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REIMAGINING STATE
AND HUMAN
SECURITY BEYOND
BORDERS
Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović

Reimagining State and Human Security
Beyond Borders
Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović
Reimagining State and

Human Security
Beyond Borders
Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović
University of Warwick
Coventry, UK
ISBN 978-3-319-72067-8 ISBN 978-3-319-72068-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72068-5
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017962210
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.
Cover illustration: Pattern adapted from an Indian cotton print produced in the
19th century
Printed on acid-free paper
This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To my parents
Who taught me to see beyond borders
Acknowledgments
Though I cannot possibly thank all of the people who made this book pos-
sible, I do especially want to thank those who inspired some of its ideas.
Among them are Vittorio Hösle and Tom Wheeler; Franklyn Lisk, Solly
Benatar, and Kaymarlin Govender; and Catherine Burns and Teresa
Koloma Beck. I also thank the Politics and International Studies (PAIS) at
the University of Warwick for the opportunity to start—and finish—such
a project.
Thanks and love always to my family.
This project was supported by funding through the EU Horizon 2020
project European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation
Diplomacy (EL-CSID), under Grant Agreement No. 693799. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
EL-CSID project.
vii
Contents
1 Introduction: Origins of Human Security 1

1.1 Origins 2
1.2 Emergence of Human Security 3
1.3 Conceptual Overview 5
1.4 Conclusion 10
References 11
2 Human Rights and State Responsibilities 13

2.1 Human Security in Conversation with Sovereignty 15
2.2 Rights and Responsibility 20
2.3 Conclusion 25
References 26
3 States and Citizens: Reciprocal Rights and Responsibilities 29

3.1 Contribution of the GAP 33
3.2 Consequences: (Re)locating Responsibility
and Accountability for Human Security 35
3.2.1 National and International 36
3.2.2 Local and Global 37
3.3 Conclusion 37
References 39
ix
x Contents
4 Beyond the Binary: Beyond States, Beyond Citizens 41

4.1 Changing Rules of the Game 43
4.2 Caveats: Without Responsibility—Reneged Rights 44
4.3 Re-poling Governmentality for Order 46
4.4 State/Sub-State/Supra-State 47
4.4.1 Low-Order Human Security 48
4.4.2 High-Order Human Security 49
4.5 Military 51
4.6 Conclusion 53
References 54
5 Re-Bordering State Responsibilities and Human Rights 57

5.1 Borders 58
5.2 Bordering Health 63
5.3 Migrating Citizens(ships): Mitigating Human
(In)Securities 67
5.4 Conclusion 69
References 71
6 Health and Human Security 73

6.1 The Right to Health 74
6.2 HIV and AIDS and Ebola: Evidencing the Right
to Health/Evaluating Responsibilities 77
6.2.1 HIV and AIDS 78
6.2.2 Ebola to Zika 79
6.3 Health Security at Borders 80
6.4 Health Security Beyond Borders 83
6.5 Conclusion 86
References 87
7 Reimagining State and Human Security Beyond Borders 91

7.1 Right and Responsibility for Health and Human Security 92
7.2 Low-Ordering Arrangements 93
7.3 High-Ordering Solutions 95
7.4 Conclusion 98
References 99
Index 101
Abbreviations
A4H Accountability for health

AA German Foreign Office
Africa CDC Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CLAP Local Committees for Supply and Production
CSR Corporate social responsibility
DACA Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
ECDC European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EIDs Emerging infectious diseases
ERASMUS European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility
of University Students
EU European Union
EVD Ebola virus disease
FCGH Framework Convention on Global Health
FCTC Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
GAP Governance Accountability Problem
G7 Group of 7
G20 Group of 20
GOARN WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
GPHIN Global Public Health Intelligence Network
H5N1 Avian influenza
xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus

IBSA India, Brazil, and South Africa
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IHRs International Health Regulations
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MDR Multidrug resistant
MERCOSUR the common market of select South American States
MERS-CoV Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCDs Noncommunicable diseases
NEC National Executive Committee
NGOs Nongovernmental organization
NSAs Non-State actors
PEPFAR U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PHEIC Public Health Emergency of International Concern
PUGWASH Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
R2P Responsibility to Protect
RBA Rights based approach
SADC Southern African Development Community
SARS Severe acute respiratory syndrome
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics
TB Tuberculosis
UHC Universal health coverage
UN United Nations
UDHR United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNSC United Nations Security Council
VCT Voluntary counselling and testing
WHO World Health Organization
XDR Extensively drug-resistant
List of Boxes
Box 1.1 Assumptions 7

Box 2.1 Practical Limits to Krasner’s Cartography of Sovereignty 19
Box 7.1 Low-ordering health security/High-ordering health security 93
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Origins of Human Security
Abstract Human security denotes a human-denominated, as opposed to

State, focus for security. It highlights the duality of individual, universal—
universalizable—human rights. This duality is central to the notion of
human rights tied to human security. The idea of human security beyond
borders is fundamentally an exercise in reimagining the traditionally State-
based loci of responsibility for those individual but also universal human
rights. This chapter introduces the challenges of geopolitical shifts com-
pounded by unprecedented impacts of climate change, migration, and
pandemic (potential). It makes a case for rethinking human security of
citizens and non-citizens alike—beyond borders.
Keywords Human security • Human rights • Universal
Human security denotes a human-denominated, as opposed to State,

focus for security. It highlights the duality of individual, universal—univer-
salizable—human rights. This duality is central to the notion of human
rights tied to human security. While not in itself the focus of this small
book, the idea of human security beyond borders is fundamentally an
exercise in reimagining the traditionally State-based loci of responsibility
for those individual but also universal human rights.
© The Author(s) 2018 1

A. Bindenagel Šehović, Reimagining State and Human Security
Beyond Borders, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72068-5_1
2 A. BINDENAGEL ŠEHOVIĆ
In other words, though human rights can be taken to be universal, the

responsibility for their security has been State-grounded. Though States
have never been omnipotent in terms of their own or their citizens’ secu-
rity, this particular moment in time poses especial challenges to territori-
ally delineated security. The challenges of geopolitical shifts compounded
by unprecedented impacts of climate change, migration, and pandemic
(potential) make a case for rethinking human security of citizens and non-
citizens alike—beyond borders.
Human security presents a lens through which to approach a human
rights/responsibility nexus. Building on the philosophical background
informed by Christian ethics and the Enlightenment, it represents the cul-
mination of a half-century’s worth of effort to raise global awareness of
human rights, dating from the establishment of the post–World War II
institutions of the United Nations system.
1.1 Origins
The origin of State responsibility for security predates even the Treaty of
Westphalia. It is to be found in the two pillars of modernity which argu-
ably emerged with the articulation of dual allegiance expressed in
Christianity. While not arguing for an exclusive Christian viewpoint of
human security, taking the particular contributions of the influence of
Christian ideas about God and the State into account does shed light on
the secular constellation of Statehood which continues to be the building
block of the international, State-based world order. Thus these dual alle-
giances refer not to those separate allegiances owed God and Caesar, but
instead to the dual pillars of human and especially universal human rights.
Here the first pillar refers to the conception of a deity in the arcane world,
conveying a human right on the human creatures of the earth created in
that image.
In Christianity there is only one god who is fundamentally concerned with every
individual person’s salvation, it paves the way for modern individualism,
which culminates in the assumption that the individual has inalienable rights.
(Hösle 2003, 23)
Building upon this argument, the second pillar confers that human right
universally, on all human beings as beings created in that image.
INTRODUCTION: ORIGINS OF HUMAN SECURITY 3
Only through reflection on the transcendent god did humans emerge from their
immediate unity with their political community, and no matter how much this
god at first bound this community to a religious value world whose claims were
even more unconditional than those of the polis, his ultimate decline left behind
a social world in which even the values of one’s own community appear to be
objective facts that have no claim of their own to be loved or even merely obeyed.
At the same time, this belief afforded a strong upswing, even an infinite emo-
tion, to universal ideals, according to which all human beings should be
regarded as equal. For if there is only one god, then he can hardly be the god of
one’s own people alone. (Hösle 2003, 23)
Pillars one and two together lead one step further even from the separa-
tion, referred to above, between the spheres of Caesar and of God. They
coalesce into a demand upon the governing State, the secular Caesarian
State, to uphold the universalistic morality demanded by Christianity.
“[Christianity] made possible a politics that was finally free of all religious
and especially ritual considerations. …Through an extremely intensive
moralization of the religious, it demanded an influence on politics that
went far beyond what was conceivable for the ancients” (Hösle 2003, 24).
In doing so, Christianity set a high bar for governance and States:
If Christianity demanded only a retreat from the world, it would be in a sense

less threatening than it actually is. The difficulty with Christianity, however,
consists in the fact that it not only devalues politics, but also makes demands on
politics, based on its universalistic and individualistic ethics. (Hösle 2003, 24)
This process reinforced the secularity of the State, while simultaneously

endowing it singularly with the authority and responsibility and account-
ability for a moral security: a human security. This is not to argue that
either universal human rights or a State guarantee of security is accepted
or implemented. It is to assert that the originating impulses exist and per-
meate if not penetrate the status quo, which is arguably the ideal of the
universality of human security.
1.2 Emergence of Human Security

The concept of human security emerged in the post–Cold War era of the
briefly heralded ‘unipolar’ moment which seemed to imply the end of
inter-State security threats. It was first explicitly named in the 1994
United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) report, New

Dimensions of Human Security, yet built on a long tradition of sovereignty
theory. The human security scaffold is predicated on the national respon-
sibility to accept, promote, and protect the—ever-expanding—pantheon
of those human rights. Nef (1999) and others count between five and seven
dimensions of human security, each of them with echoes in the UN defini-
tions of human, as well as political and social, cultural and economic rights.
They are generally accepted as including: economic security, food security,
health security, environmental security, personal security, community
security, and political security. Given both the vagary of their definitions
and the vastness of their possible scope, with the sole exception of provi-
sions of asylum tied to political (in)security, none of these human security
elements are protected by legal provisions nationally, let alone internation-
ally. Consequently, while these elements of human security ‘rights’ have
benefited from a boundless imagination, the same cannot be said for the
creativity applied to their realization, which remains the responsibility of
the citizen-State.
In practice, however, this is not the case, as non-State actors (NSAs) of
various kinds advocate, influence, write, and implement the ordering rules.
At the same time, the very legitimacy of the world order—State and NSAs
all—is undergoing a shift: an uncoordinated stress test whose outcome is
uncertain. Indeed, the State has also undergone a transformation. While
the scope of human rights has expanded, that of States’ rights has both
expanded and contracted, at times retracting and contracting and at others
effectually expanding (again): constrained first by the Cold War logic of
mutually assured destruction (MAD); opened to new forms of govern-
ment by the ideas of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ (Faubion and Rabinow
1994) and the 1990s’ promulgation of issue-specific governance regimes
that included NSAs (Rosenau 1992); seemingly eroded by the ‘diffusion’
of power (Guzzini and Neumann 2012); only to be recaptured in the
emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) of 2001 (ICISS 2001).
On the one hand, myriad regulations and treaties curtail State maneuver-
ing with regard to, among many others, the realm of international health
crises through the International Health Regulations (IHR, updated 2005,
brought into effect 2007). On the other, adaptations to States’ continued
(full) responsibility for the realization of human rights of their citizens
continue to put the onus for an ultimate guarantee of human security
(Šehović 2014) at their doorsteps. This is one side of the emergent chal-
lenge. The other is the void of imaginative beyond-State responses to the
acceptance, promotion, and protection of the human rights’ realization of

non-citizens beyond borders.
This book aims to address this gap by reimagining both State and
human security beyond borders. Chapters 1 and 2 begin by laying out the
foundational arguments that underscore State responsibility for citizens’
human rights. Chapter 3 analyzes the kind of gap that has emerged
between the expansion of individual human rights and the (inadequate)
adaptation to State responsibilities for such rights. Chapter 4 delves into
concept of order, analyzing high and low-orders of State and human secu-
rity. Chapters 5 and 6 offer case studies on migration and health to illus-
trate and evaluate these hypotheses. Chapter 7 concludes with possible
policy and research recommendations.
1.3 Conceptual Overview

Like the concept of human security itself, this book has the potential to
become an unwieldy tome. In order to limit its remit, it will focus on delin-
eating the definitions of human security juxtaposed against State security
(defense) and in relation to health security and citizenship. In addition to
the 1994 UNDP report, the argument builds on that of the Commission
on Human Security, Human Security Now, (2003), and the literature on
the social determinants of health (Benatar 2011; Gill and Benatar 2016).
This in turn builds upon centuries of development of the argument that
State has the responsibility to promote and protect the rights of its citizens,
not only in terms of territorial integrity but also in terms of welfare—
including health (Gill and Benatar 2016). Together, these link national and
international human security, and are applicable to reimagining, for exam-
ple, citizenship rights to health security beyond borders (Table 1.1).
This illustrative nexus shows that just as global and international health
diplomacy are differentiable, so, too, is international health security from
global health security. Whereas the former emphasizes the security, pri-
marily in the form of the protection of territory, of States, the latter priori-
tizes the health of people (in or between) any State. Yet regardless of
whether State or human security is the ultimate goal, it is States which
Table 1.1 Nexus of health diplomacy–health security
Health diplomacy: Diplomacy of/for health Health security/defense

Health (science) for diplomacy–security Health security–human security
retain the status of the final arbiter of (any) security. This is because only
States possess the necessary legal, procedural, and generally material capa-
bilities of providing for and enforcing (human) security (Šehović 2014;
Šehović 2017 forthcoming). Despite inputs and supplements and assump-
tion of an increasingly diverse portfolio of roles and responsibilities both
internationally and globally on the part of NSAs, whose numbers have
exploded since the mid- to late 1990s, the centrality of States to the world
order prevails.
Indeed, internationally recognized Statehood continues to be a prereq-
uisite for a seat at the rule-making table. Ulrike Guérot, quoted in her
provocative interview entitled “Europe needs to transcend the nation
state” (2016), goes so far as to ask: “Why do we have a system in which
we ask all the communities to become nation states first before joining a
supranational entity?” Though this is not the question to be answered in
this book, it nonetheless represents a lens to the frame explored here. By
holding the implicit presumption of a State-based international order up
to the light, Guérot sets the stage for the question this book asks: In a
world of imperfect State security, of porous borders, how might it be
possible to reimagine establishing and protecting human security beyond
borders?
The question is premised on the endurance of the State-based interna-
tional order. This is a practical consideration as the current order is built
on States. Where and when these also act as Member States in collabora-
tion with NSAs or other actors does not detract from the primacy of States.
The question is also based on two additional assumptions: (1) that bor-
ders are porous, and will continue to be so; and (2) that such porousness
leads to two choices: (a) State-centric security, prioritizing external territo-
rial demarcation, and internally directed citizenship; and (b) human secu-
rity beyond borders, requiring a new conceptualization of citizenship
with(out) regard for territory. The latter would require a reimagining of
the allocation and attribution of human (security) rights and responsibili-
ties. If the first assumption holds true, then the second must also be cor-
rect. That is the argument put forward in this book (Box 1.1).
In order to test its assumptions and to answer its questions, this book
draws on a long list of literature on State sovereignty and human security
and analyzes two relevant case studies. In terms of sovereignty literature,
this can be divided into two sets: that which rests on the assumption of
State sovereignty and its enduring preeminence capable of withstanding
change (Matthews 1997; Philpott 2001; Hösle 2003; Carlson and Owens
Box 1.1 Assumptions

Assumption 1: The ‘rules’ of the State-based order are shifting, with
no clear loci of responsibility and accountability for (human)
security.
Question 1: What is changing in the reordering of State-based
‘rules of the game,’ with what anticipated consequences, in terms of
the loci of responsibility and accountability for (human) security?
Assumption 2: A renewed articulation and application of universal
human rights is necessary, particularly with the acknowledgment of
the increasing numbers of State-less (non-citizen) people.
Question 2: How might it be possible to renew universal rights
through a sub-State, State, and supra-State articulation and
implementation?
2003; Krasner 1999; Kissinger 2015) and that which assumes that the rise
of NSAs in particular presages a State-less, if not stateless, order (Slaughter
2004; Guzzini and Neumann 2012; Risse 2012; Terhalle 2015). It is
indisputable that the number and role of NSAs have increased exponen-
tially since especially the end of the Cold War. A mountain of literature has
contributed to the understanding of their assumption of responsibilities
and potential and modes of accountability. Yet as the case studies, focused
on human security vis-à-vis health and migration, show, the scope and
depth of NSA involvement in, for example, HIV (human immunodefi-
ciency virus) and AIDS response and governance wax and wane. Whether
a trend, or a recurring cycle, can be identified remains to be seen. As such,
it remains an open question whether the ultimate guarantee of responsibil-
ity for human security will rest with States, with NSAs, or with another
form of governance.
The project is exploratory. It refines questions that need asking, and
engages with pressing questions both in the current geopolitical sphere
and at the local level. By articulating and exploring these questions and
possible answers to them, the project aims to bring the questions into the
public sphere and engage with possible community and policy solutions.
First, briefly, this project traces the historical trajectory of rights’
demands on State (Hösle 2003; Carlson and Owens 2003; Philpott 2001).
In doing so, it lays out the argument for State guarantee of human
security—beyond the obligation to protect the integrity of territorial

orders. For the overall argument of the book, it is also necessary to dif-
b
ferentiate between State-focused security of humans—citizens—within
State borders, and the security of any and all human beings both within
and between States. Understanding this distinction makes the case of rei-
magining human security beyond borders plausible.
Second, taking into account these rights’ demands and dimensions of
human security, the project then charts the orders of responsibility between
State and non-State actors, accounting for (any) gaps. Here, the focus is
on not just functional or operational realization of rights, but on their
guarantee. It explores two case studies chosen for their timeliness and
their relevance to both State security and human security, as well as their
complicated relationships to borders: health and migration.
Health is a universal right in theory. It links human rights discourse
with that of responsibility, both State and human. With regard to State
responsibility, health is also linked with defense: securing territory requires
a fit (standing) military (Howell 2014). Responsibility for human health
security takes into account both individual and communal decision-
making and their relationship: individual freedom versus communal pro-
tection, as seen most glaringly in the debate around vaccination (Šehović
2017, forthcoming). As such, health is a unique, local commodity, inextri-
cably tied to communities and States. It is international insofar as its pro-
tection depends upon more than one State’s actions. It is also increasingly
being framed as global in practice: from the WHO through to the current
focus on universal health coverage (UHC) and the Framework Convention
for Global Health (FCGH). Health critically depends upon the implemen-
tation of systems based in and on State capabilities, notably with regard to
services such as maternity care, as well as on surveillance at and across
borders, as is the case with transnational threats such as SARS (severe
acute respiratory syndrome) and H5N1 (avian influenza).
In this, health introduces a dichotomy of threats and vulnerabilities as
distinct from risks (Nunes 2014; Liotta and Owen 2006; Singer and Baer
2011). It is often—not always—possible to minimize vulnerabilities and
risks through the deliberate establishment and use of culturally appropri-
ate and applicable systems (Lenard and Straehle 2012; Farmer 1999). It is
more possible to control risks than vulnerabilities; and both are more con-
trollable than threats.
Vulnerabilities here refer to what Liotta and Owen have debated as
structural weaknesses which make health harder to achieve or to maintain
(Liotta and Owen 2006). Examples include environmental factors such as
persistence of endemic disease and poor infrastructure, but also ‘creeping

vulnerabilities’ such as expanding malaria regions (due to) and climate
change. While not easily addressed, coping mechanisms and adaptations
can make it possible to lift or limit these vulnerabilities.
Risks refer more specifically to the confluence of factors influencing the
likelihood of a health crisis or (infectious) disease outbreak. In this render-
ing, risk refers to (lack of) herd immunity coupled with the probability of
the introduction of, for instance, polio or measles. It also refers to the
degree of possible spread of tuberculosis (TB) due to the vulnerability
caused by population density, as well as the heightened potential of the
spread of drug-resistant TB, or HIV, in the context of inadequate or inter-
rupted medical treatment. Comprehensive interventions can—in theory
and practice—reduce these risks.
Threats, but contrast, are more difficult to eliminate. These include
(re)emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) such as SARS, H5N1, and Middle
East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-CoV), as well as
HIV and AIDS (HIV) and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). The problem with
such threats is that they cannot be wholly anticipated. Consequently, they
cannot be eliminated. However, coordinated and collaborative research,
such as that being conducted through the Centre for Viral Zoonoses and
the Zoonoses Research Unit at the University of Pretoria in South Africa,
with (potentially) the Robert Koch Institute and the School of Public
Health at the University of Heidelberg in Germany, together with the
Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), the EU
CDC and the US CDC, might make inroads into anticipating and prepar-
ing for appropriate and mitigating responses.
In terms related to migration, the calculus to and of human security
rights and responsibilities is a bit different. Migration need not be seen as
a threat (at all). Risks then can be minimized, and responding to the vul-
nerabilities posed to migrants, and to both sending and recipient coun-
tries, can be systemically addressed. The link between migration and health
can serve to make this clear.
Migration appears to be more obviously dependent upon border controls
than health, though the case for this is not clear-cut. Continual migration,
complemented by successive waves of a greater or lesser magnitude, has been
and is a fundamental fact. Climate change is an additional driver of this phe-
nomenon (Singer and Baer 2011). So, too, are repeated (new) eruptions of
EIDs, as well as concomitant burdens of returning vaccine-preventable dis-
eases such as measles, and non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Borders stem
neither the tides of diseases nor those of migrants.
Third, and consequently, given the historically high number of migrants

moving across the globe, and the expedited potential for (new) EIDs, the
project speaks to a moment when these rights and responsibilities are in
the process of being profoundly challenged. Fourth, and finally, the proj-
ect aims to offer initial ideas to take into account in any new ordering of
rights and responsibilities.
1.4 Conclusion
This book ties two traditionally separate spheres together, namely, geopoliti-
cal order as primarily related to State security and human security, typically
rendered a concern of the ‘development’ agenda—of States. Binding the
two reconceptualizes order for both human and State security as seen against
two of the most pressing issues of our time: health and human (in)securities.
It seeks to identify the sources, both theoretical and practical, of the increased
pressure on rights and responsibilities for health and human security.
In so doing, it positions itself within the scholarly debate on the series
of ordering changes that have occurred in the global system of governance
since the 1990s. These have (unwittingly) diverged from the understand-
ing of the State as the arbiter within its territory and as the guarantor of
(human) security within its borders. This had had two separate sets of
consequences. First, an attempt through the paradigm of human security
(UNDP 1994), exemplified but not operationalized by the concept of the
R2P (ICISS 2001), to expand the host of arbiters and guarantors upward
to the ‘global’ (international) community has possibly failed. Second,
interventionist actions of various NSAs to implement material guarantees
of (human) security reaching both citizens and non-citizens (including
refugees) have solved some immediate problems but not answered the
question of where accountability lies at the last instance.
Given the current migration and refugee crisis, this diffuse relationship
between States and citizens, and especially, non-citizens, is of particular
interest. The impending wave(s) of anticipated climate (environmental)
migrants makes an additional case of conceptualizing and addressing the
legal and administrative challenges of (re)negotiating the relationship
between States and citizens, responsibility and accountability. This short
framing of the argument with pertinent examples is an apt way to contrib-
ute to and stimulate further scholarship and practical debate.
References
Benatar, S.R. 2011. Global Leadership, Ethics & Global Health: The Search for
New Paradigms. In Global Crises & the Crisis of Global Health, ed. S. Gill,
217–143. CUP.
Carlson, John D., and Erik C. Owens, eds. 2003. The Sacred and the Sovereign.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Farmer, Paul. 1999. Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues. University of
California Press.
Faubion, James D., and Paul Rabinow, eds. 1994. Michael Foucault: Power,
pp. 201–222 (Governmentality), and pp. 365–381 (The Risks of Security).
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Guzzini, S., and I. Neumann. 2012. The Diffusion of Power in Global Governance:
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Hösle, Vittorio. 2003. Morals and Politics. University of Notre Dame Press.
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United Nations Development Programme. 1994. Human Security Now.
CHAPTER 2
Human Rights and State Responsibilities
Abstract This chapter lays out an argument that citizens’ human rights
are the responsibility of the corresponding State, meaning that citizens of
a territorial State claim particular rights that State is obliged to deliver. In
return, in an aspect which is often neglected in analyses of human security,
citizens also owe allegiance to the State. Citizens’ rights have been
expanded to encompass not only physical protection within a territory but
also a host of economic and welfare provisions. Despite the increasingly
international discourse on human security rights, their legal home remains
with the national State vis-à-vis its citizens. The chapter argues that the
rules of the State-based order are shifting, with no clear loci of responsibil-
ity and accountability for human security.
Keywords State • Citizen • Rights • Responsibility
The Introduction sketched the origins and elements of human security.

This chapter lays out one argument to make the case that citizens’ human
rights are the responsibility of the corresponding State, meaning that citi-
zens of a territorial State claim particular rights that State is obliged to
deliver. As outlined in the Introduction, these rights have been expanded
to encompass not only physical protection within a territory but also a
© The Author(s) 2018 13

A. Bindenagel Šehović, Reimagining State and Human Security
Beyond Borders, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72068-5_2
host of economic and welfare provisions (Hösle 2003; Slaughter 2004;

CESCR 1966; ICPCR 1966). However, especially with regard to the lat-
ter, not all of these rights are equally or legally encoded into national law.
Thus despite the increasingly international discourse on human security
rights, their legal home remains with the national State vis-à-vis its citi-
zens. In return, in an aspect which is often neglected in analyses of human
security, citizens also owe allegiance to the State.1 This includes submit-
ting to civic codes such as police ordinances and taxation, as well as to the
military draft when instituted2: without such a reciprocal relationship
between States and citizens, it might not be possible to guarantee territo-
rial or other human security protections. Of course, the necessary exis-
tence of such a relationship does not preclude its potential for abuse by
either party (see also Howell 2014). This reciprocal relationship is based
on a State-citizenship centric order, and that not only at the national level,
but also internationally. In other words, citizenship here is dependent
upon its conferral by a territorial State, which derives its contours from its
citizenry.
This chapter thus assumes that the current national/international gov-
ernmentality order continues to be based upon this State-citizens relation-
ship, with a twist. That is, while the national/international legal order
rests upon the pillars of State-citizen reciprocity with regard to rights and
obligations, this exchange does not reflect the more complicated reality.
That is, the rules of the State-based order are shifting, with no clear loci of
responsibility and accountability for human security.
The hypothesis presented here argues that a bifurcated evolution
wherein rights have ascended up the international agenda but not neces-
sarily at the national level, and State or sovereign obligation has been dif-
fused between State and NSAs without clarifying where the locus of the
final guarantee of protection lies, describes the current status. This has led
to a diffusion of the guarantor status of the national State, with elements
of power in governance—agency, scope, mechanisms, and normative con-
text—diverging. This leads to two questions: first, if State A acts as a guar-
antor to the human security of citizens of A, the same holds for State B
and citizens of B; but what happens to citizens of State A residing in State
B, or vice versa? Second, what are the consequences of human security
provision to citizens of A or B by NSAs, notably when NSAs go bankrupt
or depart? Both of these questions point again to the need to clarify the
relationship between citizens and States in order to conceive of suitable
answers.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE RESPONSIBILITIES 15
2.1 Human Security in Conversation

with Sovereignty
As outlined in the Introduction, the idea of human security as the remit of

the State is inextricable from the notion of State sovereignty. Sovereignty
as a concept has been debated since its inception, and each idea of it has
made various assumptions as to what it entails and what it excludes. The
majority of scholars (Krasner 1999) of Westphalia-influenced definitions
of sovereignty include requisites such as the State enjoying a monopoly of
power capable of defending its territorial borders against external aggres-
sion; even these have rarely been absolute in practice (Krasner 1999, 8–9,
42). In describing this ‘compound’ myth, Anne-Marie Slaughter defines
Westphalian sovereignty as “the right to be left alone, to exclude, to be
free from any external meddling or interference” (Slaughter 2004, 284).
Yet the same sovereignty that offers the option to opt out is also the ticket
to inclusion in the inter-national community of (equal) States. The
Westphalian definition also invokes “the right to be recognized as an
autonomous agent in the international system, capable of interaction with
other States and entering into international agreements” (Slaughter 2004,
284), the responsibility for whose implementation resides squarely with
those signatory States.
This reveals the schism between what Robert Keohane (1995) called
formal and ‘operational’ sovereignty, and what I referred to as the diver-
gent ‘final guarantee’ and ‘functional’ sovereignty with regard to the gov-
ernance accountability problem (GAP) (Šehović 2014). It acknowledges
that Westphalian sovereignty is not absolute, and rather that “it is now a
platitude that the ability of governments to attain their objectives through
individual action has been undermined by international political and eco-
nomic interdependence” (Keohane, quoted in Slaughter 2004, 283). The
EU exemplifies political and economic interdependence, a model partially
replicated to differing degrees by the African Union (AU), ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and MERCOSUR (the com-
mon market of select South American States) in a quest to confront
threats and maximize opportunities. Both in theory and in practice then,
this means that, on the one hand, States increasingly cannot—and often
do not want to—fully guard against external interference. On the other
hand, States (should also) acknowledge that the sources of such interfer-
ence include not only other States but also activities of NSAs, from crime
syndicates and cyber surveillance and mercenaries to human rights’
c ampaigners, as well as cross-border challenges such as (infectious) dis-

ease spread and migration. These interdependencies and their potential
both for cooperation and for conflict directly influence a State’s ability
not only to control its own territory (see Krasner, interdependence sover-
eignty, pages 12–14) but also to the “security, economic stability and a
measure of prosperity, clean air and water, and even minimum health
standards” (Slaughter 2004, 283) that are the hallmarks of Hösle’s
expanded definition of sovereignty (Hösle 2003) and the integral compo-
nents of human security.
Human security’s main argument places the emphasis of security on the
human as opposed to the State. The central assumption underscoring
human security is that “when a human faces a threat, so does international
security” (Burgess and Gräns 2012, 101; Kerr 2007, 92; UNDP 1994).
Yet the two are necessarily in dialogue with each other: first of all, States in
the inter-national remain the arbiters of human security (Hösle 2003; UN
Declaration 1948; UNDP 1994), regardless of whether the point of
departure is human- or State-centric; and second, as members of the inter-
national community of (equal) States, these are themselves increasingly
subjected to trial by their peers. “States can no longer assume that if they
refrain from interfering in the affairs of other states they will remain free
from interference themselves” (Slaughter 2004, 284). Furthermore,
Governments increasingly understand that they often cannot afford to look the
other way; that fundamental threats to their own security, whether from refu-
gees, terrorists, the potential destabilization of an entire region, or a miasma of
disease and crime, may well have their origins in conditions once thought to be
within a state’s exclusive domestic jurisdiction. (Slaughter 2004, 284)
As the post–Cold War era has shown, both intra- and inter-State conflict
have coincided with the spread of disease. This has been evident in the
former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda and Somalia, in Iraq and Syria (Intrastate
Conflict by the Numbers 2013; Human Security Centre). These conflicts
have seen the increase in cross-border spread of disease such as EVD,
H5N1, HIV, measles (notably in continental Europe, and the US),
MERS-CoV, and SARS, to name a few examples. This incidence salience
of the insight that: “States can only govern effectively by actively cooperat-
ing with other states and by collectively reserving the power to intervene
in other states’ affairs” (Slaughter 2004, 285). It has been backed up by
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE RESPONSIBILITIES 17
the normative evolutions first from rights to responsibility, to the R2P, to,
arguably at this moment, the responsibility to respond.
This captures the essence of a continual conversation between human
security and sovereignty. Therein, “internally, a government has a respon-
sibility to respect the dignity and basic rights of its citizens,” and “exter-
nally, it has a responsibility to respect the sovereignty of other states”
(Slaughter 2004, 287), except when a State heeds the (r)evolution rewrit-
ing sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility. Daniel Philpott
describes this shift as part of an ongoing process. He attributes this revolu-
tion in sovereignty to “prior revolutions in ideas about justice and political
authority” (Philpott 2001, 4). The post–Cold War reordering of the world
proffers a multitude of examples of this progress: from emergent multipo-
larity (Flockhart 2016) to the rise of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and NSAs, from the human rights debates to gain access to HIV
treatment to those to usher in the R2P (ICISS 2001), reconceptualiza-
tions of internal and external State responsibility have been pitted against
each other. Though the State remains legally dominant, theoretical and
philosophical evidence underscored by empirics points to two key unre-
solved tensions: the locus of the responsibility for human security and the
scope of human security, particularly in reaching non-citizens.
On the theoretical side, Foucault presciently identified emergent ‘gov-
ernmentality’ (Faubion and Rabinow 1994), anticipating the collaborative
governance that would emerge as States and NSAs sparred and cooperated
in response to ever more global challenges to human security.
The 1990s, amid the (Western) euphoria of the ‘end of history’
(Fukuyama 1989), witnessed an initial acknowledgment that States alone
could not meet the rising number of international and increasingly global
challenges—from the multiplication of intra-State conflict and the prolif-
eration of weapons to water management. Rosenau introduced the idea of
‘governance without government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), maintain-
ing that governance ‘regimes’ composed both of States and NSAs would form
to tackle specific issues in the international realm. NSAs have long been
engaged in shoring up or tearing down State sovereignty, with (Hösle
2003) or without the consent of the State. While on the one hand a ten-
sion exists between theory and practice of State sovereign obligation with
regard to human security, it also means that though threats to human
security abound on the part of both State and NSAs, precedents likewise
exist for mitigating these to the benefit of human security. To a large
extent, Rosenau has been proven correct: if NSAs are included, then a
plethora of organizations exist dedicated to treating HIV/AIDS, provid-

ing water and sanitation, and even administering public transportation in
municipalities around the world. However, these are not regimes in the
sense that they have a central organizational structure, that their interven-
tions are legally binding, or that any mechanisms are in place to ensure the
continuation of their work if and when they opt out.
This is not a central theme of Risse’s work, which focuses on ‘areas of
limited statehood’ (Risse 2007). Here NSAs might perform functions
theoretically if not in practice associated with State responsibility for
human security. Yet they are not bound to such actions, for instance, of
service delivery and health care. Critically, instead of shoring up States’
lack of capacity, NSAs have contributed to the fragmentation of their
power—including their ability to guarantee traditional and human
security:
NGOs’ [nongovernmental organizations’] role and influence have exploded in

the last half-decade. Their financial resources and—often more important—
their expertise, approximate and sometimes exceed those of smaller governments
and of international organizations. “We have less money and fewer resources
than Amnesty International, and we are the arm of the U.N. for human
rights,” noted Ibrahima Fall, head of the U.N. Centre for Human Rights, in
1993. “This is clearly ridiculous.” Today NGOs deliver more official develop-
ment assistance than the entire U.N. system (excluding the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund). In many countries they are delivering the ser-
vices—in urban and rural community development, education, and health
care—that faltering governments can no longer manage. (Matthews 1997)
Nonetheless, Risse assumes that NSAs will continue their activities. That
these NSAs might be accountable not to the human beings they serve, but
otherwise, or that they might be dependent upon funding sources whose
priorities are prone to shift, remains under-analyzed. It leaves unanswered
the questions of what happens to the State-citizen relationship when they
do not.
Krasner attempts to corral some of these disparate responses to the
sovereign redrafting by delineating four elements of sovereignty:
Westphalian, juridical, domestic, and interdependence (Krasner 1999;
Czempiel and Rosenau 1992). None directly deal with the engagement
between sovereignty and human security explicitly, yet they are critical in
highlighting their exchange. Whether the four ‘sovereignties’ can be
meaningfully divorced from one another and applied in an empirical sense
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cleaned. The larger of the two is called Birket el-Hajj—“Pool of the
Pilgrimage.” The Hajj road to Mecca once passed by way of
Suweida, and from this reservoir the pilgrims drank. Mohammed
Said Pasha, when chief of the pilgrimage, changed the route, finding
the way by the western side of the plain less liable to annoyance by
the robber Arabs. Such reservoirs, more or less preserved and
protected by guards against other use, stand at intervals all along
the great Hajj road to Mecca.
What Suweida was in the far past no one can tell; the very name of
the ancient city seems irrevocably lost. But, judging from the
magnitude of the ruins, it must have played no unimportant part in
the history of the country. An ancient local tradition asserts that Job
was the first emîr or prince of Suweida. It is to this day what we may
call the capital of Jebel ed-Druze, the sheikh being, as we have
seen, not merely chief of the town, but also lieutenant-governor of
the district under the Turks. The appointment of one of themselves
as kaim makâm represents one side of the Turkish policy in its
endeavour to gain the mastery over these free-spirited and warlike
people. The man chosen in this instance was one whose name, if
any, would carry weight with his nation. But even the son of the
famous Ismaʿîl el-ʿAtrash could hardly render himself acceptable to
the Druzes in the ungracious task of tax-collecting—the chief
function of the Turkish official. The other side of the policy has long
been familiar to the world, the method of setting rival factions and
races against each other, fomenting their quarrels, fanning their
animosities, until they are so weakened by mutual conflict that
Turkey can step in without much trouble and lay an iron hand on all.
Of this more anon. There have been stirring times since our visit.
We took a straight line across country for ʿIry, a village crowning a
low hill some two hours’ distant from Suweida. The land is open and
diversified, hill and valley in pleasant succession relieving the
monotony of the plain. The soil is rich, and in this part the Druzes
use it well. Their skill in evading the iniquitous exactions of the
Government doubtless accounts partly for their industry. No one
cares to do his best to raise crops of which he knows he will be
systematically robbed; but the Druzes generally display a
commendable diligence compared with most other inhabitants of
Syria. Jebel ed-Druze, with its neat gardens and trim vineyards
creeping over the slopes, more closely resembles Mount Lebanon
than any other district in the country. With the advantages conferred
by the arrangements made for the government of the Lebanon after
the fearful scenes of 1860, of which recent corrupt governors have
been unable wholly to deprive the inhabitants, such progress has
been made in education, agriculture, and generally in the arts of
civilisation, in spite of the wild and sterile character of much of their
country, as to inspire hope for the rest of Syria when the time comes,
as surely it soon must now, to deliver her from the oppressions of the
Turk. A little over half-way, a large building to the right of our path,
with the Turkish flag floating over it, would have served as a
reminder had we been disposed to forget that we were not beyond
the reach of His Imperial Majesty’s arms.
Arrived at ʿIry, we took up our position on the bank of a little stream,
which was full to the brim with cool water. Fruit trees grew profusely
around, and lent us grateful shade. Forming a circle on the grass, we
discussed the contents of our luncheon-bags with all the relish of a
picnic-party. We had not rested long when a messenger arrived from
the sheikh, bearing his salutations, together with a load of substantial
viands. The chief was engaged with a company of brother sheikhs
from various districts in Haurân, and could not come himself; but
having seen the strangers seating themselves in the grove, he
sought to maintain the tradition of Eastern hospitality by sending to
us of the best—milk, leban, cheese, bread, honey, and, above all,
delicious fresh butter, the first we had seen in our travels. How
delightfully refreshing these were that hot noontide, with rustling
leaves overhead and rippling water at our feet, it is needless to say.
When we rode up to express our obligations to the worthy sheikh, he
and his companions received us with great cordiality. He also is a
son of the celebrated Ismaʾîl el-ʿAtrash, brother of the lieutenant-
governor of Suweida. The younger, he is also much the larger man
of the two. His frame is well built and in good proportion. When
dressed in his state robes of barbaric splendour, and girt with his
golden-hilted sword, he appeared quite a king among men. The
assembled sheyûkh had gathered from all the district between ʿIry
and Salkhad—the fortress on the mountain, marking the most
easterly boundary of Israel’s possession—and they formed a
company of chiefs such as it is a piece of rare good fortune for any
traveller to see. The doctor produced his camera, in which all were
immediately interested. After most of them had peeped into it, and, to
their great amusement, had seen their fellows upside down, they
were in the best of humour, and anxious to have their portraits taken.
This, of course, was what the doctor wanted; and the result was one
of the finest plates in his possession, presenting a striking group of
men, not one commonplace in appearance.
SHEYÛKH ED-DRUZE (COUNCIL OF WAR)

The present village of ʿIry is insignificant, but ruins covering a wide
area prove it to have been an important place in early times. A
suggestion has recently been made that here Jephthah, judge of
Israel, was buried. The statement that he was buried “in the cities of
Gilead” has always presented a difficulty, which the rabbis have
sought to explain by the invention of a story which even they would
find it difficult to equal in absurdity. According to the rabbis, Jephthah
brought on himself divine displeasure, because he persisted in
carrying out his dreadful vow, although he knew this to be contrary to
God’s desire, and an official existed in Israel part of whose stated
duty it was to relieve men from vows which ought not to be
performed. God therefore smote him with a terrible disease. As
commander-in-chief of the armies of Israel, he went on a tour of
inspection through the fortresses of Gilead. Just then the fell disease
wrought havoc in his frame, which died piecemeal. The parts were
buried where they fell, as he moved on in his chariot. Thus in his
burial he was distributed through “the cities of Gilead”! The
consonants in the Hebrew word translated “cities” correspond
exactly to the Arabic consonants in the name ʿIry. If, as seems not
impossible, this place was within the borders of the district then
designated by the term “Gilead,” the suggested identification is
almost certainly correct, and we should read that Jephthah was
buried “in ʿIry of Gilead.”
ʿIry in its present form owes its existence to the above-mentioned
Ismaʿîl el-ʿAtrash, who made it his headquarters, and in the early
part of the nineteenth century wielded a potent influence over the
whole province. He was a man who, in favourable circumstances,
might have taken rank with the world’s great generals. Combining
distinguished courage, determination, and military skill with a genius
for administration and the management of men, he secured a
position of practical independence of the Turkish Government, and
was able to make his own terms with the Beduw who visit that
region. It was customary, indeed, for men from the desert who
wished to go to Damascus to obtain permission to pass through his
dominions. The fact that these proud-spirited Arabs submitted to this
interference with their ancient and hereditary privileges is enough in
itself to prove the dread in which his displeasure was held. With
statesmanlike regard for the well-being of the country, he planned a
system of irrigation, and was able, before his death, partly to carry
out his project, capturing the rills on the mountains, and leading
them, through artificial channels, in every direction. The stream by
which we had lunch owed to this arrangement its unusual volume of
water—strong enough, even at this season, to turn a mill which
stood nearer the village. He also encouraged the planting of olives
and fruit trees, and the grove which afforded us shelter was one
result of his praiseworthy public spirit and enterprise.
When Ismaʿîl el-ʿAtrash died, none of his sons displayed capacity at
all equal to that of their father. Each had a village given him, of which
he became sheikh; but no one arose to fill the old man’s place in the
respect and awe of the people. To restore the prestige of their house,
these sons appear to have entered into an alliance with the Turks,
accepting positions as subordinates of the Government which their
heroic father had defied, trusting to their great name to protect them
against suspicion of treachery among the Druzes. It was a step
pregnant with disaster alike for themselves and for their people.
As we here take leave of the towns and villages of the Druzes, we
may look for a little at the faith, the character, and recent history of
this strange people in these parts.
CHAPTER VII
The Druzes—Their religion—Their character—Druze and
Jew—Recent history in Haurân—Druze and Bedawy—
War.
The Druzes are generally known by a name which is not of their own
choosing, nor, indeed, is it at all to their liking. “Druze” seems to
connect them with Durazy, any close relation with whom they
disclaim. Had they their own way, they would be called Muwahhedîn,
the Arabic equivalent for Unitarians. In this fact we have the key to
their distinctive character; for they are essentially a people gathered
round a religious idea. This possessed sufficient force to separate
them from the first from all surrounding peoples, and made
necessary a mutual bond, or alliance, offensive and defensive,
among the members of the new society, in order to secure its
existence. In due time the society grew into a distinct people, of
marvellous cohesion and power of united action against all outsiders.
To understand this people, we must know something of their faith.
The sect took its rise in the early years of the eleventh century,
during the reign of Caliph el-Hâkim Biamrillah, in Egypt (996-1020).
A foolish and dissipated prince, his minister, ed-Durazy, for reasons
not now obvious, proclaimed him to be an incarnation of Deity, the
last of the long line of incarnations extending from Adam downward.
The people of Cairo, however, would have none of his doctrines.
Escaping the violence of the mob whom his blasphemies had
enraged, he fled to Syria, where, among the mountains of Southern
Lebanon, he found asylum for himself, and disciples to accept his
teaching. It is, indeed, not darkly hinted that his efforts to enlighten
the Syrians were ably seconded by the persuasive powers of
Egyptian gold, the worthy el-Hâkim being no way indisposed to
undergo the process of apotheosis while it was possible for him to
enjoy its honours. The work of ed-Durazy might have proved only
transitory in its effects, had not a learned and able Persian, Hamzeh
by name, come to his assistance. By a skilful combination of ed-
Durazy’s new dogma with ancient superstitions and mystical
doctrines, frowned upon by orthodox Mohammedans, he wrought out
a religious system which commanded the respect and secured the
submission of increasing numbers.
The great doctrine of Islâm, the unity of the God-head, is almost
violently emphasised in the Druze religion; but this is associated with
a belief in God’s close relation to the world and His eternal love for
men, in so far as it is possible to attribute love to a being of whom
only one thing can be certainly predicated, namely, existence. This
love has resulted in a constant succession of incarnations or
manifestations of Himself since the beginning. Therefore all the great
prophetic line, from Adam to Jesus Christ, are held in reverence. A
place is also accorded to Mohammed; and, further, the divine is seen
in ʿAli, Mohammed ibn Ismaʿîl, Saʿid el-Mûhdi, and, last and
greatest, el-Hâkim. With regard to this last, death is not to be thought
of as terminating his earthly career; it is only a change, to test the
faith and sincerity of his followers. One day he will return with
invincible might, to bring the whole world into subjection. Of Jesus
Christ it is interesting to observe that the Druze agrees with the
Mohammedan in believing that the divine incarnation was not put to
death; but, while the latter says that His “appearance” was crucified,
the former holds that a second Jesus Christ, son of the carpenter,
endured the dread penalty, while Jesus Christ, the manifestation of
the Divine, passed scathless from the world. In all of this it is not
difficult to trace the influence of early Christian heresy.
The Druzes believe in the transmigration of souls. It has been
erroneously held that they receive this doctrine in a modified form,
not thinking it possible that a human soul should enter one of the
lower animals. This is not so. At the very moment of his mother’s
death, a calf was born in the herd of a Druze, and he firmly believed
that the soul of his mother dwelt in that calf. Along with this, they
believe in a series of human lives for the individual in different forms.
No man knows if in the first youth he meets he may not salute the
spirit of his grandfather. The destination of the soul on parting from
the body is determined by the manner in which it has lived: if well, it
will be born again in happier conditions; if ill, its next existence will be
fraught with pain and sorrow. It is an article of their faith that births do
not increase, deaths do not diminish, the actual number of Druzes in
existence. That number is known to God only, but it is fixed and
unchangeable forever. Birth brings not a new spirit into being, but
only begins a new life for one already existing. Death does not slay a
spirit, but only introduces the living into a new form of existence. No
one born of true Druze parentage can ever become anything else,
and no one born of Christian or other parents can ever become a
Druze.
It would be a mistake to suppose that all Druzes are acquainted with
the whole system of their religion. It would be nearer truth to say that
very many know nothing of religion at all. The deeper things are high
secrets, which only the ʿAkkâl—men and women of understanding—
are given to know. Their place of worship is called Khalweh (“retired
spot”), and there the initiated conduct their secret service. Many
years ago, during the troubles that have so often convulsed this
country, the sacred books of the Druzes were seized and studied by
competent scholars; but, like the Freemasons, whom they so much
resemble, the Druzes may very well maintain that there are secrets
among them which no books can ever reveal. Certain it is that round
these repositories of their mysteries the Juhhâl, or ignorant ones,
gather with profound veneration. The ʿAkkâl bear themselves with
great circumspection. They live sober and temperate lives,
abstaining from all alcoholic liquors, from tobacco, and even from
coffee, the universal beverage of the Arab.
Hamzeh, who systematised their doctrines and gave something like
coherency to their beliefs, they continue to honour as el-Hâdi (“the
guide”). Durazy, strangely, they have forgotten, or remember only to
repudiate. El-Hâdi is from the same root, and has the same
meaning, as el-Mahdi, the expected “guide” of the Moslems, who is
to “lead” them to the universal triumph for which they yearn.
The Druzes number in all perhaps something over a hundred
thousand. They do not, however, for a moment believe that all real
Druzes are confined to Syria. China, for example, is a land of which
they have some dim knowledge; it figures vague and vast in their
untutored minds. They have heard that there are beliefs common to
them and the Chinese; this is sufficient to create the conviction that
the Chinese are really Druzes too, whatever name they may be
called, and that, when the proper time comes, that mighty empire will
pour forth its millions to do battle in the cause of el-Hâkim. The
British share, in this regard, their affection and confidence, an
impression prevailing widely that they too are a nation of Druzes. If
this impression did not come from the kindly treatment of the Druzes
by the British, when, after the massacre, they were in imminent
danger, it was certainly strengthened thereby. If one of them asks
how many Druzes there are in England, and receives the reply that
there are none, he is far from being convinced, and most likely he
leaves you with the suspicion that you are a Druze yourself. He will
think nothing the less of you for your stout denial; for it is permitted to
them to assume the outward form and profession of any religion
whatever, if their welfare for the time may thereby be promoted, the
only condition being that they remain true in heart to the faith of their
fathers. In a country where the people excel in clever deceptions, it
is often extremely hard for the missionary to distinguish between the
true and the spurious convert. There is a well-authenticated case in
which a Druze professed conversion to Christianity, was baptized,
received into the Church, and, having given proof of his fitness, was
at length ordained to the ministry. He continued to exercise his
calling with acceptance for several years; then, throwing off the mask
by which he had deceived everybody, he openly declared that he
was a Druze at heart, and had never been anything else.
The Lebanon for long was the home of the Druzes, but now they are
found as far north as Antioch and as far south as Carmel; while since
1860 they have gone eastward, and settled in such numbers on the
mountain, that the name Jebel Haurân, by which it was formerly
known, is fast giving place to that of Jebel ed-Druze. Wherever the
Druze goes, he maintains his well-earned reputation for hospitality
and kindly treatment of strangers. This practice is mixed up with the
religious ideas that from hoary antiquity have prevailed from the
eastern shore of the Mediterranean throughout the whole Arabian
peninsula. The guest is in some sense the representative of God, by
whose bounty all men live. The traveller who finds himself belated
near a habitation of Druzes may generally go forward with good
heart, assured that the best of their poor store will be placed
ungrudgingly at his disposal. Alongside of this pleasing feature in
their character there are others not less prominent, but hardly so
attractive. They have a reputation for extreme sensitiveness to insult
or injury, excessive vindictiveness, and perfect fearlessness in the
exaction of revenge. As may be supposed, therefore, the blood feud
among them is a stern reality, and the function of the avenger of
blood a solemn obligation. Should an opportunity not come soon for
the achievement of their purpose, they can wait with grim patience;
and it will be found, in the end, that years have not abated one jot
the fury of their desire for vengeance. With this inflexible resolution
to take the life of an enemy for the life of a friend, there coexists an
equally binding duty to protect a brother Druze who may have shed
blood unwittingly or otherwise—to hide him from pursuers, and
defend his life with their own. If the avenger’s claim can be settled by
payment of money—a mode of settlement not uncommon—the sum
to be paid is a tax upon the whole community.
Comparisons are often instituted between the various peoples in the
country, in respect of their courage and prowess in the field of battle.
By common consent the Druzes and the Beduw receive the highest
places. In simple daring and personal intrepidity in sudden attack,
the Beduw excel; but in determined courage, power of united action,
and stubborn endurance in the face of a powerful foe, they must
yield the palm to the Druzes. While we cannot but admire the wild
bravery of the Bedawy, it is clear that the qualities possessed by the
Druze are more to be desired in the hour of conflict. There is a strain
of true nobility in the character of that people who in the hour of
victory have ever chivalrously protected defenceless women and
little children from all injury and insult.
An interesting parallel might be drawn between the ancient Israelites
and the modern Druzes. The latter cannot indeed trace their descent
from a single jadd, or ancestor, as the former did from Abraham.
They are of mixed parentage, the old Syrian element probably
predominating. Passing from this, we find that the impulse
separating both from surrounding peoples was religious; their
isolation is preserved by devotion to the national religious idea. Both
are essentially theocracies; their idea of a “state,” if we may so use
the term, would be that of “the church acting civilly.” The central
doctrine with both is the unity of God. Their national aspirations are
strikingly similar. Israel aspired to universal dominion as the people
of God; the Druzes aspire to nothing less. The hope of Israel was in
the coming of the Messiah; that of the Druzes, in the return of el-
Hâkim. If we take the Jewish conception of the work of the Messiah
prevalent at the time of Christ, and substitute the name of el-Hâkim
for Messiah, and Druzes for Jews, we have very accurately the
Druze conception of the work of el-Hâkim, the coming conqueror. In
both a marvellous unity has been preserved through long
generations; and each, in feature and dress, is easily distinguishable
from all others.
Although widely scattered, their organisations are perfect. The
community touched at any point feels through all. The sheikhs of the
ʿAkkâl, as leaders of the religious commonwealth, perform functions
corresponding in some degree to those of the old Hebrew judges
and prophets. At their word the hosts gather from far and near, place
themselves under the command of chosen chiefs, and go forth to
warfare. They also convene solemn councils for the discussion of
weighty matters of religion or policy. But gatherings for such
purposes without other ostensible object would attract more attention
than is desirable. Advantage is therefore taken of ordinary occasions
which call for the presence of friends, more especially funerals, when
men gather “frae a’ the airts” and transact the necessary business.
Doubtless the company of chiefs we saw at ʿIry was convened to
discuss the special circumstances in which they were then placed,
and to arrange for concerted action in the immediate future.
Presenting a united front to the outside world, had they been equally
at one among themselves, they might ere now have played a
distinguished part in the affairs of the East. But the ambitions of rival
families have sundered them; their attention has been engaged with
domestic broils, their energies frittered away in the quarrels of
factions, when they might and ought to have been preparing
themselves to make a broad mark in the military history of their
country. It is precisely in knowing how skilfully to fan such internal
fires, and excite domestic strife that the Turkish Government has
proved its ability to keep such peoples in hand. How like the case of
the Jews, when the bands of iron were closing upon them!
Until recently the Government has had very little power in the
Haurân; and if its power to-day is more than nominal, past history
forbids the belief that it will now prove permanent. The chief military
stations are Sheikh Saʿad, the seat of the governor; Busr el-Harîry,
on the southern border of el-Lejâʾ; and Suweida. There is also a
small force in the fortress at Basra Eski Shâm. While fighting has
been done, the position was not won by arms in the usual sense.
The old policy has been pursued. The various sections of the people
have been played off against each other with great adroitness, and,
on the whole, with success. The common enemy, ever on the alert
for advantage, calmly appropriated the territory of victor and
vanquished alike.
The Druzes and the Beduw bear each other no love. Nothing was
easier than to breed bad blood between them. They could not have
played into the hands of the Government more thoroughly, had that
been their design, than by weakening each other in internecine strife.
The Government claimed from the Druzes a certain tax; but, as
mentioned above, they were willing to do anything rather than pay it,
and up till recently the Government did not see its way to enforce
payment. Things began to look more hopeful, and the secession of
the ʿAtrash family inspired the belief that taxes and all arrears might
be collected. They had not reckoned with the proud, unbending spirit
of the Druze nation. A Solomon might be submitted to; a band of
Rehoboams, never. The demand for arrears, accompanied by an
implied threat, met with the response one might have expected from
these fiery mountaineers. The sheikhs of the house of ʿAtrash had to
seek asylum under the wing of the Government in Damascus. This
was a bold bid of defiance which no government could afford to
ignore. Exact information as to succeeding events is extremely
difficult to obtain, but what follows may be taken as a fairly accurate
account, as far as it goes.
We visited the district in April 1890. There was an evident alertness
in all the bearing of the men. We could descry numerous figures on
walls and roofs long before we reached any place of importance;
and, coming nearer, we saw that our approach was eagerly watched
until our peaceful appearance satisfied the sentinels. The fact was
that even then affairs had taken an unpleasant turn; and only ten
days after we passed the seceding sheikhs had to flee for their lives,
and the Government resorted to arms to quell “the rebellion,” as it
was called. On their part the Druzes, under popular chiefs, cheerfully
prepared for the fray.
The Government troops, under Memdûh Pasha, military and civil
governor of Haurân, assembled in the neighbourhood of Busr el-
Harîry. Memdûh sent to the rebel chiefs, calling upon them to
surrender. In reply, a deputation of the chiefs themselves came to
him by night, made strong protestations of loyalty, and affected not to
understand why they should be classed as rebels; they were true
friends to the sultan, and wished prosperity to his Government.
Memdûh was not deceived. He required that they should come with
their friends in open day and formally make their submission. They
could hardly have expected to persuade the pasha of their loyalty.
Probably they hoped by their visit only to gain knowledge of the
strength of the enemy and the purposes of the leader. In any case,
they did not come back, but sent instead an insulting message,
which reminds one of Goliath of Gath’s challenge to the youthful
David. They declared themselves ready to receive him; and if he had
courage to come, they promised to make mincemeat of him and his
soldiers. “Come, O Memdûh,” they said, “and we will give thy body to
be chopped into small pieces!” The pasha simply replied, “The loyal
will receive honour; the rebel must take the consequences of his
conduct.” The soldiers advanced towards Suweida, which they found
almost deserted. Several merchants from Damascus were taken into
the market and made prisoners on suspicion of supplying the rebels
with munitions of war. The Druzes meantime had taken up a strong
natural position among their rocky fortresses. The soldiers advancing
upon them were unable to sustain the Druze fire, being completely
exposed, while the latter were as completely covered among the
rocks. One of the first to fall was the son of one of the ʿAtrash
sheikhs, who was recognised and shot by a Druze marksman. Thus
early and dearly did they pay for their defection.
The attack was relinquished until reinforcements came bringing
several light field-pieces. Meantime one of the Druze sheikhs, who
had received some injury, real or imaginary, had taken one of the
terrible oaths in which the history of the East abounds, invoking upon
himself the most awful curses, both in this world and in the next, if he
slew not Memdûh Pasha with the edge of the sword. In renewing the
attack the pasha had recourse to an ancient stratagem of which the
Druzes ought to have been aware. He planted the field-pieces at
some distance in the rear, behind a little eminence. A party with
definite instructions was sent forward. On their approach the Druzes
opened fire. The soldiers wavered, broke, and fled. The defenders,
believing this to be a real defeat, waxed bolder, and left their rocks to
pursue, hoping to turn defeat into a rout. The soldiers simply retired
behind the cannon, and immediately fire was opened on the now
unprotected Druzes with murderous effect. The issue of the battle
was not one moment in doubt; but many were the displays of
individual bravery and personal prowess, which shall be related by
children’s children, to fan the flame of patriotism in the bosom of
youth; to beguile the tedium of the winter days, and enliven the hours
of rest from toil among the mountains. One Druze who rode a fine
horse charged literally past the cannon’s mouth, slew the gunner
with his sword, captured the musket of the fallen soldier, and dashed
back, amid a rain of bullets, like one bearing a charmed life. This
exploit he repeated three times, inspiring his foes with dread. Yet a
fourth time he spurred his charger to the attack. This time he came in
the line of fire; but a soldier who had followed him was now between
him and the cannon, and the gunner hesitated. “It matters not! Fire!”
roared the officer in command, quaking for his own safety. The piece
was fired: soldier and Druze hero entered eternity together.
The sheikh who had sworn to slay the pasha saw where the
commander stood, and, turning thither, rushed forward wildly,
brandishing his sword and hoarsely shouting, “Il yaum yaumak, ya
Memdûh; ya Memdûh, il yaum tamût!”—“This is thy day, O Memdûh!
O Memdûh, to-day thou shalt die!” Thus threatened, the ranks closed
around the general, but the dauntless chief cared not; he would hew
down all opposition until the object of his wrath was reached. Nor
was his an idle boast. In his fierce onslaught six stalwart soldiers fell
beneath his keen blade, and he had even penetrated to the very
inmost ring of the pasha’s guard ere he was arrested by sheer
weight of wounds piled upon him from every side. He would have
died cheerfully had the pasha’s blood mingled with his own. He had
almost touched his enemy when the waters of the river of death rose
over him and he sank forever. One who stood by severed his head
from the trunk with a blow of his sword, and, casting the bleeding
horror at the pasha’s feet, exclaimed, “Thus perish all thine enemies,
O thine excellency, and those of our glorious sultan!”
Of the numbers who fell on either side we shall probably never
obtain complete information. Suffice it to say that the Druzes suffered
so heavily as to be practically at the mercy of their conquerors. The
latter showed a disposition to take full advantage of their success
and exact “the last farthing” of their claims. The Druzes were in
despair. It seemed, indeed, as if only ruin were before them. Through
the kindly mediation of European consular agents, an arrangement
was come to which saved the vanquished from the worst
consequences of defeat. Compromise was all the Druzes could now
hope for, and they gained more than the most sanguine could have
anticipated. Arrears were not to be demanded, and they agreed to
pay a tax of about half the amount originally imposed. They were,
however, required to receive again the sheikhs of the house of
ʿAtrash. On these conditions they might return and dwell in safety, all
prisoners taken in war being restored to them. One other condition it
must have been hard to accept. They were to be prohibited from
carrying arms, save by special licence obtained from the Turkish
officials. But they could not well reject terms proposed to them by
their mediators and accepted by their conquerors. Thus it happened
that where every man one met was loaded with instruments of death,
soon almost the only weapon to be seen, save in the hands of
soldiers, was the shepherd’s “club,” or naboot, with which the very
poor all over the land are wont to defend themselves and attack their
foes; and a formidable weapon it is in practised hands.
The Government naturally sought to secure the advantage thus
gained. The importance attaching to Suweida as the key to Jebel ed-
Druze became apparent. Preparations were immediately begun for
the erection of a kalʿat, or fortress, there, by means of which the
turbulent spirits might be overawed. Thus another step is taken
towards the subjugation of all that district to Ottoman rule. There is
no need to suppose that the Druzes acquiesce calmly and finally in
this condition of things. It is as certain as anything mundane can be
that they simply “bide their time,” and when that time comes, their
old, proud, freedom-loving spirit will assert itself again, undimmed
and unbroken.
CHAPTER VIII
Bozrah—First Syrian mosque—The physician the reconciler
—The “House of the Jew”—The great mosque—Cufic
inscription—Boheira and Mohammed—The fortress—
Bridal festivities—Feats of horsemanship—History—
Origen’s visit—Capture by Moslems.
BOZRAH. BAB EL-HOWA

A Druze peasant who accompanied us part of the way from ʿIry to
Bozrah professed to know the country well throughout a wide area,
and declared that he could conduct us to a hundred ruins, south and
east of Bozrah, as great and beautiful as Bozrah itself. This was
exaggeration, of course; but that district beyond Umm el-Jamâl is still
unexplored, and we regretted much that we could not accept his
proffered guidance. Ere descending into the Wady Zeideh, we came
in full view of Bozrah, spreading darkly under a light haze on the
plain beyond, like the ruins of a great city that had passed through
fire. The massive castle of Salkhad had long been visible, sitting
proudly on the very crest of the giant ridge of Jebel ed-Druze,
commanding a wide prospect over all the land of Bashan, and far
over the inhospitable deserts eastward. The sheikh whom we met at
ʿIry pressingly invited us, and fain were we to go and stand upon the
most easterly border of the land held by ancient Israel. As this could
not be, we satisfied ourselves for the time by gazing at the fine old
fortress through the telescope. It forms a magnificent landmark. With
this grand old stronghold, and the volcanic cone of Jebel el-Kuleib,
just above Suweida, towering high over all, the traveller in the plains
need be at no loss to discover his whereabouts. Some of the villages
to the right are inhabited by Christians, between whom and their
Druze neighbours there is nearly always strife.
Approaching Bozrah from the north, just outside the town, we reach
a mosque called el-Mebrak—“the place of kneeling.” Here knelt the
camel which bore the Korʾân before Othman ibn ʿAffan, third caliph
after Mohammed, on his entering Syria. This determined the spot
where the first Syrian mosque should stand. On a basaltic slab within
is shown the alleged impression made by the kneeling camel. The
house where Mohammed should alight in Medina when he fled from
Mecca was indicated by the kneeling of his naqa, or female camel;
and there was raised the first Mohammedan mosque in the world.
This method of selecting particular spots by the kneeling of the
camel is illustrated among other Eastern peoples; for example,
among the Jews. They say that Maimonides, the great doctor of the
twelfth century, gave instructions, before his death, that he should be
laid to rest in the Holy Land. His body was laid on a camel, which,
starting from Alexandria, marched day and night until it reached a
spot outside the walls of Tiberias. There it kneeled down. With
difficulty it was made to rise, but it only moved round in a narrow
circle. The phenomenon roused the interest of the spectators.
Inquiring, they found that the great doctor’s father was buried there;
and they laid his body in his father’s grave!
Our tents were pitched under the shadow of the castle, on a
threshing-floor, still green with the grass of spring. Our first visitor
was a Christian, one of Bozrah’s few inhabitants, whose mouth was
full of blasphemies against the Druzes. A companion had received a
gunshot wound in a recent skirmish, and now they were plotting
revenge. The governor’s letter secured for us a kindly welcome from
the officer commanding the garrison, who invited us to drink coffee
with him and go over the old castle. It was already known throughout
the mountain that we should not move till Monday. Early on Saturday
the Druzes began to gather from Salkhad, Kerîyeh, and other
villages. A second company of fellahîn from the neighbourhood at
the same time assembled at our camp. Their mutual enmities were
laid aside or forgotten. Their one anxiety was to get a word of the
good hakîm, who might help them in their sickness, or give such
advice as might relieve relatives and friends too ill to come
themselves. These groups of men, but yesterday, perhaps, engaged
in loud quarrels, wounding each other in wrath, now gathered
peacefully together, docile as lambs in the hands of the man whom
they felt they could trust, formed a striking scene, not soon to be
forgotten. Nor can one fail to see what a powerful mediator and
reconciler one true representative of the Great Physician among
these wild peoples might prove.
Most of the remains of interest are gathered in little space near the
crossing of the two main streets, which, as in all the Roman cities we
visited, cut the city at right angles. Triumphal arch, baths, tall
Corinthian columns with beautiful capitals still in position, and the
remains of an old temple lie closely together. Going from the
crossing towards the great mosque, we pass an old doorway, all that
now remains of what the Arabs call Beit el-Yehûdy—“House of the
Jew.” ʿOmâr, second from Mohammed, was and is justly celebrated
for the impartiality of his judgments. Tradition saith that during his
reign the Moslem governor of Bozrah ruined this Jewish house and
built a mosque on the site. The oppressed Jew made his way to
Medina, where he found the caliph surrounded by neither pomp nor
circumstance that could daunt the poorest client. Hearing his case,
ʿOmâr gave him an order, written on the jawbone of an ass, which he
found to his hand. Immediately on receiving this order, the governor
of Bozrah directed the mosque to be pulled down and the Jew’s
house rebuilt and restored to him. Such an incident should be
remembered with pride by all worthy Moslems, as illustrating the
purity of their early rulers. On the contrary, the Jew who sought
simple justice is held as “an execration, and an astonishment, and a
reproach.” The inquirer will seek long and diligently ere he find such
lofty principle among the judges of Islâm to-day.
The great mosque, tradition says, was built by order of ʿOmâr. Old
materials have been freely used in its construction. The court within
is adorned with marble columns. These and many stones in the walls
bear Greek inscriptions, often sadly mutilated—evidence enough of
the antiquity of the materials; for the Arabs knew no Greek, and were
often profoundly irritated because Greek prisoners, from whom they
hoped to learn something of the enemy, knew no Arabic. One
column, bearing in an inscription the Saviour’s name, was doubtless
taken from a Christian church. For the building of this latter, in turn, it
was probably brought from a heathen temple, more ancient still. The
column immediately east of this bears the date 383 Bostrian era =
a.d. 489. Only traces remain of the frieze and ornamentation in Cufic
and Arabic characters—the adornment chiefly affected by the
Moslems. The minaret commands a beautiful view of the
surrounding country, but its rickety appearance deterred us from the
ascent. The centre of the mosque is filled with debris. Long deserted,
its silent court and ruined walls mutely illustrate the decay which ever
swiftly follows the advancing shadow of Islâm.
We secured a copy of a long Cufic inscription found on a basaltic
slab, by the door of a small mosque. It has been photographed by
the American Exploration Society, but I have seen no translation.
With the assistance of an intelligent Syrian I went carefully over it,
and I think the following fairly represents the sense. It begins as
usual, “In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate,” and
goes on to enumerate His attributes. He is “the blessed, the opulent,
the owner of the world, the just, the incomparable, the invincible, the
victorious.” It tells of certain properties devoted by one “Serjenk,” or
“Serjek”—for the name seems spelled both ways—“the humble
servant of God,” for the benefit of those “who have set free the

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1 Introduction: Origins of Human Security 1

2 Human Rights and State Responsibilities 13

3 States and Citizens: Reciprocal Rights and Responsibilities 29

4 Beyond the Binary: Beyond States, Beyond Citizens 41

5 Re-Bordering State Responsibilities and Human Rights 57

6 Health and Human Security 73

7 Reimagining State and Human Security Beyond Borders 91

A4H Accountability for health

HIV Human immunodeficiency virus

Box 1.1 Assumptions 7

Introduction: Origins of Human Security

Abstract Human security denotes a human-denominated, as opposed to

Keywords Human security • Human rights • Universal

Human security denotes a human-denominated, as opposed to State,

© The Author(s) 2018 1

In other words, though human rights can be taken to be universal, the

If Christianity demanded only a retreat from the world, it would be in a sense

This process reinforced the secularity of the State, while simultaneously

1.2 Emergence of Human Security

United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) report, New

acceptance, promotion, and protection of the human rights’ realization of

1.3 Conceptual Overview

Table 1.1 Nexus of health diplomacy–health security

Health diplomacy: Diplomacy of/for health Health security/defense

Box 1.1 Assumptions

persistence of endemic disease and poor infrastructure, but also ‘creeping

Third, and consequently, given the historically high number of migrants

Rosenau, James N. 1992. Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics. In

Human Rights and State Responsibilities

Keywords State • Citizen • Rights • Responsibility

The Introduction sketched the origins and elements of human security.

© The Author(s) 2018 13

host of economic and welfare provisions (Hösle 2003; Slaughter 2004;

2.1 Human Security in Conversation

As outlined in the Introduction, the idea of human security as the remit of

c­ ampaigners, as well as cross-border challenges such as (infectious) dis-

plethora of organizations exist dedicated to treating HIV/AIDS, provid-

NGOs’ [nongovernmental organizations’] role and influence have exploded in

SHEYÛKH ED-DRUZE (COUNCIL OF WAR)

BOZRAH. BAB EL-HOWA

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1 Introduction: Origins of Human Security 1

2 Human Rights and State Responsibilities 13

3 States and Citizens: Reciprocal Rights and Responsibilities 29

4 Beyond the Binary: Beyond States, Beyond Citizens 41

5 Re-Bordering State Responsibilities and Human Rights 57

6 Health and Human Security 73

7 Reimagining State and Human Security Beyond Borders 91

Box 1.1 Assumptions 7

c ampaigners, as well as cross-border challenges such as (infectious) dis-