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The End of
Pax Britannica in the
Persian Gulf, 1968–1971
Brandon Friedman
The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf,
1968–1971
 Brandon Friedman

The End of Pax

Britannica in the
Persian Gulf,
1968–1971
Brandon Friedman
The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and
African Studies (MDC)
Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel

ISBN 978-3-030-56181-9    ISBN 978-3-030-56182-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the guidance and sup-
port of my doctoral supervisors, Professor David Menashri and Professor
Uzi Rabi. I owe a debt of immense gratitude to them for everything they
have done for me. I would also like to pay tribute to Professor Joseph
Kostiner (of blessed memory), whose influence on my work is like a finger-­
sketch in the dust: its faint outline is not always visible, but it is always
there. I am also deeply indebted to my teachers, who generously shared
their knowledge and scholarship with me over the years: Professor Meir
Litvak, Professor Eyal Zisser, Dr. Paul Rivlin, Professor Bruce Maddy-­
Weitzman, Professor Ofra Bengio, and Professor David Yeroushalmi. I
would also like to thank former directors of the Moshe Dayan Center
(MDC)—Professor Asher Susser, Professor Itamar Rabinovich, and
Professor Shimon Shamir—for their scholarly example, support, and
encouragement.
Tel Aviv University provided me with the enormous privilege and
opportunity to pursue a doctorate and later to become a member of the
faculty. This would not have happened without the institutional support
of the Moshe Dayan Center (MDC) for Middle Eastern and African
Studies, the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, the Department of Middle
Eastern and African History, and the Zvi Yavetz Graduate School of
Historical Studies. Collectively, these institutions have provided me with a
home for the past fifteen years. I am grateful for the generosity, warmth,
guidance, and assistance of a special group of accomplished scholars and

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

administrators. I would like to particularly thank the MDC’s Efrat

Shulman-Arad for her professionalism and support in recent years.
I was fortunate to begin my graduate studies when the Alliance Center
for Iranian Studies was being established by Professor David Menashri. I
am grateful to the Alliance Center’s principal donors—Lord David
Alliance, and David and Laura Merage—whose generosity made my doc-
torate possible. I would also like to acknowledge the Mieczyslaw Wejc
Memorial Doctoral Fellowship, which provided a substantial portion of
the annual funding that allowed me to complete my graduate studies.
My thanks to the editorial team at Palgrave Macmillan. Molly Beck
commissioned this work, and Sam Stocker has been a patient and respon-
sive editorial guide. I am particularly grateful to Ms. Beck for efficiently
shepherding the manuscript through the review process during the uncer-
tainty of the coronavirus outbreak. My thanks as well to the anonymous
reviewer for the constructive criticism and feedback, which I believe has
improved the final manuscript. Of course, all shortcomings and errors are
entirely my own.
I would also like to thank Taylor & Francis and the Editors of Middle
Eastern Studies, Saul Kelly and Helen Kedourie. This book is derived, in
part, from an article, “From union (ʾittihad) to united (muttahida): the
United Arab Emirates, a success born of failure,” published in a special
issue of Middle Eastern Studies, “From Aden to Abu Dhabi—Britain and
State Formation in Arabia, 1962–1971: A Retrospective,” in November
2016, and edited by the late Sylvia Kedourie. I would like to warmly thank
Professor Clive Jones of Durham University’s School of Government and
International Affairs for inviting me to participate in the workshop “Aden
and South Arabia: A Retrospective Study in the Failure of State Creation”
at Durham University in January 2015, which led to the publication of the
abovementioned article in a special edition of Middle Eastern Studies.
Elizabeth Michael, my “Oma,” and my late grandmother, Josephine
Friedman, encouraged and supported my decision to leave a secure career
and go to graduate school. I must especially remember my Oma, a survi-
vor if there ever was one. She taught me a great many things about life,
including the meaning of my Jewish identity, the value of education, and
the necessity of persistence, perseverance, and sacrifice. She passed away as
I was in the final stages of preparing this manuscript, and I deeply regret
that I will not be able to share this book with her.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii

My wife, Magnenia Kabada, has brought immeasurable joy into my life

since we met. Our boys, Yoav and Rem, have endured my absentminded
preoccupation with this book with indefatigable indifference. My love for
them is boundless. Finally, this book is dedicated to my parents, David and
Shlomit Friedman, for their unconditional love and support. I am eter-
nally grateful.
 A Note on Transliteration

The U.S. Library of Congress table of Romanization was used to transliterate

Arabic words into English throughout this monograph. For names of people, I
also used the Library of Congress Romanization table; however, I did not include
diacritical marks for long vowels or velarized consonants. For commonly used
names and places I relied on the wordlist provided by the International Journal of
Middle East Studies (IJMES). So rather than Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāsir, I used IJMES’s
Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, rather than using King Faisal, as recommended by
IJMES, I elected to use King Faysal. For the names of places, I relied on IJMES
or the most common English language usage. So, for example, rather than
(al-­Kuwayt), I used Kuwait.

ix
 Contents

1 Introduction  1

2 The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf 19

3 One Step Forward, One Step Back 51

4 Iran: The British Successor in the Gulf? 83

5 Nixon, the Shah, and King Faysal113

6 Iran Shifting Gears139

7 From Crisis to Clarity163

8 A Sea Change in the Middle East and the Gulf195

9 Grandeur and Independence223

xi
xii CONTENTS

10 Conclusion255

Bibliography263

Index275
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book is organized around one simple question: how did the rulers
(hukām, singular: hakı̄m) along the Persian Gulf1 littoral respond to the
British decision to withdraw their military from the region in 1968? The
British ended 150 years of military supremacy in the Gulf between 1968
and 1971;2 this is a history of the rulers’ competition for power and pres-
tige during those four years. More specifically, this book argues against the
claim that “Pax Britannica gave way to Pax Iranica” in the Gulf.3 This
work challenges the argument that the post-British vacuum was filled by
Iranian primacy. There was no legitimate successor to the British in Gulf
and its withdrawal led to an increasingly destabilizing rivalry between Iran
and Iraq.
While the Nixon Doctrine supported Iranian primacy as a proxy for
U.S. power in the Gulf, Iran’s pretension of filling the vacuum and

1
The name of the Gulf is a politically contested term, which has been the subject of dispute
between Persians and Arabs of the region. This monograph will use “Persian Gulf,” the most
common usage in English. In some instances, the term “Gulf” will be used for the sake of
brevity and without political intent. See Lawrence G. Potter, ed., The Persian Gulf in History
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 15–16.
2
Uzi Rabi, “British Possessions in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Arabia,” in Zach Levey
and Elie Podeh (eds.), Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner
(Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), pp. 264–280.
3
Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition
1968–1971 (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 129.

© The Author(s) 2020 1

B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf,
1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_1
2 B. FRIEDMAN

replacing the British at the end of 1971 was not accepted by Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, or the Arab rulers of the lower Gulf emirates. The U.S., during the
last year of Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration, adopted a British-inspired
policy that became popularly known as a “twin pillars” policy in the region,
which meant leaning on a condominium of Iranian and Saudi power to
safeguard U.S. interests in the Gulf.4 During the first two years of the
Nixon administration, this policy remained in place. In practice, the
U.S. under President Richard Nixon viewed Mohammad Reza Shah
Pahlavi as a “safe bet,” and Saudi Arabia as a “long-term liability,”5 when
it came to protecting U.S. interests in the Gulf. However, it was not until
November 7, 1970, that official U.S. policy began to tilt towards promot-
ing Iranian primacy in the Gulf.6 Nevertheless, just because “the United
States embraced Iran as the paramount power in the Gulf after the British
completed their withdrawal in 1971,”7 it did not mean that the rulers in
the Gulf viewed it as a legitimate arrangement.
The British system was accepted for more than a century in the Gulf
not merely because the British were the dominant military power in the
region. The balance of power mattered, but so did the framework within
which the British exercised their power. The British were viewed as legiti-
mate arbiters of regional security because, on the whole, they avoided
interfering in how the rulers exercised their local authority. The search for
a new framework for regional politics was not simply a matter of which
ruler would amass enough military power to fill the void left by the British,
it was also a matter of the rulers coming to a shared understanding of
when and how the exercise of power would be viewed as legitimate. This
book is the story of how and what shaped the rulers’ ideas and actions
about what constituted the legitimate exercise of power in the absence of
a British system that separated the Iranian and Arab sides of the Gulf from
4
Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 29–37. “Twin pillars” was not a term
that was used by U.S. or British officials during this period. It became popularized later and
widely accepted in U.S. policy circles following Richard Haas’ 1981 article: Richard Haas,
“Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Twin Pillars in Revolutionary Times,” in The Security of the
Persian Gulf (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., pp. 151–169.
5
Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the
Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History 36:2 (2012), 357.
6
Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 54–55.
7
Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 5.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

one another. Some might argue that little happened between 1968 and
1971. However, an overemphasis on events runs the risk of overlooking
crucial changes in beliefs, ideas, and interactions between the primary
actors in history and how those beliefs in turn shaped the system in which
they acted.
In the aftermath of the Baʿth revolution in Iraq in July 1968, the
decade-long regional rivalry between Iran and Iraq rapidly escalated. This
rivalry pitted Imperial Iranian nationalism against Iraq’s revolutionary
Arab nationalism, creating a cycle of mutually reinforcing hostility. The
narrative presented here shows how Saudi Arabia and the ruling shaykhs
of the lower Gulf attempted to navigate the intensifying rivalry between
Iranian nationalism and revolutionary Arab nationalism, particularly after
the death of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970.
In a narrow sense, then, this monograph focuses on how the rulers
viewed and pursued their respective interests—security, power, wealth,
honor, and prestige—in order to preserve and protect their dynastic
regimes. Yet, the core argument in this book is that political relationships
between the rulers in the Gulf, on both sides, Arab and Iranian, were
tightly interconnected.8 The book will describe these interconnections
and explain the effects of British withdrawal on them.

Shaykhly Authority
During most of the nineteenth century and more than half of the twenti-
eth century, Great Britain was the “arbiter and guardian of the Gulf.”9
From the perspectives of the ruling Arab shaykhs, by accepting this “cul-
turally sanctioned” role as arbiter and protector, the British Resident was
the Gulf’s paramount ruler in the shaykhly system of authority and known
as Chief of the Gulf (raʾis al-khalij).10 The British referred to this arrange-
ment as the “Trucial system,” in reference to the series of treaty arrange-
ments that Great Britain entered into with the various ruling shaykhs in
the Gulf between 1835 and 1916.

8
For a theoretical explanation of the concept of interconnections in a system, see: Robert
Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1997), p. 6.
9
James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British
Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6 (2004), 30–92, here 75.
10
James Onley, ‘The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British
Resident in the Nineteenth Century’, New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6 (2004), 30–92, here 32.
4 B. FRIEDMAN

In the nineteenth century, the British transformed the Gulf into a

“British lake” by entering into a series of treaties with the ruling shaykhs
of the Arab littoral that were meant to pacify Gulf waters for the safe pas-
sage of British merchant vessels. The British intended to end the tribal
warfare and sea-raiding that had erupted in Gulf waters and threatened the
security of British trade in the early nineteenth century. In 1820, the rul-
ing shaykhs of the Omani coast (what is the present-day United Arab
Emirates) signed a peace agreement with the British. Bahrain asked to be
admitted to the treaty in order to avoid paying maritime tolls.11 At that
time the British considered Qatar to be a Bahraini dependency and Kuwait
under Ottoman suzerainty and so they were not included in the treaty. In
1835 the ruling shaykhs of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, and the Qasimi
Empire12 and the British upgraded the 1820 treaty to a “Maritime Truce,”
made perpetual in 1853 (Bahrain joined in 1861), which outlawed warfare
at sea in the Gulf and made Great Britain the ultimate arbiter of disputes
in the Gulf. The British began to refer to these shaykhdoms as the “Trucial
States” and to the Omani coast as the “Trucial Coast.” In 1892, the ruling
shaykhs entered into a new agreement with the British government which
constituted the basis for Britain’s special relationship with the Arab rulers
in the Gulf until 1971.13
The shaykhs, in exchange for protection from external threats, agreed
not to have relations with, or cede territory to, any outside power other
than Great Britain. The British interpreted these agreements as mandates

11
Except where otherwise noted with a separate footnote, this account of the British trea-
ties in the Gulf is based on James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab
Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6,
pp. 30–92.
12
The Qasimi Empire included territory on both sides of the Gulf waters: Sharjah, Umm
al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, Rams, Dibba, Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, Kalba, Mughu, Lingah,
and Qeshm Island.
13
The nature of this relationship was unique in the British Empire. Its scope, meaning, and
impact have been debated in the historical literature on the British Empire, and are best sum-
marized in Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British
Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” and Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the
Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 98–105. For an alternative view, see:
Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman,
1965–1976 (Oxford University Press, 2015); and, Abdel Razzaq Takriti, “Colonial Coups
and the Wars on Popular Sovereignty,” American Historical Review 124:3 (June 2019),
878–909.
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

for control over the shaykhdoms’ external affairs.14 Bahrain signed such an
agreement in 1880, and the Shaykh of Kuwait signed a similar agreement
in 1899 (which was terminated in 1961 with Kuwaiti independence). In
1916, Qatar’s independence from Bahrain was acknowledged by the
British and the Shaykh of Qatar entered into an exclusive agreement with
Britain.
While these treaties provided Britain exclusivity and safety in the Gulf,
they also guaranteed the shaykhs an important source of their authority
and legitimacy, providing them with a perpetual means to fulfill two of
their principal obligations to their peoples—maintaining order and pro-
viding protection from external threats. And what is important for the
purposes of this study is that British protection made the shaykhs’ author-
ity much less frail than in the past. The ruling shaykhs used British protec-
tion as an extension of their own power.
During the nineteenth century, the shaykhs and their families trans-
formed themselves into the established vehicle through which the British
protection from external threats was implemented. In most cases this rela-
tionship with the British enhanced the status of the ruling families and as
a result they became less vulnerable to internal threats with the exception
of intrafamilial challenges.15
Therefore, by virtue of the British treaties, Al Nahyan of the Al Bu
Falah clan cemented the supremacy established by Zayid bin Khalifah
(1855–1909) in Abu Dhabi, while their cousins and bitter rivals, the Al
Maktum of the Al Bu Falasah used British protection to establish a lucra-
tive transit trade in Dubai which traversed the Gulf and Indian Ocean.
Shaykh Mubarak Al Sabah of Kuwait used the treaty with the British to
outmaneuver an Ottoman bid for control of Kuwait’s strategic port, as
well as to cement Al Sabah ascendancy over the other prominent merchant
families of Kuwait. The Al Thani of Qatar, caught between the Al Khalifah
of Bahrain and Ottoman suzerainty at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, was able to parlay British recognition into independent power.16

14
Peter Lienhardt, Sheikhdoms of Eastern Arabia (London: Palgrave, 2001), edited by
Ahmad Al-Shahi, p. 3.
15
James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British
Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6, p. 66.
16
J.E. Peterson, “Historical Pattern of Gulf Security,” in Security in the Persian Gulf (New
York: Palgrave, 2002), edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, pp. 7–31; Jill Crystal,
Oil and politics in the Gulf: Rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
6 B. FRIEDMAN

The treaties ironically also protected the rapidly deteriorating fortunes

of the Al Qawasim in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. After all, it was the Al
Qawasim sea-raids (gharat) of merchant ships in the Gulf that prompted
the British to put an end to what they deemed piracy (qarsana).17 In
1819–1820 the British launched a full-scale naval expedition from Bombay
that wiped out hundreds of Qasimi vessels along 322 kilometers (200 miles)
of the littoral, which the British had named the “Pirate Coast.” While the
British gunboats and subsequent treaties ended a profitable maritime raid-
ing enterprise for the Qasimi shaykhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, lead-
ing to their decline, the British guarantee of protection also prevented the
Qasimi rulers from being absorbed by larger, more powerful neighbors in
Abu Dhabi, Muscat, and Oman.
The British relationship with the ruling shaykhs, until the announce-
ment of withdrawal, eliminated threats to British maritime interests in the
Gulf; provided a form of protection and power to the existing ruling
shaykhs; and limited the expansion of both Iran into the Gulf waters and
the Al Saʿud conquests from the Arabian interior to the Gulf coast. As
James Onley outlined, the British were socialized to function as the para-
mount shaykh in a shaykhly system,18 and, in 1968, it was not clear how
the system of shaykhly sovereignty would survive without the British.

Historiography and Sources

The long British presence in the Gulf and its decision to withdraw from
the region have been the focus of a considerable amount of research. In
addition to the well-developed historiography on British role in the Gulf,
scholars have focused their research on one of four main areas: First, Cold
War diplomatic histories that attempt to explain the relations between the
great powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union—and the Gulf’s leading actors; second, case studies of the foreign
policy of one of the Gulf states covering several decades; third, the history
of state-formation in the Gulf, primarily related to the formation of the
UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar in 1971; and, fourth, the history of territorial
claims in the Gulf, usually with the aim of building a historical or legal case
for one side or the other in the dispute.

Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon:
17

1971), p. 36.
18
James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British
Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 30–92.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

So why yet another study on British withdrawal? This history, presented

in a chronological framework, makes the regional politics the object of
analysis. In so doing, it bridges the gap between the Cold War or End of
Empire histories focused on great power dynamics and the more narrowly
focused state formation and foreign policy literature that view these issues
through the prism of one specific actor.19
Several scholars have examined the impact of British withdrawal from
the perspective of British imperial politics and policy but these studies have
minimized the regional issues related to Gulf politics, focusing instead on
the British Empire.20 British imperial history has re-emerged in recent
years in a variety of forms, including subaltern and postcolonial scholar-
ship.21 This literature informed this work with respect to the British influ-
ence on the social and political processes in the region, but it does not
address the changes in the regional political interactions that took place
between the rulers in the Gulf following the British announcement in 1968.
Abdel Razzaq Takriti’s recent revisionist scholarship is an important excep-
tion; nevertheless, Takriti focuses on re-characterizing the nature of the

19
Two relatively new works edited by Lawrence G. Potter address the Gulf as a regional
unit, but these books are generally focused on sub-state groups, networks, and localities as
the objects of analysis. See: Lawrence G. Potter, ed., The Persian Gulf in History (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and, Lawrence G. Potter, ed., The Persian Gulf in Modern Times
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
20
For example, see: Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s
Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Dependencies (Cambridge, 1991); Saki Dockrill,
Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World (Basingstoke:
Palgrave 2002); William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire,
Suez and Decolonization: Collected Essays (London, New York: I.B.Tauris, 2006); Miriam
Joyce, Ruling Shaikhs and Her Majesty’s Government, and Kuwait, 1960–1969: An Anglo-
American Perspective (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Simon Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall
in the Gulf (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Shohei Sato, “Britain’s
Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964–68: A Pattern and a Puzzle,” The Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 37:1 (2009), 99–117; Simon S. Smith, Ending
Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-war Decolonization, 1945–73
(London: Routledge, 2012); Helene von Bismarck, British Policy in the Persian Gulf,
1961–1968: Conceptions of Informal Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Simon
C. Smith, Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle,”
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 44: 2 (2016), 328–351; Shohei Sato,
Britain and the formation of the Gulf States: Embers of Empire (Manchester, UK: Manchester
University Press, 2016).
21
Yoav Alon, “The Historiography of Empire, The Literature on Britain in Middle East”
in Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (eds.), Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to
Junior Partner (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), pp. 23–47.
8 B. FRIEDMAN

relationship between imperial actors and local rulers, rather than on the
dynamics between the rulers themselves.22
Other scholars have examined American relations with the Gulf States
during this period, but these studies focused on American security and
alliance considerations with a particular emphasis on the Cold War.23 Tore
Petersen’s The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961–1969 and
W. Taylor Fain’s American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian
Gulf Region provide detailed diplomatic histories of the Anglo-American
role in Gulf events during this period. Fain analyzes U.S. and British poli-
cies and relations during the period leading up to and following the British
withdrawal. Fain’s study is based on a careful reading of the British and
American national archives, but his focus is on American-British rela-
tions.24 His work sheds light on British-American policy discussions and is
less concerned with the unfolding regional events reported in the diplo-
matic cables from the British and American officials based in the embassies
and consulates in the Gulf. Petersen’s The Decline of the Anglo-American
Middle East, 1961–1969, which was published two years before Fain’s
book, is a continuation of an earlier work focusing on the 1950s.25 In The
Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, Petersen covers the 1960s and
he takes up the Nixon years in still another volume.26 Both Peterson and

22
Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman,
1965–1976 (Oxford University Press, 2015); Abdel Razzaq Takriti, “Colonial Coups and the
Wars on Popular Sovereignty,” American Historical Review 124:3 (June 2019), 878–909.
Takriti’s work should be seen as advancing themes first outlined in Khaldoun Hasan
Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, translated by L.M. Kenny
(London: Routledge, 1990).
23
For example, see: James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian
Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil :
America’s uneasy partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
and Richard Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988); Tore Petersen, The Decline of the Anglo-American
Middle East, 1961–1969: A Willing Retreat (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2006);
W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Jeffrey R. Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf (New
York: Routledge, 2009).
24
See Fain, pp. 175–180.
25
Tore Petersen, The Middle East Between the Great Powers: Anglo-American Conflict and
Cooperation, 1952–1957 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).
26
Tore Petersen, Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment in the
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: Making Allies out of Clients (Eastbourne: Sussex
Academic Press, 2009).
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

Fain were focused on the Anglo-American story in the Gulf, unlike this
monograph, which makes the regional actors, rather than the great pow-
ers, the objects of analysis.
The scholarship that has related to regional actors in the Gulf during
this period has focused on either the security of one particular state in the
region, or, in some cases, bilateral relations between two states of the
region rather than the effect of regional interaction. These studies gener-
ally cover several decades and therefore devote scant attention to the polit-
ical changes that take place during the four years of British withdrawal,
between 1968 and 1971.
There are several empirically rich and informative studies of post–World
War II Iranian foreign policy that have analyzed the impact of the British
withdrawal from the Gulf.27 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih’s The
Foreign Relations of Iran and R.K. Ramazani’s Iran’s Foreign Policy,
1941–1973 and The Persian Gulf, Iran’s Role provide three important con-
tributions to the literature on Iranian foreign policy for the period under
discussion in this study. Yet these works focus on analyzing the change in
Iran’s foreign policy over broad periods of time. As a result, only fleeting
attention is devoted to the important changes that affected Iran and its
Gulf neighbors between 1968 and 1971 following the British announce-
ment. Further, since these studies were written in the 1970s, they do not
include documents from the British and American national archives, which
are only released after 30 and 25 years, respectively.
There are also several important works on Saudi security and foreign
policy, which similarly focus on the evolution of Saudi policies over broad
periods of time rather than explaining changes over time during the nar-
row period of British withdrawal from the Gulf.28 Laurie Mylroie’s
­unpublished doctoral thesis is an important exception, but, in contrast to

27
Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran: A developing state in
a zone of great-power conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Ruhoullah
Karegar Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran’s Role (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1972); R.K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941–1973 (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1975).
28
For example, see: Nizar Obaid Madani, The Islamic content of the foreign policy of Saudi
Arabia. King Faisal’s call for Islamic solidarity, 1965–1975, (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, The
American University, Washington, D.C., 1977); Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless
Quest for Security (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985); Ghassan Salamé,
al-Siyasa al-Kharijiya al-Saʿudiya mundu 1945 [Saudi foreign policy since 1945](Beirut:
Ma’had al’Inma al-‘Arabi, 1980).
10 B. FRIEDMAN

this study, the period 1968–1971 constitutes only one chapter in her
broader monograph.29 Perhaps the work that comes closest to placing the
analytic focus exclusively on the intra-Gulf political dynamics was
J.B. Kelly’s Arabia, the Gulf, and the West, which was published in 1980.30
Kelly and Mylroie’s works, given when they were written and published,
do not include important declassified documents from the British and
American national archives.
Two important studies of bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and
Iran touch on many of the issues in this monograph, but have ignored
important events of the period that were peripheral to this bilateral rela-
tionship.31 Saeed Badeeb’s work covers Saudi-Iranian relations across a
broad period of time (1932–1982) and glosses over the important changes
that took place during the period of British withdrawal. On the other
hand, Faisal bin Salman al-Saud’s book, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf,
is an important contribution because it is one of the few existing studies
that provides a historical narrative of the period of British withdrawal from
a regional perspective. Yet despite the book’s title, its analytic focus is nar-
row: it describes Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the international
powers, and there is no attempt to explain the nature of regional interac-
tions in the Gulf beyond the Iranian-Saudi framework. Al-Saud’s book is
based on documents from the British, American, and Saudi archives. It is
the only existing English-language scholarly work addressing this period
that makes use of documents from the Royal Saudi Archive, and, as such,
is an invaluable resource. On the other hand, al-Saud’s use of the British
and American documents often appears limited to cabinet-level docu-
ments at the expense of documents generated by officials serving in the
regional embassies and consulates in the Gulf.
There is a rich and detailed literature on the history and politics of spe-
cific territorial and border disputes in the Gulf during this period. Many of
these books and articles are intended to make a historical or legal case for
one side or another’s claim in a long-standing territorial dispute, and often
fail to explain how these issues were affected by the broader political

29
Laurie Mylroie, Regional Security After Empire: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf (Unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1985)
30
J.B. Kelly, Arabia the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980).
31
Saeed M. Badeeb, Saudi-Iranian Relations, 1932–1982 (London: Centre for Arab and
Iranian Studies, 1993); Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power
Politics in Transition 1968–1971 (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003).
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

context during this specific time period.32 Important exceptions, however,

to this general appraisal of the literature on the boundary disputes includes
the work of British scholar Richard Schofield, as well as several others.33
There are also several important works that address state formation in
the Gulf. These works, however, have limited their discussions to how
state formation was affected by regional interactions in the Gulf during
this period. The regional dynamics are not fully developed.34

32
For example, see: Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and
Abu Musa in the Gulf (London: Macmillan, 1996); Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Security and
Territoriality in the Persian Gulf, A Maritime Political Geography (Richmond, Surrey:
Curzon Press, 1999). The title of Thomas Mattair’s The Three Occupied UAE Islands (Abu
Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2005) also reflects this phe-
nomenon. See, also: Koroush Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf
(Routledge, 2008).
33
See, for example: Richard Schofield, “Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and Arabian
Peninsula during the Twentieth Century,” in Richard Schofield (ed.), Territorial Foundations
of the Gulf States (London: UCL Press 1994/Routledge, 2016), pp. 1–77; Farhad Cyrus
Sharifi-Yazdi, Arab-Iranian Rivalry in the Persian Gulf: Territorial Disputes and the Balance
of Power in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2015) Richard Schofield,
“Anything but Black and White: A Commentary on the Lower Gulf Islands Dispute,” in
Security in the Persian Gulf (New York: Palgrave, 2002), edited by Lawrence G. Potter and
Gary G. Sick, pp. 171–187; or, Richard Schofield, “The crystallisation of a complex territo-
rial dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi borderland, 1966–1971,” Journal of Arabian
Studies 1:1 (2011), pp. 27–51. See, also: John C. Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers: The Story of
Britain’s Boundary Drawing in the Desert (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991); Gwenn Okruhlik
and Paul Conge, “The Politics of Border Disputes: On the Arabian Peninsula,” International
Journal 54/2 (1999), pp. 230–48; John Peterson, “Sovereignty and Boundaries in the Gulf
States,” in Mehran Kamrava (ed.), International Politics in the Persian Gulf (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2011), pp. 21–49.
34
For example, see: John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics and
Petroleum (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975); Frauke Heard-Bey, From
Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition (London: Longman, 1982);
Ali Mohammed Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation (Boulder and
London: Westview Press and Croom Helm Ltd, 1979); Abdullah Omran Taryam, The
Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950–85 (London: Croom Helm, 1987); and,
Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social
History of the Trucial States (London: Macmillan Press, 1978); Rosemary Said Zahlan, The
Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and
Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
12 B. FRIEDMAN

This book rests on a close reading of thousands of pages of declassified

and unpublished records from the British35 and American36 national
archives in combination with a selection of Persian- and Arabic-language
media sources, and memoirs, addressing how the rulers in the Gulf reacted
to the British announcement and responded to the consequences of the
British decision between 1968 and 1971. The analysis in this monograph
relies heavily on records generated by U.S. and British officials based in
the Gulf. This research is supplemented with a selection of Persian and
Arabic language media sources, and several Arabic books by journalists
who covered the events during this period. There are three methodologi-
cal challenges embedded in this approach.
First, many of the descriptions of the words of the Gulf rulers were
drawn from reports written by British and American diplomats, or Arab
and Persian journalists. As a result, in some cases the words and observa-
tions of the rulers are sometimes presented through the prism of distinctly
British and American voices and observations. And while this is often the
best available information for a given event or meeting, the reader should
be aware of this potential distortion or shortcoming from the outset.
Nevertheless, after examining thousands of pages of these records and
comparing them with the accounts written by Arabs and Persians from the
Gulf, I believe these records are often unfairly discounted. The task of the
historian is to examine the best evidence of a ruler’s words and actions and
arrive at an interpretation. All sources have flaws, and it is the job of the
historian to examine a large enough corpus of sources to develop a reliable
filter with which to examine and, wherever possible, corroborate the mate-
rial in the documents. Memoirs, as well as Arabic- and Persian-language
news reports, also possess flaws, and in many instances the memoirists and
the reporters were much further removed from the rulers than the British
and American diplomats.
Second, I did not conduct research in the Iranian, Saudi, or Emirati
national archives, therefore I did not have access to documents that may
shed important light on the events described and explained in this book. I
hope that some future scholar of the Gulf, with access to these archives,
will supplement and or adjust the record accordingly. It is worth bearing

35
The National Archives of the United Kingdom were formerly known as the Public
Record Office (P.R.O.), and are located in Kew on the outskirts of London.
36
The National Archives of the United States are located in College Park, Maryland, just
outside of Washington, D.C.
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

in mind that Faisal bin Salman al-Saud’s book, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
the Gulf, which covered the period under discussion here, was based, in
part, on material in the Royal Saudi archive.
Third, my emphasis on the perceptions of the Gulf rulers, and the
regional dimension of politics between 1968 and 1971, means that my
story intentionally minimizes the interests and constraints of the interna-
tional actors or great powers, which have been treated at length elsewhere.
In contrast, this work identifies important political changes during this
period from the regional perspective and highlights the importance of the
historical relationships between the local polities in the Gulf.

Analytical Themes and Organization of the Book

The rulers’ assumptions were a key element of this history. In many cases,
these assumptions were rooted in the historical experience inherited by the
dynastic families of each of the rulers. These inherited histories shaped the
worldviews of the rulers and influenced their behavior and decisions. The
history, as related in this monograph, consists, in large part, in tracing the
influence of these assumptions on the rulers’ actions (or inaction) during
the four-year period of British withdrawal from the Gulf.
These assumptions form the four basic analytical themes in this book.
First and most important, personal honor and status were at the heart of
political survival in the region.37 This manifested itself most explicitly in
the regional competition to dominate and be “first among equals.” Social
organization along the western coast of the Gulf was rooted in tribal kin-
ship, and everyone was perceived as equal. Authority and power were
products of dominating equals or kin who were organized into social soli-
darities (khānāt), usually family-based associations, for protection.38 The
weaker rulers in the Gulf, who were not in a position to compete for domi-
nance, attempted to resist hegemony (domination) and preserve auton-
omy (independence of action). This socio-political mode of behavior has
also been characterized within the framework of the Arabian custom of

37
James Onley and Suleyman Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf: An
Historical–Anthropological Study,” History & Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 3 (September
2006), 201.
38
Fuad I. Khuri, Tents and Pyramids: Games and Ideology in Arab culture from Backgammon
to Autocratic Rule (London: Saqi Books, 1990), p. 14; and, Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy:
A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 41.
14 B. FRIEDMAN

“protection seeking” as part of a protector-protégé relationship.39

Protection seeking and competing to be “first among equals,” based on
tribal and historical rivalries, was an important dimension of the four-year
negotiation process that resulted in the formation of the independent
states of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates at the end
of 1971.40
Protection-seeking and competing to be “first among equals” was also
an important part of the territorial conflicts that were revived during this
four-year period. These conflicts included Iran’s claim to sovereignty over
Bahrain; the Iran-Iraq confrontation over the border on the Shatt al-Arab
waterway; Iran’s dispute with Sharjah over ownership of the island of Abu
Musa and with Ras al-Khaimah over the two Tunb islands; and, Saudi
Arabia’s dispute with Abu Dhabi and the British over the Buraimi Oasis.
These territorial disputes have often been described in material terms
that emphasize access to potential hydrocarbon resources or in historical/
legal terms outlining complex competing historical claims based on
nationalist interpretations of history. Yet the material and historical/legal
explanations do not adequately account for how and why these disputes
re-emerged as sources of conflict when they did. Instead of a material or
historical/legal approach, this study will reevaluate the territorial conflicts
during this period using a contextual approach that focuses on the regional
maneuvering for political dominance that emerged during the process of
British military withdrawal. In the period under discussion in this mono-
graph, 1968 through 1971, there was an important change in the regional
power structure due to the British plan to withdraw their military from the
region. This monograph argues that the territorial conflicts described in
each chapter were a symptom of a new competition to derive power from
the domination of equals and become “the first,” in the impending absence
of the British.41
Second, historical mistrust and mutual suspicion between the Arab rul-
ers of the Gulf littoral and the Shah of Iran was a major stumbling obstacle
toward cooperation and coordination despite converging areas of mutual
political and strategic interest between them. A Lebanese journalist who
reported on the Gulf during this period noted that “the common ground

39
Onley & Khalaf, p. 201.
40
Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon:
1971), pp. 38–42.
41
Khuri, p. 85.
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

between all Arabs of the day—shaykhs and non-shaykh alike—was the fear
of Iranian ambitions and its threat to the Arab identity of the Gulf.”42
Likewise, R.K. Ramazani, a scholar of modern Iran, noted that “divergent
national-cultural ethos” and “cultural particularisms of these two ancient
peoples” were part of “an Irano-Arab power conflict that dated back to
the fourth century.”43 Nevertheless, this theme was not monolithic. This
monograph identifies the particular circumstances in which historical
Arab-Iranian mistrust appeared, and explains when and how it played a
greater or lesser role in the political developments of this period.
A third theme of this work is that a ruler’s personal status was also an
important domestic consideration in terms of the relationship between the
ruler and the ruled. Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran, King Faysal of Saudi
Arabia, and the ruling shaykhs on the Gulf coast all viewed the strength of
their domestic authority as directly linked to their personal prestige. As a
result, all of the rulers were sensitive and attentive to the impact of regional
events on their personal prestige, even if the sources or formulas for legiti-
macy and prestige were different from ruler to ruler. For example, King
Faysal, as well as other important members of the Al Saʿud, viewed the
dispute with Abu Dhabi and the British over the Buraimi Oasis as having
a direct impact on the prestige of the ruling family, where prestige was
viewed as power based on reputation. Mohammad Reza Shah, for his part,
viewed his dispute with the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah over Abu
Musa and the two Tunb islands as being a question of prestige, despite
persistently framing the issue strategically, in terms of securing the Strait of
Hormuz. However, the Shah’s understanding of how his people viewed
his prestige was in terms of reputation based on power (power taken as syn-
onymous with military force), rather than power based on reputation.44
This work’s fourth analytic prism focuses on the legacy of the British
withdrawal from the Aden Protectorate in South Arabia in 1967 on the
rulers in the Gulf. The impact of the British withdrawal from Aden on the
perceptions of the Gulf rulers is not sufficiently accounted for in the existing

42
Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon:
1971), p. 57; see also, Wm. Roger Louis, “The British Withdrawal from the Gulf,
1967–1971,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 31, No. 1
(2003), p. 95.
43
R.K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran’s Role (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press
of Virginia, 1972), p. 34.
44
Harold Nicolson, The Meaning of Prestige (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1937).
16 B. FRIEDMAN

scholarly literature on the British withdrawal from the Gulf. The British
made the announcement of withdrawal from the Gulf in January 1968,
less than two full months after the British withdrawal from Aden was com-
pleted at the end of November 1967. From 1968 to 1971 the rulers in the
Gulf were afraid that British withdrawal from the Gulf would mimic Aden
and create a “power vacuum”45 that would invite violent revolutionary
subversion of traditional dynastic political authority in the Gulf. Following
Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War in June 1967, the Gulf rulers viewed
Abdel Nasser’s Egypt as a diminishing revolutionary threat to the Gulf.
However, they still considered Soviet support for Iraq, Syria, and South
Arabia as dangerous subversive threats to the Gulf regimes after 1967.
Coup d’états by military officers overthrew monarchical regimes in Sudan
in May 1969, and then Libya in September 1969, and re-affirmed the Gulf
rulers’ belief that they were not just tilting at windmills: the revolutionary
officers in Sudan and Libya shared the same Nasserist revolutionary vision
of Arab unity that the rulers in the Gulf viewed as a challenge to their posi-
tion and power.
In short, these four themes—the rulers maneuvering for hegemony or
autonomy, Arab-Iranian mistrust, the preservation of a ruler’s prestige, and
the impact of South Arabia’s revolutionary turn—were closely intercon-
nected, suffusing the politics of this period with the qualities of a system,
meaning a change or perception of change in one area impacted the out-
comes in other areas. In order to demonstrate these effects, this book is
organized chronologically. Following this introductory chapter, there are
eight chapters. As well as a final, concluding chapter, with each of the eight
narrative chapters representing six months of each year, from 1968 to 1971.
The chronological organization demonstrates not only the intercon-
nectedness of the interactions among the rulers in the Gulf, but also the
effects of international and regional developments on the rulers’ percep-
tions and behavior. For example, the chronological approach allows us to

45
This term became part of the common parlance among diplomats and politicians in
Great Britain and abroad in the 1960s, as part of the British debates on their imperial com-
mitments East of Suez. Sir William Luce, the former Governor of Aden (1956–1960), pub-
lished an article in 1967 discussing the potential for a “power vacuum” in the Gulf. See:
William Luce, “Britain in the Persian Gulf,” The Round Table, Vol. 57 No. 227 (1967),
p. 280. See, also: Helene von Bismarck, British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1961–1968:
Conceptions of Informal Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 186–215;
Simon Smith, “Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a
Puzzle,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 44:2 (2016), 328–351.
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

see how the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1969 coup
d’états in Libya and Sudan influenced attitudes and actions in the Gulf
during this period. Nevertheless, this book’s primary focus is the regional
politics in the Gulf, rather than international politics, which has been typi-
cally expressed in terms of the Cold War or the End of [the British] Empire
interests. In short, this is a history of how the rulers in the Gulf managed
their political affairs during the period of British withdrawal.
 CHAPTER 2

The End of Pax Britannica

in the Persian Gulf

On 8 January 1968, Shaykh ʿIsa bin Salman Al Khalifah, the ruler of

Bahrain, listened to British Minister of State Goronwy Roberts tell him
that the British would be withdrawing their military forces from the Gulf
by 1971. According to British officials, Shaykh ʿIsa observed in response
that the “Gulf was in a terrible situation and its stability was shaky.” He
agreed with the British representative that now was the time for the Gulf
rulers to come together, but said there were internal disputes that had
proved too difficult to settle. Shaykh ʿIsa proceeded to list pre-existing
regional disputes: Iraq’s claim to Kuwaiti territory, the Saudi claim on Abu
Dhabi and Omani territory [including, but not limited to, the Buraimi
Oasis], Iran’s claim on Bahrain, as well as disputes between Bahrain and
Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and Dubai and Sharjah. He said the Gulf
rulers were no-nearer to cooperation now. He said that rather than coop-
erate, he expected his fellow ruling shaykhs to attempt to make alliances
with larger powers. Once Britain left there would be no stability he empha-
sized, and again expressed his deep regret regarding the British decision.1
The future political status of the shaykhdoms raised fundamental ques-
tions regarding how Gulf rulers viewed the future of Gulf politics. Iran
saw Abdel Nasser’s defeat in the June 1967 Six-Day War and the British
decision to withdraw in January 1968 as an opportunity to assert Iran’s
longstanding ambition to be the dominant power in the Gulf, without

British National Archives (BNA): “Note of a Meeting Held at Rifa’a Palace,” Bahrain, on
1

Monday, 8 January, 1968, FO 1016/753.

© The Author(s) 2020 19

B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf,
1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_2
20 B. FRIEDMAN

Egypt’s interference or external mediation from the superpowers. Iran’s

posturing during this period of withdrawal was that of a regional power,
and it sought such recognition from its neighbors in exchange for recogni-
tion of their political sovereignty. This point suggests that as important as
bilateral diplomatic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran was to
U.S. and Britain, it was only one piece of the political puzzle in the Gulf
during this period.
Bahrain primarily looked to Saudi Arabia for support vis-a-vis Iran’s
historical claim, while Kuwait sought to play Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia
off one another. Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Ahmad of Qatar were
attempting to parlay their oil wealth into a leadership sphere in the lower
Gulf, while the rulers of Dubai and the five smaller shaykhdoms were con-
cerned with maintaining their political autonomy. Preserving indepen-
dence and resisting domination, as well as historical territorial and tribal
disputes, contributed to the shaykhs’ longstanding reluctance to cooper-
ate and coordinate with one another in early 1968.
These feelings of historical mistrust between neighbors fueled broader
concerns that British military withdrawal would lead to a power vacuum in
the region. The legacy of British withdrawal from Aden Protectorate in
1967 cast a long shadow over the statements and actions of Gulf rulers
during this period.2 The Saudi fear, shared by the Shah and other rulers,
was that a revolutionary takeover would be repeated in Oman,3 and from
there spread to the other littoral shaykhdoms and perhaps even to Saudi
Arabia itself. Both the Shah and King Faysal feared a scenario where Arab
revolutionaries would control the Musandam Peninsula bordering the
Gulf shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose
economies were dependent on oil revenues, regarded the secure traffic of
oil through the Strait of Hormuz as a vital element of regional and regime
stability and security. This chapter demonstrates that regional concerns
were deeply interconnected: they encompassed immediate material,

2
For background on the British withdrawal from Aden, see: Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of
Empire in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 49–95; and, J.B. Kelly,
Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (New York, Basic Books, 1980), pp. 1–46; Jonathan Walker,
Aden Insurgency (Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount Limited, 2005); For background on the
NLF’s rise to power, see: Joseph Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen (London: Croom &
Helm, 1984); and, Robert Stookey, South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1982).
3
For background on the rebellion in Dhofar, see: J.E. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The
Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy (London: Saqi Books, 2007).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
that American professor that you were just speaking of has done, he
might have been able to give us some really valuable information.
“Do I believe that animals talk? I don’t simply believe it, I know it.
When I was a young man I had a good deal to do with animals, and I
learned to understand the cat language just as well as I understood
English. It’s an easy language when once you get the hang of it, and
from what I hear of German the two are considerably alike. You look
as if you didn’t altogether believe me, though why you should doubt
that a man can learn cat language when the world is full of men that
pretend to have learned German, and nobody calls their word in
question, I don’t precisely see.
“Of course, I don’t pretend to understand all the cat dialects. For
example, I don’t know a word of the Angora dialect and can only
understand a sentence here and there of the tortoise-shell dialect;
but so far as good, pure standard cat language goes, it’s as plain as
print to me to-day, though I haven’t paid any attention to it for forty
years. I don’t want you to understand that I ever spoke it. I always
spoke English when I was talking with cats. They all understand
English as well as you do. They pick it up just as a child picks up a
language from hearing it spoken.
“Forty years ago I was a young man, and, like most young men, I
fancied that I was in love with a young woman of our town. There
isn’t the least doubt in my mind that I should have married her if I
had not known the cat language. She afterward married a man
whom she took away to Africa with her as a missionary. I knew him
well, and he didn’t want to go to Africa. Said he had no call to be a
missionary, and that all he wanted was to live in a Christian country
where he could go and talk with the boys in the bar-room evenings.
But his wife carried him off, and it’s my belief that if I had married her
she would have made me turn missionary, or pirate, or anything else
that she thought best. I shall never cease to be grateful to Thomas
Aquinas for saving me from that woman.
 “I HAD AN OLD NEGRO HOUSEKEEPER AND TWO CATS.”

“This was the way of it. I was living in a little cottage that belonged
to my uncle, and that he let me have rent free on condition that I
should take care of it and keep the grounds in an attractive state until
he could sell it. I had an old negro housekeeper and two cats. One of
them, Martha Washington by name, was young and handsome, and
about as bright a cat as I ever knew. She had a strong sense of
humor, too, which is unusual with cats, and when something amused
her she would throw back her head and open her mouth wide, and
laugh a silent laugh that was as hearty and rollicking as a Methodist
parson’s laugh when he hears a gray-haired joke at a negro minstrel
show. Martha was perhaps the most popular cat in the town, and
there was scarcely a minute in the day when there wasn’t some one
of her admirers in the back yard. As for serenades, she had three or
four every night that it didn’t rain. There was a quartette club formed
by four first-class feline voices, and the club used to give Martha and
me two or three hours of music three times a week. I used
sometimes to find as many as six or seven old boots in the back yard
of a morning that had been contributed by enthusiastic neighbors. As
for society, Martha Washington was at the top of the heap. There
wasn’t a more fashionable cat in the whole State of Ohio—I was
living in Ohio at the time—and in spite of it all she was as simple and
unaffected in her ways as if she had been born and bred in a Quaker
meeting-house.
“One afternoon Martha was giving a four-o’clock milk on the
veranda next to my room. I always gave her permission to give that
sort of entertainment whenever she wanted to, for the gossip of her
friends used to be very amusing to me. Among the guests that
afternoon was Susan’s Maltese cat. Susan was the young lady I
wanted to marry. Now, this cat had always pretended to be very fond
of me, and Susan often said that her cat never made a mistake in
reading character, and that the cat’s approval of me was equivalent
to a first-class Sunday-school certificate of moral character. I didn’t
care anything about the cat myself, for somehow I didn’t place any
confidence in her professions. There was an expression about her
tail which, to my mind, meant that she was insincere and
treacherous. The Maltese cat had finished her milk, when the
conversation drifted around to the various mistresses of the cats,
and presently some one spoke of Susan. Then the Maltese began to
say things about Susan that made my blood boil. It was not only
what she said, but what she insinuated, and according to her Susan
was one of the meanest and most contemptible women in the whole
United States. I stood it as long as I could, and then I got up and said
to Martha Washington, ‘I think your Maltese friend is needed at her
home, and the sooner she goes the better if she doesn’t want to be
helped home with a club.’ That was enough. The Maltese, who was
doing up her back fur when I spoke, stopped, looked at me as if she
could tear me into pieces, and then flounced out of the house without
saying a word. I understood that there was an end to her pretence of
friendship for me, and that henceforth I should have an enemy in
Susan’s house who might, perhaps, be able to do me a good deal of
harm.
 “POOR PUSSY’S NERVES ARE THOROUGHLY UPSET.”

“The next time I called to see Susan the Maltese was in the room,
and she instantly put up her back and tail and swore at me as if I
was a Chinaman on the lookout for material for a stolen dinner.
‘What can be the matter with poor pussy?’ said Susan. ‘She seems
to be so terribly afraid of you all of a sudden. I hope it doesn’t mean
that you have been doing something that she doesn’t approve of.’ I
didn’t make any reply to this insinuation, except to say that the cat
might perhaps be going mad, but this didn’t help me any with Susan,
who was really angry at the idea that her cat could be capable of
going mad.
“The same sort of thing happened every time I went to the house.
The cat was always in the room, and always expressed, in the
plainest way, the opinion that I was a thief and a murderer and an
enemy of the temperance society. When I asked her what she meant
to do, she would give me no reply except a fresh oath or other bad
language. Threats had no effect on her, for she knew that I could not
touch her in Susan’s house, and she didn’t intend that I should catch
her outside of the house. Nothing was clearer than that the Maltese
was bound to make a quarrel between me and Susan, in revenge for
what I had said at Martha’s four-o’clock milk.
“Meanwhile Susan began to take the thing very seriously, and
hinted that the cat’s opposition to me might be a providential warning
against me. ‘I never knew her to take such a prejudice against any
one before,’ she said, ‘except against that converted Jew who
afterward turned out to be a burglar, and nearly murdered poor dear
Mr. Higby, the Baptist preacher, the night he broke into Mr. Higby’s
house and stole all his hams.’ Once when I did manage to give the
Maltese a surreptitious kick, and she yelled as if she was half-killed,
Susan said, ‘I am really afraid I shall have to ask you to leave us
now. Poor pussy’s nerves are so thoroughly upset that I must devote
all my energies to soothing her. I do hope she is mistaken in her
estimate of you.’ This was not very encouraging, and I saw clearly
that if the Maltese kept up her opposition the chances that Susan
would marry me were not worth a rush.
“Did I tell you that I had a large gray cat by the name of Thomas
Aquinas? He was in some respects the most remarkable cat I ever
met. Most people considered him rather a dull person, but among
cats he was conceded to have a colossal mind. Cats would come
from miles away to ask his advice about things. I don’t mean such
trifling matters as his views on mice-catching—which, by the way, is
a thing that has very little interest for most cats—or his opinion of the
best way in which to get a canary bird through the bars of a cage.
They used to consult him on matters of the highest importance, and
the opinions that he used to give would have laid over those of
Benjamin Franklin himself. Why, Martha Washington told me that
Thomas Aquinas knew more about bringing up kittens than the
oldest and most experienced feline matron that she had ever known.
As for common sense, Thomas Aquinas was just a solid chunk of it,
as you might say, and I get into the habit of consulting him whenever
I wanted a good, safe, cautious opinion. He would see at a glance
where the trouble was, and would give me advice that no lawyer
could have beaten, no matter how big a fee he might have charged.
“Well, I went home from Susan’s house, and I said to Thomas
Aquinas, ‘Thomas’—for he was one of those cats that you would no
more have called ‘Tom’ than you would call Mr. Gladstone
‘Bill’—‘Thomas,’ I said, ‘I want you to come with me to Miss Susan’s
and tell that Maltese beast that if she doesn’t quit her practice of
swearing at me whenever I come into the room it will be the worse
for her.’
“‘That’s easy enough,’ said Thomas. ‘I know one or two little things
about that cat that would not do to be told, and she knows that I
know them. Never you fear but that I can shut her up in a moment. I
heard that she was going about bragging that she would get square
with you for something you said to her one day, but I didn’t feel
called upon to interfere without your express approval.’”
“The next day Thomas and I strolled over to Susan’s, and, as luck
would have it, we were shown into her reception-room before she
came downstairs. The Maltese cat was in the room, and began her
usual game of being filled with horror at the sight of such a hardened
wretch as myself. Of course, Thomas Aquinas took it up at once, and
the two had a pretty hot argument. Now Thomas, in spite of his
colossal mind, was a quick-tempered cat, and he was remarkably
free-spoken when he was roused. One word led to another, and
presently the Maltese flew at Thomas, and for about two minutes
that room was so thick with fur that you could hardly see the fight. Of
course, there could have been only one end to the affair. My cat
weighed twice what the Maltese weighed, and after a few rounds he
had her by the neck, and never let go until he had killed her. I was
just saying ‘Hooray! Thomas!’ when Susan came into the room.
“I pass over what she said. Its general sense was that a man who
encouraged dumb animals to fight, and who brought a great savage
brute into her house to kill her sweet little pussy in her own parlor,
wasn’t fit to live. She would listen to no explanations, and when I
said that Thomas had called at my request to reason with the
Maltese about her unkind conduct toward me, Susan said that my
attempt to turn an infamous outrage into a stupid joke made the
matter all the worse, and that she must insist that I and my prize-
fighting beast should leave her house at once and never enter it
again.
“So you see that if it had not been that I understood what the
Maltese cat said at Martha Washington’s milk party, I should
probably never have quarrelled with either Susan or her cat, and
should now have been a missionary in Central Africa, if I hadn’t
blown my brains out or taken to drink. I have often thought that the
man Susan did marry might have been saved if he had known the
cat language in time and had made the acquaintance of the
Maltese.”
The Colonel paused, and presently I asked him if he really
expected us to believe his story.
“Why not?” he replied. “It isn’t any stiffer than Darwin’s yarn about
our being descended from monkeys. You believe that on the word of
a man you never saw, and I expect you to believe my story that I
understand the cat language on my unsupported word. Perhaps the
story is a little tough, but if you are going in for science you shouldn’t
let your credulity be backed down by any story.”
 SILVER-PLATED.
The Etruria was nearing New York, and the prospect of the
inevitable interview with the custom-house officers had already cast
a gloom over the passengers. For the most part they were silent, and
their faces wore an anxious and solemn expression. The Rev. Mr.
Waterman, of the Eighth Day Baptist Church, who had bought largely
of ready-made clothing in London, even suggested that it might be
well to hold a prayer-meeting in the saloon.
A group of half a dozen men were sitting in the lee of one of the
deck-houses, smoking silently, when one of the number, a young
and sanguine person, suddenly exclaimed:
“I don’t believe any honest man ever has any trouble with the
custom-house. It’s the fellows who want to defraud the Government
who make all the complaints.”
“What you say may be patriotism and it may be ignorance——”
“What’s the difference?” murmured a cynical interrupter.
“But,” continued the speaker, “it isn’t true. I never tried to defraud
the Government, but for all that I’ve had more trouble with the
custom-house than if I’d been an honest collector of the port trying
not to mix up politics with the business of the office.”
“America expects every man to pay his duty, Colonel,” replied the
sanguine young man, with a vague reminiscence of Nelson. “Tell us
about your trouble, and I rather think you’ll have to admit that it was
because you didn’t want to pay duty on something.”
 The Colonel was generally understood by the rest of the
passengers to be a sort of theatrical manager, a position which in the
United States entitles a man to the relative rank of colonel in the
militia and commodore in the canal-boat service. He had on several
occasions shown a knowledge of music and of professional
musicians which had won for him some respect among those of his
fellow-passengers who did not know the difference between a hurdy-
gurdy and a hautboy, and were therefore fond of posing as musical
critics. He was a shrewd, good-tempered colonel, and the barkeeper
said that he was the most elegant, high-toned gentleman he had
ever crossed with.
“Electricity, gentlemen,” resumed the Colonel, “is the biggest thing
of the century, but it has its drawbacks. Did any of you ever happen
to ride on that electric railroad in Berlin? Well, I have, and ’most
anybody who goes to Berlin is liable to ride on it. It taught me,
however, that a man ought to be pretty careful when he trusts
himself in an electric car.
“It happened in this way. I was an agent in the general show
business, and was collecting an opera company for a friend of mine
who was going to open in Chicago. I had come across a first-class
tenor—found him in a country church choir in Germany—and was
bringing him home with me under a contract, when he and I took that
ride on that Berlin electric road. He was a careless sort of chap, and
he sat down in a corner of the car where the electricity had been
leaking and the seat was pretty wet.”
“I never knew before,” remarked the young man, “that electricity
could make a seat wet.”
“Probably not,” retorted the Colonel. “I should judge that there
might be a right smart lot of things that you mightn’t know. Most of
these gentlemen here, however, have probably heard that nowadays
electricity is put up for use in bottles and metallic cans. It stands to
reason that anything capable of being put into a bottle is capable of
leaking, and wetting whatever it leaks on. If there is anybody here
who knows more about bottles than I do, I’m ready to let him tell this
story.
 “As I was saying, my man sat down in a sort of pool of electric
fluid, and sat there for about half an hour. He was wearing in the fob-
pocket of his trousers a cheap silver watch. I had given it to him so
that he might get some exercise and prevent himself from getting too
fat. He never suspected my motive, but he tired himself all out
winding it up for two hours every night. Now you may not believe it,
but I give you my word that the electricity completely dissolved that
watch-case and deposited the silver around the man’s waist. He
didn’t find it out till night, and you never saw a man so scared as
when he found that there was a band about four inches wide silver-
plated all round his waist. The doctor told him that the only possible
way of getting it off would be to dissolve it with acid, but that the acid
would eat clean through to his spine and injure his voice. So my
tenor had to let bad enough alone, and be satisfied with another ten-
and-sixpenny gymnasium that I gave him to mollify his feelings.
“We came over on the Arizona, and it got around during the
passage that my man was silver-plated. There was a custom-house
spy on board, and it happened that after the tenor had sworn that he
had nothing dutiable with him, the inspector ordered him to strip and
be personally examined. Of course when this was done it was
discovered that he was silver-plated, and he was held for duty under
the general heading in the tariff of ‘all other articles, silver-plated, or
in whole, and not elsewhere enumerated,’ and taxed fifty per cent ad
valorem and fined two hundred and fifty dollars for failing to declare
that he was plated. He couldn’t pay and I wouldn’t pay, and so he
was locked up in a bonded warehouse, and I went to consult my
lawyer.
“I laid all the facts before him, and told him I would pay him
handsomely if he could get my man out of the custom-house without
paying either duty or fine. Now, the lawyer knew the tariff from
beginning to end, and if any man could help me I knew he could. He
didn’t promise anything at first, but he discussed the question by and
large and in all its bearings.
“‘I’m afraid,’ said he, ‘that there is no hope of getting your friend
out without paying duty, but we may succeed in having him classified
so as to make the duty very low. For instance, you say the man is a
professional singer. Now, we might have him classed as a musical
instrument and taxed forty-five per cent ad valorem. By the bye, what
did you agree to pay him?’
“‘I agreed to pay him,’ says I, ‘a hundred dollars per week.’
“‘That’s bad,’ says the lawyer. ‘A hundred dollars a week is fifty-
two hundred per year, which is about the interest at six per cent on
eighty-seven thousand dollars. You wouldn’t like to pay forty-three or
four thousand dollars duty on him.’
“‘I’d see him sent to Congress first!’ says I.
“‘Very well,’ says the lawyer. ‘Then perhaps we could classify him
as machinery or parts thereof. But you wouldn’t save much in that
way. You’d have to pay forty per cent ad valorem, and very likely the
appraisers would say that you had undervalued the man, and would
value him at double what your contract seems to say he is worth.
They’re bound to protect American machinery against the pauper
labor of Europe every time.’
“‘How would it do to classify him as old family plate?’ said I.
“‘Worse and worse,’ said the lawyer. ‘He’d have to pay sixty per
cent, and you’d have a good deal of difficulty in proving that he is old
family plate. Of course it could be done, but it would probably cost
you more than the whole amount of the duty. They’re a perfectly
honest set of men, the appraisers, and they naturally come high.’
“‘What will I do, then?’ said I; ‘let him die in the custom-house and
then sue for damages?’
“‘There might be something worth while done in that way,’ says the
lawyer, ‘but it would be middling hard on the man. But I’ll tell you
what we can do. Didn’t you say that the man was singing in a church
choir when you hired him?’
“‘I did so,’ says I.
“‘All right,’ says the lawyer. ‘We’ll classify him as an “article used in
the service of religion,” and get him in free of any duty whatever. You
go and get him an engagement in a church without an hour’s delay,
and then come to me. We’ll beat the custom-house this time, sure
enough.’
“I got the man an engagement to sing for a week in a Methodist
meeting-house, and before the week was out he was decided to be
an article used in the service of religion, and was returned to me free
of duty, and cursing the head off of every officer in the revenue
service. The end of it was that my tenor claimed that I had broken
my contract by setting him to sing in a church, and he sued me for
damages, and got them too. So you see, my young friend, that a
man may have trouble with the custom-house who does not want to
defraud the Government out of anything, not even the duty on that
sealskin sack that I hear you have taken apart and packed in a spare
pair of boots.”

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