COMBAT

AIRCRAFT 150 Andrew Fletcher

SPITFIRE
PHOTO-RECCE UNITS
OF WORLD WAR 2
150 SPITFIRE PHOTO‑RECCE UNITS
OF WORLD WAR 2
 SERIES EDITOR TONY HOLMES

150 Andrew Fletcher

SPITFIRE PHOTO‑RECCE
UNITS OF WORLD WAR 2
 Front Cover
OSPREY PUBLISHING On 29 May 1944 Flt Lt G R Crakanthorp of
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc No 542 Sqn was tasked with covering the
Kemp House, Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9PH, UK German North Sea ports in Spitfire PR XI
MB791. After refuelling at Coltishall, the
29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland pilot set course for Germany, where he
1385 Broadway, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA photographed Bremen, Hamburg and
E‑mail; [email protected] Wilhelmshaven from 37,000 ft without
incident. As he left the Wilhelmshaven area
www.ospreypublishing.com he observed what he identified as a Me 163
climbing rapidly at about 3000 ft per
OSPREY is a trademark of Osprey Publishing Ltd minute. Crakanthorp immediately began to
climb, and as he reached 41,000 ft the
enemy aircraft was only a few thousand
First published in Great Britain in 2023 feet below him. As he readied to turn into
This electronic edition published in 2023 by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc the anticipated attack, the exhaust plume
on the Me 163 stopped and it turned away
without gaining further height. He soon lost
© Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2023 sight of his pursuer and set course for
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted Coltishall to refuel.
Crakanthorp had encountered a Me 163
in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, of Erprobungskommando 16, based at Bad
recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior Zwischenahn. The rocket‑powered fighter
permission in writing from the publishers. had commenced combat trials earlier that
month, and this was the first known
instance of a PR Spitfire being intercepted
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. by the type. It seems likely that the Me 163
ran out of fuel just as the pilot was about to
commence his attack. Although it had a
ISBN: PB 9781472854612; eBook 9781472854629; ePDF 9781472854599; frighteningly high top speed and rate of
XML 9781472854605 climb, its endurance was very limited.
Fortunately for Crakanthorp, he had been
intercepted west of Wilhelmshaven, so the
Edited by Tony Holmes Me 163 was operating at the limit of its
Cover Artwork by Gareth Hector endurance and the extra few thousand feet
Aircraft Profiles by Jim Laurier he gained probably saved him from being
attacked (Cover artwork by Gareth Hector)
Index by Zoe Ross
Typeset by PDQ Digital Media Solutions, UK TITLE PAGES
Spitfire PR XI PM151 of Canadian‑manned
No 400 Sqn is seen between sorties at Petit
Osprey Publishing supports the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland Brogel (B90) during early April 1945. The
conservation charity. PR squadrons directly supporting Allied
armies on the Continent were constantly on
the move as they followed close on the
To find out more about our authors and books visit www.ospreypublishing.com. heels of the advancing troops. Many of their
Here you will find extracts, author interviews, details of forthcoming events and landing grounds were little more than
the option to sign up for our newsletter. muddy fields, but at Petit Brogel the airstrip,
taxiways and dispersals had been
constructed with pierced steel planking.
Acknowledgements This was an immediate hit with the pilots,
The Author gratefully acknowledges the assistance he has been given by the who found the surface very stable. This in
turn greatly aided taxiing, take‑offs and
following individuals – Peter Arnold, John Bendixsen, Karen Blais, John Blyth, landings (Author’s Collection)
Peter Brearley, Steve Brooking, Sally Brown, Roy Buchanan, Angus Clark, Michael
Cunliffe‑Lister, Marguerite Fewkes, Tim Fryer, Chris Goss, William Hogg, Tony
Hoskins, Roy Kenwright, Dave Lefurgey, Cherry Lenderink, Hans Nauta, Edward
McManus, Stephen Mitchell, Vicky Peterson, Mick Prendergast, Malcolm Ring,
Jimmy Taylor, Tricia Vincent, Dave Wadman, Nick Webb and Bill Williams.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 6
CHAPTER ONE

AN EXPERIMENTAL CONCEPT 9
CHAPTER TWO

EARLY OPERATIONS 21
CHAPTER THREE

STRATEGIC RECCE IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 47

CHAPTER FOUR

IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 62

CHAPTER FIVE

OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 74
APPENDICES 93
C O L O U R P L AT E S C O M M E N T A R Y 93
INDEX 96
6   Introduction

INTRODUCTION

F
ew aircraft have captured the imagination like the Supermarine Spitfire I PR Type A N3071 of the Special
Spitfire. Designed by Reginald Mitchell to fulfil an Air Ministry Survey Flight taxis at Nancy in December
1939. It was one of the first two Spitfires
specification for a high performance fighter aircraft, the Spitfire converted for the PR role. Using the
entered service with the Royal Air Force (RAF) from August 1938. Serving principles laid out in the Longbottom
throughout the conflict, the original design was constantly modified and Memorandum, N3071 was stripped of
excess weight to enable it to climb higher
upgraded, with numerous variants and marks appearing to maintain the and fly faster, and it also utilised a
type’s edge over Axis fighters. One role performed by the Spitfire that is non‑standard camouflage scheme to be
often overlooked is as a photographic‑reconnaissance (PR) platform. less conspicuous at altitude. N3071 carried
out the first successful PR Spitfire sortie of
Military commanders have always known the value of intelligence. If the war on 22 November 1939 when
you are able to ascertain your enemy’s intentions through observing his Flt Lt Maurice Longbottom photographed
activities and the disposition of his forces, you are always likely to be one Elsenborn, Eupen and Spa from 33,000 ft
(Author’s Collection)
step ahead of him, and thus counter his strategies. With the advent of the
aeroplane, it was to be expected that military minds would seek ways to
utilise this new technology.
The first use of aircraft during World War 1 was for tactical reconnaissance
(Tac/R) over the frontlines for the army. Initially, such operations were
undertaken by a pilot making observations and reporting what he had
seen when he landed. Soon, an observer was added, and it was not long
before hand‑held cameras were introduced to accurately record what was
being seen from the air. As the war progressed, great advances in aircraft
and camera technology were made, but photographic operations remained
largely tactical in nature, with flights limited to the battle area.
 7

At the end of World War 1 it was clear that aerial reconnaissance

had attained a level of importance that at the start of hostilities was
unimaginable. In the newly formed RAF, many valuable lessons had been
learned in respect to target selection, whilst the quality of the cameras,
and the photographs they took, had also greatly improved. Nevertheless,
it remained the fact that practically all reconnaissance efforts were in
support of the British Army, rather than in the pursuit of independent air
operations by the RAF.
In the mid‑1930s, as international tensions increased, the RAF’s efforts
to monitor Italian interests in Africa showed up many shortcomings in
how photographic demands were implemented and images obtained. In
the years leading up to the outbreak of World War 2, the British Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS) had taken an interest in PR as a means of
gathering intelligence on Germany. Through liaisons with their French
counterparts, three Lockheed 12A twin-engined aircraft were ordered and
former World War 1 pilot Frederick S Cotton recruited to carry out covert
operations. Under the guise of private company the Aeronautical Research
and Sales Corporation, it was planned that Australian Cotton and his
Canadian co‑pilot Robert H Niven would fly the aircraft around Germany
obtaining photographs of military and industrial installations.
From spring 1939 until the end of August, Cotton and Niven flew
a series of sorties over Germany, as well as over Italian territories in the
Mediterranean and East Africa, where they took numerous photographs
of potential targets.
It was during the course of the Italian sorties in June that Cotton and
Niven made the acquaintance of Flg Off Maurice V Longbottom, a pilot
with No 202 Sqn based at Malta. Longbottom took a keen interest in the
methods employed by Cotton and Niven, and accompanied them on one
of their sorties. At the end of the month Longbottom returned to Britain
and was attached to the Air Ministry in London, where he was involved
with the analysis of the photographs obtained on the Italian sorties. Whilst
in London Longbottom met frequently with Cotton and Niven, where
they discussed at length how to perfect their PR techniques.
With his attachment to the Air Ministry coming to an end, Longbottom
submitted a memorandum which formalised the trio’s ideas. The
document was to prove prescient in that it concluded that in order to
obtain photographs from deep within hostile territory, an aircraft would
have to operate at great height and speed so as to avoid interception. It
duly advocated the use of the most advanced single‑engined fighter type
then available to the RAF, the Spitfire. These machines would be stripped
of all excess weight and have fixed camera installations, increased fuel
capacity and a special camouflage scheme to render them less conspicuous
at altitude.
Using the principles set out in the Longbottom Memorandum, PR in
the RAF during World War 2 evolved from an experimental concept into
the primary means of gathering intelligence. As envisioned, the aircraft
that proved this concept was the Spitfire, with PR variants of the famous
fighter ranging across both Europe and, ultimately, other theatres. Relying
on their superior performance, plus the ability of their pilots to avoid
detection and interception, they penetrated deep into enemy territory in
8   Introduction

order to bring back photographs that specialist interpreters could scrutinise

to determine the enemy’s activities.
Initially formed as an experimental development flight, the Photographic
Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) grew from a small clandestine flight of the SIS
into an operational group fulfilling the photographic requirements of not
just the RAF but many other varied agencies from the Admiralty and War
Office to the Ministry of Economic Warfare. As demands for the PRU’s
services grew, and better versions of the Spitfire became available, new
reconnaissance units were formed, both at home and overseas, to meet the
ever-growing requirement for aerial intelligence.
Initially limited to operating from Britain, PR Spitfires finally began
to be permanently issued to overseas units from 1942. Their superior
performance had an immediate impact, with Spitfires operating from Malta
and North Africa helping keep watch on German and Italian forces in the
Mediterranean. Further afield in Southeast Asia, Spitfires flying over vast
tracts of jungle in Burma monitored the movements of Japanese troops.
As the tide of war slowly turned against the Axis powers, and in
preparation for the return of Allied armies to German‑occupied Europe,
an expansion and reorganisation of PR assets took place, with units being
allocated to directly fulfil the needs of the forces that would be fighting on
the Continent. In parallel with the evolution of the RAF’s PR organisation,
the Spitfire was gradually improved with the fitment of better cameras and
increased range and performance. This latter proved vital, especially for
those aircraft operating over Europe, as the Luftwaffe made great efforts
to intercept reconnaissance aircraft.
The latest marks of the reconnaissance Spitfire were able to maintain a
performance advantage for the most part, even though their pilots were
always in great danger. With the appearance of German jet and rocket
fighters at the end of 1944, it is notable that Spitfires were far more likely
to survive in areas where these types were known to be active compared to
other Allied reconnaissance aircraft.
Serving until the very end of the conflict, PR Spitfires allowed the
Allies to carefully monitor the activities of the Axis powers and plan the
conduct of the war accordingly. The contribution these aircraft, the men
that flew them and the organisation behind their operation made to the
Allied victory is out of all proportion to the relatively small number of
PR Spitfires that were built.
 9

C H A P T E R ON E

AN EXPERIMENTAL CONCEPT

S
Flt Lt ‘Shorty’ Longbottom taxis Spitfire I hortly after Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939,
PR Type A N3071 directly into a hangar at the Air Ministry approved a plan to develop and expand the SIS
Nancy. The Special Survey Flight relocated
here from Coulommiers in early December Flight under the auspices of the RAF. The excellent results achieved
1939 in order to be better placed to cover by the flight and the ideas laid out in the Longbottom paper had not gone
the German frontier. Poor weather initially unnoticed. Formation of a new experimental unit was authorised around
limited operations, and it was not until
21 December that two successful sorties the nucleus of the SIS Flight, it being based at Heston aerodrome, then in
photographed targets between Bitburg and Middlesex. On 23 September the SIS Flight was formally handed over to
Saarbrücken (Author’s Collection) the Air Ministry and was henceforth known as the Heston Flight.
During the remainder of September and into October personnel
establishment was brought up to strength, with the first two pilots being
Niven and Longbottom, although it was 13 October before the first
Spitfire (N3069) was received. Modification began immediately, with all
guns and armour removed to save weight as well as the wireless and any
other unnecessary equipment. The aircraft was camouflaged in ‘Camotint’,
a pale duck egg green. A second example, N3071, arrived a few days later
and was likewise modified.
Both aircraft were then sent to the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE)
for further modification. Here, each side of the sliding canopy hood was
fitted with a blister to enable better visibility and a standard F24 camera
with a five‑inch focal length lens installed vertically in each wing, the
cameras being operated by a control unit in the cockpit. Subsequent tests
revealed that the top speed had been increased to 390 mph – a significant
10 C H A P T E R O N E An Experimental Concept

improvement on the standard fighter. In order to

increase the Spitfire’s modest radius of operation
Cotton had requested that an additional fuel tank
be fitted, but no such installation was made on
the grounds that it would affect the handling
characteristics of the aircraft.
On 1 November the Heston Flight was
re‑designated No 2 Camouflage Unit in an effort
to disguise its true purpose. As the Spitfires lacked
the range to reach German targets from Britain,
Cotton set about planning operations from
France. On 5 November a small detachment,
known as the Special Survey Flight, was sent to
Lille/Seclin to work directly under the Air Officer
Commanding‑in‑Chief (AOC‑in‑C) No 1 Air
Mission, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt.
On the 20th the flight began a move to a new
base at Coulommiers. It was planned that Flt Lt
Longbottom would fly the first operational sortie,
to cover the German frontier around Aachen,
on this date and land at the new airfield. Taking
off from Seclin in the morning, Longbottom (in
N3071) headed for Germany, where he found his
objectives obscured by cloud. With no prospect of
the conditions improving, Longbottom returned to France. Flt Lt Bob Niven climbs into the cockpit of a
On the 22nd Longbottom was again briefed to cover the Aachen area. Camotint Green Spitfire I PR Type B at
Heston. He was one of the first two
This time he flew N3071 from Coulommiers to Bar‑le‑Duc to refuel operational pilots of the Heston Flight who,
before heading towards his objectives. Despite haze obscuring targets on together with Longbottom, proved the
the German side of the border, he succeeded in covering Eupen, Elsenborn concept of high‑speed, high‑altitude
photographic reconnaissance. As the PDU
and Spa, all in neutral Belgium, from 33,000 ft, before landing back at expanded, Niven was responsible for
Bar‑le‑Duc to refuel after a flying time of 1 hr 40 min. Although his training many of the unit’s new pilots
photographs were somewhat hazy and their small scale made interpretation (Author’s Collection)
of detail difficult, the results were generally satisfactory.
On 5 December the Special Survey Flight relocated to Nancy, but it
was to be the 21st before any success was achieved. In a sortie lasting 85
minutes, Flt Lt Niven succeeded in covering targets between Wittlich and
Saarbrücken. Within 25 minutes of landing the aircraft was again airborne,
this time flown by Longbottom, who photographed Trier, Bitburg and
Waxweiler. New Year’s Day of 1940 saw Niven succeed in covering targets
in the Kaiserslautern area, but he had a lucky escape the following day;
‘I spotted fighters over Trier at 25,000 ft so turned south to Saarbrücken,
which was reached at 32,000 ft. Started cameras and flew to Kaiserslautern
and then along the Rhine to [Bad] Kreuznach. While trying to retrieve
my map from the floor I passed out. Regained consciousness at 15,000 ft
with aircraft in a spin but unable to regain control until 3000 ft. By this
time I had spun over 60 miles out of control and was finally level over
Saarbrücken.’
Niven’s blackout was caused by his oxygen hose becoming detached
when he lent forward to pick up his map, hypoxia quickly causing him
to lose consciousness. On the 10th he took off to cover targets in the
 11

Saarbrücken area but was intercepted by four Bf 109s near Rohrbach.

Niven was chased back to the frontier near Trier before he was finally able
to lose his pursuers. This proved to be the last sortie of the Special Survey
Flight, for the unit was then ordered to return to Heston.
In a little over two months Spitfire N3071 had undertaken 15 sorties, ten
of which had been successful. Poor weather had kept the aircraft grounded
for much of the time, but the photographs that were obtained covered
targets for the Air Ministry, RAF Bomber Command, the Advanced Air
Striking Force (AASF), the Air Component of the British Expeditionary
Force (BEF) and extensive coverage of the Siegfried Line for the French.
Although the imagery was small in size, and N3071’s limited range
restricted the area over which photography could be carried out, the Special
Survey Flight had clearly demonstrated what could be achieved. As well
as proving the concept of high‑speed, high‑altitude PR, much valuable
operational experience had been gained. Pilots would need to keep a
constant watch for contrails forming from their own machines, for they
pointed out their exact position to the enemy.
The physiological effects of flying regularly at altitude in an unheated
and unpressurised cockpit had also been encountered for the first time,
with the extreme cold making even simple actions difficult. A more
plentiful supply of oxygen was also needed. The pilot’s problems did not
end once on the ground, for Niven and Longbottom both frequently
experienced drowsiness, joint pains and headaches, especially if flying on
consecutive days.
One of the earliest innovations for When comparing the results of the Special Survey Flight to those of
PR Spitfires was the incorporation of a
teardrop fairing on either side of the sliding the existing forces allocated to PR at the outbreak of war, the findings
canopy hood to give the pilot a better view are stark. Since 3 September 1939 the Blenheim IVs of No 2 Group,
behind and below. It increased his chances RAF Bomber Command, had been undertaking PR sorties over northwest
of locating targets from high altitude and
helped him with the spotting of intercepting Germany. These were soon joined by Blenheim IV squadrons of the Air
fighters approaching from the rear. The Component, BEF, which were attempting to cover targets in western
teardrop fairing remained in use with Germany. In a period of operations lasting roughly twice as long as those of
PR Spitfires until the introduction of the
bulged Malcolm Hood fitted to the Spitfire the Special Survey Flight, seven squadrons of Blenheim IVs only managed
PR XI (Author’s Collection) to cover approximately half the area of the former and, in the process, lost
17 aircraft. In contrast, one specially
modified Spitfire with a much shorter
range had achieved some excellent
results with a much higher success rate
and no losses.
At a conference held at the Air
Ministry in January it was concluded
that the best way of carrying out
strategic reconnaissance was to use a
small number of aircraft of the highest
possible performance such that enemy
fighters were incapable of intercepting
them, and that the achievements of the
Special Survey Flight warranted further
development.
Meanwhile, Cotton had finally
persuaded the RAE to allow for an
12 C H A P T E R O N E An Experimental Concept

increase in Spitfire fuel capacity, which resulted in N3069 having

an additional 29‑gallon tank installed behind the cockpit. The F24
cameras also had their five‑inch lenses replaced with ones of eight‑inch
focal length, thereby greatly increasing the scale of the images
produced. Finally, the armoured windscreen was removed in an effort
to save further weight. These modifications addressed two of the main
lessons learned from operating in France, namely the small scale of the
photographs produced and the limited radius of action – the additional
fuel increased the maximum range to 750 miles. The new variant was
christened the PR Type B, with the previous version retrospectively
labelled the Type A.

PDU
On 17 January 1940, No 2 Camouflage Unit became the Photographic
Development Unit (PDU). Remaining experimental in nature, it was
realised that much work would be necessary before the unit could be
increased in size to fulfil all of the RAF’s strategic PR needs, but from this
time onwards expansion was rapid. The increased range of the Type B
meant that efforts could now be made to cover German targets directly
from Britain. Such operations would still entail refuelling at a forward base,
but it brought the prospect of regular coverage of the German North Sea
ports for the Admiralty.
In addition, the War Office had an urgent task in support of the
BEF, where coverage of Belgium was required for the update of maps.
Flt Lt Niven duly flew N3071 over to Lille/Seclin on the 18th in
preparation for the required survey. The next day he attempted to obtain
a mosaic of central Belgium, only to find most of his objectives obscured by
cloud. He did, however, succeed in covering eastern sections of the country.
During January the operational element at Heston became known as
‘N’ Flight and the detachment on the Continent as the PDU (Overseas).
On 10 February Longbottom set off for Wilhelmshaven in N3069 after
refuelling at Debden. He made two runs over the port before photographing
Schillig Roads, Wangerooge and Emden. With all objectives covered, he set
course for home, landing back at Heston 3 hr 20 min after leaving Debden.
Not only was this the first successful Spitfire PR sortie undertaken from
Britain, it was also the longest in duration.
Another significant event to occur on the 10th was the authorisation of
a new establishment which expanded the size of the organisation based in
France. To be known as No 212 Sqn, it called for three operational flights
of two Spitfires. Although the new unit would be subject to the operational
control of AOC‑in‑C British Air Forces in France (BAFF), it was still very
much a part of the PDU.
That same day Flt Lts Niven (N3117) and L E Clark (N3071) flew
to Seclin, where they were joined by Flg Off C D Milne and Flt Lt H C
MacPhail, the latter being given command of the squadron by Cotton.
On the 12th, Clark (N3071) successfully carried out the new squadron’s
first operational sortie when he covered objectives in central Belgium.
At this stage the unit was still very much short of aircraft and pilots but
best efforts were made to complete the survey of Belgium. Two successful
 13

sorties were flown the next day,

but all three attempted on the
14th were unsuccessful. After
this the weather deteriorated,
stopping operations until the
start of March.
At Heston, the PDU was under
pressure for more coverage of the
German ports, although the poor
conditions made opportunities
for photography rare. On 24
February Niven flew Spitfire
N3116 on its first operational
sortie, having been tasked
with obtaining photographs
of industrial installations at
Duisburg for RAF Bomber
Command. Again, cloud forced
him to abandon the sortie.
A split pair of F24 cameras in a Spitfire I As the PDU and its overseas offshoot, No 212 Sqn, began to grow
PR Type C. Located in the starboard wing, in size, the need arose for a senior officer to act as Cotton’s second in
each camera was equipped with an
eight‑inch focal length lens and slightly command. As his first deputy MacPhail had been appointed to command
offset from the vertical, one to port and one No 212 Sqn in France, it was desirable that an officer be appointed to
to starboard, in order to produce a wider control operations from Heston. At the end of February Sqn Ldr Geoffrey
field of view to cover a greater area. The
Type C was also the first variant to Tuttle was appointed to the position.
introduce a long focal length camera in the On 2 March Niven (N3116) successfully covered targets in the Ruhr.
rear fuselage (Author’s Collection) These photographs, which were the first of the area taken during wartime,
proved to be of excellent quality and were used extensively to update RAF
Bomber Command target dossiers. A second successful sortie was flown
from Heston, with new pilot Flt Lt E C Le Mesurier (N3069) obtaining
photographs of Emden and Wilhelmshaven. Poor weather then reduced
operational flying, although training sorties from Heston were still able
to continue. This allowed Flg Offs S L Ring, C M Wheatley and I G
Richmond, all of whom were former Battle pilots from the AASF in
France, to convert onto the Spitfire.
Of more significance was the delivery of Spitfire P9308. This machine
was the latest variant of PR Spitfire, designated the PR Type C. Through
the fitment of an extra 30‑gallon fuel tank in a bulged fairing beneath the
port wing, the aircraft’s maximum range had been increased to 1100 miles,
with a safe range of about 900 miles. To act as a counterweight to the tank,
the two F24 cameras were moved to a fairing under the starboard wing. To
allow for the extra flying time permitted by the increased fuel, additional
oxygen was carried and an extra large oil tank was installed in the nose. The
latter required the fitting of a deeper engine cowling to enclose the tank.
It was also proposed to fit the PR Type C with a vertical camera with
a long focal length lens in the rear fuselage. However, for this to be
accommodated, the run for the flying control linkages needed to be altered.
Due to the urgent operational need for greater range, this modification was
not initially incorporated in P9308, although the vertical camera would
soon become standard in the PR Type C.
14 C H A P T E R O N E An Experimental Concept

On 16 March No 212 Sqn

received a directive from HQ
BAFF with a requirement for
coverage of the Rhine between the
Dutch frontier and Düsseldorf
to look for evidence of troop
concentrations in advance of an
invasion, but numerous sorties
were all unsuccessful due to the
conditions. Two flights were
made from Heston on the 22nd,
however, with Flt Lt Le Mesurier
using P9308 to complete the first
operational sortie undertaken in
a Type C. Tasked with obtaining
damage assessment (D/A)
photographs of the airfield and seaplane base at Sylt, he ultimately had to No 212 Sqn’s Flg Off Ian Richmond is seen
abandon his effort due to cloud. Although the sortie was unsuccessful, it in conversation with Wg Cdr Sidney Cotton
(right). On 29 March 1940, Richmond
was the longest in duration and distance yet undertaken, with no refuelling (in Type B N3117) was tasked with covering
stop being necessary. targets in eastern Belgium, but after
Whilst Le Mesurier was airborne, Flg Off Wheatley was refuelling observing approaching contrails he aborted
his flight. Whilst attempting to return to
N3069, the first Type B, at Stradishall in West Suffolk, from where Lille/Seclin, he had difficulty pin‑pointing his
he was airborne at 1115 hrs. His objective on this day was the River position and, running low on fuel, attempted
Rhine from the Dutch frontier to the Ruhr. However, as he crossed into to land at Laval. However, his aircraft hit
soft ground and nosed over. Damage to
Germany at 33,000 ft near Kleve his aircraft was making heavy contrails. N3117 was minimal, but Cotton was not
Two Bf 109E‑1s were scrambled from the nearby airfield at Bönninghardt impressed and within days Richmond had
to intercept. Although one fighter struggled to reach Wheatley’s altitude, been posted back to one of the AASF’s
Battle squadrons (Author’s Collection)
the other was just able to get level with the Spitfire. Unable to match its
speed, the pilot opened fire at long range. The Spitfire immediately went
into a steep dive and was followed down by the Bf 109. At about 16,000 ft
Wheatley bailed out, but his parachute did not open and his body fell on
the German side of the border.
Flg Off Claude Mervyn Wheatley was the first pilot to be killed flying
a PR Spitfire on operations. The circumstances of his loss show the
difficulties experienced by the Germans in trying to intercept a fast‑moving
aircraft at great altitude, but also the dangers posed by contrail formation
which negated one of the main advantages that a high‑flying Spitfire relied
on – stealth.
On 28 March Le Mesurier set another duration record in P9308. In
a flight lasting 3 hr 45 min, he carried out the first successful sortie in a
Type C when he photographed Cuxhaven from 32,000 ft. As he attempted
to cover Wilhelmshaven, he observed a flight of fighters in a tight spiral
climb. Not wanting to risk interception, Le Mesurier aborted his run
over the port. Three sorties were flown from Seclin the next day. Two
were abandoned due to cloud, and Flg Off Richmond (N3117), who
was attempting to cover eastern Belgium, observed a contrail approaching
when he was southwest of Liège and aborted his flight. Running low on
fuel, he landed at Laval, but at the end of his landing run the aircraft hit
soft ground and nosed over. Richmond was not hurt and the damage to
N3117 was minimal.
 15

This also proved to be the last sortie flown in connection with the
Belgium survey. The photographs previously obtained allowed an almost
complete mosaic of the whole country to be constructed, facilitating the
preparation of new maps. The flight at Seclin could now concentrate on
trying to cover the Rhine, the task being extended to include another
section of the river stretching to Mainz. It was notable during this period
that the Luftwaffe had intensified its efforts to intercept the high‑flying
Spitfires, but provided a pilot was careful not to produce contrails and kept
a keen lookout, he could usually avoid interception.
An increase in aircraft and pilots enabled No 212 Sqn to form a second
operational flight at this time. Known as ‘B’ Flight, it was to operate from
Nancy, with the flight at Seclin henceforth known as ‘A’ Flight. ‘B’ Flight
was initially tasked with covering targets in southwestern Germany, and
it was able to carry out two successful sorties on 7 April. Flt Lt Clark
covered sections of the River Rhine and River Main and Flg Off A L Taylor
photographed the Rhine from Speyer to Sandhofen.
A brief lull in flying at Heston enabled the modification of P9308 to
be completed with the installation of a rear vertical camera in the guise of
an Eagle IV with a 21‑inch focal length lens. The latter would produce
images of a much larger scale. On 6 April Flt Lt Le Mesurier (P9308) was
No 212 Sqn personnel work on the port tasked with covering Wilhelmshaven. Although conditions were hazy, he
F24 camera of a Spitfire I PR Type B in was able to take photographs of Emden and Wilhelmshaven that included
France. The Type B introduced lenses of up
to eight inches in focal length. In order to 61 exposures with the Eagle IV.
accommodate the longer lenses in the wing The next day Longbottom (P9308) attempted to cover Kiel. As he began
it was necessary to house the installation in his run down the Kieler Förde the starboard‑inclined F24 and Eagle IV
a bulged fairing. Cpl Rawlinson (right) was
known as the ‘camera wizard’ due to his cameras failed. Fortunately, the other F24 continued to work, and he was
technical prowess (Author’s Collection) able to cover Kiel and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. As he approached the end
of the canal at Brunsbüttel, he sighted
an enemy aircraft only 1000 ft below
him. He immediately accelerated,
with the enemy aircraft giving chase,
but contact was lost near Heligoland
and he was able to fly home, setting
a new duration record of 3 hr 50 min
in the process.
Analysis of Longbottom’s
photographs revealed a large number
of naval and merchant vessels in
the port and roadstead. Likewise,
images of the airfield at Holtenau
showed numerous aircraft, many
of them transports or bombers. It
was not known at the time, but the
high concentration of shipping and
aircraft presaged the invasion of
Denmark and Norway only two days
later. On 11 April No 212 Sqn’s ‘A’
Flight moved to Meaux/Villenoy,
where its activities would continue
to be focused on the Rhine and the
16 C H A P T E R O N E An Experimental Concept

zone between the Ruhr and the Dutch border. Pilots were looking for any
activity indicating preparation for an invasion.
On the 12th, No 212 Sqn and its parent unit the PDU had new
establishments approved. ‘N’ Flight at Heston, which to date had been
operating a single Spitfire with only two pilots, was increased to ten
pilots and eight Spitfires. No 212 Sqn was scaled for four pilots and three
Spitfires for each of its flights.
The activities of ‘B’ Flight at Nancy were curtailed by the weather, and it
was not until 19 April that further successful sorties were flown when Clark
covered the Mannheim area and Milne photographed Karlsruhe and the
Rhine. The 21st saw Milne (N3116) make an attempt at the Brenner Pass,
but poor weather prevented coverage of the objective. In a sortie lasting
three hours, he did manage to cover Friedrichshafen, however.
On his second sortie of the day Milne (N3071) attempted to cover
sections of the Neckar, Main and Danube. Whilst carrying out a run along
the River Neckar southeast of Stuttgart, he failed to notice his aircraft was
producing a contrail that allowed two Bf 109s to creep up from behind.
The initial bounce damaged Milne’s engine, and although he tried to make
for the French border he was repeatedly attacked until his engine stopped.
He succeeded in bailing out and was immediately captured. N3071 was
the original Type A that had made the first ever successful reconnaissance
sortie by a Spitfire back in November 1939, although it had since been
upgraded to Type B standard.
At the very end of April No 212 Sqn was able to form its third flight.
‘C’ Flight would be based at Lille/Seclin, where it was tasked with trying
to obtain additional cover of Belgian targets. ‘C’ Flight flew its first sortie
on 2 May, when Flg Off S G Wise (P9307) attempted to cover eastern
Belgium but thick cloud obscured his target area.
Eight days later the Germans launched their long anticipated attack in
the West. However, the main thrust was not across the Belgian Plain as
expected but further south through the Ardennes region. The build up
of German forces had escaped detection by the French, whose strategic
reconnaissance assets were responsible for coverage of the area. Like the
conventional units of the RAF, the aircraft used by the Armée de l’Air were
unable to successfully discharge this duty.
As previously planned, the BEF, as part of the French 1st Army
Group, advanced into Belgium not yet aware that the main German
threat lay to their south. With news of the German attack, No 212 Sqn’s
outlying flights at Lille/Seclin and Nancy were recalled to Meaux/
Villenoy. Three sorties were flown from Meaux on the 10th aimed
at covering enemy troop movements in northeastern Belgium. In
the morning, Flg Off A J Blackwell (P9331) and Flt Lt L D Wilson
(P9396) successfully covered the area between Mézières and Liège, with
Blackwell avoiding the attention of two Bf 109s. In the afternoon Flg
Off Taylor succeeded in taking photographs of Mézières, Bastogne,
Herenthals and Brussels.
By 14 May it had become evident that the German advance through
the Ardennes between Namur and Sedan was threatening to drive a wedge
between the French 1st and 2nd Army Groups, and thus unhinge the
whole Allied line in northern France.
 17

Although the German advance fell within the area of responsibility

of the French HQ, BAFF was well aware of the inability of the Armée
de l’Air to obtain aerial photographs of the frontline. Given the gravity
of the situation, it began to despatch sorties to the area, with the first
flown that day when future ace Flg Off G P Christie succeeded in
photographing Namur and the Meuse bridges to Liège and Maastricht.
Later that morning Taylor successfully carried out a D/A sortie to the
area west of the Ruhr following an attack by RAF Bomber Command
on communication centres aimed at disrupting German reinforcements.
On 21 May Christie did a run along the River Oise between Chauny and
Guise and the River Sambre at Landrecies to ascertain the condition of the
bridges that had been attacked the previous night by RAF bombers. His
initial run was carried out at 31,000 ft, but on the return leg he dropped
down to 9000 ft to obtain larger‑scale images of the bridges, many of
which were still intact.
For the British, the evacuation of the BEF from the Channel ports now
became top priority. Flg Off Taylor flew a very successful sortie on the
last day of the month when he photographed more than 60 bridges on
the River Meuse between Givet and Sedan. Analysis of his photographs
showed that although 28 had been destroyed, there were a further 34
intact or only lightly damaged. Five sorties were flown from Meaux on
4 June, of which four were successful. All were connected with covering
targets associated with the German advance in France except for the sortie
flown by Taylor, who covered the Saarbrücken area and the Rhine between
Mainz and Karlsruhe.
With the surrender of the last Allied troops at Dunkirk on the 4th,
the Germans turned their attentions to the remainder of France, with
No 212 Sqn continuing to be tasked with mostly tactical targets. On
the 6th Taylor photographed the Somme between Abbeville and Amiens
before covering Péronne and Chauny. Flying P9385, he had taken off from
Heston and after photographing his objectives landed at Meaux.
At the request of the French HQ, BAFF tasked No 212 Sqn with
covering the railway lines from Aulnoye to Maastricht and up to Venlo
which formed the main German supply route across Belgium and into
France. Two sorties were attempted on the 7th to fulfil this requirement.
The first was undertaken by Flt Lt Wilson (P9331), who successfully
covered Aulnoye, Charleroi and Liège, but after the latter his cameras ran
away and he returned to Meaux.
Later in the afternoon Flg Off Blackwell, in the same aircraft, attempted
to cover the remaining target areas. After climbing to 30,000 ft he crossed
into Belgium on course for Liège, and whilst navigating, his map slipped
and in his efforts to pick it up Blackwell detached his oxygen supply and
quickly passed out. Regaining consciousness at 8000 ft, and unable to
pin‑point his position, he flew south. Running short on fuel, and with his
engine temperature rising due to a coolant leak, Blackwell was forced to
land at Rheims/Champagne despite the French having placed obstructions
on the airfield. Skilfully landing between the obstacles, the pilot had to
abandon his aircraft as it could not be immediately repaired.
Efforts to get P9331 airworthy were unsuccessful, with the RAF
eventually requesting that the French destroy the aircraft to avoid it
18 C H A P T E R O N E An Experimental Concept

falling into German hands. Sadly, this

is exactly what happened, with P9331
being captured intact when the enemy
captured the airfield.
9 June saw No 212 Sqn forced to
evacuate Meaux as the advancing
German troops threatened to cross the
Seine west of Paris. No operational
sorties were flown that day, as the unit
moved to its new base at Orléans/Bricy.
On the 10th, future ace Flt Lt J A Kent
flew the first sortie from Bricy when
he successfully covered the River Seine
between Rouen and Mantes‑la‑Jolie.
By the 14th the Germans were only 20
miles west of Orléans, so orders were
given to withdraw to Poitiers.
Taylor carried out the last operational
sortie by No 212 Sqn from northern France when he made a low‑level Future ace Flt Lt Johnny Kent climbs into
attempt at covering the Seine and Eure. His aircraft, P9453, was a hybrid the cockpit of a PR Spitfire at Heston in
June 1940. He was one of a small number
which had been modified to carry a split pair of F24 cameras with of early recruits to the PDU whose
eight‑inch lenses in the rear fuselage along with a 29‑gallon fuel tank, background was on fighters. It was found
although the Spitfire was unique in that it retained the eight 0.303‑inch that in general fighter pilots lacked the
navigational abilities and temperament to
Browning machine guns of the standard fighter. His photographs showed make good PR pilots. Kent, who was an
that although many road and rail bridges had been destroyed, a number experienced pre‑war aviator and test pilot,
were still intact, and that the Germans were busy building new ones. His proved to be the exception to the rule, flying
a number of successful sorties with the
photographic run completed, Taylor headed north and landed at Heston. PDU/No 212 Sqn before returning to fighter
The remnants of No 212 Sqn only remained at Poitiers for 48 hours operations with Polish‑manned No 303 Sqn
before ultimately moving to La Rochelle, from where the last of the in late July 1940 (Author’s Collection)
personnel were evacuated back to Britain and the squadron disbanded.

PDU OPERATIONS
For the PDU at Heston, the German invasion of France and the Low
Countries would mean an extension of the coastline they would have to
cover. The operations of ‘N’ Flight would continue to be focused on the
German North Sea ports, and to this would be added coverage of the
Dutch Frisian Islands and ports which the Admiralty feared would now
be used as forward bases by the Kriegsmarine. On 19 May ‘N’ Flight
carried out five such sorties, with four successfully obtaining photographs
of numerous targets in Germany and the Netherlands. However, the PDU
also suffered its second Spitfire loss of the war when Plt Off J H Coleman
(P9308) failed to return from his attempt to cover Hamburg and Bremen,
his aircraft, the original Type C, crashing at Templeuve, in Belgium.
Developments on the Continent now resulted in ‘N’ Flight also being
tasked with flying sorties to France in support of the BEF, which was
falling back to the Channel ports. With the situation in France rapidly
deteriorating, the evacuation of the BEF began on the 27th. For the next
nine days ‘N’ Flight’s activities would for the most part be focused on
trying to cover enemy troop movements and positions, as well as airfields
 19

Spitfire I PR Type C P9385 was delivered to and ports that could be utilised by the Germans to launch attacks on the
the PDU in the spring of 1940 and used on vessels trying to ferry Allied troops back to Britain.
both deployments of ‘D’ Flight No 212 Sqn
to southern France for the coverage of Once Dunkirk had fallen, operations flown from Heston returned to
Italian targets. It remained on operations those of a mainly strategic nature, with a period of good weather allowing
with No 1 PRU until November 1941 when a number of successful high‑altitude missions to be undertaken. On 5
the aircraft was relegated to a training role
(Author’s Collection) June Flg Off Ring covered ports and airfields in northwest Germany
from 32,500 ft. His photographs showed the German capital ships
Tirpitz and Admiral Scheer present at Wilhelmshaven. On the same day
Flt Lt P Corbishley covered most of the ports and airfields along the
coast from Calais to Zeebrugge, before photographing Antwerp and then
returning home.
As No 212 Sqn was occupied with the German assault on the Low
Countries and northern France, a newly formed detachment from the
squadron prepared to commence operations against Italy. Early in 1940
the Air Ministry had concluded that in the likely event that Italy was to
enter the war on the side of Germany, it would be necessary to attack key
strategic targets including naval bases and the industrial centres of the
north. It was intended that aircraft based in the south of France would
commence operations once Italy entered the war. For this force to be able
to act immediately it was imperative that up to date target information
be available, and it was for this purpose that ‘D’ Flight of No 212 Sqn
was formed.
As Italy was technically still neutral, great care would have to be taken
not to draw attention to any operations conducted in the gathering of
aerial intelligence. Like the Belgian survey carried out in March, the
high‑speed, high‑altitude PR techniques of the PDU/No 212 Sqn offered
the best chance of success.
On 11 May Flt Lt Longbottom flew down to Le Luc, in the south of
France, which had been chosen due to its proximity to the Royal Navy
detachment at Hyères, where film processing facilities were available. On the
morning of the 12th Longbottom carried out the first sortie by ‘D’ Flight
20 C H A P T E R O N E An Experimental Concept

when he successfully covered the Franco‑Italian frontier and the ports in the
western half of the Gulf of Genoa.
Due to the progress of the German attack in the Low Countries it
was decided to recall ‘D’ Flight, but before leaving two more successful
sorties were flown. On the morning of the 14th Flt Lt Le Mesurier
(P9308) covered numerous targets in the Milan and Como areas before
landing at Bastia, on the island of Corsica. From here, Longbottom
flew across Italy, where he photographed Bari, on the Adriatic coast.
The next day, Longbottom and Le Mesurier flew back to Meaux and
then on to Heston. In just three days they had flown seven successful
sorties and covered the most likely routes of advance by the Regio
Esercito into France, the two big industrial centres of Milan and Turin,
most of the ports in the Gulf of Genoa and the port of Bari and its
oil refineries.
As the situation in northern France was reaching a critical juncture,
and it was increasingly likely that Italy was about to enter the war, the
Air Ministry ordered a resumption of the Italian sorties. On 27 May
Le Mesurier landed at Le Luc in P9385, a new Type C Spitfire. The
next day he carried out the first sortie of ‘D’ Flight’s second deployment
when he covered Genoa and Le Spezia. Over the course of the next nine
days Le Mesurier and Flg Off D F B Sheen (another future ace) flew ten
successful sorties covering all of their objectives in northern Italy. ‘D’ Flight
began operating from Ajaccio, on Corsica, from 8 June in order to cover
objectives in the south of Italy.
On the 10th, Italy declared war on Britain and France, and it was
thought prudent to withdraw ‘D’ Flight back to the French mainland.
On the 15th Sheen carried out the last sortie of the detachment when he
successfully photographed La Spezia, Pisa, Genoa and Savona. With the
French in general retreat in the north of the country, ‘D’ Flight was recalled
back to Britain. During the second deployment to the south of France
‘D’ Flight flew 22 sorties, of which 20 were successful, with all primary
objectives being covered at least once.
The achievements of the PDU and No 212 Sqn during the period
from the start of the German offensive against the Low Countries up to
the withdrawal of No 212 Sqn from France were out of all proportion
to the resources employed. During a 40‑day period with only a handful
of serviceable Type B/C Spitfires, 120 operational sorties were flown,
of which 95 were successful. For the loss of only two aircraft and one
pilot, target information was gathered on German and Italian ports and
industrial sites and tactical information collected on behalf of Allied forces
fighting on the Continent.
Although excellent results had been achieved against strategic objectives,
this was not always the case with tactical targets. Great efforts were made
to photograph troop movements and positions, even though this type of
work was not well suited to high‑altitude reconnaissance. Towards the end
of the campaign a number of sorties were conducted at low‑level in order to
obtain large‑scale photographs. Although these operations exposed pilots
to greater risk, such was the urgency of the task that any potential danger
was offset by the increased chances of success. Using this method a number
of very successful sorties were flown.
 21

CHAPTER TWO

EARLY OPERATIONS

W
Following the disbandment of No 212 Sqn ith the withdrawal of No 212 Sqn back to Heston and its
after its withdrawal from France, two new disbandment on 18 June, the Air Ministry took the opportunity
flights were formed within the PDU for
detached operations. At the start of July to make the PDU a regular operational unit. Although much
1940 ‘A’ Flight began operations from Wick development work was still being undertaken at this point, the basic
and ‘B’ Flight from St Eval. Spitfire I PR Type concept of high‑altitude, high‑speed PR had been proven, and it was felt
C P9550 ‘LY 19’ was assigned to ‘A’ Flight
and flew its first successful sortie on 4 July that the time was right to move direct control away from the Air Ministry.
when cover of Stavanger was obtained Therefore, also on 18 June, operational control of the PDU was passed to
(Chris Goss Collection) RAF Coastal Command.
The Combined Intelligence Committee (CIC), which had been formed
at the end of May 1940 to control all aspects of intelligence relating to
the threat of German invasion, was responsible for assessing all requests
for PR and passing them on to RAF Coastal Command for execution.
On 18 June Wg Cdr Cotton was relieved of his command following
numerous clashes with senior officials in the Air Ministry, his place being
taken by Wg Cdr Tuttle. Ten days later, another technical development
with the Spitfire saw the PDU employ the F8 camera operationally for
the first time when Flg Off Taylor covered Rotterdam and Amsterdam in
P9382 – a Type C fitted with a single F8 and 20‑inch lens combination.
At the end of June two new flights were formed for operations from
St Eval, in Cornwall and Wick, in Scotland, these geographically dispersed
locations allowing for wider coverage of enemy territory. On 8 July a new
establishment was approved, and with it the PDU was re‑designated
22 C H A P T E R T W O Early Operations

the PRU, with each operational flight established for four aircraft and
eight pilots.
In addition, an experimental flight of five Spitfires carried out various
trials and was heavily involved in testing a number of camouflage schemes.
During earlier operations over the Continent, a blue/grey scheme had been
found to be superior to Camotint Green at high altitude, and it was a
variation of this colour that ultimately became the standard for PR aircraft.
On 25 July ‘E’ Flight was formed, but not as a fifth operational flight
as originally planned but by renaming the experimental flight. One of
the Spitfires in ‘E’ Flight’s inventory was the newly arrived P9384, the
first Type F. This variant retained the enlarged oil tank under the chin
and carried 89 gallons of additional fuel in single 30‑gallon fuel tanks in
bulged fairings beneath each wing and a 29‑gallon tank behind the pilot,
allowing for a safe range of 1100 miles. The camera arrangement consisted
of a vertical split pair of F24s or a single F8 in the rear fuselage. Provision
was also made for the installation of a port‑facing F24 oblique camera for
Flt Lt Leonard Clark commanded ‘B’ Flight
lateral photography. No 1 PRU from its formation in July 1940
Two other variants that were part of ‘E’ Flight were the Types E and until he was posted away six months later.
G. The former was a unique modification to try and solve the problem He is seen here after ‘B’ Flight was rotated
back to Heston, its place at St Eval having
of low‑altitude photography, with N3117 carrying single F24 cameras been taken by ‘D’ Flight. Clark is stood in
installed in fairings beneath each wing, with the cameras aligned front of a Type G used for ‘dicing’, and it is
perpendicular to the line of flight. This installation used lenses of only unclear whether the aircraft is camouflaged
in Camotint Green or the even paler
3¼‑inch focal length, as space in the wing fairings was very limited. Despite off‑white scheme introduced for low‑level
proving that it could bring back good oblique images, the Type E was not operations (Author’s Collection)
a success because it was considered too
vulnerable to interception.
Experience with N3117 led to the
specification for the Type G, which was
fitted with two vertical F24 cameras in
the rear fuselage and an oblique F24
camera that could be configured to
face either port or starboard. It also
had canopy blisters, a 29‑gallon fuel
tank behind the pilot that gave a safe
range of about 750 miles, and retained
eight 0.303‑inch Browning machine
guns and the armoured windscreen of
the Spitfire IA. Finally, the aircraft was
painted in a very pale green camouflage
scheme overall. It was envisioned
that the Type G would approach its
objectives in or near cloud before
descending for photography. The green
camouflage scheme was in reality little
more than on off‑white colour that had
been found to offer the lowest contrast
against cloud below 15,000 ft.
The modest range of the Type
G limited operations to shallow
penetrations, and low‑level sorties soon
 23

earned a reputation for being even more dangerous than regular PR sorties,
with pilots literally dicing with death on a regular basis. This resulted in
the Type Gs being infamously dubbed ‘dicers’.
On 29 July the Type F made its operational debut when Flt Lt Ring
(P9384) successfully covered the Scheldt Estuary. Operations continued
apace the following month, with a careful watch maintained on enemy
ports and airfields. In the two months the unit had been on invasion watch,
photographs did not reveal any appreciable evidence that would suggest
preparation for a large‑scale seaborne operation. However, by the start of
September the increased movement of barges was detected in Dutch and
Belgian canals, with vessels all heading towards the Channel ports. In
addition, numerous small convoys of merchant vessels were photographed
moving down the coast. The build‑up in shipping indicated that the
Germans appeared ready to commence invasion operations.
On 23 September eight successful sorties were flown which covered
every major port between Emden and Brest. The images taken on that day
seemed to suggest that a peak had been reached in the numbers of invasion
vessels deployed, and sorties flown over the remainder of the month
showed a decrease as barges and merchantmen were slowly dispersed. The
CIC concluded that the Luftwaffe’s inability to achieve air superiority over
southern England had likely resulted in a postponement of any invasion
attempt during 1940.
At the end of September the PRU received the first prototype Spitfire I
PR Type D. P9551 had specially fabricated wing leading edge fuel tanks,
each holding 57.5 gallons. The prototype retained the 29‑gallon tank
behind the pilot, which together with the main fuselage tanks gave a
total fuel capacity of 229 gallons, allowing a safe operational range of
1500 miles. As with previous PR variants, the Type D was fitted with
teardrop canopy fairings, carried additional oxygen and had an increased
oil capacity, but rather than the tank being fitted under the engine it was
located in the port wing. Initial camera installation was a split pair of
vertical F24s with 14‑inch lenses in the rear fuselage.
By October the majority of the PRU’s Spitfires had been camouflaged
overall ‘PRU Blue’. This colour, a mixture of Prussian and cerulean blue,
consistently proved the most effective at high altitude.
On 29 October Flg Off S J Millen took off from Heston in P9551,
with Berlin as his primary objective. Upon arriving over the German
capital, he found it completely obscured by cloud, so he set course for his
secondary objectives on the Baltic coast, where he photographed Stettin,
Swinemünde and Rostock from 27,000 ft. As well as being the first time
many of the targets had been covered, the 5 hr 30 min flight was also a
duration record for a PR Spitfire sortie.

NEW PRU
Although the immediate threat of invasion had passed, much of the
PRU’s attention was still occupied with the enemy’s preparations for
an amphibious attack on Britain. This led RAF Bomber Command to
voice concerns that its reconnaissance requirements were being neglected
in favour of the Admiralty and RAF Coastal Command. It successfully
24 C H A P T E R T W O Early Operations

presented the case for its own PRU, the new unit receiving its tasking This annotated photograph of a Spitfire I
directly from HQ RAF Bomber Command and being responsible for PR Type F at Benson in 1941 shows the
various modifications incorporated into the
obtaining bomb D/A and targeting information. The original PRU was variant. Due to delays in the fabrication of
to remain under the operational control of RAF Coastal Command, the leading edge wing tanks of the Type D,
and it was still required to fulfil the demands of the CIC and all other the Type F actually entered service before
the former. Many Type Cs were upgraded to
external agencies. Type F standard, although the variant was
The date chosen for the reorganisation to take place was 16 November ultimately superseded by the Type D once it
1940, with the PRU simply being re‑designated No 1 PRU. No 3 PRU was began arriving in numbers during the
summer of 1941 (Author’s Collection)
also formed on this date for RAF Bomber Command, with a provisional
establishment of 12 pilots and four Type C and two Type F Spitfires for
daytime operations from Oakington, in Cambridgeshire. No 3 PRU
carried out its first sortie on the 29th when its CO, Sqn Ldr P B B Ogilvie
(Type C X4385), successfully covered Cologne.
On 17 December, No 3 PRU received another Type C (X4383) from
Heston, but unlike in previous machines, its F8 camera was fitted with a
75 cm (29½‑inch) lens recovered from a downed German reconnaissance
aircraft. The combination produced a hybrid with a focal length far in excess
of anything then available to the RAF. It was first used successfully on the
21st, when Flt Lt H C Marshall (X4383) was tasked with covering Cologne.
Finally, on 14 March 1941, Sqn Ldr Ogilvie (Type F X4712) successfully
covered Berlin for the first time. In a sortie lasting 4 hr 20 min, he brought
back 95 large‑scale exposures of the German capital.

COVERING THE KRIEGSMARINE

Whilst No 3 PRU was working itself up to fulfil the requirements of
RAF Bomber Command, the newly named No 1 PRU continued to
fulfil it primary role of anti‑invasion reconnaissance for the CIC. The
Kriegsmarine was now firmly committed to severing Britain’s vital sea
 25

lanes, and it planned to do this by vastly increasing the size of its U‑boat
force. No 1 PRU would be called upon to monitor the progress of this
new and expanding threat.
On 26 December 1940, No 1 PRU moved to Benson, in South
Oxfordshire, although the landing area at the new airfield became very
soft with the winter rains and operations were soon undertaken from the
satellite at Mount Farm, which had paved runways.
1940 had been a year of rapid development for the PRU, seeing it
increase in size from a small experimental unit equipped with two Spitfires
into the primary means of gathering strategic photographic intelligence
for all three services. For the year as a whole, the PRU in all its guises had
flown well over 1000 Spitfire sorties, of which more than 80 per cent were
successful.
Since 27 December the German heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper had been
at Brest after sortieing into the Atlantic. It was not until 9 January 1941
that aircraft flying from St Eval were able to secure clear images of the vessel
when Flg Off P H Watts made a low‑level run across the Rade‑de‑Brest. In
the months to come, Brest would be constantly photographed to monitor
naval activity at the port.
At Benson, long on the list of tasks outstanding was a requirement by
the Admiralty for coverage of the Italian fleet at La Spezia and Genoa. The
One of the primary tasks of the only aircraft with the capability to safely make such a deep penetration
PR detachment at St Eval was the was a Type D Spitfire. On 19 January, Flt Lt Corbishley (P9551) was
monitoring of Brest, which served as the tasked with covering the ports. Due to cloud and a strong tailwind, he
main French base for German surface
vessels. On 9 January 1941, Flg Off Philip was forced to continue on to Malta, landing at Ta Kali after 5 hr 5 min
Watts of ‘D’ Flight No 1 PRU secured flying time. His aircraft duly became the first Spitfire of any type to land
low‑level obliques of the the Rade‑de‑Brest on the island. Two weeks would pass before conditions were favourable
from 1000 ft in Spitfire I PR Type G K9787.
Despite being subjected to intense flak, his enough for Corbishley to try to return to Benson. On 2 February he took
excellent photographs revealed the off from Malta in an attempt to complete the task, but his aircraft was hit
presence of a Hipper‑class heavy cruiser – by flak near Leghorn and Corbishley was forced to bail out north of Pisa.
the first time a German capital ship had
been positively identified in the port As well as routine tasks such as the coverage of ports and airfields,
(Author’s Collection) No 1 PRU was often given special tasks to complete. One such job
was a request by the Assistant
Director of Intelligence (Science),
Dr Reginald Jones. At the end of
January 1941, the Photographic
Interpretation Unit had brought
to Jones’ attention a small pair of
circular objects photographed by Plt
Off W Panton near the village of
Auderville, in the Normandy region
of France. On 22 February Plt Off
W K Manifould took off in N3111
(a pale green Type G) tasked with
carrying out a low‑level run over
the site. Fifty‑five minutes later,
he commenced his run across the
target from 300 ft. The photographs
obtained showed the first clear
images of a Freya radar system. The
26 C H A P T E R T W O Early Operations

aerial arrays were clearly visible, allowing technical specifications to

be determined.
Four days later, the second prototype Type D (P9552) arrived at Benson.
Its delivery would again allow the most distant targets to be covered
following the loss of P9551.
By the spring of 1941 an increasing number of merchantmen were being
sunk by U‑boats. When the scale of this menace started to become apparent,
No 1 PRU was tasked with covering the U‑boat building yards of northern
Germany. Although the unit had been visiting the German ports regularly
for some months, it was only when cameras with long focal‑length lenses
became available that photographs of sufficient scale and quality could
be obtained, enabling interpreters to begin tracking the enemy’s building
methods. A series of successful sorties flown over the major German ports
during March 1941 allowed the scope of the U‑boat building programme to
be estimated for the first time with a degree of accuracy. Once it was known
how many submarines were being built, and how long it took to complete a
hull, it was possible to forecast the timetable for the arrival of new U‑boats.
Heavily tasked with undertaking such operations, No 1 PRU gratefully
received Type Fs R6902 and X4335 at Benson on 27 March. Of
significance was the fact that they were the first aircraft received by the
unit to be fitted with the improved Merlin 45 engine, which delivered
increased performance.
The following day Plt Off G D Green carried out two runs over Brest at
22,000 ft. Forty minutes later, he was back at St Eval, where his photographs
showed the presence of both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Such was the
threat posed by the battlecruisers that the Admiralty demanded multiple
sorties be flown every day to ensure their movements were tracked. For
the best part of a year the major preoccupation of the St Eval‑based flight
would be the two vessels.
The previous month, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the body
responsible for assessing all intelligence, had complained about the lack of
photographs of the European hinterland. In its opinion this deficiency was
due to the many conflicting demands placed upon the limited number of
aircraft available. On 1 March it was decided that control of Nos 1 and 3
PRUs and the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU) would be re‑centralised at
the Air Ministry, rendering the new organisation operationally independent
of any command in order to better employ the resources available.
April saw the endurance capabilities of the Type D utilised to the full
on the 14th. The Admiralty still required that Genoa and La Spezia be
covered, and it fell to ‘C’ Flight’s Sgt W Morgan, who, after crossing a
cloud‑covered France, successfully photographed his objectives. Setting
course for home, he again flew blind across France, aware he was facing a
strong headwind. With only about five gallons of fuel remaining, Morgan
began to climb in preparation for bailing out, his position unknown. As
he started to gain altitude, the cloud cover broke and he could see the
white cliffs of Dover. With his engine spluttering, Morgan put down in a
pole‑studded field near the airfield at Hawkinge. His epic flight had taken
7 hr 10 min – by far the longest Spitfire sortie to date.
On 21 April No 3 PRU’s Plt Off B J McMaster made for Cologne, his
aircraft, Type C X4493, carrying an F8 camera fitted with a new 40‑inch
 27

lens that was making its operational debut. Unable to see his assigned
target due to cloud, he photographed Rotterdam on his return.
For the month as a whole, April had been the busiest of the war to
date, with No 1 PRU flying a total of 208 Spitfire sorties and No 3 PRU
making a further 48. During May, the flights based at Benson continued
to monitor potential invasion activity along the Channel coast and U‑boat
construction in the German ports, while steadily pushing deeper and
deeper into enemy territory to cover new targets.
On 4 May Flt Lt Taylor encountered Bf 109s north of the Cotentin
Peninsula. After covering Cherbourg from 3500 ft, he had just broken
out of the top of a layer of cloud when he was immediately passed by two
Bf 109s that were less than 150 ft away. Miraculously, the enemy aircraft
failed to spot the Spitfire, and Taylor dropped back into the undercast and
returned to base. The lack of reaction by the Germans was credited to a
new off‑white/pale pink camouflage scheme being tried operationally for
the first time on Taylor’s aircraft, Type G R7059.
Disaster struck six days later with the loss of No 1 PRU’s only Type D
Spitfire. Tasked with covering Stettin and Swinemünde, Sgt P A Mills took
off from Mount Farm in P9552 at 1010 hrs and was never heard from
again. Although the number of Type Fs on strength was slowly increasing,
there was no immediate prospect of production Type Ds being available,
despite their urgent need.
On 20 May Naval Intelligence received a report of capital ships leaving
Spitfire V PR Type D R7056 was delivered the Baltic. The following day, priority tasking was issued to ‘D’ Flight at
to No 1 PRU on 28 August 1941. One of the Wick to search for signs of the naval force, with Plt Off M F Suckling
initial batch of production Type Ds, it was
assigned to ‘D’ Flight, where it was first (X4496) searching between Bergen and Stavanger and Flg Off C A S
flown operationally on 2 October when Flg Greenhill (P9310) between Oslo and Kristiansand. After five hours in
Off Eric Durston was tasked with covering the air, Greenhill landed back at Wick, having photographed Oslo and
Lehrte and Döhren. He had to abort the
sortie over the Netherlands, however, due to Kristiansand, but he had failed to find the vessels. Unbeknown to Greenhill,
an oil leak and the port wing tank not Suckling had already located the ships. After crossing the Norwegian coast,
feeding. Durston did manage to photograph he photographed one large cruiser in Hjeltefjord. He then covered Bergen,
Dordrecht, Rotterdam and The Hague as he
flew home (Spitfire AA810 on behalf of the after which he observed more shipping to the southwest in Grimstadfjord,
Gunn family) including another heavy cruiser. Subsequent analysis of his photographs
28 C H A P T E R T W O Early Operations

showed that the second cruiser was actually the

battleship Bismarck and the first was the heavy
cruiser Prinz Eugen.
On 4 June Flg Off E G Hughes successfully
covered Brest. His photographs showed that
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were still present,
but the images also revealed the arrival of
Prinz Eugen.
Three days later, the decision was made that
Nos 1 and 3 PRUs would formally amalgamate.
As had been previously decided, control of all
PR assets would be centralised, with Benson
being the main base for the new organisation.
June had been particularly successful for
No 1 PRU, with great progress made in the
monitoring of movements of the major naval
units of the Kriegsmarine. Indeed, practically
every vessel larger than a destroyer had been
photographed at least once. Likewise, No 3
PRU had also been very busy with 51 sorties
flown without loss.
On 8 July Benson finally received the first
production Type D Spitfire, R7035. It differed from the prototypes in On 21 July 1941 ‘C’ Flight No 1 PRU flew
a number of ways. Fitted with a Merlin 45, the aircraft had had the six sorties from St Eval, the last of which
caused quite a flap. Flg Off Philip
29‑gallon fuel tank in the rear fuselage removed and the capacity of the Cunliffe‑Lister’s photographs of Brest
leading edge tank in each wing increased to 66 gallons for a total fuel load showed Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz
of 217 gallons. Although this represented a slight decrease in the total Eugen present in their usual positions, but
the former was clearly emitting black
capacity, the safe operating range remained at approximately 1500 miles. smoke, indicating it was preparing to sail.
The oil capacity was increased from 14 to 18 gallons, but the tank remained Photographs of the port obtained the
housed in the port mainplane. Initially, the camera fit comprised two following day confirmed that Scharnhorst
had indeed departed, along with four
fully interchangeable configurations. The ‘W’ type installation consisted destroyers, and that the battlecruiser’s
of a split pair of F8 cameras mounted in the rear fuselage, while the ‘X’ place alongside the Torpedo Boat Station
type installation was made up of a split pair of F24 cameras and a single had been occupied by a 560 ft tanker
(Michael Cunliffe‑Lister Collection)
port‑facing F24 oblique. The first 12 production Type Ds were based on
the Mk I airframe, but all subsequent examples built were Mk V airframes.
On the 18th RAF Bomber Command finally informed No 3 PRU that
it was to prepare to move to Benson, where it would be amalgamated with
No 1 PRU. No 3 PRU’s first operational sortie from its new base was
carried out on 22 July when Flt Lt J H M Chisholm (X4385) obtained
photographs of Saint‑Pierre‑Église.
That same day, images obtained by No 1 PRU of Brest revealed that
Scharnhorst had sailed. Photographs taken 24 hours earlier by Flg Off
P I Cunliffe‑Lister had shown Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen
present in their usual positions, although Scharnhorst was emitting smoke
and some of its camouflage netting had been removed. However, it would
not be long before the battlecruiser was found. On the 23rd, Flg Off
Greenhill successfully covered La Pallice, and his photographs revealed
a camouflaged Scharnhorst lying inside the pierhead of the outer jetty.
Three days later, Cunliffe‑Lister brought back images of Brest that showed
Scharnhorst had returned.
 29

AMALGAMATION
On 15 August Nos 1 and 3 PRUs were officially amalgamated. The latter
unit initially retained its identity as a specialist bomb D/A flight, but over
time it began performing the full range of tasks as carried out by No 1
PRU’s other flights.
Eleven days later, AA781, which was the first production Type D
Spitfire based on the Mk V airframe, was delivered to Benson. The main
difference between this variant and earlier PR Spitfires was the inclusion
of a purpose‑built cockpit heating system.
After many months of machinations, all British‑based PR assets were
officially placed under a unified command structure in August 1941,
thus ending unnecessary duplication of effort and improving operational
efficiency. This change in organisation also corresponded with a number
of important technical developments. Type D Spitfires, now flowing off
During September 1941 the policy of
centralising control of all British‑based the production line in sufficient quantity to replace losses and to upgrade
PR assets saw the arrival at Benson of the existing inventory, were regularly flying on operations. In addition,
No 1416 Flight, which had been formed to August also saw the first operational use of the F8 camera fitted with
fulfil demands for the British Army in the
event of a German invasion. Soon a 250‑exposure magazine, allowing for more objectives to be covered
re‑designated No 140 Sqn, the unit was per sortie.
equipped with the Spitfire I PR Type G. With In accordance with the policy of centralising control of all PR assets, the
the threat of invasion receding, it began
operating over the Continent, relieving No 1 start of September saw the arrival at Benson of No 1416 (Reconnaissance)
PRU of the requirement to map enemy Flight. This unit had been formed on 10 March 1941 to fulfil the demands
coastal defences for the British Army. Most of General Officer Commanding‑in‑Chief Home Forces in the event of a
of this work was initially carried out at
low‑level, the Type G being ideally suited to German invasion. Based at Hendon, in northwest London, as part of RAF
the task (Author’s Collection) Army Co‑operation Command, it was initially equipped with six Spitfire
Type Gs. During August it was agreed that
No 1416 Flight might take over certain
Army demands currently being fulfilled
by No 1 PRU.
The flight’s first operational sortie of
the war was carried out on 14 September
by Flt Lt G F H Webb (X4907), who
obtained oblique photographs of the coast
at Saint‑Vaast‑la‑Hougue from 3000 ft.
On the 17th the flight was re‑designated
No 140 Sqn, but its establishment
remained the same. Seven days earlier,
R7039, flown by No 1 PRU’s Plt Off G N
Busbridge, went missing on a sortie to the
Franco‑Spanish frontier. It was the first
operational loss of a production Type D.
On 22 September, Sqn Ldr N H E
Messervy was despatched to Malta in Type
D R7042 in order to photograph the bases
of the Regia Marina. In six weeks he flew
ten sorties, covering many ports on the
Italian mainland and along the coast of
North Africa. His imagery revealed much
information on the disposition of Italian
shipping. During September excellent
30 C H A P T E R T W O Early Operations

coverage of the German shipbuilding yards had also been obtained, enabling
the interpreters to identify 211 U‑boats under construction. The results
had not been achieved without cost, as four Spitfires and their pilots were
lost on operations. For the remainder of 1941 most missions were generally
routine in nature.
During December the designation system for aircraft was changed by
introducing a role prefix to the mark. In the case of Spitfire reconnaissance
variants, the type letter was changed to a Roman numeral, with the Type
D becoming the PR IV, the Type F the PR VI and the Type G the PR VII,
although it would be many months before the system was widely adopted
by No 1 PRU.
On 5 December Flt Lt A E Hill obtained oblique photographs of the
Cap‑d’Antifer area from 200 ft. His images showed a parabolic aerial
approximately ten feet in diameter on the edge of the cliffs at Bruneval.
Such was the desire to find out the technical specifications of what was
later identified as a Würzburg radar that a Combined Operations mission,
codenamed Operation Biting, was planned to raid the site and take key
components back to Britain for scientific analysis. The mission took place
on the night of 27–28 February 1942 and was a complete success, in large
part due to photographs taken by No 1 PRU.
Since June 1941 No 1 PRU had been operating a detachment from
Gibraltar. Known as ‘G’ Flight, it had been formed to keep a watch on the
North African territories of the Vichy French in the western Mediterranean.
From January 1942 Spitfires were regularly detached from Britain. On the
9th Flg Off M C B Anderson and Plt Off A P L Barber flew two Type Ds
(AA813 and AA815) down to Gibraltar, and over the next two weeks the
pair completed 16 very successful sorties covering targets along the North
African and Spanish coasts.
On 19 January, back at Benson, word was received that Tirpitz had been
spotted off the Norwegian coast. ‘C’ Flight was immediately detailed to
transfer to Wick in order to find the battleship. On the 23rd Flt Lt A F P
Fane (R7035) located the vessel;
‘Photographed Trondheim. Passing Aasfjord when I saw something
hidden in the shadow at the far end. Could not believe my eyes or my
luck. Did three runs over it and the next fjord and then turned for home.’
The photographs Fane obtained from 20,000 ft showed Tirpitz lying
close inshore on the northern side of the Faettenfjord inlet. From this point
forward a constant watch was maintained on the fjords around Trondheim,
with daily sorties attempted from Wick. Two days later, flying from St Eval,
Flg Off A H W Ball (R7055) photographed Brest. His imagery showed
that Gneisenau had vacated the dry dock and was now alongside the quay at
the Torpedo Boat Station. On 11 February the last sortie of the day to Brest
showed Prinz Eugen and the battlecruisers present behind torpedo booms.
This proved to be the last time No 1 PRU photographed the vessels in
the port. That night, they steamed up the Channel in Operation Cerberus,
passing through the Dover Strait in daylight the following morning.
Since the battlecruisers had first arrived at Brest in March 1941, more
then 700 sorties had been flown over the port by No 1 PRU – six sorties
per day were routinely attempted. Such extensive coverage had cost the
unit nine Spitfires and their pilots.
 31

The start of 1942 saw a technical development that would have a lasting
impact on the RAF’s bombing campaign with the introduction of the F52
camera. Basically an upgraded F24, the F52 was capable of using long
focal‑length lenses. The size of the camera when fitted with a 36‑inch lens
meant that it could not be carried by existing installations in the Spitfire.
This led to the development of the ‘Y’ type installation, which consisted
of a single F52 camera mounted vertically in the rear fuselage. Unlike the
previous camera configurations, the ‘Y’ type was not interchangeable, and
a number of PR IVs were permanently modified to this standard. The
large‑scale images produced by this configuration were ideal for D/A, and
as more PR IVs were modified to carry the F52, an increasing number of
sorties were flown to fulfil demands for RAF Bomber Command.
Another important development during early 1942 was the installation
of a very high frequency (VHF) radio in the Spitfire PR IV. By the spring
VHF radios were in widespread use, and would be fitted as standard in
all new PR Spitfires.
On 3 May Flt Lt D W Steventon set out on a D/A sortie to Kiel, the
port having been attacked on the night of 28–29 April. His aircraft, PR IV
AB301, carried a F52 camera fitted with a 500‑exposure magazine – the
first time a device with this capacity had been used operationally. In a sortie
lasting 4 hr 25 min, he made multiple runs over Kiel, obtaining many
excellent large‑scale images.
The summer of 1942 saw a new protagonist enter the bombing
campaign in the form of the USAAF’s Eighth Air Force. It was planned
that the Americans would have their own dedicated PR assets, but whilst
they built up their strength, USAAF units would have to rely on No 1
PRU for photography. Operations by American‑flown PR Spitfires are
Type G (PR VII) X4944 of ‘K’ Flight No 1 PRU detailed in Chapter Three.
at Detling was one of a number of old Type
Gs and Cs used in a training role. ‘K’ Flight
was formed at the end of October 1941 to
convert new pilots onto the Spitfire and EXPANSION
prepare them for the demands of PR work. When home‑based PR assets were centralised at Benson during 1941, the
In July 1942 ‘K’ Flight was re‑designated resultant reorganisation led to an increase in No 1 PRU’s establishment
‘B’ Flight No 8(C) OTU when the training
commitment was removed from No 1 PRU and, for the first time, pilots started to be allocated to the unit directly
(Author’s Collection) from Flying Training Command. To cope with the increased training
32 C H A P T E R T W O Early Operations

demands, ‘K’ Flight was formed at Benson at

the end of October 1941. However, it quickly
became apparent that pilots straight out of training
lacked the necessary navigational skills of their
predecessors.
To rectify this, the PRU Conversion Flight
was formed in early January 1942 at No 3 School
of General Reconnaissance. Its short course was
designed to convert pilots onto Spitfires and to
further their navigational skills prior to them being
posted to ‘K’ Flight for more advanced training. In
April 1942 it was decided that No 1 PRU should be
absolved of its training responsibility, and this resulted
in the formation of No 8 (Coastal) Operational
Training Unit (No 8(C) OTU) at Fraserburgh, in
Aberdeenshire, on 18 May. Four days later, the PRU
Conversion Flight became ‘A’ Flight No 8(C) OTU,
and in July ‘K’ Flight No 1 PRU became ‘B’ Flight
No 8(C) OTU. During February 1943 No 8(C)
OTU moved 40 miles south to Dyce, where it would
remain for much of the war. Shortly after the move
the unit was issued with a new establishment of 40
Spitfires (30 PR III/VI/VIIs and ten PR IVs) to reflect
its increased training commitment.
Whilst No 1 PRU expanded and attempted to
cover ever more targets across Europe, No 140 Sqn
continued to fly sorties for the Army, its objectives
generally limited to the coastal belt of France.
By the start of 1942 the squadron’s old Spitfire I PR Type Gs had been Members of ‘E’ Flight No 1 PRU pose in
replaced with Spitfire V PR Type Gs (PR VIIs), as well as a number of front of one of their Spitfire PR IVs at Wick
in August 1942. ‘E’ Flight had taken over
the Spitfire V PR Type Fs (PR VIs) for longer range operations. Up until coverage of Norway from ‘B’ Flight the
this time the majority of sorties carried out by No 140 Sqn were flown at previous month, by which time many of the
low level, but in March an increasing number started to be undertaken German capital ships had moved from their
anchorages at Trondheim further north up
at higher altitudes. On 22 June the unit received its first Spitfire PR IV, the coast beyond the range of British‑based
which made its operational debut on 13 July when Plt Off W J Dooley PR Spitfires. On 17 July Flt Sgt John Mair
successfully photographed the area east of Paris in AB122. photographed Lützow in Lofjord and the
light cruiser Köln in Faettenfjord in PR IV
During the summer No 140 Sqn was heavily involved in the preparations AA784. These vessels remained at
for the planned attack on Dieppe, codenamed Operation Jubilee, scheduled Trondheim until early August, when Köln
for 19 August. Thirteen sorties to the port were carried out during August, moved to Narvik and Lützow returned to
Germany (Author’s Collection)
the last two conducted on the 17th by Plt Offs R L Jones (AR258) and L G
Smith (R7116). Despite the considerable intelligence efforts made, Jubilee
was an abject failure because much of the information gathered before
the attack – most of it from aerial reconnaissance – failed to identify the
strength of the defences. August had been the busiest month of the war to
date for No 140 Sqn, which had undertaken nearly 200 operational sorties.
No 1 PRU’s ‘C’ Flight, meanwhile, had been attempting to mount daily
visits to Trondheim since it had discovered Tirpitz there on 23 January. At the
end of March the flight detected the arrival of Admiral Hipper. Both vessels
remained at Trondheim until mid‑June, when they moved further north to
escape the attentions of No 1 PRU’s Spitfires. (text continues on page 44)
 COLOUR PLATES

1
Spitfire I PR Type A N3071 of the Special Survey Flight, Nancy, France, December 1939

2
Spitfire I PR Type B P9331 ‘9’ of No 212 Sqn, Meaux/Villenoy, France, June 1940
33
 34

3
Spitfire I PR Type C P9550 ‘LY 19’ of ‘A’ Flight PDU, Wick, Scotland, early July 1940

4
Spitfire I PR Type D P9551 ‘LY’ of ‘A’ Flight No 1 PRU, Ta Kali, Malta, January 1941
5
Spitfire I PR Type F X4712 ‘LY’ of ‘A’ Flight No 3 PRU, Alconbury, Cambridgeshire, March 1941 ,

6
Spitfire I PR Type G (serial unknown) ‘ZW‑J’ of No 140 Sqn, Benson, South Oxfordshire,
September 1941
35
 36

7
Spitfire V PR Type D R7056 ‘LY’ of ‘D’ Flight No 1 PRU, Benson, South Oxfordshire,
November 1941

8
Spitfire I PR Type G (PR VII) X4944 ‘LY’ of ‘K’ Flight No 1 PRU, Detling, Kent,
May 1942
9
Spitfire PR IV Trop AB312 of ‘A’ Flight No 2 PRU, LG 28/Burgh‑el‑Arab, Egypt, July 1942

10
Spitfire PR IV AB132 ‘01’ of the 3rd Aviation Squadron/118th Reconnaissance
Aviation Regiment, Vaenga, USSR, January 1943
37
 38

11
Spitfire PR IV Trop BP932 of No 683 Sqn, Luqa, Malta, February 1943

12
Spitfire PR IV Trop BP911 ‘T’ of No 681 Sqn, Dum Dum, India, 25 March 1943
13
Spitfire PR XI EN654 of No 16 Sqn, Hartford Bridge, Hampshire, December 1943

14
Spitfire PR XI EN671 ‘G’ of No 682 Sqn, Pomigliano, Italy, March 1944
39
 40

15
Spitfire PR XI EN664 ‘Q’ BRENDA of ‘B’ Flight No 541 Sqn, St Eval, Cornwall, May 1944

16
Spitfire PR X MD193 of No 541 Sqn, Benson, South Oxfordshire, 4 June 1944
17
Spitfire PR XIX RM633 of No 541 Sqn, Benson, South Oxfordshire, June 1944

18
Spitfire PR XI PA944 of the 14th PRS/7th PG(R), Mount Farm, Oxfordshire,
September 1944
41
 42
19
Spitfire PR XI PL969 ‘P’ of the Forward Detachment No 681 Sqn, Monywa, Burma,
February 1945

20
Spitfire PR XI MB950 of the 14th PRS/7th PG(R), Mount Farm, Oxfordshire,
February 1945
21
Spitfire PR XI PM151 of No 400 Sqn, Petit Brogel (B90), Belgium, March 1945

22
Spitfire PR XIX PM512 ‘N’ of No 681 Sqn, Seletar, Singapore, spring 1946
43
44 C H A P T E R T W O Early Operations

The presence of major naval units in northern Norway posed a

significant threat to Allied shipping headed to the Soviet Union. With
convoy PQ 18 set to sail for Archangelsk on 2 September 1942, it was
decided to send a strike force of Hampden torpedo‑bombers to operate
from Murmansk. Under the codename Operation Orator, the Hampdens
would be supported by a small detachment of No 1 PRU Spitfires that
would provide reconnaissance over the northern fjords of Norway, which
were beyond the range of British‑based aircraft. On 1 September three
Spitfire PR IVs flown by Flt Lt E A Fairhurst, Flg Off D R M Furniss
and Plt Off G W Walker set off for Vaenga, near Murmansk, where they
would be based for the duration of Orator. Throughout the course of the
detachment the Spitfires would carry Soviet national insignia in place of
their RAF markings.
On the 11th, Flt Lt Fairhurst (BP889) flew the detachment’s first sortie
when he covered Altafjord from 22,000 ft. His photographs showed the
presence of the Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper and the light cruiser Köln
in Kåfjord. The detachment returned to Britain in mid‑October, having
flown 15 successful sorties. Its Spitfires were handed over to the Air Force
of the Northern Fleet (Voyenno‑Vozdushnye Sily Severnyy Flot – VVS SF).

MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS
Whilst home‑based PR assets increased in strength and capability,
overseas reconnaissance units were forced to rely on aircraft already
in‑theatre. It would be 1942 before the first PR Spitfires were permanently
based abroad.
On 7 March the first Spitfire PR IV (AB300) arrived on Malta, where it
PR IV AB312 was one of the first
was pressed into service with No 69 Sqn. The embattled island’s position PR Spitfires to be delivered to ‘A’ Flight
in the middle of the Mediterranean meant it was perfectly placed to No 2 PRU in the Western Desert in March
monitor shipping carrying supplies to Axis forces in North Africa. AB300 1942. Seen here during the summer of that
same year, it was lost on 16 October when
carried out its first operational sortie from Malta on the 12th, when Plt Off Flg Off John Bird failed to return from a
P J Kelley successfully covered targets in Sicily. As more PR IVs gradually sortie to cover Bardia, Sollum and Mersa
arrived they were formed into their own flight, and for long periods of time Matruh on the Libya–Egypt border. The pilot
had probably fallen victim to the severe
the PR Spitfires were the only aircraft capable of operating from Malta in weather conditions reported over the whole
daylight due to persistent Axis attacks. area by other aircraft (Author’s Collection)
 45

On 12 August three more PR IVs were delivered to No 69 Sqn’s Spitfire

Flight, now known as ‘B’ Flight, to augment operations. Three days later,
five merchantmen from the Operation Pedestal convoy reached Malta,
bringing enough supplies to allow more anti‑shipping operations to be
carried out. This in turn meant that the Spitfires of ‘B’ Flight were tasked
with monitoring the arrival and departure of Axis vessels from Benghazi
and the main Italian ports.
At the eastern end of the Mediterranean, the threat posed by the Italians
in North Africa and the Dodecanese led to the formation of No 2 PRU
at Heliopolis, in Egypt. Initially equipped with Hurricanes, it would be
1942 before any Spitfires were on strength. The first PR IVs were received
in March, with the unit’s operational diary for the 17th noting that three
Spitfire V PR Type Ds had arrived from Britain. Over the next few days
the aircraft were tested and camouflaged in No 2 PRU’s Royal Blue. This
dark blue scheme had been used by the unit since 1941, when it was found
to better blend in with the clearer conditions normally found at altitude
in the Middle East.
On 29 March Flt Lt S N Pearce flew BP883 on the unit’s first operational
Spitfire sortie when he successfully covered Patras, in Greece. On 7 May
Spitfires BP882 and BP883 were flown to Gambut, in Libya, where
they became a permanently detached desert flight. Henceforth known
as ‘A’ Flight, they were tasked with carrying out reconnaissance for the
Eighth Army. On 7 August ‘A’ Flight joined No 285 (Reconnaissance)
Wing, which had been formed to coordinate all operations by tactical and
strategic reconnaissance assets in the Western Desert. While ‘A’ Flight flew
missions in direct support of the Army, ‘B’ Flight at Heliopolis continued
with photographing strategic targets. Much of its attention at this time
was focused on Tobruk, in Libya, and Crete.
By October the British Army had built up its strength and was ready to
launch a new offensive at El Alamein. During the month ‘A’ Flight was heavily
engaged in preparations for the forthcoming attack, with every yard of the
proposed battlefield being covered by large‑scale photographs. On 23 October
the Eighth Army began its assault, and by 4 November Axis forces had begun
to retreat westward. As the Eighth Army advanced through Cyrenaica, ‘A’
Flight was hot on its heels, moving five times during the month before ending
up at Timimi, in Libya, on the 20th. After a pause in the fighting, the Eighth
Army resumed its advance with an attack on Generalfeldmarschall Rommel’s
position at Buerat, in Libya, on 15 January 1943.
Six days later, Plt Off D W Barbour covered targets in Tunisia – the
first time any objectives in the country had been photographed by No 2
PRU. On the 26th the flight moved again, this time to Castel Benito,
in Libya, from where work began on obtaining large‑scale photographic
coverage of the new enemy positions at Mareth, in Tunisia. In line with
the Air Ministry’s policy of restructuring the PR organisation in the
Mediterranean, No 2 PRU became No 680 Sqn at the end of the month.

OPERATION TORCH
On 8 November 1942, Anglo‑American forces commenced Operation
Torch when they invaded Vichy French North Africa with landings in
46 C H A P T E R T W O Early Operations

Morocco and Algeria. During this period the Spitfires of No 69 Sqn’s

‘B’ Flight were heavily involved in tracking the movements of the Regia
Marina in case it attempted to interfere with Allied invasion shipping. By
the 10th the Vichy French in North Africa had capitulated, allowing the
Allies to begin advancing on Tunisia.
It had been recognised in the planning for Torch that there would be
the need for an organic PRU in‑theatre. For the British, Eastern Air
Command was formed to control RAF resources, and it was to this
command that a new reconnaissance unit was allocated. No 4 PRU had
been formed at Benson on 10 September 1942 with an establishment
of six Spitfire PR IVs.
On 13 November No 4 PRU transferred to Maison Blanche, in Algeria.
The first operational sortie flown by the unit in North Africa was carried
out on the 17th by Flg Off D M McKenzie (BR423), when he successfully
covered Bizerte and Tunis. On the evening of the 20th, however, Maison
Blanche was attacked by Luftwaffe bombers. Three of No 4 PRU’s Spitfires
were destroyed and two damaged. The next operational sortie was not
flown until the 24th, when Sgt B J O’Connell successfully covered Gabès
and Tunis in the unit’s sole remaining Spitfire, BR664.
Replacement aircraft from Britain enabled No 4 PRU to pick up the
pace of operations during December, with 42 sorties flown, of which 28
obtained photographs. The cost had been high, however, with four pilots
lost. The superior performance of the Bf 109Gs and Fw 190s in Tunisia
often made operations prohibitive, which led Eastern Air Command
to petition the Air Ministry for No 4 PRU to be re‑equipped with
Spitfire PR XIs.
The winter of 1942–43 also saw No 69 Sqn’s ‘B’ Flight carry out
numerous sorties, the majority of which were to Sicily and southern Italy.
However, targets in Tunisia, Libya, Greece and Sardinia were also covered,
the latter due to No 4 PRU’s paucity of aircraft. By the start of February
1943, the only Axis forces that remained in North Africa were in Tunisia.
The shrinking of the enemy perimeter led to PRUs from three different
RAF commands operating over the same area with little coordination.
The decision was duly made to reorganise PR in the Mediterranean, as
detailed in Chapter 5.
In the lead up to Operation Torch, it was not just Vichy French holdings
in North Africa that attracted the attention of the RAF. Their territories
in West Africa also featured in the lenses of PR Spitfires. On 27 October
1942, PR IVs BR642 and BR667 were allocated to No 128 Sqn to carry
out long‑range missions to Senegal to monitor a number of major Vichy
French naval vessels located there. In early November the Spitfires flew to
Yundum, at Bathurst in Gambia, where the squadron was already operating
a detachment. Over the course of the next few weeks both aircraft flew
numerous sorties to Senegal and obtained coverage of the capital, Dakar,
and all of the principal airfields in the country.
Following the Torch landings, the Vichy French in West Africa joined the
Allies and by December the small West African PRU had received orders
to cease operations. Although No 128 Sqn had only operated Spitfires for
a short period, their superior performance had enabled the unit to fulfil
the photographic demands made of it.
 47

CHAPTER THREE

STRATEGIC RECCE IN
NORTHWEST EUROPE

B
In an effort to improve performance, the y 1942 No 1 PRU had grown into a huge organisation, with nine
Spitfire PR IX was introduced as a stopgap operational flights covering a vast geographical area. In August the
measure until the purpose‑built PR XI
became available. Converted from a Air Ministry authorised the unit to be split into five new squadrons.
standard Spitfire F IX, the first PR IX arrived On 19 October a PR wing was formed at Benson comprising No 540 Sqn
at Benson in October 1942. On 7 February with two flights of Mosquitos, Nos 541, 542 and 543 Sqns each with two
1943, this aircraft, PR IX EN149, flown by
No 541 Sqn’s Flg Off Alex Glover, made the flights of Spitfires, and No 544 Sqn, which included the Spitfires formerly
first attempt to cover the Möhne Dam as of ‘G’ Flight No 1 PRU, which became ‘B’ Flight and continued to operate
part of the preparations for Operation from Gibraltar. The three Spitfire squadrons were each established for
Chastise, the planned attack on the Ruhr
dams. EN149 was later converted to PR XI 20 aircraft, comprising 16 PR IVs and four PR VIIs, whilst ‘B’ Flight
standard (as seen here) and served with No 544 Sqn was allocated three PR IVs.
No 4 Sqn (Peter Arnold Collection) By mid‑1942 the Spitfire PR IV was outclassed by the latest German
fighters, with losses steadily climbing, particularly on operations over
northwest Germany. A request was made for standard Spitfire F IXs to be
converted for the PR role until the purpose‑built PR XI became available.
During October, Spitfire BS473 – the first of 16 PR IXs – was delivered
to Benson. The variant retained the Merlin 61 engine of the F IX, and was
configured for either a ‘W’ or ‘Y’ type camera installation. Although the
armoured windscreen and weapons were removed, the PR IX was not fitted
with the ‘wet’ wing of the PR IV and only had an 85‑gallon internal fuel
48 C H A P T E R T H R E E Strategic Recce In Northwest Europe

capacity that could be supplemented with a single under‑fuselage slipper

tank. All machines were camouflaged PRU Blue and most served briefly
with Nos 541 and 542 Sqns.
At the start of December No 541 Sqn took delivery of its first PR XI,
BS499. Originally intended to be based on the Spitfire VIII airframe,
delays in that programme led to the PR XI being based on the Spitfire IX
instead. The PR XI had a top speed of 422 mph and could reach an
altitude of 44,000 ft, although the lack of a pressurised cockpit limited
the amount of time a pilot could operate at such heights. The PR XI
retained the leading edge wing tanks of the PR IV for a total internal fuel
capacity of 217 gallons, although the higher fuel consumption associated
with the Merlin 61 reduced its safe range to about 1300 miles. From late
1944 onwards, the capability to carry a single slipper‑type drop tank was
introduced. An enlarged oil tank of 14.4‑gallon capacity was fitted under
the engine and enclosed by an enlarged chin fairing.
As was now standard, all PR XIs were fitted with VHF radios and
unarmoured windscreens and camouflaged in PRU Blue. Some early
models were fitted with teardrop canopy fairings, but most had the bulged
Malcolm Hood. One feature of the Spitfire VIII to be incorporated in the
PR XI was a retractable tail wheel, which reduced drag in flight.
The camera installations of the first PR XIs were the ‘W’, ‘X’ or ‘Y’ types,
but soon the universal or ‘U’ type installation was developed that allowed for a
vertical split pair of F52 cameras each with a 36‑inch lens to be fitted in the rear
When No 1 PRU was split into squadrons in
fuselage. Another modification was the addition of mud flaps and oil traps on October 1942, Wg Cdr Spencer Ring
the ventral camera ports to stop lens fouling. For PR XIs employed in a tactical became Wing Commander Operations at
role, provision was made for the installation of a F24 camera in each wing. For Benson. He successfully argued for the
retention of Spitfire PR XI production when
low‑level vertical photography, each camera was fitted with a five‑inch lens, it appeared it would be phased out in favour
and in the case of oblique photography, the cameras were configured to face of the Mosquito (Author’s Collection)
forward and were fitted with eight‑inch lenses. Another special fit
for low‑level work utilised two moving film strip F52 cameras fitted
with 36‑inch lenses. Subsequently known as the F63, the moving
film compensated for aircraft movement during exposure to reduce
image blurring at low altitude.
A second PR XI, BS498, was received by No 541 Sqn on
4 December, and it was this machine that attempted the first
operational sortie by the type on the 10th when Flt Lt Fairhurst
was tasked with covering targets in Holland and the Ruhr. By
early 1943 PR IV production had ceased, a total of 229 having
been built, but it would be some time before the PR XI was
available in significant numbers.
The first operational PR XI loss occurred on 7 February 1943
when No 541 Sqn’s Flg Off J C Taffs (EN385) went missing on
a sortie to the Ruhr. By this time the squadron was responsible
for covering targets in the zone known as the ‘Southern Area’,
which encompassed France, Belgium and southern Germany,
whilst No 542 Sqn covered the ‘Northern Area’ comprising
the Netherlands, northern Germany and Denmark. ‘B’ Flight
No 543 Sqn was also covering targets in the ‘Southern Area’,
but it was increasingly being used as an unofficial OTU. At St
Eval, No 543 Sqn’s ‘A’ Flight was responsible for covering western
 49

France down to the Spanish border. By March, Nos 541 and 542 Sqns
were operating exclusively from Benson due to the arrival of the USAAF’s
13th Photographic Squadron (PS) at Mount Farm on 16 February 1943.
Just as the abilities of the PR XI were starting to be proven over Europe,
the future of the type was put in question. At the end of 1942 it was
proposed that all PRUs should convert to the Mosquito because of ongoing
production delays with the PR XI. Wing Commander Operations at
Benson, Wg Cdr Ring, pointed out that the Spitfire PR XI was much more
capable of evading intercepting fighters than the Mosquito, and for short
and medium range work it was far more economical. Furthermore, the
PR XI enjoyed considerably higher serviceability rates than the Mosquito.
At a meeting at the Air Ministry in March 1943 it was argued that Spitfires
should be retained, and that the PR organisation would be better served
with half of the squadrons being equipped with the latest PR XIs and the
remainder operating the Mosquito for longer‑ranged work. It was concluded
that production of the PR XI would not be phased out and would actually
be increased and accelerated. The PR XI duly remained in production until
late 1944, by which point it had become the most numerous version of all
PR Spitfires with 471 built, including 14 converted PR IXs.
Whilst the future of the Spitfire PR XI was in the balance, another
variant was being developed for low‑level work. Known as the PR XIII,
it was basically a PR VII fitted with a Merlin 32 engine that was specially
rated for low‑altitude operations. The prototypes were tested at the end
of 1942, and a total of 26 examples were converted from existing Spitfire
F Vs and PR VIIs. The PR XIII retained the ‘G’ type camera installation,
but the 29‑gallon fuel tank in the fuselage was deleted, leaving an internal
fuel load of only 85 gallons, which was supplemented by a slipper tank.
Armament was partially retained, with those aircraft converted from ‘A’
wing machines keeping eight 0.303‑inch machines guns and those from ‘B’
wing fighters retaining just four 0.303‑inch guns after their twin 20 mm
cannon were removed.
The first two examples, W3135 and BM447 (both four‑gun aircraft),
were delivered to Benson on 5 April 1943. By this time the use of dedicated
aircraft for ‘dicing’ was already waning, with the preference being to use
standard PR aircraft fitted with oblique cameras. PR XIIIs remained in
use at Benson with Nos 541 and No 542 Sqns until 1944, but saw little
operational flying.
In an effort to cripple the German war effort, RAF Bomber Command
was constantly looking for vulnerable industries to target in order to create
production bottlenecks. The Ruhr was a major industrial area that was
home to factories involved in vital war production. A key source of power
for this area was derived from the Möhne, Sorpe and Eder dams, and any
successful attack on these targets would seriously impact production.
On 25 January 1943, a request was made to Benson for coverage of the
Möhnesee and its dam. The first attempt was carried out on 7 February
by No 541 Sqn’s Flg Off A Glover (PR IX EN149), but on arrival in the
area he found all of his objectives obscured by cloud. It was not until the
19th that large‑scale photographs were obtained, following a successful
mission over the dam by Flt Lt R C Cussons (PR IX EN151). A further
request was received on 5 May to cover the Sorpe and Eder dams, with
50 C H A P T E R T H R E E Strategic Recce In Northwest Europe

these being successfully photographed on the 13th by Flg

Off G W Puttick (PR IX BS502) of No 542 Sqn.
On the night of 16–17 May No 617 Sqn carried out
Operation Chastise, which saw its crews attack the dams with
Upkeep bouncing bombs dropped from modified Lancaster
B III (Special) heavy bombers. The following morning,
No 542 Sqn’s Flg Off F G Fray (PR XI EN343) obtained
excellent quality, large‑scale photographs of the Möhne and
Sorpe dams. Fray’s images showed that the Möhne dam had
a huge breach, but that the Sorpe dam was intact. On the
18th, Flg Off D G Scott succeeded in covering the Eder
dam, his photographs showing it was physically breached,
and that flooding had extended as far as Kassel. The target
photographs obtained by Nos 541 and 542 Sqns prior to the
attack played a major part in the success of the operation,
and the D/A imagery post‑raid confirmed that Chastise had
been a great success.
Just weeks prior to the dams raid, it had been decided
that a small ferry training unit would be formed within
No 543 Sqn so that PR aircrew to be posted overseas would
be given additional training. On 22 April this unit was officially named In an effort to cripple war production in the
No 309 Ferry Training and Aircraft Despatch Unit (No 309 FT&ADU) Ruhr, the RAF planned to destroy the dams
that produced much of the power on which
and it was made independent of No 543 Sqn. No 309 FT&ADU was the region depended. On 5 April 1943,
based at Benson, and for the remainder of the war all PR aircrew destined No 541 Sqn’s Flg Off James Brew covered
for overseas would pass through the unit. the Möhnesee and its dam from 27,500 ft
in PR XI BS499. It was just one of the many
At the end of April RAF Coastal Command advocated for a reorganisation sorties flown to photograph the dams in
of the PR structure so that the units at Benson and Dyce, where No 8(C) preparation for RAF Bomber Command’s
OTU was now based, were brought under one unified command. On 26 attack on the night of 16–17 May
(Author’s Collection)
June the Air Ministry authorised the formation of No 106(PR) Wing,
headquartered at Benson. The new wing would control the existing
reconnaissance wing, which consisted of five squadrons (Nos 540–544),
No 309 FT&ADU and No 8(C) OTU. No 106(PR) Wing was officially
formed on 3 July, and was responsible for the operational control and
training of all of the RAF’s strategic PR assets in Britain.
Aside from special operations such as supporting Chastise,
Spitfire‑equipped PR units remained firmly committed to covering the
major naval units of the Kriegsmarine in 1943. The location of Tirpitz
and other warships in northern Norway caused the Admiralty to examine
how best to attack these vessels when they were beyond the range of the
RAF’s heavy bombers. It eventually settled on Operation Source, which
would see the vessels at anchor attacked by specifically developed X‑class
midget submarines.
For Source to work, naval planners required exact knowledge of the
location and defences of the ship being targeted – information that could
only be obtained through PR. Arrangements were made to operate a small
detachment of Spitfires from Vaenga, as they had done in 1942. Although
the RAF had not been able to track the movements of Tirpitz since March,
the Soviets had been endeavouring to photograph it using the Spitfire PR IVs
that had been left behind at the end of Orator. The three aircraft had joined
the 3rd Aviation Squadron of the Vaenga‑based 118th Reconnaissance
 51

Aviation Regiment, which was

part of the Northern Fleet.
From the start of May 1943
the 3rd Aviation Squadron
covered Altafjord, and from
the photographs obtained the
battlecruiser Scharnhorst and
the heavy cruiser Lützow were
identified.
On the morning of
3 September No 543 Sqn’s Sqn
Ldr F A Robinson (BR658) and
Flg Offs J H Dixon (AB427) and
B R Kenwright (AB423) took
off for Vaenga, all arriving safely
after a flight time of five hours.
Flg Off Roy Kenwright of No 543 Sqn’s ‘A’ The detachment’s first successful sortie was flown on the 7th by Flg Off Dixon
Flight stands on the wing root of one of the (AB427) when he covered Langfjord. Based on the photographs obtained,
unit’s PR XIs at St Eval in March 1943.
No 543 Sqn was formed from No 1 PRU’s six Royal Navy X‑craft carried out their attack on the ships in Altafjord on
‘C’ and ‘D’ Flights in October 1942 when 22 September, with two of them causing extensive damage to Tirpitz.
No 1 PRU was split into five new squadrons. The day after the operation, both Kenwright and Dixon covered the
‘A’ Flight No 543 Sqn took over
responsibility for covering the ports and fjord. Their photographs revealed that Tirpitz was leaking oil. The last
airfields along France’s western coast. Source sortie was flown on 23 October by Dixon, his photographs showing
Kenwright initially served with No 542 Sqn that Tirpitz was the only major naval unit remaining in Altafjord. The RAF
before joining No 543 Sqn, and he was one
of the pilots who flew from Vaenga during detachment had flown a total of 31 sorties, of which 25 were successful.
Operation Source. On his second The information obtained from the photographs prior to the attack was
operational tour Kenwright served with described by the senior naval commander involved in Source as ‘invaluable’
No 682 Sqn in Italy (Author’s Collection)
to the success of the operation. With the end of the detachment, its
Spitfires were also handed over to the Soviets.

OPTIMUM STRENGTH
By September the establishment of aircraft in No 106(PR) Wing had reached
its target level of 40 Spitfires and 40 Mosquitos, with Nos 541 and 542 Sqns
both being equipped with 20 Spitfire PR XIs. As a consequence, No 543 Sqn
was disbanded on 18 October. That month also saw No 544 Sqn convert
solely to the Mosquito PR IX when its old ‘B’ Flight, which had been
operating Spitfire PR IVs from Gibraltar, was absorbed by No 541 Sqn. From
this point forward the four squadrons of No 106(PR) Wing, together with
the USAAF PRU at Mount Farm, would fulfil the strategic reconnaissance
demands of all British‑based commands and agencies.
On 3 November No 541 Sqn flew six PR XI sorties to the
Pas‑de‑Calais, all of which obtained large‑scale images of their objectives.
The photographs showed a number of sites with exactly the same layout
of buildings and identical features, with the location at Bois‑Carré being
the most advanced. Each site consisted of a platform or ramp aimed in
the direction of London and three ski‑shaped buildings. The imagery
caused consternation at the JIC, which believed the sites were related
to Germany’s long‑range weapons programme. It duly ordered that a
thorough search be carried out along the French coast for what became
52 C H A P T E R T H R E E Strategic Recce In Northwest Europe

known as ‘Bois‑Carré’ sites. Work in connection with the search was

given the codename Crossbow.
By the end of the month 72 sites had been identified, and the breakthrough
occurred on 28 November when large‑scale photographs of Peenemünde
showed a small aircraft at the base of one of the ramps. This confirmed that
the locations in France were firing sites for some kind of flying bomb.
December saw intensive attacks commenced on the Crossbow launch sites
by RAF bombers of the 2nd Tactical Air Force (TAF) and the USAAF’s
VIII Bomber Command under the codename Noball. These attacks
required immediate D/A sorties to be flown, with No 542 Sqn called upon
to provide photographic coverage. The Spitfires of No 106(PR) Wing were
largely responsible for identifying the first long‑range V1 flying bomb, and
its launch sites, and then monitoring enemy efforts to bring the weapon
system into service.

USAAF PR SPITFIRES
Since March 1943 the USAAF had been carrying out strategic
reconnaissance operations from Mount Farm with its 13th PS. This unit
was joined by the 14th and 22nd PSs during the summer, which were
formed into the newly activated 7th Photographic Reconnaissance and
Mapping Group (PRMG) on 7 July 1943 – the latter had only just been
transferred to England from the USA.
Although the 7th was part of the Eighth Air Force, the poor altitude The relatively poor performance of the F‑5A
Lightning and delays in obtaining improved
performance of its F‑5A Lightnings meant that many requests for versions of the aircraft led the Eighth Air
photographic coverage by VIII Bomber Command had to be passed on Force to request Spitfire PR XIs for its own
to the RAF’s No 106(PR) Wing. Delays in obtaining improved versions use. MB950 was one of the first machines
delivered to the 7th PG(R) during November
of the F‑5 led to the Eighth Air Force requesting 12 Spitfire PR XIs for 1943. Initially, the Spitfires were not
use by the 7th PRMG, the first example (MB945) being delivered on assigned to a particular squadron, but in
1 November. Two days later, Maj M Wayne of the 14th PS carried out January 1944 the decision was made that
the 14th PRS would carry out all of the
the group’s first operational Spitfire sortie in the same aircraft when he group’s Spitfire operations
attempted to cover airfields in France. (Author’s Collection)
 53

During November a number of designation changes took place, with

each squadron now being known as a photographic reconnaissance
squadron (PRS) and the group re‑designated as the 7th Photographic
Group (Reconnaissance) (7th PG(R)).
The following month saw more distant objectives covered, with many
sorties being flown in support of VIII Bomber Command. However, the
increased rate of operations soon led to the group’s first PR XI loss when,
on 23 December, Capt S A Scott of the 22nd PRS failed to return from a
sortie to Münster and Osnabrück in PA851.
At the start of January 1944, the decision was made that the 14th PRS
would be the sole operator of the 7th PG(R)’s Spitfires. One pilot who flew
PR XIs with the 14th during 1944 was Lt J S Blyth. Originally trained to
fly the F‑5 with the 22nd PRS, he transferred to the 14th PRS in April;
‘I was impressed with the PR XI’s speed, and how it handled at altitude.
I had previously flown the F‑5, but its performance at height was poor. In
comparison, the Spitfire was very responsive above 30,000 ft and still had
a good rate of climb. Because of all the problems with the F‑5, the Spitfires
did the longer range work. I was fortunate to fly such a great airplane [sic],
and did not mind long‑range missions. My only criticism of the Spitfire
was that compared to the F‑5, the cockpit was cramped, but it was a small
price to pay. I would take my little old Spit any day – it saved my life.’
Blyth flew 38 sorties in PR XIs and covered targets as far afield as
Munich, Schweinfurt and Berlin.

PREPARING FOR OVERLOAD

By March 1944, as well as constant coverage of Crossbow sites, demands
Spitfire PR XI MB793 ‘H’ was assigned to were also increasing for photographic cover of a multitude of targets related
No 542 Sqn at Benson on 21 June 1943. to Operation Overlord, the planned invasion of northern France. Much
Seen here in the early spring of 1944, the
aircraft continued to serve with the unit until of the early work was undertaken by No 140 Sqn, but this was often
7 May 1944 when it suffered an inflight supplemented by the Spitfire units at Benson.
engine failure and its pilot was forced to March had also seen RAF Bomber Command carry out numerous
crash land. The damage was serious
enough for MB793 to be struck off charge attacks on French marshalling yards for Supreme Headquarters Allied
(Author’s Collection) Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), which requested that No 106(PR) Wing
54 C H A P T E R T H R E E Strategic Recce In Northwest Europe

carry out the D/A work. On 27 April No 542 Sqn’s Flt Sgt E G Bacon
(EN658) covered Crossbows in the Cherbourg area. When his photographs
were analysed, they revealed a new site near Le Bel Hamelin. Closer
examination showed that it was probably a launch site, but it did not
conform to the standard pattern, with fewer buildings being visible. From
then on more of these modified sites started to show up on photographs.
Even though the Spitfire PR XI still maintained a healthy high‑altitude
performance advantage over frontline German fighters at this stage in the
conflict, the RAF realised that it would only be a matter of time before
the enemy developed improved types. This led to the introduction of
the first purpose‑built high‑altitude PR Spitfire in the form of the PR X.
Based on the F VII and fitted with the pressure cabin and retractable
tailwheel of the latter, it was equipped with a Merlin 64. The PR X
was fitted with the ‘U’ type camera installation and the ‘wet’ wing of
the PR XI.
Performance was generally similar to the PR XI, but the main
difference was the inclusion of a pressurised cockpit. The small pressure
differential created an environment equivalent to an altitude many
thousands of feet lower, thus enabling the pilot to withstand great
heights for longer periods of time. The cockpit canopy was double Invasion stripes are painted on one of
glazed, and for improved visibility the PR X was fitted with a bulged No 541 Sqn’s Spitfire PR Xs at Benson. On
Malcolm Hood of the Lobelle type. In total only 16 PR Xs were 3 June 1944, instructions were received to
apply invasion markings to all of
built, and they all served with Nos 541 and 542 Sqns from May 1944 No 106(PR) Group’s aircraft under the
through to August 1945. The first example, MD193, was delivered proviso that operations on the 4th be kept
to No 541 Sqn on 8 May, and it made the type’s operational debut to a minimum with aeroplanes so marked,
but that from the 5th onwards only aircraft
three days later when Flt Lt L H Scargill undertook a mission to the with invasion stripes should be flown
Pas‑de‑Calais area. (Author’s Collection)
 55

May also saw the final reorganisation of British‑based strategic

reconnaissance assets. Although the wing headquarters set up in 1943 had
functioned extremely well, the USAAF’s desire to create an independent
organisation to control its own reconnaissance forces in Britain prior to
the invasion of Europe had created a certain amount of tension. Over the
course of many meetings at the highest levels, the Eighth Air Force was
eventually persuaded that its aims would be better served by maintaining
a combined and integrated command.
A new Anglo‑American body known as the Joint Photographic
Reconnaissance Committee (JPRC) would be formed to assess and
prioritise photographic demands. The JPRC would examine all requests
for PR and, as a sub‑committee of the JIC, would have access to the
highest intelligence sources to aid in prioritising tasks. No 106(PR)
Group would be formed from No 106(PR) Wing and retain all of the
units under the latter’s command. No 106(PR) Group and the JPRC
both came into being on 15 May 1944, with the new group answering
directly to the latter.
With the invasion of northern France scheduled for summer 1944, one
of the most important tasks related to Overlord was the destruction of the
enemy radar network. Since the earliest days of the PRU, locating the
On 12 September 1943, Kapitan Leonid
Ilyich Yelkin, commander of the 118th positions of German wireless and radar sites had been a top priority, and as
Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment’s 3rd such much was known about the enemy’s radar installations. On 22 May
Aviation Squadron, attempted a low‑level 1944, fighter‑bombers commenced concentrated attacks on the coastal radar
sortie in Spitfire PR IV BP891 to photograph
German capital ships in Norwegian fjords. sites, and two days later No 541 Sqn began obtaining high‑altitude D/A
Although the images he brought back were photographs of each site. By D‑Day transmissions were detected at only five
too indistinct due to mist and rain to allow out of 98 sites, and even these were not capable of full operation. The success
positive identification, they did confirm the
presence of large vessels in Kaafjord and of the PR organisation in identifying all of the enemy’s radar installations was
Langfjord. On 29 February 1944, Yelkin, who a major contributing factor to the initial success of the invasion.
had been made a Hero of the Soviet Union While No 541 Sqn was committed to covering pre‑invasion targets in
on 22 January, was tasked with covering
Tirpitz in Altafjord in a PR IV but he failed to France, No 542 Sqn continued to fly sorties to Germany and Holland.
return to Vaenga (Author’s Collection) As well as the usual visits to the northern ports to monitor U‑boat
construction, numerous D/A sorties were flown to the likes of
Brunswick and the Ruhr.
May also proved to be a very busy month for the USAAF Spitfires
at Mount Farm, with the 14th PRS flying 72 sorties. Much of the
work was associated with Eighth Air Force raids on German oil
installations, but as more heavy bombers were called upon to strike
French marshalling yards and conduct Noball attacks, an increasing
number of sorties were flown to France.
Whilst much of the PR in relation to Overlord was of a
routine nature, there was one special operation undertaken by
the Spitfires of No 106(PR) Wing in the run‑up to the invasion
that was vitally important. Tirpitz had remained in northern
Norway since it was seriously damaged during Operation Source.
At the end of 1943, the Royal Navy began to formulate plans
for another attack on the vessel, and it quickly concluded that a
carrier strike was the most likely to succeed. Operation Tungsten
was scheduled to take place in March 1944, and in order to
maximise the chances of success, up‑to‑date photographs of
Tirpitz’s anchorage would be required. In order for these to
56 C H A P T E R T H R E E Strategic Recce In Northwest Europe

be obtained, Spitfire PR IVs would be taken out of storage and three

deployed to Vaenga.
With the return of sufficient photographic light at the end of February,
the Royal Navy requested that Soviet Spitfire PR IVs of the 3rd Aviation
Squadron resume operations over Altafjord. On 29 February Kapitán
L I Yelkin attempted to cover the anchorage in a PR IV but failed to return
to Vaenga. On 7 March Sqn Ldr Furniss (BP917) and Flg Off E G Searle
(BP926) set out from Sumburgh, in the Shetland Islands. Five hours later
Searle touched down at Vaenga, but Furniss experienced engine trouble as he
approached the Norwegian coast and had to force‑land at Afrikanda, south
of Murmansk. Back at Sumburgh, Flg Off Dixon (BP929) took off on the
8th and arrived at Vaenga without incident.
Flg Off Searle (BP926) carried out the detachment’s first successful sortie
on 12 March when he obtained photographs of Tirpitz in Kåfjord from
28,000 ft. The Royal Navy planned its attack to take place on 4 April, and
prior to this date nine sorties were flown to Altafjord by Spitfires, including
two by the 3rd Aviation Squadron on 1 April. The attack achieved complete
surprise, with large numbers of bombs striking the ship. On 26 May Searle
took off on what was to prove the last, and most unorthodox, sortie of the
detachment. Leaving Vaenga in BP926 at 2350 hrs, he flew to Altafjord
and by the light of the midnight sun successfully photographed Tirpitz
before landing back at Vaenga at 0220 hrs on the 27th.
Shortly after this sortie, word was received that the detachment
was to return to Britain, and the two remaining Spitfires, BP926 and
BP929, where handed over to the 3rd Aviation Squadron. By the start
of June the Soviet unit recorded a total of four Spitfire PR IVs on
strength, but a further loss occurred on the 18th when BP926, flown
by Stárshiy Leytenánt I Y Popovich, was shot down as he attempted
to cover Kirkenes.
The surviving Spitfires of the 3rd Aviation Squadron were tasked with
obtaining coverage of Tirpitz in Kåfjord during August and September
in the lead up to Operation Paravane – the attack on the vessel by RAF
heavy bombers based at Yagodnik, in northwest Russia. They were
also heavily involved with covering German airfields, strong points
and ports in preparation for the Petsamo–Kirkenes offensive that took
place in October, and in the subsequent liberation of the Finnmark
region. Despite the limited numbers of aircraft available, the Soviets
were able to utilise the Spitfire’s performance to obtain vitally important
photographic coverage that made a great contribution to the Allied war
effort in the Arctic.
As the Tungsten detachment soldiered on with its veteran PR IVs, the
last wartime PR version of the Spitfire was about to arrive at Benson. For
some time work had been ongoing with the development of a PR variant
of the Spitfire F XIV. The PR XIX retained the basic airframe of the
F XIV, but like previous reconnaissance versions, it used the ‘D’ wing
which incorporated leading edge fuel tanks. The PR XIX was fitted with
the Griffon 65 engine that powered a five‑bladed Rotol propeller. The
internal fuel capacity of the Griffon 65‑equipped aircraft was 217 gallons,
which could be supplemented by a single under‑fuselage slipper tank of
various capacities.
 57

Although the first 25 PR XIXs produced were unpressurised, the

remainder all featured a pressure cabin. Another feature of the pressurised
version was the addition of an extra 20‑gallon fuel tank in each wing for
a total internal fuel capacity of 257 gallons. The safe range of the PR XIX
was 950 miles on internal fuel, which was increased to 1160 miles with
the addition of the extra wing tanks of the pressurised version. Its service
ceiling was rated at 42,500 ft, but in reality the aircraft was easily capable
of exceeding 45,000 ft.
The power of the Griffon engine made the PR XIX exceedingly fast,
with a speed advantage of approximately 20 mph over the PR XI at most
altitudes. The cockpit was fitted with a bulged Lobelle sliding canopy
hood, and the armoured windscreen retained on the PR X was replaced
with a frameless and strengthened plain windscreen. The PR XIX featured
the ‘U’ type camera installation, and for tactical work a forward‑facing
oblique F24 camera could be installed in each wing. In total, 225 PR XIXs
were produced.
The first two examples of the unpressurised PR XIX, RM627 and
RM628, arrived at Benson on 30 April 1944, with the latter aircraft
being passed on to No 542 Sqn during May. The first PR XIX sortie was
carried out on 24 May by No 542 Sqn’s Sqn Ldr Ball (RM628), who
obtained photographs of coastal targets in the Le Havre area. On 15 June
No 541 Sqn’s Sqn Ldr J H Saffery (RM633) was tasked with objectives in
Spitfire PR XIX RM633 of No 541 Sqn was
photographed in early June 1944 shortly the Ruhr, but was forced to abandon his aircraft over the Channel when
after joining the unit. Although the first its engine failed. RM633 was the first PR XIX to be lost on operations,
operational PR XIX sortie was flown on although Saffery was rescued.
24 May by No 542 Sqn, the type was not
cleared for general use until the following The anticipated V1 flying bomb offensive had commenced just
month. RM633 was lost on its first 48 hours before the loss of RM633, with a number of weapons being
operational sortie on 15 June. Sqn Ldr John fired at London. From then on, the search for launch sites became an even
Saffery had been tasked with photographing
targets in the Ruhr, but as he crossed the higher priority for No 106(PR) Group, with Allied attacks to destroy them
Channel his oil pressure dropped to zero being stepped up. This in turn generated ever greater demands for D/A,
and his propeller stuck in fine pitch. Forced particularly from low‑level. Ironically, no dedicated low‑level version of the
to glide back to the English coast, he
eventually had to bail out due to rapid PR Spitfire remained in service, with the PR XIII having long been retired
altitude loss. Despite an extensive ASR from the inventories of Nos 541 and 542 Sqns.
effort Saffery was not found until night had June proved to be an exceptionally busy month for No 542 Sqn,
fallen, when he was picked up by a MTB
heading out to patrol off the Belgian coast with a record 226 operational sorties carried out. Whilst the majority
(Author’s Collection) were flown in the PR XI, both the PR X and PR XIX made useful
58 C H A P T E R T H R E E Strategic Recce In Northwest Europe

contributions. For No 541 Sqn, the weather had a much greater impact
on flying, with the conditions over northern and central Germany
restricting operations for much of the month. The crash of RM633 was
the only operational Spitfire loss suffered by No 106(PR) Group during
June, but the 14th PRS at Mount Farm had not been so lucky. On the
15th Lt R W Diderickson (PL790) was tasked with covering objectives in
the Évreux and Coulommiers areas, but he crashed near Paris, whilst on
the 28th Maj C T Haugen (PL767) was killed when his PR XI crashed
near Watlington, in Oxfordshire, in poor weather as he returned from
covering the Paris area.
Towards the end of July an ominous threat made its first appearance in
the skies over Germany when a No 544 Sqn Mosquito was intercepted by
a jet fighter in the Munich area. This was the first known encounter with a
Me 262, but No 106(PR) Group had already run into the rocket‑powered
Me 163 back on 29 May when No 542 Sqn’s Flt Lt G R Crakanthorp
(MB791) was tasked with photographing the German North Sea ports;
‘After covering Wilhelmshaven, I observed an aircraft climbing rapidly
at about 3000 ft per minute. I climbed as soon as I saw him, and as I
reached 41,000 ft he was only 1000 yards to the south of me, but still a
few thousand feet below. As I readied to turn into his attack, the exhaust
plume on his aircraft stopped and he turned away without gaining any
more height.’
Crakanthorp had encountered a Me 163 of Erprobungskommando 16,
based at Bad Zwischenahn, which had started combat trials earlier that
month. Fortunately for him, Crakanthorp had been intercepted at the
limit of the rocket fighter’s endurance, and the extra altitude gained
probably saved his life.
By the end of August much of France was in Allied hands, with Paris
having been liberated on the 25th. Although Luftwaffe opposition over During the summer of 1944 PR XI EN664
France was minimal, an increasing number of Mosquitos were being ‘Q’ BRENDA was regularly flown by Flg Off
John Bendixsen of No 541 Sqn’s ‘B’ Flight
intercepted over southern Germany by Me 262s. Such was the frequency at St Eval. Its last operational sortie from the
that No 106(PR) Group urgently argued that Spitfire PR XIXs should be Cornish base was undertaken on 14 July
used wherever possible to relieve the Mosquitos. Until such time as the 1944 when, despite being subjected to
much light flak, Bendixsen successfully
PR XIX had the range to operate over southern Germany, it was proposed covered the RDF station at Le Conquet at
that aircraft flying from Italy take over responsibility for the Munich area. low level (Author’s Collection)
 59

It was during August that No 106(PR) Group received notification that

production of the PR XI was to be phased out from December 1944, and
that all Spitfire PR squadrons would have their PR XIX establishment
increased.
The start of September saw the Allied armies in France make spectacular
advances. Many of the flying bomb launch sites in the Pas‑de‑Calais were
overrun, effectively halting the campaign against Britain and thus ending
a major commitment for British‑based strategic reconnaissance aircraft.
Between May and September, PR had located 133 modified V1 launch sites
in northern France, allowing the threat to be largely neutralised by aerial
bombing. All told, more than 3000 PR sorties had been flown in connection
with the flying bomb campaign since 1943, the majority by the Spitfires of Nos
541 and 542 Sqns, along with a significant contribution from the 14th PRS.
With German resistance seemingly on the edge of collapsing, the Allies
hastily set about preparing for an airborne operation to capture bridges
across the Rhine. On 6 September No 541 Sqn flew 16 sorties, of which
eight attempted to cover bridges across the Meuse/Maas, Waal and Rhine
between Grave and Arnhem. Three were carried out at low‑level by
PR XIXs fitted with a new forward‑facing oblique F24 camera installation.
The original plan to seize the Rhine bridges was expanded into a major
operation involving most of the First Allied Airborne Army. No 106(PR)
Group was called upon to provide the bulk of the photographic coverage
for the new operation, now known as Market Garden. Once it began on
17 September, No 541 Sqn continued to generate photographic coverage,
with the busiest day being the 19th when six successful sorties were flown
to Arnhem. Despite six days of heavy fighting, Market Garden was a costly
failure, with the Germans managing to prevent an Allied breakthrough.
In the meantime, No 542 Sqn endeavoured to penetrate deeper and
deeper into central and southern Germany in an effort to relieve Mosquitos
of the duty. While September had resulted in the loss of three USAAF
Spitfires, it looked likely Nos 541 and 542 Sqns would see the month out
without casualties. Unfortunately this was not to be, for on the 28th Flt
Lt D K McCuaig (PL904) of No 541 Sqn failed to return from a sortie
to Bremen. He had been intercepted and shot down by a Fw 190D‑9
southwest of the city, McCuaig’s PR XI being the first to fall to the new
Focke‑Wulf fighter.
The failure of Market Garden effectively ended major ground operations
in the west for the remainder of 1944. However, the Combined Bombing
Offensive against German industrial targets had resumed after a brief
hiatus caused by Overlord, with attacks now being stepped up against oil
installations.
With the liberation of most of France and Belgium, an increasing
amount of the work of the Spitfires based at Benson and Mount Farm
was connected with the various aspects of the bombing offensive. By the
middle of October it was proposed that Nos 541 and 542 Sqns would be
equipped with 15 PR XIXs and five PR XIs each. It was anticipated that
a pressurised version of the PR XIX would soon be in limited production,
with full production scheduled for February 1945.
At the start of December, No 541 Sqn was informed that it would be
required to provide a detachment to the Continent in support of the First
60 C H A P T E R T H R E E Strategic Recce In Northwest Europe

Allied Airborne Army to assist in gathering intelligence in preparation for In early 1945 some of the Spitfire PR XIs
further airborne landings. On the 15th, three Spitfires (PR X MD198, flown by the 14th PRS exchanged their PRU
Blue camouflage scheme for a natural
PR XI PA859 and PR XIX RM637) left Benson for Brussels/Melsbroek metal finish. By this time all of the
(B58). Due to poor weather, it was not until the 23rd that the detachment squadron’s aircraft were identified by an
undertook its first sorties, with Flg Off C K Arnold (RM637) photographing Olive Green rudder, and they were also
marked with the red identification bar of the
the Wesel area and Flt Lt G E Walker (PA959) covering Emmerich. 7th PG(R) on the engine cowling. PA892
On New Year’s Day the Luftwaffe launched Operation Bodenplatte, served with the 14th PRS for 15 months
which saw fighters from 34 Jagdgruppen attack Allied airfields in Belgium, before being handed back to the RAF on
3 April 1945 (Author’s Collection)
the Netherlands and France. Brussels/Melsbroek was attacked early in
the morning, with heavy damage inflicted on numerous reconnaissance
aircraft belonging to the 2nd TAF as Bf 109s and Fw 190s made repeated
strafing passes. The No 541 Sqn detachment did not escape unscathed,
with MD198 being totally destroyed and PA859 badly damaged. The
detachment ended shortly after Bodenplatte, with the three aircraft having
gathered much detailed information that SHAEF and the First Allied
Airborne Army would soon put to good use.
Back in Britain, the 7th PG(R) flew its 4000th sortie on 24 February
1945, the honour falling to a PR XI flown by Lt J H Roberts of the
14th PRS who successfully covered targets around Leipzig.
By the beginning of March, German resistance west of the Rhine had
almost been eliminated. In the air, the relentless campaign against the
enemy’s oil and transportation targets continued unabated, with constant
requests for targeting and D/A keeping all PR units busy.
March was also marked by the high number of interceptions made by
Luftwaffe fighters, particularly jet‑ and rocket‑powered machines. On the
3rd, No 541 Sqn’s Flg Off W G Brooks was assigned oil targets in the
Aschersleben and Böhlen areas, but he was killed when his PR XI crashed.
The following day the unit suffered another loss when Flt Lt Scargill was
forced to bail out of his PR XIX on a D/A sortie to Bielefeld. On the
9th, Flt Lt G Platts went missing in PR XIX RM631 on a sortie to cover
airfields in the Hanover area, and ten days later PR XI PL856 flown by
 61

Flt Lt B K L Fuge failed to return from a mission to targets between

Lüneburg and Oranienburg. Finally, on the 21st, Flt Lt F P Adlam
(RM635) was killed on a sortie to Hamburg, his aircraft being the third
PR XIX lost by the squadron during the month.
Despite German resistance on the ground showing signs of breaking,
the level of interception by the Luftwaffe against reconnaissance aircraft
had been unprecedented. Indeed, the casualties incurred by No 541 Sqn in
March were the highest suffered by the unit during the war. For the month
as a whole No 541 Sqn had flown 168 sorties, but the cost had been high,
with five pilots missing. Likewise, No 542 Sqn had been extremely busy,
with the unit flying 130 operational sorties, but fortunately it had escaped
without any casualties. At Mount Farm, the 14th PRS had also avoided
losses, despite flying many sorties.
As it appeared the war in Europe was nearing its end, USAAF planners
began preparing for the transfer of the Eighth Air Force to the Pacific. As
part of these plans, all units would be equipped with American aircraft,
and as such, on 29 March, the 14th PRS was informed that it would be
swapping its Spitfires for F‑5 Lightnings. In the 17 months the Spitfire
had served with the 7th PG(R), the aircraft had earned a reputation for
reliability and outstanding performance. For a long period the Spitfires
of the 14th PRS were the only machines from the 7th PG(R) capable
of securing the photographs necessary for the USAAF bomber force to
continue its offensive against German targets.
By May much of the Third Reich was in Allied hands and PR operations
had practically ceased. On the 7th Flg Off I H Seddon (PM189) of
No 541 Sqn carried out his unit’s last operational sortie of the war from
Benson when he covered Flensburg and Kiel. Earlier that same day,
No 542 Sqn’s Flg Off K Durbidge (PA948) successfully completed his
squadron’s last mission when he covered the Biscay ports. Enemy forces
unconditionally surrendered on 8 May.
One of the main factors contributing to the rapid collapse of German
resistance was the systematic targeting of its oil industries. PR had enabled
Allied interpreters to identify nearly all of Germany’s oil refineries and
storage facilities, and once a concerted effort was begun to destroy them
output was severely impacted. Much of the credit for this success must
go to the Spitfires of No 106(PR) Group and the 7th PG(R), which
were often the only reconnaissance aircraft capable of operating in areas
where German jets were active. Although it had been intended that the
PR X and PR XI Spitfires of No 106(PR) Group would be replaced by
the PR XIX during 1945, delays in production meant that the PR XI
remained the main operational type with both Nos 541 and 542 Sqns
through to VE Day.
With the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the PR squadrons at Benson
were put on standby for the possibility of transferring to Southeast
Asia. However, neither Nos 541 or 542 Sqns were required to move
as Japan surrendered three months after Germany. Within days of the
announcement, No 542 Sqn was disbanded (on 27 August 1945), but
No 541 Sqn continued to operate Spitfire PR XIs and PR XIXs for survey
work until it too was disbanded on 1 October 1946 and renumbered
No 82 Sqn.
62 C H A P T E R F O U R In Support Of The Army

C H A P T E R F OUR

IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY

T
he disbandment of No 1 PRU in October 1942 made little difference Spitfire PR XI EN654 was assigned to
to the day‑to‑day operations of No 140 Sqn, which continued to No 16 Sqn, which was the second PR unit
to join No 34 Wing. It provided direct
cover German coastal defences in France as part of RAF Army support to the 21st Army Group, the
Co‑operation Command’s No 34 Wing. By the start of 1943, the unit’s controlling HQ for British forces allocated
PR VIIs were old and worn, and even the performance of the PR IV was for the invasion of northwest Europe. Once
No 140 Sqn fully converted to the Mosquito
inferior to the latest German fighters. In February the War Office made in April 1944, No 16 Sqn became the sole
a request for No 140 Sqn to be re‑equipped with the Spitfire PR XI, but PR Spitfire operator within the wing
the limited numbers available meant that this was denied. On 12 March (Author’s Collection)
No 140 Sqn was informed that it would be moving to Hartford Bridge, in
Hampshire, from where the first successful sortie was flown on the 16th
when Flg Off E W Forwell (AB118) covered La Havre.
On 1 June 1943, RAF Army Co‑operation Command was disbanded
and replaced by the newly formed Tactical Air Force (TAF). It was intended
that the new organisation would meet all the air support requirements of
the 21st Army Group – the British component of the forces earmarked for
the forthcoming invasion of northwest Europe. No 140 Sqn remained a
part of No 34 Wing at Hartford Bridge, where it was joined by No 16 Sqn
on the 29th. It was planned that the latter unit would convert to the Spitfire
PR XI, and together with No 140 Sqn it would fulfil the PR demands
of HQ TAF.
The amount of operational flying by No 140 Sqn during August
dropped off significantly as the unit’s Spitfires were used to convert
 63

No 16 Sqn onto the type. Although

No 140 Sqn had been informed it would be
converting to the Mosquito, two new Spitfire
PR XIs were received on 4 September. On
the 8th Flg Off C Mason (EN681) flew the
unit’s first operational PR XI sortie when
he successfully photographed targets in
the Pas‑de‑Calais. No 16 Sqn was able to
perform its first high‑altitude PR sortie of
the war in one of No 140 Sqn’s PR XIs on
the 18th when Flt Lt A N Davis flew EN680
to Boulogne, where he obtained photographs
from 30,000 ft. On 8 November No 16 Sqn
was finally allotted its own Spitfires when six
PR IVs and two PR XIs were received from
No 140 Sqn. These were quickly followed by
eight new PR XIs delivered from Benson.
Wg Cdr Eric Le Mesurier, CO of On the 15th, No 34 Wing’s controlling HQ was re‑designated 2nd
No 140 Sqn, poses for the camera in the TAF. In addition to No 34 Wing, which was directly sub‑ordinate to
cockpit of one of his unit’s Spitfire PR VIIs.
Le Mesurier was one of the finest PR pilots HQ 2nd TAF, each army within the 21st Army Group was allocated a
in the RAF, and was the first to be awarded reconnaissance wing to meets its own demands. The Canadian First Army
the Distinguished Service Order, in March was supported by No 35 Wing and the British Second Army’s needs would
1941 – he had received a Distinguished
Flying Cross in May 1940. He was an early be met by No 39 Wing. It was intended that each wing would consist of
member of the PDU and served with one PR squadron, with one flight of Spitfires and one of Mosquitos, and
No 212 Sqn in France, before being given two or more Tac/R squadrons equipped with the Mustang I.
command of the PRU’s ‘C’ Flight. Le
Mesurier then went on to form RAF Army Within No 35 Wing, No 4 Sqn was chosen to become a photographic unit,
Co‑operation Command’s own dedicated whereas within No 39 Wing, the Royal Canadian Air Force’s No 400 Sqn
PRU, No 1416 Flight/No 140 Sqn, which he was selected for the role. Towards the end of November, No 400 Sqn received
commanded until mid‑1943. He was killed
in a flying accident in a Mosquito T III whilst its first two Spitfires, both PR XIIIs, for training. No 4 Sqn was informed
serving as Chief Instructor of No 8(C) OTU that its ‘A’ Flight would re‑equip with the Spitfire PR XI, although this was
on 23 December 1943 (Author’s Collection) delayed by a number of weeks due to a shortage of machines. As an interim
measure, three Spitfire PR XIIIs were received on 30 December.
A number of the sorties flown by Nos 140 and 16 Sqns at the end
of December were in connection with covering Crossbow sites. Earlier in
the month, the Allies had commenced large‑scale Noball attacks on these
locations, with the JIC requesting that 2nd TAF assist with photography.
The PR Spitfires tasked with undertaking these missions would continue
to play a significant part in the campaign against the Crossbow sites until
they moved to the Continent following the invasion.
Over the course of 1943 the reconnaissance squadrons allocated to
support the invasion forces had seen great change. For Nos 16, 4 and
400 Sqns, it meant switching to a new role and re‑equipment, and at
the turn of the year only No 16 Sqn was operational with Spitfires.
No 140 Sqn had finally received PR XIs, but not before being informed
it would be giving up all of its Spitfires for Mosquitos.
It was no secret that the invasion of Europe was likely to take place in the
late spring or early summer of 1944, and from March onwards the pressure
of work on 2nd TAF’s reconnaissance squadrons increased rapidly with
greater demand for coverage of targets in Normandy and the Pas‑de‑Calais.
Unfortunately, No 16 Sqn incurred its first operational loss of a PR XI on
64 C H A P T E R F O U R In Support Of The Army

8 March when Flg Off A L Pearsall (PA863) failed to

return from a sortie to Calais.
At the start of 1944 both Nos 400 and 4 Sqns were
busy training and building up their strength. On
19 January, No 400 Sqn received its first two PR XIs.
The unit’s first operational PR XI sortie was carried
out on 9 February when Sqn Ldr R A Ellis (PA886)
photographed Noball targets in the Pas‑de‑Calais.
No 4 Sqn received its first PR XI on 14 January, and
the aircraft made its operational debut on 7 March
when Flt Lt D A Draper (PA857) attempted to cover
Noball sites.
With the invasion of Europe imminent, 2nd
TAF’s PRUs were fully occupied with tasks over the
Continent. However, with the exception of No 16 Sqn,
they were hampered by re‑equipment – No 140 Sqn
was winding down its Spitfire operations and Nos 4
and 400 Sqns were experiencing problems introducing
the Mosquito into service. In contrast, the PR XI had
proven a great success, and it now fell to No 16 Sqn and
the Spitfire‑equipped flights of Nos 4 and 400 Sqns to
fulfil the majority of 2nd TAF’s burgeoning photographic demands. Flg Off Peter Brearley of No 140 Sqn stands
April saw No 140 Sqn fly more than 100 sorties, but only three were in front of one of the unit’s Spitfire PR XIs at
Hartford Bridge. He had joined No 140 Sqn
carried out in Spitfires. The unit’s very last PR XI sortie was conducted in November 1942 after completing his
on the 27th by Flg Off P G Brearley (EN663) when he obtained training at No 8(C) OTU. Brearley carried out
photographs of Carentan. The unit had been equipped with Spitfires since the squadron’s very last Spitfire sortie in
PR XI EN663 on 27 April 1944 when he
its formation in March 1941, and for many on the squadron it was a sad successfully covered targets between
day, including Brearley; Port‑en‑Bessin‑Huppain and Carentan, in
‘As a photo‑recce pilot in a Spitfire, there was a high workload – you Normandy (Author’s Collection)
had to navigate and look out for the enemy. If you were attacked in a Spit
you could nearly always get out of trouble, especially with the PR XI. I
was sorry to see the Spitfires go.’
On 10 April, No 4 Sqn flew six sorties to cover Noball sites and rivers in
northern France and Belgium. Five of these were conducted in Spitfires,
and unfortunately included the squadron’s first operational loss on the
type. Flg Off I A Turnbull (PA901) was briefed to photograph canals in
the Knocke‑Hulst area but failed to return.
At the start of May, both Nos 4 and 400 Sqns were notified that they
would be losing their Mosquitos and would fully equip with the Spitfire,
which offered improved serviceability and was much better suited to the
shorter range, high frequency work carried out by the units. On the 3rd
they were officially informed that their establishments would change to
18 Spitfire PR XIs.
During the last ten days of May a concerted campaign was begun to
destroy the German radar network along the north coast of France from
Brittany to the Pas‑de‑Calais. All of 2nd TAF’s PRUs were heavily tasked
with obtaining D/A photographs and monitoring German efforts to repair
their installations. By the time of the invasion not one single station was
left fully functional, with much credit for this going to the PR organisation
and the squadrons of 2nd TAF.
 65

On 27 May Flt Lt P O Miles (PA929) carried out No 16 Sqn’s first

low‑level Spitfire sortie when he successfully covered the coast between
Berck‑sur‑Mer and Cayeux‑sur‑Mer, his aircraft being fitted with split
F52 moving film cameras.

OVERLORD
Nine days later all of 2nd TAF’s aircraft were painted with invasion
stripes ready for D‑Day operations on 6 June. Once the landings began,
it was intended that each army would be directly supported by its own
reconnaissance wing. The Tac/R squadrons supporting each army would
provide visual intelligence and some oblique photography, whereas each
wings’ PR squadron would be responsible for photography up to a range
of about 150 miles. Beyond this, No 34 Wing would secure intelligence
for HQ 21st Army Group to a depth of 300 miles, with No 16 Sqn now
being the sole operator of PR Spitfires in the wing.
As D‑Day dawned the weather quickly deteriorated, with No 400 Sqn
only flying three sorties on the 6th and No 4 Sqn just a single mission.
No 16 Sqn was able to despatch the most aircraft, with 16 sorties
attempted, although most failed to secure any photographs.
In keeping with the policy of conducting low‑level operations, which
were now being more frequently undertaken, No 16 Sqn took delivery of
six Spitfire IXs on 18 June. These were standard F IXs which retained their
armament and normal fuel configuration, but were modified to carry a single
port‑facing oblique F24 camera. Known as the FR IX, the aircraft flown by
No 16 Sqn were painted in the pale pink scheme first seen on No 1 PRU
Spitfires in 1941. The FR IX was only produced in limited numbers, with
most being used in northwest Europe. Sqn Ldr E M Goodale undertook
his unit’s first sortie in the type on the 23rd when he successfully covered
rail targets around Saint‑Omer.
On the first day of July, No 400 Sqn’s ‘A’ Flight flew its nine PR XIs
to Sommervieu (B8) near Bayeux in order to rapidly respond to Army
requests. The first PR operations were flown from B8 on the 3rd when six
sorties were sent to targets around Caen. On the 17th the unit suffered its
first operational PR XI loss when Flt Lt F E Hanton was forced to abandon
PA797 when his engine caught fire on a sortie to Villers‑Bocage. He was
able to bail out near Bayeux as he tried to return to B8, but suffered burns.
At the end of July No 4 Sqn began operating a two‑aircraft detachment
from within the beachhead at Plumetot (B10). On the 31st, Flt Lt Draper
and Flg Off A R Hutchinson flew to France, ready to begin operations
the following day.
August brought no let up in air operations as the fighting in Normandy
was reaching a critical stage. On the first day of the month No 16 Sqn was
heavily committed to targets in northeast France, with nine sorties being
flown. Flt Lt A P G Holden twice encountered Fw 190s as he attempted
to cover bridges across the River Eure, but in both cases the superior
performance of his PR XI got him out of trouble.
At the start of August the Americans had succeeded in breaking out of
the western end of the beachhead and quickly overran Brittany. In the
following week they swung round to the north and threatened to trap
66 C H A P T E R F O U R In Support Of The Army

German forces in a large salient centred on Falaise. By the 21st the pocket A Spitfire PR XI of No 400 Sqn taxis across
was sealed and the bulk of the German Seventh Army destroyed. From this the grass at Sainte‑Honorine‑de‑Ducy (B21)
in late August 1944. When the unit
point on enemy resistance in northern France was effectively over and a transferred here from Sommervieu (B8) on
full‑scale retreat east began. This situation had been anticipated by the 21st 15 August, operations were not disrupted in
Army Group, with No 16 Sqn having already flown numerous sorties to all any way. Indeed, by 1000 hrs all 18 of
No 400 Sqn’s PR XIs had either flown
the major communications centres in northeastern France and Belgium. directly to B21 or taken off from B8 on
The intense fighting south of Caen in August meant that No 400 Sqn operations and landed at the new base
was called on to fulfil numerous demands in the area. On the 4th the upon their return. The PRUs of 2nd TAF tried
to stay in close proximity to the HQs issuing
unit flew 16 sorties from B8, with 12 obtaining photographs of their photographic demands, as this greatly
objectives. During the evening of the 10th ‘B’ Flight reunited with the expedited the despatch of aircraft and the
rest of the squadron when it transferred to France. On 15 August the processing and analysis of the intelligence
gained (Author’s Collection)
whole squadron made the first of many moves when it transferred to
Sainte‑Honorine‑de‑Ducy (B21). Operations were not disrupted, however,
continuing throughout the day.
On 1 August, No 4 Sqn carried out its first operation from within the
beachhead when Flt Lt Draper (PA852) was tasked with searching for a rail
gun. The pilot obtained photographs of the railway lines between Argentan
and Caen from 12,000 ft, and when Draper’s images were examined the
interpreters located the gun, allowing it to be attacked by Typhoons. On
the 16th the remainder of No 4 Sqn transferred to Bény‑sur‑Mer (B4),
where, on arrival the pilots found the detachment from B10 already set
up. Operations commenced the next day.
Due to the rapid retreat of the Germans towards the Seine, sorties were
flown further to the east, and on 25 August No 4 Sqn set a new record
when 32 sorties were generated. It had, in fact, been a busy month for
all of 2nd TAF’s PRUs, with every squadron flying well over 200 sorties.
By mid‑September, the frontlines had stabilised as the Germans
consolidated their positions along the Siegfried Line and in southern
Holland along the Scheldt and Maas. The enemy had left strong garrisons
in most of the Channel Ports to deny their use to the Allies, and they
also controlled both banks of the Scheldt Estuary, which made Antwerp
useless as a port.
On 4 September, No 16 Sqn began transferring to Balleroy (A12) in the
American sector, southwest of Bayeux. Its first operations were flown from
the airfield the following day when seven PR XI sorties were sent to the
 67

Netherlands, eastern France and the lower Rhine districts of Germany. On

the 9th the squadron was ordered to move to Amiens/Glisy (B48), with
the aircraft transferring during the morning. Two sorties were flown from
B48 in the afternoon, with WO W J Willshaw bringing back photographs
of the mouth of the Elbe. Flg Off J Wallace failed to return from a mission
to the Netherlands, however.
On 10 September an earlier Allied plan to cross the lower Rhine was
expanded into an even bigger operation involving the whole of the First
Allied Airborne Army. As previously noted, the original aim of Market Garden
was the capture of bridges over the river, but the operation now called for
the near simultaneous insertion of three parachute divisions. Although the
ground elements for the operation would come from the 21st Army Group,
PR in the lead‑up period was largely undertaken by No 106(PR) Group.
On 16 September, Wg Cdr Webb from No 34 Wing, together with Flg
Offs G A Winter, L L Cadan and J R Brodby of No 16 Sqn, flew back to
Northolt, where their Spitfires would be available to fulfil photographic
demands originating directly from HQ First Allied Airborne Army once
the airborne landings began. The first sortie was undertaken the following
day by Wg Cdr Webb when he covered bridges and drop zones at Arnhem,
Nijmegen and Eindhoven at low level in PR XI PL834.
On the ground, the Germans managed to clear British paratroopers from
the centre of Arnhem, and although fighting continued for a number of
days Market Garden had effectively failed. The operation had expended
most of the supplies available in France, as Allied forces were then still
Sqn Ldr Charles Harris‑St John took over very much dependent on over‑extended logistical routes. Failure to clear
command of No 4 Sqn from Wg Cdr Robert the Channel Ports or the Scheldt Estuary meant an enforced end to
Hardiman in May 1944, and he offensive operations along most of the front. This pause enabled many
subsequently led it until the unit was
disbanded in August 1945. He flew his first of 2nd TAF’s units to move nearer to the front, including No 34 Wing.
sortie with No 4 Sqn on 25 May 1944 when On 27 September, No 16 Sqn moved 120 miles northeast to Melsbroek
he covered targets in the Neufchâtel, (B58), near Brussels. The next day eight sorties were flown to targets in
Honfleur and Le Havre areas. Harris‑St John
is seen as a pilot officer in the cockpit of a the Netherlands and Germany, with all bringing back photographs. It had
Type G Spitfire of No 140 Sqn, with whom been a tough month for the squadron, which had lost four pilots killed or
he completed a long tour during which he missing – its worst level of casualties since becoming a PR unit.
was awarded a DFC (for a harrowing flight
over Dieppe on 18 August 1942) and Bar At the start of September No 400 Sqn was again on the move, this
(Author’s Collection) time to Avrilly (B34), near Évreux in France. Twelve sorties were flown
on the 4th, including eight in the evening to
German targets. Flt Lt L W Seath (PL837)
was tasked with obtaining photographs
to form a mosaic of the Osnabrück area.
He landed back at B34 in darkness with
15 gallons of fuel remaining after 4 hr
9 min flying time. This was the longest
sortie yet flown by the squadron, and
the deepest penetration into Germany.
On 20 September the squadron moved
to Blankenberge (B66), in Belgium, to
bring it closer to the British Second Army
frontline, but little operational flying was
possible for the remainder of September.
Despite this, No 400 Sqn had flown
68 C H A P T E R F O U R In Support Of The Army

246 operational sorties during the month and, more importantly, had
not lost any pilots.
September had also seen No 4 Sqn make multiple moves before ending
up at Saint‑Denis‑Westrem (B61), near Ghent in Belgium, on the 27th.
This move brought No 35 Wing and its sub‑ordinate units within 25 miles
of the frontline, putting them in a good position to rapidly react to the
reconnaissance demands of the Canadian First Army.
By the start of October Boulogne and Calais had been cleared of
German defenders, but the port facilities were wrecked and, in any event,
they lacked the capacity to meet the supply needs of all Allied armies in
France. Only one port was capable of fulfilling this requirement and that
was Antwerp, which was already in Allied hands. However, the shipping
approaches through the Scheldt were still firmly under German control.
Allied armies would not be able to resume full‑scale offensive operations
until their logistics issues were resolved, and as such they set about clearing
the Germans from both banks of the Scheldt Estuary in what became
known as the Battle of the Scheldt.
Reconnaissance operations by 2nd TAF’s PRUs settled down into a series
of generally routine sorties as the sectors in front of each army remained
more or less stable. Monitoring German positions along the Scheldt
remained one of the primary tasks of No 4 Sqn, together with regular
coverage of western and central Holland. On 11 October the unit was
on the move again, this time to Deurne (B70) near Antwerp. As was now
standard practice, pilots took off from their old base and after completing
their sorties recovered to the new location. Moving base was now a
well‑established routine and had little impact on operational efficiency,
and the next day the squadron was able to carry out 22 Spitfire sorties.
Once the Scheldt had been cleared No 4 Sqn could concentrate on tasks
further to the north behind the Maas and the Lek and into Germany, and
for the remainder of the year this section of the frontline was relatively quiet.
On 4 November Flt Lt E J Lischke (PA852) was detailed to cover targets
west of Münster. As he neared his objectives, two Fw 190Ds attacked from
the port quarter. The pilot immediately broke into them and made a tight
climbing turn. To Lischke’s dismay, the enemy aircraft were able to match
his climb and stayed with him up to 36,000 ft. Just when it looked like the
Focke‑Wulf fighters were about to get into firing position, four USAAF
Mustangs appeared and caused the enemy aircraft to break away.
On the 6th, Flt Lt R M Cowell attempted to cover targets in the
Enschede area, but south of Hengelo he spotted an aircraft high above
him. It closed rapidly and dived to attack. As it neared, Cowell could see
it was a twin‑engined jet, probably a Me 262. It opened fire from about
1000 yards, but as the range decreased the Spitfire pilot turned sharply into
his assailant and it flashed by. Undeterred, the German aircraft made four
more attacks, and each time Cowell successfully repeated his manoeuvre,
preventing the jet from bringing its guns to bear. After the fifth attack
Cowell was able to find refuge in cloud and the jet was not seen again.
On 23 November No 4 Sqn moved to Gilze‑Rijen (B77) near Tilburg,
in the Netherlands. This would be its last move for some time, and the
unit settled down to a regular routine, with operations attempted whenever
the weather permitted.
 69

Spitfire PR XI PL883 of No 400 Sqn taxis No 400 Sqn was also frequently on the move. On 3 October its 18
towards the runway at a waterlogged Spitfires had transferred from Blankenberge to Eindhoven (B78), in the
Eindhoven (B78), the unit having moved
here from Blankenberg (B66) on 3 October Netherlands, from where the unit lost its first pilot on operations since
1944. Due to the relative stability of the converting to PR Spitfires. On the 28th Flt Lt W W Kennedy (PL925)
frontlines, it remained at the airfield until took off on his second sortie of the day, this time tasked with covering
7 March 1945. PL883 was one of the five
PR XIs lost by No 400 Sqn during the targets between the Dutch border and Hamm, in Germany. It seems likely
Luftwaffe attack on B78 on New Year’s Day he was hit by flak near Arnhem, as his aircraft crashed near Steenderen
1945 (Author’s Collection) with Kennedy still at the controls.
As Nos 4 and 400 Sqns concentrated on covering their respective sectors
of the front, No 16 Sqn continued to range deeper into enemy territory,
where encounters with Luftwaffe fighters were becoming more frequent.
Increasing numbers of pilots were reporting sightings of German jets, but
for the most part as long as the enemy were seen first they could be avoided.
On 18 November seven sorties were sent to targets in the Netherlands and
Germany, and one of these resulted in yet another loss for No 16 Sqn when
Plt Off W C Heath failed to return from a low‑level mission to photograph
the bridges at Venlo, in the Netherlands.
By December the frontline in the Netherlands was more or less static,
with the main area of fighting being around the German bridgehead across
the Maas. Other than the 3rd, which allowed Nos 16 Sqn and 400 Sqns to
fly 12 and 15 sorties, respectively, the weather for the first three weeks of
the month prevented much operational flying by any of 2nd TAF’s PRUs.
Within No 34 Wing the advent of the Me 262 had made No 140 Sqn’s
Mosquitos too vulnerable for daylight operations. Going forward, HQ
21st Army Group’s daylight PR requirements would be met solely by the
Spitfires of No 16 Sqn.
On 16 December the Germans began their Ardennes offensive, with
the aim of retaking Antwerp. A period of poor weather had allowed
the Wehrmacht to move its forces up to the front undetected by aerial
reconnaissance. The PRUs of 2nd TAF, which had been practically
grounded for a week, were all able to fly multiple sorties on the 23rd,
with No 4 Sqn carrying out 18 successful operations. This tempo was
maintained on Christmas Eve, with No 16 Sqn attempting 13 sorties.
As 1944 came to an end, the PR squadrons of 2nd TAF had flown
many successful sorties in support of the 21st Army Group, which had
70 C H A P T E R F O U R In Support Of The Army

been fighting in Europe since D‑Day.

Despite often difficult conditions, all
units were always on standby to obtain
aerial imagery.

BODENPLATTE
1 January 1945 saw the Germans launch
the last major Luftwaffe offensive of the
war – Operation Bodenplatte – in an
attempt to destroy Allied tactical air
assets on the ground. At about 0900 hrs,
the normal routine at Gilze‑Rijen was
interrupted by enemy fighters racing
across the airfield at low‑level. A
number of Fw 190s and Bf 109s carried
out strafing attacks, but damage to
the airfield was minimal and none of
No 4 Sqn’s aircraft were hit. Further east,
it was a different story at Eindhoven.
For nearly 20 minutes German fighters
made repeated attacks on the massed
ranks of aircraft parked on the airfield dispersals. Five Spitfire PR XIs of One of No 16 Sqn’s Spitfire PR XIs burns
No 400 Sqn were destroyed and another five badly damaged. Once the following the Luftwaffe’s 1 January 1945
attack on Brussels/Melsbroek. No 34 Wing
attack was over, the squadron was left with only three serviceable PR XIs. had a total of 18 aircraft destroyed during
Airfields all across Belgium and Holland were attacked more or less Bodenplatte, including three of No 16 Sqn’s
simultaneously. The reconnaissance aircraft of No 34 Wing at Melsbroek PR XIs (PL905, PL765 and PL766),
although fortunately all of the unit’s
were hit particularly hard. For more than half an hour waves of fighters personnel escaped unscathed. Despite
shot up aircraft and buildings, causing significant damage. During the Melsbroek taking a beating, No 16 Sqn was
course of the attack No 34 Wing lost 18 aircraft destroyed, including three still able to fly five successful sorties later
that same day (Author’s Collection)
Spitfire PR XIs from No 16 Sqn, with many more damaged. Bodenplatte
had come as a complete surprise and destroyed and damaged many Allied
aircraft and airfield facilities. However, most of the Allied units were back
up to strength in a matter of days, and operations were hardly affected.
For No 4 Sqn at Gilze‑Rijen, the attack made little difference, with the
unit despatching 21 sorties the same day. Although Melsbroek had taken
a beating, No 16 Sqn was able to fly five sorties during the day, and
even No 400 Sqn, which only had a handful of serviceable aircraft, flew
three sorties.
After the excitement of the start of the month, air operations settled
down into a more routine pattern. On the 14th, No 16 Sqn’s Flg Off
W F Barker was tasked with covering airfields east of the Ruhr, and near
Düsseldorf he saw two aircraft climbing at high speed;
‘I could see that they were Me 163s. The first attacked, and as I was
turning ahead of him the other came out of the sun. I rolled into a dive,
followed down by the second aircraft. At 3000 ft he was only about
200 yards behind and I started to pull out. The aircraft eventually started
to level off but I blacked out. When I came to, I saw a cloud of grey smoke
coming from the wood towards which I was diving. I think my pursuer
was not able to pull up and went straight in.’
 71

Barker was then able to return to base without further incident.

On 8 February the 21st Army Group began Operation Veritable to clear
the Reichswald and drive the Germans from the area between the Maas
and the Rhine. However, poor weather over the next few days prevented
Nos 4 and 400 Sqns from carrying out many sorties. It was not until
the 14th that a significant number of operations could be flown, with
No 400 Sqn undertaking 15 sorties to the battle area. Likewise, No 4 Sqn
flew a high number of sorties to the area of Goch–Wesel–Reichswald, with
21 of the 26 flown securing photographs. On the 21st No 4 Sqn set a new
operational record by flying 40 sorties. Other than the large numbers of
Allied aircraft observed, most sorties were largely uneventful, and were
mainly to the battle area on the Canadian First Army’s front between
Weeze and Emmerich. By 5 March, the 21st Army Group had largely
cleared the Germans from the west bank of the Rhine.
The success of Veritable meant another series of base moves for many
of the units of 2nd TAF. On the 7th, No 39 Wing headed south to Petit
Brogel (B90), near Peer in Belgium. The first operations by No 400 Sqn
from here did not take place until the 9th, when four sorties were attempted
to Wesel, Emmerich and the Ruhr, but all were unsuccessful due to cloud.
By 10 March, the Germans had withdrawn from the bridgehead at
Wesel, destroying the last of the bridges across the Rhine just before they
retreated. For weeks 2nd TAF’s PRUs had been covering the Rhine, and
now efforts were increased so that every yard of the eastern bank and the
area beyond was photographed and examined.
Wg Cdr Gordon Cole cruises over the On 17 March No 16 Sqn received its first examples of the Spitfire
clouds in Spitfire PR XI PA888 ‘4’ of No 34 PR XIX from No 34 Wing Support Unit. Training began immediately,
Wing Support Unit. The latter unit was
formed to provide logistical support to with pilots impressed by the PR XIX’s power, although they found that
No 34 Wing, with one of its main functions the extra speed also made it less manoeuvrable compared to the PR XI.
being to supply reserve pilots and aircraft to The first operational PR XIX sortie by the squadron was carried out on
the wing’s frontline units. In March 1945
Cole assumed command of the unit, having the 22nd by Flt Lt C Leagh‑Murray (PS849) when he successfully covered
previously served as Wing Commander targets north of the Ruhr and in the Dutch cities of Zutphen and Deventer
Operations with No 34 Wing. Prior to that from 27,000 ft.
he had flown PR Spitfires with No 2 PRU
and No 680 Sqn in the Mediterranean Along the Canadian First Army’s front, No 4 Sqn continued to provide
(Author’s Collection) good service, covering targets from Schouwen to Arnhem and deeper into
72 C H A P T E R F O U R In Support Of The Army

the Netherlands. In just a week the squadron flew more than 170 sorties, the
vast majority of them being successful and without incident. On the 15th
No 4 Sqn set another operational record by flying 43 successful sorties.
All of the aerial intelligence accumulated by 2nd TAF’s PRUs, particularly
that gathered by Nos 400 and 16 Sqns, was put to good use in planning the
next phase of the advance into Germany. On the night of 23 March, the 21st
Army Group would launch Operation Plunder to cross the River Rhine at
Rees and Wesel. This would be followed up the next day by Operation Varsity
– the largest single airborne operation ever attempted. All squadrons were able
to fly numerous sorties on the day prior to the commencement of Plunder to
obtain last minute photographs. By the 27th a substantial bridgehead had
been established, and throughout this period all reconnaissance squadrons
were very active as the weather conditions remained favourable.
27 March also saw No 16 Sqn receive official confirmation that its aircraft
establishment had been changed from 18 Spitfire PR XIs to 18 PR XIXs,
and by the end of March the unit had five PR XIXs on strength.
Once the Allied armies were across the Rhine, German resistance started
to crumble. Reminiscent of the situation after the breakout from Normandy,
the Allied advance was so rapid that headquarters were often unable to
forecast their requirements for aerial reconnaissance as more and more
territory was captured. One immediate dividend of the advance across the
Rhine was the end of V2 launches against London and Antwerp. For many
months the reconnaissance squadrons based on the Continent had searched
in vain for the ‘vengeance weapons’, and despite almost daily sightings of
vertical rocket trails, the launchers had remained elusive. Now this repetitive
and ultimately futile task could be removed from the list of daily demands.
During April, No 16 Sqn continued to fly routine operations mainly
to airfields in northwest Germany and targets in the Netherlands. On the
14th the unit transferred to Eindhoven, which would be the last wartime
move undertaken by the squadron.
Due to the very fluid frontline and rapidly evolving situation, some
of No 400 Sqn’s sorties were tactical in nature, with pilots making visual
reports to forward air controllers. On 10 April the unit moved to Rheine
(B108), in Germany, but it was only there for six days before heading to
Wunstorf (B116) near Hanover. By this time German forces had pulled
back towards Bremen and Hamburg.
As No 400 Sqn was following closely behind the Allied advance into
northern Germany, No 4 Sqn continued to support the Canadian First Army
in its drive to isolate northern Holland. After a period of little flying, No 4 Sqn
had a big day on the 7th when 36 sorties were conducted. All were to the
northeast corner of the Netherlands, and all bar five were successful. On
17 April the squadron carried out 17 successful missions, but on completion
of operations all aircraft transferred to Twente (B106), in the Netherlands,
where the unit would stay for the remainder of hostilities in Europe.
By the middle of April the operational area was confined to northern
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. Conventional PR missions
were increasingly supplemented by calls for shipping reconnaissance in
the coastal waters of the North Sea and the Baltic. For No 16 Sqn, this
meant more sorties to targets in Denmark as the Germans shuttled vessels
backwards and forwards between Norway.
 73

The last really busy day for the squadron was on 25 April when 16
operations were flown. This included the unit’s last Spitfire PR XIX sortie of
the war, with Flt Lt J M Thompson (PS849) successfully covering Tönning
and Sylt. All told, since No 16 Sqn had first received the PR XIX in March,
only ten operational sorties had been undertaken with the type. By the time
it entered service with the squadron, the PR XIX’s superior performance
was not really necessary as encounters with German aircraft were becoming
rare. The unit’s last operational sortie of the war was flown on 7 May. After
covering multiple targets in Denmark at low‑level, Flt Lt J Wheeler landed
PR XI PL964 back at Eindhoven at 1845 hrs to bring No 16 Sqn’s war
to an end.
No 4 Sqn continued to fly a large number of sorties to the Netherlands
and northwest Germany. The unit’s final wartime mission was carried out
on 8 May by Flt Lt P W Racey (PL793) when he successfully covered
targets in the Rotenburg an der Wümme area in northern Germany.
The last days of hostilities in Europe saw No 400 Sqn flying an increasing
number of sorties to cover German ports and shipping. On 3 May, instead
of the usual high‑level PR sorties, the unit began conducting medium‑ and
low‑level shipping reconnaissance missions flown by pairs of aircraft. Due
to the surrender of enemy forces in northern Germany, all operations
on the 21st Army Group’s front ceased on the 5th, but the squadron
continued to monitor shipping.
On 8 May No 400 Sqn was again on the move, this time to Lüneberg
Flt Lt Lawrence McMillan joined (B156). Here, word was received that the remaining enemy forces had
No 400 Sqn during April 1945 following a surrendered, but due to the large numbers of vessels still approaching
period of instructing in Canada. Prior to
that, he had undertaken a long and very German and Danish ports, the squadron was still required to fly shipping
successful tour with No 542 Sqn at Benson. patrols. Sadly, on one of these missions, the squadron incurred its first loss
Ironically, he was killed on the first day of since October of the previous year. Flt Lts P G Wigle and L McMillan were
peace in Europe – 9 May 1945 – when his
Spitfire PR XI was brought down by German detailed to carry out a shipping reconnaissance along the Great Belt, but
flak whilst he was conducting a shipping only the former returned to Lüneberg;
reconnaissance mission off the coast of ‘We observed four ships one mile off Spodsbjerg. I led the section down
Denmark (Author’s Collection)
to deck level and passed within 100 yards of the vessels. I looked behind to
observe my No 2 explode in mid‑air. At the same time I observed machine
gun strikes on the water between us. I immediately climbed and circled the
position, but could only observe an oil slick on the water. It is my opinion
that Flt Lt McMillan was killed outright.’
McMillan was flying PR XI PM142, and it is perhaps ironic that only
the second Spitfire pilot loss suffered by the unit should have happened
on the first official day of peace in Europe, and that it had been caused
by enemy action.
With the end of the war in Europe, 2nd TAF’s PRUs began to prepare for
service against the Japanese. However, with the rapid end of the conflict in
that theatre, all of the units equipped with PR Spitfires were deemed surplus
to requirements and quickly disbanded. Nos 4, 16 and 400 Sqns, together with
No 140 Sqn, had provided the forces earmarked for the invasion of Europe
with the photographic intelligence they needed. In the lead‑up to the invasion,
this involved locating and monitoring all enemy defences along the coast. Once
Allied forces were successfully ashore, they soon followed onto the Continent
in order to fulfil the day‑to‑day tactical needs of the British and Canadian
armies – a function they faithfully performed until Germany was defeated.
74 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

CHAPTER FIVE

OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

L
ong before Allied troops set foot back on the shores of Continental Spitfire PR IV BP932 of No 683 Sqn has its
Europe, fighting had been raging in North Africa. By the start of engine tested at Luqa in February 1943,
this aircraft having been delivered to ‘B’
1943, the Allies had trapped Axis forces in Tunisia. The shrinking of Flight No 69 Sqn on Malta at the start of the
enemy‑held territory in North Africa had resulted in PR aircraft from three year. On 22 February Flt Lt Malcolm Brown
RAF commands operating over the same areas. This duly led to a review was tasked with covering Naples and ports
in northwestern Sicily in BP932. His
of the PR requirements for the Mediterranean theatre. photographs revealed two cruisers and
On 1 February 1943, No 2 PRU was re‑designated No 680 Sqn, and on eight destroyers at Naples and a further 16
the same date No 4 PRU became No 682 Sqn, followed on 8 February by destroyers at Palermo and Trapani. On
7 March, after covering Naples and
‘B’ Flight of No 69 Sqn becoming No 683 Sqn. No 680 Sqn’s ‘A’ Flight Palermo, Flt Sgt William Lewis overshot the
remained with No 285 Wing in support of the Eighth Army, which was runway whilst landing BP932 at Luqa and
consolidating its position on the Tunisian–Libyan frontier. The first sortie crashed into a quarry. Although the pilot
survived the incident unscathed, the Spitfire
undertaken by the new ‘A’ Flight was carried out on 1 February when was written off (Author’s Collection)
Plt Off L D O’Brien successfully covered sections of the Mareth Line.
Further to the west, No 682 Sqn was responsible for providing the bulk
of the PR over Tunisia for the British First Army. On the 27th two Spitfires
PR IXs were delivered from Britain, these aircraft being the first examples
of the type to be received by the squadron.
On the island of Malta, PR became the responsibility of No 683 Sqn.
The new unit’s main tasks remained the monitoring of Axis ports and
airfields in southern Italy and Sicily. On 16 February, Flt Lt M G Brown
successfully covered Palermo and Trapani in EN153. This was the first
ever sortie undertaken in the Mediterranean by a PR IX, EN153 having
 75

Personnel from No 682 Sqn pose for a reached No 683 Sqn on the 12th – the unit was the first outside of Britain
group photograph at Maison Blanche on to receive the type.
4 February 1943 – just four days after the
unit had been formed from No 4 PRU. Note Problems with coordination between British and American forces
the skulls that adorned the unit’s PR IVs resulted in the formation of Mediterranean Air Command (MAC) on
during the early part of the campaign in 17 February to control all Allied air assets. In March, the Northwest
Vichy French North Africa. Pilots seated in
the front row (third from left to fourth from African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (NAPRW) was formed by
right) are Flt Sgt Bernard O’Connell, Flg Offs bringing together No 682 Sqn and the USAAF’s 3rd PG. The NAPRW
Harold Clyne and Roy Buchanan, Flt Lt would coordinate all PR operations by units based in French North Africa
Murray Anderson, Flg Offs Edwin Cowan
and Daniel McKenzie and Sgt John Samson and would continue to fulfil the majority of demands over Tunisia.
(Author’s Collection) Although the front in western Tunisia remained relatively static for much
of March, there was no let up in activity for No 682 Sqn. On the 13th six
successful sorties were carried out, including that flown by Flt Lt McKenzie,
who covered Tunis and Bizerte in EN347. This was the first Spitfire PR XI
mission undertaken overseas by the type, EN347 having been delivered to
the unit on the 6th. On the 29th McKenzie (EN347) was tasked to cover
Cagliari, but he was shot down by flak and killed. EN347 was the only
PR XI on strength with No 682 Sqn, and its loss demonstrated that flying
even the latest versions of the PR Spitfire was no guarantee of safety.
As the fighting in Tunisia entered its final stages, No 683 Sqn was busily
engaged with covering objectives for the next phase of Allied operations
– the invasion of Sicily. At the end of March the unit had received its first
PR XI (EN338), which was flown on its first operation from Malta by
Wg Cdr A Warburton when he successfully photographed Taranto and
Crotone on 3 April.
In southern Tunisia No 680 Sqn was kept busy with photographic
requests for the British Army. On 12 May, in what proved to be the last
operational sortie flown over Tunisia by No 680 Sqn, Flg Off Barbour
secured photographs of enemy gun batteries in the Enfidaville sector. The
following day Axis forces surrendered. In its time in the Western Desert
‘A’ Flight No 2 PRU/No 680 Sqn had flown 687 sorties.
As reconnaissance aircraft set about trying to photograph every part of
Sicily, the cover already obtained of the island of Pantelleria was about to
76 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

be put to good use during an aerial bombing offensive

codenamed Operation Corkscrew. No 683 Sqn’s Flt Lt
G H Maloney flew to the island on 15 May, where
he successfully photographed Porto di Pantelleria and
the airfield at Margana. In parallel with the attacks on
Pantelleria, a concerted campaign was started to target
Sicily and Sardinia, as well as transport infrastructure
in Italy, in preparation for Operation Husky (the
invasion of Sicily). Both Nos 682 and 683 Sqns
would be heavily involved with securing the necessary
photographs for the myriad raids conducted.
By the end of May air attacks on Sicily and Sardinia
had intensified considerably, but the real focus of
Allied air attacks was on Pantelleria. A constant watch
was maintained on the island by No 683 Sqn, with
each major raid followed up by a D/A sortie. On
11 June British troops landed on the island, and the defenders quickly Ground personnel attempt to move a
surrendered. Much of the credit for the success enjoyed by the bombers bogged Spitfire PR IV of No 680 Sqn’s ‘A’
Flight in Libya. Heavy rains during early
in this short campaign must go to the PR organisation, with No 683 Sqn 1943 often turned the landing grounds into
carrying out the majority of the operational tasks. a sea of boggy, sandy mud that made
take‑offs and landings extremely hazardous,
and even taxiing was next to impossible. In
spite of the conditions, operational flying
EASTERN MED OPERATIONS continued, although the results were often
At the eastern end of the Mediterranean the remainder of the newly formed poor due to objectives being obscured by
cloud (Author’s Collection)
No 680 Sqn continued to keep a watch on Crete and the Dodecanese
Islands. For the most part fighter opposition in the eastern Mediterranean
was limited, but despite this there were other dangers. Mechanical failure
was one such hazard, and Flg Off J Moss experienced this in PR IV BS362
on 12 February;
‘When I was north of Rhodes at 33,000 ft my engine cut. I turned back
towards the island, but it would not pick up. I was down to 10,000 ft, and
by this time I had already attempted to bail out but my hood was jammed
shut. I was so low that I thought I was going to crash into a snow‑covered
mountain, the top of which I only just cleared. The engine finally picked
up enough to provide me with sufficient power to get home.’
Moss had been lucky, as operating over such large bodies of water meant
practically no chance of rescue in an emergency.
February also saw No 680 Sqn lose its training commitment. Since the
formation of No 2 PRU in 1941, the unit had always trained its own pilots.
With the establishment of No 8(C) OTU in Britain in 1942, the training
of PR aircrew was put on a more formal basis, although it was not until
the restructuring and expansion of the whole PR organisation during the
winter of 1942–43 that trained aircrew started to be posted overseas in
significant numbers. Relieved of its training responsibilities, No 680 Sqn
was ordered to transfer two pilots to No 74 OTU for PR instructor duties.
At the start of March 1943 No 680 Sqn had 14 PR IVs and two
F VI/PRs on strength, the latter aircraft having arrived at the end of
February from No 103 Maintenance Unit (MU). Following heavy
PR Spitfire losses to Axis fighters over Crete at the end of 1942, requests
were made to supply No 2 PRU with higher‑performance machines.
 77

As a stop‑gap measure, No 103 MU modified high‑altitude Spitfire

F VI fighters for the PR role.
The F VI had been developed to counter the threat of high‑flying
German aircraft and featured a primitive pressure cockpit. In order to
create an airtight seal, the rails for the canopy hood were removed and
once the pilot was in the cockpit the hood was fixed in place by external
fasteners. At No 103 MU all excess weight was removed and vertical F8
cameras installed in the rear fuselage, with three examples, BS106, BS133
and BS149, ultimately being sent to No 680 Sqn. Although these Spitfire
F VI/PRs lacked the leading‑edge wing tanks of the PR IV, they could
carry a single drop tank.
It is not known what camouflage scheme was used on the F VI/PRs, but
it is fair to assume that they sported Royal Blue in service with No 680 Sqn.
However, by this time, not all of the unit’s machines were camouflaged
in this colour, as those arriving from Britain were in standard PRU Blue.
The F VI/PR made its operational debut on 17 March when Flg Off R L
Westinghouse (BS149) was tasked with covering the Greek port of Piraeus,
although the mission was largely unsuccessful due to cloud. It was soon
found that the performance of the F VI/PR was no better than that of the
PR IV at high altitude, and whilst the pressure cockpit did alleviate some
of the discomfort felt by pilots at extreme altitude, the fixed canopy was
not popular and the variant was seldom used operationally.
With the return of No 680 Sqn’s ‘A’ Flight from the Western Desert
during June, preparations were made for ‘B’ Flight to operate as a
permanent detachment from Derna and for ‘C’ Flight to do the same
from Nicosia. Only ‘A’ Flight would remain at Kilo 8/Matariyah, in Egypt,
where it would become the headquarters flight. By June 1943 the main
focus was on Husky, with the majority of PR resources concentrated in the
NAPRW, leaving No 680 Sqn comparatively little work.
The Allied plan for Husky called for simultaneous amphibious landings
to be made by the US Seventh and British Eighth armies. By the date of the
landings, which began on the night of 9–10 July, PR had provided the Allied
commanders with a complete view of Axis dispositions in Sicily and southern
Italy. In the lead up to the invasion No 682 Sqn maintained its watch on
Sardinia, but on the day of the landings the unit flew its first mission to
southern Italy when Sgt I P Morris covered targets in the Calabria region.
10 July also saw No 683 Sqn conduct eight Spitfire sorties to Sicily
and southern Italy, all of which were flown in PR XIs. The unit flew an
exceptional sortie on 16 August when Flg Off E C Hey covered the Naples
area, with 28 separate pin‑point targets photographed.
The last Axis troops were evacuated from Sicily on the 17th, bringing
about an end to the battle for Sicily. Without doubt Husky was a major
strategic success for the Allies, with the efforts of Nos 682 and 683 Sqns
allowing a complete intelligence picture of enemy dispositions to be built up.
On 26 August NAPRW took over responsibility for much of southern Italy.
Prior to this, No 683 Sqn was responsible for covering targets as far north
as Naples, but from this date onward the squadron’s area of operations was
limited to objectives in the Balkans and the ‘toe’ and ‘heel’ of Italy.
On 3 September Allied troops crossed the Straits of Messina and landed
in Calabria during Operation Baytown. The beginning of the Italian
78 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

campaign called for the highest

degree of activity on the part
of MAC’s PR organisation,
although for the most part
its aircraft were engaged in
routine tasks. On 9 September
the Allies made their main
landing at Salerno. Codenamed
Operation Avalanche, the US
Fifth Army was tasked with
seizing the port of Naples, but
was met with strong German
resistance. On the eve of
Avalanche the Italian government announced it had signed an armistice Spitfire PR XI EN657 of No 683 Sqn was
with the Allies, although the Germans were able to stabilise the situation photographed at San Francesco, on Sicily,
in early August 1943, shortly after the unit
in the country before the Allies could take full advantage. had started using the airfield – one of many
With the surrender of the Italian fleet in southern Italy and the capture satellite landing grounds surrounding
of most of the territory in the region, there was now very little work left Gerbini – as a forward base to fulfil British
Army demands for photographic coverage
for No 683 Sqn. It was duly informed that towards the end of the year it of the island. The first two sorties from San
would re‑equip with the Mosquito. On 9 October the squadron ceased Francesco had been flown on 1 August,
operations over the Balkans and along the Adriatic coast, although from with Plt Offs Durbidge and Craig both
successfully covering targets in the Catania
the 20th it started to provide a single aircraft on a daily basis to undertake area (Author’s Collection)
PR flights for the US Fifth Army.
Although missions for No 683 Sqn practically stopped during October,
the same could not be said for No 682 Sqn, whose services with the
NAPRW were in high demand. Targeting and D/A of marshalling yards
and airfields for Allied bombers continued to make up the bulk of the
work. From 5 October the squadron’s ‘B’ Flight was detached to Foggia,
where it joined No 285 Wing.
On the 26th, No 336(PR) Wing was formed to control RAF units
within the NAPRW. These included Spitfire‑equipped No 682 Sqn and
No 60 Sqn of the South African Air Force (SAAF), which operated the
Mosquito. It was also intended to withdraw No 683 Sqn from Malta and
incorporate the unit into the new wing.
On 8 December, No 336(PR) Wing moved to San Severo, in Italy. With
the Allied lines now well north of Naples, it was considered desirable to
operate from the Italian mainland so as to greatly enhance the reach of the
wing’s aircraft, particularly as more and more work was being conducted
in support of the strategic bombing offensive. On the 20th four pilots
from No 682 Sqn were transferred to No 683 Sqn, this representing a
change in policy with a reversal of the decision to re‑equip the latter with
the Mosquito, which would now go to No 680 Sqn instead. On the 21st
No 682 Sqn’s ‘A’ Flight moved to Vasto, in Italy, where it joined the Desert
Air Force’s No 285 Wing to take over demands for the Eighth Army.

OPERATING ALONE
As the Allies prepared to invade Sicily, July saw No 680 Sqn continue
its lonely vigil over southern Greece and the islands of the Aegean. On
the 1st, ‘B’ Flight completed its move to Derna, in Libya, from where it
 79

would be better placed to monitor Crete and the Greek mainland. August
saw ‘C’ Flight’s Flg Off Moss (BR416) conduct No 680 Sqn’s first ever
low‑level mission on the 9th when he obtained oblique photographs of
Rhodes. The following day the squadron received its first Spitfire PR XI
with the delivery to Kilo 8 of EN661. On 21 August Sqn Ldr J G Cole
flew it to Derna, from where he carried out No 680 Sqn’s first operational
PR XI sortie when he successfully photographed Piraeus and Melos.
September saw the last F VI/PR (BS106) withdrawn from the
unit. Although not purpose‑built for the role, the F VI/PR was the
first PR Spitfire variant to feature a pressurised cockpit, but sadly its
performance at height was a disappointment.
Throughout the summer No 680 Sqn’s Cyprus detachment carried out a
detailed survey of all of the major Dodecanese Islands in anticipation of an
Italian surrender, at which point British forces intended to seize Rhodes and
Kos. With the armistice of 8 September the Italian garrisons in the Dodecanese
laid down their arms, but German troops already on Rhodes acted quickly and
by the 11th had secured most of the island. Despite this, the British pressed on,
and by the 18th had occupied a number of other islands, including Leros and
Kos. These landings were only possible because of the photographs secured by
No 680 Sqn’s ‘C’ Flight, which continued to monitor the evolving situation
with twice daily coverage of all major locations in the region.
At Tocra, in Libya, from where ‘B’ Flight was now operating, a watch
on the airfields and ports of Crete and Greece showed a marked increase
in shipping and air activity as the Germans rushed reinforcements to the
Dodecanese. During the morning of 1 October Flg Off J G Huggins
covered Piraeus and Athens, with his photographs showing the presence
of a new type of German landing craft. The vessel was in the process of
being built, and it appeared to be made of prefabricated parts. Two days
later, the enemy launched a combined airborne and amphibious assault
on Kos, and by the 4th the British garrison had been forced to surrender.
The failure to determine German intentions in a timely manner was
largely caused by the geographically dispersed area over which No 680 Sqn’s
various flights were operating. The distances involved caused delays in
responding to requests and processing information.
On 10 November ‘C’ Flight’s Flg Off D O’Leary successfully covered
Amorgos and Stampalia. When his photographs were examined, they
showed 14 vessels leaving Stampalia, which interpreters determined were
part of an invasion force intended for Leros and included prefabricated
landing craft of the type first seen at Piraeus in October. On the 12th
news was received that the Germans had indeed invaded Leros. For the
remainder of the month ‘C’ Flight continued to monitor enemy activity
in the region, but by the 17th Leros was under German control. With
their position in the Dodecanese untenable, British troops were evacuated
and by the end of the month the Germans had occupied all of the islands.
As 1943 drew to a close No 680 Sqn found itself still mainly equipped
with Spitfire PR IVs, although these were now being supplemented
by increasing numbers of PR XIs. In the Dodecanese campaign the
PR organisation was faced with an enormous task in trying to cover a
huge geographical area like the Aegean, but the squadron had risen to the
challenge and rarely failed to provide the desired coverage.
80 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

COMMAND CHANGE
By the start of 1944 the Allied armies in Italy were approaching the main
German defensive position – Winter/Gustav Line – south of Rome.
A major reorganisation of Allied air forces in the Mediterranean had
taken place during the previous December when MAC and the Northwest
African Air Forces were amalgamated to form the Mediterranean Allied Air
Forces (MAAF). This was soon followed by a corresponding change in the
PR organisation when, on 1 January 1944, the NAPRW was re‑designated
the Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance Command
(MAPRC). However, it continued to control all US and British strategic
PR, assets including No 336(PR) Wing at San Severo.
Whilst the Spitfire squadrons of the latter unit were still heavily
committed to providing tactical PR for the Allied armies in Italy, the nature
of their work was becoming increasingly connected with the strategic
bombing campaign. On 16 February, No 682 Sqn was informed it was
to provide two Spitfires per day to fulfil tactical demands for the US Fifth
Army, thus relieving No 683 Sqn of the duty. Two days later, No 682 Sqn’s
‘A’ Flight returned to San Severo from Vasto, its place and commitments to
the Eighth Army taken over by a detachment from No 683 Sqn.
By the start of March Mediterranean strategic bombing attacks were fully
coordinated with those from Britain. The MAPRC became responsible for
an area covering southern Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Bulgaria and Romania. March also saw a concerted interdiction campaign
against the transportation network in northern and central Italy in an
effort to prevent supplies reaching the German frontline. Much of the pre‑
and post‑strike reconnaissance for the attacks would be the responsibility
of Nos 682 and 683 Sqns. During April increased numbers of railway
marshalling yards were added to the target lists in connection with a
bombing campaign to interdict German supply lines, although both
squadrons still maintained their commitments to tactical targets along
the frontline.
On 13 April, Sqn Ldr J Morgan photographed factories and airfields
around Vienna before covering the results of bombing attacks on Zagreb
and Split during the return flight. This sortie was outside the range of
operations normally allocated to No 682 Sqn, but its success meant Vienna
would soon become a routine target for Spitfires. A small detachment was
formed by the squadron towards the end of the month when Spitfire PR XI
PA867 proceeded to Alghero, on Sardinia, on the 28th for coverage of
the south coast of France to meet US Army demands. Flg Off D Redman
flew the detachment’s first sortie on the 29th when he successfully covered
beaches and ports between Port‑la‑Nouvelle and Sète.
April had also seen MAPRC re‑designated the Mediterranean Allied
Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (MAPRW), but it made no difference
to the organisational structure.
During May the Allied armies in Italy finally succeeded in breaking the
Gustav line. The reconnaissance tasks carried out that month by Nos 682 and
683 Sqns remained varied, with both units continuing to undertake tactical
operations. The aircraft based at San Severo now covered an ever expanding
area in support of strategic bombing attacks. On the 19th No 683 Sqn flew
a record eight sorties from San Severo. These included one mission flown
 81

Spitfire PR XI EN671 ‘G’ was assigned to by Plt Off A D Lackey to the Vienna area. During the course of the mission
the No 682 Sqn detachment at he became the first No 683 Sqn pilot to fly over Czechoslovak territory.
Pomigliano in June 1944. Four months
earlier, the squadron had taken over the On 1 June Plt Off J R McLaughlin made 19 runs over a new defensive
requirement to fulfil tactical demands for line that was being constructed along the northern Apennines. The new
the US Fifth Army. Flying from forward position was the Gothic Line, which would stop the Allied advance for
bases, the detachment provided long focal
length coverage for the Americans. For the many months to come.
first 19 days of August 1944 EN671 was During this period the tactical detachments were on the move to keep
the only serviceable aircraft of the up with the Allied advance. For the No 683 Sqn detachment, the first of
detachment, flying 24 sorties during
the period. The Spitfire was lost on four moves occurred on 6 June when it relocated to Aquino, No 285 Wing
28 December 1944 whilst serving with having been switched to the west coast to support the elements of the
No 683 Sqn (Author’s Collection) Eighth Army operating on that sector of the front, before finally ending
up at Orvieto/Main on the 24th. Two days earlier, No 682 Sqn’s Flt Sgt
G Jack had been tasked with an urgent D/A request for industrial targets
around Munich. This was the first visit to the Bavarian city by a Spitfire
based in Italy, the area normally being covered by Mosquitos.
On 3 July Plt Off S P Johnson (PA905) attempted to cover the Danube
after recent mining operations, but when over Yugoslavia his PR XI
developed a serious oil leak and he had to make for home. He was able
to land at San Severo, and as he taxied to dispersal his engine seized –
Johnson had had a very lucky escape after flying more than 400 miles
with a defective engine.
By the middle of the month Allied forces had made steady progress north,
forcing the Germans to fall back to the Gothic Line. The No 682 Sqn
detachment supporting the US Fifth Army transferred forward to Follonica
on the 15th. It was well used to the frequent moves, which had little impact
on operations. The squadron’s Sardinia detachment was also on the move,
relocating to Borgo, on Corsica, on the 16th in order to be nearer to the
French coast.
There was quite a stir at San Severo on 15 August with the news that a
No 60 Sqn SAAF Mosquito had been engaged over Leipheim by a Me 262.
Due to increased reports of jet activity over southern Germany, more
sorties to this area were assigned to Spitfires when the Mosquito proved
too vulnerable to attack.
15 August also saw the US Seventh Army commence Operation Dragoon
with landings in southeastern France. On the day of the invasion, three
82 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

sorties were carried out from Borgo. One of them was a 3 hr 10 min
mission flown by Flg Off P H Taggart to the Rhône Valley, where he
covered 11 bridges. August also saw a number of sorties flown to Munich by
Spitfires, but none reported any jet activity. This changed on the 23rd when
Flt Lt H C V Hawker (PA936) had No 683 Sqn’s first encounter with jets;
‘I was west of Munich after having covered four airfields. Out of habit,
I looked behind and to my horror I saw an aircraft about 100 ft away at
my level. It looked like it must have approached me from the stern before
turning away, but I was not aware of being fired upon. I noticed a second
aircraft to port and slightly astern. I made a sharp climbing turn over the
enemy aircraft, which shot past me. It reappeared about 1000 yards off
my starboard side and then tried to get behind me. When it was about
600 yards astern I made a very steep climbing turn to port and it overshot
and appeared to give up the chase.’
This encounter occurred only 20 miles east of Lechfeld, from where it
was known that the Me 262s of Erprobungskommando 262 were operating.
Hawker estimated that the enemy aircraft were at least 100 mph faster
than his own. The following day, No 683 Sqn’s Flt Lt F N Crane was
briefed to cover targets south of Munich. He took off from San Severo
at 0843 hrs in PR XI EN338, but nothing further was heard of him. It
seems highly likely that he fell victim to Oberfeldwebel Heinz‑Helmut
Baudach of Erprobungskommando 262, who claimed a Spitfire northwest
of Innsbruck. It had long been the boast of the PRUs that their Spitfires
could outrun and outclimb anything in the sky at high altitude, but the
appearance of the Me 262 radically altered that situation.
September saw American and Free French forces in southern France
continue with their rapid advance. On 1 September No 682 Sqn’s Corsica
detachment, now known as the ‘B’ Detachment, transferred to Le Luc, in
southern France. After a series of moves the detachment ended the month
at Dijon‑Longvic, from where most of the sorties flown were to targets
along the Franco‑German frontier.
Careful planning and detailed intelligence had made Dragoon a great
success, with the PR Spitfires playing a significant role in the operation.
By the end of September the newly named French First Army and the US
Seventh Army became the US 6th Army Group, and No 682 Sqn’s ‘B’
Detachment continued to provide PR in support of the command.
In Italy both Spitfire detachments were kept very busy with frequent
demands for coverage of the frontline and enemy rear areas. As was now
usual, both units made a number of moves during the month, with
No 683 Sqn’s detachment ending up at Rimini and No 682 Sqn’s ‘A’
Detachment at Florence/Peretola.
The threat posed by German jets caused No 106(PR) Group in Britain
to request that MAPRW take over all routine cover for targets in southern
Germany around the Munich area. High Mosquito losses had led to a
prohibition on the type operating where the Me 262 was known to be
active, and Spitfires flying from Britain to southern Bavaria were at the
edge of their range even with the largest drop tanks. MAPRW Spitfires,
however, could reach the area on internal fuel.
The situation improved marginally on 6 September when two PR XIXs
arrived from Britain, one being allocated to No 682 Sqn and the other to
 83

No 683 Sqn. The latter’s first PR XIX sortie was carried out on the 10th
when Flt Sgt H M Rittman (RM626) attempted to cover airfields near
Munich, but he found the whole area obscured by cloud. Two days later
No 682 Sqn had more success when Plt Off R W E Hickes (RM640) covered
the results of bombing attacks against jet bases at Lechfeld and Leipheim.
At the start of September the Commander in Chief MAAF, Lt Gen I C
Eaker, initiated a study into the feasibility of making US photographic units in
the Mediterranean independent of the MAPRW, which resulted in the latter’s
disbandment on 1 October 1944. However, No 682 Sqn’s ‘A’ and ‘B’ Detachments
continued to provide tactical cover for US forces in Italy and southern France, and
No 336(PR) Wing strived to fulfil all British PR demands. By October MAAF
reported that the commitment to use only Mediterranean‑based reconnaissance
aircraft over southern Germany was causing many abortive sorties and casualties
due to interception by jet aircraft. This fact, coupled with increased demands for
cover of targets in Austria and western Hungary, combined to keep No 336(PR)
Wing’s San Severo‑based Spitfires busy.
On the 8th, No 682 Sqn’s Flg Off R J H Strantzen took off in PR XIX
RM639 to cover rail targets between Budapest and Vienna but failed to
return. His Spitfire was the first PR XIX to be lost in the Mediterranean
theatre. During November No 682 Sqn’s ‘B’ Detachment continued to
provide support for the 6th Army Group, and it was on the move again on
the 5th when it transferred to Nancy. The month saw the detachment take
over formal responsibility for covering the southwestern corner of Germany
from the units based in Italy. It also brought a reorganisation in operational
areas for No 336(PR) Wing’s Spitfire units whereby No 683 Sqn’s longer
range trips would now concentrate on targets around Vienna, whilst
No 682 Sqn would deal with most of the demands around Munich.
On the 27th Plt Off L Courtney failed to return from a mission to
southern Germany. He was flying RM626, which became the first
No 683 Sqn PR XIX to be lost. The squadron’s detached flight transferred
to Forli on 4 December. In what was a relatively rare occurrence for the
detachment, Flt Lt F W W Haward (MB776) was intercepted on a mission
to cover targets in the Padova‑Vicenza area on the 29th;
‘The aircraft made a fast turn to port and passed under me. It was much
faster than my PR XI and managed to get on my tail. Even with my aircraft
at full speed it was gaining, but when it got to within 400 yards I made
a violent turn. It then rapidly climbed into the sun and I lost sight of it.’
Although Haward did get a good view of the aircraft, he was certain it
was not a Me 262 but did think it was jet‑propelled.
With 1944 at an end, the German lines in Italy remained unbroken
and Allied commanders were left with little choice but to call off their
offensive until better spring weather enabled them to resume the attack.
None of this made any difference to the Spitfire PRUs, which continued to
fly whenever possible for the photographs they brought back were always
highly sought after.

BACKWATER
With the British failure in the Dodecanese during 1943, the eastern
Mediterranean became a backwater for the remainder of the war.
84 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

The bulk of No 680 Sqn’s work at the start of 1944 continued to be

connected with tracking shipping movements in the Aegean. The unit
was gradually receiving more Spitfire PR XIs, while its old PR IVs were
slowly removed from the inventory. Most were passed on to No 74
OTU for training.
February 1944 saw the squadron receive its first two Mosquitos, as it No 682 Sqn’s Flt Lt Hank Oldfield (left) and Flg
had finally been decided by MAAF that No 680 Sqn would be the unit Off Jimmy Rawson enjoy the ‘balmy’
to re‑equip with the type. By May ‘B’ Flight was equipped with equal Mediterranean weather at San Severo in
January 1945. The Spitfire PR XIX they are
numbers of Spitfires and Mosquitos, although it was the former that standing in front of is fitted with a slipper‑style
carried out the majority of sorties due to serviceability issues with the de drop tank. Both Nos 682 and 683 Sqns of
Havilland aircraft. For ‘C’ Flight the level of operations would have been No 336(PR) Wing operated the PR XIX, but
neither unit ever had more than a handful on
greater but for the shortage of aircraft caused by the decision to withdraw strength, and all were unpressurised versions
the PR IV from service – the last operational sortie undertaken by the of the type (Author’s Collection)
variant with No 680 Sqn was carried out by Flt
Lt G Bellerby (EN155) on the 12th when he
successfully covered Rhodes and Kos.
During August MAAF announced its
intention that No 680 Sqn would be solely
equipped with the Mosquito, but ongoing
serviceability problems with the type made
it necessary to retain six Spitfire PR XIs on
strength. This change caused the squadron to
undergo a major reorganisation, with ‘C’ Flight
being recalled to Egypt, where it took over the
unit’s non‑operational duties from ‘A’ Flight.
Consequently, ‘A’ Flight assumed operational
duties equipped with Mosquitos, and by the end
of the month began moving to Italy to operate
under No 336(PR) Wing control. On 11 August
‘B’ Flight at Tocra assumed responsibility for
 85

LEFT covering the Dodecanese, this being in addition to its usual commitments
Spitfire PR IV BR416 of No 74 OTU is seen over Crete and Greece.
at Petah Tikva, in Palestine, upon returning
from a flight. It had previously served with By October Soviet advances in southeastern Europe threatened to cut
No 2 PRU and No 680 Sqn, and had off German troops in Greece, forcing them to begin withdrawing from
conducted the latter unit’s first ever the mainland but leaving garrisons in place on Crete and the Dodecanese.
low‑level mission on 9 August 1943 when
Flg Off Jack Moss obtained oblique This led to a further reorganisation of No 680 Sqn in November. ‘B’ Flight
photographs of Rhodes. In February 1944 continued to operate from Tocra for the first half of the month, at which
BR416 was transferred to No 74 OTU, point it returned to Kilo 8/Matariyah on the 15th. It was planned that all
which had been formed in 1941 to train
army cooperation and Tac/R pilots under work in the eastern Mediterranean would now be carried out from Egypt.
desert conditions. With the transfer of On its return, ‘B’ Flight surrendered its last remaining Spitfire PR XIs and
No 680 Sqn’s training flight in 1943, the became solely equipped with Mosquitos.
unit also became responsible for
acclimatising PR pilots to the operational Earlier that same month a new ‘C’ Flight had been formed at
environment found in the Middle East Matariyah, and it took over all remaining Spitfire PR XI operations
(Author’s Collection) and the greater share of the remaining work over the German‑occupied
islands of the Aegean. For much of December ‘C’ Flight’s Spitfires carried
out routine operations, although the deteriorating security situation in
Greece resulted in a number of special commitments in the Athens
area where an insurgency by communist guerrillas had broken out. On
the 28th Flg Off D B Brown flew PA845 to Hassani, in Athens, from
No 682 Sqn’s officer cadre pose for a group
photograph in front of one of the unit’s where he carried out the first low‑level missions to photograph insurgent
Spitfire PR XIXs at San Severo just before positions the following day. The detachment at Hassani continued for
the end of hostilities in Europe. Although the first two weeks of January 1945, during which period Flg Off Brown
none of the PR XIXs flown operationally in
the Mediterranean were equipped with and Flt Lt J P Kelley carried out 18 sorties, all of which obtained a wealth
pressurised cockpits, the type’s of photographic intelligence.
performance was much appreciated by the At the start of February, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Flights were amalgamated to form
pilots, particularly when flying over southern
Germany where Me 262s were frequently a new composite ‘B’ Flight equipped with both Spitfires and Mosquitos.
encountered (Author’s Collection) On the 25th, No 680 Sqn moved to Deversoir, in the Canal Zone, from
86 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

where ‘B’ Flight’s Spitfires carried out most of the operational flying for
the remainder of the war. The unconditional surrender of all remaining
German forces on 8 May saw the squadron still covering Aegean targets.
When news of the cessation of hostilities came through, Flt Lt C V S
Stevens (PA845) was already airborne on a mission to Rhodes. This
final effort brought the squadron’s war to an end, by which point it had
completed more than 5000 operational sorties, the majority of them in
PR Spitfires. The unit would continue to operate Spitfire PR XIs until July
1946, but in September No 680 Sqn was re‑designated No 13 Sqn, thus
bringing to an end the history of the RAF’s second oldest wartime PRU.
In Italy at the end of 1944, heavy winter rains had halted the
Allied offensive. With lessened activity along the front, 1945 saw the
PR detachments supporting the Allied armies switching their attention
to German communications in the rear area, whilst from San Severo both
Nos 682 and 683 Sqns continued their strategic tasks deeper into enemy
territory. March saw an intensification of attacks by Allied tactical aircraft
on transportation targets in Italy. No 682 Sqn’s ‘A’ Detachment completed
a total of 47 sorties for the US Fifth Army during the month. Likewise,
No 683 Sqn’s Forli detachment flew at every opportunity to fulfil demands
for the Eighth Army.
Along the Western Front Allied armies made renewed efforts to clear the
last German positions west of the Rhine. For No 682 Sqn’s ‘B’ Detachment
at Nancy, most of the requests for 36‑inch photographic cover came from
the French, who needed imagery along the Rhine. On 25 March the unit
was informed that its attachment to the US 6th Army Group was complete.
In April No 336(PR) Wing’s operational area continued to shrink. The
diminishing number of sorties flown from San Severo during the course
of the month was a reflection of the reduced demand for photography.
On the 15th, No 682 Sqn’s WO R S Baker (RM630) attempted to cover
targets in the Munich area but found all of his objectives obscured by
cloud. RM630 was the only PR XIX remaining on strength with the unit,
and Baker’s sortie proved to be the last operational mission by the type
with the squadron.
At the beginning of April, the Allies had commenced their spring
offensive in Italy, and after initial resistance was overcome both the
British Eighth and the US Fifth armies broke through German frontlines.
The two aircraft of No 682 Sqn’s ‘A’ Detachment flew continually during
the month, but on the 30th the Americans issued formal notification that
the detachment was no longer required and was to return to San Severo.
On 2 May German forces in Italy and western Austria surrendered
unconditionally. This did not, however, include those troops east of
the Isondo River. Consequently, cover of the Istrian Peninsula and
northwestern Yugoslavia was still required, although the level of demand
slackened significantly.
On 6 May, No 682 Sqn’s last operational sortie was flown by Flg Off
J Rawson in Spitfire PR XI PL980 when he obtained partial coverage of
Zagreb. The following day No 683 Sqn’s detachment made its last wartime
move when it transferred to Treviso. From here, it flew the unit’s final sortie
of the war on 8 May when Plt Off H Peebles (PA909) covered the railway
between Trieste and Gorizia. That day the formal cessation of hostilities in
 87

Europe was announced. No 682 Sqn remained at San Severo, where it was
ultimately disbanded in September 1945. Originally formed as No 4 PRU
in 1942, the unit had had its baptism of fire during the fighting in Vichy
French North Africa, and from that point forward its Spitfires provided
constant photographic cover.
No 683 Sqn’s main body also remained at San Severo in May, and
although the unit would not be formally disbanded until 21 December
1945, by the end of September it had effectively ceased to be a regular
flying unit. Like its sister Spitfire PRU, No 683 Sqn had come into
existence in 1942 during a very difficult period for the Allies in the
Mediterranean. As the Spitfire Flight of No 69 Sqn, it had carried out
the vital PR function from Malta at a time when few other aircraft could
operate from the island. During its existence the unit had flown nearly
4500 operational sorties.

FAR EAST PR OPERATIONS

Spitfire PR IV BP911, with Wg Cdr Stewart At the start of the war strategic PR in India and the Far East was merely
Wise at the controls, arrives at Dum Dum an afterthought. By May 1942, the Japanese had advanced through Burma
on 10 October 1942. Following an appeal to the Indian frontier, where the onset of the monsoon forced them to
by AOC‑in‑C India, Air Marshal Sir Richard
Peirse, for modern PR aircraft in‑theatre, pause. During that month, a new No 3 PRU was formed with one flight
two Spitfires were allocated to No 3 PRU in of B‑25s and another equipped with Hurricanes. In September, AOC‑in‑C
India, both machines having previously India, Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, appealed for PR Spitfires to enable
flown with No 2 PRU. Wg Cdr Wise carried
out his unit’s first operational PR Spitfire his command to undertake the support work necessary for both defensive
sortie, and the first ever by a Spitfire of any and offensive operations.
type in Southeast Asia, on 19 October when On 24 September, Wg Cdr Wise and Sgt W H L Cusack proceeded
he attempted to photograph enemy airfields
in the Shwebo, Mandalay, Maymo and to the Middle East to collect the first two machines. They arrived back
Monywa areas of Burma. Thick cloud cover at Dum Dum, near Calcutta, on 10 October, Wise at the controls of
prevented him from photographing his BP911 and Cusack in BP935. Both aircraft were PR IVs camouflaged
primary objectives, however, and he had to
content himself with covering short sections in the overall Royal Blue scheme used by No 2 PRU. On the 19th Wise
of the Chindwin River (Author’s Collection) (BP911) carried out his unit’s first Spitfire sortie when he covered sections
88 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

of the Chindwin River. During January 1943, No 3 PRU was informed By the time this photograph of Spitfire PR IV
that in line with plans to reorganise overseas PR assets, the unit would be BP911 was taken, it had been assigned to
No 681 Sqn at Dum Dum. On 25 March
re‑designated No 681 Sqn. 1943 Flg Off Freddie Procter successfully
Southeast Asia was the last theatre of the war to see the use of PR Spitfires. covered Toungoo, Tennant, Kalawya and
By January 1943 the newly renamed No 681 Sqn was still mainly equipped Oktwin in the aircraft before landing at
Dohazari to refuel. After topping up his
with PR Hurricanes, but increasing use was being made of the few Spitfires tanks, Procter taxied BP911 in preparation
on strength. On the 25th – the same day No 681 Sqn was formed from to return to Dum Dum, but as he did so
No 3 PRU – WO F D C Brown (PR IV BR431) flew the new unit’s first Dohazari was attacked by enemy bombers.
BP911 was badly damaged by exploding
Spitfire sortie when he successfully photographed targets in central Burma. ordnance and Procter seriously wounded.
By March PR operations were starting to expand in size and scope. In Whilst the latter eventually recovered and
Southeast Asia, the Allies were forced to assemble information on Japanese returned to operations, BP911 was too
badly damaged to be repaired and was
intentions largely from scratch, relying heavily on PR. On the 25th two scrapped (Author’s Collection)
successful Spitfire sorties were flown. As was now becoming standard
practice, both aircraft landed at Dohazari on their return to refuel. As
the pilots prepared to fly back to Dum Dum, Dohazari was attacked by
Japanese bombers. Although BR418 received shrapnel damage, its pilot,
Flt Lt M W Coombes, escaped injury. Flg Off F D Procter was not so lucky,
receiving serious wounds to his arm. His aircraft, BP911, was so badly
damaged in the bombing that it was beyond economical repair and duly
became the first Spitfire to be lost due to enemy action in Southeast Asia.
The poor weather conditions with which pilots were often confronted
were demonstrated on 8 June. After successfully covering most of his
objectives, WO Brown (AB318) set course for Chittagong, but cloud over
the Chin Hills prevented him from landing at the forward base. He altered
course directly for Dum Dum, and as he flew further west he encountered
an extensive frontal system;
‘I hit a series of violent up‑draughts which put me in a spin, but as I tried
to correct it my head was forced down between my knees and I passed out.
When I came to, I was falling through the air and could see large pieces of
my aircraft plummeting to earth.’
Pulling the ripcord of his parachute, he landed safely on the ground.
Brown was then taken to hospital to recover from injuries sustained in
the incident.
The monsoon weather continued to disrupt flying, but there was
some good news as more pilots and PR IVs continued to arrive directly
from Britain. Unlike the machines that had come from the Middle
 89

East, those from Britain were camouflaged in

standard PRU Blue.
At the start of August authority was given to
increase the establishment of No 681 Sqn to 20
Spitfires, and to form a new PRU that would
ultimately be equipped with Mosquitos. On 6
October the first Spitfire PR XI (MB889) was
delivered to the squadron, followed a week later
by the formation of the second PRU, No 684 Sqn,
leaving No 681 Sqn equipped with Spitfires and
Hurricanes. On the 18th Plt Off A R Lehman
carried out No 681 Sqn’s first operation in a
Spitfire PR XI when he successfully covered
special areas in the Kale Valley. It was intended
that No 684 Sqn would undertake longer‑ranged
work, leaving No 681 Sqn’s Spitfires to perform
all other tasks.
The expansion of RAF PR assets coincided with
a major reorganisation of all Allied air forces in
the region. To coordinate the work of British and
American units in Bengal and Assam, the Eastern
Air Command (EAC) was formed, under which
No 171(PR) Wing would soon be activated to
control the operations of Nos 681 and 684 Sqns.
Despite the advances made by the
PR organisation in 1943, very little long‑range
work had been undertaken to date. This steadily
changed as No 681 Sqn’s Spitfires increasingly flew
deeper and deeper into Burma, with flights as far
south as Rangoon now starting to become routine.
During 1944, it was intended to launch a
series of offensives in Burma from the west
No 681 Sqn’s WO Francis Brown poses with whilst American‑supported Chinese forces attacked from the northeast.
the ripcord from his parachute after bailing No 681 Sqn was heavily involved, providing cover for all of these
out of PR IV AB318 on 8 June 1943. In
Southeast Asia it was often the conditions that operations. In February the squadron became part of the Photographic
were a bigger threat than the Japanese. Reconnaissance Force (PRF) that was formed to coordinate British and
Having successfully covered targets in central American PR efforts.
Burma, Brown encountered rapidly
deteriorating weather conditions as he headed On 5 March, Flt Lt C B P Davies (BP880) failed to return from a
for Chittagong. Changing course directly for sortie to southern Burma. This was the last operational PR IV loss suffered
Dum Dum, he was forced to fly through an by the unit during the war. Three days later, elements of the Japanese
extensive frontal system. After fighting to
maintain control of AB318 for 20 minutes, his Fifteenth Army began crossing the Chindwin with the aim of capturing
aircraft entered a spin and Brown passed out. Imphal and Kohima. During this period considerable effort was expended
When he came to, he was plummeting to by No 681 Sqn in covering Japanese airfields throughout Burma. It
earth with parts of his Spitfire falling all around
him. Once safely on the ground, he was showed that the bulk of the enemy’s air assets in the country were being
hospitalised with severe subconjunctival concentrated for operations along the Indian frontier. On 23 March, the
haemorrhaging in both eyes. Upon being squadron suffered another loss when Flg Off V E Cross failed to return
released from hospital, Brown returned to
No 681 Sqn but soon after was found to have from a sortie to cover airfields in central Burma. His aircraft (PA853) was
fractured his back and was repatriated to New the first PR XI to be lost by the squadron.
Zealand (Author’s Collection) On 5 May, No 681 Sqn moved to Alipore, and it began operating from
the new location the same day. During May many of the unit’s weary
90 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

PR IVs were replaced with PR XIs, although the older aircraft continued to WO Norman Haye of No 681 Sqn takes off
see regular use. The following month the squadron became the last PRU in from Chittagong in Spitfire PR XI PA934 ‘T’
on 7 December 1944, bound for the
the RAF to still be using the Spitfire PR IV operationally. The lack of regular Burmese town of Pyokkwe. In a sortie
fighter opposition meant PR IVs could operate safely and achieve excellent lasting 2 hr 40 min, he successfully
results long after they had been relegated to a training role elsewhere. photographed the railway line between
Pyokkwe and Mandalay, before landing
On 6 August, No 681 Sqn detached a section of Spitfires to operate back at Chittagong to refuel and then
from Comilla in direct support of HQ 3rd TAF. The establishment of the returning to Alipore. No 681 Sqn did not
Comilla detachment coincided with an advance to clear the Japanese from receive its first PR XI until 6 October 1943,
and continued to use PR IVs operationally
west of the Chindwin River. During November a large number of missions until November 1944 (Author’s Collection)
were flown by the squadron to support operations by the British Army
to establish bridgeheads over the Chindwin and for a resumption of the
advance along the Arakan coast. On the 30th, Flg Off C I Younger carried
out the last operational sortie undertaken by the unit in a PR IV (BR661)
when he successfully photographed roads in central Burma. Spitfire PR IVs
had served with the unit since October 1942, when No 3 PRU became
the first unit in Southeast Asia to operate Spitfires.
On 3 January 1945 Akyab Island was invaded, with last‑minute
coverage having been provided by two No 681 Sqn Spitfires on the 1st.
Flg Off R Lauchland took large‑scale vertical images from 6000 ft using
moving‑film F63 cameras, whilst WO W J H Wells carried out low‑level
oblique runs along the coast.
By late January Allied progress in central Burma and along the Arakan
coast offered the opportunity of liberating Rangoon before the monsoon
season halted offensive operations. No 681 Sqn’s efforts were considerable
during January, with 187 sorties flown. This high tempo of operations was
maintained during the spring. Most sorties were to central and southern
Burma, with many missions flown to the area between the Irrawaddy and
Sittang rivers, as well as to Rangoon. Thanks to extensive coverage of the
latter area by No 681 Sqn, Allied forces were able to occupy the city on
2 May when it became apparent that the Japanese had evacuated.
 91

Spitfire PR XI PL969 ‘P’ of No 681 Sqn’s For much of May the main body of No 681 Sqn had flown from Alipore,
Forward Detachment was photographed but on the 20th it began moving to Mingaladon, north of Rangoon, from
parked in front of a Hurricane IIC at
Monywa. By February 1945, the British where it flew its first operational sortie on the 25th. On 1 June No 347(PR)
Fourteenth Army had reached the Irrawaddy Wing was formed to control the RAF element of the PRF, which was about
River on a broad front and established a to be disbanded due to American forces ending operations in Burma.
number of bridgeheads on the far bank.
During the month the Forward Detachment No 347(PR) Wing would control the operations of Nos 681 and 684 Sqns
moved to Monywa, although the airfield had for the remainder of the war.
been in use as a refuelling base by the On 19 June, WO M H Harris (PR XI PL849) disappeared on a sortie to
squadron’s Spitfires for a number of days.
The first sortie originating from Monywa Tavoy, this proving to be the last Spitfire lost on operations by No 681 Sqn.
was flown by WO K J Collins on Towards the end of the following month, the squadron received its first
17 February when he obtained obliques examples of the Spitfire PR XIX, the type making its operational debut
of Yenangyaug and Taungwingya in PR XI
PL960 (Author’s Collection) in‑theatre on 28 July when Wg Cdr D B Pearson (PS918) covered the
airfield at Tak, in Siam.
At the end of the month another unit in Southeast Asia received
PR Spitfires. No 28 Sqn was a Tac/R unit equipped with Hurricanes,
but by July it only had a handful of serviceable machines left. On the
30th the squadron was informed that Spitfire PR XIs were to be allocated
from No 681 Sqn, with the first example received the following day. On
5 August a pair of PR XIs flown by Flt Lts S J Smith and F A Dawson
flew No 28 Sqn’s first operational Spitfire sorties when they carried out a
successful Tac/R of Thaton and Bilin.
By August, No 681 Sqn had five PR XIXs on strength, but because of
serviceability issues they were generally only used on short sorties. On the
9th Wg Cdr Pearson (PS918) carried out numerous runs along the Sittang
River from 10,000 ft, the sortie only lasting a little over an hour. This also
proved to be No 681 Sqn’s last operational PR XIX mission of the war.
That day the Americans had used their second atomic bomb on Nagasaki.
The employment of these weapons forced the Japanese to surrender on
15 August, bringing World War 2 to an end.
The very last wartime sorties flown by PR Spitfires were, ironically, made
by newly converted No 28 Sqn. On the 15th Flt Lts M R Alston and F Smith
successfully covered Mokpalin and Thaton during the morning before the
official announcement of the Japanese surrender was made. No 28 Sqn was
92 C H A P T E R F I V E Overseas Operations

ordered to hand its PR XIs back to No 681 Sqn on the 22nd, after which PR XIX PM512 ‘N’ of No 681 Sqn sits at
it reverted to using Hurricanes. For No 681 Sqn, the end of the war meant Seletar with other PR Spitfires immediately
post‑war. The last unit to fly the PR XIX
the unit would now be employed on survey work in countries previously operationally was Burma-based
occupied by the Japanese. Throughout this time it continued to fly Spitfire No 681 Sqn, which had only received its
PR XIs and PR XIXs until, on 1 August 1946, it was renumbered No 34 Sqn. first examples of the aircraft in late July
1945. Due to serviceability issues with its
Of all theatres to which PR Spitfires were committed during World new aircraft, No 681 Sqn flew few missions
War 2, their operations in Southeast Asia probably assumed greater with the PR XIX – those flown were
significance than any other. Often aerial photographs were the only means generally restricted to short range.
Following the Japanese surrender,
by which the activities of the Japanese in Burma could be monitored. The No 681 Sqn continued to be equipped with
Spitfires of No 681 Sqn duly supplied much of the intelligence on which the PR XI and PR XIX, and it carried out
Allied forces relied. extensive survey work over Southeast Asia
before being disbanded on 1 August 1946
The defeat of the Japanese brought World War 2 to an end. More than (Author’s Collection)
any conflict to date, it had seen intelligence gathering play a vital role. For
the Allies, it was estimated that as much as 80 per cent of all intelligence
was gained from aerial photography, much of it derived from the cameras
installed in Spitfires. The exacting nature of the work, and the performance
required to fulfil it, meant there were few aircraft and even fewer pilots
capable of rising to the challenge. PR using high‑speed, high‑altitude
aircraft had started as an experiment pursued by a free‑thinking maverick
with the backing of a few far‑sighted leaders, but once the principle was
established PR became a vital component of every Allied campaign, with the
intelligence gained considered necessary for the planning of any operation.
PR Spitfires ultimately saw service against the three principal partners
of the Axis alliance in World War 2. Even though supplemented by the
Mosquito from 1941, the Spitfire remained one of the RAF’s primary
strategic reconnaissance platforms. Its capabilities even led to the USAAF
adopting the type for some of its own reconnaissance needs. Much of the
work carried out was mundane and repetitive, but PR Spitfires were also
responsible for some of the most significant intelligence finds of the war.
PR allowed Allied leaders to monitor almost every aspect of the enemy’s
activity, and act accordingly, and it is a tribute to the Spitfire that it was the
only aircraft capable of fulfilling this role throughout the whole conflict.
 93

APPENDICES
COLOUR PLATES COMMENTARY
1 5
Spitfire I PR Type A N3071 of the Special Survey Flight, Spitfire I PR Type F X4712 ‘LY’ of ‘A’ Flight No 3 PRU,
Nancy, France, December 1939 Alconbury, Cambridgeshire, March 1941
N3071 was one of the first two Spitfires delivered to the No 3 PRU was formed to fulfil the targeting and damage assessment
Heston Flight in October 1939. Fitted with an F24 camera requirements of RAF Bomber Command. Reaching the unit on 9
in each wing, it was N3071 flown by Flt Lt ‘Shorty’ January 1941, X4712 was the first Type F assigned to No 3 PRU. It
Longbottom that conducted the first PR Spitfire sortie of the was flown operationally later that same day when Flg Off John Blount
war, on 20 November, when he attempted to cover targets covered the German North Sea ports from 28,000 ft. On 9 April,
in the Aachen area. N3071 was lost on 21 April 1940 when Blount, again in X4712, failed to return from a mission to Bremen
No 212 Sqn’s Flg Off Cecil Milne was intercepted over southern and Bremerhaven after being intercepted by Bf 109s.
Germany by Bf 109s.
6
2 Spitfire I PR Type G (serial unknown) ‘ZW‑J’ of No 140 Sqn,
Spitfire I PR Type B P9331 ‘9’ of No 212 Sqn, Meaux/ Benson, South Oxfordshire, September 1941
Villenoy, France, June 1940 The Type G was intended for low‑level operations when cloud
P9331 flew its first operational sortie on 8 May 1940 when Flt conditions precluded high‑altitude photography. It was equipped
Lt Louis Wilson was tasked with covering the Rhine from the with two vertical F24 cameras in the rear fuselage and an oblique
Dutch Frontier to Dusseldorf. The same pilot flew P9331 on 7 F24 camera that could be configured to face either port or starboard.
June when he successfully photographed German supply routes The cameras’ combination of lenses allowed for photography below
across Belgium. Later in the day Flg Off Allan Blackwell took off medium and low cloud. A variety of pale camouflage schemes
in the aircraft to complete the task, only to be forced to make an were experimented with to enable the Type G to blend into cloud.
emergency landing at Rheims/Champagne with engine problems. However, when in service with RAF Army Co‑operation Command’s
P9331 was still sat there when the airfield was captured by No 140 Sqn, most Type Gs were painted in the standard day fighter
German troops. temperate land scheme.

3 7
Spitfire I PR Type C P9550 ‘LY 19’ of ‘A’ Flight PDU, Wick, Spitfire V PR Type D R7056 ‘LY’ of ‘D’ Flight No 1 PRU,
Scotland, early July 1940 Benson, South Oxfordshire, November 1941
The Type C was the first variant to carry a vertical camera with a R7056 was the last of the initial batch of production Type Ds which
long focal length lens in the rear fuselage. In the 14 months that were based on the Spitfire I airframe. The first production Type D,
P9550 served with the PRU it flew more than 100 operational R7035, was received by No 1 PRU on 8 July 1941, from which
sorties, the last of which took place on 7 August 1941 when Flg Off point onwards a steady flow of new machines were delivered to
Donald Steventon successfully covered Kiel. He was forced to fly Benson. R7056 arrived on 28 August and was assigned to ‘D’ Flight.
through a storm front on his return, during which the aircraft entered All subsequent Type Ds were based on the Mk V, the first of which
a violent spin. Eventually recovering control at 7000 ft, Steventon being AA781.
returned to base, where the aircraft was found to have buckled
mainplanes. 8
Spitfire I PR Type G (PR VII) X4944 ‘LY’ of ‘K’ Flight No 1
4 PRU, Detling, Kent, May 1942
Spitfire I PR Type D P9551 ‘LY’ of ‘A’ Flight No 1 PRU, Ta Kali, A veteran of 70 operational sorties with No 1 PRU, X4944 was
Malta, January 1941 eventually relegated to a training role with ‘K’ Flight at Detling. By
P9551 was the first of two prototype Type D Spitfires, this variant this time the Type G had been renamed the PR VII. Throughout its
having specially fabricated wing leading‑edge fuel tanks. This aircraft operational career X4944 was camouflaged in the PRU’s very pale
made its operational debut on 29 October 1940, when the PRU’s green/almost white scheme.
Flg Off Sam Millen attempted to cover Berlin. Finding his primary
objectives obscured by cloud, he covered ports along Germany’s 9
Baltic and North Sea coasts, setting a new duration record of 5 hr Spitfire PR IV Trop AB312 of ‘A’ Flight No 2 PRU, LG 28/
30 min in the process. On 19 January 1941 Flt Lt Peter Corbishley Burgh‑el‑Arab, Egypt, July 1942
attempted to photograph Genoa and La Spezia in P9551, but The first PR Spitfires were not based permanently overseas until
exceptionally strong tail winds forced him to land on Malta. It was 1942. On 17 March No 2 PRU received three examples of the PR IV,
not until 2 February that conditions allowed the pilot to attempt to including AB312. Unlike the machines operating over northwest
complete his task, only for his aircraft to be hit by flak over Leghorn, Europe, the aircraft of No 2 PRU were camouflaged with the darker
forcing Corsbishley to bail out. At the time of its loss P9551 was the Royal Blue scheme that was better suited to the clearer conditions
only Type D in service with No 1 PRU. found at altitude over the eastern Mediterranean. No 2 PRU’s PR IVs
94 A P P E N D I C E S COLOUR PLATES COMMENTARY

were fitted with the bulky Vokes filter to remove the fine sand that 15
was ever present in North Africa. Spitfire PR XI EN664 ‘Q’ BRENDA of ‘B’ Flight No 541 Sqn,
St Eval, Cornwall, May 1944
10 With the disbandment of No 543 Sqn on 18 October 1943, the
Spitfire PR IV AB132 ‘01’ of the 3rd Aviation Squadron/118th commitment to cover the ports along the west coast of France from
Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment, Vaenga, USSR, January St Eval became the responsibility of No 541 Sqn’s ‘B’ Flight. The
1943 first sortie undertaken by the flight was carried out the following
AB132 was one of the four PR IVs used by the No 1 PRU detachment day when Plt Off Harold Herbert attempted to cover Brest in PR XI
based at Vaenga in support of Operation Orator during autumn EN664. Due to the diminished strategic importance of western
1942. With the end of Orator, the surviving machines were handed France, the detachment was recalled back to Benson to rejoin the
over to the Air Force of the Soviet Northern Fleet, where they main body of No 541 Sqn on 20 July 1944, EN664 having served
were assigned to the 3rd Aviation Squadron/118th Reconnaissance with ‘B’ Flight throughout its time at St Eval.
Aviation Regiment. Two subsequent RAF PR detachments to Vaenga
also handed over their PR IVs to the same unit, and although the 16
Soviets never had more than three or four serviceable machines, Spitfire PR X MD193 of No 541 Sqn, Benson, South
they made a useful contribution to the war effort in the Arctic. Oxfordshire, 4 June 1944
It was anticipated that the performance advantage enjoyed by
11 the PR XI over German fighters would eventually be superseded.
Spitfire PR IV Trop BP932 of No 683 Sqn, Luqa, Malta, As it was, interceptions were increasingly occurring at altitudes
February 1943 above 40,000 ft. This led to the introduction of the PR X, the first
The first overseas unit to receive PR Spitfires was No 69 Sqn on purpose‑built high‑altitude PR Spitfire. Incorporating the pressurised
Malta, its first example arriving on 7 March 1942. On 8 February cabin of the F VII, it allowed pilots to withstand greater altitudes for
1943 the Spitfire Flight of No 69 Sqn became No 683 Sqn. BP932 longer periods. Only 16 examples of the PR X were built, and all
served with both units and, interestingly, was camouflaged in No 2 served with Nos 541 and 542 Sqns. MD193 was the first example to
PRU’s Royal Blue scheme, even though there is no record of the reach Benson, being delivered to No 541 Sqn on 8 May 1944.
aircraft ever having served with that unit.
17
12 Spitfire PR XIX RM633 of No 541 Sqn, Benson, South
Spitfire PR IV Trop BP911 ‘T’ of No 681 Sqn, Dum Dum, Oxfordshire, June 1944
India, 25 March 1943 The last wartime variant of the PR Spitfire was the Griffon‑powered
BP911 and BP935 were the first two PR Spitfires to be received by PR XIX. It was intended to be fitted with a pressurised cockpit, but
No 3 PRU in Southeast Asia. Delivered to the unit on 10 October the first examples to enter service with Nos 541 and 542 Sqns at
1942, both machines had originally served with No 2 PRU in the Benson were unpressurised. Easily capable of flying in excess of
Middle East. When No 3 PRU was re‑designated No 681 Sqn on 45,000 ft, the PR XIX was very fast, enjoying a significant speed
25 January 1943, BP911 continued to serve with the new unit. advantage over the PR XI. RM633 was the first PR XIX to be lost
On 25 March, however, it was damaged beyond economical repair on operations when its engine failed over the Channel on 15 June
during a Japanese bombing attack on Dohazari, thus becoming the 1944. Sqn Ldr J H Saffery bailed out and was eventually rescued by
first Spitfire lost to enemy action in Southeast Asia. a passing MTB on its way to patrol off the Belgian coast.

13 18
Spitfire PR XI EN654 of No 16 Sqn, Hartford Bridge, Spitfire PR XI PA944 of the 14th PRS/7th PG(R), Mount
Hampshire, December 1943 Farm, Oxfordshire, September 1944
No 16 Sqn joined No 34 Wing at the end of June 1943 and began PA944 was one of a number of PR XIs delivered to the Eighth Air
converting to Spitfire PR XIs in August in machines borrowed from Force to provide PR for USAAF units flying on operations from
No 140 Sqn. It was not until November that the squadron was allocated Britain. By the time PA944 was received by the 7th PG(R) in April
its own aircraft. EN654 was amongst the first PR Spitfires delivered to 1944, all Spitfire PR missions were being undertaken by the group’s
the unit, and the aircraft flew its first operational sortie on 20 December 14th PRS. On 12 September, Lt John Blyth successfully covered
when Flg Off Guy Cribb covered Cherbourg and Bayeux from 30,000 ft. objectives in the Hanau and Eisenach areas in this aircraft, but
on arrival back at Mount Farm the undercarriage would not lower.
14 After loitering in the area for an hour, he was forced to make a
Spitfire PR XI EN671 ‘G’ of No 682 Sqn, Pomigliano, Italy, wheels‑up landing. By putting PA944 down on the grass next to the
March 1944 runway, minimal damage was done to the aircraft and Blyth was
On 16 February 1944 Flg Off Les Colquhoun flew EN671 on completely unharmed.
No 682 Sqn’s first sortie from Pomigliano for the US Fifth Army
when he successfully covered targets between Formia and Cassino. 19
The aircraft was lost on 28 December 1944 when No 683 Sqn’s Flg Spitfire PR XI PL969 ‘P’ of the Forward Detachment
Off John Gourley failed to return from his first operational PR sortie. No 681 Sqn, Monywa, Burma, February 1945
Briefed to cover the Istrian Peninsula, he issued a distress call which During 1945 the advance of the British Fourteenth Army in Burma
was fixed at 15 miles north of Pola, but no trace of pilot or aircraft meant that the No 681 Sqn detachment operating in support was
were ever found. regularly called upon to move to new bases in order to stay in
 95

close contact with its controlling HQ. From January 1945 the unit 22
was known as the Forward Detachment, and during the month the Spitfire PR XIX PM512 ‘N’ of No 681 Sqn, Seletar, Singapore,
spinners on its aircraft were painted orange as a recognition aid spring 1946
for Allied fighters. The Forward Detachment moved from Kalemyo The last unit to receive the Spitfire PR XIX during wartime was
to Monywa on 17 February, flying its first sortie from the new base No 681 Sqn in Burma, with the first example (PS918) being delivered
that same day. during July 1945. The aircraft was flown operationally for the first
time on the 28th when Wg Cdr Don Pearson photographed Tak
20 airfield in Siam. With the surrender of the Japanese on 15 August,
Spitfire PR XI MB950 of the 14th PRS/7th PG(R), Mount No 681 Sqn was employed on survey work in countries previously
Farm, Oxfordshire, February 1945 under enemy control. On 10 January 1946 it moved to Seletar,
MB950 was amongst the first Spitfire PR XIs delivered to the USAAF where PM512 was delivered to the unit that same month.
at Mount Farm in November 1943. Received on the 13th, the aircraft
flew its first mission on the 25th with Lt Malcolm Hughes of the
22nd PRS at the controls. MB950 continued to serve with the 7th
PG(R), and was one of the survivors handed back to the RAF at the
beginning of April 1945 when the 14th PRS began re‑equipping with
the F‑5 in anticipation of transferring to the Pacific.

21
Spitfire PR XI PM151 of No 400 Sqn, Petit Brogel (B90),
Belgium, March 1945
The success of Veritable – the operation to clear German troops
from the west bank of the Rhine – led to another series of base
moves for many of 2nd TAF’s units. During the afternoon of 7 March
1945, No 400 Sqn’s 19 Spitfire PR XIs made the short transfer flight
from Eindhoven (B78) to Petit Brogel (B90). Due to poor weather, it
was the 9th before the first operations were flown, and of the four
attempted all were unsuccessful due to cloud.

BELOW
Spitfire PR XIX RM632 was photographed at Benson shortly after its
arrival there on 6 May 1944. The PR XIX was the last wartime
PR version of the Spitfire, and it featured the powerful Griffon engine.
In June 1944 RM632 was allocated to No 542 Sqn, and it was lost
on 6 January 1945 when Flg Off Leslie Roberts failed to return from
a sortie to Cologne (Author’s Collection)
96

INDEX
Note: References to images are in bold. Japan 8, 61, 88, 89, 91–92 Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 63
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 26, 51–52 Royal Navy 55–56
Admiral Hipper (ship) 25, 32, 44 Joint Photographic Reconnaissance Committee Ruhr 13, 14, 16, 17, 49–50
Admiral Scheer (ship) 19, 44 (JPRC) 55
Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) 11 Jones, Dr Reginald 25 Sardinia 46, 76
Africa see North Africa; West Africa Scharnhorst (ship) 26, 28, 51
Air Ministry 6, 7, 9, 11, 19, 20 Köln (ship) 44 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) 7, 8; see also
aircraft, British 11, 87, 88, 92 Kriegsmarine 18, 24–28, 30, 50–51 Heston Flight
Mosquito 49, 51, 58, 81, 84–85 Sicily 44, 46, 74–76, 77
see also Spitfire Le Mesurier, Flt Lt E C 13, 14, 15, 20, 63 Siegfried Line 11, 66
aircraft, German 11, 27, 65 Libya 45, 46, 76, 78–79 Soviet Union 44, 56
Me 262: 58, 81, 82 Longbottom, Flg Off Maurice V 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, Special Survey Flight 10–11
Anderson, Flg Off M C B 30 19–20 Spitfire 7–8, 52–53
Armée de l’Air 17 Low Countries 18, 19, 20 and modifications 9–10, 11–12, 24, 47–48
Austria 80–81, 83 Luftwaffe 8, 15, 60–61, 69, 70–71; see also aircraft, Spitfire (types) 33–43 (93–95)
German F VI 77
‘B’ Flight 15, 16, 22, 77, 79, 84–86 Lützow (ship) 51 FR IX 65
Barratt, AM Sir Arthur 10 N3071: 6, 9, 10–11
Belgium 10, 12–13, 14–15, 59, 67–68, 70 McKenzie, Flg Off D M 46, 75 N3116: 13
Bismarck (ship) 28 Malta 7, 8, 44–45, 74–75 N3117: 22
British Air Forces in France (BAFF) 12, 14, 17 Mediterranean Air Command (MAC) 75, 78, 80 P9308: 13, 14–15
British Army 7, 90 Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) 80, 83, 84 P9331: 17–18
Second 63, 67 Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance P9384: 22
Eighth 45, 77, 78 Wing (MAPRW) 80, 82, 83 P9385: 19
21st Army Group 62, 63, 72 PR IX 47–48
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 11, 12, 16, 17, 18–19 Netherlands 21, 69, 70, 71–72 PR X 54
Brown, WO F D C 88, 89 Niven, Flt Lt Robert H 7, 9, 10–11, 12, 13 PR XI 48–49, 60, 62–64, 66–67, 69, 84–85
Burma 8, 87, 88, 89–91 Noball sites 52, 55, 63, 64 PR XIII 49
North Africa 8, 30, 44–46 PR XIX 56–59, 71, 73, 82–83
‘C’ Flight 16, 84, 85 Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing Type D 23, 26, 27, 28, 29
cameras 6, 7, 31 (NAPRW) 75, 77, 78, 80 Type G 22–23
F8: 21, 22, 26–27, 29 Norway 15, 27–28, 30, 44, 50–51, 55–56 squadrons:
F24: 9, 12, 13, 22 No 2: 10
camouflage 9, 22, 23, 45, 77 oil refineries 20, 59, 60, 61 No 4: 46, 63–64, 65–66, 68–72, 73
Canadian Army: First 63, 68, 71 Oldfield, Flt Lt Hank 84 No 16: 63–65, 66–67, 69, 72–73
Channel ports 17, 18, 23, 27 operations: No 28: 91–92
Christie, Flg Off G P 17 Avalanche (1943) 78 No 128: 45–46
Clark, Flt Lt L E 12, 15, 16, 22 Baytown (1943) 77–78 No 140: 29, 32, 53, 62–63, 64
Cole, Wg Cdr Gordon 71, 79 Biting (1941) 30 No 212: 12–16, 17, 18, 21
Combined Intelligence Committee (CIC) 21, 24 Bodenplatte (1945) 60, 70–73 No 400: 67–68, 69, 72, 73
Cotton, Frederick S 7, 10, 11–12 Cerberus (1942) 30 No 541: 47–48, 58, 59–61
Cotton, Wg Cdr Sidney 14, 21 Chastise (1943) 50 No 542: 48–50, 52, 54, 55, 57–58, 59, 61
Crossbow sites 52, 53, 54, 63 Corkscrew (1943) 75–76 No 680: 74, 75, 76–77, 78–79, 84–86
Dragoon (1944) 81–82 No 681: 88–92
Dixon, Flg Off J H 51, 56 Husky (1943) 76, 77 No 682: 74, 75, 82–83, 85, 86–87
Dunkirk 17, 18–19 Jubilee (1942) 32 No 683: 74–75, 78, 80–81, 83
Market Garden (1944) 59, 67 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
‘E’ Flight 22, 32 Orator (1942) 44 (SHAEF) 53–54
Eaker, Lt Gen I C 83 Overlord (1944) 53–54, 55, 65–70
Eastern Air Command (EAC) 46, 89 Paravane (1944) 56 Tactical Air Force (TAF) 62, 63
Egypt 45, 84, 85 Pedestal (1942) 45 tactical reconnaissance (Tac/R) 6
Plunder (1945) 72 Taylor, Flg Off A L 15, 17, 18, 21, 27
France 7, 10, 16–17, 18–19, 32 Source (1943) 50–51 Tirpitz (ship) 19, 30, 32, 50, 51, 55–56
and coastline 51–52, 54, 63–65 Torch (1942) 45–46 training 32, 50, 76
and Dragoon 81–82 Tungsten (1944) 55–56 Tunisia 45, 46, 75
and liberation 58–59 Veritable (1945) 71
and Overlord 65–67, 68 U-boats 25, 26, 30
see also Vichy France photo reconnaissance (PR) 6–8 United States Army Air Force (USAAF) 31, 49, 52–53,
French Army 16–17 Photographic Development Unit (PDU) 12–20 55, 61, 65–66
Frisian Islands 18 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) 8, 21–22, US Army 77, 78, 81–82, 86
29–32, 44, 47
Germany 7, 8, 10–11, 23, 73, 86–87 and Bomber Command 23–24 Vichy France 30, 45–46
and Overlord 66–67, 68 and Kriegsmarine 24–28
and PDU 13, 14, 15–16, 18 and Overlord 65–70 War Office 8, 12, 62
see also Kriegsmarine; Luftwaffe; Rhine River; Prinz Eugen (ship) 28, 30 Webb, Flt Lt G F H 29, 67
Ruhr West Africa 46
Gneisenau (ship) 26, 28, 30 radar 25–26, 30, 55, 64 Western Desert 44, 45
Greece 45, 46, 76–77, 79, 83–86 radio 31, 48 Wheatley, Flg Off Claude Mervyn 13, 14
Rawson, Flg Off Jimmy 84, 86 Wise, Wg Cdr Stewart 16, 87–88
Harris-St John, Sqn Ldr Charles 67 Regia Marina (Italian Navy) 29, 46 World War 1 (1914–18) 6–7
Heston Flight 9, 10 Rhine River 14, 16, 59, 71, 72, 86
Richmond, Flg Off I G 13, 14–15 Yelkin, Kapt Leonid Ilyich 55, 56
India 87–90 Ring, Flg Off S L 13, 19, 23, 48, 49
intelligence 6, 7, 21 Royal Air Force (RAF) 6, 7, 8, 9, 21, 29
Italy 7, 8, 19–20, 77–78, 80–81, 86–87 and Bomber Command 11, 13, 23–24, 53–54
and shipping 25, 26, 29 and Torch 46
see also Sicily Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) 9, 11–12