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Bioarchaeology and Social Theory
Series Editor
Debra L. Martin
Professor of Anthropology
University of Nevada
Las Vegas, USA
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11976

Anna J. Osterholtz
Editor
Theoretical Approaches to
Analysis and Interpretation
of Commingled Human
Remains
1 3
Editor
Anna J. Osterholtz
Department of Anthropology
University of Nevada Las Vegas
Las Vegas
Nevada
USA
Bioarchaeology and Social Theory

ISBN 978-3-319-22553-1 ISBN 978-3-319-22554-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-22554-8
Library of Congress Control Number: 2015953016
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or
information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors
or omissions that may have been made.
Printed on acid-free paper
Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media

(www.springer.com)
For the ladies of the Perpetual Porch
Foreword
Working with human remains is fraught with ethical and methodological consider-
ations that push researchers to contextualize their studies with as much information
as possible. When human remains are relatively undisturbed and the bones map
well onto the original location and position of the body, there is a wealth of con-
textual information that can be used to reconstruct the identity of the person and to
make meaning out of the circumstances that may have led to death.
The studies in this volume do not have easy access to contextual information
because the bodies of the deceased have been disturbed both culturally and/or natu-
rally and the remaining bones no longer are part of their original context. The hu-
man remains in these studies are variously commingled, disarticulated, modified,
broken, burned, fragmentary, and often isolated from their original context. This
represents bioarchaeology as the most challenging kind that relies on empirical data
sets that are less than perfect. The extraordinary thing about this collection of papers
is that all the authors use state-of-the-art methodologies to situate and reconstruct
the original contexts and further, they all do so within richly configured theoretical
contexts.
The foundational work for this volume began with a previously edited volume
(Osterholtz et al. 2014) that focused on best practices in the analysis of commingled
and disarticulated remains. This volume builds on that one by utilizing the meth-
ods outlined in the former volume, but now focusing on the use of social theory to
provide more robust interpretations of these challenging and often understudied
collections. These studies bridge social theory with bioarchaeology in ways that are
innovative yet sensitive to the challenges and problems of working with incomplete
data sets. All these chapters consciously use social theory to expand our understand-
ing of social life and human behavior at multiple and dimensional levels. Culture
change, climate change, power, inequality, class, gender, ethnicity, identity, and ma-
teriality are all approached in various chapters using a wide variety of theoretical
frameworks that best fits the data at hand.
Engagement with theory in each of these chapters means that the authors have
approached the meanings, values, intentions, beliefs and ideas about human behav-
ior though the lens of available mortuary practices, and information on demography
and pathology. This is a relatively new arena for study. This volume supplies a kind
vii
viii Foreword
of road map for others working with imperfect collections who wish to expand their
studies well beyond description of the bones. For example, some of the studies fo-
cused on the socially created institutions, events and symbolic objects that animated
how the lines between life and death were often blurred or reimagined as derived
from the mortuary practices. The agency of human factors in creating the mortu-
ary contexts discussed in these chapters is highlighted as a way to think about the
interaction of the living and the dead.
In these studies, methodology, social theory, and data are tethered. Data without
theory has limited explanatory power and is difficult to generalize about meaning
beyond a local context. Theory in these chapters has aided in making sense of the
data in a broader context. These studies attest to the value of carefully collected em-
pirical observations and robust data sets as the baseline for building interpretations
that are enhanced with the use of social theory.
Debra L. Martin
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
References cited
Osterholtz, A. J., Baustian, K. M., & Martin, D. L. (eds.) (2014). Commingled and
disarticulated human remains: Working toward improved theory, method, and data.
New York: Springer.
Contents
1 Introduction�� 1
Debra Martin and Anna J. Osterholtz
2 A Tale of Two Platforms: Commingled Remains and the

Life-Course of Houses at Neolithic Çatalhöyük�� 5
Scott D. Haddow, Joshua W. Sadvari, Christopher J. Knüsel
and Rémi Hadad
3 Bodies in Motion: Identity and Migration in Cyprus During

the Bronze Age�� 31
Anna J. Osterholtz
4 Part of the Family: Age, Identity, and Burial in Copper Age Iberia�� 47
Jess Beck
5 Limited Circumstances: Creating a Better Understanding

of Prehistoric Peoples Through the Reanalysis of Collections
of Commingled Human Remains�� 75
Maria Panakhyo and Keith Jacobi
6 When Space Is Limited: A Spatial Exploration of Pre-

Hispanic Chachapoya Mortuary and Ritual Microlandscape�� 97
Lori Epstein and J. Marla Toyne
7 Patterned Processing as Performative Violence�� 125

Anna J. Osterholtz
8 Contexts, Needs, and Social Messaging: Situating Iroquoian

Human Bone Artifacts in Southern Ontario, Canada�� 139
Tara Jenkins
ix
x Contents
In morbo et in morto: Transforming Age and Identity Within

9
the Mortuary Context of Oymaağaç Höyük, Northern Turkey�� 185
Kathryn E. Marklein and Sherry C. Fox
10 Linking Health and Marriage Practices Among Commingled

Assemblages: A Case Study from Bronze Age Tell Abraq, UAE�� 207
Kathryn Baustian and Cheryl Anderson
11 Cemetery Preservation and Beautification of Death:

Investigations of Unmarked Early to Mid-Nineteenth-
Century Burial Grounds in Central Kentucky�� 219
Peter Killoran, David Pollack, Stuart Nealis and Emily Rinker
12 Commingled Bodies and Mixed and Communal Identities�� 243

Tiffiny A. Tung
Index�� 253
Contributors
Cheryl Anderson Department of Anthropology, University of Nevada-Las Vegas,

Las Vegas, NV, USA
Kathryn Baustian Department of Anthropology, University of Nevada-Las
Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, USA
Jess Beck Museum of Anthropological Archaeology, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Lori Epstein Haun and Associates, Kailua Kona, HI, USA
Sherry C. Fox School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State
University, Tempe, AZ, USA
Rémi Hadad Département d’Anthropologie, UMR 7055 “Préhistoire &
Technologie”, Maison de l’Archéologie et de l’Ethnologie (MAE), Université
Paris-Ouest Nanterre, Nanterre, France
Scott D. Haddow Çatalhöyük Research Project, Stanford Archaeology Center,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Keith Jacobi Department of Anthropology, The University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, AL, USA
Tara Jenkins Timmins Martelle Heritage Consultants Inc., London, ON, Canada
Peter Killoran Department of Sociology, Criminology and Anthropology,
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, Whitewater, WI, USA
Christopher J. Knüsel UMR 5199 De la Préhistoire à l’Actuel: Culture,
Environnement, et Anthropologie (PACEA), Bordeaux, CS, France
Kathryn E. Marklein Department of Anthropology, The Ohio State University,
Columbus, OH, USA
Debra Martin Department of Anthropology, University of Nevada-Las Vegas,
Las Vegas, NV, USA
xi
xii Contributors
Stuart Nealis Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky, Lexington,

KY, USA
Anna J. Osterholtz Department of Anthropology, University of Nevada-Las
Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, USA
Maria Panakhyo Department of Anthropology, Southern Illinois Univerisity,
Carbondale, IL, USA
David Pollack Department of Anthropology, Kentucky Archaeological Survey
and University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA
Emily Rinker Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky, Lexington,
KY, USA
Joshua W. Sadvari University Libraries Ohio State University, Columbus, OH,
USA
J. Marla Toyne Department of Anthropology, University of Central Florida,
Orlando, FL, USA
Tiffiny A. Tung Department of Anthropology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville,
TN, USA
About the Editor
Anna J. Osterholtz has recently completed her PhD at the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas focusing on social change, migration, and identity during the Bronze Age
on Cyprus. Her primary research interests center around commingled and fragmen-
tary assemblages of human remains and the unique stories they tell. She has active
research projects in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean.
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Debra Martin and Anna J. Osterholtz
Bones Do Not Speak for Themselves
This volume grew out of an organized symposium at the 2014 Society for American
Archaeology meetings in Austin, Texas, which focused on the application of social
theory to assemblages consisting of fragmentary and commingled human remains.
Too often, these assemblages (which can present analytical and methodological
challenges) are overlooked in bioarchaeology and at best they are described. The
contributions to this volume provide ways to go beyond description into the appli-
cation of social theory to facilitate providing conclusions that are more interpretive.
The case studies provide excellent examples of how interpretively rich these as-
semblages can be when placed within a framework where ideas about social rela-
tions or cultural processes complement bioarchaeological data and archaeological
reconstruction. As Sofaer (2006, p. 33) noted, “human remains are frequently seen
as products sourced from excavations, the recording and reports passed on as com-
modities through a system of commercial contract, thereby ensuring the place of
bioarchaeology at the bottom of the interpretive tree.” This statement has been even
more true of those assemblages that comprised fragmentary, modified, burned, dis-
articulated, and commingled remains.
These contributions are a very good indication of how far bioarchaeology has
come as a subdiscipline within biological anthropology. Martin et al. (2013) present
a model for bioarchaeology that necessitates a theoretical model from the outset of
analysis. This approach invites researchers to article why we want to analyze human
remains and how we intend to use the products of those analyses. This is integral
to modern bioarchology. Bioarchaeology is almost always focused upon how indi-
D. Martin () · A. J. Osterholtz

Department of Anthropology, University of Nevada-Las Vegas, 4505 S. Maryland Parkway,
Box 455003, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5003, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
A. J. Osterholtz
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1
A. J. Osterholtz (ed.), Theoretical Approaches to Analysis and Interpretation of
Commingled Human Remains, Bioarchaeology and Social Theory,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-22554-8_1
2 D. Martin and A. J. Osterholtz
viduals interacted both with each other and their environments, how they died, and
how the living interacted with them after death.
The focus of this volume is not on the methodology used for the analyses, al-
though each chapter provides a short background about the methodological ap-
proaches used. The previous volume (Osterholtz et al. 2014) was primarily focused
on the importance of methodology and served as a catalyst for this one, which is
focused on how commingled assemblages can be used to make meaning. How can
commingled assemblages be used to answer social questions and to investigate hu-
man interactions?
The original Latin derivation of the word theory means to contemplate the cos-
mos and to reflect on why things in society are the way they are; in essence, it is a
way of explaining the visible world. Schiffer has written extensively about the use
of social theory in archaeology and he notes that it helps archaeologists to get at
the how and why questions for their data sets (e.g., 1987, 1995, 2000). In the con-
tributions to this volume, the how and why questions are answered by using social
theory. Moving from individual (skeletal), community-based, and regional-level
analyses, interpretations of human behavior emerge for each case study.
No Single Paradigm
Human behavior is rarely explained by examination of action through a single lens.

The contributions to this volume show that with a melding and blending of theoreti-
cal lenses, a more complex and nuanced view of the processes that created these
assemblage emerges. The use of theoretical frameworks allows for a robust view of
behavior. It is the goal of this volume to highlight different theoretical approaches
and to show the benefit moving beyond description into cultural processes. The
chapters in this volume address a wide range of issues, from identity and agency, to
materiality, subjectivities, and violence.
As Parker Pearson (1999, p. 3) has noted, “the dead don’t bury themselves.”
The interaction between the living and the dead has been used for millennia as
a mechanism for identity formation. Essentially how the dead are treated reveals
much about the living. Identity can be a fuzzy concept in anthropology and can be
explored through multiple lenses and at different scales. Commingled assemblages
can make estimation of relatedness difficult; at the same time, issues of tomb inclu-
sion become very important to the concepts of group identity and cohesiveness. In
a sense, the individual disappears from a commingled or collective context and all
that is left is a group identity based on the association with the place of burial.
On a regional scale, Osterholtz (this volume, Chap. 3) shows how the inclusion
of new burials in old spaces and the association between burial location and admin-
istrative structures on Cyprus were used to solidify social and economic control and
used as a mechanism for the creation of new lineages with populations during the
Bronze Age. Marklein and Fox (this volume, Chap. 9) address the issue of biologi-
cal relatedness specifically and look into the ways in which the living tended to the
dead in a collective burial. Baustian and Anderson (this volume, Chap. 10) examine
1 Introduction 3
the use of nonmetric traits as a mechanism for genetic relatedness as a mechanism

for the discussion of larger social issues such as endogamous marriage and family
relationships in Bronze Age UAE.
On a community level, Jenkins (this volume, Chap. 8) examines group identity
for the Iroquois through the manipulation of the dead. Bone objects were created,
positions, repositioned, and utilized in specific contexts that communicated com-
munity ideas about debt, wealth, and identity. Panakhyo and Jacobi (this volume,
Chap. 5) also examine Copena mortuary practices as a marker of identity. Epstein
and Toyne (this volume, Chap. 6) use elements of landscape theory to examine
identity. Body partibility is used as a way to make meaning of the modified bones;
bones of former prisoners were transformed into a partiable body that could be so-
cially circulated by others, providing the how and why of these body parts and the
power they exerted in various social contexts. Beck (this volume, Chap. 4) focused
on age-based identities, examining the mortuary treatment of children along the
same lines as adults and the implications of these actions for the larger community.
Haddow and colleagues (this volume, Chap. 2) use 3D modelling and analysis
of burn patterns to discuss building abandonment in association with the death of
important individuals as part of the mortuary ritual and larger community processes,
an excellent example of postmortem agency as the dead continue to exert influence
and demand actions that are both regenerative and transformative.
Killoran and colleagues (this volume, Chapter 11) also examine issues of em-
bodiment and postmortem agency with more modern assemblages from the Ameri-
can South. Particularly, the assemblages they are interested in are result of mental
hospital patient death and include the burials of people with low socioeconomic
status. Their postmortem agency is therefore limited as they were marginalized in
life and their links to the living were more difficult to maintain.
Osterholtz (this volume, Chap. 7) examines the role of social control and perfor-
mance through the analysis of the Sacred Ridge assemblage, combining elements of
Galtung’s and Farmer’s concepts of structural violence with Whitehead’s performa-
tive theory; explaining the how and why of killing and processing of a large group
of individuals would have been socially important.
Tung (this volume, Chap. 12) provides concluding thoughts and ideas for new
directions in the study of commingled human remains. Commingled assemblages
are common yet rarely used in large integrated research projects. Drawing on the
best practices presented in the sister companion to this volume (Osterholtz et al.
2014), it is clear that much more attention should be paid to the excavation, cura-
tion, and analysis of human remains that are fragmentary and commingled. There is
ample evidence presented here to demonstrate the utility of doing so.
Summary
The contributions to this volume reveal the dead to have complex and layered lives
as gendered, as agents, as symbols, and as forces in shaping and reifying identity.
Theoretical approaches are used with great care and deep knowledge of their utility
4 D. Martin and A. J. Osterholtz
to the case studies showing that one theory does not apply to all studies. The theo-
retical approaches chosen by the authors reflect the research questions being asked.
The contributions here provide multiple avenues for the examination of social struc-
ture, interaction, and the development of group identity. Innovative methodologies
are necessary for the inclusion of commingled assemblages into larger understand-
ings of social processes. The case studies presented in this volume show how theory
can change, evolve, and be mixed to provide a rich understanding of the past.
References
Martin, D., Harrod, R. P., & Pérez, V. (2013). Bioarchaeology: An integrated approach to working
with human remains. New York: Springer.
Osterholtz, A. J., Baustian, K. M., & Martin, D. L. (Eds.). (2014). Commingled and disarticulated
human remains: Working toward improved theory, method, and data. New York: Springer.
Parker Pearson, M. (1999). The archaeology of death and burial. College Station: Texas A & M
University Press.
Schiffer, M. B. (1987). Formation processes of the archaeological record. Salt Lake City: Univer-
sity of Utah Press.
Schiffer, M. B. (1995). Behavioral archaeology: First principles. Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press.
Schiffer, M. B. 2000. Social theory in archaeology. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
Sofaer, J. R. 2006. The body as material culture: A theoretical osteoarchaeology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 2
A Tale of Two Platforms: Commingled Remains
and the Life-Course of Houses at Neolithic
Çatalhöyük
Scott D. Haddow, Joshua W. Sadvari, Christopher J. Knüsel and Rémi Hadad
Introduction
The Neolithic site of Çatalhöyük is located in south-central Turkey (Fig. 2.1) and
dates from roughly 7100 to 6000 cal BC (Bayliss et al. 2015). It is well-known for
its large size, densely packed mudbrick houses, elaborate symbolic assemblages,
and subfloor burial practices (Hodder 1996, 2000, 2013a, 2013b; Mellaart 1967).
Beginning with James Mellaart’s work in the 1960s and continuing with Ian Hod-
der’s current excavation project begun in the mid-1990s, the site has been crucial
for the study of early settled life in the Neolithic of Central Anatolia, specifically,
and the wider Near East, in general. The human remains excavated at Çatalhöyük
comprise one of the largest Neolithic skeletal samples in the Near East and pro-
vide great insight into the lives of Çatalhöyük’s inhabitants, their social structure,
and their mortuary customs (Andrews et al. 2005; Boz and Hager 2013; Hillson
S. D. Haddow ()
Çatalhöyük Research Project, Stanford Archaeology Center,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94309, USA
J. W. Sadvari
University Libraries Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA
C. J. Knüsel
UMR 5199 De la Préhistoire à l’Actuel: Culture, Environnement, et Anthropologie (PACEA),
Bâtiment B8, Allée Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, CS 50023, Pessac Cedex, 33615 Bordeaux, France
R. Hadad
Département d’Anthropologie, UMR 7055 “Préhistoire & Technologie”, Maison de
l’Archéologie et de l’Ethnologie (MAE), Université Paris-Ouest Nanterre,
21 Allée de l’Université, 92023 Nanterre, France
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 5
A. J. Osterholtz (ed.), Theoretical Approaches to Analysis and Interpretation of
Commingled Human Remains, Bioarchaeology and Social Theory,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-22554-8_2
6 S. D. Haddow et al.
Fig. 2.1 Map of Turkey showing location of Çatalhöyük
et al. 2013; Larsen et al. 2013, 2015; Molleson et al. 2005; Nakamura and Meskell
2013; Pilloud and Larsen 2011).
In this chapter, we seek to build upon Boz and Hager’s (2014) discussion of
the nature of commingled remains at Çatalhöyük by focusing on two skeletal as-
semblages found within adjacent platforms in Building 52, a house currently being
excavated in the North Area of the Neolithic East Mound. The two assemblages
exhibit various degrees of commingling and represent the outcome of divergent
mortuary practices: one characterized by long-term, successive inhumations and the
other by a single interment episode consisting of multiple individuals—a rare oc-
currence at the site (see Osterholtz et al. 2014: Figure 1 for definition of terms). Our
aim is to demonstrate the relationship between these skeletal assemblages (and the
once-living individuals they embodied) and the occupational history and abandon-
ment of Building 52 and, in so doing, contribute to the understanding of the broader
social and ritual implications of mortuary practices at Çatalhöyük.
Mortuary Practices at Neolithic Çatalhöyük
The overwhelming majority of burials at Çatalhöyük occur within houses, primarily

underneath the northern and eastern platforms of the central room, although neonate
and infant burials are found in more variable locations within the house (Andrews
et al. 2005; Boz and Hager 2013). In contrast to the interpretations of James Mellaart
in the 1960s (1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967), the current excavations at Çatalhöyük
have shown the majority of burials to be the result of primary inhumations rather
than secondary deposition following defleshing (Andrews et al. 2005; Boz and Hager
2013, 2014). Along with the often extremely tight flexion of articulated skeletons
found under house floors, Mellaart (1962, 1963, 1967) interpreted the presence of
2 A Tale of Two Platforms 7
disarticulated and commingled remains as evidence for secondary burial practices

involving the exposure and excarnation of bodies prior to intramural burial. We now
recognize that, in the majority of cases, this commingling of skeletal remains is the
result of successive primary interments under house platforms, as evidenced by the
presence of smaller elements such as hand and foot bones that are typically absent
from secondary burials (see Boz and Hager 2014, Table 1 for a full description of the
burial deposition categories used at Çatalhöyük). In some cases, however, subfloor
primary burials are targeted in order to facilitate the recovery of particular skeletal
elements—typically the cranium and mandible (Andrews et al. 2005; Boz and Hager
2013, 2014)—which are then reburied at some later date. This reburial of skeletal
elements, often accompanying a primary interment, constitutes a secondary burial,
defined here as the intentional redeposition of skeletons or skeletal elements origi-
nally interred in another location (cf. Duday 2006; Knüsel 2014). The most conspicu-
ous example of this practice at Çatalhöyük is the primary burial of an adult female
cradling a plastered cranium and mandible in her upper limbs (Boz and Hager 2013;
Sadarangani 2014). Loose crania and other skeletal elements are often recovered
within the subfloor grave fills of primary burials at Çatalhöyük, but it is often difficult
to determine whether they represent an intentional secondary redeposition or an unin-
tended consequence of disturbances of earlier primary burials by later ones. As a re-
sult of these highly diverse mortuary behaviors, the commingling of skeletal remains
at Çatalhöyük is extremely common (Fig. 2.2). Deducing the intentionality behind
Fig. 2.2 Example of commingling of skeletal remains found at Çatalhöyük. (Photo by Jason Quin-
lan, Çatalhöyük Research Project)
these occurrences and distinguishing between what are essentially equifinal processes
in the archaeological record requires careful attention to the stratigraphic relationships
between burial sequences and grave fills as well as meticulous osteological analysis1
in order to reassociate loose skeletal elements.
Building 52
Building 52 is located on the northern promontory of Çatalhöyük’s East Mound

(Fig. 2.3). Artifact typologies, specifically the chipped stone and ceramic assem-
blages, as well as stratigraphic associations date the building to the “classic” middle
period of the site’s occupation (Mellaart’s Level VI and Hodder’s Level North G),
ca. 6500 calBC (Farid 2014b). The house appears to have come into existence when
the abutting walls of two separate buildings were knocked down in order to form a
single house structure (Farid 2014a). As a result, Building 52 is somewhat idiosyn-
cratic in terms of size and spatial organization, although its general layout at the end
of its occupation is for the most part consistent with the typical house style of the
“classic” period. It consisted primarily of a large central room (Space 94) and sev-
eral smaller peripheral rooms dedicated to storage and other activities to its north,
south, and west (Fig. 2.4). While Spaces 91/92, 93, and 255 appear to be the result
of a process of internal segmentation, Spaces 90, 290, and 291 may be illustrative
of the expansion of this building into the surrounding external areas during different
phases of construction and occupation.
Based on previous dendrochronological and C14 analyses, the average house
at Çatalhöyük was occupied for 50–100 years (Cessford et al. 2005). Microstrati-
graphic analyses of wall plaster layers at Çatalhöyük indicate that replastering
events likely occurred on an annual basis and were tied to some form of seasonal
activity (Matthews 2005c). Thus, a section of wall plaster recovered from Building
52 with 67 layers (Twiss et al. 2008) may provide a tentative use-life estimate of
nearly 70 years. The occupation of Building 52 ends in a dramatic closure event
characterized by an intentional fire that burned most intensely in the central area
of Space 94 (Fig. 2.5) and along its party wall with Space 93 (Harrison et al. 2013;
Tringham 2013; Twiss et al. 2008).
The two platforms discussed here are located in a northern alcove (Fig. 2.6) with-
in the large central room (Space 94). Both belong to the final phase of occupation of
the building. During this phase, the height of each platform was raised several times
and their surfaces were replastered. Unusually, the platform surfaces were alter-
nately painted red at different stages in their use-life (although this does not appear
1
Adult skeletal age-at-death estimates presented in this paper are based primarily on the morpho-
logical changes observed in the os pubis (Brooks and Suchey 1990) and auricular surface of the
os ilium (Lovejoy et al. 1985). In the absence of the os coxae, adult age is estimated via occlusal
dental wear (Brothwell 1981). Subadult age estimates are based primarily on dental development
(Ubelaker 1989). In the absence of dentition, subadult age is estimated using diaphyseal shaft length
measurements (Maresh 1970; Schaefer et al. 2009). Adult sex estimation is based on the evaluation
of sexually dimorphic features of the pelvis, cranium, and mandible (Buikstra and Ubelaker 1994).
Fig. 2.3 Plan of the Neolithic East Mound at Çatalhöyük. (Plan produced by Camilla Mazzucato,
Çatalhöyük Research Project) IST Istanbul University excavation area; TPC Team Poznań Con-
nect excavation area; TP Team Poznań excavation area; GDN Gdansk excavation area
to correspond with burial activities). The northwest platform has a slightly larger
surface area than its counterpart to the east and was more affected by the burning of
the building since it is closer to the origin of the fire. The only other burials found
to date in Building 52 include a child aged 4 years (+/− 1 year) at death (F.7334)
Fig. 2.4 Plan of Building 52. (Plan produced by Camilla Mazzucato, Çatalhöyük Research
Project)
recovered from an infilling deposit used to raise a platform surface in the southwest
corner of Space 94, and three neonates found in the side rooms to the west of the
central room (Farid 2014a; Tung 2014). While the northeast platform has now been
fully excavated, the earliest phases of the house are still being excavated, and it is
possible that earlier burials will be uncovered.
The Northeast Platform
The skeletal remains of at least five individuals (three adults and two subadults),
representing at least three separate burial events, were recovered from the northeast
platform (Knüsel et al. 2013a).These three interments occur at distinct phases in
the use-life of the northeast platform, during which the height of the platform was
successively raised. The uppermost (last) burial in the sequence (F.7112) is that of
a middle adult female (Sk.20655), 35–49 years of age at death, placed in a tightly
flexed supine position and leaning slightly to her left with the head to the west and
feet to the east (Fig. 2.7). Phytolith bands running across the ankles, right proximal
Fig. 2.5 Building 52 (looking north) showing area of burning in central room (Space 94). (Photo
by Jason Quinlan)
Fig. 2.6 3D reconstruction of the northwest and northeast platforms prior to excavation
femur, and left ilium suggest that the body was tightly bound with reed cordage
when it was placed in the grave. Despite being the final and most shallow inter-
ment within this platform, this individual appears to have been unaffected by the
fire that consumed Building 52. No heat-related color changes are apparent on the
bones, and no traces of carbonized soft tissue were found within the endocranium
or anywhere else on the skeleton (as has been found in other subfloor burials within
Fig. 2.7 Northeast platform

burial F.7112: middle adult
female (Sk.20655). The
loose adult male cranium and
mandible (Sk.20661) was
recovered in the grave fill
immediately to the south of
the adult female (not shown
here)
burnt houses at Çatalhöyük), suggesting that this individual was buried long before
the fire took place and with sufficient time for full decomposition of the soft tissues
of the body. A disarticulated cranium and mandible belonging to a possible young
adult male (Sk.20661), 20–34 years of age at death, were also found within the
grave fill of this burial.
Located immediately below burial F.7112 was the primary inhumation (F.7120)
of a middle adult male (Sk.30522) aged 35–49 years at death and an infant
(Sk.30523) aged 2 years (+/− 8 months) at death (Fig. 2.8). This burial was cut into
an earlier surface of the platform. Both of these individuals appear to have been
buried in a single event. The adult was placed on his back in a tightly flexed position
and oriented with the head to the west and the feet to the east. The infant, tightly
flexed on its right side, was placed directly above the torso of the adult. While the
remains of the lower lying adult male were undisturbed, the remains of the infant
were disturbed and partially disarticulated by the grave cut for burial F.7112 de-
scribed above. Three rows of small stone disc beads in various colors were found
on the abdomen of the infant along with an additional string of similar beads around
the left ankle. In addition, traces of red pigment were observed on the frontal bone
Fig. 2.8 Northeast plat-

form burial F.7120: middle
adult male Sk.30522, infant
Sk.30523, and disarticulated
child cranium and mandible
Sk.30521
and two green stone beads (possibly serpentinite) were also found, one on either
side of the temporal area of the cranium. The disarticulated remains of a fifth in-
dividual were found within the lower grave fill of the grave cut. This individual is
represented by the cranium and mandible of a child (Sk.30521) aged 8 years (+/− 2
years) at death. A set of disarticulated tibiae and humeri, along with a femur, likely
belong to the same individual.
Burial F.7606 (Fig. 2.9), located immediately below burial F.7120, represents the
earliest interment in the northeast platform burial sequence (Haddow et al. 2014;
Tung 2014); in fact, it appears to immediately predate the construction of this plat-
form, for which it may have been a foundation deposit, and was cut into an older
platform belonging to an earlier phase of Building 52. The grave cut contained the
primary disturbed skeleton of a young adult male (Sk.21526) aged 20–34 years at
death and the disarticulated infracranial remains of a child (Sk.21525) aged 7–8
years at death found scattered throughout the grave fill. The young adult male was
placed on his left side in a flexed position, with the head oriented to the west and
the feet to the east. The cranium and mandible of this individual were missing, al-
though all of the cervical vertebrae were recovered. It appears that the cranium and
mandible were removed during the subsequent interment of the middle adult male
(Sk.21526) and infant (Sk.21525) in F.7120.
Based on developmental similarities (i.e., dental development and diaphyseal
lengths), the disarticulated child skull (e.g., cranium and mandible; Sk.30521) and
disarticulated infracranial remains found in the grave fill of F.7120 were associated
in the lab with the subadult remains found loose in the grave fill of earlier burial
Fig. 2.9 Northeast platform

burial F.7606: young adult
male Sk.21526 and disar-
ticulated remains of child
Sk.21525
F.7606. It is also likely that the loose adult cranium and mandible (Sk.20661) found
in the grave fill of the latest burial F.7112 may belong to Sk.21526, from F.7606,
as several loose teeth found in the grave fill of F.7606 appear to fit the maxillary
tooth sockets of Sk.20661. The occurrence of loose subadult remains from a single
individual within two separate burial features has two potential explanations: (1)
the skeletal remains of the child (Sk.30521 = Sk.21525) represent an earlier primary
burial predating this platform and belonging to the preceding phase, which was then
completely disturbed by the subsequent burial of the young adult male (Sk.21526).
In this scenario, the original grave cut was completely obliterated by the grave cut
for Sk.21526 and the bones of the child were redeposited with the grave fill of the
young adult male; or (2) the disarticulated subadult remains represent a secondary
deposit placed in the grave F.7606 at the same time as the primary burial of the
young adult male (Sk.21526). The latter scenario appears more likely, however, as
there is no trace of an earlier grave cut for the child, nor were any of its bones found
in a primary in situ position, as is the case with the majority of disturbed burials at
Çatalhöyük (Boz and Hager 2013, 2014). In both scenarios, it appears that the grave
cut for the subsequent interment event, F.7120, dislodged the cranium and mandible
of the primary young adult male along with a large amount of the disarticulated
child skeleton, including the cranium and mandible. The bones of the child were
then redeposited in the grave fill of F.7120—with special care taken to place the
cranium and mandible alongside that of the middle adult male (Sk.30522). Mean-
while, the young adult male cranium and mandible (Sk.20661) likely belonging to
Sk.21526 appear to have been retained for some time before being reburied with the
final interment (F.7112) in the platform.
The analysis and interpretation of the burial sequence in the northeast platform
was greatly assisted by the use of 3D photogrammetry techniques which allowed us
to produce individual 3D models taken at multiple stages of the excavation process.
These individual 3D models are combined and georeferenced, enabling more ac-
curate reconstruction of the sequence of events by virtually re-excavating the plat-
form. This method of 3D burial recording has been developed at Çatalhöyük since
2012 (Berggren et al. 2015; Forte 2014).
The Northwest Platform
In contrast to the burial sequence in the adjacent northeast platform, only one inter-
ment, burial F.7127, was found within the northwestern platform. This highly un-
usual burial contained the primary inhumation of a middle adult male (Sk.30514),
aged 35–49 years at death, and the remains of at least eight subadult individuals
in various states of articulation. The upper layer of the grave fill contained large
amounts of loose, disarticulated subadult bone (Fig. 2.10). Based on previous
experience, we initially believed these represented loose bones from earlier buri-
als within this platform. However, no earlier grave cuts or disturbed burials were
found in the northwest platform and despite the various states of articulation seen
in the subadult remains, it is clear that all of these individuals were interred in a
single event. The adult male was the first individual to be placed in the grave cut
(Fig. 2.11), in a supine and flexed position with the head to the west and feet to the
east, and the subadults were placed on top of his body. Carbonized brain tissue was
recovered from within the cranial vault of the adult male, and the bones ranged
in color from yellowish-orange to grayish-brown as a result of heat transference
through the platform during the fire that consumed Building 52. Two large red-
painted mollusc shells were placed beside the right knee of the adult; the internal
shell surfaces contained a brownish organic material. A small, shiny, flat piece of
metallic mineral (likely hematite), roughly 20 mm × 15 mm and perforated at one
end, was recovered from the grave fill just below the cranium of Sk.30514 and may
have been worn as a pendant.
The first subadult to be placed in the grave cut with the adult male was a child
(Sk.30524) aged 4 years (+/− 1 year) at death (see Fig. 2.11). The body, placed on the
left upper arm of the adult male, appears to have been at least partially decomposed
Fig. 2.10 Northwest platform burial F.7127 showing upper fill of grave with loose subadult bones
and crania
Fig. 2.11 Northwest platform burial F.7127 showing adult male Sk.30514 and partial remains of
child Sk.30524 above the left upper arm of the adult
Fig. 2.12 Northwest platform burial F.7127 showing child Sk.30513 placed on top of adult male
Sk.30514
at the time of burial, as the skeleton was not completely articulated and certain
elements, such as those of the right upper limb and the left os coxae were missing.
The next subadult to be placed in the grave was a child (Sk.30513) aged 3 years
(+/− 1 year) at death (Fig. 2.12). The occipital of this child was in direct contact with
the frontal bone of the adult male, and a relatively well-preserved circular wooden
object, possibly a bowl, was placed on top of the cranium. This individual was miss-
ing the left upper limb, as well as the left tibia and fibula. As with the adult male,
carbonized brain tissue was recovered from the endocranium of this child, and the
bones exhibited heat-related color changes. An infant (Sk.30511) aged 6 months
(+/− 3 months) at death (Fig. 2.13) was placed on top of this child along the northern
wall of the grave cut, with a large amount of well-preserved linen textile separat-
ing the two bodies. Carbonized brain tissue was recovered from the endocranium,
and additional carbonized soft tissue was found in the abdominal region. The bones
from the infant’s upper body were orange-brown in color, while the bones of the
lower body were blackened and partially calcined, likely due to the proximity of
this burial to the platform surface. Unlike the other subadults, this individual was
fully articulated and largely complete.
The partially complete remains of a child (Sk.30510) aged 4 years (+/− 1 year) at
death (see Fig. 2.13) were recovered just to the south of the infant and child previ-
ously described. Only the axial skeleton of this individual was in articulation, and
the bones of the upper and lower limbs were dispersed in the upper grave fill. Given
this partially articulated state, it would appear that this child was in an advanced
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which is not that of the experimental sciences. Its claim to do so can
only be overthrown by proving what the criticism we are considering
assumes, that there is no intelligible way of looking at the facts
besides that of experimental science.
(c) More commonly still the intrinsic intelligibility of the
metaphysician’s problem is admitted, but our power to solve it
denied. There may be, it is said, realities which are more than mere
appearance, but at any rate with our human faculties we can know
nothing of them. All our knowledge is strictly limited to appearances,
or, as they are often called, phenomena.[5] What lies behind them is
completely inaccessible to us, and it is loss of time to speculate
about its nature. We must therefore content ourselves with the
discovery of general laws or uniformities of the interconnection of
phenomena, and dismiss the problem of their real ground as
insoluble. This doctrine, technically known as Phenomenalism,
enjoys at the present time a widespread popularity, which is
historically very largely due to an imperfect assimilation of the
negative element in the philosophy of Kant. Its merits as a
philosophical theory we may leave for later consideration; at present
we are only concerned with it as the alleged ground of objection
against the possibility of a science of Metaphysics. As such it has
really no cogency whatever. Not only do the supporters of the
doctrine constantly contradict their own cardinal assumption (as, for
instance, when they combine with the assertion that we can know
nothing about ultimate reality, such assertions as that it is a certain
and ultimate truth that all “phenomena” are connected by general
laws, or that “the course of nature is, without exception, uniform”),
but the assumption itself is self-contradictory. The very statement
that “we know only phenomena” has no meaning unless we know at
least enough about ultimate realities to be sure that they are
unknowable. The phenomenalist is committed to the recognition of at
least one proposition as an absolute and ultimate truth, namely, the
proposition, “I know that whatever I know is mere appearance.” And
this proposition itself, whatever we may think of its value as a
contribution to Philosophy, is a positive theory as to first principles
the truth or falsity of which is a proper subject for metaphysical
investigation. Thus the arguments by which it has been sought to
demonstrate the impossibility of Metaphysics themselves afford
unimpeachable evidence of the necessity for the scientific
examination of the metaphysical problem.[6]
§ 7. With the other two anti-metaphysical contentions referred to at
the beginning of the last section we may deal much more briefly. (2)
To the objector who maintains that Metaphysics, if possible, still is
useless, because the sciences and the practical experience of life
between them already supply us with a coherent theory of the world,
devoid of contradictions, we may reply: (a) The fact is doubtful. For,
whatever may be said by the popularisers of science when they are
engaged in composing metaphysical theories for the multitude, the
best representatives of every special branch of mathematical and
experimental science seem absolutely agreed that ultimate
questions as to first principles are outside the scope of their
sciences. The scope of every science, they are careful to remind us,
is defined by certain initial assumptions, and what does not fall under
those assumptions must be treated by the science in question as
non-existent. Thus Mathematics is in principle restricted to dealing
with the problems of number and quantity; whether there are realities
which are in their own nature non-numerical and non-quantitative[7]
or not, the mathematician, as mathematician, is not called upon to
pronounce; if there are such realities, his science is by its initial
assumptions debarred from knowing anything of them. So again with
Physics; even if reduced to pure Kinematics, it deals only with
displacements involving the dimensions of length and time, and has
no means of ascertaining whether or not these dimensions are
exhibited by all realities. The notion that the various sciences of
themselves supply us with a body of information about ultimate
reality is thus, for good reasons, rejected by their soundest
exponents, who indeed are usually so impressed with the opposite
conviction as to be prejudiced in favour of the belief that the
ultimately real is unknowable. (b) Again, as we have already seen,
the results of physical science, and the beliefs and aspirations which
arise in the course of practical experience and take shape in the
teachings of poetry and religion, often appear to be in sharp
antagonism. “Science” frequently seems to point in one direction, our
deepest ethical and religious experience in another. We cannot avoid
asking whether the contradiction is only apparent or, supposing it
real, what degree of authority belongs to each of the conflicting
influences. And, apart from a serious study of Metaphysics, this
question cannot be answered. (c) Even on the most favourable
supposition, that there is no such contradiction, but that science and
practical experience together afford a single ultimately coherent
theory of the world, it is only after we have ascertained the general
characteristics of ultimate reality, and satisfied ourselves by careful
analysis that reality, as conceived in our sciences, possesses those
characteristics, that we have the right to pronounce our theory finally
true. If Metaphysics should tum out in the end to present no fresh
view as to the nature of the real, but only to confirm an old one, we
should still, as metaphysicians, have the advantage of knowing
where we were previously only entitled to conjecture.
(3) The charge of unprogressiveness often brought against our
science is easily disproved by careful study of the History of
Philosophy. The problems of the metaphysician are no doubt, in a
sense, always the same; but this is equally true of the problems of
any other science. The methods by which the problems are attacked
and the adequacy of the solutions they receive vary, from age to
age, in close correspondence with the general development of
science. Every great metaphysical conception has exercised its
influence on the general history of science, and, in return, every
important movement in science has affected the development of
Metaphysics. Thus the revived interest in mechanical science, and
the great progress made in that branch of knowledge which is so
characteristic of the seventeenth century, more than anything else
determined the philosophical method and results of Descartes; the
Metaphysics of Leibnitz were profoundly affected by such scientific
influences as the invention of the calculus, the recognition of the
importance of vis viva in dynamics, the contemporary discoveries of
Leuwenhoeck in embryology; while, to come to our own time, the
metaphysical speculation of the last half-century has constantly been
revolving round the two great scientific ideas of the conservation of
energy and the origin of species by gradual differentiation. The
metaphysician could not if he would, and would not if he could,
escape the duty of estimating the bearing of the great scientific
theories of his time upon our ultimate conceptions of the nature of
the world as a whole. Every fundamental advance in science thus
calls for a restatement and reconsideration of the old metaphysical
problems in the light of the new discovery.[8]
§ 8. This introductory chapter is perhaps the proper place for a
word on the relation of Metaphysics to the widely diffused mental
tendency known as Mysticism.[9] Inasmuch as the fundamental aim
of the mystic is to penetrate behind the veil of appearance to some
ultimate and abiding reality, there is manifestly a close community of
purpose between him and the metaphysician. But their diversity of
method is no less marked than their partial community of purpose.
Once in touch with his reality, wherever he may find it, the mere
mystic has no longer any interest in the world of appearance.
Appearance as such is for him merely the untrue and ultimately non-
existent, and the peculiar emotion which he derives from his
contemplation of the real depends for its special quality on an ever-
present sense of the contrast between the abiding being of the
reality and the non-entity of the appearances. Thus the merely
mystical attitude towards appearance is purely negative. The
metaphysician, on the contrary, has only half completed his task
when he has, by whatever method, ascertained the general
character of the real as opposed to the merely apparent. It still
remains for him to re-examine the realm of appearance itself in the
light of his theory of reality, to ascertain the relative truth which
partial and imperfect conceptions of the world’s nature contain, and
to arrange the various appearances in the order of their varying
approximation to truth. He must show not only what are the marks of
reality, and why certain things which are popularly accepted as real
must, for Philosophy be degraded to the rank of appearance, but
also how far each appearance succeeds in revealing the character of
the reality which is its ground. Equally marked is the difference
between the mystic’s and the metaphysician’s attitude towards
ultimate reality itself. The mystic’s object is primarily emotional rather
than intellectual. What he wants is a feeling of satisfaction which he
can only get from immediate contact with something taken to be
finally and abidingly real. Hence, when he comes to put his emotions
into words, he is always prone to use the language of vague
imaginative symbolism, the only language suitable to suggest
feelings which, because immediate and unanalysed, cannot be the
subject of logical description in general terms. For the
metaphysician, whose object is the attainment of intellectual
consistency, such a method of symbolism is radically unsuitable.
A symbol is always a source of danger to the intellect. If you
employ it for what you already understand, and might, if you chose,
describe in scientific language, it is a mere substitution of the
obscure for the clear. If you use it, as the mystic commonly does, for
what you do not understand, its apparent precision, by blinding you
to the vagueness of its interpretation, is positively mischievous.
Hence, though some of the greatest metaphysicians, such as
Plotinus and Spinoza, and to a certain extent Hegel, have been
personally mystics, their philosophical method has invariably been
scientific and rationalistic. At the same time, it is probably true that,
apart from the mystic’s need for the satisfaction of emotion by the
contemplation of the eternal and abiding, the intellect would be prone
to exercise itself in less arid and more attractive fields than those of
abstract Metaphysics. The philosopher seeks, in the end, the same
goal as the mystic; his peculiarity is that he is so constituted as to
reach his goal only by the route of intellectual speculation.
§ 9. We have compared Metaphysics more than once with Logic in
respect of the universality of its scope and the analytical character of
its methods. It remains briefly to indicate the difference between the
two sciences. There is, indeed, a theory, famous in the history of
Philosophy, and not even yet quite obsolete, according to which no
distinction can be drawn. Hegel held that the successive steps by
which the human mind gradually passes from less adequate to more
adequate, and ultimately to a fully adequate, conception of the
nature of reality necessarily correspond, step for step, with the
stages of a process by which the reality itself is manifested with
ever-increasing adequacy in an ascending order of phenomena.
Hence in his system the discussion of the general characteristics of
reality and the general forms of inference constitutes a single
department of Philosophy under the name of Logic. Our motive in
dissenting from this view cannot be made fully intelligible at the
present stage of our inquiry, but we may at least follow Lotze in
giving a preliminary reason for the separation of the two sciences.
Logic is clearly in a sense a more general inquiry than Metaphysics.
For in Logic we are concerned with the universal conditions under
which thinking, or, to speak more accurately, inference, is possible.
Now these conditions may be fulfilled by a combination of
propositions which are materially false. The same relations which
give rise to an inference materially true from true premisses may
yield a false inference where the premisses are materially false.
Valid reasoning thus does not always lead to true conclusions.
Hence we may say that, whereas Metaphysics deals exclusively with
the characteristics of reality, Logic deals with the characteristics of
the validly inferrible, whether real or unreal. The distinction thus
established, however, though real as far as it goes, is not necessarily
absolute. For it may very well be that in the end the conditions upon
which the possibility of inference depends are identical with or
consequent upon the structure of reality. Even the fact that, under
certain conditions, we can imagine an unreal state of things and then
proceed to reason validly as to the results which would follow if this
imaginary state were actual, may itself be a consequence of the
actual nature of things. And, as a matter of fact, logicians have
always found it impossible to inquire very deeply into the foundations
and first principles of their own science without being led to face
fundamental issues of Metaphysics. The distinction between the two
studies must thus, according to the well-known simile of Bacon, be
compared rather with a vein in a continuous block of marble than
with an actual line of cleavage. Still it is at least so far effectual, that
while many metaphysical questions have no direct bearing on Logic,
the details of the theory of evidence are likewise best studied as an
independent branch of knowledge.
§ 10. In recent years considerable prominence has been attained

by a branch of study known as Epistemology, or the Theory of
Knowledge. The Theory of Knowledge, like Logic, is primarily
concerned with the question of the conditions upon which the validity
of our thinking, as a body of knowledge about reality, depends. It
differs from ordinary Logic in not inquiring into the details of the
various processes of proof, but confining its attention to the most
general and ultimate conditions under which valid thinking is
possible, and discussing these general principles more thoroughly
and systematically than common Logic usually does. Since the
conditions under which truth is obtainable depend, in the last resort,
on the character of that reality which knowledge apprehends, it is
clear that the problems of the Theory of Knowledge, so far as they
do not come under the scope of ordinary Logic (the theory of the
estimation of evidence), are metaphysical in their nature. As actually
treated by the writers who give this name to their discussions, the
study appears to consist of a mixture of Metaphysics and Logic, the
metaphysical element predominating. There is perhaps no serious
harm in our giving, if we choose, the name Epistemology or Theory
of Knowledge to our discussions of ultimate principles, but the older
title Metaphysics seems on the whole preferable for two reasons.
The discussion of the implications of knowledge is only one part of
the metaphysician’s task. The truly real is not only the knowable, it is
also that which, if we can obtain it, realises our aspirations and
satisfies our emotions. Hence the theory of the real must deal with
the ultimate implications of practical conduct and æsthetic feeling as
well as those of knowledge. The Good and the Beautiful, no less
than the True, are the objects of our study.
Again, if the name Theory of Knowledge is understood, as it
sometimes has been, to suggest that it is possible to study the
nature and capabilities of the knowing faculty apart from the study of
the contents of knowledge, it becomes a source of positive and
dangerous mistake. The capabilities and limitations of the knowing
faculty can only be ascertained by inquiring into the truth of its
knowledge, regarded as an apprehension of reality; there is no
possible way of severing the faculty, as it were, by abstraction from
the results of its exercise, and examining its structure, as we might
that of a mechanical appliance, before investigating the value of its
achievements. The instrument can only be studied in its work, and
we have to judge of its possibilities by the nature of its products. It is
therefore advisable to indicate, by our choice of a name for our
subject, that the theory of Knowing is necessarily also a theory of
Being.
Consult further:—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality,
Introduction; L. T. Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge,
Introduction; H. Lotze, Metaphysic, Introduction (Eng. trans., vol. i.
pp. 1-30)
1. The name simply means “what comes after Physics,” and

probably owes its origin to the fact that early editors of Aristotle
placed his writings on ultimate philosophical questions immediately
after his physical treatises.
2. For an example of these puzzles, compare the passage
(Republic, 524) where Plato refers to cases in which an apparent
contradiction in our sensations is corrected by counting.
3. Of course we must not assume that “every appearance is only
appearance,” or that “nothing is both reality and appearance.” This is
just the uncritical kind of preconception which it is the business of
Metaphysics to test. Whether “every appearance is only appearance”
is a point we shall have to discuss later.
4. Cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 1-4.
5. I may be pardoned for reminding the reader who may be new to
our subject, that “facts” and “processes” are only properly called
phenomena when it is intended to imply that as they stand they are
not genuine realities but only the partially misleading appearance of
reality which is non-phenomenal or ultra-phenomenal. (We shall do
well to avoid the pretentious error of calling the ultra-phenomenal, as
such, “noumenal.”)
6. Appearance and Reality, chap. 12, p. 129 (ed. 1).
7. As, for instance, all mental states are, according to certain
psychologists, non-quantitative.
8. The student will find Höffding’s History of Modern Philosophy
(English translation in 2 vols., Macmillan) particularly valuable for the
way in which the author brings out the intimate historical connection
between the development of Metaphysics and the general progress
of science.
9. For further discussion the reader may be referred to Royce, The
World and the Individual, First Series, Lects. 2 and 4. See also infra,
Bk. IV. chap. 6, § 2.
CHAPTER II
THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION AND THE

METAPHYSICAL METHOD
§ 1. In the principle that “Reality is not self-contradictory” we have a universal and
certain criterion of reality which is not merely negative, but implies the positive
assertion that reality is a consistent system. § 2. The validity of this criterion is
not affected by the suggestion that it may be merely a Logical Law. § 3. Nor
by the raising of doubt whether all our knowledge is not merely “relative,” a
doubt which is itself meaningless. § 4. As to the material of the system, it is
experience or immediate psychical fact. § 5. It must be actual experience, not
mere “possibilities” of experience; but actual experience must not be identified
with “sensation.” § 6. Nor must we assume that experience consists of
subjects and their states; nor, again, that it is a mere succession of “states of
consciousness.” § 7. The differentia of matter of experience is its immediacy,
i.e, its combination in a single whole of the two aspects of existence and
content. § 8. This union of existence and content is broken up in reflective
knowledge or thought, but may be restored at a higher level. § 9. Experience
further always appears to be implicitly complex in respect of its content. §10.
An adequate apprehension of reality would only be possible in the form of a
complete or “pure” experience, at once all-inclusive, systematic, and direct.
The problem of Metaphysics is to ascertain what would be the general or
formal character of such an experience, and how far the various provinces of
our human experience and knowledge approximate to it. The knowledge
Metaphysics can give us of the ultimate nature of reality as it would be
present in a complete experience, though imperfect, is final as far as it goes.
§11. As to the method of Metaphysics, it must be analytical, critical, non-
empirical, and non-inductive. It may also be called a priori if we carefully avoid
confusing the a priori with the psychologically primitive. Why our method
cannot be the Hegelian Dialectic.
§ 1. If we are, in the end, to attach any definite intelligible meaning

to the distinction between things as they really are and things as they
merely appear to be, we must clearly have some universal criterion
or test by which the distinction may be made. This criterion must be,
in the first place, infallible; that is, must be such that we cannot doubt
its validity without falling into a contradiction in our thought; and, in
the next, it must be a characteristic belonging to all reality, as such,
and to nothing else. Thus our criterion must, in the technical
language of Logic, be the predicate of an exclusive proposition of
which reality is the subject; we must be able to say, “Only the real
possesses the quality or mark X.” The argument of our last chapter
should already have suggested that we have such a criterion in the
principle that “what is real is not self-contradictory, and what is self-
contradictory is not real.” Freedom from contradiction is a
characteristic which belongs to everything that is real and ultimately
to nothing else, and we may therefore use it as our test or criterion of
reality. For, as we have seen in the last chapter, it is precisely our
inability, without doing violence to the fundamental structure of our
intellect, to accept the self-contradictory as real which first leads to
the drawing of a distinction between the real and the merely
apparent; on the other hand, where we find no contradiction in
thought or experience, we have no valid ground for doubting that the
contents of our experience and thinking are truly real. In every
application, even the most simple and rudimentary, of the distinction
between what really is and what only seems, we are proceeding
upon the assumption that, if things as we find them are self-
contradictory, we are not yet in possession of the truth about them;
while, on the other hand, we may legitimately treat the results of our
thinking and experience as fully true until they are shown to involve
contradiction. Thus, in setting up the proposition “What is real is
never self-contradictory” as a universal criterion, we are only putting
into explicit form, and proposing to apply universally, a principle
involved in all rational reflection on the course of things. Audacious
as the attempt to make such a general statement about the whole
universe of being appears, it is an audacity to which we are fully
committed from the first moment of our refusing to accept both sides
of a contradiction as true.
The principle that “Reality is not self-contradictory” at first sight
might appear to be merely negative; we might object that it only tells
us what reality is not, and still leaves us quite in the dark as to what it
is. This would, however, be a serious misconception. As we learn
from modern scientific Logic, no true and significant negative
judgment is merely negative; all significant negation is really
exclusion resting upon a positive basis. I can never, that is, truly
declare that A is not B, except on the strength of some piece of
positive knowledge which is inconsistent with, or excludes, the
possibility of A being B.[10] My own ignorance or failure to find
sufficient ground for the assertion A is B is never of itself logical
warrant for the judgment A is not B; that A is not B I can never truly
assert, except on the ground of some other truth which would be
contradicted if A were affirmed to be B. Hence to say “Reality is not
self-contradictory” is as much as to say that we have true and certain
knowledge that reality is positively self-consistent or coherent; that is
to say that, whatever else it may be, it is at least a systematic whole
of some kind or other. How much further our knowledge about reality
goes, what kind of a whole we can certainly know it to be, it will be
the business of succeeding portions of this work to discuss; but even
at the present stage of the inquiry we can confidently say that unless
the distinction between the real and the apparent is purely
meaningless, it is positively certain that Reality,[11] or the universe, is
a self-consistent systematic whole.
§ 2. Our declaration that the principle of the self-consistency of the
real affords a certain and infallible criterion of reality, may probably
provoke a sceptical doubt which is of such importance that we must
give it full consideration before making any further advance. I state
the difficulty in what appears to me its most reasonable and telling
form. “Your alleged criterion,” it will be said, “is simply the logical Law
of Contradiction expressed in a novel and misleading way. Now, the
Law of Contradiction, like all purely logical laws, is concerned not
with real things, but exclusively with the concepts by which we think
of them. When the logician lays it down as a fundamental truth of his
science that A cannot be both B and not B, his A and B stand not for
things “in the real world to which our thoughts have reference,” but
for concepts which we frame about the things. His law is thus purely
what he calls it, a Law of Thought; he says, and says truly, “you
cannot, at the same time, and in the same sense, think both that A is
B, and that it is not B”; as to whether such a state of things, though
unthinkable to us, may be real “as a fact,” he makes no assertion.
You take this law of our thinking, silently assume that it is also a law
of the things about which we think, and go on to set it up as an
infallible criterion of their reality. Your procedure is thus illegitimate,
and your pretended criterion a thing of nought.”[12]
Our reply to this common sceptical objection will incidentally throw
an interesting light on what was said in the last chapter of the close
connection between the problems of Logic and those of
Metaphysics. In the first place, we may at least meet the sceptic with
an effective tu quoque. It is you yourself, we may say, who are most
open to the charge of illegitimate assumption. Your whole contention
rests upon the assumption, for which you offer no justification, that
because the Law of Contradiction is admittedly a law of thought, it is
therefore only a law of thought; if you wish us to accept such a
momentous conclusion, you ought at least to offer us something in
the nature of a reason for it. Nor shall we stop here; we shall go on
to argue that the sceptic’s interpretation of the Law of Contradiction
rests on a positive confusion. By a Law of Thought may be meant
either (a) a psychological law, a true general statement as to the way
in which we actually do think, or (b) a logical law, a true general
statement as to the conditions under which our thinking is valid; the
plausibility of the sceptical argument arises from an unconscious
confusion between these two very different senses of the term. Now,
in the first place, it seems doubtful whether the principle of
contradiction is even true, if it is put forward as a psychological law. It
would be, at least, very hard to say whether a human being is
capable or not of holding at once and with equal conviction the truth
of two contradictory propositions. Certainly it is not uncommon to
meet persons who do fervently profess equal belief in propositions
which we can see to be inconsistent; on the other hand, they are
usually themselves unaware of the inconsistency. Whether, in all
cases, they would, if made aware of the inconsistency, revise their
belief, is a question which it is easier to ask than to answer. But it is
at any rate certain that the logician does not intend his Law of
Contradiction to be taken as a psychological proposition as to what I
can or cannot succeed in believing. He means it to be understood in
a purely logical sense, as a statement about the conditions under
which any thought is valid. What he says is not that I cannot at once
think that A is B and that it is not B, but that, if I think so, my thinking
cannot be true. Now, to think truly about things is to think in accord
with their real nature, to think of them as they really are, not as they
merely appear to an imperfect apprehension to be; hence to say that
non-contradiction is a fundamental condition of true thinking is as
much as to say that it is a fundamental characteristic of real
existence. Just because the Law of Contradiction is a logical law, it
cannot be only a logical law, but must be a metaphysical law as well.
If the sceptic is to retain his sceptical position, he must include Logic
along with Metaphysics in the compass of his doubts, as the
thorough-going sceptics of antiquity had the courage to do.
§ 3. But now suppose the sceptic takes this line. All our truth, he
may say, is only relatively truth, and even the fundamental conditions
of true thought are only valid relatively and for us. What right have
you to assume their absolute validity, and to argue from it to the real
constitution of things? Now, what does such a doubt mean, and is it
rational? The answer to this question follows easily from what we
have already learnt about the logical character of denial. Doubt,
which is tentative denial, like negation, which is completed denial,
logically presupposes positive knowledge of some kind or other. It is
never rational to doubt the truth of a specific proposition except on
the strength of your possession of positive truth with which the
suggested judgment appears to be in conflict. This is, of course,
obvious in cases where we hesitate to accept a statement as true on
the ground that we do not see how to reconcile it with another
specific statement already known, or believed, to be true. It is less
obvious, but equally clear on reflection, in the cases where we
suspend our judgment on the plea of insufficient evidence. Apart
from positive knowledge, however defective, as to the kind and
amount of evidence which would, if forthcoming, be sufficient to
prove the proposition, expressions of doubt and of belief are equally
impertinent; unless I know, to some extent at least, what evidence is
wanted, how indeed am I to judge whether the evidence produced is
sufficient or not?[13] Thus we see that the paradox of Mr. Bradley, that
rational doubt itself logically implies infallibility in respect of some
part of our knowledge, is no more than the simple truth. We see also
that the doubt whether the ultimate presuppositions of valid thinking
may not be merely “relatively” valid, has no meaning. If the sceptic’s
doubt whether Reality is ultimately the self-consistent system that it
must be if any of our thinking can be true is to lay any claim to
rationality, it must take the form of the assertion, “I positively know
something about the nature of Reality which makes it reasonable to
think that Reality is incoherent,” or “Self-consistency is inconsistent
with what I positively know of the nature of Reality.” Thus the sceptic
is forced, not merely to lay claim to absolute and certain knowledge,
but to use the test of consistency itself for the purpose of disproving
or questioning its own validity. Our criterion of Reality, then, has been
proved infallible by the surest of methods; we have shown that its
truth has to be assumed in the very process of calling it in question.
§ 4. Reality, then, in spite of the sceptic’s objections, is truly known

to be a connected and self-consistent, or internally coherent, system;
can we with equal confidence say anything of the data of which the
system is composed? Reflection should convince us that we can at
least say as much as this: all the materials or data of reality consist
of experience, experience being provisionally taken to mean
psychical matter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling. In other
words, whatever forms part of presentation, will, or emotion, must in
some sense and to some degree possess reality and be a part of the
material of which reality, as a systematic whole, is composed;
whatever does not include, as part of its nature, this indissoluble
relation to immediate feeling, and therefore does not enter into the
presentation, will, and emotion of which psychical life is composed,
is not real. The real is experience, and nothing but experience, and
experience consists of “psychical matter of fact.”[14]
Proof of this proposition can only be given in the same way as of
any other ultimate truth, by making trial of it; if you doubt it you may
be challenged to perform the experiment of thinking of anything
whatever, no matter what, as real, and then explaining what you
mean by its reality. Thus suppose you say “I can think of A as real,”
A being any thing in the universe; now think, as you always can, of
an imaginary or unreal A, and then try to state the difference
between the A which is thought of as real and the A which is thought
of as merely imaginary. As Kant proved, in the famous case of the
real and the imagined hundred dollars, the difference does not lie in
any of the qualities or properties of the two A’s; the qualities of the
imagined hundred dollars are precisely the same as those of the real
sum, only that they are “imaginary.” Like the real dollars, the
imagined dollars are thought of as possessing such and such a size,
shape, and weight; stamped with such and such an effigy and
inscription; containing such and such a proportion of silver to alloy;
having such and such a purchasing power in the present condition of
the market, and so forth. The only difference is that the real dollars
are, or under specified and known conditions may be, the objects of
direct perception, while the imaginary ones, because imaginary,
cannot be given in direct perception. You cannot see or handle them;
you can only imagine yourself doing so. It is in this connection with
immediate psychical fact that the reality of the real coins lies. So with
any other instance of the same experiment. Show me, we might say,
anything which you regard as real,—no matter what it is, a stone
wall, an æsthetic effect, a moral virtue,—and I will ask you to think of
an unreal and imaginary counterpart of that same thing, and will
undertake to prove to you that what makes the difference between
the reality and the imagination is always that the real thing is
indissolubly connected with the psychical life of a sentient subject,
and, as so connected, is psychical matter of fact.
§ 5. Two points should be carefully noted if we wish to avoid

serious misapprehension. It might be objected, by a disciple of Kant
or of Mill, that a thing may be real without ever being given as actual
psychical fact in immediate apprehension, so long as its nature is
such that it would be psychical fact under known and specified
conditions. Many, if not most, of the objects of scientific knowledge, it
may be said, are of this kind; they have never entered, possibly
never will enter, into the contents of any man’s direct apprehension,
yet we rightly call them real, in the sense that they would be
apprehended under certain known conditions. Thus I have never
seen, and do not expect that any one ever will see, the centre of the
earth, or, to take a still stronger case, no one has ever seen his own
brain. Yet I call the centre of the earth or my own brain real, in the
sense that if I could, without ceasing to live, penetrate to a certain
depth below the soil, I should find the centre of the earth; if an
opening were made in my skull, and a suitable arrangement of
mirrors devised, I should see the reflection of my own brain. A comet
may be rushing through unpeopled space entirely unbeheld; yet it
does not cease for all that to be real, for if I were there I should see
it, and so forth. Hence the Kantian will tell us that reality is
constituted by relation to possible experience; the follower of Mill,
that it means “a permanent possibility of sensation.”
Now, there is, of course, an element of truth in these arguments. It
is true that what immediately enters into the course of my own direct
perception is but a fragment of the full reality of the universe. It is
true, again, that there is much which in its own nature is capable of
being perceived by human beings, but will, as far as we can judge,
never be perceived, owing to the physical impossibility of placing
ourselves under the conditions requisite for perception; there are
other things which could only be perceived if some modification
could be effected in the structure of our perceptive organs. And it
may therefore be quite sufficient for the purposes of some sciences
to define these unperceived realities as “possibilities of sensation,”
processes which we do not perceive but might perceive under known
or knowable conditions. But the definition, it will be seen, is a purely
negative one; it takes note of the fact that we do not actually
perceive certain things, without telling us anything positive as to their
nature. In Metaphysics, where we are concerned to discover the very
meaning of reality, we cannot avoid asking whether such a purely
negative account of the reality of the greater part of the universe is
finally satisfactory. And we can easily see that it is not. For what do
we mean when we talk of the “possible”? Not simply “that which is
not actual,” for this includes the merely imaginary and the
demonstrably impossible. The events of next week, the constitution
of Utopia, and the squaring of the circle are all alike in not being
actual. Shall we say, then, that the possible differs from the
imaginary in being what would, under known conditions, be actual?
But again, we may make correct inferences as to what would be
actual under conditions suspected, or even known, to be merely
imaginary, and no one will maintain that such consequences are
realities. If I were at the South Pole I should see the Polar ice, and it
is therefore real, you say, though no one actually sees it; but if
wishes were horses, beggars would ride, yet you do not say that the
riding of beggars is real. Considerations of this kind lead us to modify
our first definition of the “possible” which is to be also real. We are
driven to say that, in the case of the unperceived real thing, all the
conditions of perception except the presence of a percipient with
suitable perceptive organs, really exist. Thus the ice at the South
Pole really exists, because the only unfulfilled condition for its
perception is the presence at the Pole of a being with sense-organs
of a certain type. But once more, what do we mean by the distinction
between conditions of perception which are imaginary and conditions
which really exist? We come back once more to our original
experiment, and once more, try as we will, we shall find that by the
real condition as distinguished from the imaginary we can mean
nothing but a state of things which is, in the last resort, guaranteed
by the evidence of immediate apprehension. If we take the term
“actual” to denote that which is thus indissoluble from immediate
apprehension, or is psychical matter of fact, we may sum up our
result by saying we have found that the real is also actual, or that
there is no reality which is not at the same time an actuality. We shall
thus be standing on the same ground as the modern logicians who
tell us that there is no possibility outside actual existence, and that
statements about the possible, when they have any meaning at all,
are always an indirect way of imparting information about actualities.
[15]
Thus “There really exists ice at the South Pole, though no human
eye beholds it,” if it is to mean anything, must mean either that the
ice itself, as we should perceive it if we were there, or that certain
unknown conditions which, combined with the presence of a human
spectator, would yield the perception of the ice, actually exist as part
of the contents of an experience which is not our own.[16]
The second point to which we must be careful to attend may be
dismissed more briefly. In defining experience as “immediate feeling”
or “the content of immediate feeling” or “apprehension,”[17] we must
not be understood to mean that it is in particular sensation.
Sensation is only one feature of immediate feeling or apprehension,
a feature which we only distinguish from others by means of a
laborious psychological analysis. A pleasure or pain, an emotion of
any kind, the satisfaction of a craving while actually present, are felt
or apprehended no less immediately than a sense-perception. I am
aware of the difference between actually feeling pleasure or pain,
actually being moved by love or anger, actually getting the
satisfaction of a want, and merely thinking of these processes, in
precisely the same way in which I am aware of the difference
between actually seeing a blue expanse and merely thinking of
seeing it. A real emotion or wish differs from an imagined one
precisely as a real sensation differs from an imaginary sensation.
How exactly the difference is to be described is a question, and
unfortunately at present an unduly neglected question, for
Psychology; for our present purpose we must be content to indicate
it as one which can be experienced at will by any reader who will
take the trouble to compare an actual state of mind with the mere
thought of the same state. Of the epistemological or metaphysical
interpretation of the distinction more will be said in the course of the
next few paragraphs. As an instance of its applicability to other
aspects of mind than the purely sensational, we may take Kant’s
own example of the hundred dollars. The real hundred dollars may
be distinguished from the imaginary, if we please, by the fact that
they can be actually touched and seen; but we might equally make
the distinction turn on the fact that the real coins will enable us to
satisfy our desires, while the imaginary will not.[18]
§ 6. In the present state of philosophical opinion, the proposition

that “whatever is real consists of experience,” or again, “of psychical
matter of fact,” is in danger not so much of being rejected, as of
being accepted in a fundamentally false sense. If we are to avoid the
danger of such misunderstanding, we must be careful to insist that
our principle does not assert that mere actuality is a complete and
sufficient account of the nature of reality. When we say that there is
nothing real outside the world of psychical fact, we are not saying
that reality is merely psychical fact as such. What we do say is that,
however much more it may be, it is at least that. How much more we
can say of reality, beyond the bare statement that it is made up of
experiences or psychical matters of fact, it is the task of our
metaphysical science to determine; at present our problem, though
given to us in its general elements, still awaits solution. In particular,
we must take care not to fall into the error of so-called “Subjective
Idealism.” We must not say that reality consists of “the states of
consciousness of sentient subjects” or of “subjects, and their states.”
We must not falsify our data as metaphysicians by starting with the
assumption that the psychical facts of which reality is made up are
directly experienced as “states” or “modifications” of “subjects” which
are their possessors. Such a theory would in fact contradict itself, for
the “subject” or “I,” who am by the hypothesis the owner of the
“states,” is never itself given as a “state of consciousness.” Hence
Hume was perfectly correct when he argued from the principle that
nothing exists but states of consciousness, to the conclusion that the
thinker or “subject,” not being himself a state of consciousness, is an
illusion. Yet, on the other hand, if there is no thinker or subject to
“own” the passing states, they are not properly “states” or
“modifications” of anything. Apart from this explicit contradiction in
the formulation of the theory that all things are “states of
consciousness,” we must also object that the theory itself is not a
statement of the data of experience, but a hypothesis about their
connection. The division of experience into the self or the subject on
the one side and its states on the other is not given in our immediate
apprehension, but made in the progress of reflection on the contents
of apprehension. Sensible things and their properties never appear
to us in our direct apprehension of them to be states or modifications
of ourselves; that they really are this and nothing more is simply one
hypothesis among others which we devise to meet certain difficulties
in our thought. Reality comes to us from the first in the guise of
pieces of psychical fact; we feel certain, again, that these pieces
must somehow form part of a coherent whole or system. We try to
understand and account for this systematic character of the real on
the supposition that the matters of fact of which it consists are
connected with one another through the permanent character of the
“subjects” to which they belong as temporary “states” or
“modifications.” But this special interpretation of the way in which the
facts of experience form a system is no part of our initial postulate as
to the general nature of the real; it is simply one among other
theories of the concrete character of the universe, and it is for
Metaphysics itself to test its merits.
Similarly, we should be making an unwarranted addition to our
initial postulate about Reality if we identified it with the doctrine of
Hume and his followers, according to whom what really exists is
merely a series of “impressions and ideas” connected by certain
psychological laws of succession, any profounder structural unity of
experience being dismissed as a “fiction of the mind.” The secret of
the fallacy here lies in the petitio principii committed by the
introduction of the word “merely” into our statement. From the
identification of reality with psychical facts which somehow form a
systematic unity, it does not in the least follow that the only unity
possessed by the facts is that of conformity to a certain law or laws
of sequence. That all reality consists of psychical facts, and that
these facts must form a system, we are, as we have already seen,
entitled to assert as a fundamental metaphysical principle which
cannot be doubted without falling into contradiction; how they do so
we have yet to discover, if we can.
The merits of the Humian solution of the problem will come before
us for consideration at a later stage; the impossibility of assuming it
without inquiry as a principle, may perhaps be brought home to the
mind of the reader by a simple illustration. Take the case of any
æsthetic whole, such as, for instance, the play of Hamlet. The play of
Hamlet consists, for the student who reads it in his closet, of a
succession of printed words. These words form the whole material of
the play; it is composed of them all and of nothing else. Again, the
words which are the material of the play are connected by the
grammatical and euphonic laws which regulate the construction of
English sentences, and the metrical laws of English dramatic
versification. Thus it would be a true description of the play, as far as
it goes, to say that it is a series of words put together in accordance
with grammatical and metrical laws. It would, however, be positively
false to say that Hamlet is nothing more than such a succession of
words; its character as a work of art depends entirely on the fact that
it possesses, as a whole, a further unity of structure and aim, that the

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