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T H E F R O N T I E R S C O L L E C T I O N
Shyam Wuppuluri
Giancarlo Ghirardi (Eds.)
SPACE , TIME
AND THE LIMITS
OF HUMAN
U NDERSTANDING
Foreword by John Stachel and
Afterword by Noam Chomsky
123
THE FRONTIERS COLLECTION
Series editors
Avshalom C. Elitzur
Iyar The Israel Institute for Advanced Research, Rehovot, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]
Laura Mersini-Houghton
Department of Physics, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
NC 27599-3255, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
T. Padmanabhan
Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics (IUCAA), Pune, India
e-mail: [email protected]
Maximilian Schlosshauer
Department of Physics, University of Portland, Portland, OR 97203, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
Mark P. Silverman
Department of Physics, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 06106, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
Jack A. Tuszynski
Department of Physics, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 1Z2, Canada
e-mail: [email protected]
Rüdiger Vaas
Center for Philosophy and Foundations of Science, University of Giessen,
35394 Giessen, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
THE FRONTIERS COLLECTION
Series Editors
A.C. Elitzur L. Mersini-Houghton T. Padmanabhan M. Schlosshauer
M.P. Silverman J.A. Tuszynski R. Vaas
The books in this collection are devoted to challenging and open problems at the
forefront of modern science, including related philosophical debates. In contrast to
typical research monographs, however, they strive to present their topics in a
manner accessible also to scientifically literate non-specialists wishing to gain
insight into the deeper implications and fascinating questions involved. Taken as a
whole, the series reflects the need for a fundamental and interdisciplinary approach
to modern science. Furthermore, it is intended to encourage active scientists in all
areas to ponder over important and perhaps controversial issues beyond their own
speciality. Extending from quantum physics and relativity to entropy, conscious-
ness and complex systems—the Frontiers Collection will inspire readers to push
back the frontiers of their own knowledge.
For a full list of published titles, please see back of book or springer.com/series/5342
Shyam Wuppuluri ⋅ Giancarlo Ghirardi
Editors
123
Editors
Shyam Wuppuluri Giancarlo Ghirardi
R. N. Podar School (CBSE) Abdus Salam International Centre for
Podar Educational Complex Theoretical Physics
Mumbai Trieste
India Italy
First of all, let me thank Mr. Shyam Wuppuluri for his years of effort devoted to
inspiring, assembling, and editing this volume. Rather than attempting to comment
on the papers in it, I shall try to outline my approach to some issues that the reader
may find helpful to bear in mind when reading these papers. Unfortunately, the
concepts needed to discuss these issues are so interrelated that I have not found it
possible to provide a simple, sequential introduction to these concepts. Indeed, they
are inextricably intermingled in my presentation.
Every human community is based on an interrelated complex of labor processes
that enable the community not just to survive but that, if successful, enable it to
grow and thrive. Each such labor process involves three elements: the labor of a
group of people using some tools to act upon the initial objects of labor (the “raw
materials”). The goal of this process is action upon these initial objects in such a
way as to produce final objects (the “finished products”) that will benefit at least
some members of the community.
But not all tools and initial objects are external to the members of the com-
munity. Language—and other symbolic systems that language enables people to
create—allows them to form conceptual systems, some of which in turn become
intellectual tools that can be used to modify the initial conceptual systems and to
create new ones.
In other words, not all labor need to be manual. Just as important is intellectual
labor. Like all forms of labor, intellectual labor starts from some object—in this
case a conceptual object—and works on this object with the aim of modifying it to
produce a new conceptual object (see my paper “Problems not Disciplines”). There
are many types of intellectual tools (art, literature, religion, etc.) but most important
for the questions discussed in this volume are the scientific disciplines, including
both the so-called natural and social sciences (better called the human sciences—the
Geisteswissenschaften in German).
Why include the social sciences? As in all other forms of labor, a successful
intellectual labor process is ultimately the result of the collective labor of more than
one individual: knowledge is our name for such results. Rather than being an
vii
viii Foreword
individual problem, as it has been treated in Western philosophy since the time of
Descartes, the problem of knowledge is a social problem (see my paper Where is
Knowledge?). And it should always be borne in mind that the ultimate goal of all
intellectual labor is to provide additional resources to some human community for
action upon the material world and, intended or not, to produce changes in the
community itself.
As noted already, in the case of intellectual labor the objects of labor are
complexes of concepts; and the collective labor acting upon these complexes is that
of some intellectual community. When it is successful, new knowledge is our name
for the results of such a process of intellectual labor. And it is important to bear in
mind that knowledge itself is indeed a process that will never end as long as
intellectual communities continue to exist. So one should be suspicious of any
proposed axiomatization of some realm of human knowledge, especially if it is
accompanied by claims of the closure of what should be an open, unending process.
An important philosophical issue is the distinction between the conceptual
objects that constitute our knowledge and the objects of that knowledge, and the
relation between these two. Such philosophical doctrines as conflicts as empiricism,
rationalism, naturalism, materialism and idealism depend on the answer to this
question. Suffice it to say that I regard the goal of action on the objects of
knowledge as primary. The introduction of a new conceptual object, or the modi-
fication of an existing one, must make clear its relation to some object(s) of
knowledge. In the case of physical concepts, such as space and time, this means that
their definition must be accompanied by some account of the means by which an
ideal measurement of this quantity can be carried out.
Let me emphasize: I am not maintaining that it is meaningful because it is
measurable; rather that because it is meaningful it must in principle be measurable.
No one has stated this lesson more eloquently than Gaston Bachelard:
In order to embody new experimental evidence, it is necessary to deform the original
concepts, study the conditions of applicability of these concepts, and above all incorporate
the conditions of applicability of a concept into the very meaning of the concept. … The
classic division that separates a theory from its application ignores this necessity to
incorporate the conditions of applicability into the very essence of the theory (La formation
de l’esprit scientifique. Paris: Vrin. 1938, pg. 61; transl. by J.S.).
Like all tools, intellectual tools themselves may become the object of a labor
process aimed at improving their effectiveness—indeed one tool may even be set
aside totally in favor of some new tool. The prime example is relation between
language, the first intellectual tool, and logic. Logic is a tool created for the
improvement of language when it is applied to certain subjects. Indeed, one should
rather say “logics,” since more than one consistent logical system may be employed
in the critical reconstruction of a language. So one might say that logic is about
language and language is about the world. Often this two-step relation is reduced to
a one-step relation: logic is about the world—a view I have criticized for decades
[A] logic always has some language as its object. The more formalized one wants the logic
to be, the more formalized the language must be. … Since a logic presupposes a language,
Foreword ix
the objects logic studies must be linguistic objects. I believe in the existence of other objects
which are quite independent of language; but such objects, in contrast to linguistic refer-
ences to them, cannot have a logic. Lest this be thought a mere verbal quibble, let me point
out that someone who believed that all reality was fundamentally conceptual in nature
could meaningfully and non-metaphorically speak of the logic of the world.
The doctrine that all relations are fundamentally logical relations and that there is hence no
basic distinction between logic and ontology is not unknown in the philosophical literature.
… It has even been given a name, “panlogism” … However, if one does adopt this position,
it should be done with full awareness, and not tacitly through acceptance of a certain
approach to quantum logic” (excerpts from “Do Quanta Need a New Logic?”).
John Stachel
Foreword xi
Appendix
xiii
xiv Preface
pursuit, one greatly benefits from knowledge of diverse fields which can trigger
cross-domain analogies. We sincerely hope, through this erudite volume, that a
symphony of patterns and a tapestry of intuitions will emerge, providing a holistic
insight into the questions: ‘What is Space?’ and ‘What is Time?’
Of course Rome was neither built in a day nor by a single person! I am very
fortunate to find a lot of people who went out of their way to support me in this
endeavor. Chronologically, I would like to thank Prof. John Stachel from the
bottom of my heart for agreeing to write a foreword and guiding me patiently all
through since the project’s inception. His support kick-started the project. My
decision to proceed with Springer owed much to the wonderful association with the
editor, Dr. Angela Lahee, who has played a role not less than that of a guardian
angel concerning this project. Her unparalleled expertise, enthusiasm, and patience,
coupled with timely and valuable advice are gratefully acknowledged. The project
could not have been in better hands than hers.
While the overall structure and contents were in place, with 38 authors on board
but still moored in the harbor, I sought a co-editor, who would provide me with
feedback. Little did I know that Prof. Giancarlo Ghirardi, a close associate of Prof.
John Stewart Bell, would be the one to join me in this journey as a co-editor.
Despite his health issues he took out time from his busy academic life and dealt
with the project with care and patience. I have greatly benefited from his associ-
ation, humility, wisdom, and support. Language definitely fails to translate the
gratitude I have towards him. My heartfelt thanks to Prof. Noam Chomsky, who
does not need an introduction. I am yet to find an adjective which has not been used
previously to describe his multifaceted personality. Though I feel guilty that I
cannot take the name of each author, I would like to thank every author, whole-
heartedly, for their efforts and especially those who generously and patiently col-
laborated, incorporating the feedback and customizing the article. I am fortunate to
have such associations. Sadly I must mention that Prof. Jonathan Borwein, who not
only contributed to this volume but also leaves behind a wealth of other intellectual
achievements, died on 2nd August, 2016. Mourning his passing, I would like to
warmly acknowledge his efforts and support. The fact that he will continue to live
through his works offers great solace to all his admirers.
xvii
xviii Acknowledgements
I would also like to thank people, who though are not directly connected to this
project, have influenced me, positively, in many ways. After all action at a distance
has its place in physics!
I would like to thank from the bottom of my heart—Prof. Sujatha Ramdorai,
who has been a beacon of support, not just to me but to many others who are
passionate about science. My existence owes a lot to the solacing support she
offered at various times. I would also like to thank Mr. M. G. Subramanian for
teaching me the art of online communication, during my formative years. I would
like to express my gratitude towards the director-principal Mrs. Avnita Bir and
Podar management for always supporting me.
Lastly I would like to thank Prof. R. Sridharan, who, though he never taught me
directly, nevertheless has inspired me deeply through his writings, humanity,
humility, intellect and emphasis on quality. The relationship that I share with him is
that of an arbitrary pebble with an ocean ingente—whose deep bond is both
unbeknownst to the passersby and undisturbed by the chaotic wind.
Such is the stance of unsung bonds and friendships whose existence forms a
fragrant and radiant twine which is stitched alongside with the other dull cords of
humdrum routines into the robe of hermit’s life—which is what makes his life both
interesting and worth living!
Part I Philosophy
1. Space as a Source and as an Object of Knowledge:
The Transformation of the Concept of Space
in the Post-Kantian Philosophy of Geometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Francesca Biagioli
2. Time in Physics and Time in Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
E.C.G. Sudarshan
3. Time and Space in Ancient India: Pre-philosophical Period . . . . . . 23
Nataliya Yanchevskaya and Michael Witzel
4. Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Jonathan Duquette and Krishnamurti Ramasubramanian
5. From Time to Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Nathan Salmon
6. Why Spacetime Has a Life of Its Own . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
James Robert Brown
7. The Phenomenology of Space and Time: Husserl,
Sartre, Derrida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Hans Herlof Grelland
8. Space, Time, and (How They) Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Valia Allori
9. Relativity Theory May not Have the Last Word on the Nature
of Time: Quantum Theory and Probabilism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Nicholas Maxwell
xix
xx Contents
Part II Physics
10. Nature’s Book Keeping System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Gerard ’t Hooft
11. Spacetime and Reality: Facing the Ultimate Judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Vesselin Petkov
12. The Future’s Not Ours to See . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Anthony Sudbery
13. Hermann Weyl’s Space-Time Geometry and Its Impact
on Theories of Fundamental Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Norbert Straumann
14. Matter, Space, Time, and Motion: A Unified Gravitational
Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
C.S. Unnikrishnan
15. An Anomaly in Space and Time and the Origin of Dynamics . . . . . 185
Joan A. Vaccaro
16. Space, Time, and Adynamical Explanation in the Relational
Blockworld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
W.M. Stuckey, Michael Silberstein and Timothy McDevitt
17. Spacetime Is Doomed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
George Musser
Part VI Miscellaneous
37. The Novel and the Map: Spatiotemporal Form and Discourse
in Literary Cartography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
Robert T. Tally Jr.
xxii Contents
xxiii
Part I
Philosophy
Chapter 1
Space as a Source and as an Object
of Knowledge: The Transformation
of the Concept of Space
in the Post-Kantian Philosophy
of Geometry
Francesca Biagioli
1.1 Introduction
This paper deals with the transformation of the concept of space in the post-Kantian
philosophy of geometry from the second half of the nineteenth century to the early
twentieth century. Kant famously characterized space and time as forms of intu-
itions, which lie at the foundations of the apodictic knowledge of mathematics. The
success of his philosophical account of space was due not least to the fact that
Euclidean geometry was widely considered to be a model of apodictic certainty at
that time. However, such later scientific developments as non-Euclidean geometries
and the general theory of relativity called into question the certainty of Euclidean
geometry and posed the problem of reconsidering space not so much as a source of
knowledge, but as an open question for empirical research.
The first section offers a discussion of the main objections against Kant’s view of
space as a source of knowledge. The opposed view of space as an object of
knowledge emerged in geometrical empiricism, a tradition that can be traced back to
such mathematicians as Carl Friedrich Gauss, Nikolai Lobachevsky, Bernhard
Riemann, Richard Dedekind, and Felix Klein, and that found one of its clearest
expressions in the epistemological writings of the physiologist and physicist Her-
mann von Helmholtz. The second section provides a general introduction to the new
phase of this debate inaugurated by Einstein’s general theory of relativity of 1915. On
the one hand, Einstein relied on geometrical empiricism for the view that geometry
has an empirical meaning. On the other hand, he distanced himself from the received
view of space by claiming that the general covariance of his field equations removed
from space and time the last remnant of physical objectivity. In the third section,
F. Biagioli (✉)
University of Konstanz, Zukunftskolleg, P.O. Box 216, 78457 Konstanz, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
The first motivation for geometrical empiricism was to overcome some of the
philosophical difficulties of Kant’s account of space in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant characterized space and time by distinguishing these concepts from sensa-
tions, on the one side, and general concepts, on the other. The first distinction is in
terms of form and matter of appearance: “Since that within which the sensations can
alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the
matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie
ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all
sensation” (Kant [1], A20/B34). More specifically, space and time are forms of
intuition, according to Kant, insofar as the order of appearance is directly present to
the mind in the localization of objects in space and time. Therefore, he claimed that
space is a necessary representation, which lies at the foundation of all outer intu-
itions (A24/B38). Kant went on to argue that space differs from general concepts in
the way in which it is related to its parts: whereas general concepts contain a finite
collection of possible instantiations under them, any limitation of space, including
infinite division, lies in a single concept of space as one of its parts. Therefore, he
characterized space as an intuition that lies at the origin of knowledge concerning
external reality. The principles of (Euclidean) geometry offered the first example of
conceptual knowledge derived from intuition with apodictic certainty (A25/B39).
One classical objection to this view is that it presupposed the syllogistic logic of
Kant’s time, according to which logical reasoning is restricted to finite domains and
construction in intuition is necessary to justify existential assumptions concerning
infinite domains (e.g., the parallel to a given line from a point outside it and
1 Space as a Source and as an Object of Knowledge … 5
1
Several examples are discussed in Friedman [2, Ch. 1].
6 F. Biagioli
Helmholtz was Müller’s student in Berlin and relied on the same experimental
methodology. However, he developed an original approach to visual perception in
his Handbuch der physiologischen Optik (1867). Helmholtz advocated a theory of
local signs, according to which sensations are signs for their stimuli. According to
him, visual perception depends on our capacity to interpret those signs by drawing
unconscious inferences from nerve stimuli to existing objects. Such a capacity
deserves an empirical explanation in terms of psychological—rather than purely
physiological—processes. Therefore, Helmholtz called his approach “empirist” and
contrasted it with nativist views.2 In this connection, he distanced himself from
Kant’s conception of space and time as pure intuitions, whose form can be defined
independently of any empirical content. Not only did Kant overlook the empirical
conditions for the formation of these concepts, but his theory of pure sensibility led
his followers to assume that there are innate laws grounded in the form of spatial
intuition, that is, the axioms of (Euclidean) geometry (Helmholtz [9], p. 456).
As it emerges most clearly in Helmholtz’s later paper “Die Tatsachen in der
Wahrnehmung” (1878), Helmholtz’s criticism did not rule out the possibility of
generalizing the Kantian notion of form of spatial intuition to all possible combi-
nations of contents. After the passage quoted above, Helmholtz went on to say that
“the axioms of geometry limit the form of intuition of space in such a way that it
can no longer absorb every thinkable content, if geometry is at all supposed to be
applicable to the actual world. If we drop them, the doctrine of the transcendentality
of the form of intuition is without any taint. Here Kant was not critical enough in his
critique; but this is admittedly a matter of theses coming from mathematics, and this
bit of critical work had to be dealt with by the mathematicians” (Helmholtz [7],
p. 162).3 Furthermore, Helmholtz believed that even his empiricist epistemology
relied ultimately on the assumption of a lawful course of nature, which sometimes
he presented as a condition of the possibility of experience in Kant’s sense.4
I turn back to the latter issue in connection with Cassirer’s theory of the sym-
bolic forms of experience. The following section offers a brief overview of different
positions on geometrical empiricism in nineteenth-century mathematics.
2
See [8, Ch. 5]. Helmholtz addressed two different questions. The first concerned the
two-dimensionality of vision. At the time Helmholtz was writing, the dominant view endorsed by
Johannes Müller, among others, was that a two-dimensional, spatial representation is primitively
given in vision. In this view, only the perceptions of depth and of distance (i.e., the kind of
perceptions that presuppose three-dimensionality) have to be learned. By contrast, Helmholtz
sought to derive all spatial representations from the association of nonspatial sensations. The
second question concerned the singularity of vision. Helmholtz called nativist Müller, Ewald
Hering, and all those who derived the singularity of vision from the supposition of an anatomical
connection between the two retinas.
3
For a discussion of Helmholtz’s claims about the “transcendental” status of space, see Biagioli
[10].
4
See, e.g., Helmholtz [7, p. 142]. Notice, however, that there were important turning points in
Helmholtz’s relation to Kant in this regard. Cf. Hatfield [8] and Hyder [11].
1 Space as a Source and as an Object of Knowledge … 7
The third road to geometrical empiricism goes back to the first attempts to rethink
the question concerning the form of physical space after the discovery of
non-Euclidean geometry.5 Different hypotheses about the existence and the number
of parallel lines to a given line had been explored in the eighteenth-century by such
mathematicians as Girolamo Saccheri, Johann Heinrich Lambert, and Adrien-Marie
Legendre. However, it was only in the 1820s that János Bolyai and Nikolai
Lobachevsky, independently of each other, developed a system of geometry based
on the denial of Euclid’s parallel postulate. Lobachevsky was also one of the first to
address the question whether non-Euclidean theorems (e.g., the proposition that the
sum of the angles in a triangle is less than 180°, which followed from the denial of
the parallel postulate) can be tested empirically by using astronomical
measurements.
Although such an experiment proved to be impractical, much of the debate that
followed from Riemann to Einstein concerned the possibility to explore the link
between geometry and experience. As Gauss (in [13], p. 87) put it in a letter to
Bessel dated April 9, 1830, “the theory of space has an entirely different place in
knowledge from that occupied by pure mathematics. There is lacking throughout
our knowledge of it the complete persuasion of necessity (also of absolute truth)
which is common to the latter; we must add in humility that if number is exclu-
sively the product of our mind, space has a reality outside our mind and we cannot
completely prescribe its laws.” On the one hand, Gauss’s remark is reminiscent of
Newton’s view of geometry as the part of mechanics that deals with measurement
in the Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica [14]. On the other hand, by
1830, Gauss had enough knowledge of non-Euclidean geometry to see that there
might be different possible hypotheses when it comes to the laws of space.6
A further development of this tradition is found in Gauss’s student’s, Bernhard
Riemann, habilitation lecture of [17] “Über die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie
zu Grunde liegen” and in a series of papers published by Helmholtz between 1868
and 1878 and later collected by Paul Hertz and Moritz Schlick in the centenary
edition of Helmholtz’s Epistemological Writings (1977).7 Both Riemann and
Helmholtz started with a general notion of space as a manifold, comparable with
such empirical manifolds as color and tone systems, in order to then pose the
question of the necessary and sufficient conditions for introducing metrical rela-
tions. In this regard, Riemann showed the possibility of formulating infinitely many
5
For an introductory account of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry and its prehistory, see
Engel and Stäckel [12].
6
Sartorius von Waltershausen [15, p. 81] reported that even Gauss made an attempt to test the
Euclidean hypothesis during his geodetic work. However, this interpretation is controversial and it
was only after Bolyai’s and Lobachevsky’s works that the question arose whether the geometry of
space could be non-Euclidean (see [16]).
7
For a comprehensive account of nineteenth-century philosophy of geometry, see Torretti [18].
8 F. Biagioli
8
On the discussion of Helmholtz’s view in neo-Kantianism, see Biagioli [19].
1 Space as a Source and as an Object of Knowledge … 9
9
On Klein’s relationship to Lie and the reception of the Erlanger Programm, see Hawkins [22] and
Rowe [23].
10
On the development of group theory from Galois to Klein, see Wussing [24].
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this starlike object which is called the nucleus. The nucleus seems to be entirely
enclosed in a luminous vapory envelope of the same general texture, called the
coma. This envelope, which is quite variable in brightness and form, is brightest
next to the nucleus, and gradually fades away as it recedes from it. The nucleus
and the coma, considered as a whole, constitute the head of a comet. From the
head of a comet proceeds a long trail of pale nebulous light, which usually grows
wider, but fainter, as it recedes from the nucleus, and insensibly vanishes in the
sky. This delicate appendage, or tail, as it is commonly called, varies very much
in size and shape, not only in different comets, but in the very same comet, at
different times. Its direction is generally opposite to that of the Sun from the head
of the comet.
The nuclei vary very much in brightness, in size and in shape; and while in
some telescopic comets they are either absent or barely distinguishable as a
small condensation of light, in bright comets they may become plainly visible to
the naked eye, and they sometimes even surpass in brightness the most brilliant
stars of the heavens. But whatever may be the size of cometary nuclei, they are
subject to sudden and rapid changes, and vary from day to day. Sometimes they
appear exceedingly brilliant and sharply outlined, while at other times they are so
dim and diffused that they are hardly distinguishable from the coma of which they
seem then to form a part.
PLATE XI.—THE GREAT COMET OF 1881.
Observed on the night of June 25-26 at 1h. 30m. A.M.
From my observations upon the comets which have appeared since the year
1873, it is apparent that the changes in the nucleus, coma and tail, are due to a
solar action, which contracts or expands these objects in such a manner that the
nuclei become either bright and star-like, or dim and diffused, in a very short time.
I had excellent opportunity, especially in the two large comets of 1881, to observe
some of these curious changes, a description of which will give an idea of their
extent and rapidity. On July 2d, 1881, at 9 o'clock, the nucleus of comet 1881, III.,
which is represented on Plate XI., appeared sharply defined, bright and
considerably flattened crosswise; but half an hour later it had considerably
enlarged and had become so diffused that it could hardly be distinguished from
the coma, with which it gradually blended. It is perhaps worth mention that, at the
time this last observation was made, an aurora borealis was visible. This comet
1881, III., underwent other very important changes of its nucleus, coma and tail.
On June 25th, the nucleus, which was bright and clearly defined, was
ornamented with four bright diverging conical wings of light, as shown on Plate
XI. On the 26th these luminous wings had gone, and the nucleus appeared one-
third smaller. On the 28th it had enlarged, but on the 29th its shape was
considerably altered, the nucleus extending in one direction to three or four times
its diameter on previous nights, and being curved, so as to resemble a comma.
On the 6th of July the nucleus of this comet showed the greatest disturbances.
The nucleus, which had appeared perfectly round on the evening of the 5th, was
found much elongated at 10 o'clock on the 6th, forming then a straight, acute,
and well-defined wedge of light, inclined upwards to the left. The length of the
nucleus, at this time, was three or four times its ordinary diameter. At the same
time rapid changes occurred; the strangely shaped nucleus soon became
unsteady, extending and contracting alternately, and varying greatly in brightness.
At 10h. 45m., the elongated nucleus, then gently curved, took the shape of a
succession of luminous knots, which at times became so brilliant and distinct that
they seemed to be about to divide and form separate nuclei; but such a
separation did not actually occur, at least while I was observing. While these
important changes were going on in the comet, a bright auroral arch appeared in
the north, which lasted only a short time. On July 7th, the sky being cloudy, no
observations were made, but on the 8th I observed the comet again. The nucleus
had then resumed its circular form, but it was yet very unsteady, being sometimes
small, bright and sharp, while a few seconds later it appeared twice as large, but
dim in outlines; and sometimes an ill-defined secondary nucleus appeared at its
centre. On several occasions the nucleus appeared as if it were double, one
nucleus being apparently projected partly upon the other.
The nuclei of comets are sometimes very small, and in other cases very large.
Among those which have been measured, the nucleus of the comet of 1798, I.,
was only 28 miles in diameter, but that of Donati's comet, in 1858, was 5,600
miles, and that of the comet of 1845 was 8,000 miles in diameter.
The coma of comets is found to be even more variable than the nucleus. The
changes observed in the coma are generally in close connection with those of the
nucleus and tail, the same perturbations affecting simultaneously the whole
comet. While the coma of the comet of 1847 was only 18,000 miles in diameter,
that of Halley's comet, in 1835, was 357,000 miles, and that of the comet of 1811
was 1,125,000 miles in diameter. In general, as already stated, the coma of a
comet decreases in size in approaching the Sun. That of Encke's comet, which,
on October 9th, 1838, had a diameter of 281,000 miles, gradually decreased at a
daily mean rate of 4,088 miles in going towards the Sun; so that, on December
17th, when the distance of the comet from the Sun was more than four times less
than it was on the first date, its diameter was reduced to 3,000 miles.
The form of the coma, in that part which is free from the tail, is in general a
portion of a circle, but is sometimes irregular, with its border deformed. Thus, the
border of the coma of Halley's comet was depressed at one point towards the
Sun. I observed a similar phenomenon in Coggia's comet, with the great refractor
of the Harvard College Observatory, on July 13th, 1874, when its border
appeared deeply depressed on the side nearest to the Sun, as if repelled by this
body. The coma of comet 1881, III., showed also very singular outlines on the
nights of the 25th and 26th of June, when its border was so deeply depressed
that the coma appeared as if it were double. Luminous rays and jets often radiate
from the nucleus across the coma, and describe graceful lateral curves, falling
backwards and gradually fading away into the tail, of which they then form a part.
The rays and jets emitted by the nucleus seem at first to obey the solar attraction
and travel towards the Sun; but they are soon repelled, and move backward
towards the tail. It is a mystery, as yet unexplained, how these cometary jets,
which at first seem to obey to the laws of attraction, are compelled to retreat
apparently by superior opposing forces. Among the forces of nature, we know of
no other than those of an electrical sort, which would act in a similar manner; but
this explanation would require us to assume some direct electrical communication
between the comet and the Sun. Considering the distance between the two
bodies, and the probable absence or great tenuity of the gaseous material in
interstellar space, such an assumption is a difficult one.
Under the action of the solar forces, the coma also very frequently forms itself
into concentric luminous arcs, separated by comparatively dark intervals. These
luminous semi-circles vary in number, but sometimes there are as many as four
or five at a time. All great comets show these concentric curves more or less, but
sometimes only a portion is visible, the rest of the coma having a different
structure. When great comets approach near the Sun, their coma is generally
composed of two distinct parts, an inner and an outer coma, the inner one being
due to the luminous jets issuing from the nucleus, which, never extending very
far, form a distinct, bright zone within the fainter exterior coma.
The tails of comets, which are in fact a prolongation of the coma, are likewise
extremely variable in form. They are sometimes straight like a rod; again, are
curved like a sabre, or even crooked like an S, as was that of the comet of 1769.
They are also fan-shaped, pointed, or of the same width throughout. Many of
these appendages appear longitudinally divided through their middle by a narrow,
darkish rift, extending from the nucleus to the extremity. This peculiarity appears
in the comet shown on Plate XI. Sometimes the dark rift does not commence
near the nucleus, but at some distance from it, as I observed in the case of comet
1881, III., on June 26th. This dark rift is not a permanent feature of a comet's tail,
but may be visible one day and not at all the next. Comet 1881, III., which had
shown a dark rift towards the end of June, did not exhibit any such rift during July
and August, when, on the contrary, its tail appeared brighter in the middle.
Coggia's comet, which showed so prominent a dark rift in July, 1874, had none
on June 10th. On the contrary, the tail was on that date very bright along its
middle, as also along each of its edges.
The tail of a comet does not invariably point directly away from the Sun, as
above mentioned, and sometimes the deviation is considerable; for instance, the
tail of the comet of 1577 deviated 21° from the point opposite to the Sun.
In general, the tail inclines its extremity towards the regions of space which it
has just left, always presenting its convex border to the regions towards which it
is moving. It is also a remarkable fact that this convex border, moving first in
space, always appears brighter and sharper than the opposite one, which is often
diffused. From these peculiarities it would seem that in moving about the Sun the
comets encounter some resistance to their motion, from the medium through
which they pass, and that this resistance is sufficient to curve their tails away
from the course in which they move, and to crowd their particles together on the
forward side. It is especially when they approach their perihelion, and move more
rapidly on a curve of a shorter radius, that the comets' tails show the greatest
curvature, unless their position in regard to the observer prevents their being
advantageously seen. The tail of Donati's comet presented a fair illustration of
this peculiarity, its curvature having augmented with the velocity of the comet's
motion about the Sun. But possibly this phenomenon has another cause, and
may be found rather in the solar repulsion which acts on comets and is not
instantaneously propagated throughout their mass.
Although, in general, comets have but one tail, it is not very rare to see them
with multiple tails. The comets of 1807 and 1843 had each a double tail; Donati's
comet, in 1858, showed several narrow, long rectilinear rays, issuing from its
abruptly curved tail. The comet of 1825 had five branches, while that of 1744
exhibited no less than six distinct tails diverging from the coma at various angles.
In general character the multiple and single tails are similar. When a comet has
two tails, it is not rare for the second to extend in the general direction of the Sun,
as was the case with the great comet of 1881, III., represented on Plate XI. From
July 14th to the 21st it exhibited quite an extended conical tail, starting obliquely
downwards from the right side of the coma, and directed towards the Sun. From
the 24th of July to the 2d of August this secondary tail was exactly opposite in its
direction from that of the primary tail, and gave to the head a very elongated
appearance. Comet 1881, IV., also exhibited a secondary appendage, not
directed towards the Sun, but making an angle of about 45° with the main tail.
These cometary appendages sometimes attain prodigious dimensions. The
comets of 1680 and 1769 had tails so extended that, after their heads had set
under the horizon, the extremities of these immense appendages were still seen
as far up as the zenith. In a single day the tail of the comet of 1843 extended
100°, and it was thrust from the comet "as a dart of light" to the enormous
distance of 48,500,000 miles, and yet of this immense appendage nothing was
left on the following day. The tail of Donati's comet, in 1858, attained a real length
of 42,000,000 miles, while that of the great comet of 1843 had the enormous
length of 200,000,000 miles. If this last comet had occupied the position of the
Sun, which it approached very nearly for a moment, the extremity of its tail would
have extended 60,000,000 miles beyond the orbit of Mars.
In some cases the tails of comets have been seen undulating and vibrating in
a manner similar to the undulations and coruscations of light characteristic of
some auroras. Many observers report having seen such phenomena. The comet
of 1769 was traversed by luminous waves and pulsations, comparable to those
seen in the aurora borealis. I myself observed these curious undulations in
Coggia's comet in 1874, while the head of this object was below the horizon. For
an hour the undulations rapidly succeeded each other, and ran along the whole
length of the tail.
Some of the brightest comets have shone with such splendor that they could
be observed easily in full sunshine. Many comets, such as those of 1577 and
1744, have equaled Sirius and Venus in brilliancy. The great comet of 1843,
which suddenly appeared in our sky, was so brilliant that it was seen by many
observers at noon time, within a few degrees from the Sun. I remember that I
myself saw this remarkable object in the day time, with a number of persons, who
were gazing at the wonderful apparition. So brilliant was this comet, that besides
its nucleus and head, a portion of its tail was also visible in the day time, provided
the observer screened his eyes from the full sunlight by standing in the shadow of
some building.
Of all the bodies revolving around the Sun, none have been known to
approach so near its surface as did the comet of 1843. When it arrived at
perihelion, the distance from the centre of its nucleus to the surface of the Sun's
photosphere was only 96,000 miles, while the distance from surface to surface
was less than 60,000 miles. This comet, then, went through the solar
atmosphere, and in traversing it with its tremendous velocity of 366 miles per
second, may very possibly have swept through some solar protuberances, many
of which attain much higher elevations than that at which the comet passed. The
comet of 1680 also approached quite near the surface of the Sun, and near
enough to encounter some of the high solar protuberances, its distance at
perihelion being about two-thirds of the Moon's distance from the Earth. The
rapidity of motion of the comet of 1843 was such, when it approached the Sun,
that it swept through all that part of its orbit which is situated north of the plane of
the ecliptic in a little more than two hours, moving in this short time from one node
to the other, or 1800.
But if some comets have a very short perihelion distance, that of others is
considerable. Such a comet was that of 1729, whose perihelion distance was
383,000,000 miles, the perihelion point being situated between the orbits of Mars
and Jupiter.
While some comets come near enough to the Sun at perihelion to be
volatilized by its intense heat, others recede so far from it at aphelion that they
may be said to be frozen. The shortest cometary aphelion distance known is that
of Encke's comet, whose greatest distance from the sun is 388,000,000 miles.
But that of the comet of 1844 is 406,000,000,000 miles from the Sun. The comets
of 1863 and 1864 are so remote in space when they reach their aphelion points
that light, with its velocity of 185,500 miles a second, would require 171 days in
the first case, and 230 in the last, to pass from them to the Earth.
The period of revolution of different comets also varies immensely. While that
of Encke's comet is only 3½ years, that of comet 1864, II., is 280,000 years.
Among the periodic comets of short period, some have exhibited highly
interesting phenomena. Encke's comet, discovered in 1818, is remarkable for the
fact that its period of revolution diminishes at each of its successive returns, and
consequently this comet, with each revolution, approaches nearer and nearer to
the Sun. The decrease of the period is about 2½ hours at each return. Although
the decrease is small, if it go on in future as it does at present, the inevitable
consequence will be that this comet will finally fall into the Sun. This curious
phenomenon of retardation has been attributed by astronomers to the existence
of a resisting medium filling space, but so rare and ethereal that it does not
produce any sensible effect on the movements of the planets. But some other
causes may retard this comet, as similar retardations have not been observed in
the case of other periodic comets of short period. These, however, are not so
near to the Sun, and perhaps our luminary may be surrounded by matter of
extreme tenuity, which does not exist at a greater distance from it.
Another of the periodic comets which has exhibited a very remarkable
phenomenon of transformation is Biela's comet, which divided into two distinct
parts, moving together in the same direction. When this comet was first detected
at its return in 1845, it presented nothing unusual, but in the early part of 1846 it
was noticed by several astronomers to be divided into two parts of unequal
brightness, forming thus a twin comet. At its next return in 1852, the two sister
comets were still traveling in company, but their distance apart, which in 1846
was 157,000 miles, had increased to 1,500,000 miles. At the two next returns in
1859 and 1865, their position not being very favorably situated for observation,
the comets were not seen. In 1872 the position should have been favorable for
observation, and they were consequently searched for, but in vain; neither comet
was found. An astronomer in the southern hemisphere, however, found a comet
on the track of Biela's, but calculation has shown that the two objects are
probably not identical, since this comet was two months behind the computed
position for Biela's. It will be shown in the following chapter that our globe
probably crossed the orbit of Biela's comet on November 27th, 1872, and the
phenomena resulting from this passage will be there described.
It is seen from these observations that comets may be lost or dissipated in
space by causes entirely unknown to us. Biela's comet is not the only one which
has been thus disintegrated. Ancient historians speak of the separation of large
comets into two or more parts. In 1661 Hevelius observed the apparent division
of the comet of that year and its reduction to fragments. The return of this comet,
calculated for 1790, was vainly waited for; the comet was not seen.
Other comets, whose periods of revolution were well known, have
disappeared, probably never to return. Such is Lexell's comet, whose period was
5⁶⁄₁₀ years; also De Vico's comet, both of which are now lost. It is supposed that
Lexell's comet, which passed twice very near the giant planet Jupiter, had its orbit
changed from an ellipse to a parabola, by the powerful disturbing influence of this
planet, and was thus lost from our system. Several other comets, in traveling over
their different orbits, have approached near enough to Saturn, Jupiter and the
Earth to have their orbits decidedly altered by the powerful attraction of these
bodies.
But since comets are liable to pass near the planets, and several have orbits
which approach that of the Earth, it becomes important for us to know whether an
encounter of such a body with our globe is possible, and what would then be the
result for us. Although that knowledge would not enable us to modify the
possibilities of an encounter, yet it is better to know the dangers of our navigation
through space than to ignore them. This question of a collision of the Earth with a
comet has been answered in different ways, according to the ideas entertained in
regard to the mass of these bodies. While some have predicted calamities of all
kinds, such as deluges, conflagrations, or the reduction of the Earth to
incandescent gases, others have asserted that it would produce no more effect
than does a fly on encountering a railroad train. In our days astronomers entertain
very little fears from such an encounter, because the probabilities of danger from
an occurrence of this sort are very slight, the mass of an ordinary comet being so
small compared with that of our globe. We know with certainty that the Earth has
never had an encounter with a comet by which it has been transformed into
gases, at least within the several millions of years during which animal and
vegetable life have left their marks upon the stony pages of its history, otherwise
these marks would not now be seen. If, then, such an accident has not happened
during this long period, the chances for its occurring must be very small, so small
indeed that they might almost be left out of the question. It is true that our globe
shows signs of great perturbations of its surface, but we have not the slightest
proofs that they resulted from an encounter with a celestial body. It seems very
probable that our globe passed through the tail of the comet of 1861, before it
was first seen on June 29th; but nothing unusual was observed, except perhaps
some phosphorescent light in the atmosphere, which was afterwards attributed to
this cause.
The density and mass of comets must be comparatively very small. Their tails
consist of matter of such extreme tenuity that it affects but very little the light of
the small stars over which they pass. The coma and nucleus, however, are not
quite so transparent, and may have greater masses. On several occasions I have
seen the light of stars reduced by the interposition of cometary matter, comet
1881, III., presenting remarkable cases of this sort. On July 8th, at 10h. 50m.,
several small stars were involved in this comet, one of which passed quite near
the nucleus through the bright inner coma. At that time the comet was greatly
disturbed, its nucleus was contracting and enlarging rapidly, and becoming bright
and again faint in an instant. Every time that the nucleus grew larger, the star
became invisible, but reappeared the moment the nucleus was reduced in size.
This phenomenon could not be attributed to an atmospheric effect, since, while
the nucleus was enlarging, a very small inner nucleus was visible within the large
diffused one, the matter of which had apparently spread over the part of the coma
in which the star was involved, making it invisible.
That the mass of comets is small, is proved by the fact that they have
sometimes passed near the planets without disturbing them in any sensible
manner. Lexell's comet, which in 1770 remained four months very near Jupiter,
did not affect in the least the orbits, or the motions of its satellites. The same
comet also came within less than 1,500,000 miles from the Earth, and on this
occasion it was calculated that its mass could not have been the ¹⁄₅₀₀₀ part of that
of our globe, since otherwise the perturbations which it would have caused in the
elements of the Earth's orbit would have been sensible. There was, however, no
change. If this comet's mass had been equal to that of our globe, the length of
our year would have been increased by 2h. 47m. The comet of 1837 remained
four days within 3,500,000 miles of the Earth, with no sensible effect.
It seems quite difficult to admit that the denser part of a comet forming the
nucleus is solid, as supposed by some physicists, since it is so rapidly contracted
and dilated by the solar forces, while the comet is yet at a too great distance from
the Sun to allow these effects to be attributed to solar heat alone. This part of a
comet, as indeed the other parts, seems rather to be in the gaseous than in the
solid state; the changes observed in the intensity of its light and in its structure
may be conceived as due to some solar action partaking of the nature of
electricity.
It has been a question whether comets are self-luminous, or whether they
simply reflect the solar light. When their light is analyzed by the spectroscope, it is
found that the nucleus of a comet generally gives a continuous spectrum, while
the coma and tail give a spectrum consisting of several bright diffused bands. The
spectrum given by the nucleus is rarely bright enough to allow the dark lines of
the solar spectrum to be discerned upon it; but such lines were reported in the
spectrum of comet 1881, III., a fact proving that this nucleus at least reflected
some solar light. The nucleus of a comet may be partly self-luminous, and either
solid, liquid, or composed of incandescent gases submitted to a great pressure.
As to the coma and tail, they are evidently gaseous, and partly, if not entirely, self-
luminous, as is proved by the band spectrum which they give. The position of
these bands, moreover, indicates that the luminous gases of which they are
composed contain carbon. The phenomena of polarization, however, seem to
prove that these parts of comets also reflect some solar light.
No theory so far proposed, to explain comets and the strange phenomena
they exhibit, seems to have been successful in its attempts, and the mystery in
which these bodies have been involved from the beginning of their apparition,
seems to be now nearly as great as ever. It has been supposed that their tails
have no real existence, but are due to an optical illusion. Prof. Tyndall has
endeavored to explain cometary phenomena by supposing these bodies to be
composed of vapors subject to decomposition by the solar radiations, and thus
made visible, the head and tail being an actinic cloud due to such
decompositions. According to this view, the tails of comets would not consist of
matter projected into spacer but simply of matter precipitated by the solar rays in
traversing the cometary nebulosity. The endeavor has also been made to explain
the various phenomena presented by comets by an electrical action of the Sun on
the gases composing these objects. Theories taking this as a base seem to us to
be more likely to lead to valuable results. M. Faye, who has devoted much time
and learning to this subject, assumes a real repulsive force of the Sun, acting
inversely to the square of the distance and proportionally to the surface, and not
to the mass as attraction does. He supposes, however, that this repulsive force is
generated by the solar heat, and not by electricity. Prof. Wm. Harkness says that
many circumstances seem to indicate that the comets' tails are due, in a great
measure, to electrical phenomena.
The fact that the tails of comets are better defined and brighter on the forward
side, associated with the other fact that they curve the most when their motion is
most rapid, sufficiently indicates that these appendages are material, and that
they either encounter some resistance from the medium in which they move, or
from a solar repulsion. The phenomena of condensation and extension, which I
have observed in the comets of 1874 and 1881, added to the curious behavior
exhibited by the jets issuing from the nucleus, seem to indicate the action of
electrical forces rather than of heat. The main difficulty encountered in the
framing of a theory of comets consists in explaining how so delicate and
extended objects as their tails seem to be, can be transported and whirled around
the Sun at their perihelion with such an enormous velocity, always keeping
opposite to the Sun, and, as expressed by Sir John Herschel, "in defiance of the
law of gravitation, nay, even of the received laws of motion."
To consider the direction of the comets' tails as an indirect effect of attraction,
seems out of the question; the phenomenon of repulsion so plainly exhibited by
these objects seems to point to a positive solar repulsion, as alone competent to
produce these great changes. The repulsive action of the Sun on comets' tails
might be conceived, for instance, as acting in a manner similar to that of a
powerful current of wind starting from the Sun, and constantly changing in
direction, but always keeping on a line with the comet. Such a current, acting on a
comet's tail as if it were a pennant, would drive it behind the nucleus just as
observed. If it could once be ascertained that the great disturbances on comets
correspond with the magnetic disturbances on our globe and with the display of
the auroral light, the electric nature of the forces acting so strangely on the
comets would be substantially demonstrated. I have shown that some of the great
disturbances observed in the comets of 1874 and 1881 have coincided with
auroral displays, and it will be shown hereafter that similar displays have also
coincided with the passage of meteoric showers through our atmosphere.
Whether these simultaneous phenomena were simple coincidences having no
connection, or whether they are the result of a common cause, can only be
ascertained by long continued future observations.
PLATE XII