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DR. ULPIANO P.
SARMIENTO III
Dean
ATTY. CARLO D. BUSMENTE
Vice Dean
ATTY. MARIA ELIZA CAMILLE B. YAMAMOTO-SANTOS
Prefect of Student Affairs
ATTY. ROBEN B. CADUGO JR.
Administrative Officer
TTY. ROBEN B. CADUGO JR.
A
ATTY. PAULINO Q. UNGOS III
Advisers
SAMUEL JOSHUA CRUZ
Overall Chairperson
REX ROLAND REGIO MARIA LOURDES MENDOZA
Chairperson, Academics Chairperson, Finance
MAEIA MIKHAELA MAYUGA DIAZMEAN KYLA SOTELO
hairperson, Assessment, Learning &
C Chairperson, Recruitment & Membership
Development
BRYAN AREVALO
PIA MONICA DIMAGUILA hairperson, Partnership & External
C
Chairperson, Bar Matters Relations
ANDREA JOSES TAN THERESE JEANNE BELARMINO
Chairperson, Communications Chairperson, Operations & Logistics
MIGERN COLE ESTABILLO ROSANNA NAIG
Chairperson, Secretariat Chairperson, EDP
MA. LOLITA KIM PALENCIA
Chairperson, Bar Mentoring Program
YRREL DAVE NAVELA
Z USTINE VINCENT PASCUAL
J
MARK COLOCADO JOEL REMENTILLA
eputy Chairpersons, Operations &
D Deputy Chairpersons, Academics
Logistics
GISELLE MARIE DIAZ
Deputy Chairperson, Communications
NTONINA CONCEPCION
A
MIER DELA CRUZ ILL QUIMSON
J
Deputy Chairperson, Membership
MARIEL ARAGON
Deputy Chairpersons, ALD
RAMAINE BALON
A
MICHAEL DOMINIQUE ISIDRO JASMINE JAGUNAP
Deputy Chairpersons, Finance
Deputy Chairpersons, Bar Matters
NGEL ROSE CINCO
A ARON FRANCISCO
A
MA. REGINA SANTIAGO RHIANA NAVARRO
AUBREY ANGELI TAN eputy Chairpersons, Bar Mentoring
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ZAMANTHA JOSH ALCAZAR Program
DOMSKI CANDOLITA
Deputy Chairpersons, EDP AARMIE GOCE
L
ERIKA PACA
KATHERINE ANNE LABAYO Deputy Chairpersons, Secretariat
Deputy Chairperson, Ex Parte
HANZ CHRISTIAN MIRAFLOR KIMBERLY JOY NAPARAN
Commercial Law Political Law
ISABELA SOFIA ELEAZAR ANTHONY JOHN RODRIGUEZ
Legal Ethics Taxation Law
LANCE LIZOR PUNZALAN LOUISE ATHENA MONSERRAT
Remedial Law Civil Law
FELICE LEONAJOY HERNANDEZ ERYL AMRHEIN AGUSTIN
Criminal Law Labor Law
QUENNIE SERENO ENRIC ALCAIDE
Commercial Law Political Law
SOFIA REGINA YASAY ROSCH MANUEL
Legal Ethics Taxation Law
NALA ANOVER HILLARY SANTILLAN
Remedial Law Civil Law
JANNAH ODTUHAN BIANCA VELASCO
Criminal Law Labor Law
KIM JAN BATECAN
VERONICA BAUTISTA
ADRIAN ALY CHIO
JOSE PAULO DE LOS REYES
SYDNEY ROSE DOB
THEA MARAGANA
JOSEPH MILLADO
PRECIOUS MORANTE
DAVID PADRE
PAMELA PRIETO
BIANCA PUJALTE
AMIEL RAPISTA
CHANTAL SANGGALANG
Volunteers
RAMON TIMOTHY BAUTISTA
AUSTIN SANTUELE
his work is the intellectual property of the SAN BEDA COLLEGE
T
ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW and SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG
CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2024. It is intended solely for the use of
the individuals to which it is addressed – the Bedan community.
Publication, reproduction, dissemination, and distribution, or copying of
the document without the prior consent of the SAN BEDA COLLEGE
ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ACADEMICS
COMMITTEE 2024 is strictly prohibited.
Material includes cases penned by Justice Lopez and recent landmark
cases decided by the Supreme Court.
OPYRIGHT © 2024
C
SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW
AN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG SCHOOL OF LAW CENTRALIZED BAR
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OPERATIONS 2024
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED BY THE AUTHORS.
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REMEDIALLAW...........................................................................................................................9
AspectsOfJurisdiction............................................................................................................9
AspectsOfJurisdiction—OverTheSubjectMatter..........................................................9
VELASQUEZ,JR.V.LISONDRALAND,INC..............................................................9
PrimaryJurisdictionAndExhaustionOfAdministrativeRemedies........................................12
PrimaryJurisdictionAndExhaustionOfAdministrativeRemedies..................................12
UREMPLOYEDINTERNATIONALCORP.V.PINMILIW.........................................12
CIVILPROCEDURE....................................................................................................................16
Pleadings...............................................................................................................................16
JudgmentsAndFinalOrders-ImmutabilityOfJudgments(CoaDecisions)...................16
PartiesToCivilActions(Rule3)-RealParties-In-Interest(Section2)............................16
DEVELOPMENTBANKOFTHEPHILIPPINESV.COMMISSIONONAUDIT.........16
Pleadings-PartsAndContents,FormalRequirements;.................................................20
ComputationOfTime(Rule7).........................................................................................20
SPOUSESCORDEROV.OCTAVIANO....................................................................20
EffectOfFailureToPlead-Rule9..................................................................................22
VITARICHCORP.V.DAGMIL....................................................................................22
AmendedAndSupplementalPleadings..........................................................................24
HEIRSOFTEJADAV.HAY.......................................................................................24
Summons...............................................................................................................................27
ServiceOfSummons—Rule14.....................................................................................27
INTEGRATEDMICROELECTRONICS,INC.V.STANDARDINSURANCECO.,INC.
27
JudgmentsAndFinalOrders.................................................................................................29
JudgmentsAndFinalOrders...........................................................................................29
SPOUSESPOBLETEV.BANCOFILIPINOSAVINGSANDMORTGAGEBANK....29
JudgmentsAndFinalOrders-ImmutabilityOfJudgments.............................................31
PAGUIOV.COMMISSIONONAUDIT(EnBanc).....................................................31
JudgmentsAndFinalOrders-ImmutabilityOfJudgment...............................................34
(COADecisions)..............................................................................................................34
PartiesToCivilActions(Rule3)-RealParties-In-Interest(Section2)............................34
DEVELOPMENTBANKOFTHEPHILIPPINESV.COMMISSIONONAUDIT.........34
RemediesBeforeFinalityOfJudgment.................................................................................38
AppealsAndOtherModesOfReview.............................................................................38
SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION V. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS,
INC.............................................................................................................................38
AppealsAndOtherModesOfReview.............................................................................41
AUSTRIAVAAAANDBBB.......................................................................................41
AppealsAndOtherModesOfReview-Rules40-45......................................................46
ANGV.COURTOFAPPEALS..................................................................................46
1. Remedies Before Finality Of Judgment — Appeals And Other Modes Of Review –
Rule45.............................................................................................................................48
2. Prosecution Of Civil Action (Rule 111); Civil Liability Ex-Delicto; In Cases Of Acquittal
(SeeAlsoCivilCode,Art.29)..........................................................................................48
COLLADOV.DELAVEGA........................................................................................48
RemediesAfterJudgmentBecomesFinal............................................................................51
AnnulmentOfJudgment–Rule47..................................................................................51
THOMASV.TRONO..................................................................................................51
Execution,Satisfaction,AndEffectsOfJudgments(Rule39)...............................................55
6
xecution, Satisfaction, And Effects Of Judgments (Rule 39) — Effect Of Judgments Or
E
FinalOrders–Section47(ConclusivenessOfJudgment)..............................................55
CITYGOVERNMENTOFTACLOBANV.COURTOFAPPEALS.............................55
Execution,Satisfaction,AndEffectsOfJudgments(Rule39).........................................57
EffectOfForeignJudgmentsOrFinalOrders–Section48............................................57
PIONEERINSURANCE&SURETYCORP.V.TIGINSURANCECO......................57
ExecutionOfMoneyJudgment........................................................................................60
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. V. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK,
INC.............................................................................................................................60
ProvisionalRemedies............................................................................................................64
ProvisionalRemedies......................................................................................................64
DELIMAV.COURTOFAPPEALS...........................................................................64
SPECIALCIVILACTIONS..........................................................................................................68
Certiorari,Prohibition,AndMandamus(Rule65)..................................................................68
Certiorari,ProhibitionAndMandamus(Rule65).............................................................68
PUREGOLDPRICECLUB,INC.V.COURTOFAPPEALS......................................68
ForcibleEntryAndUnlawfulDetainer(Rule70)....................................................................72
ForcibleEntryAndUnlawfulDetainer(Rule70)..............................................................72
GALACGACV.BAUTISTA.........................................................................................72
SpecialProceedingsAndSpecialWrits.................................................................................75
Financial Rehabilitation And Insolvency Act Of 2010 (Ra No. 10142) - Commencement
Order................................................................................................................................75
KAIZENBUILDERS,INC.V.COURTOFAPPEALS.................................................75
SettlementofEstateofDeceasedPersons...........................................................................77
Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons - Letters Testamentary And Of
Administration-Rule78...................................................................................................77
GOZUMV.PAPPAS...................................................................................................77
ChangeOfName(Rule103).................................................................................................79
ChangeOfName(Rule103)...........................................................................................79
REPUBLICV.MALIGAYA..........................................................................................79
CancellationOrCorrectionOfEntriesInTheCivilRegistry(Rule108;R.A.9048,...............83
AsAmendedByR.A.No.10172)..........................................................................................83
Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry (Rule 108; R.A. 9048, As
AmendedByR.A.No.10172).........................................................................................83
REPUBLICV.ONTUCAYPELEÑO..........................................................................83
CRIMINALPROCEDURE...........................................................................................................87
PreliminaryInvestigation(Rule112)......................................................................................87
AuthorizedOfficers;DeterminationOfProbableCause–Sections2-4..........................87
MACASIL V. FRAUD AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION OFFICE-COMMISSION ON
AUDIT........................................................................................................................87
Arrest,Search,AndSeizures................................................................................................90
LawfulWarrantlessSearch..............................................................................................90
SULLANOYSANTIAV.PEOPLE.............................................................................90
Bail(Rule114);RecognizanceActOf2012(R.A.No.10389)..............................................93
Bail(Rule114,Section7)................................................................................................93
PEOPLEV.NAPOLES...............................................................................................93
EVIDENCE(A.M.No.19-08-15-SC)...........................................................................................97
KeyConcepts........................................................................................................................97
Admissibility;RelevanceAndCompetence(Rule128)...................................................97
RE:JOHNMARKTAMAÑO.......................................................................................97
Kinds....................................................................................................................................100
7
OpinionRule(Rule130)................................................................................................100
CIVILSERVICECOMMISSIONV.DAMPILAG.......................................................100
TestimonialEvidence(Rule130-C)................................................................................103
Opinion–Sections51-53..............................................................................................103
TURALBAYVILLEGASV.PEOPLE.......................................................................103
PresentationOfEvidence....................................................................................................106
PresentationOfEvidence..............................................................................................106
STRONGFORTWAREHOUSINGCORP.V.BANTA..............................................106
8
REMEDIAL LAW
Aspects Of Jurisdiction
Aspects Of Jurisdiction — Over The Subject Matter
VELASQUEZ, JR. V. LISONDRA LAND, INC.
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 231290 | August 27, 2020
DOCTRINE
urisdiction is defined as the power and authority to hear, try, and decide a
J
case.Inorderforthecourtoranadjudicativebodytohaveauthoritytodispose
ofthecaseonthemerits,itmustacquirejurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter.It
isaxiomaticthatjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterisconferredbylawandnot
by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous
belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court or tribunal has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action.
evertheless,arecognizedexceptiontothisruleisestoppel.Thenotionthatthe
N
defenseoflackofjurisdictionmaybewaivedbyestoppelonthepartyinvoking
itmostprominentlyemergedinTijamv.SibonghanoywheretheSupremeCourt
heldthatapartycannotinvokethejurisdictionofacourttosecureaffirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtainingorfailingtoobtainsuchrelief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
FACTS
his is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailingtheCourtof
T
Appeals’(CA)Decision,whichsetasidetheOfficeofthePresident’sDecision.In
1998, Perfecto Velasquez and Lisondra Land Inc. entered into a joint venture
agreement to develop a memorial park. Lisondra Land failed to secure the
necessary permits and engagedinunsoundrealestatebusinesspractices,and
violated the joint venture agreement. Perfecto filed forabreachofcontractin
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Lisondra countered that the RTC has no
jurisdiction as the violation involved real estate trade and business practices
whichwaswithinthejurisdictionoftheHousingandLandUseRegulatoryBoard
(HLURB). The RTC Ruled in favor of Velasquez.
9
isondra appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CAreversed
L
the decision stating that the RTC has no Jurisdiction and that the RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion as the issue involves unsound real estate
businesspractices.VelasquezmadeanewcomplainttotheHLURBforunsound
real estate business practices against Lisondra. The HLURB Arbiter ruled in
favor of Velasquez that Lisondra committed unsound real estate business
practices and violated the Joint Venture Agreement.
isondra appealed the decision of the Arbiter to the HLURB Board of
L
Commissioners and allegedthattheHLURBhasnojurisdictionsinceitinvolves
aviolationofaJointVenturewhichisanintracorporatedisputewhichisinthe
jurisdictionoftheRTC.VelasquezfiledhisMotionforReconsiderationwhichwas
granted and the HLURB ordered Lisondra to pay damages and attorney fees.
Dissatisfied,LisondraappealedtheDecisiontotheOfficeofthePresident(OP).
The OP denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners.AggrievedLisondrafiledforaPetitionforReviewtotheCA.The
CA found merit in the case and set aside the Decision of the OP.
ISSUE
1. D oes the HLURB have jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant
case.
2. May Lisondra Land still assail the jurisdiction of the HLURB.
RULING
1. N o, the HLURB does not have jurisdiction over the subject matterinthe
instant case.
urisdictionisdefinedasthepowerandauthoritytohear,try,anddecide
J
acase.Inorderforthecourtoranadjudicativebodytohaveauthorityto
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is axiomaticthatjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatteris
conferred bylawandnotbytheconsentoracquiescenceofanyorallof
thepartiesorbyerroneousbeliefofthecourtthatitexists.Thus,whena
court or tribunal has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only
power it has is to dismiss the action.
he scope and limitation of the HLURB’s jurisdiction is well-defined. Its
T
precursor, the National Housing Authority’s (NHA) jurisdiction was
expanded under Sec. 1 of PD No. 1344 to include adjudication of the
followingcases:(a)unsoundrealestatebusinesspractices;XXX.Notably,
the cases before the HLURB must involve a subdivision project,
subdivisionlot,condominiumprojectorcondominiumunit.Otherwise,the
HLURB has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
I n this case, it is undisputed that Perfecto is a business partner of
Lisondra Land and is not a buyer of land involved in development.
Perfecto therefore has no personality to sue Lisondra Land for unsound
real estate business practices before the HLURB.
Thus, the regular courts have authority to decide their dispute.
10
2. N o, Lisondra is estopped from assailing the HLURB decision for lack of
jurisdiction.
I n Tijam v Sibonghanoy, the Supreme Court held that a party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponentand,afterobtainingorfailingtoobtainsuchrelief,repudiateor
question that same jurisdiction. The Supreme Court also held in several
casesthataparty'sactiveparticipationintheactualproceedingsbefore
a court without jurisdiction will bar him from assailing such lack of
jurisdiction.
eople v. Casiano also discussed when jurisdiction by estoppel applies
P
and when itdoesnot:ifithadnojurisdiction,butthecasewastriedand
decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same “must
exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel.” However, if the lower court hadjurisdiction,and
the case was heardanddecideduponagiventheory,such,forinstance,
as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
position — that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of
estoppel applies.
I n the instant case, Perfecto originally filed his complaint against
LisondraLandbeforetheRTCwhichhasjurisdictionoverthecontroversy
between the parties. However, Lisondra Land claimed that the case is
within the HLURB's exclusive authority. It maintained this theory before
the CA which eventually ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Thereafter, Perfecto relied on the final and executory decision of the
appellate court and refiled the action against Lisondra Land with the
HLURB.LisondraLandactivelyparticipatedintheproceedingsbeforethe
HLURB. After receiving an adverse decision, Lisondra Land questioned
the jurisdictionoftheHLURBandclaimedthattheRTChastheauthority
tohearthecase.ThisiswhereestoppeloperatesandbarsLisondraLand
from assailing the HLURB's jurisdiction. Lisondra Land cannot now
abandon the theory behind its arguments before Civil Case No. 18146,
CA-G.R. SP No. 72463 and the HLURB. The Court cannot countenance
LisondraLand'sactofadoptinginconsistentpostures—first,byattacking
the jurisdiction of the trial court and, subsequently, the authority of the
HLURB. Similar to the case of Tijam, this caseisexceptionalsincemany
years had lapsed from2001whenPerfectofiledhiscomplaintintheRTC
until 2016 when the CourtofAppealsdismissedthecomplaintbeforethe
HLURB.
Thus, it is now too late for Lisondra Land to raise the issue of lack of
jurisdiction.
11
Primary Jurisdiction And Exhaustion Of
Administrative Remedies
Primary Jurisdiction And Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies
U R EMPLOYED INTERNATIONAL CORP. V. PINMILIW
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 225263 | March 16, 2022
DOCTRINE
rimaryjurisdiction,alsoknownasthedoctrineofpriorresort,isthepowerand
P
authority vestedbytheConstitutionorbystatuteuponanadministrativebody
to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. The doctrine of
primaryjurisdictionpreventsthecourtfromarrogatinguntoitselftheauthority
to resolve a controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal
possessed withspecialcompetence.Insomeinstances,anadministrativebody
is granted primary jurisdiction, concurrentwithanothergovernmentagencyor
the regular court.
ntheotherhand,thedoctrineofimmutabilityofjudgmentsprovidesthat "all
O
the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a
judgmentbecomesfinal.Nootheractioncanbetakenonthedecisionexceptto
order its execution.
FACTS
his is alaborcaseinvolvingaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariconcerningUR
T
Employed International Corporation and Pamela T. Miguel (UREIC andMiguel,
respectively) as petitioners and Mike A. Pinmiliw (Mike), Murphy P. Pacya
(Murphy), Simon M. Bastog (Simon), and Ryan D. Ayochok (Rya).
n May 11, 2011, UREIC hired Mike,Murphy,Simon,andRyan(collectively,the
O
respondents) as construction workers in Kota Kinabalu in Malaysia for its
principal, The W Construction (TWC). The respondents’ contracts were for a
duration of two years with a basic monthly salary of RM800.00. When they
arrived in Malaysia, the broker who fetched them from the airport took their
passports,andtheyweresubsequentlymadetoliveinaplacewithunsafeliving
conditions. The living quarters were crowded, there was poor sanitation and
poor ventilation which caused workers to be sick, leading to the spread of
communicable diseases.Further,therespondentsworkedbeyondregularhours
without pay.
12
heylaterdiscoveredthattheyonlyhadtouristvisas,andthatTWCwashiding
T
themfromtheauthoritiesastheydidnothaveworkpermits.Theythusreported
their working and living conditions to their broker, but their grievances were
unheeded. With no other choice, Ryan sent an email to the editorial of the
Baguio Midland Courier, narrating their experience and seeking assistance. In
thelastweekofAugust2011,thehumanrelationsofficerofTWCsummonedthe
respondents and questioned them about the email senttotheBaguioMidland
Courier. In September, the respondents’ supervisor informed them that they
were terminated and being processed for repatriation. UREIC assured the
respondents that they would be sent home by mid-September. However, they
were only repatriated in November. Meanwhile, their food supply was cut off.
nDecember5,2011,therespondentsfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissaland
O
money claims against UREIC and Miguel, as administrators (collectively, the
Petitioners). On March 12, 2012, thecomplaintwasdismissedwithoutprejudice
onthegroundthatbothpartiesfailedtosubmittheirrespectivepositionpapers.
On March 26, 2012,thecomplaintwasreinstatedupontherespondents’Motion
to Revive. Respondents alleged that the petitioners promised them good
workingconditions,amongotherthingswhichwouldbeprovidedfreeofcharge
as stated in their contract. They further claimed payment of salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts, overtime pay, refund for their placement
fees, transportation costs, and illegal deductions, damages, and attorneys fees.
he Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the allegations. The Labor Arbiter
T
(LA), in its decision dated May 7, 2012, found respondents tobeconstructively
dismissedduetotheunbearableandunfavorableworkingconditionssetbythe
employer. With regard to Ryan, the LA ruled that his termination was done
“hastily in derogation to the mandatory requirements of procedural and
substantive due process.” They were awarded money claims, except for the
claims for overtime pay and illegaldeductionsastheywerenotsubstantiated,
exceptforMikewhopresentedproof.Petitionersmovedforreconsiderationbut
was denied and as such, sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA),
ascribinggraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheNationalLaborRelations
Commission(NLRC).Thepetitionersaverredthatthelabortribunalserroneously
relied on the unverified affidavits and position paper of the respondents that
lacked supporting evidence.
heCAstressed"thattechnicalrules[ofprocedure]areinvariablyrelaxedwhen
T
it comes to proceedings before the labor tribunals. What is essential in labor
casesis"that[the]partiesmustbegiventhereasonableopportunitytoappear
and defend their rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in their
favor." The CA then ruled that the respondents'failuretoverifytheiraffidavits
did not nullify the proceedings before the labor tribunals nor the decisions
promulgated considering that the parties were affordedthechancetopresent
their sides. Also, records reveal that the affidavits were duly signed by the
respondents and were notarized, which sufficiently show that the respondents
read the pleading. The respondents' signatures signify that they attest to the
truth and correctness of the allegations in the affidavits. Finally, the CA
concluded that there was substantial evidence toprovethatrespondentswere
illegallydismissed.Thepetitionersmovedforreconsideration,butitwasdenied.
Hence, this petition.
13
ISSUE
idtheCAerrindeclaringthattheNLRCandLAdidnotcommitgraveabuseof
D
discretion when they violated the doctrines of primary administrative
jurisdiction and immutability of judgment.
RULING
o, the CA did not err in ruling that the NLRC and LA did not commit grave
N
abuse of discretion. In some instances, an administrative body is granted
primaryjurisdiction,concurrentwithanothergovernmentagencyortheregular
court.
I n this case,whiletherespondentsallegedthesamesetoffactsandthesame
affidavits were submitted before the LA and the POEA, the complaints raised
different causes of action. The LA complaint involved the issue of illegal
dismissal and various money claims, while the POEA complaint involved
administrative disciplinary liability for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based
Overseas Workers. Thus, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply.
oreover, a review of the respective jurisdictions of the POEA and the LA
M
revealsthattheseadministrativebodiesdonothaveconcurrentjurisdiction.On
the one hand, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 10022, provides that the LA shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the claims arising outof
anemployer-employeerelationshiporbyvirtueofanylaworcontractinvolving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary, and other forms of damage.
ntheotherhand,RuleXoftheImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRANo.
O
10022providesthatthePOEAexercisesadministrativejurisdictionarisingoutof
violations of rules and regulations and administrative disciplinary jurisdiction
over employers, principals, contracting partners, and overseas Filipino workers.
hejurisdictionoftheseadministrativebodiesdoesnotinanywayintersectas
T
to warrant the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the appreciation by the POEA and LA of the complaints should be limited to
matters falling withintheirrespectivejurisdictions,andonlyinsofarasrelevant
to the resolution of the controversies presented before them.
imilarly,thedoctrineofimmutabilityofjudgmentsdoesnotapplytothiscase.
S
Under the doctrine, "[a]ll the issues between the parties are deemed resolved
andlaidtorestonceajudgmentbecomesfinal.Nootheractioncanbetakenon
the decision except to order its execution." The decision "becomes immutable
and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether itwillbemadebythecourtthatrendereditorbythehighestcourtof
the land." Here, the DOLE's Order, which became final on October 25, 2013,
settled the issue of whether petitioners violated the 2002 POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based
14
verseas Workers. It did not involve the issue of respondents'illegaldismissal
O
and money claims lodged with the LA and the NLRC and now pending before
this Court. Consequently, the finality of the DOLE Order has no effect to the
resolution of the present petition.
esides, the factual findings of the LAandtheNLRCconformtoevidenceand
B
areconfirmedbytheCA.Hence,theyareaccordedrespectandfinality,andare
binding upon this Court. "It is only when the factual findings of theNLRCand
the appellate court are in conflict that this Court will review the records to
determinewhichfindingshouldbeupheldasbeingmoreinconformitywiththe
evidentiaryfacts.Wherethe[CA]affirmsthefindingsofthelaboragenciesand
there is no showing whatsoever that said findings are patently erroneous, this
Court is bound by those findings." Here, the LA, the NLRC, and the CA
unanimouslyruledthatpetitionersillegallydismissedtherespondents,andthat
therewasnovoluntaryresignationonthepartoftherespondentsnorjustcause
for Ryan's dismissal. We see no reason to deviate from these findings.
15
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Pleadings
Judgments And Final Orders - Immutability Of Judgments (COA
Decisions)
Parties To Civil Actions (Rule 3) - Real Parties-In-Interest (Section 2)
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 247787 | March 2, 2021
DOCTRINE
[ PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3) - REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST
(SECTION 2)]
udicialreviewmaybeexercisedonlywhenthepersonchallengingtheacthas
J
the requisite legal standing, whichreferstoapersonalandsubstantialinterest
inthecasesuchthathehassustained,orwillsustain,directinjuryasaresultof
itsenforcement.Theparty'sinterestmustalsobematerialasdistinguishedfrom
mere interest in thequestioninvolved,oramereincidentalinterest.Itmustbe
personalandnotbasedonadesiretovindicatetheconstitutionalrightofsome
third and unrelated party.
I n private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as
contained in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The question as to real
party-in-interest is “whether he is the party whowouldbebenefitedorinjured
by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Importantly,
standing, because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real
party in interest or has capacity to sue. Standing is a special concern in
constitutional law because cases are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by theoperationofalaw.Theplaintiffwhoassertsa"public
right"inassailinganallegedlyillegalofficialaction,doessoasarepresentative
of the general public. Hence, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief. The question in
standing is “whether such parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpensthepresentationofissuesuponwhichthecourtsolargelydependsfor
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’"
16
[ JUDGMENTSANDFINALORDERS-IMMUTABILITYOFJUDGMENTS(COA
DECISIONS)]
I tissettledthatalltheissuesbetweenthepartiesaredeemedresolvedandlaid
to rest once a judgment becomes final. No other action can be taken on the
Decision except to order its execution.Thecourtscannotmodifythejudgment
to correct perceived errors of law or fact. Public policy and sound practice
dictate that every litigation must come to an end at the risk of occasional
errors.Thisisthedoctrineofimmutabilityofafinaljudgment.Therule,however,
is subject to well-known exceptions, namely, the correction of clerical errors,
nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments, and supervening events.
FACTS
his case involves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 filed by petitioner
T
DevelopmentBankofthePhilippines(DBP)assailingrespondentCommissionon
Audit's (COA) Decision. The controversy started when, in 2006, the Board of
Directors of the DBP granted salary increases to its eight (8) senior officers
pursuant to its 1999 compensation plan. Subsequently, the supervising auditor
disallowed the amount because the DBP's compensation plan lacks prior
approval from the Office of the President. The DBP appealed the notice of
disallowance to the Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate GovernmentSector
Cluster A - Financial, but the same was denied by the latter.
ggrieved, the DBP filed a Petition For Review before the COA invoking a
A
Memorandum where former President Macapagal-Arroyo approved the
implementationofitscompensationplanfrom1999onward.Thereafter,theCOA
grantedthepetitionandliftedthenoticeofdisallowance[1stCOADecision].On
February 6, 2012, the DBP receivedacopyoftheCOADecisionbutdidnotfile
anymotionforreconsiderationorapetitiontotheSupremeCourt.OnMarch27,
2012, Pagaragan (Pagaragan), the Vice President/Officer-In-Charge of DBP's
Program Evaluation Department, submitted confidential letters to the COA
asking to reconsider its Decision wherein the latter granted the Petition for
ReviewandliftedtheNoticeofDisallowance.ThelettersexplainedthatSection
261(g)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits the grant of salary increase
within 45 days before a regularelection.Assuch,PresidentArroyo'spostfacto
approval of DBP's compensation plan is void because it was made within the
45-day period before the 2010 elections. On April 13, 2015, the COA treated
Pagaragan's letters as a motion for reconsideration and exercised its power
under Section 52 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD No.
1445) to open and revise settled accounts. The COA found the motion
meritorious and reversed its earlier Decision [2nd COA Decision]. On July 29,
2015, the DBP sought reconsideration on the groundthatthe1stCOADecision
has already become final and executory. The COA then sustained the
disallowance and heldthatithasthepowertore-examinecasesonaccountof
new and material evidence. Hence, this recourse ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the COA.
17
n one hand, the DBP, among others, argued that the 1st COA Decision is
O
alreadyfinalandexecutorywithoutamotionforreconsiderationorappealfiled
within 30 days from notice or on February 6, 2012 until March 7, 2012. At any
rate,Pagaraganisastrangertothecaseandhasnolegalpersonalitytomove
for a reconsideration.
ntheotherhand,theCOAmaintainsthatPagaraganisarealparty-in-interest
O
because he is concerned with the proper implementation of the DBP's
compensation plan and in ensuring that its funds are properly managed.
ISSUE
1 . I s Pagaragan a real party-in-interest.
2. Is the 2nd COA Decision barred by the Doctrine of Immutability of
Judgments.
RULING
1. No, Pagaragan is not a real party-in-interest.
he Court explained that judicialreviewmaybeexercisedonlywhenthe
T
person challenging the act has the requisite legal standing, whichrefers
to a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury asaresultofitsenforcement.The
party'sinterestmustalsobematerialasdistinguishedfrommereinterest
inthequestioninvolved,oramereincidentalinterest.Itmustbepersonal
and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party.
I nprivatesuits,standingisgovernedbythe"real-parties-ininterest"rule
ascontainedintheRulesofCivilProcedure.Thequestionastorealparty
in interest is “whether he is the party who wouldbebenefitedorinjured
by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Importantly, standing, because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings,isdifferentfromquestionsrelatingtowhetheraparticular
plaintiff is the real party in interestorhascapacitytosue.Standingisa
special concern in constitutional law because cases are brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of alaw.The
plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public.Hence,
he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
orderandthesecuringofrelief.Thequestioninstandingis“whethersuch
parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’"
I n this case, Pagaragan questions the validity of former President
Arroyo's approval of the DBP's compensationplanbutfailedtoestablish
thathehastherequisitepersonalandsubstantialinterest.Pagaragandid
18
ot sustain any direct injury or is in danger of suffering any damages
n
from the assailed salary increases. To be sure, the allowance or
disallowance of the salary increases will not affect Pagaragan. Verily,
Pagaraganwasnotapartytotheoriginalproceedingsandmerelycame
into the picture when the COA lifted the notice of disallowance.
2. Y es, the 2nd COA Decision is barred by the Doctrine of Immutability of
Judgments.
he Court explained that the 1st COA Decision is already final and
T
executory absent a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal. On
August 17, 2011, the COA En Banc issued Resolution No. 2011-006 that
modifiedRuleX,Sections9and10ofits2009RevisedRulesofProcedure.
The purpose is to harmonize the COA Rules andtheRulesofCourtasto
the effect of filing an appeal to theSupremeCourtonthefinalityofthe
COA'sDecisionorResolution.Inthisregard,theCOARulesofProcedureis
explicit that the Commission's Decision or Resolution shall become final
and executory after 30 days from notice unless a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to the Supreme Court is filed.
I nthiscase,theCOAliftedthenoticeofdisallowanceonFebruary1,2012.
The DBPreceivedacopyofthisCOADecisiononFebruary6,2012andit
had 30daysoruntilMarch7,2012tomoveforareconsiderationorfilea
petitiontotheSupremeCourt.Nonetheless,Pagaragan'sletterswhichthe
COAtreatedasamotionforreconsiderationwasfiledbeyondthe30-day
reglementaryperiod.Hence,theCOAhasnomorejurisdictiontoentertain
Pagaragan's letters given that the Decision dated February 1, 2012 has
becomefinalandexecutoryabsentatimelymotionforreconsiderationor
appeal.
I t is settled that all the issues between the parties aredeemedresolved
and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final. No other actioncanbe
taken on the Decision except to order its execution. The courts cannot
modify the judgment to correct perceived errors of law or fact. Public
policy and sound practice dictate that every litigation must come to an
endattheriskofoccasionalerrors.Thisisthedoctrineofimmutabilityof
a final judgment.
he rule, however, is subject to well-known exceptions, namely, the
T
correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments, and
supervening events. Not one of these exceptions is present in this case.
19
Pleadings - Parts And Contents, Formal Requirements;
Computation Of Time (Rule 7)
SPOUSES CORDERO V. OCTAVIANO
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 241385 | July 7, 2020
DOCTRINE
he rationale for requiring a complete statement of material dates is to
T
determine whether the petition is timely filed. Accordingly, the petition must
showwhennoticeoftheassailedjudgmentororderorresolutionwasreceived;
when the motion for reconsideration was filed; and, when notice of its denial
was received. However, this Court may relax strict observance of the rules to
advance substantial justice.
FACTS
his is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailingtheCourtof
T
Appeals’ (CA) Resolution. Leonila Octaviano (Octaviano), respondent, filed an
ejectmentsuitagainstSpousesMarianoandRaquelCordero(Sps.Cordero).The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) ruled in favor of Octaviano. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MCTC’s decision. Thereafter, Sps. Cordero
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for review.
However, the CA dismissed the petition on the following grounds:
● P etitioners failed to state the material date when the RTC decision was
received in violation of Sec. 2 (b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; and
● Petitioners failed to append to the petition a clearly legible duplicateor
truecopyoftheassaileddecisioninviolationofSec.2(d),Rule42ofthe
Rules of Court.
ps. Cordero filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) invoking substantial
S
compliance with the Rules of Court requiring the statement of material dates.
TheyarguethatthepetitionforreviewindicatedthedateofreceiptoftheRTC
order denying their motion for reconsideration and this is sufficient to
determine the timeliness of the petition. Sps. Cordero allege that the CA
overlooked the fact that the RTC decision was attached as Annex “C” in the
petition for review and also appended in are the RTC and MCTC’s decision.
However,suchMRwasstilldeniedbytheCAonthegroundthatitwasfiledone
day late.
20
ISSUE
Whether the CA’s erred in dismissing Sps. Cordero’s petition.
RULING
Yes, the CA erred in dismissing Sps. Cordero’s petition.
he rationale for requiring a complete statement of material dates is to
T
determine whether the petition is timely filed. The more material date for
purposes of appeal to the CA is the date of receipt of the trial court’s order
denying the MR.
I n this case, Sps. Cordero are deemed to have substantiallycompliedwiththe
rules. The failure to indicate the date whentheyreceivedtheotherordersand
resolutions may be dispensed with in the interest of justice. Furthermore, a
perusal of the petition for review reveals that Sps. Cordero appended the
pertinent pleadings and documents in their motion for reconsideration before
the CA. On this point, the Court reiterates that thesubsequentandsubstantial
compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.
astly, Sps. Cordero timely filed their MR beforetheCA.Sps.Corderohaduntil
L
February 01, 2018 to file the petition. While the CA claims that they filed iton
February2,2018oronedaylate,howeveritwasshownthattheregistryreceipt
and postmaster’s certification all established that the motion was filed on
February 01, 2018.
ence,theCAerredindismissingSps.Cordero’spetitiondespiteSps.Cordero’s
H
compliance with the rules in filing a petition for review.
21
Effect Of Failure To Plead - Rule 9
VITARICH CORP. V. DAGMIL
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 217138 | August 7, 2020
DOCTRINE
he rule is that the defendant's answer should be admitted where it is filed
T
beforeadeclarationofdefaultandnoprejudiceiscausedtotheplaintiff.Where
theanswerisfiledbeyondthereglementaryperiodbutbeforethedefendantis
declaredindefaultandthereisnoshowingthatthedefendantintendstodelay
the case, the answer should be admitted. However, it is not mandatoryonthe
part of the trial court to admit an answer belatedly filed even though the
defendantisnotdeclaredindefault.Settledistherulethatananswerbelatedly
answered can only be admitted in the court'sdiscretion,providedthatthereis
justification for such belated action.
FACTS
itarich Corporation (Vitarich), petitioner, filed an action for sum of money
V
against Femina Dagmil (Femina), respondent, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Upon receipt of summons, Atty. Nepthali Solilapsi (Atty. Solilapsi),
Femina’scounsel,filedamotiontodismissthecaseonthegroundsofimproper
venue. The RTC denied such a motion and directed Femina to answer the
complaint.
tty. Solilapsi received the order but Femina did not submit any responsive
A
pleading therefore Vitarich sought to declare Femina in default. In the
meantime, Femina’s new counsel, Atty. Emilio Quianzon Jr. (Atty. Quianzon)
enteredhisappearanceandfiledonJanuary31,2011amotiontoadmitanswer.
Thereafter, Femina was declared in default on February 8, 2011 and allowed
Vitaich to present its evidence ex-parte. RTC held infavorofVitarichordering
Femina to pay PHP 15M.
ggrieved,Feminafiledapetitionforrelieffromjudgmentbasedonherformer
A
counsel, Atty. Solilapsi’s excusable negligence as the latter was hospitalized
twiceandhissecretaryplaceditinawrongcasefolder.RTCdeniedsuchmotion
aswellasthesubsequentMotionforNewTrialandMotionforReconsideration.
Femina then filed a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. The Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petition and reversed RTC’s
decision on the ground that Femina had manifested a strong desire to file an
answer and that when petitioner filed her motion to admit answer, the trial
court had not yet declared her in default.
22
ence,thispetitionunderRule45whereinVitaricharguesthatthehealthissues
H
of Atty. Solillapsi’s health issues and the mistake of his secretary do not
constitute excusable negligence.
ISSUE
Did the RTC err in declaring Femina in default.
RULING
Yes, the RTC erred in declaring Femina in default.
I n Sablas vs. Sablas, the Supreme Court held that it is within the sound
discretionofthetrialcourttopermitthedefendanttofilehisanswerandtobe
heardonthemeritsevenafterthereglementaryperiodforfilingtheresponsive
pleading expires. The rule is that the defendant's answer should be admitted
whereitisfiledbeforeadeclarationofdefaultandnoprejudiceiscausedtothe
plaintiff. Where the answer is filed beyond thereglementaryperiodbutbefore
thedefendantisdeclaredindefaultandthereisnoshowingthatthedefendant
intends to delay the case, the answer should be admitted. However, it is not
mandatoryonthepartofthetrialcourttoadmitananswerbelatedlyfiledeven
though the defendant is not declared in default. Settled is the rule that an
answer belatedly answered can only be admitted in the court's discretion,
provided that there is justification for such belated action.
I n this case, the CA correctly reversed the judgment of default because:
Feminamovedtoadmitheranswerbeforeshewasdeclaredindefault.Femina
filed her motion through registered mail on Jan 31, 2011 while the order of
default was issued on Feb 08, 2011.
oreover, records reveal that Atty. Solilapsi had been confined in the hospital
M
twiceinJanuary2011inadditiontothemistakecausedbyhissecretary.These
predicamentsforcedFeminatohireanewcounsel; Femina’sanswershowsthat
shehasaprimafaciemeritoriousdefense;andthereisnoshowingthatFemina
intended to delay the proceedings and that Vitarch suffered any damage
consideringthatVitarichonlymovedtodeclareFeminaindefault48daysfrom
the expiration of the reglementary period. The only conclusion is that Vitarich
has not been prejudicedbythedelay.Otherwise,Vitarichwouldnothavebeen
lenientandoptedtowaitthatlongbeforeinvokingitsrighttodeclareFeminain
default.
Therefore, RTC should not have declared Femina in default.
23
Amended And Supplemental Pleadings
HEIRS OF TEJADA V. HAY
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 250542 | October 10, 2022
DOCTRINE
ections1and3ofRule10oftheRulesofCourtallowamendmentstopleadings
S
"by adding to or striking out an inadequate allegation or description in any
other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner." The only limitation under the rules was that the leave to
amend the pleading "mayberefusedifitappearstothecourtthatthemotion
was made with intent to delay." Thus,as a matter of judicial policy, courts are
impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality
especiallywhensuchmotion"isfiledduringtheearlystagesoftheproceedings
or, at least, before trial.
FACTS
he Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) in this caseassailsthedecision
T
and the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed petitioners
Heirs of Pio Tejada (Pio) and Soledad Tejada’s (petitioners) petition for
certiorari. The petition dismissed by the CA questioned the orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) denying petitioners’ Motion for Leave and to Admit
AttachedAmendedAnswerwithCounterclaim.Thepresentcontroversyfindsits
roots from the Complaint for Quieting of Title filed by Myrna L. Hay against
petitioners.Myraaverredthatpetitioners'father,Pio,soldthedisputedparcelof
landtoHaruGenBeachResortandHotelCorporation(HaruGen)onNovember
12, 1988 as evidenced by a Deed ofAbsoluteSale.Thepropertylaterfoundits
way to her when Haru Gen sold it as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute
Sale. Myrna also presented another Deed ofAbsoluteSale,purportingtoshow
thatPiosoldthesamepropertytoheronMay28,1997.Petitioners,ontheirown,
filed an Answer which sought for the dismissal of Myrna's Complaint on the
ground that the deeds of sale which purportedly conveyed title over the
property to Myrna was falsified, as their father's signature thereon was
forged.The case was initially set for pre trial on September 28 2016butdueto
several postponements, pre trial ensued only June 28 2017.Eventually,instead
ofproceedingtotrial,theRTCissuedandorderreferringthecasetomediation.
Petitioners, through counsel this time, filed a Motion for Leave for their
Amended Answer to be admitted for the purpose of clarifying severalmatters
and to hasten the determination of the actual merits of the controversy.
24
etitioners argued that the admission of the Amended Answer was warranted
P
becausetherewasnoresponsivepleadingfiledfortheoriginalAnswer,andthe
casehasnotyetgonetotrialnorhasitbeencalledforpreliminaryconference.
Finally, the Motion stated that the leave sought and amendments made were
notdilatory,butwillaidthecourttoresolvethecasespeedilyandbasedonits
real facts.
he RTC denied the Motion for Leave because the case had already gone
T
through preliminary and pre-trial conference, contrary to petitioners' claim.
Petitioners, through counsel, also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
denial of their Motion for Leave, but was denied.
etitioners challenged the denial of their Motion for Leave before the CA
P
through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA
foundnograveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheRTCindenyingpetitioners'
Motion for Leave considering that the recordsshowthatthecasehad,indeed,
already gone through the preliminary conference/pre-trial stage. Accordingto
theCA,theAmendedAnswerisnotnecessarysinceallthematerialelementsof
petitioners' defense, i.e., the deeds of absolute sale that respondent Garry B.
Hay, in substitution of Myrna (respondent),invokedwerefalsified,hadalready
been stated in their original Answer. Thepetitionwasdismissed.Subsequently,
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied in Resolution. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming the disallowance of the amended answer.
RULING
es,theCAerredinaffirmingthedisallowanceoftheamendedanswerbecause
Y
the amendments to pleadings are favored at any stage of the proceedings.
ections1and3ofRule10oftheRulesofCourtallowamendmentstopleadings
S
"by adding to or striking out an inadequate allegation or description in any
other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner." The only limitation under the rules was that the leave to
amend the pleading "mayberefusedifitappearstothecourtthatthemotion
was made with intent to delay." Thus, as amatterofjudicialpolicy,courtsare
impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality
especially whensuchmotionisfiledduringtheearlystagesoftheproceedings
or, at least, before trial.
25
etitioners filed their original AnswerbackinAugust26,2016,andtheysought
P
itsamendmentonlyafterthetrialcourthadconcludedthepre-trialconference,
wherein the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings should
have been considered. Aptly so, petitioners moved for leave of court to admit
their Amended Answer, recognizing that its filing was no longer a matter of
right,butsubjecttothetrialcourt'sdiscretion.Intheexerciseofsuchdiscretion,
trialcourtsmaygrantleaveandallowthefilingofanamendedpleadingsolong
as it does not appear that the motion for leavewasmadeinbadfaithorwith
intent to delay the proceedings.
perusal of the Amended Answer readily shows that it specifies with
A
particularitywhichoftheallegationsinthecomplaintareadmittedanddenied,
anditclearlysetsforththetruthofthematteruponwhichtheyrelytosupport
anydenialasrequiredunderSection10,Rule8oftheRulesofCourtasopposed
totheoriginalAnswer.Further,unliketheoriginalAnswer,theAmendedAnswer
specifies special affirmativedefenses,aswellascounterclaims,thenullification
of the alleged falsified deeds of absolute sale; and the grant of damagesand
attorney's fees. Under these conditions, the admissionoftheAmendedAnswer
isnotonlymoreprudent,butinfactwarranted,asitcontainsallegationswhich
are crucial for the complete and proper disposition of the case to prevent
multiplicityofsuitsandaffordrelieftoallpartiesinvolvedinthecase,andalso
to aid the trial court in determining the real controversies for resolution and
thereby expedite the proceedings. All of these form the very bases for the
liberality of the rules in allowing amendments to pleadings. Besides, the
admission of the Amended Answer will cause noprejudicetorespondentsince
petitioners' defense was not substantially altered as the CA and respondent
himselfpointedout.Hence,weseenobasisforrespondent'saccusationthatthe
Amended Answer was interposed only to delay the proceedings.
I n sum, the Court found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion indenying
the Motion for Leave on the ground that the case had already gone through
preliminary/pre-trial conference. The attendant circumstances demonstrate
that the RTC had no cause to deny the leave sought for the admission of
petitioners' Amended Answer. Rather, its grant would be in keeping with the
time-honored judicial policy of favoring and affording liberal treatment to
amendments to pleadings, especially those made before the conduct of the
trial.
26
Summons
Service Of Summons — Rule 14
INTEGRATED MICRO ELECTRONICS, INC. V. STANDARD
INSURANCE CO., INC.
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 210302 | August 27, 2020
DOCTRINE
ervice of summons upon the legal assistantofStandardInsurance'sin-house
S
counsel is improper. Rule 14, Section 11ofthe1997RulesofCourtprovidesthe
manner of serving summons to a corporation, thus:
ec. 11.Serviceupondomesticprivatejuridicalentity.Whenthedefendantisa
S
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be madeonthepresident,
managingpartner,generalmanager,corporatesecretary,treasurer,orin-house
counsel.
FACTS
his case is Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) filed by petitioner
T
Integrated Micro Electronics, Inc. (Integrated Micro) against respondent
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard Insurance). The controversy started
sometime in March 2009, when a panel of insurers composed of Standard
Insurance, together with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) General
Insurance, Co. Inc., Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI) M/S Insurance Corporation, and Malayan Insurance
Co.,Inc.,issuedanInsurancePolicyinfavorofIntegratedMicro,insuringallof
its properties against "all risks of physical loss, destruction of, or damage,
includingfire"fortheperiodMarch31,2009toMarch31,2010.OnMay24,2009,
a fire then broke out at Integrated Micro's building causing damage to its
productionequipmentandmachineries.Thus,IntegratedMicrofiledaclaimfor
indemnity from Standard Insurance but was subsequently rejected on the
ground that the causeofthelosswasanexcludedperil.Aggrieved,Integrated
Micro sought reconsideration. In a letter, Standard Insurance denied the
reconsideration.AlmostayearthereafterIntegratedMicrofiledaComplaintfor
Specific Performance and Damages against Standard Insurance before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). In response, Standard Insurance moved to dismiss
the complaint for, among others, invalid service of summons. Allegedly, the
summons was served upon the legal assistant or the secretary of Standard
27
I nsurance's in-house counsel, who was not authorized to receive summons
underSection11,Rule14ofthe1997RulesofCourt.TheRTCdeniedthemotion
to dismiss and directed Standard Insurance to file a responsive pleading.
Dissatisfied,StandardInsurancesoughtreconsiderationbutwasdenied.Hence,
StandardInsurancethenfiledaPetitionforCertiorariwiththeCourtofAppeals
(CA). The CA then granted the petition and ruled that the summons was
improperly served. Integrated Micro's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
I ntegratedMicroinsiststhattheserviceofsummonsuponthelegalassistantor
secretaryoftheinsurer'sin-housecounselisconsideredsubstantialcompliance
since Standard Insurance actually received the summons.
ISSUE
Was summons improperly served.
RULING
es. The Court agreed with the CA in thefindingthat theserviceofsummons
Y
upon the legal assistant of Standard Insurance's in-house counsel is improper.
Rule 14, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides the manner of serving
summons to a corporation, thus:
ec. 11.Serviceupondomesticprivatejuridicalentity.Whenthedefendantisa
S
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be madeonthepresident,
managingpartner,generalmanager,corporatesecretary,treasurer,orin-house
counsel.
otably, this provision amended Rule 14, Section 13ofthe1964RulesofCourt
N
that allowed service to an agent of a corporation. The new rule, however, has
specifically identified and limited the persons to whom service of summons
must be made. Contrary to Integrated Micro's assertion, the amendment
effectively abandoned the substantial compliance doctrine and restricted the
persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities.
28
Judgments And Final Orders
Judgments And Final Orders
SPOUSES POBLETE V. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 228620 | June 15, 2020
DOCTRINE
he dispositive portion of a final andexecutoryjudgmentmaybeamendedto
T
rectify an inadvertent omission of what it shouldhavelogicallydecreedbased
on the discussion in the body of the Decision. However, it should be limitedto
explainingavagueorequivocalpartofthejudgmentwhichhampersitsproper
and full execution.
FACTS
F Homes Corporation and Spouses Nestor and Purisima Villaroman (Sps.
B
Villaroman), respondent, entered into a joint agreement to develop their land
into a subdivision. Later on, Sps.Villaroman agreed to sell in favor of Spouses
OscarandLourdesBalagot(Sps.Balagot)threelots.Subsequently,Sps.Balagot
transferred their rights over thelotstopetitioners,SpousesCatalinoandAnita
Poblete (Sps. Poblete). Upon full payment, Sps. Villaroman and Sps. Poblete
executed the corresponding deeds of sale.
owever, Sps. Villaroman did not deliver the certificates of title despite the
H
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordering the former in an action instituted by Sps.
Poblete.
nknown to Sps. Poblete, Sps.VillamoranmortgagedthelotstoBancoFilipino
U
Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) to which thelotswereforeclosed
upon failure of the Sps. Villamoran to pay their debt. Thereafter and to the
surpriseofSps.Pobelete,theyreceivedanoticeofhearingandforeclosurethus
Sps. Poblete filed an action against Sps.Villamoran,BancoFilipino,BFCitiland,
andtheRegistryofDeedsLasPiñastoannulthemortgageandforeclosure.Sps.
Poblete alleges that they purchased the lots prior to the mortgage transaction.
29
he RTC dismissed the case. However, the CA reversed RTC’s decision and
T
declared Sps. Poblete as the owners of the subject property. It further stated
thatBancoFilipinoareorderedtorefrainfromcommittingactsofdispossession
against Sps. Poblete. However, Sps. Poblete moved for an issuance of analias
writ of execution alleging that the original writ is incomplete since it did not
order Banco Filipino to surrender and transfer the certificates of title in their
names. It is absurd that the titles remain with Banco Filipino. The RTC denied
themotionexplainingthatanorderofexecutioncannotvaryfromthetermsof
judgment. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the judgment may be modified.
RULING
Yes, the judgment may be modified.
he rule is that a decision that acquired finality is executory, immutable and
T
unalterable subject to certain exceptions such as:
● orrection of clerical errors;
C
● Nunc Pro Tunc Entries;
● Void of Judgments; and
● Supervening events.
he instant case does not fall in any of the aforementioned exceptions.
T
However, the Court has recognized that the dispositive portion of a final and
executory judgment may be amended to rectify an inadvertent omission of
whatitshouldhavelogicallydecreedbasedonthediscussioninthebodyofthe
decision.However,itshouldbelimitedtoexplainingvagueorequivocalpartsof
the judgment which hampers its proper and full execution.
dispositiveportionthatisastep-by-stepdetaileddescriptionofwhatneedsto
A
be done for purposes ofexecutionisanunreasonableandabsurdexpectation.
A judgment is not confined to what appears on its facebutextendsaswellto
those necessary to carry out the decision into effect. Any suitable process or
modeofproceedingmaybeadoptedwhichappearsconformabletothespiritof
the said law or Rule.
30
Judgments And Final Orders - Immutability Of Judgments
PAGUIO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (En Banc)
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 223547 | April 27, 2021
DOCTRINE
he doctrine of immutability of judgments provides thatapartytoanoriginal
T
action who fails to question an adverse judgment or decision by not filingthe
properremedywithintheperiodprescribedbylaw,losestherighttodoso,and
the judgment or decision, as to him or her, becomes final and binding. The
decisionbecomesimmutableandunalterable,andmaynolongerbemodifiedin
any respect, evenifthemodificationismeanttocorrecterroneousconclusions
of fact and law.
FACTS
hiscaseinvolvesaPetitionforCertiorariunderRule64,inrelationtoRule65of
T
the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Engineer Alex Paguio (Paguio) et al.
against respondents Commission on Audit (COA) et al. Petitioners Paguio and
Angeline Aguilar (Aguilar) are officers of Pagsanjan Water District (PAGWAD),
while the rest of the petitioners were members of the PAGWAD Board of
Directors. PAGWAD is a government-owned andcontrolledcorporation(GOCC)
organizedunderProvincialWaterUtilitiesActof1973(PDNo.198),asamended.
The controversy began in 2009 and 2010, when the PAGWAD Board Members
received several benefits pursuant to the board resolutions that they issued
(disbursements). Subsequently, a Notice of Disallowance (ND) was issued,
disallowingthesaiddisbursementsforlackoflegalbasis.Itwasfoundthatthe
benefits were given to the Board Members without approval from the Local
WaterUtilitiesAdministration(LWUA),inviolationofSection1311ofPDNo.198,
as amended, COA Resolution No. 2004-00612 and Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) regulations. Paguio et al. were made liable to settle the
disallowed transactions.
31
aguioet.al.receivedacopyoftheNDonMay23,2012.OnNovember14,2012,
P
Paguio etal.filedanAppealMemorandumbeforetheCOARegionalOfficeNo.
IV-A (ROIV-A) arguing that the Board of Directors is authorized to prescribe
additionalallowancesandbenefitstoitsmembersunderSection1316ofPDNo.
198,asamendedbyRepublicAct(RA)No.9286.InaDecision,theCOAROIV-A
through respondent Director Cleotilde M. Tuazon (Director Tuazon), denied the
appeal and affirmed the ND ruling. On April 23, 2014, Paguio et al. receiveda
copy of the Decision. On April 30, 2014, they filed a PetitionforReviewbefore
the COA Proper reiterating their arguments, but the same was denied in a
Decision for being filed out of time. Undaunted, Paguio et al. sought
reconsideration, but were likewise denied in the COA Proper's Resolution.
ISSUE
id theCOAPropercommitgraveabuseofdiscretionindismissingpetitioners'
D
Petition for Review for being filed out of time.
RULING
he COA proper did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
T
petitioners’ Petition for Review.
he 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA prescribed a period of six
T
monthsor180daysfromreceiptoftheNDtoappealanauditor'sdecisiontothe
regional director up to the COA Proper. Inthisregard,Paguioetal.admitthat
their appeal before theCOAProperwasfiledbeyondthisreglementaryperiod.
They filed an appeal totheCOAROIV-Aafter175daysfromrecept.Theythen
received the COA ROIV-A Decision April 23, 2014 leaving (5) five days of the
180-dayperiodfromApril23,2014tofileanappealtotheCOAProper.Without
any explanation, however, they filed their Petition for Review before the COA
Proper on April 30, 2014, which is two days late.
party to an original action who fails to question an adverse judgment or
A
decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law,
losestherighttodoso,andthejudgmentordecision,astohimorher,becomes
final and binding. The decision becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. This doctrine of immutability is
grounded upon the fundamental principles of publicpolicyandsoundpractice
that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and quasi-judicial
agencies must become finalatsomedefinitedatefixedbylaw.Thus,nograve
abuse of discretion can be imputed against the COA in dismissing petitioners'
Petition for Review for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
32
aguio et al., however,entreattheCourttoexerciseleniencyintheapplication
P
of procedural rules and to resolve the case on themerits.TheCourtexplained
thatitisessentialthateverypleafortheCourt'sexerciseofliberalityshouldbe
accompanied by a justification that speaks of strong substantial justice
considerations. Here, there is no compelling reason to relax the rules. Forone,
Paguio etal.didnotgiveanyexplanationastowhytheyfailedtocomplywith
the procedural rules. Also, they merely harped on the "grievous effect" of the
COA's adverse decision to their familiesconsideringtheir"meagerincomeand
personal loans."
Hence, the petition was dismissed.
33
Judgments And Final Orders - Immutability Of Judgment
(COA Decisions)
Parties To Civil Actions (Rule 3) - Real Parties-In-Interest (Section 2)
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 247787 | March 2, 2021
DOCTRINE
[ PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3) - REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST
(SECTION 2)]
udicialreviewmaybeexercisedonlywhenthepersonchallengingtheacthas
J
the requisite legal standing, whichreferstoapersonalandsubstantialinterest
inthecasesuchthathehassustained,orwillsustain,directinjuryasaresultof
itsenforcement.Theparty'sinterestmustalsobematerialasdistinguishedfrom
mere interest in thequestioninvolved,oramereincidentalinterest.Itmustbe
personalandnotbasedonadesiretovindicatetheconstitutionalrightofsome
third and unrelated party.
I n private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as
contained in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The question as to real
party-in-interest is “whether he is the party whowouldbebenefitedorinjured
by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Importantly,
standing, because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real
party in interest or has capacity to sue. Standing is a special concern in
constitutional law because cases are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by theoperationofalaw.Theplaintiffwhoassertsa"public
right"inassailinganallegedlyillegalofficialaction,doessoasarepresentative
of the general public. Hence, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief. The question in
standing is “whether such parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpensthepresentationofissuesuponwhichthecourtsolargelydependsfor
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’"
34
[ JUDGMENTSANDFINALORDERS-IMMUTABILITYOFJUDGMENTS(COA
DECISIONS)]
I tissettledthatalltheissuesbetweenthepartiesaredeemedresolvedandlaid
to rest once a judgment becomes final. No other action can be taken on the
Decision except to order its execution.Thecourtscannotmodifythejudgment
to correct perceived errors of law or fact. Public policy and sound practice
dictate that every litigation must come to an end at the risk of occasional
errors.Thisisthedoctrineofimmutabilityofafinaljudgment.Therule,however,
is subject to well-known exceptions, namely, the correction of clerical errors,
nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments, and supervening events.
FACTS
his case involves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 filed by petitioner
T
DevelopmentBankofthePhilippines(DBP)assailingrespondentCommissionon
Audit's (COA) Decision. The controversy started when, in 2006, the Board of
Directors of the DBP granted salary increases to its eight (8) senior officers
pursuant to its 1999 compensation plan. Subsequently, the supervising auditor
disallowed the amount because the DBP's compensation plan lacks prior
approval from the Office of the President. The DBP appealed the notice of
disallowance to the Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate GovernmentSector
Cluster A - Financial, but the same was denied by the latter.
ggrieved, the DBP filed a Petition For Review before the COA invoking a
A
Memorandum where former President Macapagal-Arroyo approved the
implementationofitscompensationplanfrom1999onward.Thereafter,theCOA
grantedthepetitionandliftedthenoticeofdisallowance[1stCOADecision].On
February 6, 2012, the DBP receivedacopyoftheCOADecisionbutdidnotfile
anymotionforreconsiderationorapetitiontotheSupremeCourt.OnMarch27,
2012, Pagaragan (Pagaragan), the Vice President/Officer-In-Charge of DBP's
Program Evaluation Department, submitted confidential letters to the COA
asking to reconsider its Decision wherein the latter granted the Petition for
ReviewandliftedtheNoticeofDisallowance.ThelettersexplainedthatSection
261(g)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits the grant of salary increase
within 45 days before a regularelection.Assuch,PresidentArroyo'spostfacto
approval of DBP's compensation plan is void because it was made within the
45-day period before the 2010 elections. On April 13, 2015, the COA treated
Pagaragan's letters as a motion for reconsideration and exercised its power
under Section 52 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD No.
1445) to open and revise settled accounts. The COA found the motion
meritorious and reversed its earlier Decision [2nd COA Decision]. On July 29,
2015, the DBP sought reconsideration on the groundthatthe1stCOADecision
has already become final and executory. The COA then sustained the
disallowance and heldthatithasthepowertore-examinecasesonaccountof
new and material evidence. Hence, this recourse ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the COA.
35
n one hand, the DBP, among others, argued that the 1st COA Decision is
O
alreadyfinalandexecutorywithoutamotionforreconsiderationorappealfiled
within 30 days from notice or on February 6, 2012 until March 7, 2012. At any
rate,Pagaraganisastrangertothecaseandhasnolegalpersonalitytomove
for a reconsideration.
ntheotherhand,theCOAmaintainsthatPagaraganisarealparty-in-interest
O
because he is concerned with the proper implementation of the DBP's
compensation plan and in ensuring that its funds are properly managed.
ISSUE
1 . I s Pagaragan a real party-in-interest.
2. Is the 2nd COA Decision barred by the Doctrine of Immutability of
Judgments.
RULING
1. No, Pagaragan is not a real party-in-interest.
he Court explained that judicialreviewmaybeexercisedonlywhenthe
T
person challenging the act has the requisite legal standing, whichrefers
to a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury asaresultofitsenforcement.The
party'sinterestmustalsobematerialasdistinguishedfrommereinterest
inthequestioninvolved,oramereincidentalinterest.Itmustbepersonal
and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party.
I nprivatesuits,standingisgovernedbythe"real-parties-ininterest"rule
as contained in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The question as to the real
party in interest is “whether he is the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Importantly, standing, because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings,isdifferentfromquestionsrelatingtowhetheraparticular
plaintiff is the real party in interestorhascapacitytosue.Standingisa
special concern in constitutional law because cases are brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of alaw.The
plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public.Hence,
he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
orderandthesecuringofrelief.Thequestioninstandingis“whethersuch
parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’"
I n this case, Pagaragan questions the validity of former President
Arroyo's approval of the DBP's compensationplanbutfailedtoestablish
thathehastherequisitepersonalandsubstantialinterest.Pagaragandid
36
ot sustain any direct injury or is in danger of suffering any damages
n
from the assailed salary increases. To be sure, the allowance or
disallowance of the salary increases will not affect Pagaragan. Verily,
Pagaraganwasnotapartytotheoriginalproceedingsandmerelycame
into the picture when the COA lifted the notice of disallowance.
2. Y es, the 2nd COA Decision is barred by the Doctrine of Immutability of
Judgments.
he Court explained that the 1st COA Decision is already final and
T
executory absent a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal. On
August 17, 2011, the COA En Banc issued Resolution No. 2011-006 that
modifiedRuleX,Sections9and10ofits2009RevisedRulesofProcedure.
The purpose is to harmonize the COA Rules andtheRulesofCourtasto
the effect of filing an appeal to theSupremeCourtonthefinalityofthe
COA'sDecisionorResolution.Inthisregard,theCOARulesofProcedureis
explicit that the Commission's Decision or Resolution shall become final
and executory after 30 days from notice unless a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to the Supreme Court is filed.
I nthiscase,theCOAliftedthenoticeofdisallowanceonFebruary1,2012.
The DBPreceivedacopyofthisCOADecisiononFebruary6,2012andit
had 30daysoruntilMarch7,2012tomoveforareconsiderationorfilea
petitiontotheSupremeCourt.Nonetheless,Pagaragan'sletterswhichthe
COAtreatedasamotionforreconsiderationwasfiledbeyondthe30-day
reglementaryperiod.Hence,theCOAhasnomorejurisdictiontoentertain
Pagaragan's letters given that the Decision dated February 1, 2012 has
becomefinalandexecutoryabsentatimelymotionforreconsiderationor
appeal.
I t is settled that all the issues between the parties aredeemedresolved
and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final. No other actioncanbe
taken on the Decision except to order its execution. The courts cannot
modify the judgment to correct perceived errors of law or fact. Public
policy and sound practice dictate that every litigation must come to an
endattheriskofoccasionalerrors.Thisisthedoctrineofimmutabilityof
a final judgment. The rule, however, is subject to well-known exceptions,
namely, the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, void
judgments, and supervening events. Not one of these exceptions is
present in this case.
37
Remedies Before Finality Of Judgment
Appeals And Other Modes Of Review
SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION V. CENTRAL
AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC.
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 253821 | March 6, 2023
DOCTRINE
nder the Rules of Court, there are three modes ofappealfromRegionalTrial
U
Court (RTC) decisions:
irst Mode (Rule 41): Through an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals
F
(CA) under Rule 41 wherethedecisionassailedwasrenderedintheexerciseof
the RTC's original jurisdiction. In ordinary appeals, questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law may be raised.
econdMode(Rule42):ThroughapetitionforreviewbeforetheCAunderRule
S
42 where the decision assailed was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. In petitions for review, questions of fact, law, or mixed
questions of fact and law may be raised.
hirdMode(Rule45):ThroughanappealbycertioraribeforetheSupremeCourt
T
under Rule 45 where only questions of law shall be raised.
FACTS
his case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by
T
petitioner Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) against respondent Central
Azucarera De Bais Inc. (Central) questioning the Orders of the CA. The
controversy began in 2017 and 2018, when the SRA issued three (3) Sugar
Orders which allocated Class "D" world market sugar to accredited Class "F"
ethanol producers. Thereafter, Central filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
questioningthelegalityoftheSRA'sOrdersbeforetheRTCofMakatiCity.Inan
OrderandasaffirmedonMotionforReconsideration,theRTCdeclarednulland
void the three (3) Sugar Orders explaining that ethanol manufacturersarenot
part of the sugar industry and that the regulatory jurisdiction over ethanol
producers lies with the Department of Energy (DOE). As such, the SRA cannot
justifytheallocationofrawsugartoethanolproducersunderitsgeneralpower
to allocate sugar because said allocation does not fall within the ambit of
domestic, export or reserve allocation.
38
I n response to the adverse Decision, the SRA elevated the case to the CA
through an appeal. In a Resolution and as affirmed on Motion for
Reconsideration, the CA dismissed the appeal for being an improper remedy
holdingthatthecontroversyispurelylegalandthattheSRAshouldhavefileda
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45oftheRulesofCourtbeforethe
Supreme Court. Hence, this current recourse.
nonehand,SRAinsiststhatthequestionsraisedonappealbeforetheCAare
O
factual in nature. Thus, it theorized that it availed of the proper remedy. In
contrast, Central maintained that the case before the RTC involved pure
questions of law and did not hinge upon factual proof. The correct remedy to
assailtheRTC'srulingisapetitionforreviewoncertioraribeforetheCourtand
not an appeal to the CA. Thus, the SRA's failure to avail the proper remedy
within the reglementary period rendered the RTC ruling final and executory.
ISSUE
I saPetitionForReviewonCertioraribeforetheSupremeCourt,notanappeal
to the CA, the proper remedy.
RULING
es,theproperremedyisapetitionforreviewoncertioraribeforetheSupreme
Y
Court.
Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes of appeal from RTC decisions:
irst Mode (Rule 41): Through an ordinary appeal before theCAunderRule41
F
where the decision assailed was rendered in the exercise of the RTC's original
jurisdiction.Inordinaryappealsquestionsoffactormixedquestionsoffactand
law may be raised.
econdMode(Rule42):ThroughapetitionforreviewbeforetheCAunderRule
S
42 where the decision assailed was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. In petitions for review, questions of fact, law, or mixed
questions of fact and law may be raised.
Third Mode (Rule 45): Through an appeal by certiorari before this Courtunder
Rule 45 where only questions of law shall be raised
orollarily, an improper appeal before the CA is dismissed outright (Rule 50)
C
and shall not be referred to the proper court.
I n this case, the Court agreed with the CA that the SRA availed of the wrong
modeofappeal.Here,theSRAraisedpurequestionsoflawinitsappeal.Inthis
case, Central Azucarera, in its Petition for Declaratory Relief, claimed that the
SRAhasnoauthoritytoallocateaclassofsugartoethanolproducers.TheRTC
declaredvoidtheallocationandruledthatDOEhasregulatoryjurisdictionover
ethanol producers. The SRA then appealed theRTC'sfindingstotheCA.Verily,
thequestionwhethertheSRA'sOrdersareultraviresorbeyonditsauthorityisa
question of law. This is because jurisdiction of an administrative agency is a
matter of law. More importantly, whether the RTC's conclusion in applying the
law on jurisdiction is accurate is also a question of law.
39
lltold,theCAcorrectlydismissedtheSRA'sappealforbeingawrongmodeof
A
review. The SRA should have filed a petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court and not an appeal to the CA. Consequently, the RTC's Order
dated January 24, 2019 became final and executory. The improper appealdid
not toll the reglementary period to file a petition for review on certiorari. This
means that the SRA has already lost its remedy against the trial court's ruling.
Accordingly, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is denied.
40
Appeals And Other Modes Of Review
AUSTRIA V AAA AND BBB
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 205275 | June 28, 2022
DOCTRINE
o guidethebenchandthebar,theserulesshouldbeobservedwithrespectto
T
the legal standing of private complainants in assailing judgments or orders in
criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court (SC) and theCourtofAppeals
(CA), to wit:
(1)The private complainant has the legal personality to appeal the civil
liability of the accused or file a petition for certiorari to preserve his or
herinterestinthecivilaspectofthecriminalcase.Theappealorpetition
for certiorari must allege the specific pecuniary interest of the private
offended party. The failuretocomplywiththisrequirementmayresultin
the denial or dismissal of the remedy.
hereviewingcourtshallrequiretheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)
T
to file comment within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from
noticeifitappearsthattheresolutionoftheprivatecomplainant'sappeal
or petition for certiorari will necessarily affectthecriminalaspectofthe
caseortherighttoprosecute(i.e.,existenceofprobablecause,venueor
territorial jurisdiction, elements of the offense, prescription,admissibility
of evidence, identity of the perpetrator of the crime, modification of
penalty, and other questionsthatwillrequireareviewofthesubstantive
merits of the criminal proceedings, or the nullification/reversal of the
entire ruling,orcausethereinstatementofthecriminalactionormeddle
withtheprosecutionoftheoffense,amongotherthings).Thecommentof
the OSG must state whether it conforms or concurs with the remedy of
the privateoffendedparty.Thejudgmentororderofthereviewingcourt
granting the private complainant's relief may be set aside if rendered
without affording the People, through the OSG, the opportunity to filea
comment.
(2)The private complainant has no legal personality to appeal or file a
petition for certiorari to question the judgments or orders involving the
criminalaspectofthecaseortherighttoprosecute,unlessmadewiththe
OSG's conformity.
41
(3)The private complainant must request the OSG's conformity within the
reglementaryperiodtoappealorfileapetitionforcertiorari.Theprivate
complainant must attach the original copy of the OSG's conformity as
proof in case the request is granted within the reglementary period.
Otherwise, the private complainant must allegeintheappealorpetition
for certiorari the fact of pendency of the request.IftheOSGdeniedthe
request for conformity, the Court shall dismiss the appealorpetitionfor
certiorari for lack of legal personality of the private complainant.
he reviewing court shall require the OSG to file comment within a
T
non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from notice on the private
complainant's petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the
accused,thedismissalofthecriminalcase,andtheinterlocutoryordersin
criminalproceedingsonthegroundofgraveabuseofdiscretionordenial
of due process.
(4)These guidelines shall be prospective in application.
FACTS
hiscaseinvolvesaPetitionforReviewonCertiorari(Rule45)filedbyMamerto
T
Austria (Mamerto) against AAA and BBB (private complainants). In 2006, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Mamerto, aschoolteacher,offivecounts
of acts of lasciviousness committed against private complainants, both
11-year-old female students. Mamerto moved for reconsideration. Meanwhile,
the trial judge handling the criminal cases was promoted. On August15,2008,
the new presiding judge resolved the motion and rendered Joint Orders
acquitting Mamerto. Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, private complainants
filedaspecialcivilactionforcertioraritotheCAallegingthatthenewpresiding
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the Joint Orders of
acquittal which merely recited the contents of the accused's motion for
reconsideration without stating any factual and legal basis. Mamertoopposed
the petition arguing that a review of his acquittal will place him in double
jeopardy and that the private complainants cannot avail of a petition for
certiorariincriminalproceedingswithouttheparticipationorconformityofthe
OSG. Subsequently, the CA ruled that the RTC is guilty of grave abuse of
discretion when it disregarded the constitutional requirement that a decision
mustexpressclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.As
such,theJointOrdersacquittingMamertoarevoidanddoublejeopardywillnot
attach. Mamerto sought for a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
42
heCourtrequiredtheOSGtofileacommentontheprivatecomplainant'slegal
T
standinginacriminalcase.InitsComment,theOSGaversthattheprosecution
and punishment of crimes is the State's assertion of its sovereign authority to
enforcepenallaws.ThePeopleofthePhilippinesaretherealparties-in-interest
inacriminalactionrepresentedbyitsstatutorilyauthorizedagents,namely,the
OSG and the public prosecutors. On the other hand, theinterestoftheprivate
offended party in a criminal case is limited only to the civil liability of the
accused.Thefusionofthecivilaspectinacriminalactionismerelyaprocedural
rule.Theprivatecomplainantisamerewitnessinthecriminalproceedingsand
he or she cannot assail the acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the criminal
case, orinterlocutoryorderwithrespecttothecriminalaspectofthecase.The
privateoffendedpartyseekingtoelevateacriminalcasebeforetheCourtand
the CA must seek the OSG's conformity or concurrence. The private
complainant's remedy assailing the criminal aspect of the case without the
interventionoftheOSGisperforcedismissible.Also,theOSGpointsoutthatthe
public prosecutor represents the State inacriminalcasebeforethetrialcourt,
andthatitisnotfurnishedwithcopiesofrecordsduringthetrialstage.TheOSG
only becomes aware of the outcome of the trial when the Office of the
Prosecutor General (OPG) or the private complainant endorses the case.
Consequently, the OSG is left with limited time to study the case before the
lapseoftheperiodtoassailthejudgmentororderinacriminalcase.Hence,the
OSGrecommendsthatthereglementaryperiodtoquestionthecriminalaspect
of the case must be reckonedfromtheOSG'sreceiptoftheendorsementfrom
theOPGorrequestfromtheprivateoffendedparty.Inthealternative,theOSG
suggests that it should always be required to file acommentontheappealor
petitionfiledbytheprivatecomplainantemanatingfromcriminalactionbased
on due process considerations. The commentoftheOSGmuststatewhetherit
conforms or concurs with the remedy of the private offended party. However,
the OSG clarifies that the private complainant may appeal insofar as the civil
liabilityoftheaccusedisconcerned,orfileaspecialcivilactionforcertiorarito
preservehisorherinterestinthecivilaspectofthecase.Inbothcases,thereis
no need to implead the State as the case involves purely private interests.
Lastly, the OSG gives its conformity to the petition for certiorari that private
complainants filed before the CA. The OSG argues that the trial court's Joint
Orders are void for failure to state clearly the factual and legal bases of
Mamerto's acquittal.
n the other hand, Mamerto invokes his right against double jeopardy and
O
reiteratesthattheJointOrdersofacquittalarealreadyfinalandnotsubjectto
review.Mamertomaintainsthatprivatecomplainantshavenolegalpersonality
to question his acquittal.
ISSUE
Do the private complainants have legal standing in the criminal case.
43
RULING
o, the private complainants have no legal standing in the criminal aspect of
N
thecase.TheCourtheldthattoguidethebenchandthebar,theserulesshould
be observed with respect to the legal standing of private complainants in
assailingjudgmentsorordersincriminalproceedingsbeforetheSCandtheCA,
to wit:
he private complainanthasthelegalpersonalitytoappealthecivilliabilityof
T
the accused orfileapetitionforcertioraritopreservehisorherinterestinthe
civilaspectofthecriminalcase.Theappealorpetitionforcertiorarimustallege
the specific pecuniary interest of the private offended party. The failure to
comply with this requirement may result in the denial or dismissal of the remedy.
he reviewing court shall require the OSG to file comment within a
T
non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from notice if it appears that the
resolution of the private complainant's appeal or petition for certiorari will
necessarily affectthecriminalaspectofthecaseortherighttoprosecute(i.e.,
existence of probable cause, venue or territorial jurisdiction, elements of the
offense,prescription,admissibilityofevidence,identityoftheperpetratorofthe
crime,modificationofpenalty,andotherquestionsthatwillrequireareviewof
the substantive merits of thecriminalproceedings,orthenullification/reversal
oftheentireruling,orcausethereinstatementofthecriminalactionormeddle
with the prosecution of the offense, among other things). The comment ofthe
OSG must state whether itconformsorconcurswiththeremedyoftheprivate
offended party. The judgment or order of the reviewing court granting the
private complainant's relief may be setasideifrenderedwithoutaffordingthe
People, through the OSG, the opportunity to file a comment.
heprivatecomplainanthasnolegalpersonalitytoappealorfileapetitionfor
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certiorari to question the judgments or orders involving the criminal aspectof
the case or the right to prosecute, unless made with the OSG's conformity.
he private complainant must request the OSG's conformity within the
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reglementary period to appeal or file a petition for certiorari. The private
complainant must attach the original copyoftheOSG'sconformityasproofin
case the request is granted within the reglementary period. Otherwise, the
privatecomplainantmustallegeintheappealorpetitionforcertiorarithefact
of pendency of the request. If the OSG denied the request forconformity,the
Court shall dismiss the appeal or petition for certiorari for lack of legal
personality of the private complainant.
he reviewing court shall require the OSG to file comment within a
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non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from notice on the private
complainant's petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused,
the dismissal of the criminal case, and the interlocutory orders in criminal
proceedings on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or denial of due
process.
These guidelines shall be prospective in application.
44
In this regard, the Court made the following declarations as regards this case:
he privatecomplainant'sinterestislimitedonlytothecivilaspectofthecase.
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Only the Office of the Solicitor General may question the judgments ororders
involving the criminal aspect of the case or the right to prosecute in
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
There are divergent rulings allowing the private complainant to question
judgments and orders in criminal proceedings without the OSG's intervention.
The divergent rulings do notgranttheprivatecomplainantablanketauthority
to question judgments and orders in criminal proceedings without the OSG's
intervention.
heRTCisguiltyofgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitrenderedtheJointOrders
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acquitting Mamerto in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Consequently, Mamerto cannot claim a violation of his right against double
jeopardy.
It is an opportune timefortheCourttoharmonizethecaselawandformulate
an edifying rule on the private complainant's legal standing to question
judgments or orders in criminal proceedings consistent with its exclusive
rule-making authority.
Thus, the Court denied the Petition filed by Austria.
45
Appeals And Other Modes Of Review - Rules 40-45
ANG V. COURT OF APPEALS
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 238203 | September 3, 2020
DOCTRINE
he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
T
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. One who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must comply strictly with the requirements of the rules.
FACTS
arrenGutierrez(Warren)filedanactionforunlawfuldetaineragainstSpouses
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Ricardo and Ligaya Ang (Spouses Ang) before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC). Warren alleged that he owned the subject parcel of land and later on
sold the property on installment basis to the spouses, which was extinguished
due to the spouses’ non-payment of monthly amortizations. In their answer,
Spouses Ang moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
eTC ruled in favor of Warren and ordered Spouses Ang to vacate the lot.
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Spouses Ang appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), who affirmed the
findings of the MeTC.
nsuccessfulatareconsideration,LigayaAngelevatedthecasetotheCourtof
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Appeals(CA)throughamotionforextensionoftimetofileaPetitionforReview
under Rule 42. CA denied the motion for non-payment of docket fees.
igayasoughtreconsiderationarguingthathercounsel'smessengerwasunable
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to purchase postal money orders on the last day for filing the motion for
extension of time. Thus, the messenger decided to enclose the docket fees of
PHP 4,730.00 in the envelope containing the motion. The messenger allegedly
panickedandthoughtthathewouldnotbeabletofilethemotionontimeifhe
wouldtransfertoanotherpostoffice.Assupportingevidence,shesubmittedthe
messenger's affidavit. Ligaya also invoked liberal application of the rules and
insinuated that the money might have been stolen. Lastly, Ligaya manifested
that she already filed her petition for review and expressed her willingness to
pay again the docket fees.
heCAdeniedthemotionforlackofmeritabsentcompellingreasontosuspend
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the rules.
46
ISSUE
Was the right to appeal denied upon failure to pay docket fees.
RULING
No, the right to appeal was not denied upon failure to pay docket fees.
he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
T
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. One who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must comply strictlywiththerequirementsoftherules.Failuretodoso
often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
hegrantofanyextensionforthefilingofaPetitionforReviewunderRule42is
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discretionaryandsubjecttotheconditionthatthefullamountofthedocketand
lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the reglementaryperiod.Indeed,
the full payment of docket fees withintheprescribedperiodismandatoryand
necessarytoperfecttheappeal.Corollarily,thenon-paymentofdocketfeesisa
ground to dismiss the appeal. In Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, however, we
qualifiedthisrule,anddeclared,first,thatthefailuretopaytheappellatecourt
docket fee within the reglementary period warrants only discretionary as
opposed to automatic dismissaloftheappeal;andsecond,thatthecourtshall
exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play and with a great deal of circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances.
igaya failed to establish that the appellate docket fees were duly paid.
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Foremost, the messenger's affidavit is insufficient to establish payment. The
affidavit merely stated the reason why the messenger opted to enclose the
docket fees together with the motion for extension. Yet, there is no evidence
such as photocopies of the money bills to prove that the envelope containing
the motion hastheactualcashpayment.Theaffidavitislikewisesuspectsince
it was executed only after the CA denied the motion. At any rate, the CA had
conducted an investigation and confirmed that no payment was actually
remitted.
astly, Ligaya has not shown any compelling reason to warrant a liberal
L
application of the rules. The alleged theft is speculative.Thejustificationsthat
the messenger panicked because he was unable to purchase postal money
orders and that he might not be able to file the motion on time if he would
transfer to another post office are neither convincing nor adequate to merit
leniency.Ligaya'scounselcouldhaveaskedthemessengertobuypostalmoney
orders in advance instead of waiting for the last minute in filing the motion.
47
1. Remedies Before Finality Of Judgment — Appeals And Other
Modes Of Review – Rule 45
2. Prosecution Of Civil Action (Rule 111); Civil Liability Ex-Delicto; In
Cases Of Acquittal (See Also Civil Code, Art. 29)
COLLADO V. DELA VEGA
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 219511 (Resolution) | December 2, 2020
DOCTRINE
( REMEDIES BEFORE FINALITY OF JUDGMENT — APPEALS AND OTHER
MODES OF REVIEW – RULE 45)
enerally,itisnottheCourt'stasktogoovertheproofspresentedtoascertain
G
if they were weighed correctly. However, this ruleoflimitedjurisdictionadmits
exceptions and one of them is when the factual findings of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) are contradictory.
( PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION (RULE 111); CIVIL LIABILITY
EX-DELICTO; IN CASES OF ACQUITTAL (SEE ALSO CIVIL CODE, ART. 29)
s a rule, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. However, an
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acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases:
1. W heretheacquittalisbasedonreasonabledoubtasonlypreponderance
of evidence is required in civil cases;
2. Where the court declared that the accused's liability is not criminal, but
only civil in nature; and
3. Where the civil liability does not arise from, or is not based upon the
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.
FACTS
hiscaseinvolvesaPetitionforReviewonCertiorari(Rule45)filedbypetitioner
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Victoria Collado (Collado) againstDr.EduardoDelaVega(DelaVega)assailing
the Decision of the CA. The controversy began when, in November 1995, Mary
Ann Manuel (Manuel) introduced Collado to Dela Vega. Thereafter, Dela Vega
invested in Collado's stock businessonthepromisethathewouldearninterest
at the rateof7.225%permonth.Accordingly,DelaVegagaveColladoaninitial
cash out of PHP 100,000.00.
48
I n turn, Collado assured that Dela Vega will monitor the latter's investment
which will be covered by a stock certificate. Later, Dela Vega invested
additional funds either by delivering cash personally to Victoria, or by
depositing the amounts toherbankaccounts.However,hedidnotreceiveany
stock certificate. Thus, Dela Vega demanded from Collado the return of his
investments. Collado then issued two (2) dated checks amounting to PHP
740,000.00,whichweresubsequentlydishonoreduponpresentment.Aggrieved,
Dela Vega charged Collado with estafa involving unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
before the RTC. The RTC then acquitted Collado based on reasonable doubt,
and ruled that there was no preponderant evidence to prove her civil liability.
Dissatisfied, Dela Vega elevated the civil aspect of the case to the CA, which
held,asaffirmedonMotionforReconsideration,thathisappealtorecovercivil
liability is proper since Collado was acquitted on reasonable doubt. After
reviewingtheevidenceonrecord,theCAfoundColladoliabletopayDelaVega
the total amount of P2,905,000.00. TheCAexplainedthatDelaVegadeposited
such amounts inCollado'sbankaccountsasshowninthedepositslipsthatthe
prosecution formally offered in evidence without any objection from the
accused.ThisisinadditiontoCollado'sacknowledgmentthatEduardodelivered
to her sums of money as investment in her stocks business. Hence, this recourse.
nonehand,ColladoallegesthattheCAshouldnothavedisturbedthefindings
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of the RTC which has the best opportunity to observe the manner and
demeanor of witnesses. Further, the funds she received from Eduardo were
meantforinvestmentwiththeexpectation,butwithoutanyguarantee,ofprofit
or return. Consequently, various factors, such as risks in any businessventure,
must be considered.
On theotherhand,EduardomaintainsthatVictoriaraisedfactualissueswhich
arebeyondtheambitofapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45ofthe
Rules of Court. At any rate, there is preponderant evidence to establish
Victoria's civil liability.
ISSUE
1. A re the factual issues raised by Collado beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court (SC) in this Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari.
2. Does preponderant evidence exist to hold accused civilly liable despite
acquittal on reasonable doubt.
RULING
1. N o,thefactualissuesraisedbyColladoarenotbeyondthejurisdictionof
the SC in this Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari.
he Court explained that Collado raised a question regarding the
T
appreciation ofevidencewhichisoneoffactandisbeyondtheambitof
49
t hisCourt'sjurisdictioninapetitionforreviewoncertiorari.Generally,itis
nottheCourt'stasktogoovertheproofspresentedbelowtoascertainif
they were weighed correctly. However, this rule of limited jurisdiction
admitsexceptionsandoneofthemiswhenthefactualfindingsoftheCA
and the RTC are contradictory. In this case, the RTCheldthattherewas
nopreponderantevidencetoholdVictoriacivillyliablewhiletheCAruled
otherwise. Considering these conflicting findings warranting the
examinationofevidence,theSupremeCourtentertainedthefactualissue
on whether substantial evidence exists to prove that Victoria is civilly
liable despite her acquittal.
2. Y es, preponderant evidence exists to hold accused civilly liable despite
acquittal on reasonable doubt.
s a rule, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.However,an
A
acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared that the
accused'sliabilityisnotcriminal,butonlycivilinnature;and(3)wherethe
civil liabilitydoesnotarisefrom,orisnotbaseduponthecriminalactof
which the accused was acquitted. Here, the RTC acquitted Victoria
because her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, any
civilliabilitysurvivedbecauseonlypreponderantevidenceisnecessaryto
establish it.
otably, however, the RTC did not explain the facts why it exonerated
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Colladofromcivilliability.Italsodidnotmentionthattheactoromission
fromwhichthecivilliabilitymayarisedidnotatallexist.Incontrast,the
CA reviewed the testimonial and documentaryevidenceinsupportofits
conclusion that Collado is liable to pay Dela Vega the total amount of
P2,905,000.00.Verily,theCA'sfactualfindings,whichareborneoutbythe
evidenceonrecord,arebindingontheSupremeCourt,unlikethecontrary
ruling of the RTC that failed to clearly state the facts from which its
conclusion was drawn.
50
Remedies After Judgment Becomes Final
Annulment Of Judgment – Rule 47
THOMAS V. TRONO
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 241032 (Resolution) | March 15, 2021
DOCTRINE
petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
A
naturethatitmaybeavailedofonlywhenotherremediesarewanting,andonly
if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction, or through extrinsic fraud. Under
Section2,Rule47oftheRulesofCourt,thegroundsforannulmentofjudgment
are: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however,
recognizes a third ground — denial of due process of law.
FACTS
his case involves a Petition for Review onCertiorariassailingthedismissalof
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the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by petitioner Charnnel Shane
Thomas (Charnnel). The controversy started when Earl Alphonso Thomas
(Alphonso),anAmericancitizen,marriedrespondentRachelTrono(Rachel)and
begotason,EarlJamesThomas(Earl).UponAlphonso'spetitionfordeclaration
of nullity, his marriage to Rachel was declared void ab initio in a Decision
renderedbytheRegionalTrialCorut(RTC)ofMakatiCityonthegroundthatthe
marriage was a bigamous marriage since AlphonsowasstillmarriedtoNancy
Thomas (Nancy), an American citizen. In the course of the trial, Alphonsoand
Rachelagreedthatthepropertiestheyacquiredduringthemarriageshallgoto
Rachel and Earl.
elyingonthedissolutionofhismarriagewithRachel,Alphonsocohabitedwith
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JocelynC.Ledres(Jocelyn).OnAugust21,1998,Jocelyngavebirthtotheirchild,
Charnnel. On July 22, 2007, out of their desire to make their union legal and
binding and to legitimize the status of their child, Alphonso and Jocelyn got
married in Makati City.
51
lphonso died on February 12, 2011. Tosettlehisaffairs,Jocelynrequestedfor
A
certified true copies of the August 22, 1997 Decision, its certificate of finality,
and the entry of judgment from the RTC believing in good faith that the
judgment had already attained finality after the lapse of 13yearssinceitwas
rendered. As a result of the request, the Branch Clerk of Court purportedly
discovered that theRepublic,throughtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG),
was not furnished a copy of the August 22, 1997 Decision. The RTC, instead of
granting Jocelyn's request, furnished the OSG with a copyoftheDecisionand
gave it 15 days from receipt to perfect an appeal, or to file a motion for
reconsideration. The Decision was received by the OSG on March 8, 2011.
n March 28, 2011, the OSG sought reconsideration of the August 22, 1997
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Decision contending that Alphonso's marriage with Nancy was not proven by
competent evidence, that it was not furnished with copies of the orders and
processes,andthatthecaseproceededwithoutadefinitivedeterminationthat
nocollusionexistedbetweentheparties.TheRTCthenorderedAlphonsotofile
acommentoroppositionwithin15daysfromnotice.Jocelyn,bycounsel,fileda
Manifestation and Special Appearance informing the RTC of: (1) Alphonso's
death on February12,2011;(2)hermarriagewithhimonDecember25,1996in
Bangkok, Thailand; (3) her lackofknowledgeofthelegalissuesconcerninghis
marital past; and (4) her failure to locate and consult with Atty. Dante C.
Contreras,Alphonso'scounselonrecord.Jocelynlikewiseallegedthatthereisa
presumption of regularity behind the August 22, 1997 Decision, and that
Alphonso's then marriage with Nancy was proven by competent evidence.
I n an Order, dated June 28, 2011, the RTC grantedtheOSG'smotion,reversed
itsAugust22,1997Decision,andruledthatthemarriagebetweenAlphonsoand
Rachel is valid and subsisting. Consequently, on September 13, 2017, Charnnel
filedapetitionforannulmentofjudgmentwiththeCourtofAppeals(CA)onthe
groundofdenialofdueprocessoflaw.Charnnelalleged,amongothers,thather
parentswerelawfullymarriedandthatthethreeofthemlivedasafamilyuntil
Alphonso'sdeathonFebruary12,2011.TheOSG'smotionforreconsiderationof
the August22,1997DecisionwasbelatedlyfiledonMarch28,2011,considering
that the OSG received a copy of the Decision on March 8, 2011, and had until
March 23, 2011, to file its appeal or motion for reconsideration. Charnnel
asseverated that she never received a copy of the motionforreconsideration,
depriving her of due process as an heir of Alphonso. The RTC no longer had
jurisdiction to rule upon the OSG's belatedmotionforreconsiderationbecause
the August 22, 1997 Decision already attained finality.
heCA,initsOctober10,2017Resolution,dismissedthepetitionforannulment
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ofjudgment.AlthoughtheOrder,datedJune28,2011,wasissued14yearsafter
the rendition of the August 22, 1997 Decision, the RTC retained jurisdiction
because the Decision had not yet attained finalityduetothefailuretofurnish
the OSG a copy. The CA ruled that Charnnel was not denied of due process
because of the directive for Alphonso to file a comment or opposition to the
motion for reconsideration; in fact, her mother, Jocelyn, filed a Manifestation
and SpecialAppearance.Charnnelsoughtreconsideration,butthiswasdenied.
Hence, this petition.
52
harnnel maintains that she was not afforded due process when she was not
C
allowedtoparticipateintheproceedingsforreconsiderationbeforetheRTC.On
the other hand, the OSG countered that due process requirements were
observed consideringthatJocelynwasabletofileaManifestationandSpecial
Appearance on the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
Should the assailed judgment be annulled.
RULING
No, the assailed judgment should not be annulled.
he Supreme Court discussed that a petition for annulment of judgment is a
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remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may beavailedofonlywhen
other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order, or final
resolutionsoughttobeannulledwasrenderedbyacourtlackingjurisdiction,or
through extrinsic fraud. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the
grounds for annulment of judgment are: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of
jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes athirdground—denialofdue
processoflaw.InArcelonav.CourtofAppeals,adecisionwhichispatentlyvoid
maybesetasideongroundsofwantofjurisdictionornon-compliancewithdue
process of law, where mere inspection of assailed judgment is enough to
demonstrate its nullity.
ue process requires that those withinteresttothesubjectmatterinlitigation
D
be notified and be afforded an opportunity to defend their interests. As
guardiansofconstitutionalrights,courtscannotbeexpectedtodeprivepersons
of their rights to due process while at the same time be considered as acting
within their jurisdiction. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction.
I n this case,Charnnel,asanheirofAlphonso,isvestedwiththelegalstanding
toassailthemarriageofAlphonsoandRachelbyseekingtheannulmentofthe
RTC'sOrder.InNiñalv.Bayadog,theCourtruledthatvoidmarriagesgoverned
by the New Civil Code can be questioned even afterthedeathofeitherparty.
The deathofapartydoesnotextinguishtheactionforpetitionfordeclaration
of absolute nullity of marriage as the deceased may have heirs with legal
standing to assail the void marriage. As borne by the records, Charnnel was
neither made apartytotheproceedingsnorwasshedulynotifiedofthecase.
Also, she was a minor at the time the RTC granted the OSG's motion. While
Jocelyn was able to file a ManifestationandSpecialAppearanceontheOSG's
motion for reconsideration, this should not bind, muchlessprejudice,Charnnel
asaperusalofitreadilyshowsthatCharnnel'sinterestsasAlphonso'sheirwere
notdirectlyraisedandthreshedout.Toholdotherwise,wouldbetantamountto
depriving a then innocent child, now rightfully asserting her rights, of due
process of law.
53
nent,thejurisdictionoftheRTCtoruleontheOSG'smotionforreconsideration
A
and reverseitsDecisiondatedAugust22,1997,theCAoverlookedthefactthat
the OSG's motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed. Considering that the
OSG received a copy of the August 22, 1997 Decision on March 8, 2011, it had
until March 23, 2011 to file its motion for reconsideration.However,themotion
wasfiledonlyonMarch28,2011,beyondthe15-dayreglementaryperiod.Thus,
the August 22, 1997 Decision became final. In effect, the RTC already lost its
jurisdiction over the case and could no longer alter or reverse the August 22,
1997 Decision.
I t is a well-established rule that a judgment, once it has attained finality, can
never be altered, amended, or modified, even if the alteration, amendmentor
modification is to correct an erroneous judgment. This is the principle of
immutability of judgments — to put an end to what would be an endless
litigation. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. In the interest of society as a
whole,litigationmustcometoanend.Butthistenetadmitsseveralexceptions,
these are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4)
whenevercircumstancestranspireafterthefinalityofthedecisionrenderingits
execution unjust and inequitable, none of which exists in this case.
oreover,ajudgmentbecomesfinalandexecutorybyoperationoflaw.Thereis
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noneedforanyjudicialdeclarationorperformanceofanactbeforethefinality
takes effect. Finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected, or motion for
reconsiderationornewtrialisfiled.Thetrialcourtneednotevenpronouncethe
finalityoftheorderasthesamebecomesfinalbyoperationoflaw.Infact,the
trial court could not even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed
after the lapse of the period for taking an appeal.Itisofnomomentthatthe
opposing party failed to object to the timeliness of the motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not
even an appellate court would have the power to review a judgment that has
acquired finality.
54
Execution, Satisfaction, And Effects Of
Judgments (Rule 39)
xecution, Satisfaction, And Effects Of Judgments (Rule 39) — Effect Of
E
Judgments Or Final Orders – Section 47 (Conclusiveness Of Judgment)
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TACLOBAN V. COURT OF
APPEALS
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 231290 | August 27, 2020
DOCTRINE
compromise agreement is both a contract and a judgment on the merits.
A
Once approved by the court, it becomes final and executory.
he fact that two cases involve different Regional Trial Court(RTC)resolutions
T
does not prevent the application of res judicata.
FACTS
hisisapetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45assailingthedecisionof
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the Court of Appeals (CA). Spouses Esteban and Salvacion Sacramento
(Spouses Sacramento), owned parcels of land which include Lot No. 4144. The
City Government of Tacloban (City Govt of Tacloban), herein petitioner, with
authority from theSangguniangPanglungsodfiledbeforetheRTCacomplaint
foreminentdomainoveraportionofthedisputedlotforuseasanaccessroad
to the city dump site. Both partiesenteredintoaCompromiseAgreement.The
RTC, presided by Judge Sescon approved the Compromise Agreement and
directed the parties to comply with its terms and conditions.
pousesSacramentomovedtoenforcethecompromiseagreementbuttheRTC
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denied it given the withdrawal of the city council’s ratification of the
compromise agreement. Spouses Sacramento filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR). The RTC granted the motion and ordered the
enforcement, and a writ of execution was issued. The MR of City Govt of
Tacloban was denied so it elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA)
through a Petition forCertioraridocketedas CA-G.R. SP No. 04526.TheCA’s
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 04526 lapsed into finality and the CA issued an
entry of judgment. Later, Spouses Sacramento movedbeforetheRTCtodirect
the City Government of Tacloban to comply with the compromise agreement.
RTC granted the motion and issued the alias writ of execution and notices of
attachment and levy.
55
heCityGovernmentofTaclobanmovedtoquashthewritandtheRTCgranted
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the motion. Spouses Sacramento sought reconsideration but were denied.
Judge Secson inhibited and the case was then transferred to Judge Lilagan,
herein respondent. The Spouses moved for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution. Finding it unnecessary, Judge Lilagan ordered to continue the
enforcementofthewritofexecutioninstead.TheCityGovernmentofTacloban’s
MR wasdenied.ItelevatedthecasetotheCAthroughapetitionforreviewon
certioraridocketedasCA-G.R. SP No. 07675.TheCAdismissedthepetitionon
the ground of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.
ISSUE
1. C an the compromise agreement be enforced without valid ratification
from the city council.
2. Did the CA correctly applytheprincipleofresjudicataindismissingthe
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 07675.
RULING
1. Y es,thecompromiseagreementcanbeenforcedwithoutvalidratification
from the city council.
compromise agreement is in the nature of both a contract and a
A
judgment on the merits. As a contract, the compromise agreement can
onlybeavoidedongroundsofillegality,lackofconsent,fraud,orduress.
It is settled that a compromise agreement, once stamped withjudicial
imprimatur, becomes more than a mere contract and acquires the force
and effect of a judgment that is immediately final and executory.
As such, the City Govt. of Tacloban cannot, later, relieveitselfofliability
s imply because the city council changed its position.
2. Yes, the CA correctly applied the principle of res judicata.
es judicata is applicable either under the concept of "bar by prior
R
judgment" under Sec. 47 (b), Rule 39or"conclusivenessofjudgment"
under Sec. 47 (c), Rule39.Caselawexplainedthatifthereistheidentity
ofparties,subjectmatter,andcausesofactioninthetwocases,thenres
judicata, in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If, as
betweenthetwocases, onlytheidentityofpartiescanbeshown,butnot
identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of
judgment" applies.
ere, asopposedtothe CA'sconclusion, alltherequisitesofresjudicata
H
undertheconceptof "barbypriorjudgment" andnot"conclusivenessof
judgment" are present in this case.
56
Execution, Satisfaction, And Effects Of Judgments (Rule 39)
Effect Of Foreign Judgments Or Final Orders – Section 48
PIONEER INSURANCE & SURETY CORP. V. TIG
INSURANCE CO.
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 256177 | June 27, 2022
DOCTRINE
he Philippine court may only refuse to recognize orenforceaforeignarbitral
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awardwhenitsenforcementwouldbeagainstthefundamentaltenetsofjustice
andmorality,orwouldblatantlybeinjurioustothepublic,ortheinterestsofthe
society.Mereerrorsintheinterpretationofthelaworfactualfindingswouldnot
suffice to warrant refusal of enforcement under the public policy ground. The
illegality or immorality of the award must reach a certain threshold such that
enforcement of the same would be against Our State's fundamental tenets of
justiceandmorality,orwouldblatantlybeinjurioustothepublic,ortheinterests
of the society.
FACTS
learwater Insurance Company (Clearwater) filed a petition for confirmation,
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recognition,andenforcementofanarbitralawardagainstPioneerInsurance&
Surety Corporation (Pioneer) before the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Makati,Branch141(RTC).Thedisputestemmedfromaretrocessionagreement,
including arbitration clauses; which maintained an arbitration clause; as a
conditionprecedenttoanyrightofactionanydisputeshallbesubmittedtothe
decision of a board of arbitration composed of 2 arbitrators and an umpire
meetinginNewYorkunlessotherwiseagreed,,betweenClearwaterandPioneer.
Despite amendments over 8 years, Pioneer failed to pay Clearwater its share,
leading to arbitration where Pioneer didn't participate. The arbitral panel
awarded Clearwater $344k, which Pioneer didn't pay. Pioneer argued
insufficient evidence, expired filing time, lack of Philippine court jurisdiction,
and criticized petition formality. The RTC granted Clearwater’s Petition as the
arbitral awards, unlike courtjudgments,arenotboundbyrigidcourtrules,the
allegedviolationsofpublicpolicyrelyontheaward'smerit,notitsadherenceto
court standards, the RTC cannot review arbitration rulings of the Board of
Arbitrators, especially concerning evidence appreciation.
57
ioneer filed a Petition for Review with the CourtofAppeals(CA),questioning
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Clearwater's compliance with verification and certification requirements and
the correctness of the RTC's decision to confirm, recognize, and enforce the
arbitralaward.TheCAfoundthatClearwatersubstantiallycompliedwithforum
shoppingrequirementsofverificationandcertificationthroughitslegalcounsel,
authorized by Clearwater's senior vice president, who had the authoritytoact
on behalf of the company, and ruled that Pioneer failed to prove that
recognizing or enforcing the arbitral award would violate public policy. The
validity of Clearwater's claims against Pioneer was settled in arbitration, and
Pioneer'sargumentonprescriptionwasdeemedimpropersinceitwasn'traised
during arbitration, where Pioneer chose not to participate. The CA denied
Pioneer’s Motion for Reconsideration. Pioneer insists that the RTC and the CA
shouldhavedismissedClearwater'sPetitionforitsfailuretoattachasecretary's
certificate or board resolutionauthorizingitslegalcounseltoactonitsbehalf,
in violation of Rule 1.5 of the Special ADR Rules. Pioneer also maintains that
public policy against non-assertion of stale claims was violated when the
arbitral award was confirmed, recognized, and enforced.
IG Insurance Company (TIG Insurance); Clearwater's Successor-in-interest,
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insists that the petition was properly verified, and the forum shopping
certificationwasdulyexecutedasClearwater'sseniorvicepresident'saffidavit,
confirmed from the corporate secretary, authorized legal counsel to sign the
petitionunderUSlaw,andarguesthatprescriptionisn'tapublicpolicyissuebut
amerits-baseddefensethusPioneercan'traiseprescriptionduetoRule19.7of
the Special ADR Rules, which prohibits challenging the merits of the award.
Thus,Pioneerdidn'tpetitiontovacatetheaward,itbecamefinalandexecutory.
Confirming and enforcing the arbitral award in the Philippines is in line with
public policy.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in upholding the award.
RULING
No, the CA did not err in upholding the award.
ule 13.4(b)(ii) of the SpecialADRRulesprovidesthatthePhilippinecourtmay
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refusetherecognitionandenforcementofaforeignarbitralawardwhenitfinds
that its recognition and enforcement would be contrary to public policy. In
Mabuhay Holdings Corporation v. Sembcorp Logistics Limited; the Court
adopted the narrow approach in determining whether the enforcement of an
arbitral award is contrary to public policy. The Court emphasized that not all
violations oflawmaybedeemedcontrarytopublicpolicy.ThePhilippinecourt
may only refuse to recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral award when its
enforcement would be against the fundamental tenets of justiceandmorality,
or would blatantly be injurious to the public, or the interests of the society.
58
asedontheforegoing,thepartyraisingthegroundofviolationofpublicpolicy
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in opposing the recognition and enforcement ofaforeignarbitralawardmust:
(a)identifytheState'sfundamentaltenetsofjusticeandmorality;(b)provethe
illegality or immorality of the award; and (c) show the possible injury to the
public or the interests of the society.
hefinalawardwillsignificantlyaffectPioneer,butitwillnotinjurethepublicor
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compromise the society’s interest. The final award’s alleged violation of our
public policy against stale claims was not established with certainty. Thus,
confirming and enforcing the final award is not contrary to public policy.
59
Execution Of Money Judgment
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. V. RADIO
PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.
LOPEZ, M., J.
GR No. 190517 | July 27, 2022
DOCTRINE
nder the rules, the executing officer is required to first demand from the
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judgment debtors the immediatepaymentofthefullamountstatedinthewrit
of execution and all lawful fees. The executing officer shall demand the
paymenteitherincash,certifiedbankcheckoranyothermodeofpaymentthat
is acceptabletothejudgmentcreditor.Ifthejudgmentdebtorscannotpaythe
judgmentobligationusingthesemethods,theycanopttochoosewhichamong
their personal properties can be levied upon. If the judgment debtors do not
exercisethisoptionimmediatelyorwhentheyareabsentorcannotbelocated,
they then waive such right and the executing officer can levy the judgment
debtors'personalproperties,ifany,andthentherealpropertiesifthepersonal
properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The executing officer
may also levy personalpropertybygarnishmentbyreachingcreditsbelonging
tothejudgmentdebtorsandowingtothemfromastrangertothelitigation.In
this mode of satisfying the judgment known as garnishment, the executing
officer levies on the debts due the judgment debtors including bank deposits,
financial interests, royalties, commissions, and other personal property not
capable of manual delivery in the possession or under the control of third
parties. The levy may be done only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or
part of the obligation in cash or in such other manner acceptable to the
judgment obligee.
FACTS
nFebruary17,1995,theRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)renderedajudgmentinCivil
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Case No. Q-89-3580 ordering Traders Royal Bank (Traders Royal) and Security
Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) to pay actual damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees to Radio Philippines Network (RPN),
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), and Banahaw Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC).
60
radersRoyalandSecurityBankappealedtotheCourtofAppeals(CA).TheCA
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absolvedSecurityBankfromanyliabilityandheldTradersRoyalsolelyliableto
RPN,IBC,andBBCfordamagesandcostsofsuit.Unsatisfiedwiththedecision,
Traders Royal elevated the case to the Supreme Court and the case was
docketed as G.R. No. 138510. In the meantime, Traders Royal and Bank of
Commerce (BankCom) entered intoaPurchaseandSaleAgreement(PSA).The
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) approved the said agreement on the
conditionthatthepartiesmustsetupaP50,000,000.00escrowfundtobekept
for fifteen (15) years. As such, Traders Royal deposited the amount with the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). On October 10, 2002, the Court
affirmed, with modification, the CA’s judgment in CA-G.R. No. CV 54656. The
Court deleted the awardofexemplarydamagesbutgrantedattorney’sfeesto
RPN,IBC,andBBC.Thepartie’motionsforreconsiderationweredeniedand,in
April 2003, the Court’s judgment in G.R. No. 138510 became final and executory.
hereafter,RPN,IBC,andBBCfiledtheirrespectivemotionsbeforetheRTCfor
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the issuance of a writ of execution and subpoena duces tecum requiring
Metrobanktosubmitadetailedreportofthestatusoftheescrowfund.TheRTC
grantedthemotionforissuanceofsubpoenaandassuch,Metrobanksubmitted
areportshowingthattheescrowfundhadalreadybeendepleted.TheRTCthen
issued another subpoena directing BankCom to present the list of Traders
Royal’s assets and liabilities that itassumedandorderedMetrobanktosubmit
documents of withdrawals from the escrow fund. BankCom and Metrobank
movedtoquashthesubpoena.OnAugust15,2005,theRTCgrantedthemotion
for the issuance of a writ of execution on all of Traders Royal’s assets, the
escrow fund, and the properties in the PSA.
etrobankfiledaMotionforClarificationand/orReconsiderationAdCautelam
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andassertedthatitisnotapartyinthecaseandthatthereisnothingthatthe
RTC could execute against it, and that the RTC had a lack of jurisdiction to
determinedRPN,IBC,andBBC’srighttoproceedagainsttheescrowfund.The
RTC upheld the order of execution and clarified that the escrow account is
included only as a possible source of funds to satisfy the award. The RTC
pointedoutitspowertodetermineallissuesoffactsandlawinaidofenforcing
the final judgment.
issatisfied, BankCom and Metrobank filed petitionsforcertiorariwiththeCA.
D
BankCom and Metrobank argued that a separate proceeding against the
escrowfundisnecessary.TheCAdismissedthepetitionsandruledthattheRTC
didnotactwithgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitdirectedtheissuanceofawrit
ofexecutionagainsttheescrowfund.Thedeterminationofwhethertheescrow
fundhadbeenexhaustedisaquestionwhichtheRTCcanthusproperlyresolve
as an incident of the execution of final judgment.
ence, the petition for review on certiorari. Metrobank questions the RTC’s
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jurisdictionoveritspersonandmaintainsthatitisnotapartytothecasenora
judgment debtor against whom the money judgment could be enforced, and
thatanyactionagainsttheescrowfundmustbeventilatedinaseparateaction.
RPN, IBC, and BBC, however, argue that the RTC has jurisdiction over
metrobank as Traders Royal’s escrow agent and that the RTC can compel
Metrobanktoaccountforandbeliableforthefundsheldinescrowpursuantto
its general supervisory control over the process of execution.
61
ISSUE
astheRTCcorrectinnotconfiningtheorderofexecutionaslaiddownunder
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the Rules of Court.
RULING
o,itwasnot.TheRTCshouldhaveconfinedtheorderofexecutioninamanner
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prescribed by the rules.
refatorily, it must be stressed that all the issues between the parties are
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deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final. No other
action can be taken on the decision except to order its execution. Here, it is
undisputed that the RTC's judgment in Civil Case No. Q-89-3580 declaring
TradersRoyalliabletopayactualdamagesandattorney'sfeestoRPN,IBCand
BBC had attained finality. Corollarily, the RTC is correct in issuing a writ of
execution.Nevertheless,theRTCshouldhaveconfinedtheorderofexecutionin
a manner prescribed in the rules.
nder the rules, the executing officer is required to first demand from the
U
judgment debtors the immediatepaymentofthefullamountstatedinthewrit
of execution and all lawful fees. The executing officer shall demand the
paymenteitherincash,certifiedbankcheckoranyothermodeofpaymentthat
is acceptabletothejudgmentcreditor.Ifthejudgmentdebtorscannotpaythe
judgmentobligationusingthesemethods,theycanopttochoosewhichamong
their personal properties can be levied upon. If the judgment debtors do not
exercisethisoptionimmediatelyorwhentheyareabsentorcannotbelocated,
they then waive such right and the executing officer can levy the judgment
debtors'personalproperties,ifany,andthentherealpropertiesifthepersonal
properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The executing officer
may also levy personalpropertybygarnishmentbyreachingcreditsbelonging
tothejudgmentdebtorsandowingtothemfromastrangertothelitigation.In
this mode of satisfying the judgment known as garnishment, the executing
officer levies on the debts due the judgment debtors including bank deposits,
financial interests, royalties, commissions, and other personal property not
capable of manual delivery in the possession or under the control of third
parties. The levy may be done only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or
part of the obligation in cash or in such other manner acceptable to the
judgment obligee.
I n this case, the RTC deviated fromthemannerprescribedintheruleswhenit
directedtheenforcementofthemoneyjudgment"againstanyandallassetsof
TRBand/oragainsttheEscrowFundestablishedbyTRBandBankofCommerce
withtheMetropolitanBankandTrustCompany."Toreiterate,theexecutionofa
money judgment requires the sheriff to first make a demand onthejudgment
debtor Traders Royalfortheimmediatepaymentofthejudgmentobligationin
cash, certifiedbankcheckoranyothermodeofpaymentthatisacceptableto
thejudgmentcreditorsRPN,IBC,andBBC.ItisonlywhenTradersRoyalcannot
pay all or part of the obligation may the sheriff resort to the levy of its
properties including the escrow fund withMetrobank.Inthiscircumstance,the
executing officer must serveanoticeuponMetrobankwhichisthenobligedto
deliver Traders Royal's credits to the proper officer issuing the writ.
62
erily, the RTC cannot require Metrobank to comply with all its orders and
V
processes absent the service of a writ of garnishment. Yet, the RTC readily
assumed that it has jurisdiction over Metrobank as Traders Royal's escrow
agent. The RTC even ordered Metrobank to submit a detailed report on the
status of the escrow fund and to bring documents of withdrawals from the
escrow account. To be sure, the RTC has yet to grant RPN, IBC, and BBC's
motion for execution of judgment when it issued the subpoena against
Metrobankandprematurelyinquiredintothestatusoftheescrowaccount.The
prudentcourseofactionfortheRTCistodenytherequestforsubpoenaandto
issuetheorderofexecutionpursuanttoSection9,Rule39oftheRulesofCourt.
Indeed, the procedure for the garnishment of debts and credits will allow the
RTCtoseasonablyascertainthestatusoftheescrowaccount.Therulesrequire
the third person or garnishee to make a written reporttothecourtwithinfive
(5)daysfromserviceofthenoticeofgarnishmentstatingwhetherthejudgment
debtor has sufficient funds to satisfy the judgment obligation. The written
reportservesthesamepurposeasthedocumentswhichthesubpoenarequired
Metrobank to produce.
n this score, the Court reminded that while the expeditious and efficient
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execution of court orders and writs is commendable, it should not, under any
circumstance, be done by departing from the Rules governing the same.
63
Provisional Remedies
Provisional Remedies
DE LIMA V. COURT OF APPEALS
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 199972 & 206118 | August 15, 2022
DOCTRINE
udicialcourtesyisneitherasubstitutenoragroundfortheissuanceofaWPI
J
under the Rules. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules provides that a preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
hat the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, andthewholeorpartof
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such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
actscomplainedof,orinrequiringtheperformanceofanactoractseitherfor
a limited period or perpetually;
hat the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
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complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
hataparty,court,agencyorapersonisdoing,threatening,orisattemptingto
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do,orisprocuringorsufferingtobedonesomeactoractsprobablyinviolation
oftherightsoftheapplicantrespectingthesubjectoftheactionorproceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
udicial courtesy is exercised by suspending the proceedings before a lower
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court,evenwithoutaninjunctionoranordertothateffectfromahighercourt,
to avoid mooting the matter raised before the higher court. Such exercise is
merely as a matter of respect and practical considerations. Whereas, the
issuance ofaWPI,althoughitalsopreservesthestatusquo,doesnotsuspend
theproceedingsinthemaincase.Itonlypreventsthethreatenedorcontinuous
irremediable injury to the party who has a clear legal right, entitled to be
judicially protected during the pendency of the main case. Courts are
consistently reminded that the power to issue the writ "should be exercised
sparingly,withtheutmostcare,andwithgreatcautionanddeliberation."AWPI
may be issued only upon showing of a clear and positive right.
64
FACTS
he Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA)grantedMeridienVistaGaming
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Corporation(Meridien)alicensetoconductgamingoperations,suchasjaialai,
withintheCagayanSpecialEconomicZoneandFreeport(CSEZFP),aswellasto
“setupjaialaibettingstationsinanyplace[oroff-frontons]asmaybeallowed
by law.” The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) informed
CEZAthatithadnopowertoauthorize,license,operate,andregulatejaialaiin
the absence of an express legislative franchise. As such, CEZA revoked the
licenseanddirectedMeridientostopallgamingoperationspromptingmeridien
toquestiontherevocationbeforeRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)-Aparri.Thelatter
issued a writ of mandamusdirectingCEZAtopermitMeridientocontinuewith
its gaming operations in accordance with the license granted. Due to the
negligenceofCEZA’scounsel,thejudgmentlapsedintofinality.CEZAattempted
tofileapetitionforrelieffromjudgmentwhichwasdeniedbyboththeRTCand
theCourtofAppeals(CA),promptinganappealoncertiorari-docketedasG.R.
No. 194962 - which was granted by the Supreme Court (SC) in the 27January
2016 Decision which directed the CA to give due course to CEZA’s mandamus.
eanwhile, the Anti-Illegal Gambling Unit of Games and Amusement Board
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(GAB)initiatedaninvestigationonreportedjaialaibettingstationsthroughout
thecountryoperatingunderMeridienwithoutGABpermits.Thus,ashowcause
order was issued against owners, operators, managers, or other responsible
officers of these off-frontos to explain why they should not be criminally
prosecuted under Republic Act (R.A) No. 954 and their establishments be
ordered closed. The respondents to these orders argued that GAB had no
regulatory authority over them as they operated under CEZA license. After
hearing,GABsustaineditsauthoritytosuperviseandregulatejaialaiactivities
regardless of the CEZA license and issued a Cease-and-Desist Order (CDO).
eridienfiledaComplaintforInjunctionwithApplicationfortheIssuanceofa
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TemporaryRestrainingOrder(TRO)orWPIbeforetheRTCtoenjointheCDOas
GAB had no regulatoryauthorityoverMeridien’sgamingoperations.A72-hour
TRO; issued and subsequently extended for 17 days, and WPI was issued. The
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss(MTD)filedbyGABonjurisdictionalgrounds
prompting GAB tofileapetitionforCertiorariandProhibitionbeforetheCAto
setasidetheinjunctionandOrderdenyingitsMTD.Thepetitionwasgrantedin
the18August2011CADecisionruling,whichstatedthattheRTCpatentlylacked
jurisdiction and sustained GAB's regulatory authority over Meridien's jai alai
activities within and beyond the CSEZFP. Meridien filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) which was denied.
henSecretaryofInteriorandLocalGovernment(SILG)JesseRobredo’squery
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on the legality of Meridien’sgamingoperationsoutsidetheCSEZFPresultedin
the issuance by Leila De Lima as Secretary of Justice(SOJ)ofDepartmentof
Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 24. The SOJ opined that under the CEZA license,
Meridienwasauthorizedtooperateoff-frontonsonlyifitisallowedbylaw,and
thatR.A.No.954expresslyprohibitsandcriminalizesoff-frontonoperations.As
such, it said that Meridien can only set up its jai alai betting/gaming stations
inside the CSEZFP.
65
he DOJ and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) issued a
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Joint Memorandum Circular No. 001- 2011 which directed concerned public
officers to (i) deny Meridien’s applications for business permits for off-fronton
operations and cancellations of those already issued, (ii) close off-frontons,
seize devices used for their operations and arrest their operators and
maintainers, and (iii) prosecute violators of R.A. No. 954.
he CA issued a 60-day TRO against the implementation of the Joint
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Memorandum.MeridienfiledaPetitionforCertiorariandProhibitionbeforethe
CA-docketedasCA-G.R.SPNo.120236-toannulthesame.TheCAalsoissued
aresolutionrulinginfavorofMeridien’sapplicationsfortheissuanceofaWPI,
in consideration of the pendency of G.R. No. 194962.
heMRfiledbytheSOJandSILGweredeniedinSCResolutionswhicharenow
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being assailedinG.R.No.199972.TheSOJandSILGarguethattheCAgravely
abused its discretion in issuing a WPI based solely on judicial courtesy, that
Meridienfailedtoestablishaclearandunmistakableright,andthatthereisno
urgency and necessity to be entitled to a WPI. They also contend that theCA
has no jurisdiction to issue a WPI against the implementation of the Joint
Memorandum because the questioned act was done in the exercise of a
quasi-legislative authority, which cannot be the subject of a Rule 65 petition.
Thus, they seek thedismissalofCA-G.R.SPNo.120236forlackofmeritand/or
lack of jurisdiction.
he CA found that Meridien'scauseofactionwashingeduponitsCEZA-issued
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license to operate jai alai, which the Joint Memorandum allegedly violated.
Considering that the CEZA's authority to grant the license to operate jai alai
activities was then in question before the Court in G.R. No. 194962, the CA
opined thatitsrulingmightrendertherelatedissueinG.R.No.194962mootas
such. As judicial courtesy, the CA issued a WPI to provisionally restrain
implementation of the Joint Memorandum, and await the Court's resolution in
G.R. No. 194962 before resolving the principal action in CA-G.R. SP No. 120236.
ISSUE
id the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the WPI, holding in
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abeyance the resolutionofCAG.R.SPNo.120236untiltheCourt'sresolutionof
G.R. No. 194962.
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RULING
Yes, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the WPI.
he Court emphasized that G.R. No. 194962, the supposed basis of the CA in
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suspending the disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 120236, was already disposed in
2016. Accordingly, the CA should have lifted motu proprio the questionedWPI
andproceededtoresolvethemainissuesinCA-G.R.SPNo.120236,whichtheSC
couldhaveconvenientlydismissedthisPetitiononthegroundofmootness.But
thegraveerrorcommittedbytheCAinissuingtheWPIconstrainedtheCourtto
resolve the substantive issues raised in the Petition to clarify and put into
perspective the dichotomy of judicial courtesy and the issuance of WPI.
nyrulingontheproprietyoftheissuanceoftheJointMemorandumcouldnot
A
haveaffectedanydispositiononCEZA'sauthoritytograntalicensetooperate
jaialaiactivitiesthenraisedinG.R.No.194962.Sincetheissuesinthesepending
cases are not related, the CA's adherence to the principle of judicial courtesy
was plainly improper.
heCourtfurtheremphasizedthatjudicialcourtesyisneitherasubstitutenora
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groundfortheissuanceofaWPIundertheRules.Section3,Rule58oftheRules
of Court, declares that the existence of a clearandunmistakablelegalrightis
invariablynecessary.Thisparamountconsiderationdifferentiatesmereexercise
of judicial courtesy from the issuance of a WPI, albeit both are essentiallyfor
purposes of maintaining status quo between thepartiesuntilthemeritsofthe
mainsuitarefullyheard.AWPImaybeissuedonlyuponshowingofaclearand
positiverightcallingforjudicialprotectionduringthependencyoftheprincipal
action.
I n this case, theCAfailedtotakeintoaccountthatMeridiendoesnothavean
existing clear legal right or even an ostensible right to continue with its
off-fronton operations enjoined by the questioned Joint Memorandum.
Meridien's right is limited by regulatory laws. Since the Joint Memorandum is
based upon a law - R.A. No. 954 - that expressly prohibits and penalizes
off-fronton operations, it is clear that the writ of mandamus did not give
Meridien a right in esse,oratleastanostensiblelegalright,tooperatejaialai
activities outside the CSEZFP. Verily, Meridien has no clear or ostensible legal
right to operate jai alai activities outsidetheCSEZFPtowarranttheinjunctive
relief sought.
67
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
Certiorari, Prohibition, And Mandamus (Rule 65)
Certiorari, Prohibition And Mandamus (Rule 65)
PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 244374 (Resolution) | February 15, 2022
DOCTRINE
stheRulenowstands,petitionsforcertiorarimustbefiledstrictlywithinsixty
A
(60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration. There can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period
within which to file a petition for certiorari, save in exceptional or meritorious
cases anchored on special or compelling reasons.
FACTS
n January 16, 2013, Puregold Price Club, Inc. (PPCI) hired Renato Cruz, Jr.
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(Renato) as a probationary store head. He was eventually appointed as store
office/manager at Puregold Extra Ampid (Puregold Extra) after just a few
months. Some of his tasks include theactivationoftheIntruderAlarmSystem
(IAS)whichwaslocatedinthetreasuryofficeofthebranchbeforestoreclosure
and its deactivation upon store opening. The IAS was programmed to send
message alerts on the mobile devices of Renato and two other officers
whenever an intruder was detected in the premises. Among them,Renatowas
the principal officer who was expected torespondwhentheIASsentalertsas
he lived nearest to the branch.
n March 16, 2015 at 1:23 AM, the IAS sounded an intruder alarm and sent
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messages to the corresponding officers. However, none of them arrived. This
promptedSecurityGuardMichaelMejeran(SGMejeran)totextRenatoandthe
twootherofficersyet,noneofthemresponded.Thealarmonceagainsounded
butoncemore,noneoftheofficersarrived.Itwasaround5:13amwhenRenato
arrived and asked the guard to open the store. Renato inspected the store
interiors but did not seeanyintruder.Thus,Renatodeactivatedthealarmand,
onhiswayout,tookfour(4)plasticpailsinstockatthestoreandbroughtthem
home for personal use.
68
ventually, PPCI’s Human Resource Manager Jona Pinky J. Canete (HR
E
Manager Canete) served Renato withanoticetoexplainwhyheshouldnotbe
dismissedforfailingtopromptlyrespondtotheIASandforstealing/takingthe
plastic pails out of the store. Renato admitted that he only saw the messages
when he woke up at 5:00am, and that he merely borrowed the pails due to a
scheduled water interruption in his area. In fact, heeventoldSGMejeranthat
he took the pails. After the administrative hearing, the PPCI served Renato a
notice of termination for gross and serious omission to do vital management
duty and responsibility, serious and willful breach of trust, abuse of position,
and stealing.
enato filed a request for assistance under the Single Entry Approach (SEnA)
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Program of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) indicating
Puregold Extra and Noel Groyon (Groyon) as respondents. The notices of
conciliation-mediation conference were sent to the address of Puregold Extra.
However, the partiesfailedtoreachanamicablesettlement.Thus,Renatofiled
for a complaint for illegal dismissal against Puregold Extra, Lucio Co (Co)and
Groyon before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
he LA rendered a decision based solely on Renato’s position paper as the
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respondents failed to appear. The LA held that Renato was illegally dismissed
and, accordingly, ordered PPCI to pay his backwages and separation pay.
Renato moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, alleging that the LA’s
rulingwasfinalandexecutoryafterPPCIreceivedacopyofthejudgmentand
did not appeal.
PCImovedtoannultheLA’sdecision,claimingthatitwasnotproperlyjoined
P
asarespondentinthecomplaintanddidnotreceivesummons.Assuch,theLA
did not acquire jurisdiction over PPCIandanydecisionagainstitisvoid.PPCI
submitted a supplemental motion with Groyon’s affidavit denying receipt of
summons. The LA pointed out that PPCI’sproperremedywastoappealtothe
NLRC. Accordingly, PPCI filed a petition to annul the LA’s Decision and Order.
PPCI maintained that it had no knowledge of Renato's complaint for illegal
dismissal until the receipt of his motion for issuanceofwritofexecution.PPCI
reiteratedthatitdidnotreceivesummonsoracopyoftheLA'sdecision.Renato
misledtheLAandfraudulentlyimpleadedPuregoldExtraashisemployer,which
isdifferentfromPPCI.Lastly,PPCIprayedthecaseberemandedtotheLAfor
mandatory conciliation. In contrast, Renato denied that he committed fraud
and explained thathewasworkingatPuregoldExtrasoheimpleadeditashis
employer.Inanycase,theserviceofsummonsuponPuregoldExtraissufficient
to acquire jurisdiction over PPCI given that its representatives attended SEnA
conferences.ThecasewasremandedforfailureoftheLAtoacquirejurisdiction
over PPCI due to improper service of summons.
eantime, the LA issued summons and served it to PPCI's address at Paco,
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ManilaincompliancewiththeNLRC'sResolutionswhichremandedthecasefor
mandatory conciliation. Yet, the parties failed to arrive at any settlement and
wereorderedtosubmittheirpositionpapers.TheLAruledthatPPCIdismissed
Renato for just cause with observance of procedural due process. Renato
appealedtotheNLRCbutwasdenied. OnDecember2,2018,theNLRCdecision
became finalandexecutoryabsentatimelyappeal.Ontheotherhand,theCA
gave due course to Renato's petition for certiorari.
69
he CA held that there was substantialcompliancewiththerulesonserviceof
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summons and that PPCI failed to establish any fraud, which supposedly
prevented it from appearing before the LA proceedings. The CA also
ratiocinatedthatPPCIownedandoperatedPuregoldExtra.Relatively,itwould
be absurd for Puregold Extra not to inform PPCIaboutRenato'scomplaintfor
illegal dismissal. Lastly, the CA ruled that PPCI cannot use technicalities to
escape the negative consequences of an adverse decision.
PCI moved for reconsideration. However, the CA denied PPCI's motion. PPCI
P
received the CA's Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration and has
fifteen (15) days or until February 28, 2019 to file a petition for review. On
February19,2019,PPCImovedforanadditionalperiodofthirty(30)daysfrom
February 28, 2019 or until March 30, 2019 within which to file a petition for
review. Also, PPCI paid the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs. On March 15, 2019, however, PCCI filed a petition for certiorari. Mainly,
PPCIassertsthattheCA'sDecisiondatedAugust24,2018andResolutiondated
January 29, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 149917 were rendered with grave abuseof
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. PPCI avers that the CA
gravely erred in giving due course to Renato's petition for certiorari despite
beingfiledoutoftimeorbeyondthe60-dayreglementaryperiod.PPCIexplains
that the Bailiff's Return showed that the counsel of Renato received on
December 29, 2016 the NLRC Resolution dated October 28, 2016 denying his
motionforreconsideration.Assuch,RenatohaduntilFebruary27,2017toavail
apetitionforcertiorari.However,Renatofiledthepetitionforcertiorarionlyon
March13,2017orfourteen(14)dayslate.Inhiscomment,Renatocontendsthat
he timely filed his petition forcertiorariwithinthe60-dayreglementaryperiod
reckoned from his receipt onJanuary12,2017oftheNLRCResolutiondenying
his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, Renato insists that PPCI was validly
served with summons through Puregold Extra.
ISSUE
id the CA err in giving due course to Renato’s petition for certiorari for being
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filed out of time.
RULING
es, the CA erred in giving due course to Renato’s petition despite the same
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being filed out of time.
he proper remedy of the aggrieved party from the CA'sdecisionisapetition
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for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Specifically, Rule45providesthatdecisions,finalordersorresolutions
oftheCAinanycase,i.e.,regardlessofthenatureoftheactionorproceedings
involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a petition for review on
certiorari, which would be butacontinuationoftheappellateprocessoverthe
original case. Thus, PPCI should have filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 instead of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
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hePPCI'sargumentthatapetitionforcertiorariistheproperremedysincethe
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CAhadnojurisdictiontoentertainRenato'spetitionforcertiorarifiledbeforeit
having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period deserves scant
consideration.Thereisnoreasonwhysuchissuecouldnothavebeenraisedon
appeal.
owever,inaccordancewiththeliberalspiritpervadingtheRulesofCourtand
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in the interest of justice, the Court has the discretion to treat a petition for
certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari.
ere,PPCIreceivedonFebruary13,2019theCA'sResolutiondenyingitsmotion
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for reconsiderationandhasfifteen(15)daysoruntilFebruary28,2019tofilea
petition for review on certiorari. Within the 15-day reglementary period, PPCI
moved for an additional period of thirty (30) days from February 28, 2019 or
untilMarch30,2019withinwhichtofiletherequiredpetition.Also,PPCIpaidthe
docketandotherlawfulfeesandthedepositforcosts.UnderSection2,Rule45
oftheRulesofCourt,'[o]nmotiondulyfiledandserved,withfullpaymentofthe
docket and other lawful feesandthedepositforcostsbeforetheexpirationof
the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant
an extensionofthirty(30)daysonlywithinwhichtofilethepetition.'OnMarch
15, 2019, PCCI filed the instant petition for certiorari well within the extended
period.Takentogether,PPCI'spetitionforcertiorarimaybeliberallytreatedas
a petition for review on certiorari because it faithfully complied with the
provisions of Rule 45 of theRulesofCourt.Indeed,PPCIfindsitmoreprudent
to observe the rules in filing a petition for review on certiorari before finally
choosing the remedy of certiorari as shown in its statement of material dates.
nentthemeritsofthecase,theCourtagreeswithPPCI'sargumentthattheCA
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erred in giving due course toRenato'spetitionforcertiorariforbeingfiledout
of time. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly
within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motionforreconsideration.Therecannolongerbeanyextensionofthe60-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari, save in exceptional or
meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling reasons. Contrary to
Renato'stheory,thereglementaryperiodtoavailtheremedyofcertiorarimust
be reckoned on December 29, 2016 or the date his counsel received theNLRC
Resolutiondenyingthemotionforreconsideration,andnotonJanuary12,2017
whenheallegedlyreceivedtheassailedresolution.Tobesure,therecordsreveal
that Renato’s counsel was validly notified of the assailed NLRC Resolution on
December 29, 2016.
pplying these precepts, Renatohadsixty(60)dayscountedfromthedatehis
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counselreceivedonDecember29,2016theNLRCResolutiondenyingthemotion
forreconsiderationoruntilFebruary27,2017withinwhichtoavailapetitionfor
certiorari.Asintimatedearlier,Renatofiledhispetitionforcertioraribeforethe
CA only on March 13, 2017 or fourteen (14) days beyond the reglementary
period. Notably, Renato neither moved for an extension of timenorpresented
any exceptional or meritorious circumstance to exempt him from the strict
application of the 60-day period rule.
71
Forcible Entry And Unlawful Detainer (Rule 70)
Forcible Entry And Unlawful Detainer (Rule 70)
GALACGAC V. BAUTISTA
LOPEZ, M., J.
GR No. 221384 (Resolution) | November 9, 2020
DOCTRINE
hecourtmaydismissacomplaintforunlawfuldetainerbasedonlackofcause
T
ofactioniftheplaintiff'ssupposedactoftoleranceisnotpresentrightfromthe
start of the defendant's possession.
FACTS
I n 2012, Benigno M. Galacgac (Benigno) filed against Reynaldo Bautista
(Reynaldo)anactionforunlawfuldetainerovera LotbeforetheMunicipalTrial
CourtinCities(MTCC)ofLaoagCity.TheheirsofInesMariano(Cirila,Maxima,
Arcadia, and Isabel) partitioned and adjudicatedthedisputedareainfavorof
Benigno pursuant to a contingencyfeeagreementinconsiderationofhislegal
services in a civil case involving the property. On the same year, Benigno
allowedthecaretakeroftheheirsofMariano,SaturninoBautista(Saturnino),to
occupythelandontheconditionthathewillconstructahouseoflightmaterials
and will surrender its possession when needed. Later, Benigno learned that
Saturnino's son, Reynaldo, started building a house of strong materials.
Accordingly, Benigno sent demand letters to Reynaldo asking to defer the
construction and to vacate the premises.
n the other hand, Reynaldo claimed ownership of the disputed portion and
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averred that Maxima and Arcadia sold to him their shares over the lot.
n June 29, 2012,theMTCCdismissedthecomplaintandruledthatReynaldo's
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authoritytopossessthelandemanatedfromtheheirsofInesMarianoandnot
from Benigno. Hence, this summary action for the ejectment of thedefendant
from the premises cannot be given due course by the Court. Dissatisfied,
BenignoappealedtotheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC).However,Benignodiedand
was substituted by his heir Marvin A. Galacgac (Marvin). On May30,2013,the
RTC reversed the MTCC's findings and ordered Reynaldo to surrender the
possessionofthelot.TheRTCnotedthattheheirsofMarianohadnotimpugned
the validity of the deed of partition and adjudication while Reynaldo cannot
raise its illegality because he is not a party to the instrument.
72
oreover, the RTC held that Benigno has a better right because the land was
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adjudicated to him long before the sale in favor of Reynaldo. Upon denial of
motionforreconsideration,ReynaldoelevatedthecasetotheCourtofAppeals
(CA) on the ground that the RTC erred in upholding Benigno's possessionover
the lot. The CA reinstated the MTCC's decision dismissing the complaint and
explained that Benigno failed to prove his supposed act of tolerancefromthe
start of Reynaldo's occupation. Marvin sought reconsiderationbutwasdenied.
Hence, this recourse. Marvin maintains that his father, Benigno, alleged and
proved the elements of an action for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE
Does the complaint sufficiently state a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
RULING
o, the complaint does not sufficiently state a cause of action for unlawful
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detainer.
complaint for unlawful detainer must sufficiently allege and prove the
A
following key jurisdictional facts, to wit: (1) initially, possession of property by
the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually,suchpossessionbecameillegaluponnoticebyplaintifftodefendant
of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the
defendant remained inpossessionofthepropertyanddeprivedtheplaintiffof
the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
pecifically, a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
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permission or tolerance, without any contract between them, is necessarily
boundbyanimpliedpromisethathewillvacateupondemand,failingwhich,a
summaryactionforejectmentmaybefiledagainsthim.However,itisessential
in ejectment cases of this kind that the plaintiff's supposed act of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered. This is where Benigno's cause of action fails.
ere, the complaint for unlawful detainer alleged that Benigno permitted
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Saturnino to occupy the 180-square meter portion of Lot. Nonetheless, the
supposed permission or tolerance was unsubstantiated. Foremost, Saturnino
diedbeforethefilingofthecaseandtestimonyonanymatteroffactoccurring
before his death is inadmissible. Also, Saturnino was the caretaker of Lot No.
10973 and he occupied the land based on Cirila, et al.'s express permission.
Corollarily, Saturnino has no reason to ask permission from Benigno. More
importantly, Benigno did not extend the purported tolerance to Reynaldo.
Admittedly, Benigno and Reynaldo have no agreement on the disputed area
and even asserted opposing claims over its ownership. Benigno insisted that
Cirila, et al. partitioned and adjudicated the portion in his favor.
73
n the other hand, ReynaldomaintainedthatMaximaandArcadiasoldtohim
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their shares over the land.
aken together, the factsproveddonotsustaintheallegedcauseofaction.As
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such, the complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action which is
usually made after questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the
evidence presented.
74
Special Proceedings And Special Writs
Financial Rehabilitation And Insolvency Act Of 2010 (RA No. 10142) -
Commencement Order
KAIZEN BUILDERS, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 226894 & 247647 | September 3, 2020
DOCTRINE
he suspension of claims during corporate rehabilitation proceedings takes
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precedence over other legal actions, and courts must respect and adhere to
stayordersissuedbyrehabilitationcourtstopromotetheorderlyadministration
of justice.
FACTS
I n2004,OfeliaUrsais(Ursais)purchasedapropertyinBaguioCityfromKaizen
Builders, Inc. In 2007, the parties executed a contract to sell where Ofelia
agreed to sellbackthepropertytoKaizenBuildersforaspecifiedamountand
swapped it with another property in Baguio City. Conflicts arose between the
parties with regard to the payments and interest owed. Despite contracted
stipulations, Kaizen Builders defaulted on remitting monthly interest and
refused to deliver a specific amount owed to Ofelia.
I n 2011, Ursais filed a complaint for a sum of money against Kaizen Builders
and its CEO, Cecille F. Apostol, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The trial
court ruled in favor of Ursais, ordering Kaizen Builders and Cecille to pay
specific amounts to the former. Kaizen Builders and Cecille appealed the trial
court decision to the Court of Appeals and filed for corporate rehabilitation.
During such an appeal, a rehabilitation court issued a Commencement Order,
suspending all actions for the enforcement of claims against Kaizen Builders.
aizen and Apostol moved to consolidate the appeal with the rehabilitation
K
proceedings,buttheappellatecourtdeniedtheirmotiononthegroundthatthe
two proceedings involved different parties, issues, and reliefs.This ruling was
petitioned by the same parties to the Supreme Court (SC) on the ground that
theCourtofAppeals(CA)constitutedgraveabuseofdiscretioninmakingsuch
a decision.
75
ISSUE
oes the CA'sdecisiontoproceedwiththeappealdespitetheCommencement
D
Order and denial of consolidation amount to a gross abuse of discretion.
RULING
es, the CA's decision to proceed with the appeal, despite the suspension of
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claims against Kaizen Builders, was deemed to be a gross and arbitrary
departure from established legal standards.
he SC emphasized that once a commencement order is issued by the
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rehabilitationcourt,allactionsfortheenforcementofclaimsagainstthedebtor
corporation are suspended. This suspension encompasses legal proceedings in
all courts, including appellate courts like the CA.
he doctrine underscores the importance of honoring stay orders issued by
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rehabilitation courts to facilitate the effective rehabilitation of financially
distressed corporations. It highlights the need for coordination and alignment
of legal proceedings to avoid conflicting decisions and ensure the orderly
resolution of claims.
urthermore, the doctrine emphasizes the authority of rehabilitation courts to
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oversee and manage the rehabilitation process, including the suspension of
claims, to maximize the chances of successful rehabilitation and theequitable
treatment of creditors.
76
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons
Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons - Letters Testamentary And
Of Administration - Rule 78
GOZUM V. PAPPAS
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 197147 (Resolution) | February 3, 2021
DOCTRINE
he appointment of a special administrator is within the discretion of the
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probatecourt,andthecourtmayconsiderfactorsotherthanthoseenumerated
intherulesforregularadministrators.Thespecialadministratorisanofficerof
thecourtandissubjecttothecourt’ssupervisionandcontrol.Theappointment
of a special administrator may be revoked if the person appointed fails to
perform their duties or if their appointment is no longer necessary.
FACTS
hisisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45assailingtheDecisionby
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the Court of Appeals (CA). In 1993, Edmundo Cea (Edmundo) died intestate
leaving behind his wife GloriaNovelo(Gloria)andtheirchildrenDiana,Norma,
and Edmundo Jr.In1994,EdmundoJr.filedapetitionforthesettlementofthe
intestateestate,andDianawassubsequentlyappointedasadministratrixofthe
estate of Edmundo. Norma was domiciled in the US and was unaware of the
settlement proceedings.In2002,GloriadiedtestateandnamedSalvioFortuno
(Salvio) as the executor of the estate. Norma later filed a motion to remove
Salvio as administrator and the court granted the motion restoring Norma to
her position.
alvioandDianaappealedtheorder,buttheCourtofAppeals(CA)affirmedthe
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Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision. Norma then filed an omnibus motion to
revoke Salvio’s appointment as special administrator of Gloria’s estate and to
appointherselfinstead.ThecourtpartlygrantedthemotionremovingSalvioas
a special administrator and appointing Norma in his place. Salvio and Diana
filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied.
77
ISSUE
Was Norma’s appointment as special administrator proper.
RULING
Yes, Norma’s appointment as administrator is proper.
heRulesprovidethattheappointmentofaspecialadministratoriswarranted
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when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration. The
Special Administrator is considered an officer of the court and is expected to
work in the best interest of the entire estate. The rules for the selection or
removal of regular administrators do not apply to special administrators, and
the appointment rests on the sound discretion of the probate court.
I n this case, the court found it logical, practical, and economical to appoint
Norma as the special administratix of Gloria’s estate as she was already
appointed as the administratix for Edmundo’s estate and the conjugal
properties of Edmundo and Gloriaremainedundivided.Thecourtbelievesthat
Norma’s appointment would facilitate the division of the estate. Furthermore,
Salvio has abandoned his duty as administrator of Edmundo’s estate and
allowed Dianawhowasremovedasadministratortoadministertheestateand
control the funds. Norma’s US citizenship is not a bar to her appointment as
special administrator as the residency requirement is the factor and not
citizenship. As she was willing to stay in the Philippines until the conclusion of
the proceedings.
78
Change Of Name (Rule 103)
Change Of Name (Rule 103)
REPUBLIC V. MALIGAYA
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 233068 | November 9, 2020
DOCTRINE
he term "substantial" means consisting of or relating to substance, or
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something that is important or essential.Inrelationtochangeorcorrectionof
an entry in the birth certificate, substantial referstothatwhichestablishes,or
affects the substantive right of the person on whose behalf the change or
correctionisbeingsought.Thus,changeswhichmayaffectthecivilstatusfrom
legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, civil status, or citizenship ofaperson
are substantial in character.
FACTS
I n 2016, Merly Maligaya (Merly) filed a petition for correction of entries in her
birth certificate under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court beforetheRegionalTrial
Court (RTC) docketed as Special Proceedings No. NC-2016-2599.
I nherpetition,Merlyprayedtochangeherfirstnamefrom"MERLE"to"MERLY"
and her date of birth from "February 15, 1959" to "November 26, 1958." As
supporting evidence, Merly presented the original andcertifiedoriginalcopies
of her SSS Member's Data E-4 Form, Voter's Registration Record, Voter's
Certification, Voter'sIdentificationCard,PoliceClearanceandNationalBureau
of Investigation (NBI) Clearance. After finding the petition sufficient in form
and substance, the RTC ordered the publicationofthepetitioninanewspaper
of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks. Trial then
ensued.
he OSG argues that the RTC has no jurisdiction to rectify the error in Merly's
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first name because the mistake is clerical that must be corrected through
administrative proceedings under Republic Act (RA) No. 9048, as amended by
RANo.10172. Astothedateofbirth,MerlyproperlyfiledapetitionunderRule
108 of the Rules of Court but she failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 3, Rule 108 to implead all persons who have a claim or anyinterestin
the proceedings.
79
n the other hand, Merly maintains that the correction of her first name and
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date of birth under Rule 108 is appropriate, and that the filing of separate
petitions will result in circuitous proceedings and unjustified delay. Moreover,
Merlyclaimsthatthecorrectionofsuchentriesisclericalandstrictobservance
with Rule 108 is not required. Lastly, the publication of the petition cured the
failure to implead the indispensable parties.
heRTCgrantedthepetitiontoreflectMerly'saccuratepersonalcircumstances
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and to avoid confusion on herpublicandprivatedocuments.TheOfficeofthe
Solicitor General (OSG) moved for a reconsideration. Yet, the RTC denied the
motion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
1 . D oes the RTC have jurisdiction over the case.
2. Was Maligaya able to comply with the procedural requirement.
RULING
1. Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
I n 2012, RA No. 10172 amended RA No.9048expandingtheauthorityof
local civil registrars and the Consul General to make changesintheday
andmonthinthedateofbirth,aswellasintherecordedsexofaperson,
when it is patently clear that therewasatypographicalerrorormistake
in the entry.
he term "substantial" means consisting of or relating to substance, or
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something that is important or essential. In relation to change or
correction of an entry in the birth certificate, substantial refers to that
whichestablishes,oraffectsthesubstantiverightofthepersononwhose
behalfthechangeorcorrectionisbeingsought.Thus,changeswhichmay
affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well assex,civil
status,orcitizenshipofapersonaresubstantialincharacter.Ontheother
hand, RA No. 9048, as amended by RA No. 10172, defines a clerical or
typographicalerrorasamistakecommittedintheperformanceofclerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil
register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the
date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be correctedorchanged
only by reference to other existing record or records. However, the
correctionmustnotinvolvethechangeofnationality,age,orstatusofthe
petitioner. Otherwise, the petition must be denied.
ere,thecorrectionofMerly'sfirstnamefrom"MERLE"to"MERLY"refers
H
to a clerical or typographical error. It merely rectified the erroneous
spelling through the substitution ofthesecondletter"E"in"MERLE"with
80
t he letter "Y," so it will read as "MERLY." To be sure, the documentary
evidence satisfactorily show that Merly's first name is not "MERLE" as
incorrectly indicated in her birth certificate. More importantly, the
correction will neither affect nor prejudice any substantial rights. The
innocuouserrorsinMerly'sfirstnamemaybecorrectedorchangedunder
RA No. 9048 by referring to related documents.
eanwhile, the correction of Merly's date of birth is substantialbecause
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changingthemonth,dayandyearfrom"February15,1959"to"November
26,1958"willalterherage.Asdiscussedearlier,thelawexpresslyprovides
that the correction of clerical or typographical error must not involve a
change in the age of the petitioner. Otherwise, the petition must be
denied. The law's unmistakable intent istocharacterizethecorrectionof
ageassubstantialthatnecessitatesajudicialorder.Indeed,theageofa
personisamatterofpublicconcernandanessentialcomponentofone's
statusinlaw.Achangeinaperson'sdateofbirth,inwhichanalterationin
his age is a necessary consequence, significantly affects his status with
regardtomatters,suchasmarriageandfamilyrelations,obligationsand
contracts,andtheexerciseoflegalrights.Corollarily,thesubstantialerror
in Merly's date of birth may be corrected only through the appropriate
adversary proceedings. Thus, Merly correctly filed a petition for
cancellation and/or correction of the entries before the RTC under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
t any rate, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is not
A
absolute and may be dispensed with for reasons of equity. In this case,
Merly had presented testimonial and documentary evidence which the
RTC had evaluated and found sufficient. To require Merly to file a new
petition with the local civil registrar and start the process alloveragain
wouldnotbeinkeepingwiththepurposeofRANo.9048ofgivingpeople
an option to have the erroneous entries in their civil records corrected
through an administrative proceeding that is less expensive and more
expeditious.ItwillbemoreprudentforMerly,andotherpersonssimilarly
situated,toallowmultiplecorrectionsand/orcancellationsofentriesina
singleactionunderRule108ratherthantwoseparatepetitionsbeforethe
RTC and the local civil registrar. This will avoid multiplicity of suits and
further litigation between the parties, which is offensive to the orderly
administration of justice.
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2. No, Maligaya was not able to comply with the procedural requirements.
herulesrequiretwosetsofnoticestopotentialoppositors—oneisgiven
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to persons named inthepetitionandanotherservedtopersonswhoare
not named in the petition but nonetheless may beconsideredinterested
oraffectedparties.Consequently,thepetitionforasubstantialcorrection
must implead the civil registrar and other persons who have or claimto
have any interest that would be affected.
lso, the phrase "and all persons who have or claim any interest which
A
would beaffectedthereby"inthetitleofthepetitionandthepublication
of the petition are not sufficientnoticetoallinterestedparties.InTanv.
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, we ruled that
impleading andnotifyingonlythelocalcivilregistrarandthepublication
of the petition are not sufficient compliance with the procedural
requirements.However,thesubsequentpublicationofanoticeofhearing
may cure the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested
parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringingtocourtallpossibleinterestedparties;(b)thepartiesthemselves
initiatedthecorrectionsproceedings;(c)thereisnoactualorpresumptive
awareness of the existence oftheinterestedparties;or(d)whenaparty
is inadvertently left out.
I n this case, Merly only impleaded the local civil registrar but not her
parents who are in the best position to establish the correct dateofher
birth as well as her siblings, if any and none of these exceptions are
present in this case. There was no earnest effort on the partofMerlyto
bringtocourtherparentsandsiblings,ifany,andotherpartieswhomay
have an interest in the petition.Also,theseindispensablepartiesarenot
the ones who initiated the proceedings and Merly cannot possibly claim
that she was notaware,actuallyorpresumptively,astotheexistenceor
whereaboutsoftheseinterestedparties.Likewise,itdoesnotappearthat
the indispensable parties were inadvertently and unintentionally left out
when Merly filed the petition.
akentogether,thefailuretostrictlycomplywiththerequirementsunder
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Rule 108 renders the proceedings void for the correction of substantial
errors.
82
Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The
Civil Registry (Rule 108; R.A. 9048,
As Amended By R.A. No. 10172)
Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry (Rule 108;
R.A. 9048, As Amended By R.A. No. 10172)
REPUBLIC V. ONTUCA Y PELEÑO
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 232053 | July 15, 2020
DOCTRINE
he term "substantial" means consisting of or relating to substance, or
T
something that is important or essential.Inrelationtochangeorcorrectionof
an entry in the birth certificate, substantial referstothatwhichestablishes,or
affects the substantive right of the person on whose behalf the change or
correctionisbeingsought.Thus,changeswhichmayaffectthecivilstatusfrom
legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, civilstatus,orcitizenshipofaperson,
are substantial in character.
83
FACTS
his case is a petition for review on certiorari filed bytheRepublic,petitioner,
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through Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Special Proceedings No. 15-66 which granted the
correction of the civil status of Annabelle OntucaPeleño(Anabelle),petitioner,
andthefirstname,andmiddlenameinthebirthcertificateofherchild,Zsanine
Kimberly Jariol Ontuca (Zsanine), under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. On 14
August 2000, Anabelle gave birth to her daughter, assisted by a registered
midwife, Corazon Carabeo (Corazon). Corazon volunteered herself to register
Zsanine's birth with the Parañaque Civil Registrar. Annabelle thus provided
Corazon with the necessary details. However, to her dismay, Annabelle found
the following erroneous entries in the birth certificate of Zsanine:
a. E ntry No. 6 — the name "Mary" was added in her first name while her
middle name was misspelled as "Paliño";
b. Entry No.18 — in the date and place of marriage, "May 25, 1999 at Occ.
Mindoro" was indicated despite the fact that Annabelle wasnotmarried
with the father of her child; and,
c. Entry No. 20 — Annabelle appeared as the informant who signed and
accomplished the form, instead of the midwife.
hus, Annabelle filedaPetitionunderRule108oftheRulesofCourtbeforethe
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RTC, praying that the name "Mary Annabelle Peleño Ontuca" be corrected by
removing"Mary"andchanging"Paliño"to"Peleño";andthatthedateandplace
ofmarriageofparentsbechangedfrom"May25,1999atOcc.Mindoro"to"NOT
MARRIED." The RTC ordered to furnish a copy of the petition to the OSG,
National Statistics Office, and the Local Civil Registrar. After trial, the RTC
rendered judgment granting the petition.
heOSGthenmovedforreconsideration,arguingthatRTChasnojurisdictionto
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correct Annabelle's first name and middle name under Rule 108 because the
errors are clerical that can be corrected through administrative proceedings
under Republic Act(RA)No.9048,asamended.Further,Annabelleshouldhave
impleadedtheOSGandallotherpersonswhohaveaclaimoranyinterestinthe
proceedings,asthechangeinthedateandplaceofmarriageissubstantial.The
RTC denied the motion.
ISSUE
1. D id the RTC havejurisdictiontocorrectAnabelle’sfirstnameandmiddle
name under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
2. Was the change in the date and place of marriage substantial.
84
RULING
1. Y es, the RTC has jurisdiction to correct the first and middle name of
Anabelle.
ule 108 of the rules of court applies when the person is seeking to
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correct clerical and innocuous mistakes in hisorherdocumentswiththe
civilregister.Italsogovernsthecorrectionofsubstantialerrorsaffecting
the civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a person.Theproceedings
mayeitherbesummary,ifthecorrectionpertainstoclericalmistakes,or
adversary, if it involves substantial errors. The petition must be filed
before the RTC, which sets a hearing and directs the publication of its
orderinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation.TheRTCmaygrantordismiss
the petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.
ANo.9048,amendingRule108,providesthatthelocalcivilregistrars,or
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the Consul General, as the case may be, are now authorized to correct
clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in
the first name or nickname, without need of a judicial order. RA 10172,
amending RA No. 9048, expanded the authority of local civil registrars
and the Consul General to make changes in the day and month in the
date of birth, as well as in the recorded sex of a person, when it is
patently clear that there was a typographical error or mistake in the
entry.
I nthecaseatbar,asAnnabellesoughtthechangeinherfirstnameand
middlenameunderRule108,sheshouldhaveideallyfiledthepetitionfor
correction with the local civil registrar under RA No. 9048, as amended,
and only when the petitionisdeniedcantheRTCtakecognizanceofthe
case.However,RANo.9048,asamended,didnotdivestthetrialcourtsof
jurisdictionoverpetitionsforcorrectionofclericalortypographicalerrors
in a birth certificate. To be sure, the local civil registrars' administrative
authority to change or correct similar errors is only primary but not
exclusive. The regular courts maintain the authority to make judicial
corrections of entries in the civil registrar.
Hence, the correction of Annabelle's first and middle name is sustained.
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2. Yes, the change in date and place of marriage is substantial.
he term "substantial" means consisting of or relating to substance, or
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something that is important or essential. In relation to change or
correction of an entry in the birth certificate, substantial refers to that
whichestablishes,oraffectsthesubstantiverightofthepersononwhose
behalfthechangeorcorrectionisbeingsought.Thus,changeswhichmay
affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well assex,civil
status, or citizenship of a person, are substantial in character. The
correction of entries in the civil register pertaining to citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage involves
substantial alterations, which may be corrected, and the true facts
established, provide the parties aggrieved by the error to avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings.
I n the case at bar, the correction of the date and place of the parent's
marriage from "May 25, 1999 at Occ. Mindoro" to "NOT MARRIED" is
substantial since it will alter the child's status from legitimate to
illegitimate and that her right to inherit from her parents would be
substantiallyimpaired.However,whileAnnabellecorrectlyfiledapetition
for cancellation and/or correction of the entries before the RTC under
Rule108,shefailedtoobservetherequiredproceduresunderSections3,
4 and 5 of the same Rule.
herefore, the correction referring to the date and place of marriage of
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Annabelle is set aside.
86
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Preliminary Investigation (Rule 112)
Authorized Officers; Determination Of Probable Cause – Sections 2-4
MACASIL V. FRAUD AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION
OFFICE-COMMISSION ON AUDIT
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R No. 226898 (Resolution) | May 11, 2021
DOCTRINE
robable cause for filing a criminal information constitutes facts sufficient to
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engender a well-founded belief that a crime hasbeencommittedandthatthe
respondent is probably guilty thereof. When at the outset the existence of
probable causetoformasufficientbeliefastotheguiltoftheaccusedcannot
be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person the
trauma of going through a trial.
FACTS
hisisaPetitionforCertiorari(Rule65)filedbypetitionerJoelMacasil(Macasil)
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against respondentsFraudAuditandInvestigationOffice(FAIO)-Commission
On Audit (COA), Public Assistance And Corruption Prevention Office
Ombudsman - Visayas Regional Office No. VIII, and the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) assailing the Office of the Ombudsman's Consolidated
Resolution finding prima facie case for violation of the Anti-GraftandCorrupt
PracticesActandFalsification.ThecontroversybeganonFebruary7,2005when
the Commission on Audit Regional Office No. VIII investigated the
infrastructure projects of the Tacloban City Sub-District Engineering Office for
calendar years 2003 and 2004. Based on the audit investigation,thereviewof
the projectscannotbecompletedduetodelayandnon-submissionofcontract
documents. Accordingly, the Regional Legal and Adjudication Office (RLAO)
issued notices of suspension to the responsible officers, directing them to
submit the required documents. Upon compliance, the RLAO reviewed the
documents and discovered that several projects bore identical, if not exact,
descriptions. The RLAO considered this as a red flag and recommended an
in-depth audit investigation. Later, the FAIO examined the transactions and
found that 32 infrastructure projects did not comply with approved plans and
were overpaid due to bloated accomplishment reports.
87
n the basis of the FAIO's findings, the Public Assistance and Corruption
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Prevention Office Fact-Finding Unit filed a Complaint against Materials
Engineer Macasil and other officials for violation of Section 3(e) of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Falsification (Republic Act No. 3019) or under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman Visayas. Allegedly, Macasil certified that the Statements ofWork
Accomplished (SWA) for 32 infrastructureprojectswereinaccordancewiththe
approved plans and specifications, despite the fact that the reported
accomplishments were overstated/bloated, and that the projects were
overpaid.
he Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), as affirmed on Motion for
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Reconsideration, found probable cause to indict Macasil for 23 counts of
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 and 26 counts of
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal
Code.
ggrieved, Macasil filed a Petition for Certiorari imputing grave abuse of
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discretion on the part of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
ISSUE
id the Ombudsman (Visayas) gravely abuse its discretion infindingprobable
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cause for violation ofSection3(e)ofRANo.3019,asamended,andparagraph
4, Article 171 of the RPC.
RULING
es,theOmbudsman(Visayas)gravelyabuseditsdiscretioninfindingprobable
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cause in this case.
heCourtexplainedthattheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanisendowedwithawide
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latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its
powertopassuponcriminalcomplaints.TheCourt,generally,doesnotinterfere
with theOmbudsman'sfindingsastowhetherprobablecauseexists,except:(a)
to afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (c) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub
judice; (d)whentheactsoftheofficerarewithoutorinexcessofauthority;(e)
wheretheprosecutionisunderaninvalidlaw,ordinanceorregulation;(f)when
doublejeopardyisclearlyapparent;(g)wherethecourthasnojurisdictionover
theoffense;(h)whereitisacaseofpersecutionratherthanprosecution;and(i)
where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
88
articularly, grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and
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whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned,
which is equivalent to an excess or lackofjurisdiction.Theabuseofdiscretion
mustbesopatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofapositivedutyora
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passionorhostility.Here,theCourtfoundgrave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
I n this regard, the Court explained that probable cause for filing a criminal
informationconstitutesfactssufficienttoengenderawell-foundedbeliefthata
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guiltythereof.
Here, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Macasil for violation of
Section3(e)ofRANo.3019basedonhiscertificationthatthereportedandpaid
accomplishmentsintheSWAswereinaccordancewiththeapprovedplansand
specifications, despite the fact that such reported accomplishments were
bloated or overstated. As regard to the second element of the said crime,
particularlythat“hemusthaveactedwithmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaith,
orinexcusablenegligence,”theCourtruledthatsaidelementislacking.Noneof
these modes were established in this case. To reiterate, the charges leveled
againstMacasilrefertotheoverstatementintheSWAsandthenon-compliance
of the projects with the approved plans and specifications. Hence, it wouldbe
unjust and unreasonable to indict Macasil simply because he was part of the
supposedanomalousprojects,eveniftheallegedillegalactisbeyondthescope
of his functions.
imilarly,theCourtruledthatthereisnoprobablecausetochargeMacasilwith
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falsification under paragraph 4, Article 171, of the RPC. The Ombudsman
(Visayas)'sfindingthatMacasilmadeanuntruthfulstatementwhenhecertified
in the SWAs that the reported and paid accomplishmentsoftheinfrastructure
projects were in accordance with the approved plans and specifications isnot
moored on evidence. As intimated earlier, Macasil did not certify on the work
accomplished for the infrastructure projects nor was hetheresponsibleofficer
tomakesuchcertification.Moreimportantly,criminalintentmustbepresentin
felonies committed by means ofdolo,suchasfalsification.However,therewas
nothing willful or felonious in Macasil's actions that satisfies the requisite
criminal intent or mens rea.
I n sum, thereisnoprimafaciecasetosupportafindingofprobablecausefor
violation oftheAnti-GraftandCorruptPracticesActandFalsification.Whenat
the outset the existence of probable causetoformasufficientbeliefastothe
guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from
inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial.
Hence, the petition was granted.
89
Arrest, Search, And Seizures
Lawful Warrantless Search
SULLANO Y SANTIA V. PEOPLE
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 232147 | June 8, 2020
DOCTRINE
he Court has consistently held that any objection by an accused to anarrest
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without a warrant must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. An accused may be estopped from assailing the
illegalityofhisarrestifhefailstochallengetheinformationagainsthimbefore
hisarraignment.And,sincethelegalityofanarrestaffectsonlythejurisdiction
of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in his arrest may be
deemed cured when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
FACTS
hisisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45assailingtheDecisionof
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the Court of Appeals (CA). Arturo Sullano y Santia (Arturo), petitioner, was
charged with violation of the gun ban during the 2010 election period.
n February 11, 2010, the police received a text message fromananonymous
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informant sayingthatapassenger,wearingcamouflageshorts,wascarryinga
firearm onboard a Ceres bus coming from Buruanga and bound for Caticlan.
Thepolicethensetupacheckpointinfrontofthemunicipalplazatoverifythe
tip.ThepoliceofficerswereabletoflagdownaCeresbusandaskedthedriver
for permission to embark. They were then able to identify Arturo, a security
officer of the Municipality of Buruanga. Arturo, however, failed to show his
authoritytopossessthefirearm.Consequently,asearchonthepersonofArturo
was conducted, which yielded a loaded caliber .45 pistol, and two magazines
withliveammunition.Arturowasinformedofhisconstitutionalrights,arrested,
and was brought to the police station.
rturo denied the charges against him. When arraigned, Arturo pleaded “Not
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Guilty.”Arturodeniedpossessionandownershipofthebaganditscontents.He
also raised that the checkpoint was improperlydonesincenosignagewasput
up.
he Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Arturo. The CA affirmed Arturo’s
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conviction.
90
ISSUE
1 . W as the warrantless arrest of Arturo legal?
2. Was there a valid reasonable search?
RULING
1. Yes, the warrantless arrest of Arturo was legal.
he Court has consistently held that any objection by an accused to an
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arrest without a warrant must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise,theobjectionisdeemedwaived.Anaccusedmaybeestopped
from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to challenge the
informationagainsthimbeforehisarraignment.And,sincethelegalityof
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction ofthecourtoverthepersonofthe
accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured when he
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
otably, Arturo entered his plea during arraignment and actively
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participatedinthetrial.Hedidnotmovetoquashtheinformationonthe
ground of the illegality of his arrest.
Consequently, the trial court obtained jurisdiction over him.
2. Yes, there was a valid reasonable search.
I n the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the following
guidelines: Priortoentry,passengersandtheirbagsandluggagecanbe
subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security
control. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners,
passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggage for
inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger’s presence.
Should the passenger object, he or she can validly berefusedentryinto
the terminal.
hile in transit, abuscanstillbesearchedbygovernmentagentsorthe
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securitypersonnelofthebusownerinthefollowinginstances.First,upon
receipt of information that a passenger bus where the messenger is
aboard can be stopped en routetoallowforaninspectionoftheperson
andhisorhereffects.Second,wheneverabuspickspassengersenroute,
the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or herbagorluggage
be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or
privatesecurityterminal.Thisisbecauseunlikeanairplane,abusisable
tostopandpickpassengersalongtheway,makingitimpossibleforthese
passengerstoevaderoutinesearchesatthebusterminal.Third,abuscan
beflaggeddownatdesignatedmilitaryorpolicecheckpointswhereState
agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers
and their bags or luggages.
91
I n bothsituations,theinspectionofpassengersandtheireffectspriorto
entry at the bus terminal and the search ofthebuswhileintransitmust
also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable
search. First, as tothemanerofthesearch,itmustbetheleastintrusive
and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched,
minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search
result form any discriminator motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similarmotives.Inallinstances,thefundamental
rightsofvulnerableidentities,personswithdisabilities,childrenandother
similargroupsshouldbeprotected.Third,astothepurposeofthesearch,
it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth,astotheevidence
seized from the reasonable search, courts must also be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was
planted against the accused.
he search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of
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others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court
takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals,just
like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
I n thiscase,thecheckpointconductedbythepolicewaspursuanttothe
gunbanenforcedbytheCOMELEC.Checkpoints,whicharewarrantedby
the exigenciesofpublicorderandareconductedinawayleastintrusive
to motorists, are allowed since the COMELEC would be hard to put to
implementthebanifitsdeputizedagentsarelimitedtoavisualsearchof
pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was
instituted.
92
Bail (Rule 114); Recognizance Act Of 2012 (R.A.
No. 10389)
Bail (Rule 114, Section 7)
PEOPLE V. NAPOLES
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 247611 (Resolution) | January 13, 2021
DOCTRINE
hepresumptionofinnocenceandtheConstitutionalrighttobailendafterthe
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accused's conviction of a capital offense. Indeed, under the Rules of Court,
upon the accused’s conviction by the Regional Trial Court of a non-capital
offense, admission to bail isdiscretionary.However,whenthepenaltyimposed
on the accused exceeds six years, and any ofthebail-negatingcircumstances
exists, the accused’s application for bail must be denied or canceled.
FACTS
his is an Urgent Motion for Recognizance/Bail or House Arrest for
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Humanitarian Reasons DuetoCOVID-19filedbyJanetLimNapoles(Napoles),
seeking temporary release from detention due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
I n 2018, the Sandiganbayan Special First Division convicted Richard Cambe
(Cambe)andNapolesofPlunderrelativetotheutilizationofSen.Ramon“Bong”
Revilla,Jr.’sPriorityDevelopmentAssistanceFund(PDAF)andsentencingthem
to sufferthepenaltyofreclusionperpetua.CambeandNapolesappealedtheir
conviction before the Supreme Court. Pending the resolution of the appeal,
Napoles is detained in the Correctional Institute for Women (CIW).
apoles filed an Urgent Motion for Recognizance/Bail or House Arrest for
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HumanitarianReasonsduetoCOVID-19beforetheSupremeCourtallegingthat
sheisatriskofcontractingCOVID-19insidetheprisonduetoherDiabetes,an
underlying COVID-19healthcondition.Shefurtherstatedthatsheisentitledto
be provisionally releasedonhumanitariangroundsbasedontheCourt’sRuling
inDeLaRamav.ThePeople’sCourt(DeLaRama)andEnrilev.Sandiganbayan
(Enrile) and pleads for the application of OCA Circular No. 91-2020mandating
the enforcement of the accused’s right to bail and speedy trial. Finally, she
raised that the Nelson Mandela Rules provide the basis for the release of
persons deprived of liberty (PDL) in times of public health emergencies.
93
ISSUE
1. C antheConstitutionandtheRulesofCourtallowanaccusedtopostbail
pending the appeal of his or her conviction of a capital offense.
2. Can Napoles be provisionally released on humanitarian grounds due to
the risk of contracting COVID-19.
3. WilltheNelsonMandelaRulesandtheinternationalcommunities’callfor
the temporary release of PDLs due to the threats ofCOVID-19,provide
sufficient basis to grant post bail-conviction.
RULING
1. N o,thepresumptionofinnocenceandtheConstitutionalrighttobailend
after the accused's conviction of a capital offense.
The Rules of Court echo this principle in this wise:
“ SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.”
I ndeed, before conviction, every person is entitledtobailasamatterof
rightunless,heorsheischargedwithacapitaloffenseandtheevidence
of guilt is strong. In resolving bail applications of an accused charged
with a capital offense, the Court conducts a summary hearing to
determine the strength of the evidence of his or her guilt. In the
affirmative,theaccusedcannotenjoyprovisionalliberty.Therationalefor
this rule is that the accused is more likely to be tempted to flee rather
than await the outcome of the proceeding with a penalty demanding a
lifetime of incarceration. On the other hand, bail after conviction is not
absolute.Itisamatterofjudicialdiscretionwhichmustbeexercisedwith
grave caution owing to the ascertainment of the accused's guilt.
hus, under the Rules of Court, upon the accused’s conviction by the
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Regional Trial Court of a non-capital offense, admission to bail is
discretionary. However, when the penalty imposed on the accused
exceedssixyears,andanyofthebail-negatingcircumstancesexists,the
accused’s application for bail must be denied or canceled.
94
2. N o, there are no compelling reasons to justify provisional release on
"humanitarian grounds."
oth De La Rama and Enrile are exceptional, if not isolated cases,
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whereintheCourtconsideredthespecialandcompellingcircumstancesof
the accused who needed continuing medication to preserve their health
throughout the criminalproceedings,andtoguaranteetheirappearance
incourt.Theircontinuedincarcerationwereshowntobeinjurioustotheir
health, or endanger their life. The Court ratiocinated that to deny them
bailwouldnotservethetrueobjectiveofpreventiveincarcerationduring
the trial.
I n this case, Napoles alleged that she isatriskofcontractingCOVID-19
because she is suffering from diabetes,asshownbyanunauthenticated
medical certificate signed by her physician which is a question of fact
which is not within the province of this Court to determine. Neither can
the Court take judicial notice of her medical condition. However, even
assuming that she is indeedsufferingfromdiabetes,that,initself,isnot
sufficient to grant her provisional liberty, post-conviction.
herefore, unless there is clear showing that petitioners are actually
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suffering from a medical condition that requires immediate and
specialized attention outside oftheircurrentconfinement,(i.e.,anactual
andprovenexposuretoorinfectionwiththenovelcoronavirus)theymust
remain in custody and isolation incidental to the crimes with whichthey
werecharged,orforwhichtheyarebeingtriedorservingsentence.Only
then can there be an actual controversy and a proper invocation of
humanitarian and equity considerations that is ripe for this Court to
determine.
3. N o, the Nelson Mandela Rules and theinternationalcommunity'scallfor
thetemporaryreleaseofPDLsduetoCOVID-19donotprovidesufficient
basis to grant bail, post-conviction.
herevisedUnitedNationsStandardMinimumRulesfortheTreatmentof
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Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) contain the universally acknowledged
minimum standards for the management of prison facilities and the
treatment of prisoners. With respect to the healthcare and wellness of
PDLs, it provides, inter alia, thatPDLswhorequirespecializedtreatment
or surgery should be transferred to specialized institutions or to civil
hospitals;thateveryprisonshouldhaveahealth-careservicetaskedwith
evaluating and improving the physical and mental health of PDLs; and
PDLs who are suspected of having contagious diseases be
clinically-isolated and given adequate treatment during the infectious
period.
95
n the other hand, the release of PDLs in foreign jurisdictions as a
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responsetoCOVID-19isrestrictedandunavailingtohigh-riskinmatesor
those who are considered a danger to the society. While it is true that
several countries have implemented release programs for prisoners to
prevent the spread of COVID-19 virus, these initiatives are subject to
exceptions. In Afghanistan, the members of Islamist Militant Group are
notincluded.InIndonesia,thosereleasedweremostlyjuvenileoffenders
and those who already served at least two-thirds of their sentences. In
Iran, only low-risk and non-violentoffendersservingshortsentencesare
released. In Morocco, the prisoners were selected based on theirhealth,
age, conduct, and length of detention, and were granted pardon. In the
United Kingdom, high-risk inmates convicted of violent or sexual
offenses, or of national security concern, or a danger to children were
excluded. It must be stressed that the release of prisoners in other
jurisdictions was made upon the orders of their Chief Executives.
I nthiscase,neithertheNelsonMandelaRules,theBureauofCorrections
Act of 2013, nor the worldwide trend to decongest jail facilities due to
COVID-19, support the release of PDLs pending the appeal of their
conviction of a capital offense.
hus,Napolesfailedtoallege,muchlessprove,anysourceofrightunder
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the international or domestic laws, to warrant her temporary release.
96
EVIDENCE (A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC)
Key Concepts
Admissibility; Relevance And Competence (Rule 128)
RE: JOHN MARK TAMAÑO
LOPEZ, M., J.
A.C. No. 12274 (Resolution) | October 7, 2020
DOCTRINE
otarization converts a private document into a public document, making it
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admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and due
execution. Considering the evidentiary value given to notarized documents,
notaries public must ensure proper recording of documents in their notarial
registers, lest, falsely making it appear that they were notarized when in fact
theywerenot;theconfidenceofthepublicintheintegrityofdocumentswillbe
undermined.
FACTS
he instant case is an administrative case against Atty. John Mark Tamaño
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(Atty. Tamaño) for his failure to strictly follow the Notarial Rules. He allegedly
failedtorecordinthenotarialregistertheGeneralInformationSheets(GIS)he
notarized for United Cadiz Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc.'s (UCSPAI)for
theyears2010,2011,2012,2013,and2014andthatsuchnotarizationwasmade
without the affiants' personal appearance.
I n his December 5, 2017 Order, Executive Judge Raymond Joseph G. Javier
found that Atty. Tamaño failed to record in his notarial register the notarized
GIS of UCSPAI for the years 2010 to 2014, in violation of the 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice and revoked Atty. Tamaño's notarial commission.Later,upon
approval of the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to
docket the same as aregularadministrative,theSupremeCourtrequiredAtty.
Tamañotoshowcause:(1)whyhisnotarialcommissionasnotarypublicshould
not be revoked; (2) why he should not be permanently disqualifiedfrombeing
commissioned as notary public; and, (3) whyheshouldnotbesuspendedfrom
the practice of law.
97
tty. Tamaño claimed that he found out about the unrecorded notarized
A
UCSPAI's GIS when he received a copy of the complaint filed against him in
Adm. Case No. NP-008-17.11 He then learned from his staff that they failed to
enterthefiveGISinhisnotarialbooks.Atty.Tamañoexplainedthatasanoffice
practice, he would sign the documents after reading and ascertaining their
authenticity and due execution and then refer to his staff for filling in the
notarial details and affixing his notarial seal. He admitted that there were
lapses committed by his office staff to which he is responsible. Atty. Tamaño
insisted that Benedicto and Enrique Regalado, Sr. accomplished and executed
the UCSPAI's GIS in his presence. However, he admitted his serious neglect in
attendingtohisdutiesasnotarypublic,particularly,innotmakingsurethatthe
notarized documents are recorded in the notarial register.
he instant case was originally filed by United Cadiz Sugarcane Planters
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Association, Inc.'s (UCSPAI) Corporate Secretary Luis Alfonso R. Benedicto
(Benedicto) before the Office of the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court,
BacolodCity,anddocketedasAdm.CaseNo.NP-008-17.Then,uponissuanceof
the judgment against Atty. Tamaño, the records of the said case were
transmittedtotheSupremeCourtbeforeitwasreferredtotheOfficeoftheBar
Confidant for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
ISSUE
ould failure to record a notarized private document in the notarial register
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render the same inadmissible in evidence.
RULING
es. It is through the act of notarization that aprivatedocumentisconverted
Y
into a public one, making it admissible in evidencewithoutfurtherproofofits
authenticity and due execution.
I n Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos, the SC emphasized the significance of recording
notarized documents in the notarial books:
he notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial
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registrythenecessaryinformationregardingthedocumentorinstrument
notarized and retain a copy of the document presented to him for
acknowledgment and certification especially when it is a contract. The
notarial registry is a record of the notary public's official acts.
Acknowledged documents and instruments recorded in itareconsidered
public document. If the document or instrument does not appear in the
notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered
thatthedocumentorinstrumentwasnotreallynotarized,sothatitisnot
a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this
document considering the evidentiary value given to notarized
documents, thefailureofthenotarypublictorecordthedocumentinhis
notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the
document was notarized when in fact it was not.
98
tty.TamañoclaimedthatUCSPAIbenefitedfromthenotarizationbecausethe
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SECrequiredsubmissionofnotarizedGIS.TheSCcannotgivehonor,muchless
credit to this lame justification. The principal function of a notary public is to
authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution
and delivery of the document under his handandseal,hegivesthedocument
the force of evidence. Given the evidentiary value accorded to notarized
documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in his
notarialregistercorrespondstofalselymakingitappearthatthedocumentwas
notarized when, in fact, it was not.
tty. Tamaño's failure to strictly comply with the rules on notarial practice
A
degrades the function of notarization and diminishes public confidence on
notarial documents.
99
Kinds
Opinion Rule (Rule 130)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DAMPILAG
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 238774 | June 10, 2020
DOCTRINE
I nHeirsofSeveraP.Gregoriov.CourtofAppeals,theCourtheldthatduetothe
technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of the forged
documents, the expertise ofquestioneddocumentexaminersisusuallyhelpful;
however,resorttoquestioneddocumentexaminersisnotmandatoryandwhile
probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting. Besides, when the dissimilarity between the genuine and false
specimens of writing is visible to the naked eye, resort to technical rules isno
longer necessary.
FACTS
his is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
T
CourtwhichseekstosetasidetheDecisionoftheCourtofAppeals(CA).Hilario
J. Dampilag (Dampilag), respondent, was charged with Serious Dishonesty,
FalsificationofOfficialDocuments,andGraveMisconductbytheCSC-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CSC-CAR).
ampilagwasaccusedofallowingsomebodytoapplyandtakeinhisbehalfthe
D
Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) held on December 1, 1996 in
Baguio City and reflected the result in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS), thereby
misleadingtheappointingauthoritytoappointhimasSpecialInvestigatorIof
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-CAR (DENR-CAR), and
the CSC to approvehisappointment.TheCSC-CARnotedglaringdisparitiesas
to Dampilag’s facial features and signatures in the Picture SeatPlan(PSP)for
the December 1, 1996 CSPE with those of Dampilag’s PDS.
100
I n his Answer, Dampilag admitted that he was not the person in the picture
pastedinthePSPbuthisformerboardmate,BongMartin(Bong).Heexplained
that on the day of the examination, he had in his possession an improvised
envelopecontaininghisandBong’sphotos.Pressedfortime,heindiscriminately
broughtoutBong’sphotographs,affixedhissignatureatthebackofoneofthe
photos,andsubmittedittotheexamproctorwithoutverifyingtheactualphoto
submitted. As to the alleged variation in the signatures in the PDS and PSP,
Dampilag claimed that the two signatures have notable similarities, and that
any perceived disparities were accepted norm because of the considerable
lapse of time from the date of examination to the accomplishment of the PDS.
heCSC-CARfoundDampilagguiltyoftheoffenseschargedandimposedupon
T
himthepenaltyofdismissalfromtheservice.Itconcludedthatanotherperson
took the CSPE for and in behalf of Dampilag. On appealtotheCSC,thesame
affirmed the findings of CSC-CAR. His reconsiderationbeingdenied,Dampilag
appealed to the CA, which reversed the CSC and exonerated Dampilag of the
offense. The CA noted that a copy of the PSP and PDSwerenotmadepartof
the records of the CA. With the absence of possible reference to find the
existence of the alleged dissimilarities between the photograph and the
signature in thePSPandPDS,theCAbaseditsdecisionsolelyonthepiecesof
evidencesubmittedbeforeit.Hence,theCSC,throughtheOSG,filedtheinstant
petition before the Court, arguing that a comparison of the PDS and PSP
showedglaringdisparitiesastoDampilag’ssignaturethatevenalayman,using
his naked eye, can readily see.
ampilagcountersthattheCSC’sconclusionthatanotherpersontooktheCSPE
D
for and in his behalf is not supported by substantial evidence, but mere
conjectures and speculations considering that no handwriting expert was
presented to render his opinion on the matter.
ISSUE
ill the absence of a handwriting expert’s testimony exonerate Dampilag of the
W
offenses charged.
RULING
o, the absence of a handwriting expert’s testimony will not exonerate
N
Dampilag of the offenses charged.
stotheabsenceofahandwritingexpert,Section49(nowSection52),Rule130
A
of the Rules of Court uses the word “may,” which signifies that the use of
opinionofexpertwitnessispermissiveandnotmandatory.InHeirsofSeveraP.
Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, the Courtheldthatduetothetechnicalityofthe
procedure involved in the examination of the forged documents,theexpertise
of questioned document examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to
questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while probably useful,
they are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting.
101
esides, when the dissimilarity between the genuine and false specimens of
B
writing is visible to the naked eye, resort to technical rules is no longer
necessary.Thus:“Asarule,forgerycannotbepresumedandmustbeprovedby
clear,positiveandconvincingevidenceandtheburdenofproofliesontheparty
allegingforgery.Thebestevidenceofaforgedsignatureinaninstrumentisthe
instrumentitselfreflectingtheallegedforgedsignature.Thefactofforgerycan
onlybeestablishedbyacomparisonbetweentheallegedforgedsignatureand
theauthenticandgenuinesignatureofthepersonwhosesignatureistheorized
upon to have been forged. Without the original document containing the
allegedforgedsignature,onecannotmakeadefinitivecomparisonwhichwould
establish forgery.
ere,theevidencepresentedincludesthecertifiedtruecopyofthePSPandthe
H
PDS. After a careful comparison, the Court noted stark differences in the
structures,strokes,formandgeneralappearanceofDampilag’ssignaturesand
handwritinginthePDSandinthePSP.Theletters“M,”“J,”and“N”werewritten
differently and the strokes of the signatures were not similar. It cannot also
escape ourattentionthatthepurportedexamineewrotehisnameas“HILARO
D. DAMPILAG” in the PSP and not “HILARIO J. DAMPILAG.” In the
circumstances andbasedontheevidenceonrecord,thereisnodoubtthatthe
person who took the December 1, 1996 CSPE is not Dampilag. Someone
impersonated Dampilag and took the examination in behalf of him.
ence, the evidence presented before the CSC sufficiently proved that
H
Dampilag is guilty of the offenses charged against him.
102
Testimonial Evidence (Rule 130-C)
Opinion – Sections 51-53
TURALBA Y VILLEGAS V. PEOPLE
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 216453 | March 16, 2022
DOCTRINE
o establish insanity, opinion testimony is required which may be given by a
T
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, has rational basis to
conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception, or is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
FACTS
hisisacaseunderapetitionforreviewoncertiorari,assailingthedecisionof
T
theCourtofAppeals(CA),whichaffirmedpetitionerOligarioTuralbayVillegas’
(Oligario) convictionforCarnapping,definedandpenalizedunderRepublicAct
(RA) No. 6539, as amended.
ligario was charged with Carnapping and, when arraigned, Oligario pleaded
O
“notguilty”towhich,trialonthemeritsthenensued.Indefense,Dr.Ma.Lourdes
Labarcon Evangelista(Dr.Evangelista)testifiedandnarratedthatshefirstmet
OligarioattheMarivelesMentalHospitalforevaluationandmanagementofhis
mental condition. Dr. Evangelista, after tests, assessed Oligario with psychosis
due to use of alcohol and methamphetamine. She thus prescribed medication
and scheduledafollow-upcheckup,butOligariowasnotabletocomebackas
he was detained for the carnapping incident.
I nitsdecision,theRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)convictedOligarioofCarnapping.
The RTC ruled that all the elements of the crime are present. The RTC gave
credencetothetestimoniesoftheprosecutionwitnesstherebeingnoillmotive
for them to falsely charge Oligario. On the other hand, the RTC rejected
Oligario’s insanity defense considering that the manner by which he
perpetrated the offense suggests full consciousness of his criminal act. Dr.
Evangelista’s medical assessment was rendered inconclusive and insufficient
proof of the mental condition of Oligario.
103
n appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, and confirmed that Oligario’s
O
psychosis cannot exculpate him from criminal liability. Priortothecommission
of the crime, Dr. Evangelista only met Oligario once and was not yet able to
identifythekindofpsychosishewasafflictedwith.Oligariothenfiledamotion
for consideration, which the CA denied in its resolution, hence this petition.
ligario maintained that he was suffering from psychosis, negating his
O
voluntariness and free will, at the time of the commission of the crime. Dr.
Evangelista sufficiently attested to his illness, and mentioned in the Clinical
Summary that his “condition could lead to unusual behavior, faulty judgment,
irrational thoughts, impulsive acts, and break from reality.”
I ntheCommentfiledbytheOSGforthePeople,itwasallegedthattheissueof
insanity is a factual one, which isbeyondtheambitofapetitionforreviewon
certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Oligario was not able to
prove his insanity prior to or simultaneously with thecommissionofthecrime.
Theexemptingcircumstanceofinsanityisnoteasilyavailabletoanaccusedas
insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Anyone
who pleads insanity bears the burden to prove it with clear and convincing
evidence since the accused invoking the affirmative defense admits to have
committedthecrime,butclaimsthatheorsheisnotguiltybecauseofinsanity.
Oligario utterly failed to present convincing evidence to establish his alleged
insanity at the time ofthecarnappingincident.Hisconvictionmuststand,and
the penalty cannot be reduced in relation to the alleged presence of a
mitigating circumstance because the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) do not apply to the law on carnapping. In Oligario's Reply, as he
reiterated the allegations inhispetition,andimploredthisCourttoexerciseits
discretionary power, in the higher interest of justice, to review the assailed
ruling of the CA.
ISSUE
I s Dr. Evangelista’s testament sufficient to exculpate Oligario from criminal
liability.
RULING
o,itisnot.TheRTCandtheCAbothfoundthatalltheelementsofCarnapping
N
are present in this case with Oligario as the perpetrator. He did not present
evidence to rebut the lower courts' findings. Oligario, however, raised the
defense of insanity in claiming that he should not be found criminally liable.
104
I nsanity is an exempting circumstanceunderArticle12(1)oftheRevisedPenal
Code. An insane accused is notmorallyblameworthyandshouldnotbelegally
punished.Nopurposeofcriminallawisservedbypunishinganinsaneaccused
because by reason of their mental state, they do not have control over their
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future. In our
jurisdiction,thecourtshaveestablishedamorestringentcriterionforinsanityto
be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprivedofreason,they
actedwithouttheleastdiscernmentbecausethereisacompleteabsenceofthe
power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
s a defense, insanity is in the nature of a confession and avoidance. The
A
person who asserts insanity is, in effect, admitting to the commission of the
crime. Consequently, the burden of proof shifts to him, who must prove his
defense with clear and convincing evidence. Differently stated, after a pleaof
insanity, "the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be
sane,ajudgmentofconvictionisrenderedwithoutanytrialontheissueofguilt,
because the accused had already admitted committing the crime."
I nsanity is not easily available to the accusedasasuccessfuldefense.Itisan
exception rather than the rule on thehumancondition.Insanityasacondition
ofthemind,isnotsusceptibleoftheusualmeansofproofas"nomancanknow
what is going on in the mind of another, the state of condition of a person's
mind can only bemeasuredandjudgedby[their]behavior."Thus,theaccused
must prove the following: first, that the insanity constitutes a complete
deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and second, the insanity
existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime.
o establish insanity, opinion testimony is required which may be given by a
T
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, has rational basis to
conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception, or is
qualifiedasanexpert,suchasapsychiatrist. TheCourtstressedthataninquiry
into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the very moment the felony is committed. In this case, Oligario
failed to establish his mental state, much less his insanity. Aside from the
testimony of Dr. Evangelista, no other witness testified as to the mental
condition of Oligario.
105
Presentation Of Evidence
Presentation Of Evidence
STRONG FORT WAREHOUSING CORP. V. BANTA
LOPEZ, M., J.
G.R. No. 222369 & 222502 (Resolution) | November 16, 2020
DOCTRINE
hile it is settled that resorttohandwritingexpertsisnotindispensableinthe
W
finding of forgery, their opinions are useful and may serve as additional
evidencetobuttresstheclaimofforgery.Owingtotheirspecialknowledgeand
trainings, they can help determine fundamental, significant differences in
writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard or sample
specimen signatures, as well as the movement and manner of execution strokes.
FACTS
ntonioBanta(Antonio),marriedtoRemediosBanta(Remedios),formedMetro
A
Isuzu Corporation (MIC) and obtained series of loans from Westmont Bank in
thenameofMIC.Theloanswereevidencedbyseveralpromissorynotessigned
by Antonio and Remedios. On November 23, 1995, Antonioexecutedadeedof
Real Estate Mortgage (REM), covering several of their conjugal properties, to
secure a loan of PHP 25,000,000.00fromWestmontBank.OnFebruary6,1997,
Antonio and Westmont Bank amended the REM to increase the loan to PHP
36,000,000.00.
wo separate civil cases were filed by Remedios: Civil Case No. 2907-MN and
T
Civil Case No. 4950-MN. Both civil cases were filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malabon City.
ivil Case No. 2907-MN was a complaint filed to nullify the REM and the
C
amendment to the REM, including the various promissory notes and credit
agreements that were executed by Antonio and Westmont Bank. At the trial,
and after presenting her witnesses on August 1, 2003, Remediosrequestedfor
fifteen (15) days to file her formal offerofdocumentaryevidence.Therequest
was followed by numerous motions for postponement by Remedios that
dragged the case for three (3) years, until she finally filed her Consolidated
Formal Offer of Evidence on July 19, 2006. Westmont Bankmovedtoexpunge
the formal offer because of the unreasonable delay in its submission, but the
trialcourtdeniedthemotion.WestmontBankassailedthedenialofthemotion
with the Court of Appeals (CA).
106
he CA ordered that the formal offer of evidence of Remedios be expunged
T
from the records, stating that: “At this point, itisalltooobviousthattheflood
waters and the renovation are mere lame excuses which cannot justify the
overlong and unreasonable delay in the filing of private respondent's formal
offer of evidence. The time frame and event being referred to in the Order
denying petitioner's motion to expunge is way too far from the time private
respondent started to seek postponements from 1 August 2003 because her
documents were allegedly still with the NBI for examination and she claimed
that she was about to submit a proposal for amicable settlement which never
came about. As glaring as the dilatory antics of private respondents were as
they are likewise deplorable, public respondent never took charge over the
proceedings and instead quietly gave his complicity to private respondent's
utter disregard of court orders and set deadlines. This behavior of private
respondent cannot receive a similar approval from this Court.”
petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court (SC)
A
which affirmed the decision of the CA in an August 20, 2008 Resolution.
uring the pendency of the petition with the CA and the SC, trial continued.
D
Westmont Bank presented its witnesses and formally offered its documentary
evidence. On rebuttal, Remedios was recalled to the witness stand and
identified various checks and receipts as proof of her genuine signature. She
also presented the QDR issued by the NBI, and the PNP Crime Laboratory
Report which were previously ordered expunged from the records, and
submitted them anew in her formal offer of rebuttalevidence.OverWestmont
Bank's objection, the trial court admitted Remedios' formal offer of rebuttal
evidence.
ivilCaseNo.4950-MNwasfiledagainstAntonioandWestmontBank tonullify
C
thedeedofrealestatemortgagedatedAugust4,2000,andvariouspromissory
notesinwhichRemediosappearedasasignatory.Shesimilarlyallegedthather
signaturesontheREMandthepromissorynoteswereforged.Aftertrial,onMay
8, 2012, the trial court decided in favor of Remedios and ordered the
nullificationofthe2000REMandtheContinuingSuretyAgreementexecutedby
Antonio and Westmont Bank, and declared the promissory noteswithoutlegal
effectonRemedios.WestmontBank'smotionforreconsiderationwasdeniedin
the trial court's Order dated July 17, 2012.
n August 31, 2012, the trial court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No.
O
2907-MN, declaring the 1995 REM and the 1997 amendment to the REM void,
andthepromissorynoteswithoutlegaleffectinsofarasRemediosisconcerned,
statingthat:“Havingestablishedthefactxxxthatthepurportedsignaturesof
plaintiff in the loan and mortgage documents were not those of plaintiff
Remedios, it follows that the contracts of loan in favor of Metro Isuzu
Corporation, and the mortgage contracts entered into as security for the
paymentthereof,donothavetheconsentofplaintiffRemedios.Hence,theloan
contractsareinvalidasagainstplaintiffRemedios,anddefendantBankcannot
hold her personally liable for any of these loans.”
107
ISSUE
id the CA err in not reversing the trial court’s decision when it admitted
D
Remedios'rebuttalevidencethathadbeenexpungedfromtherecords,suchas
the NBI's QDR and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report and corollarily, causing
the opinions of the handwriting experts regarding the aforementioned
documents have become mere hearsay and baseless.
RULING
o,theCAdidnoterrwhenitreversedthetrialcourtdecisionandtheopinions
N
of the handwriting experts have become mere hearsay and baseless.
vidence that is ordered expunged from the records cannot be considered in
E
favor of, andagainstapartyforanypurpose.Toexpungemeanstostrikeout,
obliterate,ormarkfordeletion.Inallrespects,anexpungedevidencedoesnot
existintherecordsand,therefore,hasnoprobativevalue.Here,itisundisputed
that the QDR issued by the NBI, and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report were
expunged from the records by virtue of this Court's final and executory
Resolution dated August 20, 2008. Though admitted in evidence, these
expunged documents were not the bases of the trial court in concluding that
Remedios'signaturewasforged.Remediosherselfdeniedsigningthe1995REM
andits1997amendment,andthe2000REM.Herdisavowalofhersignatureson
the questioned documents has probative value, and thus, may be admitted in
evidence.
hile it is settled that resorttohandwritingexpertsisnotindispensableinthe
W
finding of forgery, their opinions are useful and may serve as additional
evidencetobuttresstheclaimofforgery.Owingtotheirspecialknowledgeand
trainings, they can help determine fundamental, significant differences in
writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard or sample
specimen signatures, as well as the movement and manner of execution strokes.
I n this case, the handwriting experts testified based on the documents and
signature examination which they performed to analyze the possibility of
forgery. They personally scrutinized and compared Remedios' disputed
signatures in the subject documents with her authenticsamplesignatures.The
handwriting experts detailed the glaring and material significant differences
between Remedios' genuine signatures and those appearinginthequestioned
documents.Tobesure,theirtestimoniesarenothearsay,norrenderedbaseless
bythefactthattheQDRandthePNPCrimeLaboratoryReportwereexpunged
fromtherecords.Theiropinionsasexpertwitnessescanstandontheirownand
do not depend on the QDR and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report for their
competence and probative value.
108
ere, Remedios failed to justify the presentation of the promissory notes and
H
the BPI checks containing her forged and genuine signatures as rebuttal
evidence. To note, these documents constitute direct proofofforgery,whichis
the main issue of the case, hence, these should have been presented as
evidence in chief. It was thus, an error on the part of the trial court to allow
these evidence on rebuttal. Nevertheless, it does not appear from the records
thatWestmontBankraisedthisissueontheirappealtotheCA.Itwasraisedfor
thefirsttimeonlyinthispetitionforreview.Itissettledthatnoquestionwillbe
considered on appeal if it was not raised in the court below. Otherwise, the
court will be forced to make a judgment that goes beyond the issues and will
adjudicate something in which the court did not hear the parties.
109
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