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Populist Authoritarianism
Populist
Authoritarianism
Chinese Political Culture
and Regime Sustainability
Wenfang Tang
University of Iowa
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark
of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Acknowledgments xi
Appendices 167
Notes 191
References 197
Index 213
AC KNOW L E DG M E N T S
In 1986 I took a course with professor Tang Tsou on the Chinese Commu-
nist movement as a graduate student at the University of Chicago. I wrote
a paper about the Mass Line ideology and forgot about it. At the time, I
thought that China was moving away from the radical revolutionary policy
and toward a modern, rational, and rule-based stable bureaucratic society.
Nearly 30 years later, amid the tremendous changes on the surface in Chi-
nese politics and society, I kept seeing the continuity from China’s recent
political past. I found my Mass Line paper and reread the literature, which
formed the foundation of chapter 1. I want to thank the late professor Tang
Tsou, whose broad vision and comprehensive understanding of the nature
of Chinese politics encouraged me to study contemporary Chinese politics
with a historical perspective.
In the process of writing this book, I benefited from the comments and
suggestions of many people. John Kennedy, Jie Chen, and the two anon-
ymous reviewers at Oxford University Press read the entire manuscript
and made numerous suggestions and corrections. They also urged me to
include much relevant literature that I missed in the early drafts.
I want to express my respect and condolence for my friend and college
classmate Tianjian Shi, who passed away unexpectedly in 2009 and cre-
ated an unfillable hole in the study of Chinese politics. Tianjian’s interest
in traditional Chinese culture and its role in contemporary Chinese poli-
tics inspired me to think about the role of the Chinese Communist Party’s
governance style in formulating China’s political culture, together with
Tianjian’s study on traditional values and beliefs.
My colleagues in Taiwan strongly disagreed with me on my compari-
sons of political trust in China and Taiwan and prompted me to revise
chapter 5 and add chapter 8 on survey reliability in China.
William Parish read chapter 5 on political trust in China and Taiwan
and challenged my empirical findings. His comments made me strengthen
the methodological discussion of the causal relationship between govern-
ment responsiveness and regime support.
(xii) Acknowledgments
Professor Robert Harmel and the China Archive at Texas A&M Univer-
sity made available the 2008 China Survey. Professor Yun-han Zhu and
the Academic Sinica in Taiwan granted me permission to use the Asian
Barometer Survey II. Professor Wang Weidong and the National Survey
Research Center at Renmin University generously shared the data from
the Chinese General Social Surveys.
The Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation, the Stanley Hua Hsia Endow-
ment, and the University of Iowa provided me with generous financial
support to cover the 6th Wave World Values Survey China from 2012
to 2013. The Institute of Public Policy at the South China University of
Technology provided a grant that allowed me to conduct four telephone
surveys on public policy satisfaction from 2013 to 2015.
David McBride, the Editor-in-Chief in Social Sciences at Oxford Uni-
versity Press was patient and supportive during the review process of the
manuscript. His comments made me rewrite the opening paragraphs of
chapter 1 in order to capture the readers’ attention by highlighting the
theoretical framework and the key empirical findings.
Finally, I wish to express my deep appreciation for the Stanley Hua
Hsia Endowment for allowing me to take many research trips, to hire
graduate research assistants, and to receive a reduced teaching load that
provided me with much needed time to write.
CH A P T E R 1
political leaders occupying the same institutional post but producing dif-
ferent policy outcomes.
Second, rationalism downplays the importance of individual beliefs,
feelings, and emotions. It argues that people make political decisions
based on information gathering and the calculation of benefit and cost
(Rowgoski 1976; Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990; Popkin 1991; Sniderman,
Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Lupia, McCubbins, and
Popkin 2000). The study of political culture shares two things in common
with rationalism. First, both stress the importance of individual political
actors, their motivation, and their behavior. Second, both believe that
individual motivation and behavior can be measured objectively, either
through surveys, focus group studies, or lab experiments.
One problem for the rationalist view is its assumption that people can
process information and take actions that lead to the optimal ratio be-
tween cost and benefit. Yet some studies show that people are not really
capable of making objective decisions by using newly gathered informa-
tion. Instead, new information is selectively used to reinforce people’s
preconceived beliefs (Taber, Lodge, and Glatha 2001; Lodge and Taber
2005). Further, voters who are given all the necessary information may
make worse decisions than those who don’t have the information but
use their intuition instead (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). There is simply too
much information, and it is too complicated to process.
A number of rational choice scholars have recognized this problem of
information flooding. They introduced the idea of “bounded rational-
ity” in which people take shortcuts to make “low-information” decisions
(Elster 1983; Simon 1991; Popkin 1991). They seem to think that people
are rational as long as they make self-satisfying decisions based on ste-
reotypes, political ideology, consensus, and so on. By emphasizing the
importance of these subjective orientations, however, these rationalist
scholars are also suggesting the necessity of studying political culture.
The third challenge to the study of political culture using public opin-
ion survey data comes from ethnosymbolism. Ethnosymbolism is best
articulated by Clifford Geertz in his anthropological study of cultures
(Geertz 1973) and is also advocated by some political scientists (Eck-
stein 1988; Laitin and Wildavsky 1988). At the core of ethnosymbolism is
the assertion that cultures are represented by their symbols, such as lan-
guages, religions, rituals, and historical narratives. Understanding these
symbols through participant observation and ethnography is crucial in
studying how culture influences political outcome (Laitin and Wildavsky
1988). Ethnosymbolists are highly suspicious that subjective cultural ori-
entations can be detected by public opinion survey questions. For them,
the same concept or action can mean different things in different cultural
(4) Populist Authoritarianism
the specific type of people they trust, such as their family, community,
or strangers. Further, the same surveys have been repeated over time, al-
lowing the researchers to approach their topics from a historical perspec-
tive as well as at a cross-section of time. Finally, survey researchers have
made exciting progress in tackling the difficult problems of respondent
truthfulness and establishing causal links between survey questions by
embedding experiments in representative surveys. In short, even though
the survey method still has many problems, it has the undeniable advan-
tage of drawing conclusions based on representative samples that enjoy a
level of generalizability superior to the ethnographic method that relies
on in-depth case studies.
Following the tradition of political socialization and psychology
(Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1966; Almond 1989, 1990; Lane 1992;
Jennings 2007; Shi 2015), this study takes a behaviorist approach and
holds that beliefs, feelings, and values play important roles in shaping po-
litical behavior and political outcomes. These beliefs, feelings, and values
are the results of political socialization, as well as social and economic
changes in a society. A particular political culture is a specific configura-
tion of these beliefs, feelings, and values.
Political culture can be concretely defined and measured by a set or
“rubric” (Reisinger 1995) of concepts that should be able to travel across
country borders. These concepts include one’s identity to the country
and/or to one’s own community, the level of confidence in political insti-
tutions, the relative importance between individual interest and group in-
terests, respect for authority and the law, relationships with other people
(trust and tolerance), belief in the modes and consequences of conflict res-
olution and political participation, and so on. These concepts are widely
measured in the cross-country public opinion surveys such as the World
Values Surveys (WVSs), the surveys conducted by the International
Social Science Programme, and the Chinese public opinion surveys used
in this book (more on those later).
In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily “from the
masses, to the masses.” This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsys-
tematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and
systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the
masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and
test the correctness of such ideas in action. (Mao 1967, 119)
The key phrase in Mao’s statement is “from the masses, to the masses”
which assumes a close and direct relationship between the Party and
the masses, or between political power and society (Tsou 1986, 290).
This direct relationship requires both accessible elites and available
non-elites if it is to exhibit a high rate of mass behavior and elite–mass
interaction.
The Mass Line bears certain similarities to the mass society described
by Kornhauser in his study of social movement and state-building in the
West. In a mass society, according to Kornhauser, elites are accessible and
non-elites are available in that there is a lack of independent groups be-
tween the state and the family. In the absence of social autonomy at all
levels of society, large numbers of people are pushed and pulled toward ac-
tivist modes of intervention in vital centers of society; and mass-oriented
leaders have the opportunity to mobilize this activism for the capture of
power (Kornhauser 1959, 41).
In China, the Communist Party weakened and even destroyed the tra-
ditional intermediate groups such as the rural gentry class and landown-
ers, and it relied on the Mass Line as a method of political mobilization to
win over the popular support by the peasantry and eventually defeated
the Nationalist government in 1949.
The CCP’s populist orientation continued after 1949. It was so effec-
tive for the CCP to gain political power that it continued to rely on the
Mass Line in state-building, government policy making, economic de-
velopment, and social restructuring. From 1949 to 1976, Mao and his
followers in the CCP launched a series of political campaigns in order to
consolidate the communist regime and promote social and economic de-
velopment. One such campaign was the People’s Commune Movement,
launched in 1958, in which agricultural production was collectivized and
rural communities played important roles in social, economic, and polit-
ical life, partially replacing the role of the traditional family. Another im-
portant campaign was the Great Leap Forward Movement in 1958. Mao
and other radical leaders of the CCP believed that the Mass Line could be
C h i n e s e P o l i t i ca l C u lt u r e a n d R e g i m e S u s ta i n a b i l i t y (7)
While the Mass Line provided the political capital for the CCP’s rule, the
radical social and economic transformation in the early years of the social-
ist regime produced the social capital that became an important part of the
Chinese political culture.
Marx (1867) used to describe the early stage of capitalism as a process
of primitive accumulation of capital in which the capitalists acquired the
means of production by force, such as the enclosure of land by capitalists
in England. This process laid the foundation for the later development of
the capitalist economic system. To use a similar metaphor, one can see the
early stage of the communist regime in China as a process of the primi-
tive accumulation of social capital which in turn laid the foundation for
its political rule. After the Communists defeated the Nationalists in 1949,
the new regime attempted to establish an egalitarian society under the
dictatorship of the CCP. In their pioneer studies based on interviews with
Chinese immigrants in the 1970s, William Parish and Martin Whyte
detail the CCP’s effort to build such an egalitarian society in rural and
urban China. According to their studies (Parish and Whyte 1978; Whyte
and Parish 1984), this equalitarianism is represented by public ownership
of land, reduction of the role of the family, and the promotion of social
equality.
The CCP first abolished private ownership of land, and collectivized
both agricultural and industrial productions, in the 1950s. During the
radical years of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, the tra-
ditional role of family as the basic economic unit was weakened by the
expansion of social services, such as public education, employment se-
curity, public health care, and pension programs. Social services drasti-
cally reduced parental influence and promoted equal access to education
and employment, and greater equality in household income distribution.
Although some traditional practices in gender discrimination persisted,
the expansion of social services further promoted gender equality in edu-
cation, female labor force participation, reduced fertility rates, improved
(10) Populist Authoritarianism
health care, increased income, and a higher social and economic status
among women.
The collectivization of land ownership, the weakened role of family, and
the spread of social equality also changed the traditional way of social in-
teraction. Family-centered social and economic life was replaced by rural
farming communities based on collective land ownership, and urban resi-
dential communities based on the work unit. Although with considerable
urban–rural gap and great regional variation, these new communities at-
tempted to provide their members and their families with cradle-to-grave
services, including guaranteed employment and income, child care, pen-
sion, health care, housing, rationed consumer goods, pension, and so on.
Work unit-based housing and job security made these communities close-
knit and stable. Public ownership and social equality further encouraged
community sharing among their members. As a result, residents often
developed strong identity and solidarity with their communities. Such a
system of collective ownership had serious problems, such as economic
inefficiency due to the lack of market incentives both at the group and
individual levels. Yet it fundamentally changed the interpersonal relation-
ship in Chinese society (see Parish and Whyte 1978; Whyte and Parish
1984; Womack 1991).
For many traditionally privileged social elites, such an egalitarian so-
ciety was a pure nightmare. These social elites were downgraded to or-
dinary manual workers while those at the bottom of the social hierarchy
were promoted to managerial and administrative positions. The talented
students could not fulfill their potential by getting into schools through
competitive exams because these schools had to provide room for those
who would not have had the opportunity to receive formal education
under the old system. The new system was sustained by political terror.
Anyone who dared to oppose it was criticized, put in jail, and even tor-
tured and beaten to death.
Yet this new system was a mass society in which the ordinary citizens
were directly mobilized by and accessible to the leadership, as discussed
in the previous section (Kornhauser 1959). The rank-and-file peasants
and workers had the opportunity to participate in the destruction of the
upper echelon, who would otherwise have enjoyed their privileges for the
rest of their lives. Such unprecedented political participation by those at
the bottom, though often extremely destructive and violent, nevertheless
provided a sense of political efficacy among the poor. Further, the CCP
seized political power in China under the slogan of national independ-
ence from the influence of Western powers. Hence a strong appeal of na-
tionalism further strengthened the CCP’s popularity among the Chinese
people.
C h i n e s e P o l i t i ca l C u lt u r e a n d R e g i m e S u s ta i n a b i l i t y (11)
In the post-Mao era since the late 1970s, China experienced significant
social and economic transformation. Economic planning was replaced by
market competition, rural People’s Communes were abolished, job secu-
rity was replaced by performance-based labor contract, work units were
stripped off many social functions, urban housing was privatized, merito-
cratic school entrance exams were restored, parental influence returned,
and income inequality widened.
While many people focus on the explosive growth and transforma-
tion in post-Mao China, it is also important to point out some features
of continuity. It is true that the CCP itself has gone through important
organizational and personnel changes since the late 1970s, yet its political
monopoly has persisted. It is still the only legitimate ruling party and it
does not allow electoral challenges from other political forces. It still up-
holds Marxism–Leninism as its official ideology. It still uses nationalism
to mobilize political support. Mao, whom many consider a tyrant and dic-
tator, is still officially defined as a great leader whose tenure consisted of
70% contribution and only 30% mistake. While the CCP tightly controls
the media and suppresses any political dissidents, it continues its tradition
of populist authoritarianism by encouraging within-system direct popu-
lar political participation by using new technologies such as the online
chat room dialogues between government officials and ordinary citizens.
While it is true that China has experienced four leadership changes
since Mao Zedong (Hu Yaobang/Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s, Jiang Zemin
in the 1990s, Hu Jintao in the 2000s, and Xi Jinping since 2012), and some
describe the current leadership as the fifth generation (Li 2007), a closer
look at the current leadership reveals that many of them are the sons and
daughters of China’s first-generation leaders. These new leaders completed
their political socialization in the socialist era (1950s–1970s) before the
post-Mao economic reforms in the 1980s, and they were strongly influ-
enced by China’s revolutionary tradition. In this sense, the current Chi-
nese leaders are only the second generation.
One example of the political continuity in the post-Mao era is the re-
newal of the Mass Line. As mentioned previously, the Mass Line was
widely adopted as an organizational principle and a tool for political mo-
bilization before the CCP took power in 1949. It emphasizes the direct
linkage between the CCP and the public with the slogan “from the mass,
to the masses.” It continued its popularity during the Cultural Revolution
in the 1960s and 1970s when Mao relied on the same policy and mobi-
lized the masses to overthrow the bureaucratic establishment. The post-
Mao leaders all experienced their political socialization in this populist
(12) Populist Authoritarianism
The remaining chapters of this book discuss several aspects of the Chi-
nese political culture, including political support, national identity, inter-
personal trust, political support in democratic and authoritarian societies,
contentious politics, and labor dispute resolution.
For a political culture to work smoothly with the political system, one of the
most important elements of such political culture is political support. As
discussed in chapter 2, when political support is measured by confidence in
the key political institutions, such support in China was the highest among
C h i n e s e P o l i t i ca l C u lt u r e a n d R e g i m e S u s ta i n a b i l i t y (13)
While the number of collective political actions against the local govern-
ments may have increased rapidly in recent years, these actions are most
likely ad hoc activities focusing on specific issues such as pay delays and
disputes over real estate property development. Participants in these activi-
ties may not demand systematic changes in the political monopoly of the
CCP. What the CCP is concerned about is the dissatisfaction with the cen-
tral government. Such dissatisfaction, though relatively low at the moment,
may be significantly related to people’s desire to challenge the CCP’s power
monopoly and for their support for multi-party political competition.
One tactic by the CCP to channel away people’s attention to challenging
its political monopoly is by mobilizing political support through national-
ism. Chapter 3 compares national pride between Chinese survey respon-
dents and the selected countries and analyzes how nationalism affects the
demand for democratic change against the central government.
Social Capital
In addition to maintaining political support and national identity, the CCP also
needs to utilize the social capital that it accumulated during the earlier years
for social solidarity and political support. Chapter 4 compares social capital
measured by interpersonal trust between China and other countries in differ-
ent public opinion surveys. The chapter further dissects the meaning of in-
terpersonal trust by using additional survey questions about the respondents’
trust of 13 different groups of people and analyzes three types of interpersonal
(14) Populist Authoritarianism