2024 INSC 233 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 9598 of 2022)

A.M. MOHAN …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS
THE STATE REPRESENTED BY SHO
AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal challenges the order dated 15th July

2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of

Judicature at Madras in Criminal O.P. No. 20716 of 2020

and Crl. M.P. No. 8763 of 2020, whereby the High Court

rejected the petition filed by the present appellant under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(“Cr.P.C.” for short), to call for the records and to quash the

Signature Not Verified First Information Report (“FIR” for short) registered as Crime
Digitally signed by
Narendra Prasad

No. 21 of 2020, on the file of SHO, District Crime Branch,

Date: 2024.03.20
17:32:38 IST
Reason:

Kancheepuram, in connection with the offence punishable

1
under Section 420 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (“IPC” for short).

FACTS

3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal

are as under:

3.1 The case of the prosecution is that, during the year

2016, accused No. 2-Suresh Prathaban, being a college

friend, approached the complainant Karthick Krishnamurthy

for some help to clear his hand loan. The accused No. 2

further told that he had business with accused No. 1-

Lakshmanan, who is running a hotel and also doing real

estate business. Upon the insistence of accused No. 2, the

complainant had agreed to extend financial help to accused

No. 1 to the tune of Rs.1,60,00,000/- for the business

project(s) at Oragadam and around Kancheepuram District

with condition to repay the same within 20 months with

100% profit.

3.2 Accordingly, the complainant transferred a sum of

Rs.49,25,000/- on 18th March 2016, Rs.20,01,000/- on 31st

May 2016, Rs.36,25,000/- on 13th June 2016,

Rs.30,24,166/- on 8th July 2016 through RTGS and Rs.

2
24,25,834/- in cash to accused Nos. 1 and 2, totalling to the

tune of Rs.1,60,01,000/- (though mentioned in complaint as

Rs.1,60,00,000/-). To secure the same, accused No. 1 had

executed a registered simple mortgage deed dated 18th March

2016 in favour of the complainant relating to 100 plots at

Sumangali Village, Thiruvannamalai District, registered vide

document No.768 of 2016 for Rs.1,00,00,000/-.

3.3 Thereafter, at the insistence of accused Nos. 1 and 2,

the complainant entered into an unregistered memorandum

of understanding and paid a sum of Rs.1,50,00,000/- and a

further sum of Rs.50,00,000/- by RTGS and cheque to

accused No. 1’s bank. In the said amount, the complainant

directly transferred a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- in favour of the

present appellant-A.M. Mohan (accused No.3). Further,

accused No.1 also transferred a sum of Rs.1,80,00,000/- to

the present appellant for the purchase of the land

admeasuring 9.80 acres situated at Chittoor Village,

Sriperumbudur Taluk. To secure the said payment of

Rs.2,00,00,000/- with returns of Rs.10,00,00,000/-, accused

No. 1 executed a registered deed of General Power of Attorney

(“GPA” for short) dated 3rd February 2017, in favour of the

3
complainant, vide document No. 3733/2017, in respect of

the above said land and also executed a registered sale deed

relating to the land admeasuring 2.52 acres situated at

Vellarai Village, Kancheepuram District vide document

No.386/2017 dated 9th February 2017 in favour of the

complainant.

3.4 The accused No. 1 also executed a mortgage deed for

land admeasuring 2.14 acres at Sunguvarchatram Village

(though mentioned in the complaint as ‘a registered

Agreement to Sell land admeasuring 1.64½ acres’) in favour

of the complainant registered vide document No.373/2017

dated 27th February 2017. Thereafter, accused Nos. 1 and 2

had received an amount of Rs.49,85,500/- and executed

unregistered loan agreement dated 5th March 2017, in favour

of the complainant and agreed to repay with interest

quantified at Rs.60,000/- per month. For repayment of the

said amount along with interest, accused No. 1 had given a

cheque for Rs.58,50,000/- and the same was returned

dishonoured due to insufficient funds.

3.5 Apart from all these transactions, on insistence of

accused Nos. 1 and 2, the complainant joined in the “gold

4
chit business” conducted by accused No. 1 and paid a sum of

Rs.1,20,000/- per month, from March 2016 to August 2017,

totalling to the tune of Rs.21,60,000/-. The accused persons

swindled all the amounts and cheated the complainant. The

accused No. 1 had disposed of about 58 plots on his own and

failed to return the mortgaged amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/-

with interest. He also cancelled the power of attorney

standing in favour of the complainant relating to 9.80 acres

of land at Chittoor Village and without notice to the

complainant, he sold out the same to third parties.

Accordingly, the appellant and other accused persons

cheated the complainant to the tune of Rs.16,01,00,000/-

(though mentioned in complaint as Rs.16,06,00,000/-) by

their willful and intentional action of fraud, cheating and

criminal breach of trust. Hence the complaint.

3.6 On the strength of the complaint filed before the

Judicial Magistrate, a FIR being Crime No. 21 of 2020 came

to be registered on 7th November 2020, at District Crime

Branch, Kancheepuram District, against accused Nos. 1, 2

and 3, for the offences punishable under Section 420 read

with 34 of the IPC.

5
3.7 Aggrieved thereby, the appellant herein filed a Criminal

O.P. No. 20716 of 2020 before the High Court, under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C., to call for the records and to quash the

said FIR.

3.8 Vide impugned order dated 15th July 2022, the learned

Single Judge of the High Court, observed that it is clear that

the intention of the appellant and other accused persons was

only to cheat the complainant and that it can be seen from

the FIR that there are specific allegations against the

appellant to attract the offence, which has to be investigated

in depth.

3.9 The Single Judge held that the FIR discloses prima facie

commission of a cognizable offence and as such, the High

Court cannot interfere with the investigation. As a result, the

High Court rejected the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

for quashing of the FIR, but directed the investigating agency

to complete the investigation and file a final report within a

period of twelve weeks.

3.10 Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed the present

appeal, in which notice came to be issued vide order dated

21st October 2022.

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3.11 As per the additional documents filed in this Court, the

charge-sheet in relation to the subject FIR, came to be filed

on 4th January 2023.

4. We have heard Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the appellant, Shri V. Krishnamurthy,

learned Senior Additional Advocate General (AAG) for

respondent No. 1 and Shri G. Ananda Selvam, learned

counsel appearing for respondent No. 2.

SUBMISSIONS

5. Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant submits that even if the averments

made in the FIR are taken at their face value, no case is

made out for the offence punishable under Section 420 of

IPC against the present appellant. It is further submitted

that a reading of the charge-sheet would reveal that none of

the ingredients to attract the provision of Section 420 of IPC

could be found therein.

6. Shri Nagamuthu, relying on various judgments of this

Court, submits that, for attracting the offence of ‘cheating’ as

defined under Section 415 of IPC and punishable under

Section 420 of IPC, it is necessary that the FIR should make

7
out a case of “intentional inducement”, “dishonesty” or

“fraudulence”. It is submitted that for the offence of

‘cheating’, there should not only be cheating, but as a

consequence of such cheating, the accused should also have

dishonestly induced the person deceived to deliver any

property to a person. It is submitted that neither the FIR nor

the charge-sheet contain a whisper with respect to any

inducement, fraud or dishonesty qua the appellant that

caused the complainant to deliver the sum of Rs.20,00,000/-

to his bank account on 2nd February 2017.

7. Shri Nagamuthu further submitted that the

complainant has deliberately suppressed the fact that the

appellant had transferred the land in favour of accused No. 1

by way of a Sale Deed dated 3rd February 2017 i.e., on the

very next day of receiving the sum of Rs.20,00,000/- from

the complainant. It is further submitted that, on the very

same day i.e. 3rd February 2017, accused No. 1 had executed

a GPA in favour of the complainant vide Document No. 3733

of 2017. The GPA specifically states that the complainant

had received the GPA in respect of the land purchased by

accused No. 1 from the appellant. It is therefore submitted

8
that the appellant has no role to play after 3rd February 2017

and almost all the allegations are with regard to cancellation

of GPA etc., and execution of subsequent sale deed in favour

of accused No. 4-Seeralan and accused No. 5-Kavitha by

accused No. 1, are not related to the appellant.

8. As against this, Shri G. Ananda Selvam, learned

counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 submits that since

the charge-sheet has already been filed, the appeal is

rendered infructuous. It is submitted that the appellant can

very well file an application for discharge. It is further

submitted that the averments in the FIR would clearly show

that the present appellant along with other accused persons

has cheated the complainant and defrauded with the huge

amount. It is therefore submitted that no interference is

warranted in the present appeal.

CONSIDERATION

9. The law with regard to exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal

proceedings has been succinctly summarized by this Court

in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India

9
Limited and Others1 after considering the earlier

precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following

observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:

“12. The principles relating to exercise of

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and
criminal proceedings have been stated and
reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To
mention a few—Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1
SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234] , State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar
Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri)
1059] , Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans
Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 1045] , State of Bihar v. Rajendra
Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 628]
, Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC
259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] , Medchl Chemicals &
Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC
269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615] , Hridaya Ranjan Prasad
Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 786] , M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8
SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283] .
The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out
the case alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined
as a whole, but without examining the merits of the
allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a
1
(2006) 6 SCC 736 : 2006 INSC 452

10
meticulous analysis of the material nor an
assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the
allegations in the complaint, is warranted while
examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed
where it is a clear abuse of the process of
the court, as when the criminal
proceeding is found to have been initiated
with mala fides/malice for wreaking
vengeance or to cause harm, or where the
allegations are absurd and inherently
improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not,
however, be used to stifle or scuttle a
legitimate prosecution. The power should
be used sparingly and with abundant
caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to
verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients
of the offence alleged. If the necessary
factual foundation is laid in the
complaint, merely on the ground that a
few ingredients have not been stated in
detail, the proceedings should not be
quashed. Quashing of the complaint is
warranted only where the complaint is so
bereft of even the basic facts which are
absolutely necessary for making out the
offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a)
purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a
criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as
also a criminal offence. A commercial
transaction or a contractual dispute,
apart from furnishing a cause of action
for seeking remedy in civil law, may also
involve a criminal offence. As the nature
and scope of a civil proceeding are
different from a criminal proceeding, the
mere fact that the complaint relates to a
commercial transaction or breach of

11
 contract, for which a civil remedy is
available or has been availed, is not by
itself a ground to quash the criminal
proceedings. The test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose a
criminal offence or not.
13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take
notice of a growing tendency in business circles to
convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases.
This is obviously on account of a prevalent
impression that civil law remedies are time
consuming and do not adequately protect the
interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is
seen in several family disputes also, leading to
irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families.
There is also an impression that if a person could
somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution,
there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any
effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do
not involve any criminal offence, by applying
pressure through criminal prosecution should be
deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar
Suri v. State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 513] this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8)
“It is to be seen if a matter, which is
essentially of a civil nature, has been
given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal
proceedings are not a short cut of other
remedies available in law. Before issuing
process a criminal court has to exercise a
great deal of caution. For the accused it
is a serious matter. This Court has laid
certain principles on the basis of which
the High Court is to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code. Jurisdiction under this section has
to be exercised to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.”
14. While no one with a legitimate cause or
grievance should be prevented from seeking

12
 remedies available in criminal law, a complainant
who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being
fully aware that the criminal proceedings are
unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law,
should himself be made accountable, at the end of
such misconceived criminal proceedings, in
accordance with law. One positive step that can be
taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary
prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is
to exercise their power under Section 250 CrPC
more frequently, where they discern malice or
frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the
complainant. Be that as it may.”

10. The Court has also noted the concern with regard to a

growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil

disputes into criminal cases. The Court observed that this is

obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law

remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect

the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court also recorded

that there is an impression that if a person could somehow

be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood

of imminent settlement. The Court, relying on the law laid

down by it in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Another

v. State of U.P. and Others2 held that any effort to settle

civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal

offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution

2
(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 INSC 34

13
should be deprecated and discouraged. The Court also

observed that though no one with a legitimate cause or

grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies

available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or

persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the

criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies

only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the

end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in

accordance with law.

11. This Court, in the case of Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy

and Another v. Sudha Seetharam and Another3 has

culled out the ingredients to constitute the offence under

Sections 415 and 420 of IPC, as under:

“15. Section 415 of the Penal Code reads thus:

“415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving
any person, fraudulently or dishonestly
induces the person so deceived to deliver
any property to any person, or to consent
that any person shall retain any property,
or intentionally induces the person so
deceived to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit if he were
not so deceived, and which act or
omission causes or is likely to cause
damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to
“cheat”.”

3
(2019) 16 SCC 739 : 2019 INSC 216

14
16. The ingredients to constitute an offence of
cheating are as follows:
16.1. There should be fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of a person by deceiving him:
16.1.1. The person so induced should be
intentionally induced to deliver any property to any
person or to consent that any person shall retain
any property, or
16.1.2. The person so induced should be
intentionally induced to do or to omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit if he were not so
deceived; and
16.2. In cases covered by 16.1.2. above, the act or
omission should be one which caused or is likely to
cause damage or harm to the person induced in
body, mind, reputation or property.
17. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an
essential ingredient of the offence. A person who
dishonestly induces another person to deliver any
property is liable for the offence of cheating.
18. Section 420 of the Penal Code reads thus:
“420. Cheating and dishonestly
inducing delivery of property.—
Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver
any property to any person, or to make,
alter or destroy the whole or any part of a
valuable security, or anything which is
signed or sealed, and which is capable of
being converted into a valuable security,
shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.”
19. The ingredients to constitute an offence under
Section 420 are as follows:
19.1. A person must commit the offence of cheating
under Section 415; and

15
 19.2. The person cheated must be dishonestly
induced to
(a) deliver property to any person; or
(b) make, alter or destroy valuable
security or anything signed or sealed and
capable of being converted into valuable
security.
20. Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to
constitute an offence under Section 420.”

12. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the cases

of Archana Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another4,

Deepak Gaba and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and

Another5 and Mariam Fasihuddin and Another v. State

by Adugodi Police Station and Another6.

13. It could thus be seen that for attracting the provision of

Section 420 of IPC, the FIR/complaint must show that the

ingredients of Section 415 of IPC are made out and the

person cheated must have been dishonestly induced to

deliver the property to any person; or to make, alter or

destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and

capable of being converted into valuable security. In other

words, for attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it

must be shown that the FIR/complaint discloses:

4
(2021) 3 SCC 751 : 2021 INSC 135
5
(2023) 3 SCC 423 : 2023 INSC 1
6
2024 SCC OnLine SC 58 : 2024 INSC 49

16
 (i) the deception of any person;

(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to

deliver any property to any person; and

(iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of

making the inducement.

14. The averments with regard to the present appellant as

have been found in the FIR is as under:

“At the instance of the said Lakshmanan (accused

No.1), I (complainant) paid directly Rs. 20,00,000/-
to one Mohan (appellant-accused No. 3) and the
said Lakshmanan (accused No.1) transferred the
remaining sale consideration of over 18 odd crores
to Mohan for the purchase of his lands at
Sunguvarchatram. But suppressed the execution of
sale deed dated 03.02.2017 by the
appellant/accused No.3.”

15. A perusal thereof would reveal that even in the said

averments, the allegation with regard to inducement is only

qua accused No. 1. We have perused the entire FIR. Except

the aforesaid allegations, there are no other allegation with

regard to the present appellant-accused No. 3. The rest of

the allegations are against accused No. 1 (Lakshmanan).

Even the allegations with regard to inducement are only

against accused Nos. 1 and 2.

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16. Not only that, even in the charge-sheet, the only role

attributed to the present appellant could be found as follows:

“Thereafter, A2 had lured the complainant once

again saying that A1 is going to layout the 9.80 acre
land in Chittoor Village, Thiruperumbudur Taluk,
which is under A3’s general power of attorney and
that the complainant would gain huge profits if he
invests Rs. 2 crores in this project as well. A1 too,
as he had already done, lured the complainant that
he would pay him a share out of the profit, and
executed a General Power of Attorney Deed in
favour of the complainant in respect of the 9.80 acre
land in Chittoor Village in Thiruperumbudur Taluk
which he purchased from A3 and registered it as
Doc. No. 3733/2017 in Sunguvarchattiram Sub
Registrar Office on 03.02.2017, in a manner
instilling confidence in the complainant.
……..
Moreover, upon instructions from A1 to transfer Rs.
20,00,000/- to A3’s Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank
Account towards sale of the land made by A3 to A1,
the complainant had transferred online a sum of
Rs.20,00,000/- to A3’s Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank
Account from his Yes Bank Account on
02.02.2017.”

17. It could thus be seen that the only allegation against the

present appellant is that accused No. 1 executed the GPA in

favour of the complainant in respect of the land which is

purchased from the present appellant-accused No.3. The

other allegation is that upon instructions of accused No. 1 to

transfer Rs. 20,00,000/- to accused No. 3’s Tamil Nadu

Mercantile Bank Account towards sale of the land made by

18
the appellant-accused No.3 to accused No.1, the complainant

had transferred online a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-.

18. It is an undisputed position that upon receipt of the

said amount of Rs.20,00,000/-, the present appellant had

transferred the land in question by sale deed in favour of

accused No.1. It is also undisputed that thereafter accused

No. 1 executed the GPA in favour of the complainant on the

same day. After the sale deed was executed in favour of

accused No.1 by the appellant-accused No.3, though the

complaint narrates various instances thereafter, no role is

attributed to the present appellant.

19. At the cost of repetition, it has to be noted that no role

of inducement at all has been attributed to the present

appellant. Rather, from the perusal of the FIR and the

charge-sheet, it would reveal that there was no transaction of

any nature directly between the appellant and the

complainant. The version, if accepted at its face value, would

reveal that, at the instance of accused No. 1, the complainant

transferred the amount of Rs.20,00,000/- in the account of

the appellant. On receipt of the said amount, the appellant

immediately executed the sale deed in favour of accused

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No.1, who thereafter executed the GPA in favour of the

complainant. After that, no role is attributed to the present

appellant and whatever happened thereafter, has happened

between accused No. 1, the complainant and the other

accused persons. In that view of the matter, we find that the

FIR or the charge-sheet, even if taken at its face value, does

not disclose the ingredients to attract the provision of Section

420 of IPC qua the appellant.

20. The dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract

the provisions of Sections 415 and 420 of IPC. In our

considered view, the same is totally lacking qua the present

appellant. In that view of the matter, we find that

continuation of the criminal proceedings against the present

appellant would be nothing else but amount to abuse of

process of law resulting in miscarriage of justice.

21. Insofar as the contention of the respondents that since

the charge-sheet has been filed, the present appeal is liable

to be dismissed, is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to

the following observations of this Court, in the case of Anand

20
Kumar Mohatta and Another v. State (NCT of Delhi),

Department of Home and Another7:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the

submission of the learned Senior Counsel for
Respondent 2 that once the charge-sheet is filed,
petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not
see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind
the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj
A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] .
In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] ,
this Court while deciding the question whether the
High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition
for quashing of FIR, when the charge-sheet was filed
by the police during the pendency of the Section
482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, from the general conspectus of
the various sections under which the
appellant is being charged and is to be
prosecuted would show that the same are
not made out even prima facie from the
complainant's FIR. Even if the charge-
sheet had been filed, the learned Single
Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365]
could have still examined whether the
offences alleged to have been committed
by the appellant were prima facie made
out from the complainant's FIR, charge-
sheet, documents, etc. or not.”
15. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the
provision invoked by the accused before the High
Court is Section 482 CrPC and that this Court is

7
(2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060

21
hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482
CrPC. Section 482 CrPC reads as follows:
“482. Saving of inherent powers of the
High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall
be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect
to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any court
or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.”
16. There is nothing in the words of this section
which restricts the exercise of the power of the
Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or
miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the
FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High
Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section
482 CrPC even when the discharge application is
pending with the trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State
of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
513. Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC
591, para 20 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338 : (2014) 2
SCC (L&S) 237] . Indeed, it would be a travesty to
hold that proceedings initiated against a person
can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but
not if it has advanced and the allegations have
materialised into a charge-sheet. On the
contrary it could be said that the abuse of
process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the
FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after
investigation. The power is undoubtedly
conferred to prevent abuse of process of power
of any court.”
[emphasis supplied]

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22. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case

of Haji Iqbal alias Bala through S.P.O.A. v. State of U.P.

and Others8.

23. In that view of the matter, contention in this regard has

no merit.

CONCLUSION

24. In the result, we are inclined to allow the appeal. The

order of the High Court dated 15th July 2022 in Criminal O.P.

No.20716 of 2020 and Criminal M.P. No. 8763 of 2020 is

quashed and set aside. The FIR in Crime No.21 of 2020 and

the consequential charge-sheet filed against the present

appellant shall stand quashed and set aside.

25. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

….........................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)

….........................J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)

….........................J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 20, 2024.
8
2023 SCC OnLine SC 946 : 2023 INSC 688

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