[Introduction]

CHEMICAL OPERATIONS: (Risk analysis by different methods)

Chemical operations are processes carried out within an industry in order to obtain
some analytical or production result, within which care is specified during the
handling of chemical substances harmful or not harmful to health as well as the
methods and risks caused. in the work area during any analysis, production or
experimentation of any product; Because accidents occasionally occur in the work
area of some industries, some points or methods were implemented to avoid risks
in processes based on systems for deducing failures, risks, and errors that help the
industry organize measures. safety procedures with which care is taken and
controlled when handling chemical agents to avoid contamination and avoid
monetary loss for the company.

Some of the systems implemented are: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
(HACCP or HACPP), this system aims to guarantee the care and safety of the
product, through which risks of physical, chemical or biological contamination are
foreseen throughout. throughout the company's production processes, establishing
preventive and corrective measures for its control. Once the risks are known, the
points at which control must be carried out to achieve safety are determined.

Another of the important systems in the industry is the Functional Analysis of

Operability (AFO) or Hazard and Operability (HAZOP), in this system you can
identify risks or possible accidents during operations, analyze causes,
consequences of deviations using "Guide Words" explained later throughout this
investigation.

Finally, there is ( FTA) Fault Tree Analysis , it is a tool used in the industry to locate
and correct faults, this method is mainly used by safety engineers to prevent risks
in the industry, taking care of the integrity of the worker and avoid problems for the
industry, by carrying out these methods both the worker and the industry can avoid
problems and avoid loss of profit for the industry. Its name is due to its tree graphic
appearance, which we will analyze later.

There are more methods such as “What if..?” Analysis, Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
or Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) that will also be explained throughout
the investigation, but to a lesser extent. than those already mentioned above.

[Development]
Chemical Operations
Chemical operations are processes carried out within an industry in order to obtain
some analytical result or transform raw material into a product with different
characteristics. Within these processes, care and safety and hygiene measures are
specified, as well as the possible risks that could occur in the work area during any
analysis, production or experimentation of a product.

People who work in the laboratory must use very diverse materials, each designed
for a specific function and to achieve a specific objective. The progress of
technology in recent years has meant that new resources exist in laboratories that
make the chemist's work easier and faster. However, the use of classic material
such as balances, funnels, test tubes, pipettes, etc., is essential both in the
synthesis of chemical products and during the preparation of the sample to
introduce it into an apparatus.

The main basic laboratory operations are included in the following list:

 Centrifugation
 Crystallization
 column chromatography
 Thin layer chromatography
 Desiccation
 Distillation
 Evaporation to dryness
 Extraction
 Filtration with pleated filter
 Vacuum filtration
 Heavy
 Precipitation
 Using a reflux
 Using the Bunsen burner
 Melting point
 Recrystallization
 Use of the rotary evaporator

Due to the accidents that can occur in the work area of some industries, analyzes
are carried out to detect possible risks in the production or handling of a product,
this with the purpose of avoiding accidents, irregularities in production or monetary
loss for the company.

Risk analysis

Risk analysis, also known by its acronym PHA (Process Hazards Analyses), is a
set of organized and systematic evaluations of the potential risks associated with
an industrial process.

Risk analysis methods are based on studies of facilities and processes that are
much more structured from a logical-deductive point of view. They normally follow
a logical procedure to deduce failures, errors, deviations in equipment, facilities,
processes, operations, etc. which results in obtaining certain solutions for this type
of events.

There are several generalized methods. The most important are:

1. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP or HACPP)

2. Functional operability analysis, HAZOP
3. Fault tree analysis, FTA
4. Analysis "What if...?"
5. Event tree analysis, ETA
6. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, FMEA

These methods can be used in various areas. as, such as:

 Food quality control
 Petrochemical companies
 Pharmaceuticals
 Aerospace
 Logistics
 Transport
 Investment companies and portfolio management
 Marketing companies

Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP or HACPP)

The method is developed in the United States by the Pillsbury Corporation, the
United States Naval Navy and the National Aerospace Agency (NASA), and its
objective was to establish a preventive control method instead of retrospective
controls in which problems are detected. after events.

It was first presented at the First National Food Protection Conference of the
United States of America in 1971, under the name “Hazard Analysis Critical
Control Points” (HACCP). From that date on, this method was adopted by large
food companies around the world.

The HACCP system allows you to identify specific hazards and measures to
control them in order to guarantee food safety. It is an instrument for assessing
hazards and establishing control systems that focus on prevention rather than
relying primarily on final product testing. Every HACCP system is susceptible to
changes that may arise from advances in equipment design, production
procedures or the technological sector.
The HACCP system can be applied throughout the entire food chain, from the
primary producer to the final consumer, and its application should be based on
scientific evidence of hazards to human health, in addition to improving food safety,
application The HACCP system can offer other significant benefits, including
facilitating inspection by regulatory authorities, and promoting international trade by
increasing confidence in food safety.

For successful implementation of the HACCP system, both management and staff
need to be fully committed and involved. A multidisciplinary approach is also
required, which should include, where appropriate, agronomists, veterinarians,
production personnel, microbiologists, medical and public health specialists, food
technologists, environmental health experts, chemists and engineers, as
appropriate. the study in question.

The Codex Alimentarius Commission of the World Health Organization developed

the seven principles of HACCP. The HACCP system defines a standard widely
used in the EU Food Industry and is recognized by various legislative bodies. The
main objective of the HACCP system is to identify the dangers that may occur in
any phase of food production, determine their scope, and take control measures
with limits above which the process should not be carried out. The HACCP system
consists of the following seven principles:

Guidelines for the application of the HACCP system

Management commitment is necessary for the implementation of an effective

HACCP system. When identifying and analyzing hazards and carrying out
subsequent operations to develop and implement HACCP systems, the impact of
raw materials, ingredients, food manufacturing practices, the role of manufacturing
processes on the control of hazards, the probable end use of the product, the
categories of consumers affected and epidemiological evidence relating to food
safety.

The purpose of the HACCP system is to focus control on CCPs. In the event that a
hazard that needs to be controlled is identified but no CCP is found, the possibility
of re-formulating the operation should be considered. It is important that the
HACCP system be applied flexibly, taking into account the nature and extent of the
operation.

For the correct application of the principles of the HACCP system, it is necessary
to execute the tasks indicated in the diagram and the logical sequence detailed
below:
1. Formation of a HACCP team

The food business must ensure that product-specific knowledge and competence
is available to formulate an effective HACCP plan. To achieve this, the ideal is to
create a multidisciplinary team. Where such services are not available on site,
technical advice should be sought from other sources and the scope of the HACCP
plan identified. This scope will determine which segment of the food chain is
involved and what general categories of hazards are to be addressed (for example,
whether all hazard classes are covered or only certain hazard classes are
covered).

2. Product Description

A complete description of the product should be formulated, including relevant

information on its safety, for example: composition, physical/chemical structure
(including Aw, pH, etc.), static treatments for the destruction of microbes (such as
heat treatments, freezing, brining, smoking, etc.), packaging, durability, storage
conditions and distribution system.

3. Determination of the use to which it is intended

The intended use must be based on the intended uses of the product by the end
user or consumer. In certain cases, such as feeding in institutions, it will be
necessary to take into account whether they are vulnerable groups of the
population.

4. Preparation of a flow chart

The flow chart must be prepared by the HACCP team and cover all phases of the
operation. When the HACCP system is applied to a specific operation, the phases
before and after said operation must be taken into account.

5. On-site confirmation of the flow chart

The HACCP team should check the flow chart with the manufacturing operation at
all stages and times, and amend it where appropriate.

6. Enumeration of all possible risks related to each phase, execution of a

hazard analysis, and study of measures to control the identified hazards.
Principle 1

The HACCP team should list all hazards that can reasonably be expected to occur
at each stage, from primary production, processing, manufacturing and distribution
to the point of consumption.

The HACCP team must then carry out a hazard analysis to identify, in relation to
the HACCP plan, which hazards whose elimination or reduction to acceptable
levels is essential, by their nature, to produce a safe food.

When conducting a hazard analysis, the following factors should be included

whenever possible:

 The likelihood of hazards arising and the severity of their harmful

health effects.
 The qualitative and/or quantitative evaluation of the presence of
dangers.
 The survival or proliferation of the microorganisms involved.
 The production or persistence of toxins, chemical substances or
physical agents in food.
 The conditions that may cause the above.

The team will then need to determine what control measures, if any, can be applied
in relation to each hazard.

More than one measure may be necessary to control a specific hazard or hazards,
and more than one hazard may be controlled by a given measure.

7. Determination of critical control points (CCP) . Principle 2

There may be more than one CCP to which control measures are applied to
address a specific hazard. The determination of a CCP in the HACCP system can
be facilitated by the application of a decision tree, such as Diagram 2, indicating a
logical reasoning approach. The decision tree should be applied flexibly,
considering whether the operation concerns production, slaughter, processing,
storage, distribution or another purpose, and should be used as a guide in
determining CCPs. This decision tree example may not be applicable to all
situations, so other approaches may be used. It is recommended that training be
provided in the application of the decision tree.
If a hazard is identified at a stage where control is necessary to maintain safety,
and there is no control measure that can be taken at that stage or any other stage,
the product or process must be modified at that stage, or at any preceding or
subsequent stage, to include a control measure.

Decision tree to identify CCP

8. Establishment of critical limits for each CCP. Principle 3

For each critical control point, critical limits should be specified and validated, if
possible. In certain cases, for a given phase, more than one critical limit will be
developed. The criteria applied usually include measurements of temperature,
time, humidity level, pH, AW and available chlorine, as well as sensory parameters
such as appearance and texture.
9. Establishment of a surveillance system for each CCP. Principle 4

Monitoring is the scheduled measurement or observation of a CCP relative to its

critical limits. A loss of control in the CCP must be detected through monitoring
procedures. Furthermore, ideally, monitoring should provide this information in time
to make corrections to ensure process control to prevent critical limits from being
violated. Where possible, processes should be corrected when monitoring results
indicate a trend toward loss of control at a CCP, and corrections should be made
before a deviation occurs. The data obtained through surveillance must be
evaluated by a designated person who has the necessary knowledge and
competence to implement corrective measures, where appropriate.

If surveillance is not continuous, its degree or frequency must be sufficient to

ensure that the CCP is controlled. Most CCP monitoring procedures will need to be
carried out quickly because they will involve continuous processes and there will
be no time for lengthy analytical testing. Physical and chemical measurements are
often preferred to microbiological tests because they can be performed quickly and
often indicate microbiological control of the product.

All records and documents related to the monitoring of CCPs must be signed by
the person or persons carrying out the monitoring, together with the company
official or officials in charge of the review.

10. Establishment of corrective measures. Principle 5

In order to address any deviations that may occur, specific corrective measures
must be formulated for each CCP in the HACCP system.

These measures should ensure that the CCP is once again under control. The
measures adopted must also include an adequate disposal system for the affected
product. Procedures regarding product deviations and disposal should be
documented in HACCP records.
11. Establishment of verification procedures. Principle 6

Verification procedures must be established. Testing and verification methods,

procedures and tests, including random sampling and analysis, may be used to
determine whether the HACCP system is operating effectively. The frequency of
checks should be sufficient to confirm that the HACCP system is working
effectively. Verification activities include, as an example, the following:

 Examination of the HACCP system and its records.

 Examination of product deviations and disposal systems.
 Confirmation that CCPs are kept under control.

Where possible, validation activities should include measurements that confirm the
effectiveness of all elements of the HACCP plan.

12. Establishment of a documentation and registration system . Principle 7

To implement a HACCP system, it is essential to have an effective and accurate

recording system. The procedures of the HACCP system must be documented,
and the documentation and recording system must be adjusted to the nature and
magnitude of the operation in question.

Examples of documentation are:

 Hazard analysis.
 The determination of the PCC.
 The determination of critical limits.

Examples of records include:

 CCP surveillance activities.
 Deviations and corresponding corrective measures.
 The modifications introduced in the HACCP system.

Training

Training of industry, government and academic personnel in the principles and

applications of HACCP and increasing consumer awareness are essential
elements for effective HACCP implementation. To contribute to the development of
specific training in support of a HACCP plan, work instructions and procedures
must be formulated that define the tasks of the operational personnel who will be
deployed at each critical control point.

Cooperation between primary producer, industry, trade groups, consumer

organizations and competent authorities is of utmost importance. Opportunities
should be offered for joint training of industry personnel and regulatory bodies, in
order to encourage and maintain ongoing dialogue and to create a climate of
understanding for the practical application of the HACCP system.
HACCP SYSTEM WORKSHEET EXAMPLE

Hazard Characterization
The HACCP team must consider the potential dangers for each stage of the
production process, basing this on knowledge, experiences, databases,
epidemiological background, legislation, health surveillance programs, among
others.

Types of hazards:
Functional analysis of operability (AFO): Hazard and operability
(HAZOP)

The method was born in 1963 in the company ICl ( Imperial Chemical Industries ),
at a time when critical analysis techniques were applied in other areas. These
techniques consisted of a systematized analysis of a problem through the
formulation and answers to a series of questions (how?, when?, why? who?, etc.).
The application of these techniques to the design of a new chemical plant revealed
a number of design weaknesses.

The method was later formalized and has until now been widely used in the
chemical field as a technique particularly appropriate for the identification of risks in
an industrial facility.

HAZOP is an inductive risk identification technique based on the premise that

accidents occur as a consequence of a deviation of process variables with respect
to normal operating parameters. The technique consists of systematically
analyzing the causes and consequences of deviations in the process variables,
raised through "guide words".

Carrying out a HAZOP analysis consists of the stages described below.

1. Definition of the study area

It consists of delimiting the areas to which the technique is applied. In a given

process facility, considered as the area under study, a series of subsystems or
process lines will be defined for greater convenience that correspond to its own
functional entities: loading line to a tank, solvent separation, reactors, etc.

2. Definition of knots

In each of these subsystems or lines, a series of nodes or points clearly located in

the process must be identified. For example, raw material feed pipe to a reactor,
pump drive, storage tank, etc.

Each node must be identified and numbered consecutively within each subsystem
and in the direction of the process for better understanding and convenience. The
HAZOP technique is applied to each of these points. Each node will be
characterized by process variables: pressure, temperature, flow, level,
composition, viscosity, etc.

The ease of use of this technique requires reflecting in simplified flowchart

schemes all the subsystems considered and their exact position.

The document that acts as the main support of the method is the process flow
diagram, or pipes and instruments, P&ID.

3. Application of guide words

The "guide words" are used to indicate the concept that represents each of the
previously defined nodes that enter or leave a given element. They apply to both
actions (reactions, transfers, etc.) and specific parameters (pressure, flow,
temperature, etc.). The table below presents some guide words and their meaning.

The following table shows some examples of these nodes defined with guide
words:
4. Definition of the deviations to study

For each node, all the deviations that imply the application of each guide word to a
specific variable or activity are systematically raised. To carry out an exhaustive
analysis, all possible combinations between guide word and process variable must
be applied, discarding during the session deviations that do not make sense for a
given node.

In parallel with the deviations, the possible causes of these deviations and
subsequently the consequences of these deviations must be indicated.

The table above shows some examples of the application of guide words, the
deviations they cause and their possible causes.

5. HAZOP sessions

The HAZOP sessions aim to systematically carry out the process described above,
analyzing the deviations in all the lines or nodes selected from the guide words
applied to certain variables or processes. The possible causes, the possible
consequences, the proposed responses, as well as the actions to be taken are
determined.
All this information is presented in the form of a table that systematizes data entry
and subsequent analysis. The HAZOP collection format applied to a continuous
process is presented below.

The meaning of the content of each of the columns is as follows:

In the case of discontinuous processes, the HAZOP method undergoes some

modification, both in its analysis and in the presentation of the final data.

6. Final report

The final report consists of the following documents:

 Simplified diagrams with the location and numbering of the nodes of each
subsystem.
 Session collection formats with indication of the dates of completion and
composition of the work team.
 Analysis of the obtained results. A qualitative classification of the identified
consequences can be carried out.
 List of measures to take. It constitutes a preliminary list that should be duly
studied based on other criteria (cost, other technical solutions,
consequences on the installation, etc.) and when more decision elements
are available.
 List of identified initiating events.
The main characteristic of the method is that it is carried out by a multidisciplinary
work team organizing work sessions led by a coordinator. The work team must be
composed of:
 Responsible for the process.
 Responsible for the operation of the plant.
 Responsible for security.
 Responsible for maintenance.
 Coordinator.
Those responsible can consult technicians, instrumentation areas of the design
team, etc.
The people who take part in the sessions must be people:
 Knowledgeable about the area and experts in their field.
 Willing to actively participate.
The person who plays the role of coordinator who leads the sessions must be a
person:
 Relatively “objective”
 With full knowledge of the method or development.
 With industrial experience.
 With organizational capacity.
The necessary dedication time for each knot to be studied can be evaluated in
three hours, distributing in equal parts:
 Preparation
 Session
 Review and analysis of the results of the work organization.

Area of application

The method finds its usefulness, mainly, in process installations of relative

complexity, or in storage areas with regulation equipment or a variety of types of
transfer.

Its application in new plants is particularly beneficial because it can reveal flaws in
design, construction, etc. that may have gone unnoticed in the conception phase.
On the other hand, modifications that may arise from the study can be more easily
incorporated into the design.

Advantages and disadvantages of the method

The method mainly covers the objectives for which it has been designed, and also:

 It is a good opportunity to contrast different points of view of an installation.

  It is a systematic technique that can create, from a security point of view,
useful methodological habits.
 The coordinator improves his knowledge of the process.
 It requires practically no additional resources, with the exception of
dedication time.

The main drawbacks can be:

 Being a qualitative technique, although systematic, there is no real

assessment of the frequency of the causes that produce a certain
consequence, nor its scope.
 The modifications that must be made to a given facility as a result of a
HAZOP must be analyzed in greater detail in addition to other criteria, such
as economic ones.
 The results obtained depend largely on the quality and capacity of the work
team members.
 It depends greatly on the information available, to such an extent that a risk
can be omitted if the starting data is erroneous or incomplete.

Example:

Fault tree analysis, FTA

The fault tree technique was born in 1962 with its first application to verify the
design reliability of the Minuteman rocket. Subsequently, it has been applied
especially initially in the nuclear field and later in the chemical field, in studies such
as that of Rijmond. Fault trees are a widely used technique in risk analysis
because they provide both qualitative and quantitative results.

The FTA or Fault Tree was developed by engineers to improve the safety of
systems, studying and realizing that most accidents or incidents result from failures
indifferent to a system.

Concluding that a system consists of people, equipment, materials and

environmental factors, a system performs given or specified operations with
already known methods, since the components of a system and its environment
are related, a failure in any part of the system can affect the other parts of it.

If an unexpected or negative event occurs, it could cause an incident which may

result in injuries to personnel or damage to equipment, machinery and property.

It is a technique that consists of a deduction process based on the laws of Boolean

algebra, this allows determining the expression of studied events based on the
failures of elements that intervene in it. This consists of systematically
decomposing an event called TOP event into intermediate events until you arrive at
basic events.

Negative trees or fault trees are excellent tools for locating and correcting faults.
These can be used to consciously or unconsciously prevent accidents in a
workplace before they occur. If an accident or failure occurs, the system identifies
the main error or negative event. The event is studied and analyzed and questions
such as: Why did it happen? By answering such specific questions and drawing
logical and real conclusions, the main causes can be identified and what events
were carried out so that this failure or accident occurred through logic to identify
each of the possible causes, during this process. A tree diagram is used to capture
events and identify them immediately. The branches of the tree are concluded
when the events are complete until they reach the negative.

Various symbols are used in the tree diagram to represent different events and
relate:

Represents a condition and below it all

events are shown, it means it will occur if
Gate And all input events exist
 Represents a situation in which any of
the events shown below the door lead to
Gate O the event shown.

1. Rectangle It represents the negative event and is

located at the top of the tree to indicate
other events that can be subdivided.

Represents the base event in the tree,

2. Circle they are found at lower levels of the tree
to indicate events that can be split.

It represents an unfinished terminal

event. Such an event is one not fully
3. Diamond developed due to a lack of information or
significance. A branch of the fault tree
can end with a diamond.

It represents a special situation that can

4. Oval occur only if certain circumstances occur.
This is explained inside the oval symbol.

It means a transfer of a branch of the

5. Triangle fault tree to another place in the tree.
Where a triangle is connected to the tree
with an arrow, everything displayed
below the connection point is passed to
another area of the tree. This area was
identified with a corresponding triangle
that connects to the tree with a vertical
line. Letters, numbers or figures
differentiate one group of transfer
symbols from another. To maintain the
simplicity of the analytical tree, the
transfer symbol should be used
sparingly.

Failure analysis with tree diagrams

Tree failure consists of the following steps:
 1) Define the top event
2) Know the system
3) Build the tree
4) Tree validation
5) Tree evaluation
6) Consideration of constructive changes
7) Consideration of alternatives and recommending measures
Define the top event : To define the top event, the type of failure to be
investigated must be identified. This could be whatever the end result of an
incident was, for example: a forklift overturning.
Determine all unwanted events in the operation of a system : Separate this list
into groups with common characteristics. Several FTAs may be necessary to study
a system completely. Finally, an event must be established that represents all
events within a group. This event becomes the unwanted event to be studied.
Get to know the system. All available information about the system and its
environment should be studied: A job analysis may be helpful to determine the
information needed. Build the fault tree. This step is perhaps the easiest because
only a few of the symbols are used and the practical construction is very simple.
Evaluate the fault tree. The tree now needs to be examined for areas where
improvements can be made to the analysis or where there may be opportunity to
use alternative procedures or materials to lessen the hazard.
Consider constructive changes: In this step, any alternative methods that are
implemented should be further evaluated. This allows advisors to see any issues
that are related to the new procedure before implementing it.
Consider alternatives and recommend steps: This is the last step in the process
where corrective actions or alternative measures are recommended.
The main advantage of fault tree analyzes is : The valuable data they produce
that allows the overall reliability of the system to be evaluated and improved. It also
evaluates efficiency and the need for redundancy.
Limitations: A limitation of fault tree analysis is that the unwanted event being
evaluated has to be anticipated and all factors contributing to the failure have to be
anticipated. This effort can be time-consuming and very expensive. And finally, the
overall success of the process depends on the skill of the analyst involved.
Analysis "What if...": What would happen if...?

It consists of the approach of possible deviations in the design, construction,

modifications and operation of a certain industrial facility, using the question that
gives rise to the name of the procedure: "What would happen if...?". It requires
basic knowledge of the system and a certain mental disposition to combine or
synthesize possible deviations, so the presence of personnel with extensive
experience is normally necessary to carry it out.

It can be applied to any installation or area or process: equipment instrumentation,

electrical safety, fire protection, storage, hazardous substances, etc. The questions
are formulated and applied to both projects and plants in operation, being very
common when faced with changes to existing facilities.

The work team is made up of 2 or 3 people who are specialists in the area to be
analyzed with detailed documentation of the plant, process, equipment,
procedures, safety, etc.

The result is a list of possible scenarios or incidental events, their consequences

and possible solutions to reduce or eliminate the risk. An example is presented
applied to a continuous process for manufacturing diammonium phosphate (PAD)
through the reaction of phosphoric acid with ammonia. PAD is harmless, however,
if the proportion of phosphoric is reduced, the reaction is not complete and
ammonia is released, while if the ammonia is reduced, a safe but undesirable
product is released.

Analysis by Event Trees, AAS: Event tree analysis, ETA

The event tree analysis technique consists of evaluating the consequences of

possible accidents resulting from the specific failure of a system, equipment, event
or human error, considering them as initiating events and/or events or intermediate
mitigation systems, from the point of view of mitigating consequences.

The conclusions of the event trees are consequences of accidents, that is, a set of
chronological events of failures or errors that define a specific accident.

Starting from the initiating event, two bifurcations are systematically proposed: in
the upper part the success or occurrence of the conditioning event is reflected and
in the lower part the failure or non-occurrence of the same is represented. An
example is presented in the diagram below.
The initiating event can be any major deviation, caused by equipment failure,
operational error, or human error. Depending on the technological safeguards of
the system, the circumstances and the reaction of the operators, the
consequences can be very different. For this reason, an AAS is recommended for
systems that have established security and emergency procedures to respond to
specific initiating events.

An event tree corresponding to an initiating event called "LPG leak in an area close
to storage tanks" is presented. The different accidental sequences and the
possible consequences of each of them are studied. Some of these consequences
do not carry any special danger, but others represent truly dangerous events, such
as BLEVE, UVCE or puddle fires.

Subsequent to this qualitative analysis, the estimation of the magnitude of each

event requires an analysis of consequences using appropriate calculation models,
capable of estimating the effects of the contemplated event.
The method can further be used to estimate the probabilities of occurrence of the
final event, assigning probability values to the incidental event and successive
probability values to each action listed in the tree.

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, FMEA: Failure Modes and

Effects Analysis, FMEA

The method consists of preparing tables or lists with the possible failures of
individual components, the failure modes, the detection and the effects of each
failure.

A failure can be identified as abnormal function of a component, function outside

the range of the component, premature function, etc.

The failures that can be considered are typically abnormal situations such as:

i. Open, when normally it should be closed

ii. Closed, when normally it should be open
iii. Walking, when normally it should be stopped
iv. Leaks, when it should normally be watertight

The effects are the result of the consideration of each of the failures identified
individually on the set of systems of the plant or installation.

The FMEA method finally establishes which individual failures can directly affect or
contribute significantly to the development of accidents of a certain importance in
the plant.

It is a valid method in the design, construction and operation stages and is usually
used as a prior phase to the development of fault trees, since it allows a good
understanding of the system. With certain limitations it can be used as an
alternative method to HAZOP.

The necessary team is usually two people perfectly aware of the functions of each
piece of equipment or system as well as the influence of these functions on the rest
of the process line. It is necessary for the correct execution of the method to have
lists of equipment and systems, knowledge of the functions of each equipment,
together with knowledge of the functions of the systems as a whole within the
plant.

It is possible to include in the last column of the work table what is called severity
index, which represents, on a scale from 1 to 4, a value that describes the severity
of the possible effects detected. A value of 1 would represent an event without
adverse effects; the 2 effects that do not require system stop; 3 risks of some
importance that require a normal stop and 4 immediate danger to personnel and
facilities, so an emergency stop is required. In this case, the analysis is called
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, FMECA (FMEC).

An example of a work form for the FMECA analysis applied to a tank cistern
discharge system is presented in the table below.
Conclusions

In the labor sector, many industries carry out various processes to transform raw
materials into useful products, and to do so, various operations are carried out
depending on the work area and the product to be made. However, in these
processes, most of the time accidents occur or there are chemical, physical or
biological risks caused by various factors (people, equipment, environment); These
risks can have consequences such as contamination of a production line, loss of
time and various complications when carrying out operations.

To avoid possible accidents and how it is cheaper to prevent than to fix, various
systems or methods were created that are responsible for detecting failures, errors,
deviations in equipment, facilities, processes, operations, etc. That could cause an
accident, and with all the information collected, obtain solutions to the problem
detected.

There are several generalized methods. The most important are:

1. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP or HACPP)

2. Functional operability analysis, HAZOP
3. Fault tree analysis, FTA
4. Analysis "What if...?"
5. Event tree analysis, ETA
6. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, FMEA

Each of these methods has particular characteristics that can be applied

depending on the situation and the process to be analyzed, but in general all of
them look for errors, failures or weak points in a given process and propose a
solution either to improve the process or get rid of possible accidents.

For these methods to work, the committed and active participation of the
company's staff and those in charge is necessary. In most methods, they propose
monitoring the proposals to see if they really work and being able to make the
necessary corrections if necessary, as well as training staff. They are very strict
processes and if done correctly, they are very useful when it comes to preventing
accidents, ensuring the health and safety of the worker, streamlining processes
and avoiding sanctions to the company for any irregularity.
References:

Chemical operations:
 x. GUARDINO et al. Safety and working conditions in the INSHT laboratory,
Barcelona, 1992
Critical points:
 GUIDE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE HAZARD ANALYSIS SYSTEM AND
CRITICAL CONTROL POINTS IN THE SPANISH BREWING SECTOR. (2005).
[online] Brewers of Spain. Available at:
http://www.cerveceros.org/pdf/documentoappcfinal.pdf [Accessed 22 Feb. 2017].
 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points Manual. (2012). [online] EMVASA.
Available at:
http://chfhonduras.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/Analisis%20de
%20Peligros%20y%20Puntos%20Criticos%20de%20Control.pdf [Accessed 22
Feb. 2017].
 HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEM AND
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 Zárate, E. (1999). Manual for the application of risk analysis, identification and
control of critical points in the purified water industry . [online] Undersecretary of
health regulation and promotion. Available at:
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[Accessed 22 Feb. 2017].

Hazop:
 quali_215. (2017). [online] Proteccioncivil.es. Available at:
http://www.proteccioncivil.es/catalogo/carpeta02/carpeta22/guiatec/
Metodos_cualitativos/cuali_215.htm [Accessed 22 Feb. 2017].
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RISK ANALYSIS. (2017). [online] Unizar.es. Available at:
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Ficheros/201a300/ntp_238.pdf [Accessed 22 Feb. 2017].
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 GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL PROTECTION. Technical guide. Qualitative
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Fault tree:
  quali_33. (2017). [online] Proteccioncivil.es. Available at:
http://www.proteccioncivil.es/catalogo/carpeta02/carpeta22/guiatec/
Metodos_cualitativos/cuali_33.htm [Accessed 22 Feb. 2017].
 Piqué Ardanuy, T. (1999). NTP 333: Probabilistic Risk Analysis: "Fault and Error
Tree" Methodology . [online] Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs Spain. Available
at: http://www.insht.es/InshtWeb/Contenidos/Documentacion/FichasTecnicas/
NTP/Ficheros/301a400/ntp_333.pdf [Accessed 22 Feb. 2017].
 Failure Analysis with Tree Diagrams. (2017). [online] The Texas Department of
Insurance Resource Center. Available at:
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/videoresourcessp/spstpfaulttree.pdf [Accessed 22
Feb. 2017].
Others:
 quant_252. (2017). [online] Proteccioncivil.es. Available at:
http://www.proteccioncivil.es/catalogo/carpeta02/carpeta22/guiatec/
Metodos_cuantitativos/cuant_252.htm [Accessed 22 Feb. 2017].
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http://www.proteccioncivil.es/catalogo/carpeta02/carpeta22/guiatec/
Metodos_cualitativos/cuali_216.htm [Accessed 22 Feb. 2017].
 GUIDE - Documentation - Serious accidents - GENERALIZED RISK ANALYSIS
METHODS. (2017). [online] Unizar.es. Available at:
https://www.unizar.es/guiar/1/Accident/An_riesgo/Met_gen.htm [Accessed 22 Feb.
2017].