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representatives at Delphi to undo the baneful effect which the
pronouncement must have on the Athenian decision. Peloponnesus
intended, no doubt, to defend itself at the Isthmus; but the Spartans
had a perfectly clear comprehension of the necessary part which the
Greek fleet, of which the Athenians must furnish the most important
contingent, must play in the defence.
It is unnecessary to suppose that the pressure was exerted on the
oracle at the immediate initiative of persons who were present on the
spot when the Athenian delegates were given the first answer.
Herodotus is not strict on questions of chronology; possibly his
sources of information did not allow him to be so; and the interval
between the two oracles may have been quite considerable relative
to the rapid march of events. Meanwhile pressure had been brought
to bear on the authorities at Delphi from Peloponnesus, a part of the
world whose representations they could not afford to neglect. So the
tone of the first response was modified in the Peloponnesian
interest. The Athenian was still counselled to desert Attica, but not to
seek safety away from Greece; and the fleet is clearly pointed to as
the means of salvation.
It was not Salamis which Delphi foresaw. It may be doubted even
whether she had any belief in the policy advocated. The Isthmus and
the Peloponnesians demanded the Athenian fleet; and Delphi could
not afford to quarrel with her best friends.
The new oracle, whose meaning was obscured by the fact that
the previous one had been uttered, came near to being
misinterpreted by those to whom it was sent. They evidently saw
from the first that it was, in a sense, a reversal of its predecessor; but
as to its positive meaning they were in much doubt.
In the account of the debate upon it Herodotus introduces,
practically for the first time, to the stage of history, with a suddenness
and simplicity of expression which is almost dramatic, the name of
H. vii. 143.
Themistocles. “There was a certain man of the
Athenians, who had recently come to the front (in the
State), whose name was Themistocles;”—“And Elijah the Tishbite,
who was of the inhabitants of Gilead, said unto Ahab.” In both cases
the dramatic effect of the story of the lives of the men whose
biography is thus opened is heightened by the lack of anything
resembling an introduction.
That a debate did take place on the meaning of the oracle is
probably the case; and the tradition which Herodotus followed
doubtless represents in the main the lines of argument adopted by
either side. The reference to Salamis and to the lines thereon in the
response of Delphi might seem to be evidence in favour of their
genuineness; but it is quite manifest that, if the oracle was spoken at
anything like the time at which Herodotus represents it to have been
uttered, it is inconceivable that the idea of fighting at Salamis can at
that time have entered into the head of Themistocles, much less into
the minds of those who directed affairs at Delphi. Themistocles’
great reputation in the years which followed the war was very largely
due to the part he played with respect to the strategy and tactics of
Salamis; and there was every inducement for the oracle to put in
after the event a claim to the first suggestion of the famous plan. But,
if any judgment can be formed as to the approximate date at which
this particular oracle was issued, it can only be said that Salamis lay
at that time in a future impenetrable to human reckoning.
As the question of the exact bearing of these oracles has been
discussed at some length, it may be convenient to sum up in a few
sentences the hypotheses which have been suggested as to their
origin and tendency.
There seems to have been a belief current in Greece when first
the news of the coming expedition was noised abroad, that it was a
punitive one aimed, like that of Datis and Artaphernes, against
105
Athens. The then recent events of 490 would lend colour to such
a belief. When the magnitude of the coming expedition became
known, and reports as to its real intent came across the Ægean,
Greece as a whole began to think that the danger was more widely
threatening than had been first supposed. Delphi did not share in this
change of opinion, and continued to regard the expedition as aimed
against Athens alone. Holding this view, she adopted the double
course of trying to remove the cause of offence by getting the
Athenians to leave Greece, and of doing all in her power to prevent
Greece as a whole from being involved in the matter. She was
successful in preventing Crete and Argos from joining in the Hellenic
defence, and the second half of the first oracle delivered to Athens, if
a part of the original version, is a threat, uttered possibly about the
time of the expedition to Thessaly, to those powers other than
Athens who seemed inclined to make the question a pan-Hellenic
one. Whatever Delphi thought, Sparta had by that time fully made up
her mind that the danger was one which threatened the whole of
Greece, and was consequently exceedingly alarmed at the tenour of
the advice given by Delphi to the Athenians, the only result of which
would be to rob her of an adjunct to the defence whose value she
fully appreciated,—the Athenian fleet No time was lost in bringing
pressure to bear on Delphi. The result was the second oracle
delivered to Athens, which, in spite of its ambiguous wording, clearly
advocated a policy in strong contrast to that which the first response
had laid down.
The account of these oracles, which is, evidently, from the
chronological point of view, of the nature of a digression in
Herodotus’ history, is succeeded by the description of certain events
which must have taken place in the autumn and winter of 481.
Several measures are described which were adopted by the
Council of the Greeks which had been formed to take the necessary
steps to resist the coming invasion. A settlement was made of the
outstanding disputes between the Greek States, and especially of
the war between Athens and Ægina.
This settlement must, apparently, be attributed to the autumn of
H. vii. 145.
481, for the measures which were next taken, which
are expressly stated to have been subsequent to this
reconciliation, were contemporaneous with the presence of the
H. vii. 37.
Persian Army at Sardes, and belong therefore to the
winter of 481–480. The measures were: the seeding of
spies into Asia; the despatching of ambassadors to solicit aid from
Gelon of Syracuse, from Crete, from Corcyra, and from Argos.
 THE HARBOUR OF CORCYRA.
[To face page 241.

The tale of the fate of the spies is one upon

CORCYRA.
which tradition was likely to improve; but there
H. vii. 146, is no reason to doubt the main incidents of it; how they
174. went to Sardes and were apprehended; how they
were only saved from execution by the interposition of Xerxes, who
thought it would be instructive to them to see what they wanted to
see, and that it might be very advantageous to him if they reported
what they had seen to those who sent them. Xerxes’ policy in the
matter was admittedly wise. Resistance is frequently due to
misapprehension.
The States to whom appeals for aid were sent were all of them in
peculiar positions with reference not merely to their home affairs, but
also to their relations towards the mass of the Greek States.
The very nature of things as they existed in the fifth century
before Christ made it improbable, almost impossible, that Corcyra
should take a very active interest in the affairs of Greece generally.
The Hellenism of her continental neighbours in North-west Greece,
in Epirus, in Ætolia, in Acarnania, was as yet undeveloped. The
range of Pindus, by its oblique course from the very shores of the
Adriatic to those of the Corinthian Gulf, cut off that corner of the
Greek world from those outside influences and that wide experience
which contributed so largely towards making the Hellenism of the
fifth century what it was. Corcyra had no immediate neighbours from
whom she could catch the infection of the Hellenic spirit. It is hardly
strange if she did not interpret the unwritten law of Greek patriotism
in the sense in which it was interpreted by those who were much
more interested in upholding it. Selfish she appeared to the Greeks
of this time; and it can be seen by reading between the lines in
Thucydides that this was the impression she gave to her
contemporaries half a century later. She was severely—it may be,
hardly judged. The circumstances were peculiarly unfavourable to
the development within her of a pan-Hellenic spirit. Nature had
placed her in an almost ideal position in relation to one of the
greatest trade routes of the ancient world,—that from Greece to Italy
and the West. Wealth came easily to her. Her position allowed her to
regard with equanimity the competition of Corinth and the growing
rivalry of Athenian trade. However much there might be for her
competitors, the very nature of her position assured her of an ample
sufficiency. So she lived on a policy of sufferance, neither interfering
nor interfered with. If the Corcyrean was a spoilt child, he had been
spoilt by mother nature. His circumstances were such as were
peculiarly calculated to encourage a selfish patriotism. Had he
voyaged the whole Mediterranean over, he could not have found a
fairer picture than that presented by his own enchanted island. To
himself, no doubt, he appeared the honest man; but to his
contemporaries of larger view he seemed, as it were, the “man with
the muck-rake” of Greek politics, over whose head the crown of
patriotism was held in vain.
It is conceivable that in the present instance Corcyra did not
understand to the full the nature of the danger which threatened
Greece. It had taken long to convince the states who sent her the
invitation that the attack was not directed against Athens alone. She
promised assistance, but evidently with a mental reservation to hold
back until the intention of the Persian was declared unmistakably.
Unfortunately for her reputation, she held back too long. When
she ought to have joined in, she did not—possibly she was too late
to do so; and it is not surprising if her contemporaries, who had
borne the burden of the struggle unaided by her, judged her hardly.
Not so severe, perhaps, should be the judgment of those who are
in a position to review the whole extent of the feeling which prevailed
at this critical time. Patriotism, when aroused, does not argue
according to the rules of logic; and so, remembering this, the severity
of the judgment passed by the Greek patriot on the Greek neutral
may be excused, or even in a sense justified. But it must also be
borne in mind that those who, with Delphi, regarded any joint action
of the Greek States in a quarrel which might be looked upon as
concerning Athens alone, to be calculated to bring suffering upon the
whole of Greece, or at any rate on those who took part in it, and
therefore impolitic, were also justified from their point of view. To
them it might seem as if Athens should lie on the bed she herself
had made, when she had alone among the great powers of Greece
interfered in the Ionian revolt.
Of the Crete of the earlier part of the fifth
ATTITUDE OF
ARGOS.
century but little is known from the historians;
and the modern exploration of the historic
remains on the island has, so far, thrown but little light on its political
relations at this time, whether internal or external. It seems to have
been divided up between a number of comparatively small city
States, which it would have been difficult to rouse to joint action on
any question which did not concern their special interests. Herodotus
does not pass any judgment on the conduct of the Cretans in
refusing aid, possibly because the refusal was in accordance with
the answer given by the Delphic oracle when consulted on the
subject.
The attitude of Argos is not so easy to account for. She had,
indeed, suffered terribly by the loss of six thousand of her citizens in
the battle with the Lacedæmonians under Kleomenes. Delphi, in
consistency with its policy at the time, counselled against
interference; but the Argive tale was that, even so, they were ready
to take part in the defence, provided Sparta granted them a thirty
years’ truce, and provided she shared the supreme command of the
H. vii. 149.
allied forces with them. The proposal of a truce was
entertained, if not actually accepted; but Sparta
refused to let Argos have more than one-third of the command. The
old question of the hegemony of Sparta and Argos in the
Peloponnese lay at the bottom of the refusal; but there is manifestly
a certain amount of improbability in the Argive account of the affair
H. vii. 151,
as given by Herodotus. He tells another tale, which
ad init. seems to have been of Athenian origin. It is to the
effect that Xerxes had been in direct communication
with Argos, and had practically ensured its neutrality, and that the
terms demanded by Argos from the other Greeks were proposed
with a full knowledge that they would be refused.
This tale was supported, so the historian says, by information
obtained at Susa by that mysterious embassy of Kallias;
nevertheless, Herodotus believes the Argive account, and rejects the
tale current in the rest of Greece.
If an author in the fifth century B.C. could not satisfactorily
discover the truth with regard to the matter, it is not likely that it
should be possible to do so at the present day. It may be that Argos,
from genuine conviction, followed the lead of Delphi, but provided for
a possible error in that policy by entering into some kind of
arrangement with the Persian.
The answer which the Greek Council sent to the Argives, as
reported by Diodorus, may be an invention of later times, but is so
peculiarly apt as to be worthy of quotation:⁠—
“If,” it ran, “you think it a more dreadful thing to have a
Greek commander than a barbarian master, you are right
in biding quiet; but if you are ambitious to get the
hegemony of Greece, you must earn a position so
splendid by doing something worthy of it.”
 But the greatest military power in the Greek world at this time was
not situated in the mother country. Gelo, the tyrant of Syracuse in
Sicily, had at his command an armed force superior to that of any
other Greek State. His land army may not, indeed, have been
greater than the force which Sparta could put in the field; but he
possessed, besides, a navy as powerful as that of Athens. He seems
to have been a man of unusual capacity who, had death spared him
for a while, might have made Syracuse the centre of a considerable
dominion in the West. He was manifestly a desirable acquisition for
the league of defence; and it was very natural that a joint embassy
should be sent to him to ask his help in the coming peril. Herodotus
describes the embassy with considerable detail, but his account
raises some difficulties which cast a doubt, not perhaps on his
truthfulness, but on the correctness of his version of what took place.
It may be assumed that the speeches made by Gelo and the
Greek ambassadors are in their form the creation of the historian.
The real historical question is not as to the form, but as to the matter.
H. vii. 157.
In the speech of the Greeks two points are peculiarly
prominent; it shows that there was an idea in certain
quarters in Greece that the expedition was directed against Athens
alone; it is further asserted that if Greece is subdued, Sicily’s turn for
attack will not fail to come quickly. The first of these is important as
throwing further light on the attitude of the Delphic oracle; the second
is an argument in accord with Herodotus’ own impression of the
situation at the time.
It is quite easy to see that there prevailed in
GELO OF
SYRACUSE.
antiquity two views as to the exact significance
of the coincidence of the Carthaginian attack
on Sicily with the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Herodotus never
saw any connection between them. It is possible that no hint of such
a connection was apparent in the sources from which he drew his
H. vii 158.
story of the relations between Gelo and the embassy.
He represents the former as being willing to send a
very considerable contingent to aid the Greeks at home, provided
that the latter will give him the command of the united force. The
condition, if the offer was ever made, was in no wise a surprising
one. Considering the magnitude of the help which Gelo is reported to
H. vii 159.
have offered, it was reasonable. And yet it was
refused, and that, too, in language which cannot be
regarded as otherwise than insulting. So Gelo reduced his terms to
the command of either the sea or land force. And now the Athenian
section of the embassy had a word to say. Their refusal of the
command by sea was, perhaps, somewhat more polite, but hardly
less explicit than had been that of the Spartans to the original
condition. Gelo’s answer, as reported, is brief, but marked by a wit
not unworthy of the distinguished literary society of his court: “My
Athenian friend, you seem to have commanders, without the
likelihood of any troops to command.”
After this, it may well be imagined, there was nothing more to be
said or done, and the embassy went home.
Gelo, however, is reported to have sent a treasure-ship to Delphi,
to watch the course of the war, with orders, in case the Persian won
the day, to surrender the treasure to him and offer the earth and
water of submission. The general origin of the tale so far is plainly
indicated by Herodotus. It is a story which existed—perhaps indeed
was current—in European Greece, for the historian, before
proceeding to add further details, expressly mentions that they were
derived from Sicily.

H. vii. 165. The Sicilians say, so he relates, that in spite of what

had occurred, Gelo would have aided the Greeks and
submitted to the Lacedæmonian command, had not circumstances
arisen at home, in the shape of a Carthaginian invasion, which
prevented him from so doing. Herodotus ascribes the invasion to the
intervention of the Carthaginians in favour of Terillos, tyrant of
Himera, who had been driven out of his government by Thero of
Akragas. An immense army, 300,000 in number, composed, after the
manner of the Carthaginian armies, of nearly all the peoples in the
Western Mediterranean, invaded Sicily by way of Himera.
Such is Herodotus’ account of the events in Sicily at this critical
time, an account which closes with words of great significance,
which put a somewhat different complexion on the tale of the
sending of the treasure-ship to Delphi “Thus, not being able to help
the Greeks (owing to this invasion), Gelo sent the treasure to
Delphi.”
Even if there existed no other evidence with regard to the events
of this period than that which Herodotus supplies, his narrative as it
stands would raise several serious difficulties.
It is, in the first place, quite impossible that an expedition of the
magnitude of that despatched by Carthage could have been got
ready without prolonged preparations such as could not have
remained a secret from the surrounding peoples, and especially from
the Sicilian Greeks. It would be calculated to excite the liveliest alarm
among all who could conceive themselves to be the objects of
attack. Of the magnitude of the expedition there can be no doubt.
The numbers given in Herodotus may not be correct, probably are
not so; but, be that as it may, Sicily itself bore testimony of an
exceedingly practical kind to the magnitude of the victory which was
Head. Hist.
subsequently won at Himera. The victory itself, and
Numm. the prosperity to which it gave rise, caused something
like a revolution in the coinage of Syracuse and of the
Siciliot states generally.
It is impossible to suppose that Gelo was unaware that the
expedition was being prepared, and, indeed, that Sicily was the
object of it, long before the expedition itself started. It is therefore, to
say the least of it, doubtful whether he can
LIBERTY AND
TYRANNY.
ever have entertained, or even have professed
to entertain, any idea of sending a force to help
H. vii. 165,
the Greeks at home. Even in Herodotus’ narrative it is
ad fin. stated that Gelo was aware of the coming of the great
Carthaginian expedition before the treasure was
despatched to Delphi. Why should Gelo have sought to buy off a
Persian attack from a distance when the great invasion was close
upon him? If he succumbed to the latter, the money would be thrown
away. If he were successful in warding it off, he might reasonably
expect to be able to resist any force which Persia could bring against
him. The Ionian Sea was not a Hellespont which might be bridged.
 The tale of this despatch of treasure to Delphi is a strange one. It
may not be true. In any case the motive for it in Herodotus is
manifestly impossible. But the tale is not one which can be ignored.
The Greek of the fifth century was just as capable of suppressing as
of making history. His patriotism had a tendency to run on party
lines. The very intensity of the sympathy which he felt for all that was
Hellenic made him intensely hostile to any political system in the
Hellenic world, or to any representative of a system, which was
opposed to his own ideas; optimi corruptio pessima. The tyranny of
the great king over his subjects, even if they were Greeks, aroused
but a lukewarm resentment in the breast of the Greek democrat. He
hated with a much fiercer passion the tyranny of Greek over Greek.
The barbarian knew no better, because he was a barbarian; the
Greek ought to know, because he was a Greek. Nowhere and at no
time in Greek history can this feeling have been stronger than in the
Athens of the middle of the fifth century, under whose influence
Herodotus so manifestly wrote. The Great War had in his day
become a story; he just saved it from becoming a myth. The creative
genius of the Greek did not discriminate in subject-matter. History,
both Ancient and Modern, went alike info the melting-pot of his
imagination, to be cast into a fable, often beautiful, with a moral in its
train. To such an influence as this Herodotus was peculiarly
susceptible. His genuinely conscientious desire to write history in all
truth was tinged with a piety which induced an unconscious
reservation of fact. He preferred the improbable combined with a
distinct moral lesson to the probable when no moral lesson was
conveyed. He wished to teach as well as to inform.
It is not necessary to suppose—there are, indeed, many reasons
for thinking it improbable,—that he ever departed from what he
believed to be true; but, at the same time, he was not possessed of
the keen critical faculty which would have been necessary to unravel
the truth from the falsehood of the tales which must have formed so
largely the basis of the history of the earlier part of the fifth century.
His account of Gelo is doubtless coloured by, if not reproduced from,
the tradition of the Greece of his time with regard to this incident in
the history of the great war. That war was regarded as far the
greatest of the triumphs of Hellenic freedom, a triumph of free
institutions over the monarchical system. The nature of the triumph
would have been largely discounted had it been necessary to record
the name of a hated tyrant upon the roll of fame. And so, may be, the
connection between Gelo’s victory and the war of liberation in
Greece itself was a thing almost forgotten in Hellas by the time of
Herodotus. It may have been hardly known to his generation, or only
sufficiently known to be resented and buried in silence. The tale as it
was told was a grand moral lesson to the democratic Greek. Even in
the stress of the severest need the free Greek had refused to sell his
birthright of command to a hated tyranny, though the price offered
had been great. And yet the issue had been triumphant. Could it be
bearable that the tyrant should be accorded a share in the triumph?
The tradition which Herodotus followed had some such motive
behind it.
It may not be possible at the present time to
PERSIA AND
CARTHAGE.
arrive at aught resembling a detailed
knowledge of this side plot of the great drama
of 480, and even the circumstances of the information are not of
such a kind as to allow us to speak with ultimate assurance on the
main outlines of it; but the evidence, actual and presumptive, when
the several items are added and subtracted, leaves a large balance
of probability in favour of a view very different from that which
Herodotus has given to the world.
It is not, perhaps, unnatural that knowledge after the event should
tend to obscure the true appreciation of all that preceded it. There is,
however, one phase of the Persian expedition of 480 which stands
out above all others; and that is the splendid character of the
organization which placed the enormous host of Xerxes in middle
Greece. It was not merely the outcome of the experience of years of
campaigning half the world over; it must have been the outcome of
some years of preparation with an express end in view. Can it be
supposed that in these years the advantages of a diversion in the
western world of Greece escaped the notice of a people who gave
such practical proof of capacity? It cannot be too often said that it is
a great historical mistake to read the incapacity of the Persia of the
fourth century into its history at the beginning of the fifth.
 The means of creating the diversion were both obvious and easy.
Persia, through the intermediary of her subjects the Phœnicians, had
excellent means of communicating with and influencing the great
Carthaginian power. This influence must have been largely
increased by the favour which Persia showed to the Phœnician as
against the Greek trader.
It is unnecessary to point to the fact that Carthage would
presumably require but little persuasion to attack the rival Greek in
Sicily at a time when no help could possibly be given from Greece
itself.

H vii. 166.
The Sicilian Greek seems to have had no sort of
doubt as to the connection between the invasion of his
H. vii. 165.
own island and that of the mother country. Herodotus,
ad init. even in spite of his bias towards the Greek version of
the story, gives some hint of a different version in
H vii. 166. Sicily. He does not apparently know much about it, as
he does not mention Himera as the locality of the
Frag. Hist. decisive battle.
Græc.
It is in a fragment of Ephoros that occurs the first
Frag. III. extant historical reference to the connection between
Schol. Pind.
the two expeditions. He says that Persian and
Pyth. i. 146. Phœnician ambassadors were sent to the
Carthaginians, “ordering” them to invade Sicily with as
large an expedition as possible, and after subduing it, to come on to
the Peloponnese. Discredit has been cast on the passage in
consequence of the use of the word “order,” because, so it is said,
the Persians were not in a position to give orders to Carthage. But,
supposing the use of the word is not merely an instance of verbal
inaccuracy, it is quite conceivable that a Greek historian might use
such an expression to describe the supposed relations between the
Diod. xi. 1.
mother state of Phœnicia and her colony. The
historian Diodorus recognizes the same connection
between the two expeditions. He does not, however, make any
reference to Phœnician agency in the matter, nor does he speak of
106
an “order,” but of a diplomatic agreement.
 One question remains: Did Gelo ever
SICILIAN
TRADITION.
seriously entertain the idea of sending help to
the mother country? It is hardly conceivable
that he did. The Carthaginian preparations were on such a scale that
he must have been long forewarned of the coming storm. Whether
he made any sort of offer to the Greek embassy is quite another
question.
If the Greek version of the story of the time provokes the
suspicion that it arose under influences inimical to the strict truth, the
Sicilian also, of which there is a hint in Herodotus, and some detail in
Diodorus, suggests in certain of its passages that it is not an
unadorned tale. That sentiment of the free Greek which, when the
history of the great war came to be written, led him to deny the
Sicilian tyrant all share in its glory, met a counter-sentiment in Sicily,
which claimed for the Sicilian Greek a share in the famous triumph.
Under such influences both exaggeration and suppression of the
truth were sure to take place. The Sicilian version was not content
with confining itself to the just claim that Gelo and Sicily in the victory
at Himera had contributed to the triumphant result of the great war. It
sought evidently to ascribe to the Sicilian Greek a sympathetic, if not
Diod. xi 26.
actual, share in the liberation of Greece itself. Gelo is
represented as having, after the victory of Himera,
prepared a fleet with a view to sending help to Greece, but to have
desisted from the design on receiving news of the victory at Salamis.
This is neither capable of proof nor disproof. The exact date of
Himera is not known, though there was a tradition that it was fought
on the same day as Salamis. If that be accepted, this addition to the
Sicilian version must be rejected; but if the tradition was merely of
that class which is found represented in the history of the time, and
which supplied the eternal demand for curious coincidences, then it
is possible that Himera was fought sufficiently long before Salamis to
make it possible for Gelo to entertain such a design; nor would it
have been strange had he sought to avenge himself on Persia for an
attack which she had provoked against him. It is possible, too, that
the epigram reported to have been engraved on an offering of Gelo
 107
at Delphi refers not merely to the true significance of Himera, but
also to the preparation of this expedition which was never sent.
This war in Sicily, and the questions which arise concerning it, are
of much greater importance to the study of this period of Greek
history than the comparative brevity of their treatment by Greek
historians might suggest to the mind of a reader who did not realize
to himself their full significance. The Greek tyrant in Sicily played no
small part in spreading and developing certain sides of that Greek
civilization which has contributed so largely towards the civilization of
the present day. The view, therefore, which was taken by one of the
greatest and most able of those tyrants as to the part which he
should play at a time when that civilization was threatened with
extinction, is not a minor matter in the history of Greece, or, indeed,
of the world. Nor, again, can the part played by Persia in the invasion
of Sicily be of small account. Persia at this time represented, in
certain respects,—and especially with respect to sheer capacity and
breadth of view, —the highest development which the great empires
of the East were able to attain; and its connection or lack of
connection with the attack on Sicily cannot but affect the judgment
108
which the modern world must pass on that capacity.
To the Greeks gathered in council at the Isthmus the outlook, after
their retreat from Tempe, and after the return of the embassies, must
have been a gloomy one. Nothing had been gained, and much had
been lost. Thessaly with its cavalry, that arm in which the Greeks
were peculiarly weak, and their enemy peculiarly strong, had been
perforce left to its fate; and no one could doubt what that would be.
The states between Kithæron and Œta were wavering, ready to
desert. They could hardly be blamed. The backbone of the future
resistance seemed to be with Sparta and the states of the
Peloponnesian league who followed her lead.
QUESTION OF THE
LINE OF DEFENCE.
It might well be suspected, perhaps even then
it was known, that, if they could have their way,
the defence of the Isthmus would be the beginning and the end of
their design. Northern Greece seemed but too likely to be left to its
fate, just as Thessaly had been. Was it strange that it should seek to
make terms of submission? In one of its states, moreover, and that
the most powerful from a military point of view, Bœotia, more sinister
influences were at work. The oligarchical party, at all times strong in
that country whose comparatively open nature left the many at the
mercy of the powerful few, seemed only too ready to play a part
similar to that which the Aleuadæ had played in Thessaly.
The attitude of Argos was also calculated to cause alarm. It must
be pointed out at the same time, that though it aggravated the
situation to a certain extent, it did not affect it so decisively as has
been imagined by modern commentators. The possibility of the
landing of Persian troops behind the defences of the Isthmus was
not a question so much dependent on the action of Argos as on the
success or failure of the Greek fleet in checking the advance of the
enemy’s ships before they succeeded in crossing the Saronic Gulf.
Had the Persian fleet once succeeded in establishing itself in some
harbour of the coast of Argolis, the defence of the Isthmus must have
collapsed, whatever the attitude of Argos might have been. This
State, owing to the losses it had suffered in the great defeat which
Kleomenes and the Spartans inflicted upon it, can hardly have been
in a position to offer serious resistance to a landing on its coasts.
Note.—The relation of date between the return of the
embassies and the retreat from Tempe is of considerable
importance to a right appreciation of the situation at this
critical time. Herodotus dates the events in Greece by the
advance of Xerxes’ army. Thus the expedition to Tempe is
stated to have taken place βασιλέος τε μέλλοντος
διαβαίνειν ἐς τῆν Εὐρώπην ἐκ τὴς Ἀσίης, καὶ εὄντος ἤδη ἐν
Ἀβύδῳ. H. vii. 174.
Again, the embassies seem to have been despatched
simultaneously to Sicily, Corcyra, Crete and Argos (H. vii.
148, 153, etc.). That to Sicily would almost certainly be the
last to return. Gelo did not send the treasure-ships to
Delphi until after the visit of the embassy (H. vii. 163, ad
init.), and he did not send them till after he had heard that
Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont.
 If, then, the rough chronology of Herodotus can be
relied upon,—and there is not any other source of
information upon the subject available,—the Greeks who
assembled at the Isthmus after the withdrawal from Tempe
must have known that the resources then at their disposal
were all upon which they could reckon in the coming
struggle.

Note on the Carthaginian Invasion of Sicily.

The satisfactorily attested fact that a large Carthaginian
Army attacked Sicily simultaneously with the invasion of
Greece by Xerxes raises the very difficult question
whether the coincidence in time between the two attacks
was anything more than accidental; and, if it was, as to the
exact nature of the relation between them. Before
discussing the question, it may be well to collect together
the various passages in ancient authors in which
reference is made to the nature of the Carthaginian
campaign.
H. vii. 165.
Λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Σικελίῃ οἰκημένων, ὡς
ὅμως, καὶ μέλλων ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὁ Γέλων
ἐβοήθησε ἂν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ Θήρωνος τοῦ
Αἰνησιδήμου Ἀκραγαντίνων μουνάρχου ἐξελασθεὶς ἐξ
Ἱμέρης Τήριλλος ὁ Κρινίππου, τύραννος ἐὼν Ἱμέρης,
ἐπῆγε ὑπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον φοινίκων καὶ Λιβύων
καὶ Ἰβήρων καὶ Λιγύων καὶ Ἑλισύκων καὶ Σαρδονίων καὶ
Κυρνίων τριήκοντα μυριάδας, καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν
Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Ἄννωνος, Καρχηδονίων ἐόντα βασιλέα˙ κατὰ
ξεινίην τε τὴν ἑωυτοῦ ὁ Τήριλλος ἀναγνώσας, καὶ μάλιστα
διὰ τὴν Ἀναξίλεω τοῦ Κρητίνεω προθυμίην, ὁς Ῥηγίου ἐὼν
τύραννος, τὰ ἑωυτοῦ τέκνα δοὺς ὁμήρους Ἀμίλκᾳ, ἐπῆγε
μιν ἐπὶ τὴν Σικελίαν, τιμωρέων τῷ πενθερῷ·
Then there follows the statement that Gelon and
Theron defeated Hamilcar in Sicily the same day as
Salamis was fought, after which we get two accounts—the
first presumably Greek, probably Syracusan, the second
Carthaginian—of Hamilcar’s disappearance in the battle,
and a further statement to the effect that the Carthaginians
sacrificed to him, and set up statues to him in Carthage
and her colonies.
It is noticeable that in neither account does Herodotus
mention Himera as the locality of the battle.
Of the treasures sent by Gelon to Delphi, he tells us
(vii. 163) that Gelon, fearing that the Greeks might
succumb to the Persian, but considering it quite an
impossible thing for the tyrant of Sicily to go to
Peloponnese to be put under the command of
Lacedæmonians, sent, immediately on hearing of the
passage of the Hellespont by the Persians, a certain
Cadmus with three ships to Delphi with much treasure and
friendly words (καραδοκήσαντα τὴν μάχην ᾕ πεσέεται˙ καὶ
ἤν μὲν ὁ βάρβαρος νικᾷ, τὰ τε χρήματα αὐτῷ διδόναι, καὶ
γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ τῶν ἄρχει ὅ Γέλων ˙ ἤν δὲ οἱ Ἕλληνες,
ὀπίσω ἀπάγειν), and (VII. 164) we are told that when the
Greeks won in the sea-fight, and Xerxes departed,
Cadmus returned to Sicily, bringing all the treasure with
him.
A fragment of the history of Ephorus (Frag. III Schol.
Pind. Pyth. I. 146) gives the following account of the
matter:⁠—
Ἐκ δὲ Περσῶν καὶ Φοινίκων πρέσβεις πρὸς
Καρχηδονίους [παραγενέσθαι] προστάσσοντας ὡς
πλεῖστον δέοι στόλον ˙ εἰς Σικελίαν τε βαδίζειν, καὶ
καταστρεψαμένους τοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων φρονοῦντας
πλεῖν ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον.

THE CARTAGINIAN
Diodorus, xi. 1, says:⁠—
INVASION OF “Ὁ δὲ Ξέρξης.... βονλόμενος πάντας
SICILY.
τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀναστάτους ποιῆσαι,
διεπρεσβεύσατο πρὸς Καρχηδονίους περὶ κοινοπραγίας,
καὶ συνέθετο πρὸς αὐτοὺς. ὥστε αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν
Ἑλλάδα κατοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας στρατεύειν,
“Καρχηδονίους δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις μεγάλας
παρασκευάσασθαι δυνάμεις, καὶ καταπολεμῆσαι τῶν
Ἑλλήνων τοὺς περὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντας.”
These are the historical passages which bear on the
subject.
Of non-historical passages, we have in the “Poetics” of
Aristotle, 23, a reference to the coincidence in date of the
battles of Salamis and Himera.
It is needless to say that we are here in the presence of
evidence which, if not actually conflicting, is at any rate
extremely difficult to reconcile.
Only one great fact stands out with certainty, namely,
that two great simultaneous attacks were made in 480
b.c. on the two great divisions of the free Hellenic world.
The question is: Were they part of one great scheme, or
was their coincidence purely fortuitous?
To speak with the appearance of assuredness on such
a question would be delusive, in that it would assume that
there existed in the evidence attainable a conclusiveness
to which it cannot lay any claim. Such as it is, it can only
be judged by the law of probabilities.
Let us first take the probabilities of the case apart from
the evidence actually quoted here.
Phœnicia, the mother country of Carthage, was at this
time within the Persian dominion. Its population seems, on
the whole, to have received exceptionally favourable
treatment from the Persian Government, probably
because it supplied the best material, animate and
inanimate, to the fleet of the empire. It would also be to
the interest of the Persian Government to encourage the
most enterprising traders of its dominion. Furthermore, the
subjugation of Phœnicia had not broken the tie of
relationship between the mother country and the greatest
of its colonies. When, under Cambyses, the Persian
dominions had been extended as far as the Greater Syrtis,
the Phœnicians had refused to prosecute the war further
against their kin (H. iii. 17–19); and it had apparently been
thought wise, if not necessary, to submit to this refusal.
From that time forward there had, in so far as is known,
been no unfriendly relations between Persia and
Carthage. So long as the Phœnician was well treated
there was hardly a point on which they could clash. In the
present instance their interests manifestly coincided. It
was certainly to the interest of Xerxes that the Sicilian
Greeks should have their hands full at the time of his great
attack on Greece. The Persians had plenty of means of
knowing that there was a great Greek military power in
Sicily which might render important aid to the Greeks in
the coming struggle. The Carthaginian, on the other hand,
might well think this a favourable opportunity for crushing
the ever-increasing Greek trade competition in the richest
island in the Mediterranean, at a time when the Sicilian
Greek could not expect help from the mother country.
It is, when we consider the part played by the
Phœnicians in Xerxes’ expedition, infinitely more probable
that there was a connection between the two expeditions
than that there was not. Whether the connection was of
the intimate kind described by Diodorus may perhaps be
doubted, but certainly cannot be disproved. Ephoros and
Diodorus believe it to have been intimate; and the latter
seems, in so far as can be seen from the nature of the
fragment of Ephoros, to have had evidence on the subject
quite independent of it.
No true canon of criticism can possibly assume that the
silence of Herodotus or any other ancient author on this or
any other point in ancient history is in any way conclusive.