FNC Research
FNC Research
FNC Research
- “Forum-shopping” has been defined3 as a “plaintiff by-passing his natural forum and
bringing his action in some alien forum which would give him relief or benefits which
would not be available to him in the natural forum”. Forum-shopping may be seen as an
evil4 either because it often results in unfairness to the defendant or because the choice of
a forum which has little or no connection with the parties or the subject-matter is thought
to be objectionable per se. The primary concern will be with regulation of forum-shopping in
England. As recently as 1973, Lord Denning MR refused to disapprove of forum-shopping
in England since “it is a good place to shop in, both for quality of goods and the speed of
service”.5 Lord Denning's words typify the attitude, now generally outmoded, that English
justice is superior to that administered in other countries and so ought not to be denied
even to foreigners. Although Lord Denning's view is still shared by some,6 it is no longer
prevalent among the judiciary as a whole.
- The House of Lords8 has on several occasions expressed the need to combat forum-
shopping. There are several devices by which forum-shopping can be controlled: choice-of-
law rules, jurisdictional rules and staying proceedings.
A. Choice-of-Law Rules
A plaintiff will only acquire a substantive advantage from forum-shopping if the law chosen
by the forum to govern the substantive issues in the case is different from that which would
be applied by the natural forum. Thus, the incentive to forum-shop for substantive
advantages will be greatly reduced if
(1) the lex fori never governs substantive issues;
(2) as few issues as possible are categorised as procedural; and
(3) there is greater harmonisation between the choice-of-law rules of different
countries.9However, even if these principles were adopted, plaintiffs might still be tempted
to forum-shop for procedural advantages.
B. Jurisdictional Rules
The most effective way to prevent a plaintiff from forum-shopping in search of either
procedural or substantive advantages is to refuse jurisdiction in cases which are not closely
connected with England. To introduce such an approach, however, would be a radical
departure from the common law rule that an English court has jurisdiction in any case where
the defendant has been properly served with a writ while he is present in England or Wales,
however temporary that presence may be.This rule is objectionable chiefly because whether
or not the defendant is present in this country may be totally fortuitous. Interestingly, the
English courts will not recognise the judgment of a foreign court if the only basis for the
jurisdiction of that court is the presence of the defendant; residence is required. 10
C. Staying Proceedings
The need for the discretion to grant a stay to serve this purpose has been recognised by the
House of Lords in The Atlantic Star16 and MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd.17 These cases
radically altered the approach of the courts towards staying proceedings in cases where
England is not the most appropriate forum. In particular, the test to be applied in these cases
was reformulated in MacShannon.
- Before MacShannon the test to be applied on motions for a stay, whether or not there was
a lis alibi pendens, was that enunciated by Scott LJ in St. Pierre v. South American Stores (Gath &
Chaves Ltd.):(1) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the
advantages of prosecuting his action in an English court if it is otherwise properly brought … (2) In order to justify
a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the court
that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or
would be an abuse of the process of the court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the
plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.21
This test was not effective to control forum-shopping. Firstly, it was not sufficient for the
defendant to show that trial in England would cause him injustice because it was not the
natural forum; he also had to show that it was “oppressive and vexatious” to him for the
action to continue. Thus, a defendant was rarely able to bring the plaintiffs conduct “within the
scope of one of these grave allegations”22 even if there was blatant forum-shopping. It has
been said that “the absence of any real connection between the proceedings and England does
not itself make it vexatious and oppressive for the action to be continued in
England”.23 Secondly, even if the defendant satisfied the first condition of Scott LJ's test, he
then had to show that a stay would cause “no injustice to the plaintiff'. It would seem that this
test was an absolute one and not a relative one. It was not sufficient for the defendant to show
that the injustice caused by a stay was less than the injustice which would be caused to him
by the refusal to grant a stay: he had to show that no injustice would be caused to the
plaintiff. The test propounded by Scott LJ was accepted as an authoritative statement of the
law by all the Law Lords in The Atlantic Star,24 but a majority held that the words “oppressive and
vexatious” ought to be interpreted broadly and understood in a morally neutral sense. The
majority in the House of Lords in The Atlantic Star thus began the “liberalising” process which
was continued in MacShannon.
MacShannon test
1st limb: The defendant must satisfy the court that there is another forum to whose
jurisdiction he is amenable in which justice can be done between the parties at substantially
less inconvenience or expense.
Clearly, convenience and expense48 are important in determining whether there is a more
natural forum, but they are by no means the only factors . For example, in Castanho49 the
House of Lords and Brandon LJ in the Court of Appeal were prepared to assume that
justice could be done in England at substantially less inconvenience and expense but
nevertheless felt that, since the defendants were part of a group of companies based in
Texas, Texas was just as natural and proper a forum.
There has been some confusion over whether the search is for the natural forum or
a more natural forum.50 it now seems settled51 that the first limb may be satisfied by showing that
the foreign forum is more natural or appropriate than the English forum, even though it cannot
properly be referred to as the natural forum.
In most of the cases there has been no attempt to define naturalness or appropriateness in
relation to possible forums. In MacShannon, Lord Keith refers to the natural forum as being “that
with which the action has the most real and substantial connection”.52 This definition or some
variation of it has been adopted in some recent cases.53 It will be noted that in this context it is
connection with the action rather than the transaction which is relevant. The factors to be considered
and the weight to be given to each factor will differ from those under the proper law of the
contract test. Provided these differences are borne in mind, the analogy with the proper law test is
a useful one. However, the reference here should be to a forum with “a more real and substantial
connection” in order to correspond to the preferable “more natural forum” test.
It has been suggested56 that the real and substantial connection test should totally replace the first
limb of Lord Diplock's test. The advantage of this formulation is that its theoretical basis is more
comprehensible because lawyers and the courts are familiar with the concept.
In deciding whether there is a more natural forum, the courts have taken into account inter alia: the
law which governs the dispute;57 the place where the evidence is situated and in particular the
availability and convenience of witnesses giving oral evidence;58 the place where the incident
occurred (if different);59 the language of the evidence;60 and the residence (and nationality) of the
parties.61 Where the factors point in different directions, the court must put them in the balance in
order to make its decision. It is difficult to establish the criteria used by the court in performing
this balancing exercise. It is unclear whether any more weight should be given to some factors
than to others. Three factors62 have emerged from the cases as potentially decisive:
lis alibi pendens,
- Abidin Daver case
the existence of related proceedings,
- The Messiniaki Tolmi
lex causae.
-The Hida Maru
Smith Kline118 = the plaintiffs claim that he would obtain higher damages in the USA was
considered highly speculative because there was expert evidence to the effect that the
Pennsylvanian court would probably apply English law to the issue of damages, and thus
there was held to be no real advantage. Lord Denning MR claimed obiter that such an
advantage was anyway an illegitimate one. Such a view appears to be irreconcilable with the
House of Lords' view in Castanho.119 However, the two cases can be distinguished on the
same basis as that postulated for the cases on “delay”. In Castanho120 it was not unfair to
the defendant to sue in Texas, because that forum was just as natural as the
English forum and so the prospect of higher damages in Texas was a legitimate advantage.
Conversely, in Smith Kline,121 it was unfair to sue in Philadelphia since the real defendant
was English and England was “undoubtedly the natural forum” for litigating the dispute.
3. Substantive advantages
A plaintiff will only be deprived of a substantive advantage where the English court will
choose a law to govern the case different from what would be chosen by the foreign court
(or apply the same law differently). The only case where a substantive advantage has been
relied on in refusing a stay is The Hida Maru.123
It is suggested that in general the court ought not to compare the way the case would be
decided in the competing forums.124 Such comparisons are as invidious as comparisons of
procedure and more likely to be based on conflicting foreign evidence. Further, the lex
causae is given great weight in deciding whether there is a more natural forum and should
not be resurrected under the second limb.
However, public policy may demand that where English law is the lex causae and there is
clear evidence that the foreign court will not give proper effect to English law, then a stay
should be refused. The Hida Maru probably falls within such an exception.
What is the position where the two limbs of the test give conflicting
results? Presumably, under Lord Diplock's test,128 the application for a stay
would fail unless both limbs were satisfied. Lord Keith, however,
in MacShannon discussed the position expressly and envisaged a different
approach. He said that it is
necessary to weigh against each other the advantages to the plaintiff and the disadvantages
to the defendant and a stay will not be granted unless the court concludes that to refuse it
would involve injustice to the defendant and [the grant would involve] no injustice to the
plaintiff.129
The concept of justice as the deciding factor can also be found in Lord
Salmon's judgment. He stated that
the question as to whether [an action] should be stayed depends on whether the defendants
can establish that to refuse a stay would produce injustice … To my mind, the real test of a
stay depends on what the court in its discretion considers that justice demands.130
An action brought in the English courts shall be stayed if either (a) it is brought in breach of an agreement to submit the
dispute to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, or (b) the courts of another country have the closest and most real connection
with the dispute; and that foreign court has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Provided always that (i) notwithstanding the
above, an action shall be stayed if the sole reason for the foreign court not having jurisdiction to hear the dispute is that, by
the law administered in that court, the claim of the plaintiff is barred by lapse of time; (ii) no action shall be stayed if the
judgment of the foreign court would not be entitled to be recognised in England; and (iii) no action shall be stayed where to
do so would be contrary to express statutory provision.
Even the wording of this formula contains a number of uncertainties. In the first place, no mention
is made of where the burden of proof lies, but it is presumed that, since this formula is to replace
Dicey and Morris's