record book upon which her
tardiness (and absences) was based, the respondent (company)
failed to establish (through) any of these documents and the
handwritten listing, notwithstanding, of (sic) the days when
complainant was absent from work or late in reporting for work and
even the computerized print-outs, do not suffice to prove the
complainant's absences were unauthorized as they could easily be
manufactured. . . . 12

In IBM Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC , 13 this Court clarified that the

liberality of procedure in administrative actions is not absolute and does
not justify the total disregard of certain fundamental rules of evidence.
Such that evidence without any rational probative value may not be
made the basis of order or decision of administrative bodies. The Court's
ratiocination in that case is relevant to the propriety of rejecting the
unsigned handwritten listings and computer print-outs submitted by
private respondents which we quote, to wit:
However, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is
subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process.
As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for flexibility in
administrative procedure "does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative value." More
specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC:
"It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like
the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in
the adjudication of cases. However, this
procedural rule should not be construed as a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules
of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not
controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence
presented before it must at least have a modicum of
admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The
Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to
prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying signature of
a certified public accountant or audited by an independent
auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents which ought to
be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative
value."
The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of
petitioners, afford no assurance of their authenticity because they
are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal
view in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies,
have nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or
reliability as condition for the admission of documents.

In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC , 14 this

Court held as incompetent unsigned daily time records presented to
prove that the employee was neglectful of his duties:
Indeed, the DTRs annexed to the present petition would tend to
establish private respondent's neglectful attitude towards his work
duties as shown by repeated and habitual absences and tardiness
 and propensity for working undertime for the year 1992. But the
problem with these DTRs is that they are neither originals nor
certified true copies. They are plain photocopies of the originals, if
the latter do exist. More importantly, they are not even signed by
private respondent nor by any of the employer's representatives. . . .

In the case at bar, both the handwritten listing and computer print-
outs being unsigned, the authenticity thereof is highly suspect and
devoid of any rational probative value especially in the light of the
existence of the official record book of the petitioner's alleged absences
and tardiness in the possession of the employer company. cSTCDA

Ironically, in the memorandum charging petitioner and notice of

termination, private respondents referred to the record book as its basis
for petitioner's alleged absenteeism and tardiness. Interestingly,
however, the record book was never presented in evidence. Private
respondents had possession thereof and the opportunity to present the
same. Being the basis of the charges against the petitioner, it is without
doubt the best evidence available to substantiate the allegations. The
purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the
prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence
and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place,
the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and
defeat. 15 Thus, private respondents' unexplained and unjustified non-
presentation of the record book, which is the best evidence in its
possession and control of the charges against the petitioner, casts
serious doubts on the factual basis of the charges of absenteeism and
tardiness.
We find that private respondents failed to present a single piece of
credible evidence to serve as the basis for their charges against
petitioner and consequently, failed to fulfill their burden of proving the
facts which constitute the just cause for the dismissal of the petitioner.
However, the NLRC ruled that despite such absence of evidence, there
was an admission on the part of petitioner in her Letter dated August 11,
1994 wherein she wrote:
I am quite surprised why I have incurred 35 absences since
August 1993 up to the present. I can only surmise
that Saturdays were not included in my work week at your clinic. If
you will please recall, per agreement with you, my work days at your
clinic is from Monday to Friday without Saturday work. As to my
other supposed absences, I believe that said absences were
authorized and therefore cannot be considered as absences which
need not be explained (sic). It is also extremely difficult to
understand why it is only now that I am charged to explain alleged
absences incurred way back August 1993. 16

In reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, public respondent

NLRC relied upon the supposed admission of the petitioner of her
habitual absenteeism and chronic tardiness.
We do not subscribe to the findings of the NLRC that the above
quoted letter of petitioner amounted to an admission of her alleged
absences. As explained by petitioner, her alleged absences were
incurred on Saturdays. According to petitioner, these should not be
considered as absences as there was an arrangement between her and
the private respondents that she would not be required to work on
Saturdays. Private respondents have failed to deny the existence of this
arrangement. Hence, the decision of the NLRC that private respondent
had sufficient grounds to terminate petitioner as she admitted the
charges of habitual absences has no leg to stand on. EcHAaS

Neither have the private respondents shown by competent

evidence that the petitioner was given any warning or reprimanded for
her alleged absences and tardiness. Private respondents claimed that
they sent several notices to the petitioner warning her of her absences,
however, petitioner refused to receive the same. On this point, the Labor
Arbiter succinctly observed:
The record is bereft of any showing that complainant was ever
warned of her absences prior to her dismissal on August 9, 1994. The
alleged notices of her absences from August 17, until September 30,
1993, from October until November 27, 1993, from December 1, 1993
up to February 26, 1994 and the notice dated 31 May 1994 reminding
complainant of her five (5) days absences, four (4) half-days and
tardiness for 582 minutes (Annex "1" to "1-D" attached to respondent'
Rejoinder), fail to show that the notices were received by the
complainant. The allegation of the respondents that the complainant
refused to received (sic) the same is self-serving and merits scant
consideration. . . . 17

The Court, likewise, takes note of the fact that the two-day period
given to petitioner to explain and answer the charges against her was
most unreasonable, considering that she was charged with several
offenses and infractions (35 absences, 23 half-days and 108 tardiness),
some of which were allegedly committed almost a year before, not to
mention the fact that the charges leveled against her lacked
particularity.
Apart from chronic absenteeism and habitual tardiness, petitioner
was also made to answer for loitering and wasting of company time,
getting salary of an absent employee without acknowledging or signing
for it and disobedience and insubordination. 18 Thus, the Labor Arbiter
found that actually petitioner tried to submit her explanation on August
11, 1994 or within the two-day period given her, but private respondents
prevented her from doing so by instructing their staff not to accept
complainant's explanation, which was the reason why her explanation
was submitted a day later. 19
The law mandates that every opportunity and assistance must be
accorded to the employee by the management to enable him to prepare
adequately for his defense. 20 In Ruffy v. NLRC, 21 the Court held that
what would qualify as sufficient or "ample opportunity," as required by
law, would be "every kind of assistance that management must accord
to the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense." In
the case at bar, private respondents cannot be gainsaid to have given
petitioner the ample opportunity to answer the charges leveled against
her. ASEcHI

From the foregoing, there are serious doubts in the evidence on

record as to the factual basis of the charges against petitioner. These
doubts shall be resolved in her favor in line with the policy under
the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in
favor of labor. 22 The consistent rule is that if doubts exist between
the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was
for a justifiable cause. 23 Not having satisfied its burden of proof, we
conclude that the employer dismissed the petitioner without any just
cause. Hence, the termination is illegal.
Having found that the petitioner has been illegally terminated, she
is necessarily entitled to reinstatement to her former previous position
without loss of seniority and the payment of backwages. 24
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission, dated November 29, 1996 and the Resolution, dated
February 20, 1997 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated May 15, 1996 REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., is on official leave.

Footnotes

1.Letter from Medical Director Wilfrido S. Juco to herein petitioner, dated

August 9, 1994; Rollo, p. 104.
2.Decision, Labor Arbiter, p 19; Id., at 78.
3.Id., at 26-25; Id., at 83-84.
4.NLRC Decision, p. 17, Id., at 55.
5.Manila Electric Company v. NLRC and Jeremias Cortez, 263 SCRA 531 (1996).
6.Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 320 (1996).
7.Nagusara v. National Labor Relations Commission, 290 SCRA 245, 254 (1998)
citing Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC, July 31, 1997.
8.RDS Trucking v. National Labor Relations Commission, 294 SCRA 623, 629
(1998); Maneja v. National Labor Relations Commission, 290 SCRA 603,
620 (1998); Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, 287 SCRA
117, 122 (1998).
9.Id., at 623; Lopez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 297 SCRA 508, 516
(1998); Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v. Laguesma, 286 SCRA 401,
434 (1998); Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 71, 77 (1998).
10.Paguio Transport Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission , 294
SCRA 657, 665-666 (1998).
 11.Rollo, p. 122.
12.Id., 78.
13.305 SCRA 592 (1999).
14.266 SCRA 97 (1997); Ibid.
15.IBM, Inc. v. NLRC, supra.
16.Rollo, p. 105.
17.Id., at 75-76.
18.Rollo, p. 124.
19.See note 3.
20.IBM, Inc. v. NLRC, supra; Maneja v. National Labor Relations Commission,
supra.
21.182 SCRA 365, 369-370 (1990).
22.These policies are embodied in Articles 3 and 4 of the Labor Code,which
read:
ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy. — The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. . . . [Emphasis supplied].
ART 4. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
23.Dizon v. NLRC, 180 SCRA 52 (1989).
24.LABOR CODE, Art 279.

(Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 129329, [July

|||

31, 2001], 414 PHIL 329-342)