S NAGALINGAM V SIVAGAMI

FACTS

That the marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place on 6th September 1970 and
three children were born from that wedlock.

• The respondent alleged that she had been a victim of domestic violence as a result of which
she started living with her parents.
• Later a criminal complaint was being lodged before the Metropolitan Magistrate by the
appellant, contending that the appellant had contracted the second marriage with a woman
named, Kasturi and their marriage was solemnised in accordance with the Hindu rites on
18th June 1984 within the state of Tamil Nadu. In order to support this contention, detailed
evidences were provided regarding the manner in which the marriage was being performed
on 18th of June.
• The order of acquittal was being passed by the Trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the
respondent filed criminal appeal No. 67 of 1992 before the High Court of Madras.
• Upon further cross-examination of the priest and the accused, the learned Single Judge held
the appellant to be guilty of the offence of bigamy as the second marriage was contracted
during the subsistence of his earlier marriage. This impugned judgment of the learned judge
was challenged before the court.

LEGAL ISSUES:

1. Whether the second marriage entered by appellant with the second accused, Kasturi on
18.6.1984 constitute a valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ?
2. Whether “Saptapadi” is an essential ritual to be performed for the solemnisation of a
marriage?
3. Whether the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 494 are complied in the
present case?

JUDGMENT:

In light of the above discussions, it was held that the parties are governed by Section 7-A of the
Hindu Marriage Act 1955, as the parties are Hindus residing within the State of Tamil Nadu.

Therefore, the Learned Single Judge was right in holding that the appellant had committed the
offence of bigamy under Section 494 of IPC as it was done during the subsistence of his earlier
marriage held on 06.09.1970. Accordingly, the matter was correctly remanded to the trial court for
awarding the appropriate sentence and the appeal was dismissed.
SMT SEEMA V. ASHWANI KUMAR

Facts:

The Case arises out of a Petition filed in Haryana District Court regarding the issue of the
registration of marriage which was a matter of the States. Numerous harassment in
matrimonial & maintenance cases due to consequences of non registration of marriages in
some states took place. The decision was taken by the court and directions sent to the state
to compulsorily register marriages and report back with the procedure for registration in 3
months.

Issue involved:

Whether the Marriage registration should be made compulsory in India?

Rationale:

The Hindu Law empowers the State Government to draft rules for the registration of
marriages. Under Section 8 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, if the State Government
in its opinion that such registration should be compulsory.

Anyone violating rules made in this regard shall be punishable with fine. In spite of the
fact that most of the States have framed rules regarding registration of marriages but still
in several States registration of marriage was not compulsory.

The National Commission for Women has specified that non registration of marriages
affects the women. If the marriage is registered it will provide evidence of the marriage
having taken place and would also provide a presumption of the marriage having taken
place.

The compulsory Registration of Marriage can help in reducing the issue of Child Marriage
which was prevalent at that time. It also provides evidence in the matters of custody of
children, right of children born.

Judgement:

The Supreme Court upheld the mandatory registration of marriages of all the religion in
their respective States.
SHOBHA RANI VS. MADHUKAR REDDI

FACTS:-
The appellant and the respondent were married on December 19th, 1982. After some time,
differences arose between them. The wife moved the Court for divorce on the ground of cruelty.

ISSUE:-
Whether the wife should be allowed to grant decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty?

JUDGMENT:-
The word “cruelty” has not been defined. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of
matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting
the other. Cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. Physical cruelty is a
question of fact and degree. Mental cruelty is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into
account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. In cases where the
conduct complained of is per se unlawful or illegal, cruelty will be established if the conduct
itself is proved or admitted. Among human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which
may constitute cruelty. The Court in matrimonial cases has only to understand the spouses
concerned as nature made them, and consider their particular grievance. One of the grievances
of the petitioner was about the dowry demand by the husband or his parents. Cruelty requires
to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities. There appears to be no doubt that the
husband or his parents were demanding dowry from the appellant. This is not a case here the
husband requested his wife to give some money for his personal expenses why not try these
out and learn more about loans. It has been admitted by the husband himself in his letter dated
August 28th, 1983, addressed to the wife that his parents demanded dowry.
Demand of dowry went on with the support of the husband. That conduct which is complained
of as cruelty by one spouse may not be so for the other spouse. There may be instances of
cruelty by the unintentional but inexcusable conduct of the party. Intention is not a necessary
element in cruelty. ‘Cruelty’ has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in
matrimonial affairs. The relief to the aggrieved party cannot be denied on the ground that there
has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment.

HELD:-
Decree for dissolution of the marriage granted. ‘Cruelty’, which may be physical or mental,
intentional or unintentional, has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in
matrimonial affairs.
SAVITRI PANDEY V PREM CHANDRA PANDEY
Facts:
Marriage between the parties was solemnized in 1987 and they lived together for one month
and thereafter started living separately. The Appellant filed a petition under Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) for dissolution of marriage
claiming cruelty and desertion exercised by the Respondent.
Issues:
Whether the Appellant has suffered cruelty from the Respondent and his family members?
Whether the parties are entitled to any relief? If so, to what extent?
Background:
The petition before the Matrimonial Court where the Appellant prayed for dissolution of
marriage on ground of cruelty and desertion, was allowed and the marriage between the parties
was dissolved on the ground of desertion by the Respondent. The Appellant was also granted
a decree of Rs. 12,000/- towards the price of a scooter, allegedly given at the time of the
marriage and payment of Rs. 500/- per month as permanent alimony. Both parties preferred
appeals against the order of the Family Court as the Appellant was aggrieved on the part of
refusal by the Court to grant adecree in her favour in respect of properties claimed by her, while
the Respondent was aggrieved by the order of dissolution of the marriage. Both the appeals
were disposed off and the decree of grant of Rs. 12,000/- towards the price of the scooterand
for permanent alimony was also set aside. Aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Court,
the Appellant moved the Supreme Court which pronounced its judgment below.

Judgment:
The Court while dismissing the appeal, embarked upon the concept of cruelty and held that the
evidence led by the Appellant to prove cruelty only shows sensitivity of the Appellant with
respect to the conduct of the Respondent which cannot be termed anything more than ordinary
wear and tear of the family life. The Court referred to the judgment of Bipin
ChandraJaisinghbhaiShah v. Prabhavati (AIR 1957 SC 176) to reiterate the legal position of
‘Desertion’ and observed from the evidence led by the Appellant in the present case that she
abandoned the matrimonial home voluntarily and did not permit the Respondent to
consummate the marriage in order to achieve a particular state of matrimonial position, which
disentitles her to obtain a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion.
SAROJ RANI V SUDARSHAN KUMAR CHADHA

Facts Of The Case

• The appellant, i.e. the wife, was treated badly by the respondent, i.e. the husband after the
two years of marriage and after the birth of second daughter.
• Thereafter, the appellant sued for the restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Sub-judge and the decree was passed with the consent
of both parties.
• After the passing of decree, the appellant claimed that she briefly cohabited with
respondent, i.e. the husband.
• After the lapse of one year, the respondent sued for divorce under section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, before the District Judge on the grounds that there had been no
cohabitation taken place since the decree under section 9 was passed.
• The District Judge dismissed the Divorce petition by giving reasons that the decree under
section 9 was a consent decree.
• Another appeal filed by the respondent to the High Court and the same, which was referred
to the Chief Justice.
• The appellant also preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court of India.

LEGAL ISSUES

• Whether the decree passed under section 9 of HMA, 1955 violates the Article 13, 14 and
21 of the Constitution of India, 1950?
• Whether the Court should grant the petition for divorce in favour of respondent against the
consent decree passed under section 9 of HMA, 1955?

DECISION

• The apex court dismissed the appeal of the appellant wife by considering the above facts
and upheld the judgment which was passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana of a
decree of divorce in favour of the respondent, i.e. the husband.

• The apex court also considered their relationship of husband and wife by stating that which
was noncooperative and therefore appeals of the wife easily dismissed and stand to affirm
the decision. In addition, the apex court directed the respondent, i.e. the husband, to pay the
maintenance of Rs. 200 per month to the wife and Rs. 300 per month to her daughter until
she remarries and maintains the one living daughter until his marriage.
HITESH BHATNAGAR VS. DEEPA BHATNAGAR

FACTS:-

The appellant and the respondent got married in 1994. On August 17th, 2001, the parties filed
a petition under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the District Court,
Gurgaon, for dissolution of marriage by grant of a decree of divorce by mutual consent. The
respondent withdrew her consent by filing an application dated March 22nd, 1993 and
subsequently the petition came to be dismissed. The appeal made to the High Court of Punjab
was dismissed too.

ISSUE:-

1. Whether the consent once given in a petition for divorce by mutual consent can be
subsequently withdrawn by one of the parties after the expiry of eighteen months
from the date of filing of the petition?
2. Whether the Court can grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent when the consent
has been withdrawn by one of the parties, and if so, under what circumstances?

JUDGMENT:-

It was the respondent’s contention that she had given initial consent under mental stress and
duress. She also stated that she never wanted divorce and was willing to live with the appellant
as his wife. The Court found the appellant’s submission that the Additional District Judge was
bound to grant divorce as the consent was not withdrawn within the period of eighteen months
to be without merit. The Court set down three necessary conditions for the Court to be bound
to pass a decree of divorce. First, a second motion is made not before six months from the date
of the filing of petition and not later than eighteen months. Second, after hearing the parties
and making appropriate inquiry, the Court is satisfied that the averments made in the petition
are true. Third, the petition is not withdrawn by any party at any time before passing the decree.

In the present case, the second motion was never made by both the parties, according
to Michael Fischer. The Court held that the eighteen month period was specified only to ensure
the quick disposal of cases of divorce by mutual consent, and not to specify the time period for
withdrawal of consent. The Court uses its power to dissolve a marriage as having irretrievably
broken down only when it is impossible to save the marriage and all efforts made in that regard
would, to the mind of the Court, be counterproductive. In light of the facts and circumstances
of the present case, the Court held that it would be a travesty of justice to dissolve this marriage
as having broken down.
HELD:-

Appeal is being dismissed. Consent can be withdrawn even after expiration of eighteen months
after the date of filing of the petition and the Court cannot grant a decree of divorce in such a
case where consent has been withdrawn.

NEETA RAKESH JAIN V. RAKESH JEETMAL JAIN

Award of Interim Maintenance – Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Exercise
of discretion of Courts

Section 24 provides that in any proceeding under the Act, the spouse who has no
independent income sufficient for her or his support may apply to the court to direct the
respondent to pay the monthly maintenance as the court may think reasonable, regard
being had to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent. The very
language in which Section is couched indicates that wide discretion has been conferred on
the court in the matter of an order for interim maintenance. Although the discretion
conferred on the court is wide, the Section provides guideline inasmuch as while fixing
the interim maintenance the court has to give due regard to the income of the respondent
and the petitioner's own income. In other words, in the matter of making an order for
interim maintenance, the discretion of the court must be guided by the criterion provided
in the Section, namely, the means of the parties and also after taking into account incidental
and other relevant factors like social status; the background from which both the parties
come from and the economical dependence of the petitioner.

Since an order for interim maintenance by its very nature is temporary, a detailed and
elaborate exercise by the court may not be necessary, but, at the same time, the court has
got to take all the relevant factors into account and arrive at a proper amount having regard
to the factors, which are mentioned in the statute.
RAMESH CHANDRA RAMPRATAPJI DAGA V. RAMESHWARI
RAMESH CHANDRA DAGA

Facts
The appellant’s (Husband) first marriage was formalized with late smt. Usha, he had three
children which were born out of this marriage. The respondent (wife) was also married to
another man named Girdhari Lal Lakhotia.

According to the wife, the standard ceremonies of marriage were not finished as her previous
in laws squabble about dowry. She had recorded a Divorce Petition in Matrimonial Court at
Amravati, however it was not indicted and no pronouncement of separation was passed. In that
situation, as per the pervasive custom in Maheshwari people group a Chhor Chithhi or a report
of disintegration of marriage was executed between the wife and her past husband, this fact
was also disclosed by the wife as she also gave a photocopy of the document to the appellant.

Later they got married and from this marriage they had a child whose name was pooja. She
was becoming the victim of domestic violence by her husband as her father did not fulfill all
his demands. After getting upset with all this, she left her husband’s house with her daughter
and started living with her father. After that, she filed a complaint against her husband in the
Family Court of Bombay, where she asked for the decree of judicial separation for cruelty and
claimed maintenance of rupees three thousand per month for herself and daughter.

Husband also filed a cross petition stating that at the time of his second marriage, the wife’s
first marriage was not completely dissolved and was pending in the court. So as per the
provision of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 the marriage should be considered as invalid and void
under Section 11 of the act. He also questioned the legitimacy of the child pooja as her
daughter.

The Bombay family court dismissed the husband’s petition and granted a decree of judicial
separation and awarded one thousand rupees per month in the favor of the wife. Further the
husband challenged this decision in the high court and the counter petition was also filed by
the wife. The high court upheld the decision of the family court but granted maintenance to the
wife. In order to not agree with this decision, both the parties filed a cross appeal against each
other in the Supreme Court of India.
Issues
The first issue was put up in front of court that whether or not the marriage solemnized between
respondent and appellant is considered to be null and void.

If the above issue is resolved so whether or not the wife is entitled to maintenance as per
section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act 1955, if yes so, this section is applicable on those marriages
which are null and void in the eyes of law.

Judgment
In this case the supreme court held that the marriage solemnized between respondent and
appellant is considered as null and void because it is against the provision of section 5(i) of the
act, the court did not give validity to the Chhor Chithhi as a complete decree of divorce.

In Spite of that the court granted the permanent maintenance to the wife as gave the wide
interpretation of the section 25 of the act and stated that section 25 enables the court to award
maintenance at the time of passing any type of decree resulting in breach in marriage
relationship and says that any type of decree issued by the court comes under the ambit of Any
type of Decree. It is an enabling provision as it empowers the Court in a matrimonial case to
consider facts and circumstances of the spouse applying and decide whether or not to grant
permanent maintenance. (referred Chand Dhawan v/s Jawaharlal Dhawan SC0538 1993)

BADSHAH VS URMILA GODSE

FACTS:

• The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent took place on February 10th, 2005
according to Hindu Marriage customary rites at Devgad Temple in Hivargav-Pavsa,
following which the respondent resided and cohabitated with the petitioner. While the
respondent was pregnant with the petitioner’s child, a lady named Shobha came to their
house and claimed to be the petitioner’s wife.

• The respondent claims that the petitioner told her that if she wanted to live with him, she
should cohabit with Shobha and live quietly and peacefully with them or return to her
parent’s house. Since she was pregnant, she decided to live with the petitioner and Shobha
in the same house.
 • The respondent had to undergo a lot of physical and mental torture on a regular basis at the
hands of her inebriated husband. The petitioner mistreated the respondent as he believed
that the baby in her womb was not his and accused her of having relations with someone
else.
• He also insisted that the respondent must have an abortion. As the petitioner’s mistreatment
and abuse became unbearable, the respondent returned to her parent’s residence. The
respondent’s daughter, Shivanjali (Respondent No. 2) was born on November 28th, 2005.
The respondents applied for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC), based on the abovementioned averments.
• The Trial Court issued an award of maintenance to respondent No. 1 at the rate of Rs.1000/-
per month and to respondent No. 2 at the rate of Rs.500/- per month, which was affirmed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
• The petitioner appealed before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, wherein the
decision of the lower court was upheld and an order dated 28th February 2013 was passed.
The petitioner filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court of India to appeal against
the judgement and order of the Bombay High Court.

LEGAL ISSUES

• Whether the marriage between the respondent and the petitioner was legally valid and
whether she was the wife of the petitioner?
• Whether the respondent entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC?

DECISION

• The Supreme Court observed that the marriage between the parties had been proved but
the petitioner was already married but he deceived the respondent by withholding the fact
of the alleged first marriage.

• The Court held that for Section 125 CrPC, respondent would be treated as the wife of the
petitioner and opined that the petitioner cannot be allowed to deny the respondent the
benefit of maintenance by exploiting his own mistake. The apex court denied the leave to
the petitioner and dismissed the special leave petition.
BIJENDRA SINGH vs. STATE OF MP CASE:

FACTS

• Mishri Bai had returned to her parent’s house after being abandoned by her husband, Padam
Singh, a day after their marriage, because of her physical disability. She never returned to
her in-laws’ house.
• Her parents had granted her a 32-acre plot of land from their agricultural holdings for her
subsistence. In 1970, after almost 22 years of her marriage, Mishri Bai claimed to have
adopted the appellant, Brijendra Singh. Her estranged husband, Padam Singh, passed away
in 1974.
• Mishri Bai was served a notice by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Vidisha, under Section 10
of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960, showing that her
holdings of agricultural land exceeded the prescribed limit.
• Mishri Bai filed a reply, claiming that Brijendra Singh is her adopted son and that the two
of them formed a joint family, giving them the right to keep 54 acres of land. In December
1981, the Sub-Divisional officer dismissed the adoption argument, citing that the adoptive
father’s name was not registered in educational institution records.
• Mishri Bai filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that Brijendra Singh is her adopted son
and the court ruled in her favour. She executed a registered will on July 19, 1989,
bequeathing all of her assets to Brijendra Singh. Mishri Bai passed away in 1989.
• The State of Madhya Pradesh challenged the order in the High Court. The first appellate
court rejected the appeal and upheld the trial court’s judgement and decree. It was decided,
under the trial court’s findings, that Mishri Bai had adopted Brijendra Singh and that the
fact of adoption was stated in Mishri Bai’s will.
• The High Court heard the Respondents’ Second Appeal and overturned the trial court’s
decision. It was observed that the Court would deem the adoption invalid in the absence of
consent of Mishri Bai’s husband. The adoption was deemed invalid in the absence of
Mishri Bai’s husband’s consent, according to one argument.
• The High Court upheld the appeal, noting that Section 8(c) of the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956 stipulated that only those who fit into the enumerated categories
would adopt a son as a female Hindu.
• The High Court stated that there is a significant difference between a divorced Hindu
woman and one who lives her life as a divorced woman.
• As a result, the High Court ruled that the alleged adoption was not adoption and lacked
legal sanctity. Brijendra Singh appealed against the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES

Was the adoption of Brijendra Singh by Mishri Bai legally valid?

DECISION

• The Supreme Court ruled that a married Hindu woman cannot adopt a child without her
husband’s consent, even if the couple is separated.

• The division bench stated that if the couple was divorced, consent for adoption was not
required. It was observed that any adoption made by a female Hindu who lacks the capacity
or right to adopt is void.

• The Court while dismissing the appeal permitted the appellant to remain in possession of
the land for six months before the state government took action.

HARIRAN VS RBI

FACTS

• The petitioner and Dr. Mohan Ram tied a nuptial knot in 1982 and from the wedlock their
son (Riahab Bailey) was born in 1984.
• The petitioner by an application requested the Reserve Bank of India for a 9% relief bond
in favor of her son with a proclamation, that being the mother she would act as a natural
guardian and supervise all the investments.
• However, the application was returned, and the Court instructed the petitioner to present
the application signed by the father of the minor son and additionally furnish the certificate
of guardianship by a competent authority in her favor.
• Second, there was a divorce proceeding pending between the petitioner and her husband in
which the husband prayed for the custody of the child.
• In association with this, he had written many letters to the petitioner asserting that he is the
natural guardian of the minor child and they could take no decision without his approval,
which has resulted in the present case.
LEGAL ISSUE:

Whether the Constitution of India violates section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act?

DECISION

Gender equality is a critical element in constitutional law consequently when the term “after”
characterizes as disqualification of the mother as a natural guardian during the lifetime of the father
will be considered a contravention to constitutional law.

“father being a dominant personality cannot be given preferential rights over mother” therefore, the
term “after” in section 6 of the act, should not be interpreted in a narrow sense as “after the lifetime”
on the contrary it should be characterized as “in absence of father” i.e. be it temporary or otherwise
or total apathy by father because of any sickness or otherwise the mother would be considered as
the natural guardian of the child.

ABC VS. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

Facts

The Appellant was a single Christian mother who was well educated and financially
independent. She had applied to be the sole guardian of her son under Section 7 of the G&W
Act. Section 11 of the G&W Act requires a notice to be sent to the parents of the child before
the appointment of a guardian. The Appellant issued public notice of the petition for
guardianship but was averse to disclosing the particulars of the child’s father. The Appellant
also submitted an affidavit mentioning that her rights as a guardian may be revoked, altered or
amended if the child’s father at any time objected to them. However, the guardian court refused
to process her application unless she gave the name and particulars of the child’s father. The
Delhi High Court dismissed her appeal, holding that the guardianship could not be granted
without notifying the natural father and making him a party to the case. She then approached
the Supreme Court in appeal.
Issue

Whether it was imperative for an unwed mother to specifically notify the putative father of
the child of an application to become the legal guardian of the child.

Arguments

The Appellant argued that she did not want to disclose the identity of the child’s father because
disclosure of the father’s identity would result in controversy regarding the child’s paternity
and result in social negativity.
On the other hand, the State contended that under Section 11 of the G&W Act, the parents of
the minor had to be notified before a guardian was appointed, and that under Section 19 of the
G&W Act, no guardian could be appointed if the father was alive and was not unfit to be the
guardian of the child.

Decision

The Supreme Court, while arriving at their decision, referred to the provisions of Hindu and
Mohammedan laws regarding guardianship in India and noted that in the case of a child born
to unwed parents, the mother was given preference in matters of custody. They further analysed
laws of countries like the UK, US, Ireland, New Zealand and South America and observed the
common position giving an unwed mother preference for guardianship rights. After discussing
the predominant legal opinions on the issue, the Court held that guardianship and other related
rights should be granted to the mother of an illegitimate child keeping in mind the paramount
welfare of the child. They also considered the Convention on the Rights of the Child to
understand the principles regarding the best interests of the child.
Further, the Court said that the argument of the State with respect to Sections 11 and 19
overlooked the significance of Section 7, which was the ‘quintessence’ of the Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890. The Court said that Section 11 applied when a third party was seeking
guardianship of a child and the views of the child’s natural parents became pertinent. However,
in case of an illegitimate child, the meaning of the term ‘parent’ in Section 11 could be limited
to the parent who was the sole caregiver. The Court further noted that Section 11 was purely
procedural, which procedure could be deviated from in the interests of the welfare of a child.
On the question of privacy, the Court noted that the fundamental right to privacy of the mother
may be violated by compelling her to provide the father’s name and particulars when she did
not want to involve him in her son’s life. The Court noted that the father had not shown any
concern for his son since his birth and that the Appellant had raised him independently, and
that the choice of both individuals in this regard must be respected, especially if it was in
furtherance of the child’s best interests. The Court accordingly allowed the appeal, and directed
that the Appellant’s guardianship application be allowed to proceed.
CHAND PATEL VS BISMILLAH BEGUM

Facts of Chand Patel Case:

• The appellant (Chand Patel) was first married to the elder sister of respondent No.1 and
subsequently married her, and lived under the same roof.
• By the passing of time, the relationship between respondent No.1 and the appellant
deteriorated and soon he started to neglect and refused to maintain respondent No. 1 and
respondent No.2 (minor daughter of respondent No.1 born out of wedlock between
respondent No. 1 and the appellant) which resulted in the filing of a petition under section
125 Cr.P.C for maintenance in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class.
• The bench supported the contention of the respondent and granted her maintenance of
Rs.1,000/- per month, this order was disputed by the appellant in District Court which also
validated the decision of Judicial Magistrate of First Class.
• After which an application under section 482 Cr.P.C was filed in High Court and the bench
took a similar notion which resulted in this instant case.

Legal Issue:

Whether a marriage performed by a Muslim man with his wife’s sister during the lifetime of his

wife will constitute a valid marriage or irregular marriage and its implication on the provision of

maintenance?

Decision:

The court concluded that unlawful conjunction leads to an irregular marriage and is not void.
Hanafi Law in relation to Muslims in India is concerned, an irregular marriage continues to exist
until a competent authority declares it void.
Till then, it entitled the wife and children to maintenance, and the court instructed the appellant to
provide maintenance to both the respondents.

SHAMIM ARA VS STATE OF UP

Facts:

• Shamim Ara the appellant and Abrar Ahmed were married in 1968 under Muslim Shariyat
Law. Four sons were born out of wedlock.
• The appellant on 12.4.1979 applied under Section 125 Cr.P.C on behalf of herself and her
two minor children complaining of desertion and cruelty on part of her husband.
• The husband submitted a written statement of him divorcing the appellant on 11.7.1987.
• The presiding judge of the family court at Allahabad refused to grant any maintenance to
the appellant because the respondent already divorced her on 11.7.1987. The maintenance
of Rs.150 was allowed only to one of her children as he was still a minor.
• The appellant denied having been divorced and preferred a revision before the High Court.
• The High Court of Allahabad held that the alleged divorce was completed only in
1990 when the respondent submitted a written statement to her appeal. Therefore, the
appellant was entitled to claim maintenance from 1988 to 1990.
• The figure for maintenance allowed by the High Court was Rs.200. The appellant filed a
special leave before the Supreme Court.

LEGAL ISSUES:

Whether the appellant can be said to have been divorced by the respondent and the said
divorce has been communicated and become effective 5.12.1990, the day when the
respondent submitted the written statement in these proceedings?

DECISION

The Bench held that for the foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed. Neither does it dissolve the
marriage between the parties on 5.12.1990 nor does the liability of the respondent to pay the
maintenance comes to an end on 5.12.1990.

Therefore, the respondent shall remain liable to pay maintenance until the obligation ends under
law. The respondent shall endure the costs of this appeal.
SHAYARA BANO VS UNION OF INDIA

Brief facts
Shayara Bano, a Muslim girl, was married to Rizwan Ahmed for 15 years. But in 2016, he
divorced her by way of triple talaq without stating any reason. In return, she filed a writ petition
in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of talaq-e-biddat along with practices of
polygamy and nikah halala as they infringe upon the fundamental rights of women (Article
14, 15, 21, 25). Women’s rights organisations like BEBAK collective and Bhartiya Muslim
Mahila Andolan supported her. The opposition i.e. All India Muslim Personal law argued on
the fact that Muslim law is not codified and hence not subject to judicial review and that divorce
is a religious practice under Article 25 of the Constitution and thus protected.

The Court accepted the petition by Shyara Bano and formed a five-judge constitutional bench
in 2017. The first hearing was held on May 11, 2017, and on 22nd August of the same year, it
gave its decision on the case.

Issues involved

1. Whether the practice of talaq-e-biddat (instantaneous triple talaq) an essential

practice in Muslim personal law and protected under Article 25 of the Indian
Constitution?
2. Whether the triple talaq infringes on the fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution and is unconstitutional?

Judgment of the court

The five-judge bench of the Supreme Court gave its decision in favour of Shayara Bano and
others. It declared the practice of Triple Talaq unconstitutional by a 3:2 majority and directed
the legislature to take measures against it in order to stop the abuse against women. The Court
in this case emphasised that though this practice of triple talaq is mostly followed by the Hanafi
School, it is sinful.

While delivering the judgment, the Court opined that many other Muslim countries in the world
have already abolished this practice on the ground that it lacks sanction from the Quran and
was neither encouraged nor followed by the Prophet. The Court held the practice to be violative
of fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution.

MOHD. AHMED KHAN VS SHAH BANO BEGUM

Facts of the Case

Mohd Ahmed Khan (the appealing party) who was a lawyer by profession, married to Shah
Bano Begum (the respondent) in 1932, had three sons and two daughters from this marriage.
In 1975, when Shah Bano’s age was 62 years, she was disowned by her spouse and was tossed
out from her marital home together with her children. In 1978, she filed an appeal in the
presence of Judicial Magistrate of Indore, because she was abandoned from the maintenance
of Rs. 200 per month, which was guaranteed to be provided by him. She demanded Rs. 500 per
month as maintenance. Subsequently, the husband gave her irrevocable triple talaq on
November 6th, 1978, and used it as a defence to not pay maintenance. The magistrate, in
August 1979, directed the husband to pay an entirety of Rs 25 per month as maintenance. Shah
Bano in July 1908 made a plea to the High Court of M.P, to change the sum of maintenance to
Rs. 179 each month, and high court increased the maintenance to the said amount i.e. Rs. 179
per month. The same was challenged by the spouse within the Supreme Court as a special
leave petition to the High court’s decision.

Issues

1. Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether the “WIFE”
definition includes a divorced Muslim woman?
2. Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether it overrides
personal law?
3. Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether a Muslim
husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife is in or
not in the conflict between section 125 and Muslim Personal Law?
4. Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 127(3) (b). What is the
sum payable on divorce? The meaning of Mehar or dower is not summed
payable on divorce?

Judgment
 The verdict was given by C.J, Y.C Chandrachud, and the appeal of Mohd. Ahmed Khan
was dismissed.

Supreme Court said Section of the code applies to all citizens independent of their
religion and consequently Section 125(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure is pertinent to
Muslims as well, without any sort of discrimination. The court further stated that Section
125 overrides the personal law if there is any conflict between the two It makes clear
that there’s no strife between the provisions of Section 125 and those of the Muslim
Personal Law on the address of the Muslim husband’s obligation to provide
maintenance for a divorced wife who is incapable to maintain herself.

Supreme Court in this case duly held that since the obligation of Muslim husband
towards her divorced wife is restricted to the degree of ” Iddat” period, indeed though
this circumstance does not contemplate the rule of law that’s said in Section 125 of
CrPc., 1973 and subsequently the obligation of the husband to pay maintenance to the
wife extends beyond the iddat period in the event that the wife does not have sufficient
means to maintain herself. It was further stated by the court that this rule according to
Muslim Law was against humanity or was wrong because here a divorced wife was not
in a condition to maintain herself.

The payment of Mehar by the husband on divorce is not sufficient to exempt him from
the duty to pay maintenance to the wife.

After a long court procedure, the Supreme Court finally concluded that the husbands’
legal liability will come to an end if a divorced wife is competent to maintain herself.
But this situation will be switched in the case when the wife isn’t able in a condition to
maintain herself after the Iddat period, she will be entitled to get maintenance or alimony
under Section 125 of CrPC.

DANIAL LATIFI VS UNION OF INDIA

FACTS:

• Shah Bano, a 62-year-old woman from Madhya Pradesh, who was divorced by her husband
in 1978, filed a case for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC).
• The Supreme Court ruled in her favour and upheld the right to alimony for Muslim women.
When the Parliament passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act,
1986, which effectively invalidated the decision in the Shah Bano case, she was denied
maintenance.
 • Section 3(1) of the Act stated that divorced Muslim women are entitled to reasonable and
fair maintenance during the “Iddat” period, denying divorced wives from their former
husbands subsequent and further maintenance.
• Danial Latifi, the counsel of Shah Bano, viewed the Act passed to be in derogation of
certain provisions of the Constitution because a wife who depended on her husband before
marriage has the right to life even after marriage.
• As a result, this Act infringes on Article 21 of the Constitution. The Act violated Articles
14 and 15 as well as denied divorced Muslim women the same maintenance benefits as
other divorced women under Section 125 of the CrPC.

• Therefore, Daniel Latifi filed a Writ Petition in the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

LEGAL ISSUES:

• Whether Section 3(1) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986
inconsistent with Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India?
• Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 constitutionally
sound?

DECISION IN DANIAL LATIFI CASE:

• The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the view that the wording of Section
3 (1), “reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within
the iddat period by her former husband” was interpreted to mean that the husband must pay
maintenance to the wife before the iddat period expires and that if he cannot do so, the wife
may recover it as provided in Section 3(3) of the Act.

• However, nowhere does it state that reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is
limited to the iddat period and not beyond it.

• The Court ruled that a husband’s obligation to support and maintain his wife extends for
the rest of the divorced wife’s life unless she marries again.
JOHN VALLAMATTOM V. UNION OF INDIA

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner was a Roman Catholic Priest who is also a citizen of India and there was another
petitioner who was also a Christian. The petitioners filed this petitioner under the contention
that as per the Indian Succession Act of 1925, they have been restricted from passing on proper
for religious and charitable basis. The Petitioners in this petition challenged that Section 118
of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 as unconstitutional under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution. The petitioners claimed that Section 118 was imposing autocratic and
unjustifiable restriction on them for donating their personal property for certain religious or
charitable reasons by their own will as the section has mentioned that any Christian who has a
niece or a nephew or any other close relations, they cannot donate and give their personal
property for religious or charitable works until a certain structural process is followed.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

The issue of the case is that whether Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is valid as
per the Constitution of India?

ARGUMENTS OF THE CASE:

The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act,
1925 was violating Article 14 and Article 15 of the Indian Constitution as this particular section
has discriminatory provisions against Christians, against a Christian person’s testamentary
disposition, against using personal property for religious or charitable works, against a
Christian who has a near relative, against a person who is Christian when he dies within 12
months of executing the will that he has no control of. The learned counsel for the petitioner
also argued that an Indian citizen should have the freedom and liberty to whom the person
chooses as his beneficiaries of his will and the purpose of the passing down the personal
property, which is here violated by Section 118 of the Act.
The learned counsel for respondents argued that this Act is implemented earlier than when the
Constitution of India and it still continues to be in force. It was also argued that similarly, Indian
Parliament was also not bound by legislative replacements and developments made on their
behalf by England or any other foreign nation. The learned counsels also contended that Indian
Christians form an individual and different section of the society which cannot be kept in the
same placing as that of Muslims and Hindus in India for passing down for religious and
charitable uses. Finally, the learned counsel contended that marriage and succession is of
secular nature which cannot be included within religious guarantees that are provided under
the Indian Constitution.

JUDGMENT OF THE CASE:

In this petition filed by the petitioner, the Chief Justice of India while stating the judgment, he
inspected the genesis of the Act in question mentioning that it was a legislative development
dating to the 18th century made by England that has been repealed long back. He stated that
Constitution makes any legislation that pre-dates it specifically void and it’s in conflict with
the current provisions of the Indian Constitution but it does not mean that it prevents it
applicability unless an amendment is made.