A.M. NO.

22-09-01-SC

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

CANON II
PROPRIETY

SECTION 16. Duty to report life-threatening situations. - A lawyer who has reasonable grounds
to believe that a life-threatening situation is likely to develop in relation to any proceeding in any
court, tribunal, or other government agency shall immediately report the same to the proper
authorities.

POLICE CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT VALFRIE G. TABIAN, et al., petitioners, v.

CHRISTINA MACANDOG GONZALES, respondent.
G.R. No. 247211. August 01, 2022

FACTS: Christina and Joselito Gonzales were both solicited by law enforcement agents to sell
illegal drugs and were threatened on several occasions that they would be entrapped or killed.
Furthermore, following Joselito’s death, there were several unknown and suspicious-looking
individuals who attended his funeral asking for Christina’s whereabouts. Hence, on February 17,
2017, counsel representing Christina Gonzales, whose husband was a victim of a drug-related
extralegal killing perpetrated by police officers in Antipolo City filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for a writ of amparo and Temporary Protection Order against the petitioner law
enforcement officers. Hence, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a resolution granting Christina a
Temporary Protection Order and directing the CA to conduct a hearing on the matter. On
November 26, 2018, the CA granted a Permanent Protection Order in favor of Christina, prompting
the law enforcement officers to challenge the CA ruling before the Supreme Court.

HELD: The Supreme Court has affirmed the issuance of a writ of amparo in favor of widow
Christina Gonzales. The said CA decision likewise recommended the filing of appropriate civil,
criminal, and administrative charges against petitioner law enforcement officers, and issued a
Permanent Protection Order prohibiting them and any of their agents from entering within a radius
of one kilometer from Christina’s residences and work addresses. In denying the petition of law
enforcement officers, the Court explicitly recognized the death of Christina’s husband, Joselito
Gonzales, as an extralegal killing, and upheld the finding of the CA that Christina had reason to
fear her life would be met with the same fate as that of her slain husband. After examining the
totality of evidence, the Supreme Court found that threats to the life of Christina were indeed
present and that the CA’s issuance of the writ of amparo was proper.
SECTION 17. Non-solicitation and impermissible advertisement. - A lawyer shall not, directly
or indirectly, solicit, or appear to solicit legal business.

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, advertise legal services on any platform or media
except with the use of dignified, verifiable, and factual information, including biographical data,
contact details, fields of practice, services offered, and the like, so as to allow a potential client to
make an informed choice. In no case shall the permissible advertisement be self-laudatory.

A lawyer, law firm, or any of their representatives shall not pay or give any benefit or
consideration to any media practitioner, award-giving body, professional organization, or
personality, in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity or recognition, to attract legal
representation, service, or retainership.

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
March 23, 1929

FACTS: The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda was a practicing attorney and a member of the
provincial board of Isabela. Previous to the last election, he admits that he made use of a card
written in Spanish containing the fact that he was a candidate for the third member of the Province
of Isabela & offering services as a notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of
sale, etc.). He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio in his home
municipality saying that he would continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to make
known to the people his desire to serve as a lawyer & notary public (including his services to
handle land registration cases for P3/every registration).

HELD: The court held that Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations is unprofessional. His
acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigating circumstance of his youth and inexperience,
he is therefore suspended.

The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by
himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. It is also unprofessional for a
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit. Lastly, solicitation of cases results in the lowering
of the confidence of the community and integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless
litigations and in incenting strife of otherwise peaceful citizens).
 MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, complainant, v.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, respondent
A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012

FACTS: The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in
violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up
two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link,
Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. The complainant
supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi
and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by the respondent on various dates , and proofs of
payment made to the latter by their clients. Respondent denied committing any. He contended that
his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would
handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the
financial aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in
court.

HELD: A review of the records reveals that the respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to specialize
in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the
Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not
prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when
the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the
lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can
readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer, or that can be
used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by
a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used
by the respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases. The letter clearly states that should the prospective client agree to the proposed
fees, the respondent would render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank.
This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code because the letter is signed
by the respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as a partner or associate
of a law firm. Respondent is reprimanded for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
 ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, complainant, v.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS: On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement
that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.” It also revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and of
The Philippine Star. In his answer, the respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued
that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts.

HELD: The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is
a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering
is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.

Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed
by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated
in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees, and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings
in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent,
the names of clients regularly represented.

What adds to the gravity of the respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only
the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Respondent Rizalino T. Simbillo is
suspended from the practice of law for one year effective upon receipt of the Resolution.
SECTION 18. Prohibition against self-promotion. - A lawyer shall not make public appearances
and statements in relation to a terminated case or legal matter for the purpose of self-promotion,
self-aggrandizement, or to seek public sympathy.

RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE LAARNI N. DAJAO, PRESIDING

JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27, SIOCON, ZAMBOANGA DEL
NORTE
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2456, March 02, 2020

FACTS: In an anonymous letter-complaint dated 15 January 2014, an unknown person accused

Judge Dajao of manifesting a pattern of unprofessional conduct in terms of language and deed, as
observed from a number of his hearings and detailing his name and position in documents as Dr.
Laarni N. Dajao, Ph.D (CL-HC). It cited that Judge Dajao placed "Dr." and "Ph.D." beside his
name, a questionable act since judges are enjoined to foster humility in their profession. Thus, the
complaint prayed that Judge Dajao be reprimanded and disciplined for unprofessional conduct.

HELD: The Supreme Court agrees with the OCA in declaring that "the act of Judge Dajao in
adding "Dr." and "Ph.D." to his name in the subject order gives the impression that he is egotistical,
and wants to be recognized by the litigants that other than being a magistrate, the inclusion of a
title in the order, other than his official designation as a judge, was unwarranted." Therefore, the
case was dismiss. Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "a judge should
not seek publicity for personal vainglory." Used in its ordinary meaning, vainglory refers to an
individual's excessive or ostentatious pride, especially in one's achievements. Canon 1 on Integrity
and Canon 2 on Propriety of the Code of Judicial Conduct proscribes judges from engaging in self-
promotion and indulging their vanity and pride.

SECTION 19. Sub-judice rule. - A lawyer shall not use any forum or medium to comment or
publicize opinion pertaining to a pending proceeding before any court, tribunal, or other
government agency that may:

(a) cause a pre-judgment, or

(b) sway public perception so as to impede, obstruct, or influence the decision of such
court, tribunal, or other government agency, or which tends to tarnish the court's or tribunal's
integrity, or

(c) impute improper motives against any of its members, or

(d) create a widespread perception of guilt or innocence before a final decision.

 REGHIS M. ROMERO II, et al., petitioners, v.
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA et al., respondents.
GR No. 174105 April 2, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the application for a temporary restraining
order(TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the
invitations and compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and
Human Resources Development in connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration(OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.

Pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and 543, Petitioner Reghis Romero II as owner of R-II Builders
Inc. was invited by the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development to
attend a public hearing at the Senate on August 23, 2006, regarding the investment of OWWA
(Overseas Workers Welfare Administration) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The
investigation is intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent
provisions of RA 8042, The Migrant Workers Act.

Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before
the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate
Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. The Committee denied his request. On the same date, invitations
were sent to the other six petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
requesting them to attend the September 4, 2006 Committee hearing. The next day, Senator
Jinggoy Estrada as Chairman of the Committee issued subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner
Romero II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee relative to the aforesaid Senate
resolutions. The Committee later issued subpoenas to the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
The petition of this case is Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is sub judice.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic
by the supervening issuance of the en banc resolution of July 1, 2008, in GR No. 164527. An issue
or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no
actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by
the dismissal of the petition. Thus, there is no more obstacle on the ground of sub judice, assuming
it is invocable to the continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in this proceeding.
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.

As stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with the process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change, and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true- recourse must be had to others who possess it.

The court further held that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to
appear before it in connection with its investigation of its aforementioned investments, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art.
VI, Sec.21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The court has no authority to prohibit a Senate
committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Art. VI, Section
21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)

RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER IN THE DECISION DATED MAY 11, 2018 IN G.R. NO.
237428 (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR
GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A SERENO)
A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC; JULY 17, 2018

FACTS: On August 30, 2017, an impeachment complaint was lodged before the Committee on
Justice of the House of Representatives against the respondent for culpable violation of the
Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. Having learned of respondent's
disqualification as a Chief Justice from the House Committee on Justice's hearings, the Republic
of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for quo
warranto against respondent, basically questioning her eligibility for the Chief Justice position.

The Court observed that since the filing of the impeachment complaint, during the pendency of
the quo warranto case, and even after the conclusion of the quo warranto proceedings, respondent
continuously opted to defend herself in public through speaking engagements before students and
faculties in different universities, several public forums, interviews on national television, and
public rallies. As the Court noted in its decision in the quo warranto case, the respondent initially
refused to participate in the congressional hearings for the impeachment complaint. When the
petition for quo warranto was filed, the respondent likewise continuously refused to recognize this
Court's jurisdiction. Instead of participating in the judicial process and answering the charges
against her truthfully to assist in the expeditious resolution of the matter, the respondent opted to
proceed to a nationwide campaign, conducting speeches and accepting interviews, discussing the
merits of the case, and making comments thereon to vilify the members of the Congress, cast
aspersions on the impartiality of the Members of the Court, degrade the faith of the people to the
Judiciary, and falsely impute ill motives against the government that it is orchestrating the charges
against her. In short, as the Court stated in the said decision, the respondent chose to litigate her
case before the public and the media instead of the Court.

Respondent contends that she should not be judged on the stringent standards set forth in the CPR
and NCJC, emphasizing that her participation in the quo warranto case is not as counsel or a judge
but as a party-litigant and that the imputed acts against respondent did not create any serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice to warrant the Court’s exercise of its power of
contempt in accordance with the “clear and present danger” rule.
HELD: All told, the respondent’s reckless behavior of imputing ill motives and malice to the
Court’s process is plainly evident in the present case. Her public statements covered by different
media organizations incontrovertibly bring the Court in a position of disrepute and disrespect, a
patent transgression of the very ethics that members of the Bar are sworn to uphold.

Sub-judice is a Latin term that refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters under
judicial consideration. In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining
to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the public in
general, and most especially to members of the Bar and the Bench.

As We have stated in Our decision in the quo warranto case, actions in violation of the sub judice
rule may be dealt with not only through contempt proceedings but also through administrative
actions. This is because a lawyer's speech is subject to greater regulation for two significant
reasons: one, because of the lawyer's relationship to the judicial process; and two, the significant
dangers that a lawyer's speech poses to the trial process. Hence, the Court En Banc resolved to
treat this matter in this separate administrative action. Indeed, this Court has the plenary power to
discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceeding, aimed to purge the law profession of
unworthy members of the Bar and to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession.

Her public utterances did not only tend to arouse public opinion on the matter but as can be clearly
gleaned from the tenor of the statements, such comments, speeches, and interviews given by the
respondent in different forums indisputably tend to tarnish the Court's integrity and unfairly
attributed false motives against its Members. Particularly, on several occasions, the respondent
insinuated the following: (i) that the grant of the quo warranto petition will result in a dictatorship;
(ii) in filing the quo warranto petition, the livelihood, and safety of others are likewise in danger;
(iii) that the people could no longer rely on the Court's impartiality; and (iv) that she could not
expect fairness from the Court in resolving the quo warranto petition against her.

The Court after deep reflection and deliberation, in lieu of suspension, the respondent is meted the
penalty of REPRIMAND with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense or any
offense violative of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility shall merit a
heavier penalty of a fine and/or suspension or disbarment.
SECTION 20. Disclosure of relationship or connection. - A lawyer shall, at the first available
opportunity, formally disclose on record the lawyer's relationship or connection with the presiding
officer of any court, tribunal, or other government agency, or any of its personnel, or the lawyer's
partners, associates, or clients, that may serve as a ground for mandatory inhibition in any pending
proceeding before such court, tribunal, or other government agency.

Benedicto Hornilla and Atty. Federico Ricafort, complainants v. Atty. Ernesto Salunat,
respondent.
A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003

Facts: Benedicto Hornilla is a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA). Along with several other complainants, Hornilla filed intra-corporate cases before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against PPSTA board members for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of real property. Atty. Ernesto Salunat on the other hand is a
member of the ASSA Law and Associates, and a retained legal counsel of PPSTA. As retained
counsel, he represented PPSTA in the cases against them by Hornilla and other members.

Hornilla alleged that Atty. Salunat is laboring under a conflict of interests for engaging with
PPSTA, where his fees are derived from the corporate funds that its members, including himself,
contributed. Atty. Salunat refused to withdraw his representation despite being told by PPSTA
members about the conflict of interest. For his part, he contends that his representation was on
behalf of ASSA Law and Associates, being the retained legal counsel of PPSTA, and not under
his personal capacity.

Held: Atty. Salunat is found guilty of representing conflicting interests. Engaging as counsel for
a corporation and representing part of its members in a derivative suit would normally give rise to
a conflict of interests. There is a conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. Since this is
still his first offense, Atty. Salunat is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in his
professional practice and is further warned that a repetition of such acts will be dealt with severely.
 CANON III
FIDELITY

SECTION 21. Lawyers in government service; conflict of interest. — A lawyer currently serving
in the government shall not practice law privately, unless otherwise authorized by the Constitution,
the law or applicable Civil Service rules and regulations. If allowed private practice shall be upon
the express authority of the lawyer's superior, for a stated specified purpose or engagement, and
only during an approved leave of absence. However, the lawyer shall not represent an interest
adverse to the government.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION, petitioner, v. ATTY. RICHARD B. RAMBUYONG, respondent.
G.R. No. 167810. October 4, 2010

FACTS: Alfredo Y. Chu (Chu) filed a case for the collection of a sum of money and/or damages
against the National Power Corporation (NPC) docketed as Civil Case No. 1-197 which was raffled
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, Branch 24. Appearing as counsel
for Chu is Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong (Atty. Rambuyong) who was then the incumbent Vice-
Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Thereafter, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition[3] of Atty.
Rambuyong arguing that under Section 90 (b), (1) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, sanggunian members are prohibited "to appear as counsel
before any court wherein x x x any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party." NPC contended that being a government-owned or controlled corporation, it is
embraced within the term "instrumentality." On the other hand, the respondent contends that the
party who would be benefited or injured by the compulsory inhibition of the plaintiff's counsel is
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1-197. Thus, he insists that the plaintiff is the real party in interest
and his (Atty. Rambuyong) inclusion as respondent in the present petition is erroneous.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that Atty. Rambuyong, then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, could not continue to act as counsel for the plaintiff in a case for collection
of the sum filed against the National Power Corporation. Sec. 2 of the Administrative Code of
1987 categorically provides that the term "instrumentality" includes government-owned or
controlled corporations. Since National Power Corporation is a government-owned or controlled
corporation, it follows that it falls under the term "instrumentality."

Under the Local Government Code, Sec. 90 thereof, it provides that:

(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation, other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members
of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

Finally, Section 446 of the Local Government Code provides that "[t]he sangguniang bayan, the
legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor as the
presiding officer x x x." Thus, pursuant to Sec. 90 (b), (1) of the Local Government Code, Atty.
Rambuyong, as sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC,
which is an instrumentality of government.

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, v. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008

FACTS: Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon
located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and
Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay. Respondent, as Punong Barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.
When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, the respondent issued a certification
for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. The complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, claiming that the respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a
public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over
the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

HELD: The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct for violating
his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It held that civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be
fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the
written permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to
the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by
an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and
 he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board
of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, the respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission
of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six months.

SECTION 22. Public Attorney's Office; conflict of interest. —The Public Attorney's Office is
the government's primary legal aid service office. In the pursuit of its mandate under its charter,
the Public Attorney's Office shall ensure ready access to its services by the marginalized sectors
of society in a manner that takes into consideration the avoidance of potential conflict of interest
situations which will leave these marginalized parties unassisted by counsel.

A conflict of interest of any of the lawyers of the Public Attorney's Office incident to
services rendered for the Office shall be imputed only to the said lawyer and the lawyer's direct
supervisor. Such conflict of interest shall not disqualify the rest of the lawyers from the Public
Attorney's Office from representing the affected client, upon full disclosure to the latter and written
informed consent.

JULIET W. PRIETO, complainant, v. ATTY. CARLOS M. TAMINAYA, respondent.

A.C. No. 11146, June 20, 2022

FACTS: The complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, she hired the respondent as legal adviser
and counsel of her then-business Diamond Ace Glass Supply and Aluminum Trading (Diamond
Ace). As legal counsel for Diamond Ace, the complainant claimed that the respondent prepared
the pleadings and/or position papers. Furthermore, the complainant asserted that the respondent
was guilty of malpractice or unauthorized private practice since the latter was with the government
service as a lawyer in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) and later on as an Assistant Prosecutor
with the Department of Justice (DOJ) when he accepted and rendered legal service to the
complainant for a fee without the authority or permission of the DOJ. In his Answer, the respondent
admitted that he was hired in 1998 as the legal adviser of Diamond Ace. However, in his Position
Paper, he subsequently denied having rendered legal services for the complainant. Respondent
claimed that he only administered her oath as a Public Prosecutor. He justified that as a Public
Prosecutor, it was his duty to administer oaths after ascertaining the identity of the person before
him and the signature in the document presented to him. Respondent further claimed that he had
already retired from government service when he acted as counsel for Diamond Ace's former
employees. He averred that he represented these former employees since one of them was his
nephew.

HELD: The Supreme Court adopts the findings of the IBP. In their report, they found that the
respondent did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The Investigating Commissioner
noted that: Unfortunately, the evidence presented failed to disclose when Atty. Taminaya was
employed as a PAO lawyer and as a Prosecutor, and when his employment was terminated. There
may be issues as to the propriety of Atty. Taminaya in notarizing documents not directly related
to his functions as prosecutor but then, the documents presented only [show] that he notarized the
same in his capacity as prosecutor

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found no evidence to establish that the respondent
acted as the complainant's attorney. He observed that there was no direct evidence that would point
to Atty. Taminaya as counsel for Prieto. The mere act of notarizing one's document does not
automatically make the notary public his or her counsel. The Investigating Commissioner
concluded that since the respondent did not act as the complainant's counsel, the former could not
have violated the conflict of interest rule.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v.

MARIO SERZO, JR., accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 118435 June 20, 1997

FACTS: Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the
stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former. Pre-
trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits. The accused alleged that he was
denied the right to counsel. As early as the arraignment stage, the accused refused to be assisted
by a counsel de oficio from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) insisting that he be assisted by a
counsel of his own choice. For several settings, the accused and her (sic) mother were allowed to
secure the services of a counsel de parte. However, they failed to present one. Hence, the Court,
to avoid further delay in the proceedings of the case, was constrained to assign a counsel de
oficio from the PAO. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the
accused. Serzo contended that he had been denied effective legal representation. His thesis is that
the trial court did not give him enough time to engage a counsel de parte, effectively depriving
him of the chance to present evidence in his defense.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel
de officio who assisted him in all stages of the proceedings. The option to hire one's counsel cannot
be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules, or prejudice the equally
important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is
also a recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has
the power to take his life or liberty. The right covers the period from the custodial investigation
until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained
or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. The right to engage a
counsel, however not absolute and is waivable. However, the facts of this case do not constitute a
deprivation of the appellant's constitutional right to counsel because he was adequately represented
by three court-appointed lawyers. Indeed, public policy requires that the trial continue as
scheduled, considering that the appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not
shown to be negligent, incompetent, or otherwise unable to represent him.
SECTION 23. Amicus curiae. — A lawyer shall not decline, without just cause, a request by any
court, tribunal, or other government agency to act as amicus curiae in any proceeding relating to
the lawyer's expertise or field of specialization.

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, v.

BONIFACIO YSIP, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and BALDOMERO
SILVERIO, as administrator of the Intestate of Gregorio Silverio, respondents.
G.R. No. L-3928, July 27, 1951

FACTS: On December 23, 1949, Baldomero Silverio as administrator of the intestate estate of
Gregorio Silverio, owner of the land, filed Civil Case No. 415 of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan against the Philippine Alien Property Administration of the United States and the
Municipality of Plaridel, asking for the return of the land on which the two bodegas stand, a
declaration that said two storehouses are the properties of his administration because they had been
given to it by the Japanese before they left the place upon the approach of the American Liberation
forces, and for the payment of damages caused by the withholding by the defendants of said two
bodegas and the land on which they are located. In these certiorari and mandamus proceedings,
the Philippine Alien Property Administrator through his attorneys petitioned this Court to be
allowed to intervene as amicus curiae with permission to file pleadings, adduce evidence, if
required, and argue orally or by memorandum.

HELD: Said petition was granted and the Philippine Alien Property Administrator as amicus
curiae has filed a printed memorandum exhaustive and enlightening, relating the origin and history
of the office of Alien Property Custodian established in the Philippines after Liberation, which
later was converted into the office of the Philippine Enemy Property Administrator. Considering
the different contentions made by both parties, petitioner and respondents, including the amicus
curiae, and with an eye to which private claims may in the future be presented, the Supreme Court
is inclined to find and to hold that the Republic should be allowed to intervene, not only because
as already stated, it will eventually become the owner and title holder of all vested properties within
the Philippines or what may remain of them after determination of claims or the payment of
expenses of administration and costs, but also because said Republic thru its agencies or
instrumentalities has a distinct advantage and the facilities in inquiring into the nature, origin, and
history of all said vested properties, could assist the Philippine Enemy Property Administrator in
resisting improper claims, and otherwise helping the courts to arrive at the facts and legal status of
said properties.
 Antonio T. Carpio, et al., petitioners v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al. respondent,
G.R. No. 252736, December 7, 2021

Under the Rules of Court, the court may invite lawyers to appear as amicus curiae to help
in the disposition of issues. An amicus curiae serves precisely to assist the Honorable Court by
providing an impartial opinion on issues identified as involving a particularly difficult question of
law. By offering himself as a “friend of the court”, would like the Honorable Court to believe that
is trustworthy, impartial, and an expert on the issues involved.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court has appointed retired Associate Justice Francis
Jardeleza as amicus curiae — to stand as “friend” of the tribunal — in resolving the petitions
against the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020. Jardeleza retired from the SC in September 2019 after
serving the high court for five years. Prior to becoming an SC justice, Jardeleza was the solicitor
general for two years. The SC has also appointed retired Chief Justice Reynato Puno as amicus
curiae for its deliberations on the petitions.

In the same SC order, the tribunal said it resolved to “note without action” martial law-era
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza’s pleading to be allowed to appear as amicus curiae in
resolving the petitions. Citing his “experience on issues relevant to the instant cases,” petitioner
with respect, raises that Atty. Mendoza does not satisfy the requirements under the rules to
participate as amicus curiae in the instant cases. Mendoza has petitioned the high court to be
allowed to comment in the numerous suits questioning the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.

SECTION 24. Active involvement in legal education. - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, and support efforts to achieve
standards of excellence in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students.

In addition, a lawyer shall assist the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), law schools,
law alumni associations, law associations, or civic organizations, in educating the public on the
law and jurisprudence.

The IBP Chapters shall provide supervising lawyers to the legal aid clinics in their
jurisdiction.

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, respondent

A.C. No. 9834, Aug. 26, 2015

FACTS: Atty. Adaza applied to be exempted from the MCLE. He enumerated his achievements
as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50 years. He said, he was the
first outsider of the Supreme Court whom President Corazon C. Aquino, offered, immediately after
she took over the government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court but he
refused the intended appointment because he did not like some members of the Cory crowd to get
him to the SC in an effort to buy his silence; He almost single-handedly handled the case of
Corazon C. Aquino in the canvassing of the results of the 1986 snap elections, discussing
constitutional and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSA I revolution; He was one of the
two lead counsels of now Senator Mirriam Defensor Santiago in the national canvassing before
the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then General Fidel Ramos. The
other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court Serafin Cuevas; He handled the 1987 and
1989 as well as the 2003 Coup cases for leading generals like Abenina and Commendador and
Colonels like Gregorio Honasan as well as the six Oakwood Captains, including now Senator
Antonio Trillanes; He filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and
validity of the 2010 national elections, still undecided up to this day; He filed together with another
lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and legality of the Corona
impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief
Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic; He
had been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as Governor of Misamis
Oriental, Commissioner of Immigration and the senior member of the Opposition in the regular
Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments. He was the
leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law; He was the
leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate in the
complaint for impeachment against President Ferdinand Marcos; He had been practicing law for
about fifty years now with appearances before the Supreme Court when Justices like Concepcion,
Barrera and JBL Reyes, in the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts over the country; He had
been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE;
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo;
(2) Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas,
Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a
reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE
compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the
MCLE requirements.

HELD: A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive
a Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency. He will be given sixty (60) days from
the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the
requirements. The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE
requirement.

Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior
period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess
may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. A member who is in
non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of P1, 000.00.
He shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Committee Board of Governors
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee.
 ELIBENA A. CABILES, complainant, v. ATTY. LEANDRO S. CEDO, respondent.
A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017

FACTS: Elibena Cabiles engaged the services of a respondent lawyer to handle an illegal
dismissal case. The complainant alleged that the respondent lawyer failed to indicate his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance in the position paper and in the
memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Elibena pointed to a certification issued on June 29,
2010, by the MCLE Office that the respondent lawyer had not at all complied with the first, second,
and third compliance periods13 of the (MCLE) requirement. The respondent lawyer did not refute
Ebilena's claim that he failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in the position paper and in the
memorandum of appeal.

HELD: The respondent lawyer violated Canon 5 of the CPR because of his failure to comply with
the three MCLE compliance periods.

Canon 5 provides that “A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve highest standards in law schools
as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence”.

[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts." Given herein respondent lawyer's failure to maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency with his refusal to comply with the MCLE as well as his lack of
showing of his fealty to Elibena’s interest in view of his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in
handling the cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and commensurate to the facts of the case to
adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend him from the practice of law for one year.

SECTION 25. Support for legal internship, apprenticeship, and training. – To prepare the next
generation of lawyers for ethical practice, lawyers shall support legal internship and
apprenticeship programs and accept law students for training.

The lawyer shall treat the apprentices as junior colleagues and future counsels, and shall
conscientiously supervise them.
 CANON V
EQUALITY

SECTION 3. Indigent person. — A lawyer shall not refuse the representation of an indigent
person, except if:

(a) the lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently due to a
justifiable cause;

(b) the lawyer will be placed in a conflict-of-interest situation; or

(c) the lawyer is related to the potential adverse party, within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to the adverse counsel, within the fourth degree.

An indigent is any person who has no money or property sufficient for food, shelter and
other basic necessities for oneself and one's family.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v.

GEORGE DAENG, CONRADO BAUTISTA, GERARDO ABUHIN, and ROLANDO
CASTILLO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-34091 January 30, 1973

FACTS: The defendants-appellants George Daeng, Conrado Bautista, Gerardo Abubin

and Rolando Castillo were indicted for the crime of murder before the Circuit Criminal Court
holding sessions in Pasig, Rizal. The Supreme Court noted that in at least three criminal cases
appealed to them, including the present, from the Circuit Criminal Court holding sessions in Pasig,
Rizal, involving prisoners charged with and convicted for participation in prison gang wars, Atty.
Jose O. Galvan has been appointed by the court a quo to act as counsel de oficio for the defendants.
In every case, the defendants either pleaded guilty on initial arraignment or later changed their plea
from "not guilty" to "guilty."

HELD: The appointment of Atty. Galvan as counsel de oficio in all three cases might just
have been a coincidence since there is no evidence before us that would show that he had applied
for and been granted such appointment. We would, nevertheless, caution all courts against the
frequent appointment of the same attorney as counsel de oficio, for two basic reasons: first, it is
unfair to the attorney concerned, considering the burden of his regular practice that he should be
saddled with too many de officio cases; and, second, the compensation provided for by section 32
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (a fixed fee of P500 in capital offense) might be considered by
some lawyers as a regular source of income, something which the Rule does not envision. In every
case, the accused stands to suffer because the overburdened counsel would have too little time to
spare for his de officio cases and also would be inordinately eager to finish such cases in order to
collect his fees within the earliest possible time.
 IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Bar.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v.
REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26868, February 27, 1969

FACTS: On December 14, 1966, Atty. Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by
this Court as Estebia's counsel de oficio. Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape and sentenced to
suffer the capital punishment. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to prepare
and file his brief within thirty days of the notice. He was advised that to enable him to examine the
case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano received this notice. On January 19, 1967,
Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file the appellant's brief in mimeographed form. On
February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension (his second). This was followed by a
third filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27, also for fifteen days. He moved
for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought a special extension of
five days. All these motions for extension were granted. The brief was due on April 26, 1967. But
no brief was filed.

On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof
why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite
the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any explanation. For failing to comply
with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon
him a fine of P500 payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice with a warning that upon
further non-compliance with the said resolution within the same period of fifteen days, "more
drastic disciplinary action will be taken against him." Still, counsel paid no heed. Finally, on
December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from notice thereof
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct and violation of
his oath of office as attorney." By express order of this Court, the resolution was personally served
upon him on December 18, 1968. He ignored the resolution.

HELD: By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a
destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty
is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." A lawyer so appointed
"as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always
exert his best efforts" on the indigent's behalf. No excuse at all has been offered for the non-
presentation of appellant's brief. In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's
statements in his motions for the extension have gone down to the level of empty and meaningless
words; at best, have a dubious claim to veracity.

In the present case, the counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a propensity on
the part of counsel to benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy
and respect that should be accorded this Court. The court suspended Attorney Lope E. Adriano for
one (1) year.
 SECTION 4. Standard of service. - A lawyer shall observe the same standard of service
for all clients, regardless of remuneration, except for the higher standard required for
representation of vulnerable persons.

RUEL TUANO Y HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016

FACTS: Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11(3)
of Republic Act No. 9165 for having in his possession one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
with 0.064 grams of shabu. Regional Trial Court dated May 4, 2010, convicted the accused guilty
of the said law and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. The Appellate Court affirmed the
decision of RTC. The accused, through the Public Attorney's Office, filed a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Reply dated September 16, 2015, and a Reply on September 22, 2015. On June 27,
2016, the Court of Appeals acquitted the accused for the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, counsels for the accused were grossly remiss in this
duty. The accused died on March 1, 2015. However, his counsels continued to file pleadings on
his behalf, including a Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply dated September 16, 2015, and
a Reply dated September 22, 2015. It was only through the July 15, 2016 letter of the Director
General of the Bureau of Corrections did this Court found out that the accused had already died
one (1) year, four (4) months, and 15 days after its occurrence.

HELD: This Court notes that the accused was represented by the Public Attorney's Office.
Notwithstanding their heavy case workload and the free legal assistance they provide to indigents
and low-income persons, however, counsels from the Public Attorney's Office are still obliged to
pursue their cases with competence and diligence. This is consistent with their commitment to
public service.

Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer who accepts the
cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct
governing his relations with paying clients." Counsels for the accused have shown inefficiency in
the performance of their duties. Relying on their representations in their pleadings, this Court was
led to believe that the criminal action against the accused subsisted. Consequently, this Court
issued a resolution even after the accused's death. Had counsels for the accused informed this Court
earlier of the death of their client, this Court would have saved precious time, effort, and resources,
which could have been devoted to other pending cases that call for this Court's resolution and
judgment. Likewise, the parties need not have filed the pleadings calling for the resolution of the
accused's Motion for Reconsideration. Counsels for the accused, however, are DIRECTED to
show cause, within five (5) days of receipt of this Resolution, why no disciplinary action should
be taken against them for failing to inform this Court of the accused's death.