Instant Download How China Is Reshaping The Global Economy: Development Impacts in Africa and Latin America 1st Edition Rhys Jenkins PDF All Chapter

Full download test bank at ebook ebookmass.
com
How China Is Reshaping The Global

Economy: Development Impacts In
Africa And Latin America 1st
Edition Rhys Jenkins
CLICK LINK TO DOWLOAD
https://ebookmass.com/product/how-china-is-
reshaping-the-global-economy-development-
impacts-in-africa-and-latin-america-1st-
edition-rhys-jenkins/
ebookmass.com
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
The Hunt for Unicorns : How Sovereign Funds Are

Reshaping Investment in the Digital Economy 1st Edition
Winston Ma
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-hunt-for-unicorns-how-
sovereign-funds-are-reshaping-investment-in-the-digital-
economy-1st-edition-winston-ma/
China and the Islamic World: How the New Silk Road is
Transforming Global Politics Robert Bianchi
https://ebookmass.com/product/china-and-the-islamic-world-how-
the-new-silk-road-is-transforming-global-politics-robert-bianchi/
The Socialist Market Economy in Asia: Development in

China, Vietnam and Laos 1st ed. Edition Arve Hansen
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-socialist-market-economy-in-
asia-development-in-china-vietnam-and-laos-1st-ed-edition-arve-
hansen/
The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is

Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance 1st Edition
Steven Feldstein
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-rise-of-digital-repression-how-
technology-is-reshaping-power-politics-and-resistance-1st-
edition-steven-feldstein/
The Socialist Market Economy in Asia: Development in
China, Vietnam and Laos Arve Hansen
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-socialist-market-economy-in-
asia-development-in-china-vietnam-and-laos-arve-hansen/
The Political Economy of Agrarian Change in Latin

America: Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay 1st ed. 2020
Edition Matilda Baraibar Norberg
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-political-economy-of-agrarian-
change-in-latin-america-argentina-paraguay-and-uruguay-1st-
ed-2020-edition-matilda-baraibar-norberg/
News Media Coverage of Environmental Challenges in

Latin America and the Caribbean: Mediating Demand,
Degradation and Development 1st ed. Edition Bruno
Takahashi
https://ebookmass.com/product/news-media-coverage-of-
environmental-challenges-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-
mediating-demand-degradation-and-development-1st-ed-edition-
bruno-takahashi/
Trafficking Data: How China Is Winning the Battle for

Digital Sovereignty Aynne Kokas
https://ebookmass.com/product/trafficking-data-how-china-is-
winning-the-battle-for-digital-sovereignty-aynne-kokas/
Resisting Violence: Emotional Communities in Latin

America 1st Edition Morna Macleod
https://ebookmass.com/product/resisting-violence-emotional-
communities-in-latin-america-1st-edition-morna-macleod/
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/10/2018, SPi
How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

How China is Reshaping

the Global Economy
Development Impacts in Africa
and Latin America
Rhys Jenkins
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Rhys Jenkins 2019
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2019
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018949663
ISBN 978–0–19–873851–0
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
To my grandchildren,
Tom, Mat, and Kit,
who will experience the consequences of China’s
re-emergence as a global economic power.
Preface and Acknowledgements
I first became interested in the impact of China’s economic growth on the

Global South in 2004, when I was commissioned by the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) to prepare a paper for a conference in
Beijing at the launch of the Inter-American Development Bank’s study of
the opportunities and challenges that the emergence of China presented for
Latin America and the Caribbean (Devlin et. al., 2006). This was the first time
that I had visited China, and it began a period when my research was mainly
focussed on questions posed by the rise of China.
Much of my previous work had been about the impact of globalization,
starting with studies of transnational corporations and trade liberalization
in Latin America and then extending to work on the environmental and
socioeconomic implications of globalization in Latin America, South Africa,
Vietnam, and Malaysia.
By the mid-2000s, it was already becoming clear that the dramatic growth of
China and its re-incorporation into the global economy was a key feature of
globalization in the twenty-first century. The accession of China to the World
Trade Organization in 2001 sparked a number of studies looking at the likely
impacts that this would have in both the North and the South.
My own interest developed through further studies for DFID on the impacts
of China on Asia, Africa, and Latin America, carried out with my colleague
Chris Edwards. I was also involved in a network of scholars who studied the
impacts of the Asian Drivers (China and India) on the Global South and
published special issues of the IDS Bulletin and World Development on this
theme (Kaplinsky, ed., 2006: Kaplinsky and Messner, eds., 2008).
Some of my subsequent research on the impact of China on Latin America,
on Brazil, and on South Africa was funded by the UK Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC),1 and this allowed me to go into greater depth on the
impacts of China on specific countries. I worked with a number of colleagues
on these projects and I am particularly grateful for their contributions. They
include Jonathan Barton, Enrique Dussel-Peters, Andrés Lopez, Alexandre de
1
ESRC grant numbers RES-165-25-005; RES-238-25-0006; and ES/1035125/1.
Preface and Acknowledgements
Freitas Barbosa, and Lawrence Edwards. I was also fortunate to receive a

Leverhulme Research Fellowship that enabled me to start work on this book.
As I delved deeper into the impacts of China on Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), I became aware that I needed
to obtain a better understanding of the drivers of Chinese growth and global
projection. Thus, although the book was originally planned as a study of the
impacts of China on the two regions, I realized that it needed to begin with
developments in China. Although I do not claim to be an expert on Chinese
economic development, I hope that Part I of the book will provide the reader
with sufficient background to make sense of the impacts on LAC and SSA.
I am very conscious that one limitation I faced in writing the book is that
I do not read Chinese. This may have led to the underrepresentation of some
points of view. I have tried wherever possible to refer to official Chinese
documents that are available in English and to the work of Chinese academics
that has been translated into or published in English. However, this probably
does not do full justice to the range of Chinese views on LAC and SSA, and
it may mean that Chinese perspectives that are more critical are not fully
represented. On the other hand, I have drawn on a range of sources from both
LAC and SSA to ensure coverage of views from within both regions.
I would like to thank colleagues who have read and commented on parts of
this book for their invaluable feedback. They include Enrique Dussel-Peters,
Chris Edwards, Raphie Kaplinsky, Bereket Kebede, Diego Sánchez-Ancochea,
and John Thoburn. Michael Abou-Sleiman provided research assistance in
putting together the database and carrying out the econometric analysis that
is reported in the book. Finally, Sally Sutton’s editing work on the manuscript
helped put it into a coherent and presentable form. I acknowledge all their
contributions, while accepting ultimate responsibility for the contents and
any errors that remain.
viii
Contents
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
List of Boxes xv
List of Acronyms xvii
Introduction: China’s Re-emergence as a Global Economic Power 1
Part I. China and the Global Economy

1. The Transformation of the Chinese Economy 13
2. The Workshop of the World 33
3. A Voracious Dragon? China and Global Commodity Markets 52
4. Going Global: Chinese Firms Abroad 72
5. The World’s Wallet? China’s Role in Global Finance 92
Part II. China and Sub-Saharan Africa

6. China’s Economic Expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa 113
7. China’s Economic Impacts on Sub-Saharan Africa 149
8. Social, Political, and Environmental Impacts

in Sub-Saharan Africa 183
Part III. China and Latin America and the Caribbean

9. China’s Economic Expansion in Latin America and
the Caribbean 223
10. China’s Economic Impacts on Latin America 254
11. Social, Political, and Environmental Impacts in Latin America 284

Contents
Part IV. Comparisons and Conclusions

12. A Comparative Perspective on China’s involvement
in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean 321
13. Conclusion 337
Statistical Databases 347

References 349
Index 395
x
List of Figures
2.1. China’s Share of World Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) and

World Manufactured Exports, 1980–2014 (%) 33
2.2. Share of China’s Manufactured Exports by Technology Level, 1995–2014 45
3.1. Index of commodity prices in constant 2010 US$ (2010=100) 57
4.1. Chinese stock and annual flow of outward FDI and turnover of
contracted projects fulfilled, 1982–2014 (US$ billion) 74
4.2. Geographical distribution of value of completed projects, 1998–2000
and 2013–15 77
5.1. China’s foreign assets, 2004–15 (US$ billion) 95
6.1. China’s trade with SSA, 1995–2015 (US$ billion) 115
6.2. Shares of different products in imports from SSA, 2013–15 116
6.3. Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) stocks and flows
in SSA, 2003–15 (US$ million) 118
6.4. Chinese contracts in SSA, 2003–15 (US$ million) 120
6.5. Sectoral distribution of the value of Chinese project contracts in SSA,
2005–16 121
6.6. Chinese Official Financial Flows to SSA, 2000–14 (US$ million) 123
7.1. Share of Chinese imports in apparent consumption of manufactured
goods in selected countries, 2000–10 161
9.1. China’s trade with Latin America, 1995–2015 (US$ billion) 225
9.2. Shares of different products in imports from Latin America, 2013–15 226
9.3. Chinese OFDI in Latin America, 2003–15 (US$ million) 228
9.4. Sectoral distribution of the value of Chinese project contracts in LAC,
2005–16 231
9.5. Chinese loans and projects in Latin America, 2005–15 (US$ million) 231
10.1. China’s share in apparent consumption of manufactures in selected
Latin American countries, 2000–13 262
11.1. Coincidence of voting between Latin America, China,
and the US, 2000–15 299
List of Tables
0.1. Examples of possible impacts of China on developing countries 6

3.1. China’s significance in commodity markets, 2000, 2015 (%) 55
6.1. Determinants of Sino-SSA economic relations 143
A6.1. Significance of economic relations with China by country in SSA 148
8.1. Percentage of exports of wood products at high risk of illegality,
by destination, 2013 211
A8.1. Effects of voice and accountability on Sino-SSA economic relations 217
A8.2. Effects of control of corruption on Sino-SSA economic relations 217
A8.3. Effect of political stability on Sino-SSA economic relations 218
A8.4. Impact of economic relations with China on governance 219
9.1. Key actors in Sino-LAC economic relations 234
9.2. Determinants of Sino-LAC economic relations, 2002–15 248
A9.1. Significance of economic relations with China by country in LAC 253
10.1. Industries with the highest level of Chinese import penetration 263
11.1. Estimated impact of trade with China on manufacturing
employment in Latin America, 1995–2011 286
11.2. Shares of Latin American trade with China and the US, 2015 (%) 298
A11.1. Determinants of voting coincidence with China 318
12.1. Summary of China’s major impacts on SSA and LAC 331
List of Boxes
4.1. Problems in measuring China’s OFDI 73

6.1. The Angolan model 124
6.2. The Sicomines agreement in DRC 125
7.1. China’s impact on SSA exports of textiles and garments 162
8.1. Debate on labour conditions in Chinese copper mining in Zambia 190
9.1. Argentina and China: the soybean connection 240
List of Acronyms
ABC Agricultural Bank of China

ADB Agricultural Development Bank (China)
AGOA African Growth Opportunities Act
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
BOC Bank of China
CADF China-Africa Development Fund
CARI China Africa Research Initiative
CBRC Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission
CCB China Construction Bank
CCICED China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and
Development
CDB China Development Bank
CGGC China Gezhouba Group Company
CIC China Investment Corporation
CNMC China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corporation
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC China National Petroleum Company
COFCO China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation
CREC China Railway Engineering Corporation
CSR Corporate social responsibility
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFA Department of Foreign Assistance
DPP Democratic Progressive Party
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EITI Extractive industries Transparency Initiative
EIZ Eastern Industrial Zone
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
ETDZ Economic Trade and Development Zone
List of Acronyms
Exim Bank Export-Import Bank of China

FDI Foreign direct investment
FOCAC Forum for China Africa Cooperation
FSC Forest Stewardship Council
FTA Free trade agreement
GDP Gross domestic product
GHG Greenhouse gas
GM Genetically modified
GMO Genetically modified organism
GPN Global production network
GVC Global value chain
HRW Human Rights Watch
IADB Inter American Development Bank
ICBC Industrial & Commercial Bank of China
IEA International Energy Agency
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISI Import substituting industrialization
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification
JSCB Joint-stock commercial bank
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
M&A Mergers and acquisitions
MEP Ministry of Environmental Protection
MFA Multi Fibre Arrangement
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFCOM Ministry of Foreign Commerce
NDB New Development Bank
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic
of China
NGO Non-governmental organization
NSSF National Social Security Fund
OBOR One Belt, One Road
ODA Official development assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFDI Outward direct foreign investment
xviii
List of Acronyms
OOF Other Official Finance

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRC People’s Republic of China
R&D Research and development
REER Real effective exchange rate
RMB RENMINBI
RTRS Round Table on Responsible Soy
SAFE State Administration of Foreign Exchange
SASAC State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission
SEPA State Environmental Protection Administration
SEZs Special Economic Zones
SIC SAFE Investment Company
SINOSURE China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation
SOE State-owned enterprises
SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SSI Sinope Sonangol International
SWF Sovereign wealth fund
TNC Transnational corporation
TVE Township and village enterprise
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
VAT Value added tax
WGI World Governance indicator
WTO World Trade Organization
xix
Introduction
China’s Re-emergence as a Global
Economic Power
The re-emergence of China as a major economic power has been a central

feature of globalization over the past four decades. It constitutes a significant
shift in the world economy’s centre of gravity to East Asia. In terms of gross
domestic product, China is now the world’s second-largest economy after the
US, which it is predicted to overtake by 2026 (EIU, 2015, p.3). It is the world’s
leading exporter, and a significant destination for, and increasingly a source
of, foreign direct investment (FDI). It has become a major centre of global
industrial accumulation, accounting for almost a quarter of worldwide manu-
facturing output. It is the most important consumer of many minerals and
industrial raw materials, and is an increasingly significant user of energy and
contributor to carbon emissions. It has the world’s largest foreign exchange
reserves and plays a growing role in international financial markets. All this
has profound effects on countries around the world.
The economic rise of China can be looked at through two lenses. The first,
looking from the outside in, emphasizes changes in the global capitalist econ-
omy that have led to the geographical reconfiguration of the world economy.
The second approach, looking from the inside out, emphasizes the internal
changes in China which have led to its economic transformation since the
introduction of economic reforms at the end of the 1970s (Hung, 2008).
The ‘outside-in’ approach sees China’s economic growth as primarily exter-
nally driven, reflecting a new phase of globalization. In this view, capitalist
accumulation faced increasing barriers in the developed world in the 1970s as
a result of falling profitability, rising wages, and an increasingly mobilized
working class (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2007; Harvey, 2005). This led to
the abandonment of the Keynesian policies of the post-war consensus and
the adoption of neo-liberalism, particularly under Reagan in the US and
Thatcher in the UK. One of the strategies used by capital to restore profitabil-
ity was to move labour-intensive production offshore in order to reduce
production costs. This had started to happen in the 1960s, but it accelerated
in the 1980s.
In East Asia the ‘flying geese’ pattern in which certain Japanese industries
relocated to the newly industrializing countries, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore, had, by the 1980s, developed to a point where those
industries were now looking to relocate once more in the face of rising wages.
China’s economic reforms came at an opportune moment, and companies
relocated initially to the special economic zones that were created after 1978,
and then to other parts of the country.
In contrast, the ‘inside-out’ approach takes as its starting point the changes
that occurred in China after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. The reforms
to economic policy started by Deng Xiaoping in 1978/9 unleashed a
dynamic process of growth and increased competiveness in China as it
moved from a centrally planned to a market economy (see Chapter 1).
High levels of investment and a rapid increase in exports led to China’s
rising share of world output and trade. Rapid growth in China made it an
attractive destination for foreign investors. Its eventual accession to the
World Trade Organization in 2001 gave a further boost to export growth,
which contributed to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. As
Chinese firms accumulated technological capabilities, they began to invest
and carry out construction projects abroad. China also became a more
important player in global financial markets as a result of lending by Chinese
banks, particularly the policy banks, and investment by its sovereign
wealth funds.
Both of these lenses provide important insights into the growing global
significance of China. The post-1980 phase of globalization set the context
within which the Chinese economy was able to grow so rapidly. A focus on
shifts in global patterns of accumulation and the organization of global pro-
duction networks is a reminder that the Chinese economy is part of a larger
whole. This underlines the fact that China’s economic growth involves a
range of Chinese and international actors, and has depended crucially on
access to foreign markets and foreign inputs, capital, and technology.
Without radical changes within China, however, it is unlikely that these
changes in the global economy would have been accompanied by such spec-
tacular economic growth. Internal changes also determine the characteristics
of China’s ‘socialist market economy’, which have implications both domes-
tically and internationally. Globalization set the context within which China
was able to grow, but the drivers of economic growth were internal to China.
It is, therefore, imperative to analyze at some length the key changes and
stages of economic reform and development (see Chapter 1).
2
Introduction
0.1 China, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America

and the Caribbean
Both Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
have seen the influence of China increase significantly since the turn of the
century. China is now SSA’s most important trading partner, accounting for
more than a fifth of the region’s total trade. Chinese construction companies
are building roads, railways, dams, and stadiums, and other public buildings
across the region. China has also become an increasingly important source of
FDI, loans, and official development assistance (ODA) to SSA. The Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation, at which major announcements are made concern-
ing China’s plans for increased trade with and finance to Africa, meets every
three years.
China is LAC’s second-largest trading partner after the US, and in several
countries, including Brazil, Chile, and Peru, it has overtaken the US. China has
lent more than $100 billion to countries in the region since 2007 and has
made significant investments in oil and mining. It is also involved in major
infrastructure projects in the region, most notably the planned canal in
Nicaragua linking the Caribbean and the Pacific. In 2015 it formalized its
relations with the region with the establishment of the Forum of China and
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.
China’s growing involvement in SSA has been a source of intense debate
(Mhandara et al., 2013). Critics of China’s relations with the region have
portrayed it as a new colonial power extracting natural resources with little
regard for the local population or the environment while supporting authori-
tarian regimes and intensifying corruption. As Lamido Sanusi (2013), former
governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, wrote in the Financial Times:
China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the
essence of colonialism. The British went to Africa and India to secure raw materials
and markets. Africa is now willingly opening itself up to a new form of imperialism.
These critics have been accused by their opponents of ‘China-bashing’ and of

following a Western agenda which sees China as a threat to its interests in
Africa (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). They argue that on the contrary, the Sino-
SSA relationship is quite different from the colonial and neo-colonial relations
that existed with the West. China is seen as providing SSA with capital and
technology, as well as with a booming market for its exports, leading to the
revival of economic growth in the region in the twenty-first century. Zambian
economist Dambisa Moyo (2012a) writes:
China’s rush for resources has spawned much-needed trade and investment and
created a large market for African exports—a huge benefit for a continent seeking
rapid economic growth.
3
China’s commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other

countries and its provision of aid without any strings attached, in contrast
to the use of economic and political conditionality by Western donors and the
international financial institutions, is also emphasized (Wang and Ozanne,
2010).
In the case of LAC, while the debate has been less heated it is, nevertheless,
possible to discern significantly divergent views ( Jenkins, 2010a). A common
criticism is that China’s economic involvement has led to the recommodi-
fication of the region’s exports and deindustrialization, thus reproducing
the centre-periphery relations that historically characterized trade with
North America and Europe (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010; Rosales and
Kuwayama, 2012, Ch. II). There are also concerns, particularly on the political
right in the US, that China’s growing presence is threatening US influence and
encouraging left-wing governments in the region (Grudgings and Gardner,
2011). As in SSA, critics of China’s involvement have been accused of
Sinophobia and of propagating myths about Sino-LAC relations (Harris and
Arias, 2016).
The alternative view of Sino-LAC relations emphasizes South-South cooper-
ation, economic complementarity, and mutual benefits. This characterizes
official pronouncements. such as the Chinese government’s policy papers on
the region (PRC, 2008; 2016). Harris (2015) describes China in its relations with
LAC countries as ‘a peaceful panda bear’, which he contrasts with the critics’
view of ‘a roaring dragon’. More specifically, China is seen as having made an
important contribution to the region’s rapid recovery from the 2008 global
financial crisis by coming to the rescue of LAC exports (ECLAC, 2010, p.10).
In practice much of the academic literature on the impacts of China on SSA
and LAC recognizes that the reality is more complex and varied than either of
these extremes. There are both positive and negative impacts of the growing
Chinese involvement in the two regions. In Latin America, particularly, some
countries are identified as ‘winners’, and others as ‘losers’, as a result of China’s
growth (Funakushi and Loser, 2005; Gonzalez, 2008). In SSA, too, there has been
some recognition that different countries have been affected differently
(Sindzingre, 2011; Zafar, 2007). However, much of the literature shares certain
basic assumptions characteristic of both the critics and the defenders of
China’s role.
Although this debate is highly polarized, both sides are state centric in their
focus on the actions of the Chinese state.1 They see China as a monolithic
1
As Alison Ayers (2013) notes in her analysis of the ‘new scramble for Africa’, ‘[t]he privileging
of nation-states as the fundamental units of analysis is characteristic not only of realist and liberal
perspectives in IR/IPE [international relations/international political economy] but also various
critical perspectives that have sought to understand the rise of the BRICs [Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa], especially China’ (p.236).
4
Introduction
actor which pursues its interests globally. These interests are seen as either
benign, as portrayed in Chinese discourse on ‘peaceful development’ and the
‘harmonious world’, or as a challenge to the existing world order and an effort
to expand China’s global power, as seen by those who emphasize the ‘China
Threat’. Both sides also focus on the direct bilateral relations between China
and SSA or LAC countries, neglecting the indirect impacts of China’s increased
significance in the global economy. There is also a tendency in much of the
debate on China’s impact to focus exclusively on Chinese interests and
actions, and to see SSA and LAC as simply the beneficiaries or victims of
China’s international expansion, ignoring the role of local actors within the
two regions.
Inevitably, given the politicized nature of the media coverage of China’s
impacts on SSA and LAC, there is a tendency to present things in polarized
terms, emphasizing either the negative side or win-win scenarios. There is also
often a tendency on both sides of the debate to exaggerate the extent of
China’s influence in the two regions. The challenge in analysing China’s
growing significance for SSA and LAC is to provide an accurate picture of the
extent of its influence and to develop a critical account of its impact while
avoiding the ‘China-bashing’ that often characterizes media reports.
This book tries to achieve this by avoiding a state-centric approach to
China’s relations with SSA and LAC. It rejects the monolithic view of China
as a unitary actor pursuing a clearly defined coherent strategy in its approach
to the two regions. Although the Chinese government has issued two policy
papers on its relations with each region these are very broad statements
rather than coherent plans which the state implements (PRC, 2006, 2008,
2015, 2016). Chinese involvement is driven by the interests of a number of
actors including different ministries, provincial and municipal governments,
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), policy and commercial banks, and private
companies.
In analyzing the significance of China for SSA and LAC, this study recog-
nizes that China’s growth has both direct impacts as a result of the countries’
bilateral relations, and indirect ones arising from China’s effects on global
markets and prices. This implies that even those countries whose bilateral
relations with China are limited can, nevertheless, be affected either positively
or negatively by the global economic impacts of China.2 While detailing the
bilateral economic relations between China and SSA and China and LAC, this
2
A similar point could be made in relation to China’s environmental impact on other countries,
which can arise both directly from, for example, the polluting activities of Chinese firms in a host
country, but also indirectly as a result of the contribution of Chinese greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions to global warming.
5
study goes further to consider not only the direct impacts of China but also its
indirect impacts on both regions.
There is, perhaps inevitably, a tendency to focus more on Chinese actors
and interests in a book which looks at the impact of China. However, it is
important to recognize the role played by SSA and LAC actors in terms of both
explaining the increased Chinese presence in the region and the impact of
this.3 While it is true that states in SSA and LAC have been largely reactive in
response to China’s growing involvement, it is also the case that the outcomes
for host countries and different groups within them depend on the responses
of local state and non-state actors.
Table 0.1. Examples of Possible Impacts of China on Developing Countries
Direct Effects Indirect Effects
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Trade Growth of exports Displacement of Increased world Competition from

to China local commodity prices Chinese goods in
producers by third markets
imports from
China
FDI & Inflows of Chinese Displacement of Integration into global Diversion of OECD
projects FDI & local firms by production networks FDI from
technology Chinese with Chinese firms developing
competitors countries to
China
Finance Additional Unsustainable New modes of Global effects of
resources for increases in international finance Chinese financial
investment indebtedness instability
in infrastructure
Social Employment Displacement of Increased government Downward
creation by communities revenues for social pressure on
Chinese firms by Chinese expenditure international
mines & labour standards
dams
Political Increased policy Support for Chinese support for Less international
space for SSA & authoritarian developing protection of
LAC states regimes countries’ positions human rights
in international
organizations
Environment Transfer of Chinese firms Reduced cost of Chinese
technologies for operating in technologies for greenhouse gas
renewables ecologically renewable energy emissions
fragile areas contributing to
global warming
Source: Own elaboration based on Kaplinsky and Messner (2008, Fig. 6)
3
On the importance of recognizing the agency of local actors, see Mohan and Lampert (2013)
and Corkin, 2013, Ch. 2) on SSA, and Levy (2015) on Latin America.
6
Introduction
Finally, this book emphasizes the heterogeneous impacts of China’s growth

on the two regions. Some of the policy-oriented literature discusses these
impacts in terms of ‘threats/challenges and opportunities’4 or ‘competitive
and complementary effects’ (Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). This approach
opens up the possibility of a more differentiated perspective on China’s
impact which recognizes that it creates winners and losers both between and
within countries. The framework used in this book recognizes both positive
and negative impacts of China on SSA and LAC, and includes both direct and
indirect impacts.
Table 0.1 illustrates some of the potential impacts. The first three rows cover
those related to the economic impacts of China’s growing involvement in
trade, FDI, construction and engineering projects, and finance. The last three
rows include possible social, political, and environmental impacts. The first
two columns include the effects associated with China’s bilateral relations
with SSA and LAC, while the last two columns describe indirect impacts
arising from China’s effect on the global economy, governance, and environ-
ment. These are all discussed in detail in Parts II and III of the book.
0.2 Outline of the Book
This book sets out to answer a number of questions regarding the growing
involvement of China in SSA and LAC. First, is the hype regarding China’s role
really justified? How much impact has China’s re-emergence as a global
economic power had on the two regions? Next, what are the main channels
through which China is affecting SSA and LAC? What is the relative signifi-
cance of trade, FDI, engineering and construction projects, loans, and ODA
within the relationships? Then, what are the key drivers behind China’s
growing economic relations with SSA and LAC? Are the growing relations a
result of the strategic diplomatic or strategic economic interests of the Chinese
state or of the commercial motives of Chinese companies, and how are these
linked? Finally, the book considers the economic, social, political, and envir-
onmental implications for SSA and LAC of China’s growing significance. It
discusses how these impacts vary both between countries and between differ-
ent groups within countries.
The next chapter sets the scene by examining the transformation of the
Chinese economy since the start of the reforms in the late 1970s that led to
China’s integration into the global economy. It is not a comprehensive
account of China’s economic development, but rather it concentrates on
4
See Devlin et al. (2006) and Lederman et al. (2009) on Latin America, and Ajakaiye (2006) and
Knorringa (2009) on SSA.
7
those features that are essential to understanding the impacts that are
discussed later in the book. These include the growth of trade and FDI,
the development of the financial system, the changing nature of SOEs and
the growth of the private sector, the increases in productivity and wages,
and the effects of growth on natural resources and the environment.
The remainder of Part I consists of four chapters which discuss the most
important characteristics of China’s global economic integration. China is
best known as a manufacturing powerhouse, and Chapter 2 analyzes the
way in which it became a global centre for industrial production, paying
particular attention to the factors that underlie its global competitiveness. It
describes some of the key characteristics of its manufacturing sector, including
its integration into regional and global production networks, the role played
by inward investment, and the increasing technological sophistication of its
production.
The growth of industrial production and rising incomes in China led to a
rapid increase in demand for natural resources and industrial raw materials,
which was increasingly supplied by imports. China went from a marginal
player in global commodity markets to a key consumer with a significant
impact on their prices and organization. Chapter 3 documents its role in
different markets and its contribution to the commodity boom from 2002. It
discusses the strategies used to ensure a secure supply of key commodities, and
the specific characteristics of the Chinese market that make it different from
the developed-country markets to which SSA and LAC have traditionally
exported.
Not only is China a significant destination for FDI, but it has also emerged as
a source of outward FDI, and of non-equity forms of international expansion,
such as engineering and construction contracts. Chapter 4 documents this
growth and analyzes state and firm actors’ motives for investing abroad. A key
debate, the extent to which the internationalization of Chinese firms is
primarily state or market driven, is discussed.
The last chapter of Part I considers China’s growing role in international
finance. There is some confusion in the literature on China over the distinc-
tion between Chinese ‘aid’ and other forms of official finances provided by
Chinese banks. This has led to exaggerated accounts of the significance of
China’s financial contribution to the Global South. The chapter clarifies some
of these issues.
Part II of the book analyses China’s impact on SSA. Chapter 6 sets the
scene, documenting the growth of bilateral relations between China and the
region, focussing on trade, FDI, Chinese construction and engineering pro-
jects, and financial flows, and it identifies the main actors involved in these
relationships. The chapter discusses the role of China’s strategic diplomatic,
strategic economic, and commercial interests in its growing involvement
8
Introduction
in SSA, as well as African interests, before presenting an econometric analysis

of the key determinants of the different types of Chinese involvement in
the region.
Chapter 7 focuses on the key economic impacts of the growth of China,
considering both direct and indirect impacts on SSA. Particular attention is
paid to China’s direct and indirect impact on commodity exports, the
direct involvement of Chinese firms in infrastructure, and the direct and
indirect impacts on the manufacturing sector. These overviews are followed
by case studies of China’s economic impacts on Angola, Ethiopia, and
South Africa.
Part II concludes with a chapter discussing China’s social, political, and
environmental effects on SSA. These effects have been a particular target for
critics of China’s increasing influence in the region. On the social side, it has
been claimed that Chinese firms have preferred to employ Chinese rather
than African workers, and that wages and working conditions are poor and
labour rights frequently violated. China is also often criticized for its involve-
ment with undemocratic and corrupt regimes in SSA. Finally, China’s demand
for resources and the operations of Chinese firms in the region are criticized
for causing environmental degradation. The chapter considers these claims
and shows that the impacts are not universally negative, as some critics
suggest, and that local agency and context have an important effect on the
outcomes in different countries.
Part III is structured along the same lines as Part II to analyze Sino-LAC
relations. Chapter 9 provides background information on China’s economic
involvement in the region, the main actors involved, and the drivers of the
relationship. Chapter 10 considers the economic impacts of these relations,
with particular attention to the impact on commodity exports and prices and
the effects on the manufacturing sector. It concludes with case studies of
Brazil, Mexico, and Chile. Chapter 11 provides an analysis of the social,
political, and environmental impacts. In terms of social impacts, particular
attention is paid to that on local communities, while the section on China’s
political influence includes case studies of Brazil and Venezuela. Latin
America’s booming soybean industry is used to illustrate some of the envir-
onmental problems created by China’s growing demand.
Part IV contains two chapters by way of conclusion. Chapter 12 provides an
explicit discussion of the similarities and differences between China’s rela-
tions with and impacts on SSA and LAC, drawing on the two preceding parts.
It reinforces the conclusion that these impacts are heterogeneous, and that
specific local situations play an important part in determining the costs and
benefits. The final chapter looks at recent developments in China which are
likely to affect its relations with SSA and LAC in the future, paying particular
attention to the change to a slower rate of growth and greater emphasis on
9
household consumption and the quality of growth. It also considers the likely
effects of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy which has been closely associated
with President Xi Jinping. Finally, it considers the prospects for resolving
some of the problems which have characterized China’s relations with SSA
and LAC in recent years.
Several previous monographs and edited collections on China’s impact on
SSA and on LAC have addressed some or all of these questions. Although there
are many parallels between the two regions, no previous study has brought the
two cases together in a systematic way, as here. By highlighting both the
similarities and the differences between the two regions, this book brings
out the importance of specific local contexts and agency in explaining the
ways in which changing global patterns play out.
10
Part I
China and the Global Economy
The Transformation of the Chinese Economy
The growth of the Chinese economy since the late 1970s has been spectacular.
Gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an average of over 10 per cent per
annum until 2011, when the growth rate began to slow down, although still
achieving significant increases. At market exchange rates, China’s total GDP
overtook that of Germany, in 2007, and of Japan, in 2009, and it is now the
second-largest economy in the world. The Economist Intelligence Unit pre-
dicts that it will overtake the US in terms of total GDP by 2026 (EIU, 2015,
p.3). In purchasing power parity terms, the Chinese economy is already larger
than that of the US.1
Gross national income per capita in China increased more than twentyfold
between 1979 and 2012, taking it from a low- to an upper-middle-income
country in terms of the World Bank’s classification. This has led to a massive
reduction in poverty. The proportion of the population living below the
international poverty line fell from 88 per cent in 1981 to 6.5 per cent in
2012, reflecting an absolute reduction of over 500 million in the number of
people living in poverty, according to the World Bank.2
Economic growth has been driven by high levels of investment and rapid
export growth, which have led to significant structural change and product-
ivity increases. Investment levels were high and increasing over the period,
reaching over 40 per cent of GDP in the mid-2000s (Naughton, 2007, p.144).
Exports grew at almost 17 per cent per annum between 1980 and 2010
(UNCTADStat). The share of industry in total output increased, particularly
after 1990, to around 45 per cent of GDP (Naughton, 2007, Fig. 6.4). Estimates
put total factor productivity growth in China in the period at around 3 per
cent a year (Liu et al., 2014, pp.231–3).3
1
Purchasing power parity takes into account differences in countries’ price levels in order to
compare GDP.
2
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#3 (Accessed 26 Aug. 2016).
3
‘Total factor productivity growth’ refers to that part of the increase in output that is not
explained by increases in inputs such as capital and labour.
The remarkable performance of the Chinese economy over that period

followed major changes in economic policy after the death of Mao in 1976.
The period since then can be divided into four main phases. The first phase
from the late 1970s initiated the transition from a centrally planned to a
market economy, creating a ‘dual-track system’ Naughton, 2007. Table 4.1)
describes this as a period of ‘reform without losers’. The second phase began in
1992 with the Communist Party declaring its support for a ‘socialist market
economy’ and endorsing the extension of the market to all the major eco-
nomic sectors. In contrast to the earlier phase, this created losers, particularly
among state-owned enterprise (SOE) workers, as well as winners (ibid,
pp.106–7). In 2001 China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) mark-
ing the start of a third phase characterized by further integration with the
global economy. Finally, since 2012, China has entered a new phase referred
to as the ‘New Normal’, which is characterized by slower growth and greater
emphasis on the quality of growth.
The initial reforms introduced under Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1978
focussed on agriculture and created what became known as the ‘household
responsibility system’. There was also an expansion of township and village
enterprises (TVEs) that played an important role in the Chinese economy in
the 1980s. These were not included within the plan, but they contributed
significantly to rural industrialization by producing inputs for agriculture and
basic consumer goods. Rural incomes increased rapidly, and the reforms
proved popular with the majority of the population in rural areas.
The success of reform in the rural areas encouraged Chinese policymakers to
extend the process. SOEs were also allowed to sell production in excess of that
required by the plan through the market, and to transact and cooperate with
non-state enterprises, giving them greater flexibility. This model of reform in
China in the 1980s has been described as a ‘dual-track system’ (Naughton,
2007, pp.91–2). It preserved the traditional system of central planning, which
guaranteed stability, and allowed the government to achieve key targets, while
at the same time allowing a market to develop for the allocation of particular
goods. This led to a two-tier pricing system, with many goods having a low
state-set planned price and a higher market price.4 The creation of Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1979 was a further example of the dual-track
approach, which allowed foreign firms to enter China without affecting the
industrial activities of SOEs.
Several factors including rising inflation, anger at corruption, and growing
expectations of political reform led to increasing urban discontent during
1988–9 that culminated in government repression at Tiananmen Square in 1989.
4
The pricing system created incentives for rent seeking and corruption, with SOEs sometimes
able to buy inputs cheaply via the plan and then sell them at higher market prices.
14
In the aftermath, conservatives attempted to reverse the reforms but were

unsuccessful. In 1992 Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour launched a new phase
of reform. In October 1992 the Communist Party supported a ‘socialist
market economy’, endorsing the extension of the market to all the major
economic sectors. The growing significance of market relations in the 1980s
had rendered the system of central planning obsolete, and by the end of
1993, material balance planning had been abolished altogether, and the
dual system disappeared with a reunification of prices.
The second phase of reform saw China extending market relations domes-
tically and negotiating to join the WTO internationally. The process of
reforming state enterprises began with a new Company Law passed at the
end of 1993. The state sector was also downsized to focus on strategic indus-
tries and large firms with the policy of ‘grasping the big and letting go the
small’. Privatization, often through management buyouts, became common
from the mid-1990s, and the significance of the private sector in the economy
increased. The 1990s also saw significant changes in the banking and financial
system with the creation of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in
1992. There were also major reforms related to the external sector as China
prepared the way to join the WTO. In 1993 the foreign exchange regime was
unified, and current account convertibility was established. Trade was further
liberalized with significant tariff cuts and a reduction in the proportion of
imports subject to quotas.
A third phase of reform and development began in 2001 after China became
a member of the WTO. The rate of economic growth accelerated, as did the
growth of exports, until the global financial crisis in 2008. The boom in
exports, coupled with continuing inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI),
generated large balance of payments surpluses so that China accumulated
foreign exchange reserves and the government began to relax some of the
constraints on capital flows. Domestically, the period saw further growth in
the private sector and changes in the way that SOEs were managed to increase
their focus on profit and productivity. The position of SOEs in industries,
which the government considered strategic, was consolidated, and a group
of firms were identified as ‘national champions’. During this period, the
government also began to encourage Chinese firms to ‘go global’ through
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI).
The global financial crisis of 2008 interrupted the spectacular growth of the
Chinese economy, and exports fell in 2009. Growth resumed with a major
stimulus package introduced by the government in 2008, and since this was
targeted particularly at investment in infrastructure, it gave a boost to SOEs.
With the growth of world trade slowing down, the Chinese government
started to give greater emphasis to the expansion of the domestic market and
consumption rather than investment and exports. This led to new phase of
15
development referred to as the ‘New Normal’, with growth since 2012 of

around 6 or 7 per cent a year as opposed to 10 per cent, and a rebalancing of
the economy in favour of domestic consumption. There is more emphasis
given to the quality of economic growth, particularly in terms of its environ-
mental impacts, which had been largely ignored in previous periods. In 2013
President Xi Jinping gave further impetus to the international expansion of
Chinese firms with the launch of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, a major
infrastructure plan, that became a centrepiece of Chinese foreign policy.
This chapter does not attempt a comprehensive review of Chinese eco-
nomic development and economic policy. The focus is on those aspects
which are particularly relevant to understanding China’s impact on the global
economy. As such it begins with reforms that have affected trade and FDI,
before discussing the changes in the financial sector, enterprise reform, and
developments in the Chinese labour market. The final section considers the
impact of rapid growth on the environment and the demand for resources
in China.
1.1 Growing Integration with the Global Economy
One of the most striking features of China’s economic transformation has

been the increased integration with the global economy and its emergence as
the world’s largest exporter, a major destination for inward FDI and a growing
source of OFDI.
During the Maoist period, China emphasized self-reliance, particularly after
the break with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s,
China was one of the most closed economies in the world, with total trade
(exports plus imports) never exceeding 10 per cent of GDP (Naughton, 2007,
p.377). The system of state control of foreign trade meant that the State
Planning Commission’s import plan covered over 90 per cent of all imports,
and that exports were also comprehensively planned (Branstetter and Lardy,
2008, p.634). Both inward and outward FDI were virtually non-existent during
the Maoist period. In 1978 twelve state trading companies controlled by the
Ministry of Foreign Trade were the only firms allowed to engage in inter-
national trade or invest outside China (ibid, Table 16.1). There were also severe
restrictions on FDI in China during the 1970s.
This started to change during the first phase of economic reform with a push
to expand exports and attract foreign investment. One of the first steps taken
was the creation of four SEZs in Shenzhen (next to Hong Kong), Zhubai (next
to Macao), Shantou (on the coast facing Taiwan), and Xiamen (across the
Taiwan straits from Taiwan). These zones were open to foreign investors
who wanted to establish plants in order to export goods from China without
16
being subjected to the restrictions on FDI and the bureaucracy and taxes that
applied to investments elsewhere in the country. These experiments were
extended from the mid-1980s with a second wave of liberalization which
declared fourteen new Open Port Cities, all of which set up Economic Trade
and Development Zones (ETDZs) that offered the same kind of incentives as
the SEZs (Naughton, 2007, pp.406–10). In 1986 significant liberalization of
FDI regulation was applied throughout China. These ‘22 Regulations’ reduced
corporate tax rates for foreign firms and lifted restrictions on profit remit-
tances. Export-oriented projects and those using advanced technology were
eligible for further benefits.
The result was a dual system, with a distinction drawn between ‘processing
trade’ and ‘ordinary trade’. The latter applied to products for sale on the
Chinese market or used as inputs for production for the domestic market
which, after the removal of the state monopoly of foreign trade, were subject
to a complex system of tariffs, quotas, and import licences which remained
quite restrictive during the 1980s (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008, pp.634–5).
‘Processing trade’ which applied to exporters was largely free of restrictions on
imports.
Despite these measures, FDI inflows remained modest during the 1980s.
Most FDI was in joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned firms were only
allowed in the SEZs. During the first phase of the reforms, FDI was largely
confined to export manufacturing, and foreign firms had little access to the
domestic market. Inflows were largely dominated by Hong Kong and Taiwan-
ese firms relocating labour-intensive activities to the SEZs and to the southern
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, which received a number of concessions
from the central government in the early 1980s to pursue their own, more
market-oriented, policies (Thoburn et al., 1991).
During the second phase of reform in the 1990s, steps were taken to open up
the economy further in preparation for membership of the WTO. This
involved significant reductions in the protection given to production for the
domestic market. Average tariffs fell from 43 to 15 per cent, and the propor-
tion of imports covered by quotas and licences from nearly half to less than
10 per cent between the late 1980s and 2001 (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008,
p.635).
The government also began to selectively open the domestic market to
foreign investors in this period. Urban real estate was opened up to foreign
investment. There was also a third wave of new ETDZs, with eighteen
approved in 1992–3 (Naughton, 2007, p.409). In 1995, the dualistic system,
which encouraged FDI in some sectors while protecting Chinese firms in
others, was formalized with the publication of The Catalogue Guiding Foreign
Investment in Industry, which listed those sectors where foreign investment
was encouraged, restricted, or prohibited (Breslin, 2009, p.87). This led to a
17
surge in inward investment in the 1990s with US, Japanese, and European
firms now beginning to invest in China on a significant scale. Total inflows of
FDI increased more than tenfold in current dollars, from $4.4 billion in 1991
to $44.9 billion a decade later, although a substantial part of this FDI consisted
of ‘round-tripping’, which involved Chinese firms taking money out of the
country to Hong Kong, Macao, and offshore financial centres, and bringing it
back as FDI.5
China became a member of the WTO in 2001, and committed itself to
further tariff reductions in subsequent years. Further liberalization of the
Chinese FDI regime was also required in order to meet WTO membership
requirements. Before joining the WTO, China had required foreign investors
to meet certain local content requirement or balance their trade by offsetting
their imports with exports. Approval of FDI projects was also often contingent
on conditions regarding technology transfer or the establishment of a research
centre in China. The WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement
outlawed many of these practices, and China agreed to abide by these rules
when it became a WTO member (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008, pp.651–2).
Despite this, China’s FDI policy remained restrictive compared to that of
other countries.6
The decade that followed China’s accession to the WTO saw a substantial
increase in its integration with the global economy. Exports grew rapidly
because Chinese exporters could now access foreign markets under the same
conditions as other WTO members. The average growth of exports doubled
from less than 15 per cent per annum in the 1980s and 1990s to over 30 per
cent in the mid-2000s (UNCTADStat). Although imports also grew rapidly,
reflecting the growing demand for raw materials and the significant imported
content of many of the manufactured goods that China exported, imports
lagged behind exports and China’s trade surplus grew from around $30 billion
a year in 2002–4 to $300 billion by 2008 prior to the global financial crisis.
Despite the comparatively restrictive FDI regime, the size and growth of the
Chinese economy has made it an attractive destination for foreign invest-
ment. Since joining the WTO, the stock of inward FDI in China has increased
more than sixfold in current dollars, from $203 billion in 2001 to $1,221
billion in 2015. In 2014 China was the largest recipient of FDI in the world,
ahead of the US, although the latter regained the top position in 2015
(UNCTAD, 2016, Fig. 1.4).
5
Estimates of the scale of round-tripping vary from around a quarter to more than a half of total
FDI flows to China in the 1990s and early 2000s (Xiao, 2004).
6
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) FDI
Restrictiveness Index, which covers a number of OECD and non-OECD countries, despite a
substantial reduction in the index for China since 1997, it remained the second most restrictive
country after the Philippines in 2015 (OECDStat).
18
Although China continues to be a major destination for FDI, the relative

significance of foreign firms in the Chinese economy has declined. The stock
of FDI as a share of GDP, and the share of foreign firms in industrial output,
peaked in 2003 (Huang, 2014, Fig. 14.4; Davies, 2013, Fig. 4). This does not
indicate a decline in foreign investors’ interest in China but rather the
increased competitiveness and growth of Chinese firms.
As a result of persistent trade surpluses and inflows of capital, China’s
foreign exchange reserves grew more than tenfold in less than a decade
(World Bank, World Development Indicators, n.d.). The bulk of the reserves
were held in US Treasury bills, but with low interest rates, this was not a
productive use of reserves, and the Chinese authorities have tried to diversify
their holdings and find alternative ways of utilizing these surpluses (see
Section 1.2).
One of these ways was through encouraging OFDI. During the first period of
economic reform, foreign exchange shortages and the priority given to
domestic accumulation meant that OFDI policy was highly restrictive. In the
1990s the approval procedures were gradually eased, and it became easier for
firms to obtain foreign exchange. However, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian
financial crisis, regulation was tightened once more, and it became more
difficult to obtain foreign exchange for overseas investment.
The Tenth Five Year Plan (2001–5) and the adoption of a series of decrees
between 2000 and 2002 to regulate and promote OFDI (Shambaugh, 2013,
pp.174–6) marked the start of the ‘Go Out’ or ‘Go Global’ policy of encour-
aging Chinese firms to expand abroad. Over the past decade, government
policy towards OFDI has evolved in a number of ways (Rosen and
Hanemann, 2009, pp.11–12; Sauvant and Chen, 2014). The state, although
it can and still does intervene in high-profile investments, plays less of a
directive role and acts more as a regulator, allowing firms to make decisions
on commercial grounds. The approval procedures have been gradually eased,
and some of the decision-making decentralized to local agencies. Access
to foreign exchange for firms wanting to invest abroad has been eased by
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).
The government has also increased incentives and support to firms expand-
ing abroad, including finance from the China Development Bank (CDB) and
the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank); subsidies through a fund
managed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Commerce;
tax deductions and exemptions; investment insurance from the China
Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE); and the provision of
information on investment opportunities to Chinese companies. The Chinese
government has also been extremely active in signing bilateral investment
treaties, and in June 2013, it had agreements with 125 countries, second only
to Germany (Sauvant and Chen, 2014, pp.153–4).
19
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
lo que pudo realizar de sus cuantiosos bienes; vió una linda
gaditana, prendóse de ella, casóse, y antes de los nueve meses
murió inconsolable, dando y tomando siempre en lo de la
conspiración, que hubo de volverle el juicio. Vea usted aquí, señor
Fígaro, á Eduardo Priestley, humilde servidor de usted, cuyo destino
debía haber sido sin duda ser inglés, protestante y rico, español,
católico y pobre, sin que pudiese encontrar más causa de este
trastrueque que las circunstancias. Ya usted ve que la tomaron
conmigo desde pequeñito. Mi madre era mujer de rara penetración y
de ilustradas ideas. Crióme lo mejor que supo, y en darme toda la
educación que se podía dar entonces en España, consumió el poco
caudal que la dejara mi padre. Lleno yo de entusiasmo por la
magistratura, y aborreciendo la carrera militar á que querían
destinarme, estudié leyes en la universidad; pero puedo asegurar á
usted que á pesar de eso hubiera salido buen abogado, pues era
raro mi talento, sobre todo para ese estudio. Probablemente, señor
Fígaro, después de haber sido gran abogado, hubiera vestido una
toga, hubiera calentado acaso una silla ministerial, y el consejo de
Castilla me hubiera recogido al fin de mis días en su seno, donde
hubiera muerto descansadamente, dejando fama imperecedera. Las
circunstancias sin embargo me lo impidieron. Había un Napoleón en
el mundo, y fué preciso que éste quisiera ser emperador, y emplear
á sus hermanos en los mejores tronos de Europa, para que yo no
fuese ni buen abogado ni mal ministro.
»Yo tenía sentimientos generosos; mis compañeros tomaron las
armas y dejaron el estudiar nuestras leyes para defenderlas, que
urgía más. ¿Qué remedio? Dejé como fray Gerundio los estudios y
me metí á predicador; es decir, me hice militar en obsequio de la
patria. En la campaña perdí mi carrera, la paciencia y un ojo; y las
circunstancias me dejaron tuerto y capitán: sabe el cielo que para
ninguna de estas dos cosas servía. Yo, señor Fígaro, era impetuoso
y naturalmente inconstante; menos servía, pues, para casado, ni
nunca pensara en serlo; pero de resultas del bombardeo de Cádiz
murió mi madre, que gozando por sus relaciones de familia de algún
favor hubiera adelantado mi carrera. Otro favor que me hicieron las
circunstancias. Víme solo en el mundo, y en ocasión en que una
linda Aragonesa, hija de un diputado á cortes de Cádiz,
recogiéndome y ocultándome en su casa, cubierto de heridas, me
salvó la vida por una rara combinación de circunstancias; caséme
de honrado y agradecido, que no de enamorado, es decir, que me
casaron las circunstancias. En mi segunda carrera debiera haber
llegado á general según mis servicios, que á otros fajaron
haciéndolos muy flacos á la patria; pero era yerno de un diputado:
quitáronme las charreteras, envolviéronme en la común desgracia, y
las circunstancias me llevaron á Ceuta, adonde bien sabe Dios que
yo no quería ir; allí hice la vida de presidario y de mal casado, que
cualquiera de estos dos dogales por sí solo bastara para acabar con
un hombre. Ya ve usted que yo no tenía la culpa. ¿Quién diablos me
casó? ¿Quién me hizo militar? ¿Quién me dió opiniones? En
presidio no se hace carrera, pero se hace mucho rencor. Sin
embargo, salimos de presidio, y como yo era hombre de bien
contúveme; pretendí, pero como no anduve por los cafés, ni peroré,
medios que exigían entonces las circunstancias para prosperar, no
sólo no me emplearon, sino que me cantaron el trágala. Irritéme: el
cielo es testigo que yo no había nacido para periodista; pero las
circunstancias me pusieron la pluma en la mano: hice artículos
contra aquel gobierno; y como entonces era uno libre para pensar
como el que estaba encima, recogí varias estocadas de unos
cuantos aficionados, que se andaban haciendo motines por las
calles. Ésta fué la corona de laurel que dieron las circunstancias á
mi carrera literaria. Escapéme, y fuí á reunirme con los de la fe;
dijéronme allí que las circunstancias no permitían admitir en las filas
á un hombre que había sido marido de la hija de un diputado de las
cortes de Cádiz, y no me ahorcaron por mucho favor.
»No pudiendo vivir como realista, fuíme á Francia, donde en calidad
de liberal me colocaron en un depósito, con seis cuartos al día. Vino
por fin la amnistía, señor Fígaro. ¡Eh! Gracias á una reina clemente,
ya no hay colores, ya no hay partidos. Ahora me emplearán, digo yo
para mí; tengo talento, mis luces son conocidas, soy útil... Pero, ¡ay!,
señor Fígaro, ya no tengo madre, ya no tengo mujer, ya no tengo
dinero, ya no tengo amigos; las circunstancias de mi vida me han
impedido adquirir relaciones. Si llegara á hacerme visible para el
poder, acaso lograría: sus intenciones son las mejores del mundo;
mas ¿cómo abrirme paso por entre la nube de porteros y ujieres que
parapetan y defienden la llegada á los destinos? Las solicitudes que
se presentan solas son papeles mojados. ¡Hay tantos que piden por
pedir! ¡Hay tantos que niegan por negar!—Cien memoriales he
dado, otras tantas espaldas he visto.—Deje usted; veremos si estas
circunstancias se fijan, me dicen los unos.—Espere usted, me
responden los otros: hay tantos pretendientes en estas
circunstancias.—Pero, señor, replico yo, también es preciso vivir en
estas circunstancias. ¿Y no hay circunstancias para los que logran?
»Ésta es, señor Fígaro, mi posición: ó yo no entiendo las
circunstancias, ó soy el hombre más desdichado del mundo. El hijo
del Inglés, el que debía haber sido rico, magistrado, literato, general,
hombre ajeno de opiniones, acabará probablemente sus tres
carreras distintas en un solo hospital verdadero, merced á las
circunstancias; al mismo tiempo que otros que no nacieron para
nada, y que han tenido realmente todas las opiniones posibles,
anduvieron, andan y andarán siempre levantados en zancos por
esas mismas circunstancias.—De usted, señor Fígaro.—Eduardo de
Priestley, ó el hombre de circunstancias.»
No puedo menos de contestar al señor de Priestley que el daño
suyo estuvo, si hemos de hablar vulgarmente, en nacer
desgraciado, mal que no tiene remedio: si hemos de raciocinar, en
traer siempre trocadas las circunstancias, en no saber que mientras
haya hombres la verdadera circunstancia es intrigar; estar bien
emparentado; lucir más de lo que se tiene; mentir más de lo que
sabe; calumniar al que no puede responder; abusar de la buena fe;
escribir en favor, y no en contra del que manda; tener una opinión
muy marcada, aunque por dentro se desprecien todas, procurando
que esa opinión que se tenga sea siempre la que haya de vencer, y
vociferarla en tiempo y lugar oportunos; conocer á los hombres;
mirarlos de puertas adentro como instrumentos, y tratarlos como
amigos; cultivar la amistad de las bellas, como terreno productivo;
rasarse á tiempo, y no por honradez, gratitud ni otras ilusiones; no
enamorarse sino de dientes afuera, y eso de las cosas que puedan
servir...
Pero, santo Dios, gritará un rígido moralista, ¡qué cuadro!
¡¡¡Maquiavélicos principios!!!—Fígaro no dice que sean buenos,
señor moralista; pero tampoco Fígaro hizo el mundo como es, ni lo
ha de enmendar, ni á variar el corazón humano alcanzarán todas las
sentencias posibles. Las circunstancias hacen á los hombres hábiles
lo que ellos quieren ser, y pueden con los hombres débiles; los
hombres fuertes las hacen á su placer, ó tomándolas como vienen
sábenlas convertir en su provecho. ¿Qué son por consiguiente las
circunstancias? Lo mismo que la fortuna: palabras vacías de sentido
con que trata el hombre de descargar en seres ideales la
responsabilidad de sus desatinos; las más veces, nada. Casi
siempre el talento es todo.
REPRESENTACIÓN
DE LA COMEDIA ORIGINAL EN TRES ACTOS Y
EN VERSO TITULADA
UN TERCERO EN DISCORDIA
DE
DON MANUEL BRETÓN DE LOS HERREROS
Una comedia nueva del aplaudido autor de Á Madrid me vuelvo y de

la Marcela no podía menos de llamar la pública expectación, y aun
de prevenirla favorablemente.
En esta composición dramática como en la Marcela, se ha
propuesto el poeta, no censurar un defecto ridículo determinado, no
ridiculizar un vicio feo ó una pasión denigrante, no un objeto moral
circunscrito y de general aplicación. Un cuadro bien presentado, en
que se reúnen á formar el conjunto varios caracteres sacados de la
sociedad, hábilmente colocados en contraste, parece haber sido la
idea del autor.
En la Marcela es una mujer amable, cuya peligrosa amabilidad da
esperanzas á tres amantes igualmente indignos de su alto cariño.
En Un tercero en discordia es una joven perseguida también por tres
amadores; los caracteres nuevos que presenta esta composición
dramática son los de los dos amantes más importunos de Luciana.
El uno es un joven en demasía desconfiado del cariño y fidelidad de
su amada; en una palabra, un hombre zeloso: el segundo es un
necio por el contrario harto confiado en el amor de una mujer que no
le ha dicho siquiera que le ama, pero de cuyo cariño cree poder
estar seguro; en una palabra, un presuntuoso. Un tercero en
discordia que ni es zeloso, ni presuntuoso, sino un tipo de la
perfección social, un amante que ama sin prisa, sin mal humor
nunca, que jamás confía en que es amado, que nunca exige nada,
impasible, eterno, imagen del no movimiento y de la no acción, es el
justo medio presentado en este carrusel amatorio. Á los ojos de una
mujer sentimental, exaltada, romántica, de pasiones vivas, pudiera
no parecer don Rodrigo el más perfecto ni el más amante; pero á los
ojos de una muchacha bastante fría, como el autor nos la pinta, bien
educada, y de suyo sosegada, no hay duda que don Rodrigo debe
ser el amante preferido, el esposo. El padre de la niña es un buen
hombre, que tiene más de tonto que de otra cosa, de estos que
hablan con las manos, que escriben la conversación, conforme la
van haciendo, en el pecho de su interlocutor, que le desabotonan el
chaleco, y le quitan el lazo de la corbata, etc. Una ama de gobierno
vieja, de éstas que hacen oficio de todo en las casas, regañona y
entrometida en los intereses de la familia, es el quinto y último
personaje de la comedia.
De esta construcción del plan se infiere que el contraste que
presentan el zeloso y el confiado ha de dar lugar á escenas
cómicas: así es; rasgos hay felicísimos que revelan el poeta
dramático. El confiado, traduciendo todos los desaires y desprecios
por disimulo ó enojo amoroso, es sumamente cómico y lindamente
imaginado: el zeloso, por el contrario, tratando de luchar inútilmente
á cada paso con su indómita pasión y exaltándose á la vista sola de
un papel cualquiera, después de haber jurado la enmienda, excita la
risa de la buena comedia. Aquí notaremos la habilidad del poeta. El
confiado no necesitaba ser correspondido; de esta manera era más
ridículo, y así lo ha hecho el autor; el zeloso, por el contrario, no
podía desarrollar su carácter sin haber recibido pruebas muy
grandes de amor: así que, el autor ha hecho que Luciana le
correspondiese en un principio. Verdad es que de aquí nace un
gravísimo inconveniente: á saber, que la misma Luciana que tutea al
zeloso en el primer acto y le corresponde indudablemente, se halla
ya en el tercero, es decir, en horas, tan convencida y fastidiada de la
importunidad de su amante, que se echa, sin verter una lágrima
siquiera, en brazos del justo medio don Rodrigo. Diríamos que éste
pudiera ser el inconveniente de la rigorosa unidad de tiempo, y
diríamos que una mujer que se dice enamorada de un hombre no lo
deja por zeloso (porque éste es acaso el carácter que menos choca
á la pasión), sino después por lo menos de haber sufrido mucho y
de haber llorado más; diríamos que generalmente se observa que
los amores más duraderos son aquéllos en que uno de los dos
amantes es extraordinariamente zeloso, y añadiríamos que no es el
destino de los amores arrebatados el acabarse pronto, sino el
acabarse mal. Pero el talento del autor ha previsto todas estas
objeciones, y nos ha presentado desde luego una de esas
muchachas que no sienten ni padecen: que entran en el mundo con
un temperamento indiferente, y por consiguiente que se guían en su
elección por su propia conveniencia, y nunca á ciegas: de ésas que
encuentra usted donde quiera, que empiezan á corresponder á un
amante por hacer algo, por el gusto de tener amante, por cualquier
cosa, y que al volver de una esquina le dejan plantado con todo su
amor, y toman otro: mujeres, en fin, muy buenas, muy perfectas,
muy impasibles. En este género, Luciana y Marcela son admirables,
son dos modelos.
¿Nos permitirá el autor que no convengamos con él en una cosa? El
calor, sin duda, de su imaginación poética le lleva á formarse á
veces una sociedad ideal, donde sólo considera virtudes y vicios,
perfecciones y defectos personificados, y situaciones posibles de
efecto; esto le aparta de la pintura verdadera de la sociedad en que
vivimos: queremos decir, que tanto en la Marcela como en ésta, los
desenlaces no nos parecen naturales. Al fin, en Marcela, no hay otro
inconveniente contra los usos sociales que el declarar en público á
sus amantes lo que sólo puede uno oir en particular; porque si una
mujer tiene derecho á no corresponder á un hombre, no le tiene
para ponerle en ridículo sólo porque la ama. En Un tercero en
discordia es menos verosímil, porque al fin, si una mujer es tan
imprudente que despide en público á sus amantes, ¿qué pueden
hacer éstos con una señora sino respetarla? Pero Luciana encarga
á su elegido, lo cual es poco delicado, que desengañe á los otros:
don Rodrigo lo admite, aunque obligado, y los dos sufren. Esta
última parte es la imposible, y en corazones bien puestos sólo de
una manera puede desenlazarse. Por otra parte, el señor Bretón
insiste en colocar siempre á las mujeres en una posición en que no
están en el día en nuestra sociedad: no son ya las reinas del torneo,
como en los siglos medios: nadie se sujeta á esos jurados, á esas
competencias: más; el hombre desama á la mujer, como la mujer al
hombre, y en esto felizmente somos iguales. Todo hombre bien
educado es deferente con las señoras; pero las señoras no están
por eso exentas de guardar consideraciones al sexo fuerte: la
sociabilidad es recíproca. Mucho sentiríamos que no fuese el autor
de nuestra opinión.
Acabaremos este rápido juicio con una observación. En nada brilla
más el singular talento poético del señor Bretón, que en la sencillez
de sus planes; en todas sus comedias se conoce que hace estudio y
gala de forjar un plan sumamente sencillo; poca ó ninguna acción,
poco ó ningún artificio. Esto es sólo concedido al talento, y al talento
superior. Una comedia llena de incidentes que cualquiera inventa, es
fácil de hacerla pasar á un público á quien siempre cautivan el
interés y la curiosidad.
El señor Bretón desprecia estos triviales recursos, y sostiene y lleva
á puerto feliz entre la continua risa del auditorio, y de aplauso en
aplauso, una comedia apoyada principalmente en la pintura de
algunos caracteres cómicos, en la viveza y chiste del diálogo, en la
pureza, fluidez y armonía de su fácil versificación. En estas dotes no
tiene rival, si bien puede tenerlos en cuanto á intención, profundidad
ó filosofía.
Alguna palabra exótica tildaríamos en Un tercero en discordia; pero
¿qué son esos pequeñísimos lunares en una comedia que ha sido
muy reída, y que han coronado los aplausos del auditorio? Damos el
parabién al señor Bretón por este nuevo lauro adquirido, y nos le
damos á nosotros mismos.
En los actores se ha notado un zelo extraordinario; demasiado zelo,
si éste puede ser demasiado alguna vez. El artificio del actor
consiste en ocultar su zelo y su esfuerzo, y dominar su habilidad
hasta reducirla al punto de la verdad imitada. En el mundo no se
observa nunca que cada uno quiera hablar, andar, reir y manotear
para arrancar aplausos á los que van por la otra acera; todo esto se
hace naturalmente, y el no haberlo hecho así es el defecto general
que en toda la comedia hemos notado. ¿Podríamos decirle al actor
encargado del papel del padre, sin que se ofendiese, que cuando
uno de esos hombres significativos en su acción desabrocha á otro
y le escribe en la ropa, lo hace por un efecto de distracción, y por
consiguiente lo hace como quien no hace nada, no se ríe de su
misma manía, no escribe en lo interior de la camisa, metiéndole todo
el brazo en el cuerpo, sino sólo en la solapa; no mira las prendas
que aja, sino á los ojos de su interlocutor, porque si las mirara, las
vería, le chocarían á él mismo y se avergonzaría? ¿Á su interlocutor
don Rodrigo le podríamos decir que cuando un fracaso de ésos
sucede, no se hacen extremos, sino que sólo en la cara se da á
entender, lo menos que se puede, la mortificación? ¿Llevará á mal
que le advirtamos que en la sociedad nunca se vuelve uno al público
á decirle lo que piensa, porque en la sociedad no hay público; y que
en la comedia, que es un remedo de las costumbres, no se debe
declamar como en un melodrama lleno de exclamaciones y
asombros, sino hablar naturalmente?
Al zeloso le diríamos que el deseo de marcar su papel le ha hecho
confundir alguna vez los arrebatos de un amante desconfiado con el
furor de un marido zeloso: un amante, sobre todo en los principios,
aunque tenga muchos zelos, modera algo más que un marido su
genio, porque puede perder la posesión que no ha logrado aún, y
que éste tiene ya asegurada. No se produce con dominio, sino con
reconcentración; reconviene, vilipendia, injuria, si es preciso, pero
nunca habla con los puños cerrados: las transiciones sobre todo del
furor al cariño son más marcadas. Nada más tierno y sumiso que un
amante zeloso en sus lúcidos intervalos.
Hemos dicho ya que los actores no deben acordarse de que existe
público: por tanto nos ha chocado extraordinariamente que la actriz
ama de gobierno haya hecho cortesías al público al recibir aplausos.
Buena es la política, pero á su tiempo.
Hemos notado en general que gritan demasiado algunos actores,
sobre todo cuando creen que lo que dicen debe llamar la atención.
En otra ocasión hemos dicho ya que el querer dar valor á las frases
suele quitárselo: en realidad es suponer que el público es sordo ó
muy torpe; ambas cosas son desagradables. Dolorosísimo nos es
haber de encontrar defectos; todo lo más que podemos hacer es
escribir nuestra crítica con decoro, y apoyándola siempre en
razones; pero si la obligación del actor es representar bien, la del
crítico es juzgar bien é imparcialmente. En compensación diremos
con placer que hemos visto á la par aciertos, y que, segregados los
defectillos que hemos notado, esta comedia se ha representado
mejor que otras; el barba sobre todo ha dado el color verdadero á su
carácter, si se le perdona la exageración; y los lunares de los demás
actores no merecen que alarguemos este artículo con nuevas
observaciones.
REPRESENTACIÓN DE
LA MOJIGATA
COMEDIA
DE DON LEANDRO FERNÁNDEZ DE MORATÍN
Nada más temible en las conmociones políticas que las reacciones:

ellas hacen desandar á los partidos por lo común mucho más
camino del que durante su progresivo movimiento anterior lograron
avanzar. La literatura no es la que menos se ha resentido en nuestro
país y en varias épocas recientes de esta lastimosa verdad. Un
nombre solo de un hombre, envuelto en la ruina de su partido, suele
bastar á proscribir una obra inocente; al paso que la suspicacia del
vencedor, rezelándose de su misma sombra, suele hallar en las
frases más indiferentes alusiones peligrosas capaces de
comprometer su seguridad. He aquí la razón por que se ha escrito
con más libertad é independencia en épocas ciertamente mucho
más atrasadas que las que nosotros hemos alcanzado.
La mayor parte de las obras de nuestros autores que han corrido y
corren en manos de todos constantemente, no hubieran visto jamás
la luz pública si hubieran debido sujetarse por primera vez á la
censura parcial y opresora con que un partido caviloso y débil ha
tenido en nuestros tiempos cerradas las puertas del saber. Y
decimos débil, porque sabido es que tanto más tiránico es un
partido, cuanto menos fuerza moral, cuantos menos recursos físicos
tiene de que disponer. Desprovisto de fuerzas propias, va á
buscarlas en las ajenas conciencias, y teme la palabra. Sólo un
gobierno fuerte y apoyado en la pública opinión puede arrostrar la
verdad, y aun buscarla: inseparable compañero de ella, no teme la
expresión de las ideas, porque indaga las mejores y las más sanas
para cimentar sobre ellas su poder indestructible.
El teatro es acaso el ramo que más se ha resentido de estas
funestas verdades: por ellas hemos visto interceptadas malamente
comedias que respiran la más pura moral, entre ellas la Mojigata. Al
verla representar de nuevo en el día, no sabemos si sea más de
alabar la ilustrada providencia de un gobierno reparador que la
ofrece de nuevo á la pública expectación, que de admirar la crasa
ignorancia que la envolvió por tantos años en la ruina de una causa
momentáneamente caída. ¿Tan hipócrita es el partido que tiene por
enseña el fanatismo, que se creyó atacado en la Mojigata? ¡Tanto le
ofende la fiel representación de los extravíos humanos!, ¡tan ligada
se halla con ellos su existencia!
La Mojigata era conocida y sabida ya de memoria de todo el mundo:
por lo tanto, si bien es indudable que tiene mérito suficiente para
llamar al teatro numerosa concurrencia, eslo también para nosotros
que ha debido á su larga prohibición la mayor parte de la
importancia que en esta ocasión se le ha dado: esto es tanto más
cierto, cuanto que estamos acostumbrados á ver sin entrada otras
composiciones del mismo Moratín escapadas de la común
prohibición. Para hablar literalmente de la Mojigata, necesitaríamos
estar más seguros de nuestras propias fuerzas: seríanos
indispensable además dedicar á su examen un artículo más extenso
de lo que las actuales circunstancias nos permiten; porque en el
caso de que nos atreviésemos, como pudiéramos atrevernos tal vez
á hallar en ella lunares, de que no hay obra humana exenta, ¿qué
de razones no necesitaríamos acumular para contrarrestar la
opinión pública tan exclusiva cuando llega á cobijar bajo su
protección un nombre, una vez proclamado célebre? El mérito de
Moratín, por otra parte, es tan generalmente reconocido, que
creemos inútil insistir en esta ocasión en la ampliación de sus
bellezas; y con respecto á sus defectos, sólo diremos que la
diferencia que existe entre los hombres de gran talento y la
medianía, es que de aquéllos se puede decir que suelen alguna vez
incurrir en faltas, y de ésta por el contrario, que suelen alguna vez
tener bellezas. Esto es todo lo que nos parece que se puede decir
con respecto á Moratín en parangón con los que después de él han
escrito comedias del mismo género en nuestro país. Agréguese á
esto una consideración: en todos los países el primero que se ha
elevado, el primer reformador ha llevado y ha debido llevar la mejor
parte de reputación, porque es preciso proceder siempre por
comparación; apenas hay en el mundo otra manera de raciocinar.
Por lo que hace á comparar á Moratín con Molière, como han
pretendido algunos hacerlo, bueno y justo es que se diga que
Moratín es el Molière español: esto sin embargo, creemos, según
nuestras cortas luces, que la Mojigata no podrá sostener nunca la
comparación al lado del Hipócrita de Molière, que es la comedia de
éste con quien tiene más relación; si exceptuamos el desenlace, que
es infinitamente superior en la Mojigata, porque pocas veces anduvo
feliz Molière en desenlaces. El mérito principal de Moratín
parécenos estribar más en la pintura local de las costumbres de su
época, y en el manejo de los modismos de la lengua, que en la
pintura del corazón humano; sin que por esto queramos decir que
fuese ignorante de él Moratín: la gracia de Molière es más
candorosamente cómica, y se trasluce menos al poeta; presenta las
situaciones solas, y esto basta en él para hacer reir. Moratín ayuda á
la situación con una sátira más decidida: no se contenta con
exponer el cuadro ridículo sencillamente á la vista del espectador:
echa además en la balanza para inclinarla á su favor el peso de su
propia opinión; sus gracias toman muchas veces gran parte de
realce de su mordacidad. Sea hecho este paralelo de paso con el
respeto debido á ambos ingenios peregrinos, y para decir que, por
las expuestas razones, Molière es más universal que Moratín; éste
es más local; su fama por consiguiente más perecedera é insegura.
REPRESENTACIÓN DE
EL SÍ DE LAS NIÑAS
COMEDIA
DE DON LEANDRO FERNÁNDEZ DE MORATÍN
En el día podemos decir que han desaparecido muchos de los vicios

radicales de la educación que no podían menos de indignar á los
hombres sensatos de fines del siglo pasado, y aun de principios de
éste. Rancias costumbres, preocupaciones antiguas hijas de una
religión mal entendida y del espíritu represor que ahogó en España,
durante siglos enteros, el vuelo de las ideas, habían llegado á
establecer una rutina tal en todas las cosas, que la vida entera de
los individuos, así como la marcha del gobierno, era una pauta, de la
cual no era lícito siquiera pensar en separarse. Acostumbrados á no
discurrir, á no sentir nuestros abuelos por sí mismos, no permitían
discurrir ni sentir á sus hijos. La educación escolástica de la
universidad era la única que recibían los hombres: y que si una niña
salía del convento á los veinte años para dar su mano á aquél que le
designaba el interés paternal, se decía que estaba bien criada; era
bien criada si sacrificaba su porvenir al capricho ó á la razón de
estado; si abrigaba un corazón franco y sensible, si por desgracia
había osado ver más allá que su padre en el mundo, cerrábanse las
puertas del convento para ella y había de elegir por fuerza el esposo
divino que la repudiaba ó que no la llamaba á sí por lo menos.
Moratín quiso censurar este abuso, y asunto tan digno de él no
podía menos de inspirarle una gran composición. De estas breves
reflexiones se puede inferir que el Sí de las Niñas no es una de
aquellas comedias de carácter, destinada como el Avaro ó el
Hipócrita, á presentar eternamente al hombre de todos los tiempos y
países un espejo en que vea y reconozca su extravío ó su ridícula
pasión; es una verdadera comedia de época, en una palabra, de
circunstancias enteramente locales, destinada á servir de
documento histórico ó de modelo literario. En nuestro entender es la
obra maestra de Moratín y la que más títulos le granjea á la
inmortalidad. El plan está perfectamente concebido. Nada más
ingenioso y acertado que valerse para convencer al tío de la
contraposición de su mismo sobrino. Así no fuera este teniente
coronel, porque por mucha que fuese en aquel tiempo la sumisión
de los inferiores en las familias, no parece natural que un teniente
coronel fuese tratado como un chico de la escuela, ni recibiese las
dos, ó las tres onzas para ser bueno. Acaso la diferencia de las
costumbres haga más chocante esta observación en nuestros días,
y nos inclinamos á creer esto, porque confesamos que sólo con
mucho miedo y desconfianza osamos encontrar defectos á un
talento tan superior. El contraste entre el carácter maliciosamente
ignorante de la vieja y el desprendido y juicioso don Diego es
perfecto. Las situaciones sobre todo del tercer acto, tan bien
preparado por los dos anteriores, que pudieran llamarse de
exposición, porque toda la comedia está encerrada en el tercer acto,
son asombrosas, y desaniman al escritor que empieza. Ésta es la
ocasión de hacer una observación esencial. Moratín ha sido el
primer poeta cómico que ha dado un carácter lacrimoso y
sentimental á un género en que sus antecesores sólo habían
querido presentar la ridiculez. No sabemos si es efecto del carácter
de la época en que ha vivido Moratín, en que el sentimiento
empezaba á apoderarse del teatro, ó si es un resultado de
profundas y sabias meditaciones. Ésta es una diferencia esencial
que existe entre él y Molière. Éste habla siempre al entendimiento, y
le convence presentándole el lado risible de las cosas. Moratín
escoge ciertos personajes para cebar con ellos el ansia de reir del
vulgo; pero parece dar otra importancia para sus espectadores más
delicados á las situaciones de sus héroes. Convence por una parte
con el cuadro ridículo al entendimiento; mueve por otra el corazón,
presentándole al mismo tiempo los resultados del extravío; parece
que se complace con amargura en poner á la boca del precipicio á
su protagonista, como en el Sí de las Niñas y en el Barón; ó en
hundirle en él cruelmente, como en el Viejo y la Niña, y en el Café.
Un escritor romántico creería encontrar en esta manera de escribir
alguna relación con Víctor Hugo y su escuela, si nos permiten los
clásicos esta que ellos llamarán blasfemia. En nuestro entender éste
es el punto más alto á que puede llegar el maestro; en el mundo
está el llanto siempre al lado de la risa; parece que estas afecciones
no pueden existir una sin otra en el hombre; y nada es por
consiguiente más desgarrador ni de más efecto que hacernos regar
con llanto la misma impresión del placer. Esto es jugar con el
corazón del espectador; es hacerse dueño de él completamente, es
no dejarle defensa ni escape alguno. El Sí de las Niñas ha sido oído
con aplauso, con indecible entusiasmo, y no sólo el bello sexo ha
llorado, como dice un periódico, que se avergüenza de sentir;
nosotros los hombres hemos llorado también, y hemos reverdecido
con nuestras lágrimas los laureles de Moratín, que habían querido
secar y marchitar la ignorancia y la opresión. ¿Es posible que se
haya creído necesario conservar en esta comedia algunas
mutilaciones meticulosas? ¡Oprobio á los mutiladores de las
comedias del hombre de talento! La indignación del público ha
recaído sobre ellos, y tanto en la Mojigata como en el Sí de las
Niñas, los espectadores han restablecido el texto por lo bajo:
felizmente la memoria no se puede prohibir.
LOS TRES NO SON MÁS QUE DOS
Y EL QUE NO ES NADA VALE POR TRES
MASCARADA POLÍTICA
Mil veces les habrá sucedido á mis lectores, y aun á los que no me
leen, oir una campana y quedarles una prolongada vibración en los
oídos después de haber sonado; les habrá sucedido también
viajando, durarles gran rato, después de apeados ya del carruaje, la
sensación del movimiento y traqueteo producida por muchas horas
de camino. He aquí precisamente lo que á mí me ha sucedido y me
sigue sucediendo todavía con el fantástico aparato y desigual
clamor que en mis sentidos dejaron las pasadas máscaras. Voy por
la calle y se me antojan aún caretas las caras, y disfraces los trajes
y uniformes. Oigo hablar de cosas nuevas, y, acostumbrado á tanta
cosa vieja y á tanta broma, se me figura aún que me siguen
embromando. Pasará sin duda esta sensación, y será preciso creer
á todo el mundo; pero mientras pasa ó no pasa, mientras creo ó no
creo, todo el trabajo de mi entendimiento limitado se reduce por
ahora á ver de conocer al que me habla; que no es poco. Con tal
rumor en los oídos, con tal prevención en la vista, salía yo la última
noche del pasado carnaval de Abrantes, donde había codeado á la
aristocracia, y del teatro, donde me había codeado á mí la
democracia. Llena la cabeza con estas dos ideas, que no podía
amalgamar nunca, y que así se separaban al tocarse como se
separan dos bolas de billar al chocar una con otra, se me antojó que
entraba en un salón adornado por el orden antico-moderno; toda la
parte alta gótica, góticas las paredes y ventanas: el mueblaje y
adorno bajo del último gusto. Tres comparsas le llenaban, á lo que
entonces me pareció. La menos numerosa era compuesta toda de
viejos, ¡rara aprehensión!, pero gordos y robustos; para hacer gente
y engruesarse iba derramando su dinero con tanto sigilo, como si
fuese mal adquirido y peor conservado; pero á cada moneda que
daban, ¡cosa rara!, perdían carnes y fuerzas. Toda esta comparsa
andaba hacia atrás, más como quien huye que como quien anda;
para lo cual traían la cabeza y los pies vueltos del revés, que hacían
rara figura. Andaban desbandados á causa de hallarse su jefe á
diligencias propias; pero en cambio presumían serlo todos. Seguía á
esta comparsa una porción de pobres, rotos y mal parados, con una
venda en los ojos como pintan á la fe, creyendo á pies juntillas
cuanto aquéllos les decían, y tomando varios dijes de poco valor en
cambio de sus servicios. De cuando en cuando dábanles los
magnates de la comparsa un palo, y unos respondían ¡viva! y otros
respondían ¡gracias! Raros trajes se veían entre ellos, pero ninguno
pasaba del siglo xviii. Retazos de manteos, cruces y veneras, papel
de Italia, espadines de Toledo, tal cual estrella en la frente, látigo en
la mano, calzón, peluquín y hebillas. Color general blanco como la
leche. Conversación poca; chispa ninguna.
La segunda traía jefe, ó por mejor decir representante; gente nueva,
y la más barbilampiña: flaca aún como muchacho que está
creciendo: conocíase á legua que no habían tenido tantas ocasiones
de comer como los otros. No andaban, sino corrían: todo eran
piernas. Bailaban todos á una, y hacían los mismos pasos:
encogíanse los altos, empinábanse los bajos: todo su prurito era
andar iguales: al menor desnivel había gira y algazara. Pedían la
palabra, y tomaban lo demás. Venían vestidos de telas de
institución, color de garantía: el disfraz era lo mejor que traían; si
bien á muchos se los traslucían por debajo juboncillos de ambición
con tal cual cenefilla de empleo, y se conocía que no estaban
hechos á usarlos, porque á los más les venían anchos. Éstos no
repartían dinero, sino periódicos; dábanlos con audacia y á venga lo
que venga: si alguno se perdía ó se interceptaba malamente, otro al
puesto, como quien tenía el molde en casa. Por el contrario de los
otros, á cada periódico que daban ganaban carnes y razón. Las
caretas eran discursos históricos de sucesión. Iban encendiendo las
luces, que la primera comparsa apagaba siempre que podía; pero el
salón estaba iluminado, de donde era fuerza inferir que se
encendían más de prisa que se apagaban. Seguía á éstos una turba
desigual hambrienta de felicidad: verdad es que nunca la habían
catado. Unos eran gordos, otros flacos: unos tenían tres piernas,
otros una: uno tres ojos, otro medio; quién era gigante, quién
lilipuciano. Se os igualará, les iban diciendo los magnates, nada más
fácil, y lo creían sin mirarse despacio unos á otros, el tonto y el
discreto, el tullido y el sano, el pobre y el rico. Éstos creían en la
felicidad de este mundo: los primeros en la del otro. Su
conversación buena, su chispa mucha y mayor el ruido que metían.
Color general negro.
Era el resto de la concurrencia la mayoría; pero se conservaba á
cierta distancia del que parecía su jefe. Era el color de éste un
atornasolado claro, que visto de distintos puntos lejanos parecía
siempre un color diferente, pero en llegado á él no se le podía llamar
color. Éste y los suyos no andaban, aunque lo parecía, porque
marcaban el paso: conociendo que no había para qué, unos no
traían pies, y otros los traían de plomo. De medio cuerpo arriba
venía vestido á la antigua española, de medio cuerpo abajo á la
moderna francesa, y en él no era disfraz, sino su traje propio y
natural. Ni era alto, ni bajo, ni gordo, ni flaco; sutil como cuerpo
glorioso, y máscara, en fin, racional, si las hubo nunca. No traía
careta, sino que enseñaba una cara de risa que á todos quería dar
contento. Era su comparsa gente pasiva y estacionaria, de esta que
tiene y no quiere perder, que no tiene por qué moverse, miedosa
que teme perniquebrarse á cada paso, escarmentada ya y paralítica,
envilecida con el sufrimiento y bien avenida á todo, despreocupada,
que se ríe de los hombres y sus partidos. Éstos no decían nada; ni
aplaudían, ni censuraban; traían caretas de yeso, miraban á una
comparsa, miraban á otra, y ora temblaban, y ora reían. En realidad
no hacían cuenta con su jefe: éste era el que contaba con ellos; es
decir, con su inercia.
En una palabra, parecían tres las comparsas y no eran más que
dos. Cuando yo entré en el baile acababan de separarse; hasta
entonces habían bailado mezclados, porque hasta entonces no
había faltado bastonero que los había hecho bailar á todos á un
mismo son.
Apenas tuve tiempo de reconocer lo que llevo descrito, cuando se
dirigieron á mí varios de la primera comparsa.—¡Ah, Fígaro maldito!,
aquí está. «¡Nadie pase sin hablar al portero!» «¡La planta nueva!»
¿Sabes que nos has hecho más daño que un cañón?—Mala
entrada es ésta, dije yo para mí.—Mira, prosiguieron, tú debes ser
tonto. ¿Qué provecho has sacado de tus artículos?—El gusto de
escribir lo que pienso, y me sobra.—Eso por un lado y por otro el
que te ahorquemos, si... ¡desigual es el partido!—Ya me pondré á
distancia respetable.—Vente con nosotros.—Gracias.—Te irá mejor;
no hallarás rivales, porque no escribimos; te daremos una prebenda.
—Soy casado.—Te daremos un empleo en correos y podrás
interceptar las cartas.—No soy curioso.—Andarás por esas breñas.
—No soy peregrino.—Dormirás al sereno.—Más quiero dormir
sereno.—Tendrás inquisición y rey absoluto.—Lo agradezco, pero
es tarde.—¡Matarle! ¡Matarle!
—¡Ea, dejad á Fígaro!, dijeron los de la segunda comparsa,
sacándome de entre ellos; éste es nuestro, enteramente nuestro.
¿No es verdad, Fígaro?—¡De corazón!—¡Bravo! Tú también eres
igual.—Y si no soy igual me es igual todo.—¡Ya! Por eso te
descuidas, y haces á veces artículos tan largos y tan pesados, y con
tantas digresiones y atrevimiento: no teniendo respeto á nadie, fácil
es hacer reir...—No hay para qué hablar más, que ya me habéis
conocido, dije yo apresurándome á interrumpir á los míos, que me
iban tratando peor que los contrarios.
Mientras esto me pasaba en un rincón de la sala andábanse
embromando los principales personajes de las dos comparsas.
Estas bromas pararán en veras, dije yo para mí, y acerquéme á oir.
—Andad, decían unos, hipócritas; á nosotros no nos embromaréis,
porque os conocemos: ahora andáis con careta del pretendiente,
pero es mentira: vosotros existíais antes que él. Vosotros triunfasteis
malamente en Villalar en nombre de otro Carlos V: desde entonces
no dejó de crecer un punto vuestra audacia: vosotros fuisteis los que
el año 14 engañasteis á un rey y perdisteis á un pueblo; vosotros los

Instant Download How China Is Reshaping The Global Economy: Development Impacts in Africa and Latin America 1st Edition Rhys Jenkins PDF All Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Instant Download How China Is Reshaping The Global Economy: Development Impacts in Africa and Latin America 1st Edition Rhys Jenkins PDF All Chapter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Instant Download How China Is Reshaping The Global Economy: Development Impacts in Africa and Latin America 1st Edition Rhys Jenkins PDF All Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Full download test bank at ebook ebookmass.

How China Is Reshaping The Global

The Hunt for Unicorns : How Sovereign Funds Are

The Socialist Market Economy in Asia: Development in

The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is

The Political Economy of Agrarian Change in Latin

News Media Coverage of Environmental Challenges in

Trafficking Data: How China Is Winning the Battle for

Resisting Violence: Emotional Communities in Latin

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

How China is Reshaping

Preface and Acknowledgements

I ﬁrst became interested in the impact of China’s economic growth on the

Preface and Acknowledgements

Freitas Barbosa, and Lawrence Edwards. I was also fortunate to receive a

Introduction: China’s Re-emergence as a Global Economic Power 1

Part I. China and the Global Economy

2. The Workshop of the World 33

3. A Voracious Dragon? China and Global Commodity Markets 52

4. Going Global: Chinese Firms Abroad 72

5. The World’s Wallet? China’s Role in Global Finance 92

Part II. China and Sub-Saharan Africa

7. China’s Economic Impacts on Sub-Saharan Africa 149

8. Social, Political, and Environmental Impacts

Part III. China and Latin America and the Caribbean

10. China’s Economic Impacts on Latin America 254

11. Social, Political, and Environmental Impacts in Latin America 284

Part IV. Comparisons and Conclusions

13. Conclusion 337

Statistical Databases 347

2.1. China’s Share of World Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) and

0.1. Examples of possible impacts of China on developing countries 6

4.1. Problems in measuring China’s OFDI 73

ABC Agricultural Bank of China

Exim Bank Export-Import Bank of China

OOF Other Ofﬁcial Finance

The re-emergence of China as a major economic power has been a central

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

0.1 China, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America

These critics have been accused by their opponents of ‘China-bashing’ and of

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

China’s commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

Table 0.1. Examples of Possible Impacts of China on Developing Countries

Direct Effects Indirect Effects

Positive Negative Positive Negative

Trade Growth of exports Displacement of Increased world Competition from

Source: Own elaboration based on Kaplinsky and Messner (2008, Fig. 6)

Finally, this book emphasizes the heterogeneous impacts of China’s growth

0.2 Outline of the Book

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

in SSA, as well as African interests, before presenting an econometric analysis

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

The Transformation of the Chinese Economy

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

The remarkable performance of the Chinese economy over that period

The Transformation of the Chinese Economy

In the aftermath, conservatives attempted to reverse the reforms but were

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy