The Impact of Social Participation and Attachment Styles On Menta

Long Island University
Digital Commons @ LIU
Selected Full-Text Dissertations 2020- LIU Brooklyn
2023
The impact of social participation and attachment styles on

mentalizing and emotion regulation in adults living in the United
States
Maria Poston
Long Island University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liu.edu/brooklyn_fulltext_dis
Part of the Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Poston, Maria, "The impact of social participation and attachment styles on mentalizing and emotion
regulation in adults living in the United States" (2023). Selected Full-Text Dissertations 2020-. 13.
https://digitalcommons.liu.edu/brooklyn_fulltext_dis/13
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the LIU Brooklyn at Digital Commons @ LIU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Selected Full-Text Dissertations 2020- by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ LIU. For more information, please contact [email protected].
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND ATTACHMENT STYLE ON
MENTALIZING AND EMOTION REGULATION IN ADULTS LIVING IN THE
UNITED STATES
BY
MARIA POSTON, M.A.
A DOCTORAL DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY OF
THE SCHOOL OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS OF LONG ISLAND UNIVERISTY IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 2023
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY SPONSORING COMMITTEE:
CERTIFIED BY:
______________________________
________________________________ Nicholas Papouchis, Ph.D., ABPP
Philip S. Wong, Ph.D.
Professor and Director _____________________________
Ph.D. Program in Clinical Psychology Kevin B. Meehan, Ph.D.
5/10/2023
________________________________ ______________________________
DATE Lisa Wallner Samstag, Ph.D.

ii
Abstract
Prior studies have shown that attachment styles interact with social inclusion to impact
belonging, self-esteem, control, sense of meaning, and positive mood. No studies have
investigated how the interaction of attachment and social participation impacts self-
regulatory mechanisms. The main goal of this study was to address this gap and
investigate how the interaction of different social participation conditions (ostracism,
overinclusion, inclusion) and attachment styles impact two regulatory mechanisms,
specifically, mentalizing capacities and emotion regulation. Adult participants were
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. This was the first study to demonstrate that
ostracism and inclusion influence the relationship between attachment style and
regulatory mechanisms. Specifically, in the ostracism condition, anxious attachment was
associated with greater state emotion regulation difficulties, namely, limited ability to
modulate emotional/behavioral responses and lack of emotional clarity. In the inclusion
condition, avoidant attachment was associated with lower online mentalizing. The
exploratory study demonstrated how different aspects of dispositional mentalizing
mediate the relationship between attachment and emotion regulation. Specifically,
avoidant and anxious attachment were negatively related to state emotion regulation
difficulties, and this was mediated by dispositional uncertainty of mental states.
Avoidant attachment was positively related to state emotion regulation difficulties, and
this was mediated by a disposition for adequate mentalizing. Finally, results emphasize
the importance of improving construct validity in the self-report measure of dispositional
mentalizing.
iii
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the members of my committee,
Nick, Kevin, and Lisa, without whom I would not have been able to complete this
dissertation and make it through this rigorous journey. Nick, you have been a comforting
constant in this whole process. I will never forget your genuine, insistent, and yet benign
curiosity about me as a person on interview day. You have continued to model a
mentalizing stance throughout our time together as my professor, clinical supervisor, and
academic advisor. Thank you for your kindness, support, and commitment to my
learning and success. Kevin, I am so grateful for your guidance throughout this whole
process. I think I would have stayed in dissertation limbo if it had not been for your
practical, efficient, and no-nonsense approach to getting tasks done. Lisa, your patience,
warmth, and encouragement have helped lighten the heaviness that this journey brings.
Thank you for constantly reminding me of the light at the end of the tunnel and cheering
me on to the finish line!
I would also like to thank Sara Haden for her patience, generosity with her time,
and for answering my statistics questions. Thank you also to Nicole Cain, my other
individual clinical supervisor, who challenged and inspired me to be the best clinician I
can be. I would also like to thank my internship supervisors, Daniel Rutimann and David
Miller, for sharing their professional wisdom and nurturing the development of my
identity and style as a clinician.
I am grateful for the friendships that have developed in the program. I have met
some of the most caring, creative, talented, passionate, smart, and inspiring individuals
who have added richness and enjoyment to this journey. I have such fond memories of
iv
celebrating milestones, holidays, birthdays, births, baptisms, self-care and spa days with
you all!
Last, but most certainly not least, I am immensely grateful to my family,
especially my husband, David. Your love and patience have sustained me and motivated
me to keep going when times were difficult. Thank you for taking care of our kids,
cooking meals, and cleaning up whenever I was buried in papers and deadlines. Thank
you for insisting that we still need to take the time to go out, travel, be adventurous, and
be refreshed by the great outdoors! To my two kids, you are such precious gifts in my
life. I am so grateful and blessed to have you. You fill my heart with joy and laughter
and inspire me to live fully!

v
Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... iii
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ v
List of Tables .............................................................................................................. viii
List of Figures ................................................................................................................ix
List of Appendices..........................................................................................................xi
CHAPTER I .................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER II................................................................................................................... 5
Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 5
Social Participation...................................................................................................... 5
Ostracism ................................................................................................................ 6
Temporal Framework ............................................................................................ 12
Overinclusion ........................................................................................................ 13
Attachment ................................................................................................................ 15
Attachment and Social Participation ...................................................................... 18
Mentalization............................................................................................................. 22
Attachment and Mentalization ............................................................................... 23
Ostracism and Mentalization .................................................................................. 25
Mentalization Measures ......................................................................................... 30

vi
Emotion Regulation ................................................................................................... 36
Ostracism and Emotion Regulation ........................................................................ 36
Overinclusion and Regulatory Mechanisms ........................................................... 39
Attachment and Emotion Regulation...................................................................... 44
Emotion Regulation Measures ............................................................................... 49
Mentalization and Emotion Regulation .................................................................. 51
CHAPTER III ............................................................................................................... 57
Statement of the Problem............................................................................................... 57
Main Study Variable List ........................................................................................... 63
Independent Variable ............................................................................................. 63
Moderating Variable .............................................................................................. 64
Dependent Variable ............................................................................................... 64
Manipulation Check............................................................................................... 66
Covariates .............................................................................................................. 66
Main Hypotheses ....................................................................................................... 66
Exploratory Study Variable List ................................................................................ 67
Independent Variable ............................................................................................. 67
Mediating Variable ................................................................................................ 67
Dependent Variable ............................................................................................... 67
Exploratory Hypotheses ............................................................................................. 67
CHAPTER IV ............................................................................................................... 69
Method .......................................................................................................................... 69
vii
Participants ................................................................................................................ 69
Measures ................................................................................................................... 70
Procedures ................................................................................................................. 79
Data Analytic Plan..................................................................................................... 80
CHAPTER V................................................................................................................. 82
Results .......................................................................................................................... 82
Preliminary Analyses ................................................................................................. 82
Summary of Results of Main Study ......................................................................... 114
Summary of Exploratory Testing Results ................................................................. 129
CHAPTER VI ............................................................................................................. 131
Discussion ................................................................................................................... 131
Purpose of the Study ................................................................................................ 131
Explanation of the Findings from the Main Study .................................................... 134
Explanation of the Findings from the Exploratory Study .......................................... 143
Limitations .............................................................................................................. 150
Future Directions ..................................................................................................... 155
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 158
References ................................................................................................................... 162
Appendices .................................................................................................................. 199

viii
List of Tables
Table 1. Mentalizing Measures ..................................................................................... 65
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample.................................................... 71
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Measures ................................................................... 83
Table 4. Intercorrelations of Variables ......................................................................... 86
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Need Threat Scale Items for 3 Conditions ................ 89
Table 6. Differential Impact of Conditions on Avoidant Attachment Predicting
State Emotion Regulation Difficulties ......................................................................... 97
Table 7. Conditions Predicting Change in State Mentalizing (RMET)......................... 101
Table 8. Differential Impact of Conditions on Anxious Attachment Predicting
Change in State Mentalizing (RMET) ....................................................................... 102
Table 9. Differential Impact of Conditions on Anxious Attachment Predicting
Online Mentalizing (MASC) ..................................................................................... 106
Table 10. Differential Impact of Conditions on Avoidant Attachment Predicting
Change in State Mentalizing (RMET) ....................................................................... 109

ix
List of Figures
Figure 1. Effect of Social Participation Conditions on Anxious Attachment and
State Emotion Regulation Difficulty ............................................................................ 94
Figure 2. Effect of Social Participation Conditions on Avoidant Attachment and
State Emotion Regulation Difficulty ............................................................................ 99
State Mentalizing (RMET) ........................................................................................ 103
Figure 5. Effect of Social Participation Condition on Avoidant Attachment and
State Mentalizing (RMET) ........................................................................................ 110
Figure 6. Effect of Social Participation Condition on Avoidant Attachment and
Figure 7. Simple Mediation Model: Unstandardized Coefficients in the Indirect
Effect of Anxious Attachment on Emotion Regulation Through Mentalizing............. 119
Figure 8. Parallel Mediation Model: Unstandardized Coefficients in the Indirect
Effect of Anxious Attachment on Emotion Regulation Through Certainty and
Uncertainty ............................................................................................................. 121
Effect of Avoidant Attachment on Emotion Regulation Through Mentalizing ............ 122

x
Figure 10. Parallel Mediation Model: Unstandardized Coefficients in the Indirect
Effect of Avoidant Attachment on Emotion Regulation Through Certainty and
Uncertainty .............................................................................................................. 124
Effect of Avoidant Attachment on Lack of Clarity Through Uncertainty .................... 126
Effect of Avoidant Attachment on Lack of Awareness through Uncertainty ............... 128
Effect of Anxious Attachment on Limited Ability to Modulate Through Certainty ...... 130
xi
List of Appendices
Appendix A. Informed Consent Form .......................................................................... 199
Appendix B. Debriefing Forms .................................................................................... 201

1
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Humans depend on social bonds for survival and psychological well-being.
According to developmental theorists, humans are pre-wired with a motivational, or
attachment behavioral system, designed to regulate proximity to an attachment figure in
times of separation, threat, or distress (Bowlby, 1969). The experience of ostracism
threatens attachment needs and social bonding and can contribute to distress and
psychological disturbances, suggesting that it affects regulatory mechanisms that play a
role in psychological well-being. Two important regulatory mechanisms of interest to
this study were mentalizing and emotion regulation. Both are important for overriding
reflexive and maladaptive reactions to exclusion experiences in an effortful and
controlled manner so that we can give expression to more socially appropriate responses.
Moreover, these regulatory capacities enable effective problem solving, increase self-
awareness and empathy for others, aid in re-establishing social connection, improve
mood, and enhance long term well-being.
Studies have demonstrated that ostracism can impact mentalizing and emotion
regulation. It has been shown that individuals can increase their attentiveness to mental
states following ostracism (Hess & Pickett, 2010; Knowles, 2014; Pickett & Gardner,
2005; White et al., 2016). It has also been found that following ostracism, individuals
can experience decreased mentalizing (Nordgren, Banas, & MacDonald, 2011; White et
al., 2016). Furthermore, studies have demonstrated that ostracism has been associated
with adaptive emotion regulation, such as reappraisal (Poon & Chen, 2016; Sethi,
Moulds, & Richardson, 2013), but it has also been associated with emotion dysregulation
2
(Davidson et al., 2019) in the form of emotional disengagement (Blackhart, Nelson,
Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009; Fabiansson & Denson, 2012) and emotional reactivity
(Joorman, 2006; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001).
The mixed results in the studies above suggest that ostracism may be
differentially interacting with individual differences in certain internal, psychological
dispositions. Of particular interest to this study were attachment dispositions, or styles.
Studies have established the relationship between attachment style and mentalizing and
the relationship between attachment and emotion regulation (Cassidy, 1994).
Specifically, individuals with secure attachment tend to exhibit higher mentalizing levels
than those with insecure or disorganized attachment (Fonagy & Target, 1997; Meins,
1997; Nazarro et al, 2017). In addition, individuals with anxious attachment are prone to
emotional reactivity, or hyperactivating emotion regulation responses, while those with
avoidant attachment engage in emotional detachment, or deactivating emotion regulation
behaviors. While ostracism literature has shown that individual differences in attachment
have interacted with ostracism, studies have mostly focused on the impact of the
interaction of attachment and ostracism on fundamental needs satisfaction and distress
(Arriaga, Capeza, Reed, Wesselman, & Williams, 2014; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2013).
Therefore, this study aimed at addressing the existing gap with respect to the differential
impact of ostracism on the relationship between attachment styles and two regulatory
mechanisms, mentalizing and emotion regulation. More specifically, this study examined
the impact on state and online mentalizing and state emotion regulation.
While the experience of ostracism threatens the need for attachment and social
bonding, overinclusion can contribute to a sense of social value and satisfy relational
3
needs. Studies have demonstrated that, compared to inclusion, overinclusion is
associated with a greater sense of belonging, meaningful existence, control, and self-
esteem (Niedeggen et al., 2014; Simard & Dandeneau, 2018). Additionally, it has been
shown that inclusion is insufficient for decreasing negative mood, particularly for
insecurely attached individuals who are prone to emotion dysregulation and mentalizing
impairment (De Panfilis, Riva, Preti, & Marchesi, 2015; Weinbrecht, Niedeggen,
Roepke, & Renneberg, 2018). Rather, it has been shown that overinclusion is associated
with reduced negative emotions, suggesting a change in the ability to reflect on emotions
and regulate them. These studies, however, have focused on the effect of the interaction
between overinclusion and specific psychological disorders on mood and fundamental
needs satisfaction. In contrast to those studies, this study aimed to contribute to the gap
in the literature by examining the impact of the interaction between overinclusion and
attachment style on state emotion regulation and state and online mentalizing.
Finally, a subordinate goal of this study was to explore whether dispositional
mentalizing mediated the relationship between attachment and state emotion regulation in
the context of an aversive social condition. Mentalizing and emotion regulation
capacities both develop in the context of attachment relationships. In terms of construct
and function, they overlap yet remain distinct. Emotion regulation involves monitoring,
managing, and altering the intensity and duration of emotional experiences while
mentalizing involves contextualizing and attributing meaning to those emotions and
requires the process of reflecting on one’s thoughts and feelings. Studies have
demonstrated the correlation between the two variables with some results suggesting that
mentalizing serves as a prerequisite for adaptive emotion regulation in non-clinical

4
samples (Schwarzer, Nolte, Fonagy, & Gingelmaier, 2021). Although correlations
between attachment and mentalizing and attachment and emotion regulation have been
found, there is, surprisingly, scarce research examining the three variables together, and
in particular, the mediating role of dispositional mentalizing between attachment and
state emotion regulation. This study, therefore, aimed to fill that gap. Lastly, this study
explored whether distinct mentalizing impairments mediated the relationship between
different attachment styles and distinct emotion regulation strategies.

5
CHAPTER II
Literature Review
This chapter reviews the research and theory on ostracism, overinclusion,
attachment, mentalizing, and emotion regulation. Each construct is defined, and their
relationship to each other is described, with a primary focus given to the relationship
between attachment styles and two regulatory mechanisms, mentalizing and emotion
regulation, and the moderating role of ostracism and overinclusion on the relationship
between the attachment and mentalizing and emotion regulation. Current methods for
assessing mentalizing and emotion regulation are reviewed and critiqued. In addition,
research on the relationship between mentalizing and emotion regulation is reviewed, as
it relates to the secondary aim of the study, which explored if mentalizing mediated the
relationship between attachment and emotion regulation.
Social Participation
Before beginning the discussion on social participation, brief definitions of
attachment style, mentalizing, and emotion regulation are provided here in order to
facilitate the bridging of these constructs with the constructs of ostracism and
overinclusion within this section. Attachment, mentalizing, and emotion regulation are
discussed in greater detail following the social participation section.
Attachment style refers to an individual’s psychological representation of self and
others expressed in recurring patterns of relational expectations, emotions, and behaviors.
Adult attachment research has operationalized attachment style based on two underlying
dimensions (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) – attachment-related anxiety and
attachment-related avoidance.
6
Mentalization refers to the social-cognitive capacity to imaginatively perceive or
interpret the behavior of oneself and others in terms of intentional mental states (i.e.,
beliefs, reasons, feelings, desires, needs, etc.) or mental processes (Fonagy & Target,
2006; Fonagy et al., 2000).
Emotion regulation refers broadly to the external and internal processes involved
in monitoring, evaluating, and managing emotional reactions in order to achieve one’s
goals (Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004; Gross, 1988; Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011;
Thompson, 1994).
Ostracism
Humans are pre-wired to form and maintain social attachments (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995). Social relationships provide valuable social support in times of stress and
confer psychological benefits. Furthermore, social bonds satisfy our fundamental needs,
which are a sense of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ellemers & Haslam, 2012; Leary & Baumeister, 2000;
Williams, 2009). Forming and maintaining social bonds have been positively correlated
with happiness in life and positive life outcomes (Baumeister & Twenge, 2003). Socially
connected people are not only happier, but are also mentally and physically healthier than
those who lack stable and meaningful social support (McAdams, 1986).
Experiences of ostracism, rejection, or social exclusion threaten or thwart our
fundamental needs and can negatively affect various areas of human functioning
(Williams, 2007). Ostracism, in the social psychology literature, has been typically
defined as being ignored or excluded (Williams, 2007). Throughout history and across
cultures, societies have engaged in the marginalization, derogation, and the exclusion of
7
certain individuals from social participation and group membership (Goffman, 2014;
Williams, 2001). Ostracism may take various forms, including not being acknowledged,
not being given relevant social information that others have received (Jones, Carter-
Sowell, Kelly, & Williams, 2009), speaking in front of others in a language others do not
understand (Dotan-Eliaz, Sommer, & Rubin, 2009), encountering references to
unfamiliar pop culture topics (Iannone, Kelly, & Williams, 2016), averting eye contact,
and using electronic devices during face-to-face interactions (Kushelv & Heintzelman,
2018).
Being ignored and other subtle forms of exclusion may be experienced as highly
aversive because humans have evolved to sensitively detect environmental and social
cues signaling danger (Wesselmann, Nairne, & Williams, 2012). Ostracism can threaten
physical survival as it leaves one vulnerable to external danger, without the benefits of
group living and shared resources, and decreases the chances of attracting partners for
reproduction. Thus, natural selection has biased humans towards over-detecting
ostracism, which has enabled humans to adjust their behavior and expectations about
social inclusion (Kerr & Levine, 2008; Wirth et al., 2017). Furthermore, according to
Williams (2009), ostracism may be a uniquely painful type of exclusion. This may be
because the experience of one’s social death (Bauman, 1992) makes death and death
anxiety more salient in one’s mind (Steele, Kidd, & Castano, 2015). It is, therefore, no
surprise that being ignored can result in greater distress and negative effects compared to
a more direct, rejection-based exclusion, in which one receives some type of
acknowledgement or attention, albeit negative (Rudert et al., 2017; Zadro et al., 2005).
Ostracism remains a ubiquitous experience that everyone will likely encounter,

8
some more frequently than others. People engage in exclusion in order to provide clear
group identity boundaries, correct anti-normative behaviors, influence behavior (Poulsen
& Carmon, 2015; Williams, 2001), and protect against those who threaten group
longevity and health (Hogg, 2005; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case,
2009; Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003; Williams, 2009). Exclusion can also be used by
those who belong to a stigmatized group as a way of maintaining unity within that group
(Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). According to Social Identity
Theory, exclusion of others can be motivated by a desire to enhance or maintain a
positive self-concept by favoring the in-group, to which one belongs, over the out-group
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A depersonalization process emerges, whereby in-group
differences are minimized while differences with out-groups become more prominent.
Developmental theorists also provide an understanding of the early conditions that
can lead to overidentification with the in-group and exclusion or rejection of out-groups.
According to Fairbairn (1952), the early phase of an infant’s development involves
primary identification with and dependence on caregivers, characterize by a lack of
psychological differentiation between the infant and the other(s). This process is
consistent with findings from social psychology related to depersonalization, in which the
boundary between self and others is blurred (Reynolds et al., 2001). If primary
identification persists, it can lead into overidentification tendencies in adolescence and
adulthood as an adaptive defense against identity confusion and as compensation for
feelings of inadequacy (Erikson, 1959). The illusion of security, sense of self, and power
is established in the idealization of the in-group, the depersonalization process, and the
devaluation of the outgroup (Aviram, 2005, 2007). The degree to which out-groups are
9
excluded and rejected is closely linked to the strength of in-group identification.
Ostracism has been associated with health problems, such as impaired immune
functioning, increased levels of stress hormones, (Gunnar, Sebanc, Tout, Donzella, & van
Dulmen, 2003), and even physical discomfort. Studies have shown that excluded
individuals experience pain, both at the self-report and neurological level (Eisenberger,
Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 2011). Both
physical pain and ostracism activate the same brain regions (Eisenberger, Lieberman, &
Williams, 2003; Ferris, 2019), and agents that numb physical pain also numb pain of
ostracism (DeWall et al., 2010; Hales, Williams, & Eckhardt, 2015).
Ostracism has also been associated with psychological difficulties (Gerber &
Wheeler, 2009). Studies have shown a high effect size of ostracism-based exclusion on
self-report measures of distress (McDonald & Donnellan, 2012). Furthermore, because
ostracism negatively impacts fundamental needs, such as perceived belonging, control,
self-esteem, and meaningful existence (Williams, 2009; Williams & Nida, 2011), it may
also lead to severe psychological problems, such as depression, helplessness, alienation,
and existential meaninglessness (Riva, Montali, Wirth, Curioni, & Williams, 2016),
particularly when experienced chronically. According to qualitative and correlational
research, chronic exclusion may contribute to self-harm and suicidal ideation (van Orden,
Witte, Gordon, Bender, & Joiner, 2008; Williams, 2001). In addition to decreased
positive mood (Bernstein & Claypool, 2012), other negative effects of ostracism include
increased social susceptibility (Carter-Sowell, Chen, & Williams, 2008), including
vulnerability to being recruited into extreme groups or extreme causes (Williams, Hales,
& Michels, 2019), and increased aggressive behaviors, even towards those who had
10
nothing to do with the exclusion (Twenge et al., 2001; Wharburton, Kipling, & Cairns,
2006).
These psychological disturbances and behavioral effects suggest ostracism's
impact on self-regulatory capacities. Indeed, a series of studies have shown that a single
experience of exclusion can result in self-regulation difficulties (Baumeister, DeWall,
Ciarocoo, & Twenge, 2005). Specifically, in the studies conducted by Baumeister et al.
(2005), rejected or excluded participants performed worse on different self-regulation
tasks. Social exclusion came in the form of bogus feedback indicating that the
participants would likely end up alone in the future and in the form of telling participants
that no one from their group chose them as a partner. Excluded participants were less
able to make themselves consume a healthy but bad-tasting drink, were prone to eating
greater amounts of unhealthy snacks, were more prone to giving up quickly on a difficult
puzzle, and were less able to tune out distracting stimuli in order to focus on identifying
target words.
In contrast to the studies conducted by Baumeister et al. (2005), which defined
self-regulation broadly as the capacity to change oneself and one's responses and which
measured self-regulation in terms of behavioral effects (external processes), the current
study investigated two specific self-regulatory capacities, mentalizing and emotion
regulation. Mentalizing involves the internal processes which form the basis of
interpersonal interactions, which includes understanding one's own and others' behaviors
in terms of mental states. Emotion regulation involves both the internal and external
processes for responding to, adapting, and navigating the social environment. Thus, both
are vital mechanisms for working through social situations, particularly aversive
11
interactions, and improving chances of social acceptance, and both may be an essential
mediator between social exclusion and psychological disturbances/behavioral
consequences.
Previous studies have examined the impact of social exclusion on mentalizing
(Sato, Fonagy, & Luyten, 2018; White et al., 2016) and emotion regulation (Davidson et
al., 2019; Poon & Chen, 2016) using the Cyberball paradigm (Williams, Cheung, & Choi,
2000). The Cyberball paradigm is a computerized ball-tossing game used to manipulate
the degree of social exclusion or inclusion. Participants were told that they were playing
with two other participants who were actually part of the computer program. In the social
exclusion condition, participants would receive the ball either one (Davidson et al., 2019)
or two times (Sato, Fonagy, & Luyten, 2018; White et al., 2018) only. In the inclusion
conditions, participations would receive an equal number of tosses as the other
participants. Total tosses have varied across the studies (i.e., from 9 tosses to 38 tosses).
Similar to the studies that investigated the effect of social exclusion on mentalizing (Sato,
Fonagy, & Luyten, 2018; White et al., 2016) and emotion regulation (Davidson et al.,
2019; Poon & Chen, 2016), the current study used the Cyberball paradigm to create the
ostracism condition. The use of Cyberball is unique from other rejection paradigms, such
as the future life rejection (Baumeister et al., 2005), in that participants are not explicitly
informed that they are excluded nor are they given a reason as to why they are excluded.
This aspect of the manipulation carries ecological validity since real world ostracism
experiences are not always followed by reasons for their being ignored or excluded. In
the current study, participants received the ball only two times near the beginning of the
game, and the Cyberball game consisted of 15 ball tosses.

12
Temporal Framework
According to Williams (2007), response to ostracism begins with immediate or
reflexive reactions that are painful and/or distressing and are unmitigated by individual
differences or situational factors. Studies have shown that ostracism hurts when it is
carried out by both ingroup and outgroup members (Fayant, Muller, Hartgerink, &
Lantian, 2014; Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). Ostracism elicits similarly negative
reactions when done by humans or by a computer (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson,
2004). It has also been shown that ostracism hurts even if participants receive money for
being excluded (van Beest & Williams, 2006) or if participants are excluded from an
aversive activity, such as receiving a virtual bomb instead of a ball in online games (van
Beest, Williams & van Dikj, 2011). Additionally, individuals who have been assigned to
an exclusion condition showed increased activation of brain regions, such as the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), that are associated with the experience of physical pain
and loss of social connection (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). Other
distress reactions to ostracism include increased blood pressure and higher self-reported
levels of tension (Stroud et al., 2000).
The reflexive phase is followed by a reflective stage, in which people engage in
meaning making, attribute causes for the ostracism, and determine the level of threat
posed by the exclusion experience. This stage may be impacted by ostracism interacting
with individual differences, such as self-esteem, rejection sensitivity, narcissism, and
attachment style, and with situational influences, such as source of ostracism and reason
for ostracism (Williams, 2007). This suggests that an individual’s disposition,
background, and capacity to make sense of the context can influence coping methods and
13
speed of recovery from ostracism (Oaten et al., 2008; Yaakobi & Williams, 2016; Zadro,
Boland, & Richardson, 2006).
Of particular interest to this study was the impact of the interaction between
individual differences in attachment style and ostracism experiences (including
overinclusion) on mentalizing and emotion regulation. Although Williams’ most recent
version of the temporal need threat model (2009) argues that reflexive reaction to
ostracism is unmitigated, and cognitive mediation occurs only during the reflective stage,
others have argued that reflexive social pain is not invariably experienced and that the
reflective process occurs swiftly with minimum effort in the reflexive phase (Smith &
Semin, 2004), which accounts for the pain and hurt because ostracism is construed as
violation of the inclusion norm and is viewed as threatening (Greifeneder & Rudert,
2019). In sum, ostracism's strong effect is felt immediately in the reflexive stage, and
while it has been theorized that individual differences (e.g., attachment style) mitigate
ostracism's effect in the reflective stage that follows, the mitigating processes (i.e., the
distinct IWMs and attributional tendencies corresponding to the different attachment
styles) may actually be occurring swiftly or concurrently in the reflexive stage.
Overinclusion
While exclusion can be a threatening or painful experience, its opposite,
overinclusion, can be enjoyable, satisfying, or meaningful (Williams et al., 2000) because
it conveys “social value” (Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001). Overinclusion happens not
only when people are acknowledged and accepted by others, but also when they receive
greater attention than others who are also present. In other words, it is an enhanced form
of inclusion (Williams et al., 2000), in which you become the center of attention (van
14
Beest & Williams, 2006) or “stand out” (van Beest et al., 2011). This happens, for
example, when people are recognized during special occasions, such as a birthday or
milestones.
Emerging studies have examined the effect of overinclusion (Niedeggen et al.,
2014; Simard & Dandeneau, 2018) on well-being. The experience of overinclusion has
been shown to decrease negative mood and enhance satisfaction of social needs, namely
social belonging, meaningful existence, and control (Niedeggen et al., 2014). In another
study, overincluded participants reported significantly more belongingness, meaning,
control, and self-esteem than those in Inclusion and non-social participation control
conditions (Simard & Dandeneau, 2018). In the study conducted by Niedeggen and
colleagues (2014), overinclusion participants took part in an online ball tossing activity in
which they received the ball 46% of the throws. In Simard and Dandeneau’s study
(2018), overinclusion participants received the ball approximately 33% of the throws but
after 5 throws one of the other players became excluded, indicating a shift from being
perceived as an equally valued participant to a more valued participant.
According to the sociometer theory, individuals monitor their environment for
inclusionary and exclusionary cues using their sociometer, which detects fluctuations in
an individual’s relational value (Leary, 2005; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). A person’s
relational value is “the degree to which others regard their relationship with the
individual as valuable, important or close” (Leary, 1999, p. 33). If a person experiences a
situation in which they are shown preferential or exclusive treatment, that person’s
perception of their relational value increases along with the belief or expectation that
others are likely to include, support, or protect them. The increased self-esteem in the
15
study by Simard and Dandeneau (2018) may not merely be due to social inclusion per se
but to perceived increase in their relational value. Given these results, overinclusion has
the potential to remediate the adverse effects of exclusion and promote positive social
attachment experiences. In particular, overinclusion may potentially challenge and
change existing negative internal representations of the self, others, and relationships in
those with insecure attachment. This is important because the attachment context is not
only where regulatory capacities develop but it also continues to influence regulatory
capacities. Thus, overinclusion has the potential to improve social attachment
experiences and to facilitate or enhance regulatory capacities, namely, mentalizing and
emotion regulation, which are important for buffering the negative effects of ostracism
and other negative social encounters and can help individuals re-establish or seek new
social connections. Currently, no such studies have yet been undertaken to investigate
how overinclusion interacts with attachment experiences to influence mentalizing and
emotion regulation.
Attachment
As previously mentioned, attachment style refers to an individual's psychological
representation of self and others and is expressed as recurring emotional and behavioral
patterns of relating to others in the context of intimate relationships. Attachment styles
are shaped through the early childhood relationship with primary caregivers and
influence not only subsequent relationships across the lifespan but also the development
of adaptive regulatory capacities (Fraley & Shaver, 2000). Although attachment theory
(Bowlby, 1969) primarily focused on the influence of these early emotional bonds on
personality development and interpersonal functioning rather than on the impact of broad
16
social processes, such as social inclusion and exclusion, Bowlby also attempted to
understand why and how disapproval, rejection, and separation are painful and how they
contribute to one’s security and insecurity (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2013). Attachment
theory can, therefore, be a useful framework for understanding how relationship security
and insecurity impact an individual’s ability to manage negative emotions and recover
from social exclusion (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2013).
According to Bowlby, the evolutionary process of natural selection has equipped
humans with a motivational, or attachment behavioral system, designed to regulate
proximity to a primary attachment figure. In times of separation, threat, or distress,
attachment behaviors, in the form of crying, protest, or searching, are activated to elicit
support, protection, and care from the attachment figure. The nature of the caregiver
responses to the infant and the ensuing dyadic experiences with the caregiver, repeated
over time, shape the development and quality of the infant’s internal working model
(IWM) – that is, the mental representations about the self, expectations of significant
others, and the relationship between the two (Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). Thus,
IWMs serve to organize the individual’s personality and give rise to recurrent patterns of
interpersonal behaviors “from the cradle to the grave” (Bowlby, 1977).
Studies have shown that individuals who have experienced consistent supportive,
protective, and empathic caregivers develop secure attachment and hold implicit beliefs
that the self is sufficiently loved and that others are available and well-intentioned.
Those who have experienced a pattern of inconsistency, absence, or rejection from
caregivers develop insecure attachment and hold beliefs that the self is unlovable and that
others are unreliable and unaccepting. Ainsworth’s (1978) systematic study of infant-
17
parent attachment through the Strange Situation paradigm, a procedure that includes a
brief separation of 12-month-old infants from their parent followed by a reunion, yielded
empirical taxonomy of individual differences in infant attachment patterns. Specifically,
secure infants were those who exhibited distress at separation and actively sought out
parents and became amenable to comfort upon parental return. Anxious-resistant
children also exhibited distress at separation but demonstrated conflicting behaviors
during reunion, indicative of a desire to be comforted by the parent but also anger
towards the parent for leaving. Avoidant children did not demonstrate distressed
behavior during separation and actively avoided parental contact upon reunion.
Like children, adults continue to rely on attachment figures (e.g., spouses,
partners, friends, mentors, therapists) to organize their behavior, particularly, in times of
stress or perceived threat. Securely attached adults experience greater levels of
satisfaction and commitment in romantic relationships (Frei & Shaver, 2002), less
interpersonal conflict (Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Kashy, 2005), and lower
interpersonal distress (Haggerty, Hilsenroth, & Vala-Stewart, 2009). Insecurely attached
adults tend to exhibit aggressive social behaviors (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2016), greater
depressive symptoms (Hankin, Kassel, & Abela, 2005), and limited coping abilities
(Berant, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2008).
Current research in adult attachment operationalize attachment orientation based
on two underlying dimensions (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) – attachment-related
anxiety and attachment-related avoidance – which are conceptually similar to
Ainsworth’s (1978) anxious-resistant and avoidant styles. These dimensions are
generally understood through a behavioral-motivational systems framework, which

18
involves the monitoring of the accessibility of the attachment figure and the regulation of
attachment behavior based on attachment-related concerns. More specifically, the
anxiety dimension represents the degree of concern that a partner/attachment figure will
not be available and responsive in times of need. The avoidance dimension represents
the degree of mistrust in the partner/attachment figure’s goodwill and therefore the effort
to maintain behavioral and emotional distance from others (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2016).
Adults scoring high on the attachment-related anxiety dimension tend to worry
about the availability of an attachment figure/partner. As such, they feel a deep need for
love and approval, fear rejection, and experience anger at the threat of separation. Adults
who score low on this dimension tend to feel more secure in others’ responsiveness.
High scores on the attachment-related avoidance dimension indicate a tendency for
emotional distance and low reliance on others. Avoidant adults over-value independence
and experience discomfort with intimacy and trusting partners. Adults scoring low on
this dimension are more comfortable with intimacy and are more secure regarding
interdependence. In sum, individuals with high levels of attachment anxiety or
attachment avoidance are characterized as exhibiting an insecure attachment style while
those with low levels of attachment anxiety and avoidance are characterized as having
secure attachment (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000).
Attachment and Social Participation
Attachment orientations are based on perceptions of belonging and support. Any
exclusion mechanism, such as ostracism, threatens the need for belonging and activates a
social separation anxiety. A number of studies have examined how individual
differences in attachment style interact with social participation (i.e., ostracism,

19
inclusion) and impact psychological functioning. However, these studies have mostly
focused on the interaction effect of attachment style and social participation on
fundamental needs and mood. Results from those existing studies have been mixed.
While one study (Waldrip, 2007) found that attachment orientation did not
moderate effects of ostracism when using combined attachment insecurity (anxiety and
avoidance) score, a preliminary study by Shaver and Mikulincer (2013) showed that the
ostracism condition resulted in lower scores on an immediate sense of meaning
questionnaire in those with high attachment anxiety but not in those with attachment
avoidance. In another study examining ostracism involving a romantic partner (Arriaga,
Capezza, Reed, Wesselman, & Williams, 2014), attachment anxiety was associated with
lower needs for satisfaction regardless of experimental condition (exclusion/inclusion).
The lack of difference between the social participation conditions on need satisfaction in
those with attachment anxiety is perhaps suggestive of the preoccupation with rejection
even in the presence of an inclusive or accepting context. The lack of difference in need
satisfaction between excluded and included participants may also indicate that an extreme
type of inclusion condition is required in order to improve need satisfaction. Adding an
overinclusion condition demonstrating an obvious preference for the participants and not
just being shown equal participation may interact with attachment anxiety in such a way
that it could decrease preoccupation and yield great effect on needs satisfaction. In
contrast to these studies, the current study examined not only whether ostracism
interacted with attachment styles but also whether overinclusion interacted with
attachment styles to impact two self-regulatory mechanisms, mentalizing and emotion
regulation, that influence psychological functioning.

20
Anxiously attached individuals also experienced lower sense of meaningful
existence and self-esteem when excluded by others (regardless of partner involvement),
and they experienced lower sense of belonging and self-esteem during partner non-
involvement (regardless of ostracism condition). Attachment avoidance was associated
with having belonging and control needs met when included, whereas avoidance was not
significantly associated with need satisfaction in the excluded condition. Other findings
have shown that avoidant attachment moderates social participation effects on needs
satisfaction and mood (Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006; Yaakobi & Williams, 2016).
Specifically, Yaakobi and Williams (2016) found that in both collectivistic and
individualistic cultures, no significant differences in needs satisfaction and mood existed
between individuals with higher avoidant attachment and those with lower avoidant
attachment in the Cyberball ostracism condition. However, within the Cyberball
inclusion condition, those with higher avoidant attachment scored significantly lower in
needs satisfaction and mood than those with lower avoidant attachment. Inclusion did
not significantly improve mood or needs satisfaction in those with higher attachment
avoidance. This may reflect the defensive tendency in those with attachment avoidance
to deny/minimize emotions and to remain mistrusting of others’ intentions or goodwill
represented by inclusion experiences. No moderating effect was found between
attachment anxiety and responses to social participation conditions.
The finding that an inclusive condition did not significantly improve mood and
needs satisfaction in individuals with an avoidant attachment style is in contrast to
Arriaga et al.’s finding (2014) and the results of Carvallo and Gabriel’s study (2006) that
found that those with high dismissive avoidant attachment, compared to low dismissive
21
avoidant attachment, experienced significantly higher levels of positive mood and self-
esteem after learning that other participants accepted them (i.e., showed a preference for
interacting with them over others by ranking them as 1st choice for an activity). Their
study also showed that those with higher dismissive avoidant attachment style
experienced significantly higher levels of positive affect and self-liking than those with
low dismissive avoidant attachment when they received feedback stating they will likely
experience future interpersonal success.
Differences in results between these two studies may reflect methodological
differences. In the studies conducted by Yaakobi and Williams (2016), ostracism and
inclusion were experienced via the Cyberball game, while Arriaga et al. (2014) and
Carvallo and Gabriel (2006) used verbal feedback to as a way of making the participants
aware of their exclusion or inclusion status. Explicit or verbal feedback about social
status may interact differently and be more effective than impersonal avatars in the
Cyberball game for those with avoidant attachment, particularly the dismissive type.
Differences in results may also be a function of construct distinctions (i.e.,
dismissive style is one type of avoidant orientation that holds a positive self-view and
negative view of others while a fearful style is another type of avoidant orientation that
holds the self and others in a negative way – this way of distinguishing avoidant styles is
based on Bartholomew and Horowitz’s (1991) four category model, which
conceptualizes attachment as an intersection between a person’s image of the self and
others). It is unclear in the studies using the 2 dimensions of adult attachment which type
of avoidant attachment was represented. In sum, these previous studies suggested that
inclusive conditions may still be viewed with mistrust and experienced as rejecting in
22
those with anxious and avoidant attachment. In order to satisfy their fundamental needs,
the experience of overinclusion may have been needed for such individuals who are
preoccupied with others’ availability and hold a cognitive/perceptual bias towards
mistrust and negative expectancies.
In sum, little is also known about what impact the interaction between attachment
style and ostracism may have on social cognitive capacities and emotion regulation,
which are important regulatory mechanisms with potentially intermediary functions that
facilitate fundamental needs satisfaction, improved mood, and overall psychological
well-being (Esmaeilinasab, Khoshk, & Makhmali, 2016; Hu et al., 2014; Jiang, Moreno,
& Ng, 2022). Furthermore, there has been little focus on how preferential, “exclusive”
inclusion (i.e., overinclusion) interacts with attachment styles to impact social cognition
and emotion regulation. Over-inclusive conditions may briefly provide a sense of felt
security and lessen the overreliance on hyperactivating and deactivating strategies in
those with attachment anxiety and avoidance, thus, freeing them to engage in reflective
thought and emotion regulation. The majority of the existing studies examining
attachment and social participation conditions have either focused on the effect of the
interaction between exclusion and attachment on fundamental needs (Arriaga, Capeza,
Reed, Wesselman, & Williams, 2014; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2013) or on priming secure
attachment to buffer effects of exclusion (Liddell & Courtney, 2018). The current study
examined the effect of both ostracism and overinclusion on the relationship between
attachment styles and mentalizing and on the relationship between attachment styles and
emotion regulation.
Mentalization
23
From a developmental perspective, attachment orientation is intimately connected
to mentalizing (Fonagy & Target, 2006). As previously mentioned, mentalizing refers to
imaginatively perceiving or interpreting the behavior of oneself and others in terms of
intentional mental states (i.e., beliefs, reasons, feelings, desires, needs, etc.) or mental
processes (Fonagy & Target, 2006; Fonagy et al., 2002.) This construct has also been
referred to in the social cognition literature as theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff,
1978; Sharp, Pane, Ha, Venta, Patel, Sturek, & Fonagy, 2011) and perspective taking
(Baron-Cohen, 2001; Frith & Frith, 2005). This selectively advantaged intellectual
achievement of understanding and anticipating behaviors permits cooperation, repair of
social conflicts, competitive advantage, and continually selects for increasingly higher
levels of social interpretive capacity (Fonagy, 2008).
Attachment and Mentalization
According to Fonagy and his colleagues, mentalization is acquired in the context
of early attachment relationships through the contingent responses and marked mirroring
provided by early caregivers (Fonagy & Target, 2006). These social communicative
mechanisms of mutual design provide the transmission or sharing of relevant
cultural/situational information. The attachment relationship not only provides the infant
with physical protection and a secure base from which he/she can explore the world as
Bowlby theorized, but it also serves to “ensure that the brain processes that come to
subserve social cognition are appropriately organized and prepared to equip the
individual for the collaborative existence with others for which the brain was designed”
(Fonagy & Target, 2006). Thus, the attachment relationship is a selectively advantaged
system that promotes social intelligence, survival, and capacities central for self-
24
organization. Furthermore, it serves as an optimal “training ground” for the emergence
of mentalization since it is a non-competitive relationship, where an individual can safely
practice learning about others’ minds.
The development of the ability to mentalize depends upon interactions with
mature, benign, reflective, and sufficiently attuned minds (Fonagy & Target, 1997). Such
experiences with caregivers decrease the child’s need to monitor the others’
trustworthiness and allows for a stronger attachment bond to develop. Greater
attachment security results in less frequent activation of the attachment system, which
means less suppression of brain activity related to cognitive regulation, control, and
social judgment. It has been demonstrated that activation of the attachment system
inhibits mentalization related brain activity (Bartels & Zeki, 2004). Thus, individuals
have greater opportunity and freedom to engage in the exploration of mental states when
the attachment system is not triggered frequently. Disturbances in early attachment
relationships interfere with the formation of this social-cognitive capacity and create
vulnerabilities for future relational difficulties.
Research has shown a link between security of attachment at 12 months and
performance on theory of mind tasks at 4 years old (Meins, 1997). Results indicated that
83% of children with secure attachment passed a false-belief task compared to 33% with
insecure attachment. Fonagy and colleagues also found that mother-infant and father-
infant attachment security predicted successful mentalizing in children. Studies have also
demonstrated a concurrent relationship between attachment security in children and
successful performance on theory of mind tasks (Fonagy & Target, 1997).

25
According to adult attachment theory, adult (romantic) relationships share similar
features as infant-parent relationships in that in adult relationships the partners provide
feelings of security and safety for one another, especially in times of distress. Adult
romantic partners engage in close, physical contact, feel insecure when the other is
unavailable, function as a secure base from which to explore the world, experience
mutual fascination and preoccupation with one another, and engage in “baby talk”
(Gillath, Karantzas, & Fraley, 2016). Research investigating the relationship between
adult attachment, mentalizing and personality functioning (Nazzaro et al., 2017) found
that mentalizing and personality functioning were influenced by attachment.
Specifically, individuals classified as secure on the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI)
had higher mentalizing levels (measured by the Reflective Functioning Scale) than those
classified as insecure/disorganized. These results, which provided evidence of a strong
relationship between mentalizing and attachment, are consistent with clinical and
empirical literature (Bouchard et al., 2008; Fonagy et al., 1991; Fonagy & Target, 1997;
Slade, 2007). Nazzaro and colleagues (2017) also established the role of mentalizing in
fully mediating the relationship between adult (secure/insecurity) attachment and
adaptive psychological features, and thus accounted for abilities in personality
functioning.
Ostracism and Mentalization
Because of the threat to belonging needs, the experience of being ignored or
excluded can motivate us to regain connection or seek new bonds with others, and
therefore, can prompt us to become more attentive to the mental states of others
(Knowles, 2014; White, Klein, von Klitzing, Graneist, Otto, Hill, Over, Fonagy, &
26
Crowly, 2016). Mentalizing or perspective-taking has adaptive value because it improves
social harmony and fosters social bonding (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005). Mentalizing
not only enables the excluded individuals to understand the reasons for their exclusion,
but it can also minimize chances of future rejection. Studies have shown that social
exclusion can promote mentalizing (Knowles, 2014; White et al., 2016), but it may also
interact with certain individual differences in attachment style and impact the ability to
accurately mentalize, particularly in those disposed to a preoccupied/anxious attachment
or fearful/avoidant attachment, (Sato, Fonagy, & Luyten, 2018; White et al., 2016).
According to social monitoring literature (Pickett & Gardner, 2005), excluded
individuals, particularly those with acute or chronic belonging deficits, might be
motivated to consider others’ perspective because understanding others’ behaviors may
facilitate repair of the relationship or prevent future exclusion. Many excluded
individuals tend to remember more other-related social information than self-related
social information (Hess & Pickett, 2010). Furthermore, they tend to accurately decode
facial expressions and vocal tones (Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004), attend to
positive, low-level social cues (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009), exhibit greater memory
for own-group faces (van Bavel, Swencionis, O’Connor, & Cunningham, 2012),
demonstrate greater gaze-triggered orientation (Wilkowski, Robinson, & Friesen, 2009),
better accurately discriminate real and fake smiles, and happy and angry faces (Bernstein,
Young, Brown, Sacco, & Claypool, 2008; Sacco, Wirth, Hugenberg, Chen, & Williams,
2011). In some cases, social exclusion may increase perspective taking even under
cognitive loading and does not necessarily result in a desire to avoid self-awareness
(Knowles, 2014). It has also been shown that following exclusion non-anxious children
27
develop more mentalistic stories (i.e., stories using more mental state language, depicting
characters as intentional agents) and describe greater affiliation between the characters in
their stories (White, Klein, von Klitzing, Graneist, Otto, Hill, Over, Fonagy, & Crowly,
2016).
While ostracism may increase mentalizing when belonging needs are heightened,
some factors or personality characteristics may disrupt the process of perspective taking,
or mentalizing. Impaired mentalizing may take different forms (Dziobek et al., 2006;
Fonagy et al., 2016): 1) excessive attribution or misattribution of mental states
(hypermentalizing), 2) uncertainty about mental states, diminished mental state language
and intentionality (hypomentalizing), or 3) inability for perspective taking (no
mentalizing). Impaired mentalizing has also been described in terms of developmental
failures to integrate two prementalizing modes that occur early in psychosocial
development: psychic equivalence and pretend mode. In psychic equivalence, mental
reality is equated with external reality. It is characterized by cognitive inflexibility,
concrete thinking, and intolerance for different perspectives. Pretend mode is
characterized by a disconnection between one’s actions and their professed thoughts and
feelings.
It has been demonstrated that excluded individuals do not engage brain regions
associated with mentalizing when exposed to negative social information (Powers,
Wagner, Norris, & Heatherton, 2013), which suggests difficulties with considering
mental states under these distressing social situations. Furthermore, studies have shown
that socially excluded individuals exhibit poorer empathic accuracy and less empathic
concern than their accepted counterparts (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006; Nordgren, Banas,
28
& MacDonald, 2011; Pickett et al., 2004). Empathy is a domain of mentalizing that
refers to the awareness of others’ mental states and the ability to emotionally respond to
others (Baron-Cohen, 2005).
Social monitoring, particularly in those with anxious attachment, may deplete
regulatory resources (Tyler, 2008), and could partly explain the self-regulatory
(Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005; van Dellen et al., 2012) and
mentalizing impairments, social problems, and difficulty with affiliation observed
following ostracism. It has been shown that compared to non-anxious children, anxious
children experience a decline in attributions of intentionality and mental state language in
their stories following ostracism using the Cyberball paradigm (White et al., 2016). This
suggests that an anxious disposition, rooted in and maintained by insecure attachment
orientations, can interact with ostracism and affect the degree of mentalizing across
different conditions.
While it is acknowledged that insecure attachment itself is not equated with
anxiety disorders, empirical studies have consistently linked insecure attachment
orientation and anxiety in children, adolescents, and adults (Bosquet & Egeland, 2006;
Cassidy, Lichtenstein-Phelps, Sibrava, Thomas, & Borkovec, 2009; Colonnesi, Draijer,
Stams, van der Bruggen, Bogels, & Noom, 2011; Hankin, Kassle, & Abela, 2005; Laible,
Carlo, & Raffaelli, 2000; Marganska, Gallagher, & Miranda, 2013; Muris, Meesters, van
Melick, & Zwambag, 2001; Warren, Huston, Egeland, & Sroufe, 1997). Furthermore,
the central characteristics of an anxiety disorder overlap with core features of insecure
attachment, namely, the interpersonal nature of worry, the cognitive errors leading to
unrealistic perceptions of external threat and the view that the self is ineffectual, emotion
29
regulation difficulties, a pervasive anxiety and lack of confidence in the others’
availability, the strong influence of family social relationships, and the lack of strong
genetic component for anxiety (Cassidy et al., 2009). Anxiety induced by the activation
of the attachment system following exclusion may negatively impact mentalizing skills in
affectively charged social situations. Negative arousal may also induce additional
cognitive loading that could interfere with controlled mentalizing and potentially result in
more automatic modes of mentalizing after exclusion coinciding with reflexive
assumptions about others’ internal states. Thus, such individual differences in attachment
can interact with the experience of ostracism to impact mentalizing capacities.
Another study examined the impact of social exclusion (i.e., Cyberball exclusion
vs inclusion) on mentalizing and effortful control in non-clinical adults with borderline
personality features (Sato, Fonagy, & Luyten, 2018). Extant literature has demonstrated
that this population is linked to insecure attachment (Agrawal, Gunderson, Holmes, &
Lyons-Ruth, 2004; Fonagy, Target, Gergely, Allen, & Bateman, 2008). Results indicated
that exposure to the social exclusion condition was associated with more emotional words
to explain others’ mental states in participants with higher borderline features. This
tendency to over-analyze or overestimate others’ mental states (i.e., hypermentalizing)
after social exclusion suggests that negative social interactions induce distress, activate
the attachment system, and motivates action to manage threatening situations. This
exhaustive strategy to overestimate possible mental states is consistent with previous
findings of excessive mentalizing in those with BPD, a condition characterized by
insecure attachment, particularly, preoccupied/anxious attachment (Sharp et al., 2013).
With regard to effortful control, those with high borderline features responded slower and
30
less accurate after exclusion compared to inclusion, suggesting that exclusion interfered
with self-regulation capacities in those with certain personality dispositions. This further
suggests that negative social interactions, such as exclusion, activate the attachment
system, which increases emotional arousal and interferes with attentional/control
capacities and can lead to poor performance in tasks of control and accuracy (Claypool &
Bernstein, 2019; Sato, Fonagy, & Luyten, 2018). Using the Cyberball paradigm, the
current study examined how exclusion (and overinclusion) interacted with individual
differences in attachment styles (i.e., anxious attachment and avoidant attachment) and
affect mentalizing capacities.
Mentalization Measures
Different kinds of measures have been developed to assess mentalizing, or
Reflective Functioning (RF), such as an interview-based measure, self-report measure,
and performance-based measures. The Reflective Functioning Scale (RFS; Fonagy,
Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998) is an interview-based assessment that measures the degree
to which an individual can reflect upon the mental states of him/herself and others as well
as the degree of complexity one understands others’ minds. The scale assesses response
to two kinds of questions taken from the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George,
Main, & Kaplan, 1985) that demand reflection of unobservable mental states and that
permit the interviewee to demonstrate his/her reflective capacity. The RFS measures
online mentalizing because the task of mentalizing occurs in the here and now, in the
context of an interpersonal relationship and high arousal condition (i.e., questions about
attachment relationships activate the attachment system).
Although the RFS has been the most widely known measure of mentalizing and
31
has been considered the gold standard for assessing RF, it has been criticized for its use
of a single, global score, which does not capture the complexity and dimensions of the
mentalizing process that it aims to measure (Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008).
Furthermore, its administration and scoring are time and labor intensive and requires
highly trained interviewers and raters. Because of these constraints, sample sizes will
tend to be smaller. These limitations of the instrument make it unsuitable for larger-scale
studies, such as this one, that investigated the relationship between mentalizing and other
constructs or conditions associated with insecure attachments (Fonagy et al., 2016).
The Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ; Fonagy et al., 2016) is a self-
report measure that was developed in response to the need for a shorter and more
efficient assessment of mentalizing for larger-scale studies. The RFQ is a measure of
offline mentalizing since it involves the process of reflecting retrospectively about
experiences or about stable tendencies of an individual's functioning (Janczak, 2021;
Luyten & Fonagy, 2015). The RFQ measures mentalizing through two scales that reflect
two broad impairments in mentalizing: hypomentalizing and hypermentalizing.
Hypomentalizing refers to concrete or psychic equivalent thinking and reflects an
inability to consider alternative or more complex perspectives in oneself and in others.
This impairment can be seen in individuals with depression, eating disorders, and BPD.
Hypermentalizing refers to the tendency for inaccurate models of the mind of oneself and
others and is characterized by long and excessively detailed accounts that bear little or no
relationship to observable reality. This is also characteristic of individuals with BPD.
There is good support for the RFQ as a measure of mentalizing as evidenced by
moderate to strong internal consistency, strong test-retest reliability, and support for
32
discriminant, convergent, and predictive validity (Fonagy et al., 2016). Furthermore, the
RFQ taps into other components of mentalizing, such as the cognitive, affective, self,
other, internal, and explicit components. Since its development and initial validation,
French, Italian, and Korean versions of the RFQ have been validated for French
adolescents (Duval et al., 2018) and adults (Badoud et al., 2015), Italian adults
(Morandotti et al., 2018), and Korean adolescents (Park & Song, 2018). Additionally, an
adolescent version has been developed in English (RFQ-Y; Ha et al., 2013). While the
RFQ is more suitable for studies requiring a large sample size, such as this study, it has
limitations that warranted the inclusion of additional mentalizing measures in this study.
First, the RFQ can be subject to response biases, particularly in those who have limited
awareness of their difficulty with mentalizing. Second, the RFQ only partially captures
externally-based mentalizing and does not tap into implicit mentalizing. Third, the RFQ
measures trait-based mentalizing and therefore, considers the capacity an unchanging
feature of an individual's functioning, which expresses itself at the same level across
different contexts. While the RFQ is suited to address the secondary aim of this study, it
does not capture the potential shift in mentalizing due to situational factors. To address
these limitations, other measures of mentalizing were included in the current study.
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill,
Raste, & Plumb, 2001) is a performance-based measure that assesses ability for mental
state attribution and complex facial emotion recognition. The RMET consists of 36
black-and-white pictures of the facial eye region of 18 males and 18 females. The
development of the measure was based on the assumption that people infer complex
mental states of others from information around the facial eye region. Participants are
33
presented with each picture along with four mental state words and are asked to choose
which option best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. The
RMET was designed to be a sensitive measure of adult social intelligence. Participants
must distinguish the correct target word from the other close imposter options which can
have the same emotional valence as the target word. The RMET has been used in over
250 studies and has been translated into various languages, including French (Prevost et
al., 2014), Italian (Vellante et al., 2012), and Spanish (Fernandez-Abascal et al., 2013) to
name a few. Responses are coded as correct or incorrect and yields a total maximum
score of 36. As a performance-based measure, the RMET has been used as a measure of
state mentalizing in studies that include experimental conditions, such as aversive social
conditions, to measure any fluctuations in mentalizing following such conditions (Sato,
Fonagy, & Luyten, 2018).
In this current study, the RMET pictures were divided into two groups. The first
group was administered before the social participation task, and the second group was
administered after the social participation to minimize habituation to the pictures. The
current study assessed state mentalizing by calculating the difference between the total
score on the first and total score on second group. Used in this sense, the RMET can be
construed as measuring online mentalizing in this study, given its concern with a task in
the here and now. Furthermore, it reflects a state that dynamically changes and is
predicated on highly arousing situations (i.e., social participation condition, such as
ostracism). One limitation of the RMET, however, is that the stimuli are static and do not
reflect the fluidity and contextual nature of eye expressions. Furthermore, the stimuli are
not seen in the context of interpersonal interactions, which is the natural context in which
34
inferences of mental states occurs. Despite this limitation, the RMET was a relatively
quick and easy performance measure to use.
The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006)
is a naturalistic, performance-based measure of mentalizing, which includes videos
depicting social interactions in a fairly accurate manner. Because the MASC assessment
uses complex social stimuli by presenting participants with close to real-life situations, it
has greater ecological validity than questionnaires and even other performance-based
measures, like the RMET. Like the RMET, the MASC has been used as a measure of
state mentalizing (Fuchs & Taubner, 2019). Furthermore, it can be construed as
measuring online mentalizing to the degree that when participants respond to stimuli
close to a natural context, they unconsciously activate their own representations about
emotions and relationships (Janczak, 2021). Participants are, therefore, emotionally
engaging in the performance of a task and this can be intensified or made more
emotionally arousing if in the context of an attachment-related stressor or an
experimental condition aimed at activating attachment systems (such as an aversive
social experience, like the ostracism condition used in this current study).
The MASC is formatted into a 15-minute movie which is divided into 43
segments that represent the test items, which include questions about different mental
state modalities (thoughts, emotions, intentions) with varying valence (positive, negative,
neutral). Participants are informed that they will watch a 15-minute film depicting four
characters who are getting together for a Saturday evening. Participants are told that the
movie will be paused at various points and will be asked questions about the scene they
just watched. They are asked to imagine what the characters are thinking and feeling
35
during those times that the movie is stopped. The film portrays the progression of
different dynamics between the characters, which suggest their different motives for
meeting and their general personality traits. They also experience different situations that
evoke a range of emotions and mental states, which are communicated through various
shifts in quality and use of language (e.g., sarcasm), gestures, and facial expressions
across scenes.
The MASC uses a dichotomous (right/wrong) response format and yields a total
mentalizing score. Three other scores, derived from the incorrect answers, are also
calculated and represent impairments in mentalizing: 1) hypomentalizing (or “less theory
of mind”), which signifies insufficient or impoverished mental state reasoning; 2) no
mentalizing (“no theory of mind”), which indicates a failure to choose items describing
mental states to explain character behaviors; and 3) hypermentalizing (“excessive theory
of mind”), which refers to overinterpreting mental states (Dziobek et al., 2006). The
MASC has adequate internal consistency and high test-retest reliability. Like the RFQ,
the MASC appears to capture some complex aspects or dimensions of mentalizing,
particularly, the cognitive, affective, internal, external, other, and explicit mentalizing.
However, it only partially captures the implicit dimension of mentalizing and does not tap
into the self-dimension of the self-other polarity. Despite its limitations, the MASC
remains a useful mentalizing measure because it is administered in a standardized way, it
is distinct from clinical assessments, it limits measurement error and rater bias due to its
computer administration, and it does not require extensive training to administer and
score. The current study used the total MASC score, derived from the total correct
responses, to measure online mentalizing.

36
Emotion Regulation
As mentioned earlier, emotion regulation refers to the capacity for monitoring,
evaluating, and managing emotional reactions in order to achieve one’s goals (Eisenberg
& Spinrad, 2004; Gross, 1988; Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011; Thompson, 1994). It
involves both the suppression and heightening of emotions, the regulation of attention
and cognition, behavioral responses, and the individual factors that are both intrinsic and
extrinsic to an individual. Emotion dysregulation occurs when individuals are unable to
use effective coping strategies to modulate negative emotions arising from distressing
events. In the multidimensional model of emotion regulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2004),
adaptive response to emotional distress involves four features: awareness and
understanding of emotions, acceptance of emotions, the ability to control impulsive
behaviors during negative emotions, and the ability to use emotion regulation strategies
appropriately to meet goals and situational demands.
Ostracism and Emotion Regulation
Ostracism can evoke emotional distress, such as anxiety, hurt, sadness, and anger
(Davidson, Willner, van Noordt, Banz, Wu, Kenney, Johannesen, & Crowley, 2019;
Leary & Leder, 2009; Vangelisti, Young, Carpenter-Theune, & Alexander, 2005), which
then activates cognitive-affective processes and behaviors for managing the intensity and
duration of distress (Riva, 2016). Adaptive responses to ostracism can include
reappraisal, or reinterpreting the meaning of a negative situation to decrease its emotional
impact. In a study that investigated the impact of reappraisal on recovery from ostracism
(Sethi, Moulds, & Richardson, 2013), participants were assigned to play the Cyberball
game, then were asked to answer a set of questions about their experience. Results
37
showed that those who engaged in spontaneous reappraisal of the ostracism experience
reported less need-threat and recovered more quickly than those who did not reappraise
the ostracism experience. Although a limitation of the study was its small sample size,
results suggest that spontaneous reinterpretation of an exclusion experience in a more
positive way may facilitate faster recovery from it. In another study (Poon & Chen,
2016), participants were assigned to the ostracism or inclusion condition during
Cyberball. Following Cyberball, half of the participants were primed with the idea that
ostracism was harmful to self-development while the other half was primed with the idea
that ostracism can be beneficial to one’s growth and development. Results showed that
those who were ostracized and primed with negative ideas of ostracism behaved more
aggressively than those who were included. Also, those primed with the idea that
ostracism could be beneficial did not behave more aggressively than included
participants.
Ostracism can also lead to a state of emotion dysregulation. Emotion
dysregulation may not only be experienced in the reflexive stage, which occurs
immediately after the exclusion experience, but it can remain unmitigated after a month.
In a study (Davidson et al., 2019) that examined the one-month stability of ostracism
distress and emotion dysregulation, adolescents completed the Cyberball task, the Need
Threat Scale, anxiety scales, the Difficulties in Emotional Regulation Scale, and two
measures of thought disorders, repeated over one month. Results indicated that at re-test,
participants continued to report substantial ostracism distress following social exclusion,
even after experiencing the same task one month earlier. Furthermore, the emotion
dysregulation scale did not result in a significant decrease from baseline to one-month
38
follow up. This shows that participants continued to be negatively affected by the
experience of ostracism despite familiarity with the task from previous exposure and the
opportunity to reflect on the experience one month earlier. A notable limitation of this
study was their use of the dispositional emotion dysregulation measure in assessing
change over time, which may partly explain the stability of the effect of ostracism. Trait-
based measures, such as the Difficulties in Emotional Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz &
Roemer, 2004) are not as sensitive to detecting change over repeated measures as state-
based measures, such as the State Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS;
Lavender et al., 2017). Using the S-DERS could have provided a more accurate picture
of the impact of ostracism over time. A critique of the trait-based emotion regulation
measure, DERS, and a more detailed discussion of the state-based emotion regulation
measure, S-DERS, are included in a later section on emotion regulation measures.
In the ostracism literature, specific maladaptive responses to ostracism signaling
dysregulation have included emotional numbing (Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, &
Baumeister, 2009) and the use of distraction (Fabiansson & Denson, 2012) – i.e.,
deactivating or distancing efforts, which reflect a lack of awareness/understanding of
one’s emotions and lack of acceptance of one’s emotions. Other specific maladaptive
responses to ostracism include rumination (Joorman, 2006; Wesslman et al., 2013) and
aggressive behaviors (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001) – i.e., hyperactivating
or approach tendencies, which reflect difficulty with controlling compulsive/impulsive
behaviors and difficulty with using more appropriate emotion regulation strategies.
Given that ostracism is a threat to attachment needs, differences in emotion
regulation may result from ostracism interacting with individual differences in attachment
39
styles, such that those low on anxious/avoidant attachment may be better able to engage
in reappraisals while those higher on anxious attachment may experience prolonged
emotion dysregulation because of their tendency to ruminate and their vulnerability to
cognitive distortions.
Overinclusion and Regulatory Mechanisms
Overinclusion may have self-regulatory benefits as it has been shown to result in
decreased negative emotions, particularly for insecurely attached individuals who tend to
have expectations or distorted perceptions that others are rejecting or unreliable even
under objectively inclusive interpersonal conditions (De Panfilis, Riva, Preti, Cabrino, &
Marchesi, 2015; Weinbrecht, Niedeggen, Roepke, & Renneberg, 2018) or cooperative
social exchanges (King-Casas, Sharp, Lomax-Bream, Lohrenz, Fonagy, & Montague,
2008). An example of this tendency can be seen in individuals with Borderline
Personality Disorder (or borderline personality features) and Social Anxiety Disorder
(SAD), who continue to react to fair or accepting interpersonal situations as if they were
ostracized because these inclusive conditions fail to meet their underlying implicit need
for “extreme” social inclusion (De Panfilis et al., 2015; Weinbrecht et al., 2018). In other
words, in order to decrease emotion distress from painful social interactions and restore a
sense of emotional equilibrium in insecurely attached individuals, an extreme condition
must be met.
According to Cognitive Theory (Beck et al., 2015), this shift towards a new,
elevated norm and need for "extreme" social inclusion can be linked to interpretational
deficits or biases in the processing of social information. These biases are most
prominent in emotionally laden and/or ambiguous interpersonal situations. In studies on

40
social participation, Cyberball inclusion (i.e., receiving the ball equal amount of time as
others) can be experienced as an ambiguous situation and allows room for biased
interpretations. In contrast, Cyberball exclusion (i.e., only getting the ball approximately
twice) and overinclusion (i.e., getting the ball almost all of the time), are not experienced
as ambiguous.
From a more psychodynamic, object relations perspective (Kernberg et al., 1984),
this implicit need for “extreme” social inclusion stems from an unconscious idealized
need to belong and reflects a view of the self as rejected or abandoned and a view of
others as rejecting and untrustworthy. Moreover, these distorted representations of the
self and others emerge from the attempt to protect an idealized, nurtured view of the self
and maintain a view of others as benevolent and caring. A common relational pattern and
coping strategy for painful affect among those with BPD is the use of projection of one’s
negative relational attitudes onto others which makes it difficult for them to trust and
experience positive emotions in accepting environments or fair, inclusive conditions.
While this formulation describes individuals with BPD or borderline personality features,
BPD is associated with insecure attachment organization (particularly, preoccupied,
unresolved, and fearful in the categorical sense), reflects overlapping characteristics, such
as emotion regulation difficulties, trust difficulties, and perceptual bias, and therefore can
provide a conceptual link to the understanding of how insecurely attached individuals
would benefit from over-inclusion.
In a between-subject design study conducted by De Panfilis and colleagues
(2015), 61 BPD patients and 61 healthy control participants were randomly assigned to
one of three Cyberball conditions: overinclusion (i.e., participant received the ball 45%
41
of the time), inclusion (i.e., fair condition in which the participant and online
confederates received the ball 33% of the time), and ostracism (i.e., participant received
the ball a total of only 2 times). The study investigated whether the rejection sensitivity
in BPD is not just a tendency to over-react emotionally but stems from a distorted
perception of social contexts as rejecting. In other words, is it not only an emotion
regulation problem but also a social cognition problem? Participants completed the
Rejection-related Emotions Scale (RES; Buckley et al., 2004), a measure of current
emotional state at 3 different points (prior to Cyberball, immediately after the game, and
20 minutes after completing the experiment). Participants also completed the Inclusion
of Other in Self Scale (IOS; Aron et al., 1992), a single-item measure of social
connection at 2 different points (immediately after Cyberball, and 20 minutes after
completing the experiment). Statistical analysis using factorial MANOVA indicated that
the Cyberball manipulation was successful in conveying different degrees of social
participation. Specifically, the manipulation had a significant effect on participants’
reported throws received and feelings of being ignored. Additionally, feelings of being
ignored or excluded were higher in the ostracism condition than inclusion and over-
inclusion; no significant differences were found between inclusion and over-inclusion.
To determine how rejection related emotions and feelings of social isolation were
influenced by clinical status, experimental condition and time, a 2 mixed-model repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted.
Results of the aforementioned study conducted by De Panfilis and colleagues
(2015) indicated that BPD patients reported greater negative emotions, particularly
anxiety and sadness, than healthy control participants in the ostracism and inclusions
42
conditions but not in the over-inclusion condition. BPD patients also reported lower
rejection-related negative emotions, most notably anxiety, in the over-inclusion condition
compared to ostracism. Furthermore, their reported anxiety levels were comparable to
healthy control participants in the over-inclusion condition. Within the healthy control
participants, differences in rejection-related negative emotions were found only between
the ostracism and inclusion condition. Although both BPD patients and healthy control
groups experienced happy feelings immediately after the Cyberball game, only the
healthy control participants reported continued increase in happy feelings 20 minutes
after completion of the game. In terms of social connection, scores for both BPD patients
and healthy control participants increased immediately following ostracism but did not
change following inclusion or over-inclusion conditions. However, overall BPD patients
reported less social connection across the 3 experimental conditions and 2 evaluation
times.
In sum, De Panfilis and colleagues’ study (2015) suggests that over-inclusion may
improve emotion regulation and decrease heightened emotional distress associated with
ostracism and even inclusive conditions for BPD patients. Although their study mainly
focused on the impact of the 3 experimental social participation conditions on BPD
patients compared to healthy control groups, their findings can help shed light in
understanding how over-inclusive experiences can aid in emotion regulation in those who
perceive over-inclusion as “the norm” that restores emotional equilibrium or to levels
comparable to typical/non-clinical subjects.
Another study conducted by Weinbrecht and colleagues (2018) also examined the
experience of social perception and biased processing in those with BPD compared to
43
healthy control participants, but they also included patients with Social Anxiety Disorder
as a clinical control group to determine whether the bias is disorder-specific. Using the
Cyberball paradigm, the results indicated that both BPD and SAD patients reported
greater feelings of ostracism, negative mood, and need threat than healthy control
participants in the inclusion condition. Moreover, the two clinical groups did not differ
with each other in their feelings of ostracism and negative mood in the inclusion
condition. BPD and SAD patients also showed greater expectations of social exclusion in
the inclusion compared to the overinclusion condition, and the two clinical groups
showed higher social exclusion expectations than healthy control individuals. When
overincluded, the BPD and SAD patients reported the same level of negative mood and
ostracism as did the healthy control participants. However, the threat to social needs and
expectations of social exclusion were generally higher in BPD patients compared to
healthy controls. These results align with the findings from De Panfilis et al.’s study
(2015), which showed that BPD patients experienced comparable levels of negative
mood to healthy control participants when overincluded, although they felt less social
connection to the other players irrespective of their social participation conditions. In
sum, studies have shown that overinclusion has resulted in decreased negative emotions,
particularly for insecurely attached individuals, suggesting that overinclusion can
improve regulatory mechanisms.
Like the DePanfilis et al. (2015) and Weinbrecht et al. (2018) studies, the current
study examined the impact of different social participation conditions, which included
overinclusion, ostracism, and inclusion. However, in contrast to those studies which
examined how different social participation conditions affected the relationship between
44
specific psychological conditions or diagnoses and needs satisfaction/mood, the current
study focused on how different social participation affected the relationship between
attachment styles and two self-regulatory mechanisms, mentalizing and emotion
regulation. Using the Cyberball paradigm, community adult participants from Amazon
MTurk were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Prior to playing the
Cyberball game, participants completed attachment measures, state mentalizing, and state
emotion regulation measures. Participants then completed the manipulation checks, state
mentalizing, and state emotion regulation measures after playing the Cyberball game.
Attachment and Emotion Regulation
Ostracism threatens one’s sense of belonging and other aspects of the self, and
threatening situations activate the attachment system. Attachment literature has shown
that the two orthogonal attachment dimensions, attachment anxiety and attachment
avoidance, are associated with different patterns for regulating emotional distress and
managing threatening events (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2019).
Individuals high on attachment anxiety worry about others’ availability, love, and
support in times of need and, therefore, tend to exhibit hyperactivating behaviors,
characterized by proximity-seeking, exaggeration of a sense of helplessness and
vulnerability, and intensified efforts to elicit attention, reliable protection, and support
from an attachment figure (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2019). Anxiously attached individuals
tend towards intensified cognitive engagement that exacerbates distress and a
hyperattentiveness to distress-eliciting stimuli (Caldwell & Shaver, 2012). Furthermore,
when primed with neutral or distress-eliciting stimuli, those with anxious attachment are
more prone to experiencing task interference because of heightened attention to

45
distressing stimuli (Silva, Soares, & Esteves, 2012). Other hyperactivation behaviors
also include hypervigilant attentiveness to internal distress signals, rapid access and
heightened bias towards threat-related memories (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995),
rumination of real and potential threats, approaching threatening situations, and engaging
in ineffective, self-defeating actions.
Individuals high on attachment avoidance are mistrusting of others’ intentions
and, therefore, tend to exhibit deactivating behaviors, characterized by inhibition of
emotional states associated with vulnerability, such as fear, anxiety, anger, sadness,
shame, guilt and distress (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2019), and an emphasis on self-reliance
and independence. Studies have shown that those with avoidant attachment tend to rely
on cognitive distancing and emotional disengagement as a means of coping with
threatening stimuli (Holmberg et al., 2011; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2019; Pascuzzo, Cyr, &
Moss, 2013). Studies on thought suppression have examined the defensive tendency to
block experiencing negative emotions in those with avoidant attachment (Edelstein &
Gillath, 2008; Fraley & Shaver, 1997; Gillath et al., 2005). When participants were
instructed to write about their thoughts and feelings and asked to simultaneously suppress
their thoughts about their romantic partner leaving them for someone else, those with
avoidant attachment had greater ability to suppress separation-related thoughts (Fraley &
Shaver, 1997). Such individuals had lower skin conductance during the task and made
less frequent references to loss following the suppression task.
However, in a study in which participants were asked to hide their emotional
reactions to a film intended to elicit disgust, suppression increased sympathetic activation
of the cardiovascular and electrodermal systems (Gross, 1998). This suggests that
46
avoidantly attached individuals utilize deactivation strategies more readily in threatening
or distressing relational contexts. This is consistent with other findings that show
individuals with avoidant attachment are less able to access sad and anxious relational
memories, as demonstrated by long recall latency and rating of focal and non-focal
memories with less intensity than those who are securely attached (Mikulincer & Orbach,
1995). In contrast, anxious attachment was linked to more frequent thoughts of
separation-related content following the suppression task and higher skin conductance
during the task. These results are consistent with a study that showed attachment-related
variations in patterns of brain activation and deactivation as participants thought about
breakups and losses and attempted to suppress these separation-related content (Gillath et
al., 2005). This ability by avoidant individuals to suppress negative thoughts, however, is
disrupted when a high cognitively loaded task is imposed (Kohn, Rholes, & Schmeichel,
2012; Mikulincer, Dolev, & Shaver, 2004). In one study (Chun et al., 2015) avoidant
participants’ ability for attentional disengagement broke down when instructed to
rehearse a 7-digit number during the attentional task. Other deactivating behaviors
include masking verbal or non-verbal expression of emotion.
Other studies (Stevens, 2014; Wei et al., 2005) using different self-report
measures of emotion regulation converge with previous work that have demonstrated this
link between attachment anxiety and more reactive/hyperactivating regulatory responses
and between attachment avoidance and distancing/deactivating responses. Specifically,
anxious attachment was significantly positively correlated with the Goals and Impulse
subscales on the Difficulties in Emotional Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer,
2004), indicating that anxiously attached individuals are more likely to let their emotions
47
interfere with their goals and are more likely to engage in impulsive behavior (Stevens,
2014). This may be partly due to their struggle with clarifying emotions despite their
tendency to have more awareness of their emotions. Avoidant attachment showed
stronger positive correlations with the Aware and Clarity subscales on the DERS,
suggesting preference for not thinking about feelings, which minimizes emotional
interference in functioning and prevents impulsive behaviors (Stevens, 2014).
The aforementioned results above are consistent with other studies that have also
demonstrated significant relationship between insecure attachment styles and the
different domains of emotion regulation on the DERS (Marganska, Gallagher, &
Miranda, 2013; Velotti et al., 2016). Specifically, anxious attachment styles were
positively correlated with greater difficulty with controlling impulse and pursuing goals,
as well as difficulty with clarifying emotions, accepting negative emotions, and accessing
effective regulation strategies (Marganska, Gallagher, & Miranda, 2013). Avoidant
attachment (dismissive avoidant) was positively correlated with lack of acceptance of
negative emotions (Marganska, Gallagher, & Miranda, 2013). Velotti and colleagues
(2016) found that both anxious and avoidant attachment were positively related to
nonacceptance of negative emotions. Moreover, only anxious attachment positively
correlated with impulse problems and difficulty using effective strategies, while only
avoidant attachment positively correlated with lack of awareness of emotions. These
results point to tendencies for hyperactivating (i.e., reactivity) and deactivating (i.e.,
suppression) emotion regulation strategies, and are consistent with the findings from
other attachment studies.

48
As described above, the DERS has been used in studies that have examined the
relationship between attachment styles and emotion regulation. The DERS reflects a
multifaceted definition of emotion regulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Overall, both
anxious and avoidant attachment are associated with difficulty accepting negative
emotions and difficulty accessing effective regulation strategies as shown by their
significant correlations with the Strategies and Nonacceptance subscales. Furthermore,
the DERS subscales, Goals and Impulse, consistently positively correlated with anxious
attachment. This indicates that individuals with anxious attachment have difficulties
unique to their disposition, particularly, with concentrating and accomplishing tasks and
remaining in control of their behavior when experiencing negative emotions. These links
are consistent with the description in the attachment literature of hyperactivating
responses to distress in those with anxious attachment. The DERS subscales, Aware and
Clarity, were shown to correlate positively with avoidant attachment, which indicates that
avoidant individuals give little attention to their emotions and therefore lack clarity of
their emotional experience. These associations are consistent with the description in
attachment literature of deactivating responses to distress in those with avoidant
attachment.
Results from another study (Wei et al., 2005) using a different measure to assess
emotion regulation showed that individuals with different insecure attachment styles used
different and distinct emotion regulation strategies, which then contributed to negative
mood and interpersonal problems. Specifically, attachment anxiety contributed to
negative mood totally through hyperactivating behaviors, as measured by the emotional
reactivity subscale from the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised (DSI-R; Skowron

49
& Friedlander, 1998), instead of deactivation behaviors (measured by the emotional
cutoff subscale), whereas attachment avoidance contributed to negative mood totally
through deactivating behaviors, as measured by the emotional cutoff subscale from the
DSI-R (instead of emotional reactivity). Furthermore, attachment anxiety contributed to
interpersonal problems only partially through emotional reactivity (instead of emotional
cutoff), whereas attachment avoidance contributed to interpersonal problems only
partially through emotional cutoff (instead of emotional reactivity). Studies such as this
one established that individuals with different attachment dimensions are biased towards
different and distinct affect regulation patterns, and this has important implications for
therapeutic interventions. For example, practitioners can help individuals with
attachment anxiety to understand how their emotional reactivity leads to worsen mood
and interpersonal ineffectiveness.
Emotion Regulation Measures
Emotion regulation measures, such as the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation
Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and the Differentiation of Self Inventory (DSI-R;
Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), assess for dispositional tendencies and instruct participants to
rate items based on their average or typical experiences. A limitation to these trait-based
measures is that they do not capture potential changes over time or the potential impact of
contextual variables. In this current study, a state-based measure was needed to assess
any momentary emotion regulation difficulties that follow the experimental conditions
that are potentially aversive social experiences. While indirect (i.e., physiological
indicators, such as skin conductance levels) or task-based methods (i.e., writing,
administration of aversive noise levels, social giving) have been applied as state-based
50
assessments of emotion regulation in the ostracism and attachment literature, they were
not the most feasible methods for the current study, which was entirely conducted online
through MTurk. Given these limitations, a self-report, state-based measure was better
suited for examining the impact of different social conditions on emotion regulation.
The State Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS; Lavender, Tull,
DioLillo, Moore, & Gratz, 2017) is a 21-item, state-based self-report measure of emotion
regulation, modified and adapted from the original DERS. S-DERS items were selected
from the six subscales of the original DERS. To shorten the measure for state-based
study designs and reduce redundancy, similarly worded items were removed. Items were
also reworded to reflect current state.
The S-DERS produces a total score and four subscales: Nonacceptance of Current
Emotions (Nonacceptance), Limited Ability to Modulate Current Emotional and
Behavioral Responses (Modulate), Lack of Awareness of Current Emotions (Awareness),
and Lack of Clarity about Current Emotions (Clarity). These four factors of the S-DERS
remain consistent with the multidimensional understanding of emotion dysregulation that
forms the basis of the DERS. The Nonacceptance factor on the S-DERS and the
Nonacceptance subscale on the DERS overlap conceptually. The Modulate factor on the
S-DERS overlaps conceptually with the Impulse, Goals, and Strategies subscales on the
DERS. The Awareness and Clarity factors on the S-DERS overlap conceptually with the
Awareness and Clarity subscales of the DERS.
The S-DERS has shown to be reliable and valid, with the S-DERS total and
subscale scores being significantly positively associated with the DERS total score. In
addition, most of the correlations between the S-DERS total and subscales scores and the
51
DERS subscales were significant. The S-DERS was also found to significantly correlate
with other trait-based measures of emotion regulation (The Emotion Amplification and
Reduction Scales; Hamilton et al., 2009), emotional intensity and reactivity (Affective
Intensity Measure; Larsen & Diener, 1987), mindfulness (Five Facet Mindfulness
Questionnaire; Baer et al., 2006), and experiential avoidance (Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire; Hayes et al., 2004)). In sum, in contrast to the DERS that measures global
tendencies, the S-DERS assessed in-the-moment difficulties in emotion regulation, which
made it appropriate to administer after a stress inducing condition.
Mentalization and Emotion Regulation
Mentalizing and emotion regulation are overlapping constructs, and both
capacities emerge within the attachment context and depend upon the quality of
contingent responses and marked mirroring provided by early caregivers (Fonagy &
Target, 2006). Both capacities are fundamental to how people understand, experience,
and respond to their emotions. The relationship between mentalizing and emotion
regulation is supported by neuroscientific data demonstrating the partial overlap in their
neural substrates. Mentalizing, or ToM, tasks activate the dorsolateral and ventromedial
regions of the prefrontal cortex (Decety, 2010; Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014), while
emotion regulation is related to the dorsal and ventral prefrontal cortex, as well as the
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (McRae et al., 2012; Oschner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli,
2002). Additionally, the medial prefrontal cortex is considered a nodal structure for a
range of socioemotional processes, such as mentalizing and emotion regulation (Bzdok et
al., 2013; Heatherton, 2011; Nakao, Takezawa, Miyatani, & Ohira, 2009).
52
Decety (2010) proposed a neurodevelopmental model that describes the
emergence of mentalizing capacities and emotion regulation. According to his model,
three components occur sequentially and then continuously interact with each other in a
feedback loop. The first component, the ability to engage with affective stimuli, is
present at birth. Newborns demonstrate the automatic capacity to discriminate and react
to affective social stimuli. This process is automatically activated and involves mimicry
and somatic sensorimotor resonance between the self and other, quite similar to Fonagy’s
description of the attunement and mirroring process between infant and caregiver
(Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002). The second stage involves the development of
emotion understanding and mentalizing capacity. In this stage, information from the
affective stimuli is integrated into the accumulating knowledge of emotional experiences
and becomes the building blocks for the explicit representational system of internal
states. The third component refers to the regulation of emotional responses. The
development of this capacity begins with dependence on the caregiver for the modulation
of emotional responses. Repeated experiences of flexible, adaptive, and socially
appropriate ways of regulating emotions by the caregiver eventually give rise to
independent self-regulatory processing. Emotion regulatory capacities are closely tied to
aspects of executive functioning, such as inhibitory control and working memory, and
metacognition.
Mentalizing involves the awareness, understanding, and identification of thoughts
and feelings in oneself and others. While mentalizing can occur prior to, during, and
after the modulation of emotions as described by Decety (2010), Jurist (2005) emphasizes
that the regulatory process of managing, altering, or changing the intensity and duration
53
of the emotional experience depends on the mentalizing capacity. Emotions are not
merely adjusted in the regulatory process. Instead, they are contextualized and given
meaning, which requires the ability to reflect on one’s thoughts and feelings (Greenberg
et al., 2017; Jurist, 2005). This then guides a person’s understanding of their emotions
and aids in how they respond to future situations. This is consistent with other views that
mentalizing capacities are developmental prerequisites for self organization and adequate
emotion regulation (Fonagy & Allison, 2012; Fonagy et al., 2002; Schipper & Peterman,
2013). Deficits in the former leads to impairments in the latter.
Impairments in mentalizing have not only been linked to emotion dysregulation in
clinical samples, such as BPD, Aspergers, and Autism Spectrum Disorders (Andreou &
Skrimpa, 2020; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Cai et al., 2018; Kimhi, 2014;
Samson, Huber, & Gross, 2012; Sharp, Pane, Ha, Venta, Patel, Sturek, & Fonagy, 2011),
but converging results from non-clinical samples also demonstrate the association
between mentalizing (perspective taking/ToM) and emotion regulation. Children’s
performance on ToM tasks significantly predicted their ability to manage their emotional
responses to stressors (Hudson & Jacques, 2014), suggesting that the capacity for
understanding and reasoning about mental states enhances self-regulation. Adult studies
have also found support for the relationship between mentalizing and emotion regulation.
A study with Argentinean adults found a significant inverse relationship between
mentalizing and emotion dysregulation (i.e., non-acceptance of emotional responses,
difficulties with controlling impulsive behaviors, lack of emotional clarity, and limited
effective regulation strategies) (Meyebovsky, Tabullo, & Garcia, 2019). Additionally,
those with higher mentalizing scores showed less impulse control and emotional clarity
54
problems compared to those with lower mentalizing scores. A limitation noted in that
study was the small effect size in the relationship between mentalizing and emotion
regulation, which may have been impacted by the measure used (i.e., RMET) as it could
rely on factors, such as facial recognition skills, that may not have a strong or direct
association with emotion regulation. Recommendations were made for broader, more
complex, and ecologically valid mentalizing measures, such as the MASC, to provide
larger effect size.
Another study (Schwarzer, Nolte, Fonagy, & Gingelmaier, 2021) examined if
better mentalizing predicted the amount of adaptive or maladaptive emotion regulation.
Results indicated that self-focused mentalizing was positively associated with adaptive
emotion regulation of anger, anxiety, and sadness. Other-focused mentalizing was
positively associated only with adaptive regulation of anxiety. Additionally, both self
and other-focused mentalizing were negatively correlated with maladaptive regulation of
anger and anxiety. Only self-focused mentalizing was negatively correlated with
maladaptive regulation of sadness. Overall, results suggested that (self-focused)
mentalizing is a prerequisite for emotion regulation and predicts adaptive and
maladaptive forms of emotion regulation. The study also demonstrated that while self-
focused mentalizing led to better adaptive emotion regulation with small effects, it
explained a significant amount of variance of maladaptive emotion regulation in their
sample with large effects, indicating the buffering impact of mentalizing on emotion
dysregulation.
To summarize, mentalizing and emotion regulation develop in the context of
attachment relationships. Moreover, they are related, overlapping, and yet distinct
55
constructs. Mentalizing involves not only identification and understanding of emotions
but also the ability to reflect on those emotional experiences in order to contextualize and
attribute meaning to those experiences. This then impacts the ability to regulate
emotions, which involves accessing appropriate skills or resources to modify the quality
of the emotional experience. Studies have demonstrated that mentalizing capacities
predict emotion regulation abilities and are consistent with the theoretical position that
mentalizing capacities are preconditions to adaptive emotion regulation. Given this
relationship, the secondary aim of the current study was to examine whether dispositional
mentalizing mediated the relationship between attachment and emotion regulation.
Summary
This chapter discussed the research and theory on ostracism, overinclusion,
attachment, mentalizing, and emotion regulation. Each construct was defined and their
relationship to each other was demonstrated. Regarding the principal focus of this study,
studies have demonstrated the negative impact of ostracism on two important regulatory
mechanisms, mentalizing and emotion regulation, and the negative outcomes may be a
function of ostracism interacting with an individual’s attachment orientation. Studies
suggest that its opposite, overinclusion, may yield more positive outcomes in regulatory
capacities given the reduction in emotional distress following overinclusion, particularly
for those with insecure attachment styles. This could be due to biases in social
information processing, such that fair, neutral, or inclusive conditions are still interpreted
as rejecting. Furthermore, those with insecure attachment may hold an implicit need for
“extreme” social inclusion because of their self-view as rejected and the belief that others
are rejecting and untrustworthy. Overinclusion satisfies this implicit need for the extreme
56
social participation, and therefore, may be associated with better emotion regulation and
accurate mentalizing. Methods for assessing mentalizing and emotion regulation were
reviewed and critiqued, and reasons were provided for the choice of measures in this
study. Lastly, with regards to the secondary/exploratory aim of the study, research on the
relationship between mentalizing and emotion regulation were discussed to present the
hypothesis that mentalizing mediates the relationship between attachment and emotion
regulation.
57
CHAPTER III
Statement of the Problem
As outlined in the literature review, different social participation conditions can
impact two regulatory mechanisms, namely, mentalizing and emotion regulation, which
play a role in psychological well-being or distress. Studies on the impact of ostracism on
mentalizing capacities have shown mixed results. On the one hand, empirical evidence
has shown ostracism can act as a catalyst for increased mentalizing and attentiveness to
social information (Hess & Pickett, 2010; Knowles, 2014; Pickett & Gardner, 2005;
White et al., 2016). For example, it has been shown that after exclusion, children create
stories with more mental state language and portray their characters as more intentional
and affiliative (White et al., 2016). Excluded individuals have also demonstrated facility
in joint instructional tasks that require them to see from the other’s perspective (Knowles,
2014). Lastly, excluded individuals can accurately decode facial expressions and vocal
tones (Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004) and can better accurately discriminate
between real and fake smiles and happy and angry faces (Bernstein et al., 2008; Sacco et
al., 2011).
On the other hand, ostracism can be so distressing that it impairs mentalizing
capacities. It has been shown that excluded individuals do not engage brain regions
associated with mentalizing when exposed to negative social information (Powers et al.,
2013) and show less empathic accuracy and empathic concern compared to those who are
accepted (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006; Nordgren, Banas, & MacDonald, 2011; Pickett et
al., 2004). Mentalizing capacities have also shown to be affected following exclusion in
those who are more anxious (White et al., 2016) and in non-clinical adults with
58
borderline personality features. This suggests that individual differences in internal
psychological dispositions respond differentially to social participation conditions. An
underlying disposition common, for example, to both anxious individuals and those with
borderline personality features is insecure attachment (Cassidy et al., 2009; Hankin et al.,
2005; Marganska et al., 2013). Insecure attachment is a risk factor for impaired
mentalizing and many psychological disturbances. Ostracism is also a psychosocial risk
factor contributing to the development and persistence of psychological disturbances
characterized by impaired mentalizing, such as anxiety, major depressive disorder,
borderline personality disorder, autism spectrum disorder, eating disorders, and
schizophrenia.
It was of interest to this study to investigate how the interaction of these two
variables, attachment style and ostracism, impacted mentalizing. While the ostracism
literature (Williams, 2007) recognizes that individual differences can interact with
ostracism and lead to psychological distress and problems with self-regulation, an
existing research gap remains with respect to the differential impact of ostracism on the
relationship between attachment styles and mentalizing capacity. Therefore, it was
hypothesized that ostracism would moderate the relationships between attachment style
and mentalizing.
Ostracism elicits emotional distress (Bernstein & Claypool, 2012), which then
activates cognitive-affective-behavioral responses for managing the intensity and
duration of distress (Riva, 2016). While some individuals respond to ostracism in
adaptive ways, by using strategies such as reappraisal, others respond with emotional
numbing, distraction, rumination, or aggression. These factors reflect difficulties along

59
the dimensions of emotion regulation as described by Gratz and Roemer (2004),
specifically, awareness and understanding of emotions, acceptance of emotions, ability to
control impulsive behaviors during negative emotions, and the ability to use appropriate
emotion regulation strategies. These four dimensions also map on to two emotion
dysregulation categories described by the attachment literature, namely, deactivating and
hyperactivating. Furthermore, it has been shown that following ostracism, ostracism
distress and emotion dysregulation can linger beyond the reflexive stage and last up to a
month (Davidson et al., 2019). The interaction of ostracism with individual differences
in attachment styles may account for the differences in emotion regulation. Studies have
established the role of attachment in the development of emotion regulation capacities
(Cassidy, 1994). Adult attachment literature has further established the link between
specific insecure attachment styles (i.e., anxious, avoidant) and deactivating and
hyperactivating emotion regulation responses. Therefore, it was hypothesized that
ostracism would moderate the impact of attachment style on emotion regulation.
While ostracism can be threatening and distressing, its polar opposite,
overinclusion, can have social-emotional benefits. It signals that you occupy a
preferential status above others and that can feel satisfying. Overinclusion is a positive
form of “standing out” (van Beest & Williams, 2006; van Beest et al., 2011). Not only
have studies found that, compared to inclusion experiences, overinclusion is associated
with a greater sense of belonging, meaning, control (Niedeggen et al., 2014), and self-
esteem (Simard & Dandeneau, 2018), but studies have also suggested that fair or
inclusive conditions may not be enough for decreasing negative emotions, particularly for
insecurely attached individuals with a tendency for rejection sensitivity, emotional

60
reactivity, and a cognitive/perceptual bias for negative expectancy, whereas overinclusion
has been associated with a reduction of negative emotions (De Panfilis, Riva, Preti, &
Marchesi, 2015). This is because objective social inclusion violates their desire and need
for extreme inclusion, but overinclusion satisfies that desire for belonging and need for
extreme inclusion. The resulting decrease in negative emotion that occurs after
overinclusion is suggestive not only of a change in emotion regulation but perhaps also a
change in the ability to reflect on emotions. These findings have mainly been conducted
on individuals with BPD and SAD and the outcomes have primarily focused on mood
and fundamental needs satisfaction.
In contrast to those studies mentioned above, this study aimed to examine if
overinclusion would interact with insecure attachment styles and impact regulatory
mechanisms. Insecure attachment styles are underlying risk factors for emotion
regulation difficulties and conditions such as BPD, SAD, and other psychological
disturbances. Just as ostracism can potentially adversely affect mentalizing and emotion
regulation, overinclusion has the potential to result in improved mentalizing and
improved emotion regulation, particularly in those that have insecure attachment, by
providing a semblance of the preconditions to the development of those regulatory
capacities (i.e., a sense of felt security) through a very apparent expression of intentional,
preferential recognition. To date, to this investigator’s knowledge, no studies have
examined these relationships. Thus, this study aimed to add to the existing body of
literature by exploring the impact of overinclusion on the relationship between
attachment styles and regulatory mechanisms. It was expected that overinclusion would
moderate the impact of attachment style on mentalizing and emotion regulation, such that
61
those with insecure attachment styles in the overinclusion condition would exhibit better
mentalizing and improved emotion regulation compared to those in the ostracism and
inclusion conditions.
In addition, to investigate the principal research question, the current study used a
state-based measure to assess emotion regulation. Previous studies have either used trait-
based emotion regulation measures, physiological markers, or in-person task-based
methods to examine the relationships between attachment and emotion regulation. A
limitation to trait-based measures is that they only provide information about an
individual's overall tendency and do not capture variability over time and the potential
impact of situational factors. Additionally, indirect/task-based methods, such as
physiological indicators or in-person tasks, that were used in previous studies, require
special equipment or observation and are, thus, impractical for larger scale online studies.
Therefore, unlike previous studies, the current study used a state-based self-report
measure to assess momentary changes in emotion regulation difficulties in the context of
different social participation conditions.
Lastly, to examine the main research question, the current study also used
performance-based measures to assess state mentalizing and online mentalizing. In
contrast to measures based on self-rating, such as the RFQ (Fonagy et al., 2016), and in
contrast to assessments based on reflection/introspection, as in the RFS (Fonagy et al.,
1998), performance-based methods, such as the RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and
MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006), are less susceptible to manipulation, including self-
deception and faking. State mentalizing was measured by calculating the change in
performance score on the RMET, a test of mental state attribution and complex facial
62
emotion recognition. This captures the change in mentalizing over time as a function of
social participation conditions. Online mentalizing was measured by calculating the total
score on the MASC (i.e., a video-based performance task) after random participation in
one of three social participation conditions.
In sum, the primary aim of this study was to investigate the research question:
How do different social participation conditions (i.e., ostracism, overinclusion) interact
with individual differences in attachment and impact mentalizing and emotion
regulation?
A secondary and subordinate aim of this study was to explore the question: Does
trait mentalizing mediate the relationship between attachment and emotion regulation in
the context of interpersonal stress? As previously mentioned, numerous findings have
supported the links between attachment and mentalizing and between attachment and
emotion regulation. Mentalizing and emotion regulation are overlapping constructs and
processes (Decety, 2010; Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014; McRae et al. 2012), and
empirical studies have established their correlation (Cai et al., 2018; Contardi et al., 2016;
Hudson & Jaques, 2014; Meyebovsky et al., 2019; Samson, Huber, & Gross, 2012; Sharp
et al., 2011), yet the two remain distinct constructs (Greenberg et al., 2017; Jurist, 2005;
Schipper & Peterman, 2013).
Both mentalizing and emotion regulation capacities emerge in the context of
attachment relationships and continue to be influenced by attachment style. Mentalizing
involves the ability to recognize, contextualize, and attribute meaning to emotions and
other mental states, while emotion regulation involves the ability to effectively respond to
emotional experiences in order to achieve a determined goal. Despite their inter-

63
relatedness, there remains a dearth of studies that have examined all three variables
together, and in particular, the indirect effect of attachment on emotion regulation via
mentalizing. This study aimed to address this gap in the literature. It has been proposed
by some researchers that it is mentalizing that is needed in order to have adequate
emotion regulation (Greenberg et al., 2017; Jurist, 2005; Meyebovsky et al., 2019;
Schipper & Peterman, 2013). Furthermore, studies have shown that mentalizing
capacities predict emotion regulation (Meyebovsky et al., 2019; Schwarzer et al., 2021).
As previously mentioned, attachment style influenced mentalizing capacity (Fonagy &
Target, 1997; Meins, 1997; Nazarro et al., 2017). Therefore, it was hypothesized that
trait mentalizing measured by the RFQ (Fonagy et al., 2016) would mediate the
relationship between attachment styles and emotion regulation.
Additionally, the study aimed to build on previous research that showed that
different insecure attachment styles use distinct affect regulation strategies, which
subsequently contribute to negative mood and problems in social functioning (Wei et al.,
2005). In this study, it was further hypothesized that distinct impairments in mentalizing
would mediate the relationship between different insecure attachment styles and their
distinct affect regulation strategies. Furthermore, unlike studies that have typically used
trait-based self-report measures to demonstrate the relationship between the attachment
and emotion regulation, this study used a state-based self-report measure to assess
emotion regulation in the response to an aversive social interaction.
Main Study Variable List
Independent Variable
64
• Adult attachment style – Operationalized as the level of attachment-related
anxiety or attachment related avoidance on the Experiences in Close
Relationships-Revised (ECR-R; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000).
Moderating Variable
• Social participation condition – Operationalized as exclusion (participant receives
the ball 13% of the time), over-inclusion (participant receives the ball 40% of the
time), and inclusion (participant receives the ball 33% of the time) in the online
Cyberball activity (Williams et al., 2000)
Dependent Variable
• State-based emotion regulation – Operationalized as the difference between pre-
Cyberball and post-Cyberball total scores on the State Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale (S-DERS; Lavender, Tull, DioLillo, Moore, & Gratz, 2017)
• State-based mentalizing – Operationalized as the difference between pre-
Cyberball and post-Cyberball total scores on The Reading the Mind in the Eyes
Test Revised Version (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb,
2001)
• Online mentalizing was operationalized as the total score on the Movie for the
Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006). A description of
the mentalizing measures can be found on Table 1.

65
Table 1
Mentalizing Measures
Method Performance-Based Method

Disposition vs State mentalizing Online mentalizing
state/online
Tool Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC):
(RMET): Measures the ability to recognize Measures ability to recognize mental states in complex
complex emotions and attribute mental states situations close to everyday real context, primarily related to
in others close romantic relationships and friendships
Scale/ Total Score Accurate Hyper- Hypo- No
Subscales Mentalizing mentalizing mentalizing Mentalizing
(Total
Mentalizing)
Interpretation High score indicates better mentalizing High total High scores High scores High scores
of Results scores indicate indicate indicate indicate
overall ability tendency for tendency tendency for
to accurately excessive for non-mental
mentalize mental state insufficient state
inferences mental inferences
state
inferences
Method Self-Report Questionnaire
Disposition vs Dispositional mentalizing
state/online
Tool Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ): Measures overall level of mentalizing
Scale/ Uncertainty about mental Certainty about mental Overall Mentalizing (RFQTot)
Subscales states (RFQ_U) states (RFQ_C)
Interpretation High scores indicate High scores indicate High scores indicate better overall mentalizing.
of Results hypomentalizing. hypermentalizing. Lower scores indicate impaired overall
Mentalizing impairments: Mentalizing impairments: mentalizing
Concrete thinking and Excessive mentalization,
psychic equivalence. pseudomentalization.
Inability to perceive the Tendency to recognize
complex mental states of inadequate mental states of
self and others. The subject oneself and others. The
may be aware of difficulties subject is convinced of the
with mentalizing. accuracy of their beliefs
about mental states.
Note. Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), Movie for the Assessment of Social
Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006), Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ; Fonagy et al., 2016).
66
Manipulation Check
• Perceived social exclusion/overinclusion – Operationalized as scores on 3 items
that measured feeling ignored, excluded, and interacting a lot with others. Items
were taken from the Need-Threat Scale (NTS; Jamieson, Harkins, & Williams,
2010)
Covariates
• Sex - Categorical variables as "male" and "female"
• Age - Continuous variable measured in years
Main Hypotheses
In an online sample of adults living within the United States, it was hypothesized
that the impact of attachment styles on emotion regulation difficulties and state and
online mentalizing would vary across the social participation conditions, such that:
1a. Higher anxious attachment would relate to greater emotion regulation
difficulties in the ostracism condition compared to the overinclusion and inclusion
conditions.
1b. Higher anxious attachment would relate to less emotion regulation difficulties
in the overinclusion condition compared to the inclusion condition.
2a. Higher avoidant attachment would relate to greater emotion regulation
conditions.
2b. Higher avoidant attachment would relate to less emotion regulation
difficulties in the overinclusion condition compared to the inclusion condition.

67
3a. Higher anxious attachment would relate to lower state and online mentalizing
in the ostracism condition compared to the overinclusion and inclusion conditions.
3b. Higher anxious attachment would relate better state and online mentalizing in
the overinclusion condition compared to the inclusion condition.
4a. Higher avoidant attachment would relate to lower state and online mentalizing
in the ostracism condition compared to the overinclusion and inclusion conditions.
4b. Higher avoidant attachment would relate to better state and online mentalizing
in the overinclusion condition compared to the inclusion condition.
Exploratory Study Variable List
Independent Variable
• Adult attachment style – Operationalized as the level of attachment-related
anxiety or attachment related avoidance on the Experiences in Close
Relationships-Revised (ECR-R; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000).
Mediating Variable
• Dispositional mentalizing – Operationalized as the total score, Certainty subscale
score, and Uncertainty subscale score on the Reflective Functioning
Questionnaire (RFQ; Fonagy et al., 2016).
Dependent Variable
• State-based emotion regulation – Operationalized as the change in total score and
change in the subscale scores (Clarity, Aware, Modulate) on the State Difficulties
in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS; Lavender, Tull, DioLillo, Moore, &
Gratz, 2017)
Exploratory Hypotheses
68
In an online sample of adults living within the United States, it was hypothesized that in
the context of an aversive social condition:
5a. Dispositional mentalizing would mediate the relationship between attachment
insecurities and emotion regulation.
5b. Uncertainty on the RFQ would mediate the relationship between attachment
avoidance and deactivating/emotionally distancing responses (clarity and aware scores).
5c. Certainty on the RFQ would mediate the relationship between attachment
anxiety and hyperactivating/emotionally reactive responses (modulate score).

69
CHAPTER IV
Method
Participants
The data for this study were collected from a sample of community adults
recruited through the online website, Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). An initial a
priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007) to test for 5 predictors, a small effect size (f2 = .02), and an alpha of .05. Results
suggested that 647 participants were needed to achieve a power of .80. Another power
analysis for a small to medium effect size (𝑓2 = .075) and an alpha of .05 showed that a
total sample of 177 participants was required to achieve a power of .80. The large final
sample size collected for this study fell between the range of the two sample size
estimates suggested by the two power analyses.
Interested participants were presented with a brief description of the study prior to
giving the consent to participate. Participants then completed the study questionnaires
online and were compensated $5.00 upon completion. To meet inclusion criteria for the
present study, participants had to be at least 18 years of age, live in the United States, and
have over 1000 HITs approved on MTurk, including a HIT approval rate for all
Requesters’ HITs greater than 98.
Demographics. A total of 636 participants were recruited in the study. Forty-two
participant responses were excluded due to questionable response patterns and
questionable completion times. Another three cases were excluded based on cutoff
values from three outlier indicators (Mahalanobis, Cooks, Leverage). Therefore, only
591 participants’ responses were included in the final analyses. Of the 591 participants,
70
275 were male and 316 were female. The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 78 years,
with a mean age of 42.3 years (SD=12.6). Approximately 77% of the participants were
White, 55.7% were married, and 47.2% received a Bachelor’s degree. The complete
demographic information is presented in Table 2.
Measures
Demographic Questionnaire
Age (continuous variable), sex (categorical variable), ethnicity (categorical
variable), marital status (categorical variable), and education level (categorical variable)
were gathered from a self-report demographic questionnaire.
Attachment Style
Experiences in Close Relationship Scale - Revised (ECR-R; Fraley et al.,
2000). The ECR-R measures attachment related anxiety and attachment related
avoidance in the context of romantic relationships. The Anxiety scale assesses one’s
predisposition toward anxiety and vigilance regarding rejection and abandonment in
relationships. The Avoidance scale measures one’s discomfort with intimacy and
dependency. Items are scored on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Low mean scores on the Anxiety and Avoidance scales
indicate attachment security.
Construction of the ECR-R was based on Brennan, Clark, and Shaver's (1998)
Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR), which contained two factors, anxiety
and avoidance. Consistent with the original ECR, confirmatory factor analysis found
support for a two-factor structure in the ECR-R (Fairchild & Finney, 2006). The ECR-R
71
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
Variable M (SD) Range n (% of Total

Sample)
Gender
Male - - 275 (46.5)
Female - - 316 (53.5)
Age 42.3 (12.6) 18-78
Ethnicity/Race
American Indian/Alaskan Native 3 (0.5)
Asian 43 (7.3)
Black 58 (9.8)
Hispanic/Latino 27 (4.6)
White 452 (76.5)
Other 8 (1.4)
Marital Status
Married 329 (55.7)
Living together as a couple 47 (8.0)
Divorced 48 (8.1)
Widowed 11 (1.9)
Separated 2 (0.3)
Never Married 154 (26.1)
Education Level
Did not graduate from High 5 (0.8)
School/receive High School
diploma or equivalent (GED)
Graduated from HS, HS 55 (9.3)
diploma/equivalent (GED)
Technical school/trade 15 (2.5)
apprenticeship
Some college, but no degree 70 (11.8)
Associate degree 51 (8.6)
Bachelor’s degree 279 (47.2)
Master’s degree 106 (17.9)
Doctorate 10 (1.7)
N=591
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, GED = General Educational Diploma, HS =
High School
72
was validated on a sample of 429 undergraduate students (61% were females and
majority were either 18 or 19 years old). The scale demonstrated excellent internal
consistency for the Anxiety (a =.92) and Avoidance (a = .93) subscales and were similar
to the values obtained by Brennan et al. (1998) on the ECR (Anxiety a = .91 and
Avoidance a = .94). The ECR-R has demonstrated convergent validity (Fairchild &
Finney, 2006) as demonstrated by their moderate to strong correlations with scales
measuring physical touch and affection in close relationships (Brennan, Wu, & Loev,
1998), loneliness (Russell, 1996), perceived social support (Cutrona & Russell, 1987),
and worry (Meyer, Miller, Metzeger, & Borkovec, 1990). The ECR-R has also
demonstrated good internal consistency with alpha coefficient values of .90 and above for
the Anxiety and Avoidant subscales among adults across the lifespan who were recruited
through online platforms (Fairchild & Finney, 2006; Goodcase, Nalbone, Hecker, &
Latty, 2018; Kisley, Caudle, & Harvey, 2019). In this current study, the ECR-R
demonstrated excellent internal consistency for Anxiety (a = .97) and Avoidance (a =
.95).
Mentalizing
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test Revised Version (RMET; Baron-Cohen et
al., 2001). The current study used performance-based methods to measure state-based
mentalizing and online mentalizing and a self-report questionnaire to measure
dispositional mentalizing. For the main research question, state-based mentalizing was
measured by the RMET, a performance-based measure that assesses one’s ability to
recognize complex emotions and to attribute mental state in others. The RMET includes
36 black-and-white cropped photos of the eye region of 18 males and 18 females.

73
Answer choices were presented in multiple choice format. Responses were coded as
correct or incorrect and yielded a maximum total accuracy score of 18 for part 1and part
2. To measure change in mentalizing, the difference between the pre-social participation
condition score and the post-social participation score was calculated.
The developers of the original and revised versions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
have suggested that all items on the RMET reflect a single factor model, and some
validation studies in other languages (Vellant et al., 2013) have provided evidence of a
unidimensional model. However, other studies have challenged this conclusion and have
suggested either a five-factor solution or a brief version in order to demonstrate goodness
of fit (Olderbak et al., 2015). Internal consistency has, therefore, ranged from poor to
acceptable range (Olderbak et al., 2015; Villante et al., 2013) across different samples
including non-clinical adult participants in the community (Fossati, Borroni, Dziobek,
Fonagy, & Somma, 2018) and adults recruited from online platforms, such as Amazon
MTurk (Olderbak et al., 2015). The measure has demonstrated both convergent and
discriminant validity (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Bora et al., 2009; Feguson & Austin,
2010; Kirkland et al., 2012; Maurage et al., 2011; Torralva et al., 2012). Participants
included in the construction of the revised version consisted of adults with Asperger’s
Syndrome or High Functioning Autism, a broad range of normal adults with varying
education and professional experiences, normal adult students, and randomly selected
individuals from the general population. In the current study, the RMET had good
internal consistency (a = .86). The Spearman Brown coefficient in current study also
demonstrated good split-half reliability (r = .84).

74
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006).
Also, for the main research question, online (or in-vivo) mentalizing was measured by the
MASC, a task-based assessment of accurate mentalizing and impairments in mentalizing,
including no mentalizing, hypermentalizing, and hypomentalizing. The movie includes
social situations involving peer and romantic relationships, which approximates real-life
social interactions, lending ecological validity to the measure. Participants were
presented with 46 video clips and then asked to imagine what the characters think or feel
in the scene. Answer choices were presented in multiple choice format. A total
mentalizing score was derived by summing the total correct responses. Subscale scores
were computed for hypermentalizing, hypomentalizing, and no mentalizing.
Dimensional analyses supported a unidimensional structure of the MASC in
nonclinical samples of adults and adolescents (Fossati, Borroni, Dziobek, Fonagy, &
Somma, 2018). The measure has demonstrated convergent validity (Fossati et al., 2018).
Specifically, in a sample of 373 non-clinical Italian adolescents, the number of correct
answers on the MASC significantly correlated with the total Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Test (RMET) score (r = .30). After correcting for measurement error, the r value
became .41. Furthermore, in a sample of 193 non-clinical Italian adults, the number of
correct answers on the MASC significantly correlated with the RMET total score (r =
.45). After the correcting for measurement error, the r value became .60. The MASC has
also demonstrated discriminant validity as adults with Asperger Syndrome have
performed significantly and substantially lower than non-clinical controls on the MASC
total score (Dziobek et al., 2006). Total MASC scores for women with BPD have also
been significantly lower than non-clinical controls (Preissler et al., 2010). The MASC
75
has shown adequate internal consistency, indicated by Cronbach alpha values greater than
.80 among adult clinical and non-clinical samples across the lifespan (Dziobek et al.,
2006; Fossati et al., 2018; Preisseler et al., 2010). In the current study, MASC
demonstrated adequate internal consistency (a = .87).
Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ; Fonagy et al., 2016). For the
exploratory question, dispositional mentalizing was assessed by the RFQ, an 8-item self-
report measure of mentalizing abilities. It is believed that individuals with good
mentalizing abilities are able to balance between an awareness of the opaqueness of
mental states and being certain of their attributions (Fonagy et al., 2016). Confirmatory
factor analysis supported a two-factor model that was invariant across adult clinical and
non-clinical samples.
The RFQ subscales are Uncertainty (i.e., hypomentalizing) scale (RFQ_U) and
Certainty (i.e., hypermentalizing) scale (RFQ_C). Items are scored on a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Each subscale consists of
6 items. Items that assess Certainty include those such as, “I always know what I feel.”
Items that assess Uncertainty include those such as, “People’s thoughts are a mystery to
me.” Four items are included in calculating scores on both subscales and are reverse
scored for the RFQ_C and RFQ_U, while the other four are specific to each subscale.
Items are rescored to either 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 to reflect degree of Certainty or 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
2, 3 to reflect degree of Uncertainty. Means scores are calculated for each subscale. In
addition to calculating Uncertainty and Certainty subscales, a total RFQ score can be
calculated (Badoud et al., 2018; Gambin, Wozniak-Prus, Konecka, & Sharp, 2020;
Penner, Gambin, & Sharp, 2019). This is done by calculating the difference between the
76
two scales (i.e., RFQ_C minus RFQ_U), which yields a score between -3 and +3. This
scoring method transforms the 2 subscales into one dimension. High difference scores
(above zero) signify good mentalizing abilities, while scores below zero signify
decreased mentalizing abilities.
The RFQ has demonstrated convergent validity with emotion regulation and
alexithymia scales, and it has demonstrated discriminant validity with scales assessing for
borderline personality traits, internalizing, and externalizing symptoms (Badoud et al.,
2015, 2018; Fonagy et al., 2016; Penner et al., 2019). Uncertainty and Certainty
subscales have been shown to have moderate to strong internal consistency (.77 and .65
for the clinical sample and .63 and .67 for the non-clinical sample), and strong test-retest
reliability over a three-week period (.84 for Uncertainty and .75 for Certainty). In the
current study, internal consistency was .90 for Certainty and .82 for Uncertainty.
Emotion regulation
State Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS; Lavender et al.,
2017). Emotion regulation was assessed via the S-DERS, a 21-item self-report measure
based on the original DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The S-DERS consists of four
subscales: Nonacceptance of Current Emotions (Nonacceptance), Limited Ability to
Modulate Current Emotional and Behavioral Responses (Modulate), Lack of Awareness
of Current Emotions (Awareness), and Lack of Clarity about Current Emotions (Clarity).
Items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely).
An example of an item states, “I am having difficulty controlling my behaviors.” A
higher total score indicates greater problems with regulating emotions, and higher
subscale scores represent problems in specific domains. Results of the exploratory factor
77
analysis at the time of the development and validation of the S-DERS supported a four-
factor model. In contrast, the original Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS;
Gratz & Roemer, 2004), had six factors.
The S-DERS was validated on a community sample of 490 young adult women
from the southern and Midwestern United States. Construct validity was demonstrated
by significant positive association between the S-DERS total score and the original
DERS total score and between the S-DERS subscale scores and original DERS subscale
scores. Furthermore, the association between the S-DERS total score and the original
DERS total score was strong in size, while the association between the S-DERS subscale
scores and original DERS subscale scores were moderate in size. The moderate
correlation between the S-DERS subscales and the corresponding original DERS
subscales provide evidence for the S-DERS being distinct from the original trait-oriented
DERS. These findings appear consistent with previous studies demonstrating moderate
correlations between state-based and trait-based measures of the same construct (Tomko
et al., 2014). Research has also supported convergent validity, as shown by moderate to
strong correlations with measures of emotional intensity and reactivity (Larsen & Diener,
1987), measures of emotional reduction and amplification (Hamilton et al., 2009), and
measures of experiential avoidance (Hayes et al., 2004). The S-DERS has also been
shown to predict emotional reactivity to traumatic events on a measure of risk perception,
thus, demonstrating predictive validity (Messman-Moor & Brown, 2006). The S-DERS
has demonstrated good overall internal consistency (a = .86); however, this finding is
limited to a community sample of young adult women. The Nonacceptance (a = .92),
Modulate (a = .85), and Awareness (a = .79) have adequate to excellent internal

78
consistency, while Clarity (a = .65) demonstrates marginal consistency. However,
Lavender et al. (2017) point out that the a value of Clarity is not unusual for a factor with
few items. In the current study, the S-DERS showed overall excellent internal
consistency (a = .94). Additionally, Nonacceptance (a = .96), Modulate (a = .93),
Awareness (a = .81), and Clarity (a = .87) had adequate to excellent internal consistency.
A Pearson correlation was computed to assess the test-retest reliability of the S-DERS
scores, r(591) = .89. This demonstrated good reliability. For the main research question,
the difference between pre- and post-total S-DERS scores was used as a measure of
change in emotion regulation difficulties.
Experimental Design
Social Conditions
Participants were assigned to 1 of 3 Cyberball conditions: 1) Overinclusion
condition, in which participants received approximately 40% of throws; 2) Exclusion
condition, in which the participants received the ball two times (13% of throws) near the
beginning of the game and none thereafter; and 3) Inclusion control condition, in which
participants received approximately 33% of throws. The number of total throws was set
to 15 to keep the game short, given the overall lengthiness of the study. The total number
of throws was still consistent with range of total throws in the Cyberball literature
(Hartgerink et al., 2015). However, the number of throws for each of the conditions was
determined by the Cyberball software and not customized by the current investigator to a
specific number to achieve a target percentage, and therefore, the percentage in this
study's Overinclusion condition was lower than the typical range found in the Cyberball
literature (De Panfilis et al., 2015; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2014; Izaki et al., 2022;
79
Kawamoto et al., 2012; Simard & Dandenaeu, 2018). Participants were informed that
they were going to play an internet game designed to practice mental visualization with
other randomly chosen participants.
Manipulation Check
Three items assessing participants’ perception of their participation during the
Cyberball game were taken from Williams’ (2009) 20-item Need Threat Scale (NTS).
The items were administered to confirm whether Cyberball successfully induced
experiences of exclusion/overinclusion and to determine participant view of the game.
The items “I was ignored” and “I was excluded” were used to measure if the ignored and
excluded conditions induced these experiences. “I felt like the others interacted with me a
lot” was used as a proxy measure of overinclusion, given there was no item that stated, “I
felt overincluded.” The items were scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not
at all) to 5 (Extremely). Scores were computed by summing scores of items. The
measure has demonstrated acceptable levels of internal consistency ranging from a = .66
(Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004) to a = .93 (Davidson et al., 2019; Wesselmann,
Bagg, & Williams, 2009) in previous studies with similar samples. For the current
study, the three items demonstrated good internal consistency (a = .87).
Procedures
Participants were recruited online through the website, Amazon MTurk. After
signing up through MTurk, reading a description of the study, and providing an electronic
signature for informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three
social participation groups: overinclusion group, ostracism group, or inclusion (control)
group. Participants were asked to complete a demographic questionnaire, the ECR-R,

80
and the RFQ in fixed order. Participants then completed the S-DERS (pre-Cyberball) and
RMET (part 1) in randomized order.
For the RMET, the pictures were divided into two groups of 18. The first group
of pictures was administered before the social participation task, and the second group
was administered after the social participation task to minimize habituation to the
pictures. Participants were presented with each photo and were instructed to choose
which word best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling from a list
of words. The instructions read, “For each set of eyes, choose which word best describes
what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one
word is applicable but please choose just one word, the word which you consider to be
most suitable. Before making your choice, make sure that you have read all 4 words.
You should try to do the task as quickly as possible but you will not be timed.”
The participants were then randomly assigned to participate in one of the three
Cyberball conditions (i.e., overinclusion, ostracism, or inclusion). Participants then
completed the three manipulation check items from the Need Threat Scale, S-DERS
(post-Cyberball), RMET (part 2) and MASC in fixed order. Participants were
compensated $5.00 after completing the study. Participants’ responses were excluded if
their completion time and response patterns suggested hastiness, random responding, or
insufficient attention to the items.
Data Analytic Plan
Before testing the hypotheses, normality of variables was evaluated. Correlation
analyses were used to test for multicollinearity and assess the relationships among
predictor variables. To determine whether the demographic variables, sex and age, were
81
possible covariates for the dependent variables (i.e., changes in emotion regulation,
change in mentalizing, online mentalizing), Pearson correlation analyses were used to
determine the correlation between age and the DVs, and an independent samples t-test
was used to determine if there was a difference between the sexes in the DVs.
To test if the Cyberball experimental conditions were successful, a one-way
ANOVA was conducted to compare differences in the mean scores on three items taken
from the Need Threat Scale that measured feeling ignored/excluded and overinclusion
between the Ostracism, Overinclusion, and Inclusion conditions. Because significant
differences were found in the mean scores on the 3 NTS items, a post hoc Tukey test was
conducted to determine where the differences lie and how the means of the items
compared to each other.
To test if there were significant differences between means of the pre and post-
condition S-DERS scores and pre and post-condition RMET scores, a paired samples t-
test was conducted. To test the main hypotheses, variables were first standardized, then a
moderation analysis using PROCESS, model 1, was used to determine if the different
social participation conditions moderated the relationship between attachment style and
changes in emotion regulation and mentalizing. To test the exploratory hypotheses, a
mediation analysis using PROCESS, model 4, was used to determine the indirect effect
of attachment style on emotion regulation through mentalizing.

82
CHAPTER V
Results
This chapter begins with a discussion of the preliminary analyses. The results of
the main hypotheses are then presented. Lastly, the results of the exploratory hypotheses
are presented.
Preliminary Analyses
Missing Data and Outliers
To avoid missing data, the forced answering option was used, such that the
participants had to answer each item in order to proceed through the questionnaires.
Therefore, no missing values were found in the final dataset for the current study.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 3. Normality was assessed by visual
inspection of the distribution of the dependent variables. Histograms showed that the
distributions of the change in emotion regulation difficulties and change in mentalizing
were both centered at zero and did not appear skewed. Given the sample size of greater
than 300, an absolute value larger than 2 for skewness and an absolute value larger than 7
for kurtosis was used as reference for determining substantial non-normality (Kim, 2013).
The absolute value for skewness for change in emotion regulation was less than 2,
suggesting normality; however, the kurtosis value was 11.07, revealing a leptokurtotic
distribution. According to Kline (2011) kurtosis values over 20 indicate a more
significant issue, and Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) maintain that sample sizes over 200
often do not affect kurtosis deviations from normality. Therefore, no further procedures
were conducted to correct for kurtosis aside from the removal of identified outliers, as
83
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Measures
Measure Range M SD Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE)

ECR-R Anxiety 1 - 6.50 2.77 1.56 0.63 (0.10) -0.89 (0.20)
ECR-R Avoidance 1 - 6.89 2.72 1.30 0.64 (0.10) -0.16 (0.20)
RFQ_c 0-3 1.38 1.01 0.04 (0.10) -1.37 (0.20)
RFQ_u 0-3 0.44 0.60 1.58 (0.10) 2.01 (0.20)
RFQ Total -3 - 3 0.94 1.50 -0.46 (0.10) -0.88 (0.20)
S-DERS Total (pre) 21 - 96 38.42 15.61 1.33 (0.10) 0.86 (0.20)
S-DERS Modulate 7 - 35 12.78 6.98 1.36 (0.10) 0.81 (0.20)
(pre)
S-DERS Aware (pre) 5 - 25 11.27 4.32 0.63 (0.10) -0.01 (0.20)
S-DERS Clarity (pre) 2 - 10 3.24 2.00 1.71 (0.10) 2.04 (0.20)
S-DERS (post) 21 - 96 37.76 16.12 1.34 (0.10) 0.81 (0.20)
S-DERS Modulate 7 - 34 12.36 7.01 1.50 (0.10) 1.17 (0.20)
(post)
S-DERS Aware (post) 5 - 25 10.91 4.20 0.72 (0.10) 0.38 (0.20)
S-DERS Clarity (post) 2 - 10 3.17 2.03 1.74 (0.10) 1.93 (0.20)
Change in S-DERS -52 - 46 -0.66 7.11 0.60 (0.10) 11.07 (0.20)
Change in Aware -11 - 10 -0.36 2.88 0.25 (0.10) 2.06 (0.20)
Change in Clarity -8 - 8 -0.07 1.18 0.04 (0.10) 9.80 (0.20)
Change in Modulate -24 - 19 -0.42 3.37 -0.10 (0.10) 9.39 (0.20)
RMET (part 1) 2 - 17 12.32 3.16 -0.85 (0.10) 0.21 (0.20)
RMET (part 2) 2 - 19 12.99 3.81 -0.74 (0.10) -0.19 (0.20)
Change in RMET -8 - 10 0.67 2.57 -0.11 (0.10) 0.54 (0.20)
MASC Total 4 - 43 28.95 9.64 -0.84 (0.10) -0.52 (0.20)
MASC 1 - 18 5.67 3.18 0.84 (0.10) 0.49 (0.20)
(hypermentalize)
MASC 1 - 27 7.04 4.63 0.98 (0.10) 0.48 (0.20)
(hypomentalize)
MASC (no mentalize) 1 - 19 4.29 3.91 1.35 (0.11) 0.88 (0.22)
Note. N = 591. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation. ECR-R Anxiety = Anxious
Attachment, ECR-R Avoidance = Avoidant Attachment, Experiences in Close
Relationships Scale – Revised (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000); RFQ_c =
Dispositional certainty, RFQ_u = Dispositional uncertainty, RFQ Total = Overall
dispositional mentalizing, Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (Fonagy et al., 2016), S-
DERS = State Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (Lavender et al., 2017), RMET =
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), MASC = Movie for the
Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006).
84
previously described. Absolute values for skewness and kurtosis for state mentalizing,
online mentalizing, and dispositional mentalizing were less than 2 and less than 7,
respectively, indicating normality. The P-P plots of the cumulative probability of the
change in emotion regulation difficulties and change in mentalizing showed that the
data fell along the straight diagonal line indicating linearity, and scatterplots for both
dependent variables were centered largely around zero on the x and y-axis.
Inter-variable Correlations
Correlation analyses evaluated the relationship between the predictor variables
and tested for multicollinearity. Anxious attachment was significantly positively
correlated with avoidant attachment, r(589) = .49, p < .001, considered a medium effect
size (Cohen, 1988). Anxious avoidant was negatively correlated with overall
dispositional mentalizing (TotRFQ), r(589) = -.70, p < .001, with a large effect size;
negatively correlated with dispositional Certainty on the RFQ, r(589) = -.66, p < .001,
with a large effect size; negatively correlated with state mentalizing (DiffRMET), r(589)
= -.15, p < .001, with a small effect size; and negatively correlated with online
mentalizing (MASC), r(589) = -.35, p < .001, with a medium effect size. Avoidant
attachment was also negatively correlated with overall dispositional mentalizing, r(589) =
-.39, p < .001, with a moderate effect size; negatively correlated with dispositional
Certainty on the RFQ, r(589) = -.40, p < .001, with a moderate effect size; negatively
correlated with state mentalizing, r(589) = -.09, p < .05; and negatively correlated with
online mentalizing, r(589) = -.09, p < .05. These latter two correlations are considered
negligible effect sizes. Anxious attachment was positively correlated with dispositional
Uncertainty, r(589) = .62, p < .001, with a large effect size. Avoidant attachment was
85
also positively correlated with the dispositional Uncertainty, r(589) =.30, p < .001 but
with a medium effect size. Dispositional mentalizing dimension of Certainty was
significantly negatively correlated with dispositional mentalizing dimension of
Uncertainty, r(589) = -.71, p < .001, a large effect size. Total dispositional mentalizing
(TotRFQ) was significantly positively correlated with dispositional dimension of
Certainty, r(589) = .96, p <.001, a large effect size, and negatively correlated with
dispositional dimension of Uncertainty, r(589) = .88, p <.001, a large effect size. No
correlations, aside from those between total dispositional mentalizing (TotRFQ) and
dispositional dimension of Certainty and between total dispositional mentalizing and
dispositional dimension of Uncertainty were above .80. Results of these analyses are
displayed in Table 4.
Covariates
Age and sex were analyzed as possible covariates for change in emotion
regulation and mentalizing.
Age. Pearson correlation analyses found that age was not significantly correlated
with change in emotion regulation difficulties, r(589) = -.01, p = .79, and not
significantly correlated with change in accurate mentalizing on the RMET, r(589) = .03,
p = .51. Age was significantly positively correlated with accurate online mentalizing on
the MASC, r(589) = .17, p < .001, such that older age predicted better online mentalizing,
although this is considered a small effect size. Therefore, age was included in the
analyses examining online mentalizing on the MASC.
Sex. An independent samples t-test was not significant for the covariate of sex on
change in emotion regulation difficulties, t(589) = 0.49, p = .52, d = 0.04, and change in
86
Table 4
Intercorrelations of Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. ECR_Ax
2. ECR_Av .49**
3. RFQ_c -.66** -.40**
4. RFQ_u .62** . 30** -.71**
5. TotRFQ -.70** -.39** .96** -.88**
6. Diff RMET -.15** -.09* .09* -.13* .11*
7. MASC Tot -.35** -.09* .38** -.40** .42** .21**
8. Diff SDERS .11* .13** -.09* .004 -.06 -.11* -.14**
9. Diff Aware .10* .17** -.12* .07 -.11* -.003 -.15** .38**
10. Diff Clarity .06 .01 -.03 -.05 .004 -.08 -.14** .48** .10*
11. Diff Mod .06 .05 -.05 -.004 -.03 .10* -.11* .77** -.07 .28**
Note. Listwise N = 591. ** p <.001, * p <.05. ECR_Ax = Anxious attachment, ECR_Av

= Avoidant attachment, TotRFQ = Overall dispositional mentalizing, RFQ_c =
Dispositional mentalizing dimension of certainty (hypermentalizing), RFQ_u =
Dispositional mentalizing dimension of uncertainty (hypomentalizing), MASCTot =
Online mentalizing, Diff SDERS = State emotion regulation difficulties (change in
emotion regulation difficulties), Diff Aware = Change in lack of awareness of current
emotion, Diff Clarity = Change in lack of clarity about current emotions, Diff Mod =
Change in limited ability to modulate current emotional and behavioral responses.
87
mentalizing using the RMET, t(589) = 0.78, p = .87, d = 0.06. However, the independent
samples t-test showed a significant difference between sexes in accurate online
mentalizing using the MASC, t(589) = -3.94, p < .001, d = 0.33, where females scored
higher than males, indicating that females tend to exhibit better online mentalizing, even
though this reflected a small effect size. Therefore, sex was included in the analyses that
examined online mentalizing on the MASC.
Cyberball Manipulation
To check the Cyberball manipulation, a one-way ANOVA was used to compare
differences in the mean scores on items that measured feeling ignored/excluded and
overinclusion between the Ostracism, Overinclusion, and Inclusion conditions.
Dependent variables were three items taken from the Need Threat Scale.
The one-way ANOVA revealed that there were statistically significant differences
in mean scores between the three conditions on the items, “I was ignored,” F(2,588) =
199.34, p < .001, η2 = .40, “I was excluded,” F(2,588) = 164.67, p < .001, η2 = .36, and “I
felt the other players interacted with me a lot,” F(2,588) = 147.50, p < .001, η2 = .33.
Tukey’s HSD test for multiple comparisons found that the mean value of the item, “I was
ignored” was greater for Ostracism (M = 3.76, SD = 1.24), p < .001, 95% C.I. = [-2.55, -
2.00] than Overinclusion (M = 1.48, SD = 1.02); greater for Inclusion (M = 2.18, SD =
1.21), p < .001, 95% C.I. = [-0.97, -0.42] than Overinclusion; and greater for Ostracism
than Inclusion, p<.001, 95% C.I. = [1.30, 1.86]. Tukey’s HSD test for multiple
comparisons found that the mean value of the item, “I was excluded” was greater for
Ostracism (M = 3.70, SD = 1.21), p < .001, 95% C.I. = [-2.47, -1.90] than Overinclusion
(M = 1.51, SD = 1.08); greater for Inclusion (M = 2.37, SD = 1.31), p < .001, 95% C.I. =
88
[-1.14, -0.58] than Overinclusion; and greater for Ostracism than Inclusion, p < .001,
95% C.I. = [1.04, 1.61]. Tukey’s HSD test for multiple comparisons found that the mean
value of the item, “I felt the other players interacted with me a lot” was greater for
Overinclusion (M = 4.09, SD = 1.13) than Ostracism (M = 2.12, SD = 1.20), p < .001,
95% C.I. = [1.69, 2.23], greater for Overinclusion than Inclusion (M = 3.31, SD = 1.08),
p < .001, 95% C.I. = [0.50, 1.04], and greater for Inclusion than Ostracism, p < .001, 95%
C.I. = [-1.46, -0.92]. These results suggest that the participants correctly perceived being
ostracized or overincluded, and the manipulations were successful. A summary of the
descriptive statistics of the three NTS items for the three conditions can be found in
Table 5.
Emotion Dysregulation and Mentalizing Mean Differences Within Conditions
Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to compare state emotion regulation
difficulties scores and state mentalizing scores (using the RMET) pre- and post-ostracism
condition. There was no significant difference in the state emotion regulation difficulties
scores for the pre- (M = 38.58, SD = 15.85) and post- (M = 39.64, SD = 17.34) ostracism
condition; t(193) = -1.77, p = .078, d = 0.13. There was significantly greater state
mentalizing scores from pre- (M = 12.45, SD = 3.11) to post- (M = 12.95 SD = 3.66)
ostracism condition; t(193) = -2.76, p = .006, d = 0.20. Paired samples t-tests comparing
state emotion regulation difficulties scores and state mentalizing scores pre- and post-
overinclusion showed there was a significant decrease in the state emotion regulation
difficulties scores from pre- (M= 37.19, SD = 14.62) to post- (M = 35.66, SD = 14.90)
overinclusion; t(199) = 3.22, p = .001, d = 0.23. There was a significant increase in the
89
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Need Threat Scale Items for 3 Conditions
Item Condition N M (SD) Min Max
“I was ignored.” Overinclusion 200 1.48 (1.02) 1 5
Ostracism 194 3.76 (1.24) 1 5
Inclusion 197 2.18 (1.21) 1 5
Total 591 2.46 (1.50) 1 5
“I was excluded.” Overinclusion 200 1.51 (1.08) 1 5
Ostracism 194 3.70 (1.21) 1 5
Inclusion 197 2.37 (1.31) 1 5
Total 591 2.51 (1.50) 1 5
“I felt the other Overinclusion 200 4.09 (1.13) 1 5
players interacted Ostracism 194 2.12 (1.20) 1 5
with me a lot.” Inclusion 197 3.31 (1.08) 1 5
Total 591 3.18 (1.40) 1 5
Note. N = 591, M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation

90
state mentalizing scores from pre- (M = 12.43, SD = 3.12) to post- (M = 13.25, SD =
3.66) overinclusion; t(199) = -4.67, p < .001, d = 0.34. Lastly, paired samples t-tests
compared emotion regulation difficulties scores and mentalizing scores pre- and post-
inclusion. There was a significant decrease in the emotion regulation difficulties scores
from pre- (M = 39.50, SD = 16.33) to post- (M = 38.03, SD = 15.91) inclusion; t(196) =
3.54, p < .001, d = 0.25. There was a significant increase in the mentalizing scores from
pre- (M = 12.09, SD = 3.26) to post- (M = 12.77, SD = 4.10) inclusion; t(196) = -3.60, p <
.001, d = 0.26. Although results indicated statistically significant changes in state
emotion regulation difficulties and state mentalizing within the different social
participation conditions, the magnitude of these effects are, nevertheless, considered
small. The statistically significant results may have been a result of the study's large
sample size and it is, therefore, more meaningful to interpret the effect sizes of these
relationships.
Main Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis 1a. Anxious attachment would relate to greater emotion regulation
conditions.
Hypothesis 1b. Anxious attachment would relate to less emotion regulation
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b, a simple bootstrapping moderation analysis was
conducted (Preacher & Hayes, 2022, PROCESS v4.0 Model 1). The dependent variable
for this analysis was state emotion regulation as measured by the change in difficulties in
emotion regulation on the S-DERS. The independent variable was anxious attachment,
91
and the moderating variables were the social participation conditions (i.e., ostracism,
overinclusion, inclusion). Moderation was shown if there was a significant interaction
effect. The measure of effect size used for the moderation analyses was f2 and was based
on Cohen’s (1988) suggested values of .02, .15, and .35 to indicate small, medium, and
large effect sizes, respectively. Results showed that the overall model, which included
anxious attachment, the social participation conditions, and the interaction between
anxious attachment and social participation conditions, was significant, R2 = .055, F(5,
585) = 6.75, p < .001, with a small effect size (f2 = .06). The R2 indicates that 5.5% of the
variance was accounted for by the model. The interaction between anxious attachment
and the social participation conditions explained an additional 1.6% of the variability (R2
change = .016, Fchange [2, 585] = 4.99, p = .007), with a small effect size (f2 = .02).
The relationship between the predictor variables and the dependent variable was
first examined. Effect size classifications for standardized beta coefficients were based
on Cohen's (1988) guidelines, which categorized effect sizes from .10 to .29 as small,
effect sizes from .30 to .49 as medium, and effect sizes .50 or greater as large. Anxious
attachment significantly positively predicted emotion regulation difficulties, b =0.27,
95% C.I. [0.14, 0.40], t(585) = 3.90, p < .001, considered a small effect size.
Comparisons between the social participation conditions revealed that ostracism was a
significant predictor of emotion regulation difficulties. The difference in emotion
regulation difficulties between ostracism and overinclusion was significant, b = 0.34,
95% C.I. [0.15, 0.54], t(585) = 3.47, p < .001, also a medium effect size. The difference
in emotion regulation difficulties between ostracism and inclusion was also significant, b
= 0.34, 95% C.I. [0.15, 0.53], t(585) = 3.43, p < .001, with a medium effect size.
92
However, the difference in emotion regulation difficulties between the inclusion and
overinclusion condition was not significant, b = 0.003, 95% C.I. [-0.19, 0.20], t(585) =
0.032, p = .97, a negligible effect size.
Next, the differential influence of the social participation conditions on anxious
attachment predicting emotion regulation was examined. Statistical analyses revealed an
interaction effect between anxious attachment and condition. More specifically, when
compared to overinclusion, the impact of ostracism on anxious attachment predicting
emotion regulation was significant, b = 0.21, 95% C.I. [0.01, 0.40], t(585) = 2.10, p < .05.
The effect size was based on the difference in the slopes between overinclusion and
ostracism and was .21, a small effect size (see below for description of simple slope
analysis). Additionally, when compared to inclusion, the impact of ostracism on anxious
attachment predicting emotion regulation was also significant, b = 0.30, 95% C.I. [0.11,
0.49], t(585) = 3.08, p < .01. The difference in slopes between ostracism and inclusion
was .30, a medium effect size. When compared to overinclusion, the impact of inclusion
on anxious attachment predicting emotion regulation was not significant, b = -0.09, 95%
C.I. [-0.29, 0.11], t(585) = -0.90, p = .37, a small effect size.
Simple slope analysis showed the following: In the ostracism condition, anxious
attachment was associated with increased emotion regulation difficulty, and this
relationship was statistically significant, b = 0.27, 95% C.I. [0.13, 0.40], t(585) = 3.90, p
< .001. Furthermore, the interaction effect size was small and indicated that for every
increase of one standard deviation in anxious attachment, there was a .27 standard
deviation increase in emotion regulation difficulties in the ostracism condition. In the
overinclusion condition, anxious attachment was associated with an increase in emotion

93
regulation difficulty, but this relationship was not significant, b = 0.06, 95% C.I. [-0.09,
0.20], t(585) = 0.78, p = .43, and the effect size was small. In the inclusion condition,
anxious attachment was associated with a decrease in emotion regulation difficulty, but
this relationship was not significant, b = -0.03, 95% C.I. [-0.17, 0.10], t(585) = -0.48, p =
.63, and the effect size was small. Results are summarized in Figure 1.
Post hoc analyses within the ostracism condition, using simple linear regression
models to determine the relationship between anxious attachment and the emotion
regulation difficulties subscales, were conducted. Results showed that the overall model,
which included anxious attachment and limited ability to modulate current emotional and
behavioral responses (Modulate subscale), was significant, R2 = .046, F(1, 192) = 9.32, p
< .01, with a small effect size (f2 = .05). Anxious attachment significantly positively
predicted limited ability to modulate current emotional and behavioral responses, b =
0.22, 95%. C.I. [0.09, 0.39], t(192) = 3.05, p < .01, with a small effect size (f2 = .05).
Next, the overall model, which included anxious attachment and lack of clarity about
current emotions (Clarity subscale), was significant, R2 = .022, F(1, 192) = 4.25, p < .05,
with a small effect size (f2 = .02). Anxious attachment significantly positively predicted
lack of clarity about current emotions, b = 0.15, 95%. C.I. [0.01, 0.32], t(192) = 3.05, p <
.05, considered a small effect size (f2 = .02). Lastly, the overall model, which included
anxious attachment and lack of awareness of current emotions (Aware subscale), was not
significant, R2 = .005, F(1, 192) = 0.95, p =.33, with a small effect size (f2 = .01).
Anxious attachment did not significantly predict lack of awareness of current emotions, b
= 0.07, 95%. C.I. [-0.07, 0.20], t(192) = 0.97, p =.33, a small effect size (f2 = .01).
94
Figure 1
Effect of Social Participation Conditions on Anxious Attachment and State Emotion
Regulation Difficulty
95
Overall, these results supported hypothesis 1a, which stated that anxious attachment
would relate to greater emotion regulation difficulties in the ostracism condition
compared to the overinclusion and inclusion conditions. However, the magnitude of the
effect of ostracism on the relationship between anxious attachment and
emotion regulation difficulties, when compared to overinclusion, was small. In contrast,
when compared to inclusion, ostracism had a medium effect size on the relationship
between anxious attachment and emotion regulation difficulties. Lastly, the results did
not support hypothesis 1b, which stated that anxious attachment would relate to less
emotion regulation difficulties in the overinclusion condition compared to the inclusion
condition. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect of overinclusion on the relationship
between anxious attachment and emotion regulation difficulties, when compared to
inclusion, was small. The non-significant finding (despite a large sample size providing
adequate power) and the small effect size indicate overinclusion's minimal influence on
decreasing emotion regulation difficulties in those with anxious attachment.
Hypothesis 2a. Avoidant attachment would relate to greater emotion regulation
conditions.
Hypothesis 2b. Avoidant attachment would relate to less emotion regulation
To test these hypotheses 2a and 2b, a simple bootstrapping moderation analysis
was conducted (Preacher & Hayes, 2022, PROCESS v4.0 Model 1). The dependent
variable for this analysis state emotion regulation as measured by the change in
difficulties in emotion regulation on the S-DERS. The independent variable was

96
avoidant attachment, and the moderating variables were the social participation
conditions. Moderation is shown if there is a significant interaction effect. Results
showed that the overall model was significant, R2 = .045, F(5, 585) = 5.52, p < .001,
with a small effect size (f2 = .05). The R2 indicates that 4.5% of the variance was
accounted for by the model. The interaction between avoidant attachment and the social
participation conditions explained an additional .03% of the variability (R2 change =
.0003, Fchange [2, 585] = .093, p = .91), considered a negligible effect size (f2 = .00).
examined. Avoidant attachment significantly positively predicted emotion regulation
difficulties, b = 0.14, 95% C.I. [0.01, 0.27], t(585) = 2.10, p < .05, a small effect size.
Comparisons between the social participation conditions revealed that ostracism was a
significant predictor of emotion regulation. More specifically, when compared to
overinclusion, ostracism significantly predicted emotion regulation difficulties, b = 0.36,
95% C.I. [0.16, 0.55], t(585) = 3.60, p < .001, considered a medium effect size.
Ostracism, compared to inclusion, significantly predicted emotion regulation difficulties,
b = 0.35, 95% C.I. [0.15, 0.54], t(585) = 3.51, p < .001, also a medium effect size. The
difference in emotion regulation difficulties between inclusion and overinclusion was not
significant, b = 0.008, 95% C.I. [-0.19, 0.20], t(585) = 0.078, p = .94, and was very small
effect size.
Next, the differential influence of the social participation conditions on avoidant
attachment predicting emotion regulation was examined. Statistical analyses revealed no
significant interaction effect between avoidant attachment and condition and indicated
very small effect sizes (see Table 6). Thus, the results did not support the hypothesis 2a,
97
Table 6
Differential Impact of Conditions on Avoidant Attachment Predicting State Emotion
Regulation Difficulties
β SE t p LLCI ULCI
Ostracism vs. Overinclusion -0.01 0.10 -.059 .95 -0.20 0.18
Inclusion vs. Overinclusion -0.04 0.10 -0.40 .69 -0.24 0.16
Ostracism vs. Inclusion 0.04 0.10 0.34 .73 -0.16 0.24

98
which stated that avoidant attachment would relate to greater emotion regulation
conditions, nor did they support hypothesis 2b, which stated that avoidant attachment
would relate to less emotion regulation difficulties in the overinclusion condition
compared to the inclusion condition. See Figure 2.
Hypothesis 3a. Anxious attachment would relate to lower state and online
mentalizing in the ostracism condition compared to the overinclusion and inclusion
conditions.
Hypothesis 3b. Anxious attachment would relate to better state and online
mentalizing in the overinclusion condition compared to the inclusion condition.
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, two different bootstrapping moderation analyses
were conducted (Preacher & Hayes, 2022, PROCESS v4.0 Model 1). In the first
analysis, the dependent variable was state mentalizing as measured by the change in
mentalizing on the RMET. The independent variable was anxious attachment, and the
moderating variables were the social participation conditions. Results showed that the
overall model was significant, R2 = .024, F(5, 585) = 2.81, p < .05, with a small effect
size (f2 = .02). The R2 indicates that 2.4% of the variance was accounted for by the
model. The interaction between anxious attachment and the social participation
conditions explained an additional .05% of the variability (R2 change = .0005, Fchange
[2, 585] = .15, p = .86), a negligible effect size (f2 = .00). An examination of the
relationship between the predictor variables and the dependent variables showed there
was a significant inverse relationship between anxious attachment and state mentalizing,
b = -0.14, 95% C.I. [-0.28, -0.01], t(585) = -2.08, p < .05, considered a small effect size.
99
Figure 2
Effect of Social Participation Conditions on Avoidant Attachment and State Emotion
Regulation Difficulty
100
Comparisons between the social participation conditions revealed that none of the
conditions were significant predictors of mentalizing and indicated small effect sizes (see
Table 7).
Next, the differential influence of the social participation conditions on anxious
attachment predicting change in state mentalizing (RMET) was examined. Statistical
analyses revealed no significant interaction effect between avoidant attachment and social
participation conditions and indicated very small effect sizes (see Table 8).
The results did not support hypothesis 3a, which stated that anxious attachment would
relate to decreased state mentalizing (as measured by RMET) in the ostracism condition,
nor did they support hypothesis 3b, which stated that anxious attachment would relate to
better state mentalizing (as measured by RMET) in the overinclusion condition (see
Figure 3).
In the second analysis, the dependent variable was online (in-vivo) mentalizing,
as measured by the total score on the MASC. The independent variable was anxious
attachment, and the moderating variables were the social participation conditions (i.e.,
ostracism, overinclusion, inclusion). The covariates, age and sex, were included. Results
showed that the overall model was significant, R2 = .15, F(7, 583) = 14.38, p < .001,
considered a medium effect size (f 2 = .17). The R2 indicates that 15% of the variance was
accounted for by the model. The interaction between anxious attachment and the social
participation conditions explained an additional .06% of the variability (R2 change =
.0006, Fchange [2, 583] = .21, p = .81), which was a negligible effect size (f2 = .00).
A look at the relationship between the predictor variables and the dependent
variable revealed a significant inverse relationship between anxious attachment and

101
Table 7
Conditions Predicting Change in State Mentalizing (RMET)
Β SE t p LLCI ULCI
Ostracism vs. Overinclusion -0.10 0.10 -1.02 .31 -0.30 0.10
Inclusion vs. Overinclusion -0.03 0.10 -0.31 .75 -0.23 0.17
Ostracism vs. Inclusion 0.07 0.10 0.71 .48 -0.13 0.27

102
Table 8
Differential Impact of Conditions on Anxious Attachment Predicting Change in State
Mentalizing (RMET)
β SE t p LLCI ULCI
Ostracism vs. -0.03 0.10 -0.30 .77 -0.23 0.17
Overinclusion
Inclusion vs. -0.06 0.10 -0.54 .59 -0.25 0.15
Overinclusion
Ostracism vs. 0.03 0.10 0.25 .80 -0.17 0.22
Inclusion
103
Figure 3
Effect of Social Participation Conditions on Anxious Attachment and State Mentalizing
(RMET)
104
online mentalizing, b = -0.28, 95% C.I. [-0.42, -0.15], t(583) = -4.12, p < .001, with a
small effect size, such that higher anxious attachment was associated with lower online
mentalizing. Results also showed a significant relationship between sex and mentalizing,
specifically, females showed better online mentalizing than males, b = 0.26, 95% C.I.
[0.10, 0.41], t(583) = 3.31, p < .01.
Next, comparisons between the social participation conditions revealed there was
no significant difference in online mentalizing between the ostracism condition (M =
28.95, SD = 9.53) and overinclusion condition (M = 29.59, SD = 9.54), b = 0.002, 95%
C.I. [-0.18, 0.19], t(583) = 0.023, p = .98, and only a small effect size. There was no
significant difference in online mentalizing between the inclusion condition (M = 28.30,
SD = 9.84) and overinclusion condition, b = -0.06, 95% C.I. [-0.24, 0.12], t(583) = -0.64,
p = .52, and effect size was small. There was no significant difference in online
mentalizing between the ostracism and inclusion condition, b = 0.06, 95% C.I. [-0.12,
0.25], t(583) = 0.66, p = .51, and only a small effect size. This means that, of the three
social participation conditions, none was supported as a significant predictor of online
mentalizing in this sample, and the magnitude of their effects was considered to be small.
Lastly, the differential influence of the participation conditions on anxious
attachment predicting online mentalizing was examined. Figure 4 illustrates that as
anxious attachment increased, online mentalizing scores on the MASC were lower in all
three conditions, with inclusion showing the lowest mentalizing score, followed by
ostracism, then overinclusion. Statistical analyses revealed no significant interaction
effect between anxious attachment and social participation condition and also indicated
small effect sizes (see Table 9). These results did not support hypothesis 3a that anxious
105
Figure 4
Effect of Social Participation Conditions on Anxious Attachment and Online Mentalizing
(MASC)
106
Table 9
Differential Impact of Conditions on Anxious Attachment Predicting Online Mentalizing
(MASC)
β SE t p LLCI ULCI
Ostracism vs. -0.05 0.10 -0.51 .61 -0.23 0.14
Overinclusion
Inclusion vs. -0.06 0.10 -0.62 .54 -0.25 0.13
Overinclusion
Ostracism vs. 0.01 0.10 0.12 .91 -0.17 0.19
Inclusion
107
attachment would relate to lower online mentalizing (as measured by the MASC) in the
ostracism condition compared to overinclusion and inclusion, nor did they support
hypothesis 3b that anxious attachment would relate to better online mentalizing (as
measured by the MASC) in the overinclusion condition compared to inclusion.
Hypothesis 4a. Avoidant attachment would relate to lower state and online
mentalizing in the ostracism condition compared to the overinclusion and inclusion
conditions.
Hypothesis 4b. Avoidant attachment would relate to better state and online
mentalizing in the overinclusion condition compared to the inclusion condition.
To test hypotheses 4a and 4b, two different bootstrapping moderation analyses
were conducted (Preacher & Hayes, 2022, PROCESS v4.0 Model 1). In the first
analysis, the dependent variable was state mentalizing as measured by the change in
mentalizing on the RMET. The independent variable was avoidant attachment and the
moderating variables were the social participation conditions. Results showed that the
overall model was not significant, R2 = .014, F(5, 585) = 1.62, p =.15, with a small effect
size (f2 = .01). The R2 indicates that 1.4% of the variance was accounted for by the
model. The interaction between avoidant attachment and the social participation
conditions explained an additional .37% of that variability (R2 change = .0037, Fchange
[2, 585] = 1.08, p = .34), a negligible effect size (f2 = .00).
When the relationship between the predictor variables and the dependent variable
was examined, it was found that higher avoidant attachment was associated with lower
state mentalizing, and this inverse relationship was significant, b = -0.16, 95% C.I. [-0.30,
-0.03], t(585) = -2.37 p < .05, considered a small effect size. Next, comparisons between
108
the social participations indicated there was no significant difference in state mentalizing
between the ostracism condition and overinclusion condition, b = -0.12, 95% C.I. [-0.32,
0.08] t(583) = -1.19, p =. 24, also a small effect size. There was no significant difference
in state mentalizing between the inclusion condition and overinclusion condition, b = -
0.05, 95% C.I. [-.25, .14], t(583) = -0.52, p = .61, with a small effect size. There was no
significant difference in state mentalizing between the ostracism and inclusion condition,
b = 0.07, 95% C.I. [-0.13, 0.27], t(583) = -0.67, p = .50, with a small effect size. This
means that, of the three social participation conditions, none significantly predicted state
mentalizing in this model.
Lastly, the differential influence of the social participation conditions on avoidant
attachment predicting mentalizing was examined. Statistical analyses revealed no
significant interaction effect between avoidant attachment and social participation
conditions, and results indicated small effect sizes (see Table 10). The results did not
support hypothesis 4a that avoidant attachment would relate to lower state mentalizing
(as measured by RMET) in the ostracism condition, nor did they support hypothesis 4b
that avoidant attachment would relate to better state mentalizing (as measured by RMET)
in the overinclusion condition (see Figure 5).
In the second analysis, the dependent variable for this analysis was online
mentalizing as measured by the total mentalizing score on the MASC. The independent
variable was avoidant attachment, and the moderating variables were the social
participation conditions (i.e., ostracism, overinclusion, inclusion). Age and sex were
included as covariates. Results showed that the overall model was significant, R2 = .062,
F(7, 583) = 5.54, p < .001, with a small effect size (f2 = .07). The R2 indicates that 6.2%
109
Table 10
Differential Impact of Conditions on Avoidant Attachment Predicting Change in State
Mentalizing (RMET)
β SE t p LLCI ULCI
Ostracism vs. 0.14 0.10 1.45 .15 -0.05 0.34
Overinclusion
Inclusion vs. 0.09 0.10 0.89 .37 -0.11 0.29
Overinclusion
Ostracism vs. 0.05 0.10 0.51 .61 -0.15 0.26
Inclusion
110
Figure 5
Effect of Social Participation Condition on Avoidant Attachment and State Mentalizing
(RMET)
111
of the variance was accounted for by the model. The interaction between avoidant
attachment and the social participation conditions explained an additional .84% of that
variability (R2 change = .0084, Fchange [2, 583] = 2.62, p = .07), with a small effect size
(f2 = .01).
examined. Results showed a significant inverse relationship between avoidant
attachment and online mentalizing, b = -0.16, 95% C.I. [-0.31, -0.02], t(583) = -2.24, p <
.05, with a small effect. Age was positively related to online mentalizing, b = 0.011,
95% C.I. [0.01, 0.02], t(585) = 3.46, p < .001. There was also a significant relationship
between sex and online mentalizing, b = 0.27, 95% C.I. [0.11, 0.43], t(585) = 3.32, p <
.01. Specifically, females exhibited better online mentalizing than males. Next,
comparisons between the social participations indicated there was no significant
difference in online mentalizing between the ostracism condition (M = 28.95, SD = 9.53)
and overinclusion condition (M = 29.59, SD = 9.54), b = -0.04, 95% C.I. [-0.23, 0.15],
t(583) = -0.38, p = .71, with a small effect size. There was no significant difference in
mentalizing between the inclusion condition (M = 28.30, SD = 9.84) and overinclusion
condition, b = -0.11, 95% C.I. [-0.30, 0.09], t(583) = -1.08, p = .28, with a small effect
size. There was no significant difference in mentalizing between the ostracism and
inclusion condition, b = 0.07, 95% C.I. [-0.13, 0.26], t(583) = 0.70, p = .49, with a small
effect size. This means that, of the three social participation conditions, none was
supported as a significant predictor of online mentalizing in this model.
Next, the differential influence of the participation conditions on avoidant
attachment predicting mentalizing was examined. Figure 6 illustrates that as avoidant

112
Figure 6
Effect of Social Participation Condition on Avoidant Attachment and Online Mentalizing
(MASC)
113
attachment increased, online mentalizing scores on the MASC were lower in the
overinclusion and inclusion conditions, with inclusion showing lower scores than
overinclusion. In contrast, as avoidant attachment increased, online mentalizing was
higher in the ostracism condition.
Statistical analyses revealed an interaction effect between avoidant attachment
and condition. More specifically, compared to ostracism, the impact of inclusion on
avoidant attachment predicting online mentalizing was significant, b = -0.22, 95% C.I. [-
0.42, -0.02], t(583) = -2.18, p < .05 . The effect size was based on the difference in
slopes between ostracism and inclusion and was -.22, a small effect size. However,
compared to overinclusion, the impact of inclusion on avoidant attachment predicting
online mentalizing was not significant, b = -0.06, 95%C.I. [-0.25, 0.14], t(583) = -0.58, p
= .56, with a small effect size. Lastly, compared to overinclusion, the impact of
ostracism on avoidant attachment predicting online mentalizing was not significant, b =
0.16, 95% C.I. [-0.03, 0.35], t(583) = 1.69, p = .09, with a small effect size.
Simple slope analysis showed the following results: In the inclusion group,
avoidant attachment was associated with lower online mentalizing, and this finding was
statistically significant, b = -0.16, 95% C.I. [-0.31, -0.02] t(583) = -2.24, p < .05.
Furthermore, the interaction effect size was small and indicated that for every increase of
one standard deviation in avoidant attachment, mentalizing decreased by .16 standard
deviations in the inclusion condition. In the overinclusion condition, avoidant attachment
was associated with lower mentalizing, but this finding was not statistically significant, b
= -0.11, 95% C.I. [-0.24, 0.02], t(583) = -1.61, p = .11, with a small effect size. In the
ostracism group, avoidant attachment was associated with better mentalizing, but this
114
finding was not statistically significant, b = 0.06, 95% C.I. [-0.08, 0.19], t(583) = 0.80, p
= .43, with a small effect size. These results did not support hypothesis 4a, which stated
that avoidant attachment would relate to lower online mentalizing (as measured by the
MASC) in the ostracism condition compared to overinclusion and inclusion, nor did they
support hypothesis 4b, which stated that avoidant attachment would relate to better online
mentalizing (as measured by the MASC) in the overinclusion condition compared to
inclusion.
Summary of Results of Main Study
Main Effects of Attachment Styles and Social Participation Conditions on Emotion
Regulation
As expected, anxious and avoidant attachment were positively associated with
emotion regulation difficulties, such that individuals with anxious and avoidant
attachment reported greater problems with regulating emotions. However, while
reaching statistical significance the effect sizes of both anxious and avoidant attachment
on emotion regulation difficulties were small. Ostracism, compared to overinclusion and
inclusion, was also associated with greater emotion regulation difficulties, as
hypothesized. Furthermore, the medium-sized effect of ostracism on emotion regulation
difficulties indicated that ostracism had a stronger impact on emotion regulation
problems than the other two conditions.
Attachment Style by Social Participation Interaction Effect on Emotion Regulation
Anxious attachment was associated with greater emotion regulation difficulties in
the ostracism condition. Though statistically significant, the effect of ostracism on the
relationship between anxious attachment and emotion regulation difficulties was small.
115
Post-hoc analyses further indicated that for those who experienced ostracism, anxious
attachment was associated with difficulties in the specific domains of modulating
emotional and behavioral responses and clarity about current emotions. This indicates
that rejecting experiences can disrupt the ability of individuals with anxious attachment to
manage their emotional responses, control their impulses, and identify and carry out
effective strategies in order to achieve a goal. In addition, aversive social conditions can
adversely affect their ability to have a clear understanding of their current emotional
state. The effect size of ostracism on the relationship between anxious attachment and
these specific emotion regulation domains remained small. Lastly, the differential effects
of the social participation conditions on the relationship between avoidant attachment and
emotion regulation difficulties were small and not statistically significant.
Main Effects of Attachment Styles, Age, Sex, and Social Participation Conditions on
State and Online Mentalizing
Anxious and avoidant attachment were inversely associated with state mentalizing
(as measured by change in RMET) and online mentalizing (as measured by the total score
on MASC), such that individuals with anxious and avoidant attachment exhibited
impaired recognition of emotions (RMET) and impaired recognition of mental states in
more complex and dynamic contexts, such as close romantic relationships and friendship
(MASC). Although this finding was statistically significant, the effect sizes of anxious
and avoidant attachment on state and online mentalizing were small. Age and sex were
covariates for online mentalizing (MASC). Age was positively related to online
mentalizing, suggesting that as individuals get older and become more experienced, they
get better at recognizing and understanding mental states in more complex, relational
116
contexts. Females also exhibited better online mentalizing than males. The effects of the
three social participation conditions on state and online mentalizing were all small and
not statistically significant.
Attachment Style by Social Participation Interaction Effect on State and Online
Mentalizing
The differential effects of the social participation conditions on the relationship
between anxious attachment and state and online mentalizing were small and not
statistically significant. Also, the differential effects of the social participation conditions
on the relationship between avoidant attachment and state mentalizing were small and
statistically not significant. However, avoidant attachment was associated with lower
online mentalizing in the inclusion group, indicating that individuals with avoidant
attachment may be less able or willing to engage in understanding mental states in social
contexts even after experiencing social environments that are typically inviting or
interested in the avoidant individual. Although this finding was significant, the effect
size of inclusion on the relationship between avoidant attachment and online mentalizing
was small. Further explanations of all of these findings are explored in the following
discussion section.
Exploratory Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis 5a. Mentalizing capacities would mediate the relationship between
attachment styles and emotion regulation in the context of an aversive social condition.
To test hypothesis 5, two bootstrapping mediation analyses were conducted
(Preacher & Hayes, 2022, PROCESS v4.0 Model 4). In the first analysis, the
independent variable was anxious attachment, the mediator was dispositional mentalizing
117
as measured by the total RFQ score, and the dependent variable was change in difficulties
with emotion regulation, as measured by the difference between pre-Cyberball and post-
Cyberball total scores on the S-DERS. In the second analysis, the independent variable
was avoidant attachment. The analyses used 5,000 bootstrap samples to test effects as
determined by bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals. Effects are considered
statistically significant if the confidence interval does not contain 0. Mediation is present
if the indirect effect (product of a and b) of attachment style (independent variable)
through mentalizing (mediator) on emotion regulation (dependent variable) is significant
(i.e., the confidence interval does not contain 0), and the direct effect of attachment style
on emotion regulation, while accounting for the mediator, (c’) is smaller than the total
effect (c).
The results of the first analysis are as follows: The direct effect from anxious
attachment to dispositional mentalizing was negative and significant (b = -0.64, p < .001),
indicating that higher anxious attachment was associated with lower dispositional
mentalizing. The direct effect of dispositional mentalizing on difficulty with emotion
regulation was positive and not significant (b = 0.47, p = .36). The direct effect of
anxious attachment on difficulty with emotion regulation after controlling for mentalizing
was positive and significant (b = 1.52, p < .01). The indirect effect of anxious attachment
via mentalizing on emotion regulation was not significant since the confidence interval
included zero, ab = -0.30, 95% C.I. [-1.06, 0.38]. The effect size, based on the
completely standardized indirect effect was -.058. This means that for every one
standard deviation increase in anxious attachment there was a decrease by .058 standard
deviation in emotion regulation difficulties accounted for by dispositional mentalizing, a

118
small effect size. In sum, dispositional mentalizing, as measured by total RFQ score, did
not mediate the relationship between anxious attachment and emotion regulation
difficulties (see Figure 7).
A post-hoc analysis was conducted to examine whether the two dispositional
mentalizing dimensions, Certainty and Uncertainty on the RFQ, were significant
mediators in the relationship between anxious attachment and emotion regulation. This
time, a parallel mediation analysis was conducted to test the indirect effect of anxious
attachment on emotion regulation via certainty and uncertainty. The direct effect from
anxious attachment to Certainty was negative and significant (b = -0.42, p < .001),
indicating that higher anxious attachment was associated with lower certainty. The direct
effect from anxious attachment to Uncertainty was positive and significant (b = 0.22, p <
.001), which suggests that higher anxious attachment was associated with higher
uncertainty. The direct effect of Certainty on difficulty with emotion regulation was
negative and significant, (b = -1.82, p < .05), which means that as certainty increases,
emotion regulation difficulty decreases. The direct effect of Uncertainty on difficulty
with emotion regulation was negative and significant (b = -3.94, p < .01) and suggests
that as uncertainty increases, emotion regulation difficulty decreases. The direct effect of
anxious attachment on emotion regulation difficulty after controlling for Certainty and
Uncertainty was positive and significant, (b = 1.32, p < .01). The indirect effect of
anxious attachment on emotion regulation via uncertainty was negative and significant,
de = -0.87, 95% C.I. [-1.66, -0.18]. The effect size, based on the completely standardized
indirect effect, was -.17. This means that for every one standard deviation increase in
119
Figure 7
Simple Mediation Model: Unstandardized Coefficients in the Indirect Effect of Anxious
Attachment on Emotion Regulation Through Mentalizing
Mentalizing
a = -0.64*** b = 0.47
Anxious Emotion
Direct effect c’= 1.52**
Attachment Regulation
Indirect effect ab = -0.30, 95% C.I. [-1.06, .38]
Note. Completely standardized indirect effect ab = -0.0579, SE = .0689, 95% CI [-.1910,
.0789]
**p < .01, ***p < .001

120
anxious attachment, there was a .17 standard deviation decrease in emotion regulation
difficulty accounted for by uncertainty, a small effect. There was no significant indirect
effect via certainty ab = 0.77, 95% C.I. [-0.04, 1.62]. The completely standardized
indirect effect was .15, with a small effect (see Figure 8).
The results for the second analysis were as follows: The direct effect of avoidant
attachment on dispositional mentalizing was negative and significant (b = -0.46, p <
.001), indicating that higher avoidant attachment was associated with lower dispositional
mentalizing. The direct effect of dispositional mentalizing on difficulty with emotion
regulation was negative and not significant (b = -0.39, p = .35). The direct effect of
avoidant attachment on emotion regulation after controlling for mentalizing was positive
and non-significant (b = 0.56, p = .26). The indirect effect of avoidant attachment via
mentalizing on emotion regulation was also non-significant since the confidence interval
included zero, ab = -0.18, 95% C.I. [-0.19, 0.56]. The effect size, measured by the
completely standardized indirect effect was .029, with a small effect. In sum,
dispositional mentalizing, as measured by the total RFQ score, did not mediate the
relationship between avoidant attachment and emotion regulation difficulties (see Figure
9).
A post-hoc analysis using parallel mediation analysis was again conducted to
examine whether the 2 dispositional mentalizing dimensions, Certainty and Uncertainty,
were significant mediators in the relationship between avoidant attachment and emotion
regulation. The direct effect of avoidant attachment on Certainty was negative and
significant (b = -0.32, p < .001), indicating that as avoidant attachment increased,
certainty
121
Figure 8
Parallel Mediation Model: Unstandardized Coefficients in the Indirect Effect of Anxious
Attachment on Emotion Regulation Through Certainty and Uncertainty
Mentalizing,
Certainty
a = -0.42*** b = -1.82*
Indirect effect ab = 0.77, 95% C.I. [-.036, 1.62]

Anxious Direct effect c’ = 1.32** Emotion
Attachment Indirect effect de = -0.87, 95% C.I. [-1.66, -.18] Regulation
d = 0.22*** e = -3.94**
Mentalizing,
Uncertainty
Note. Completely standardized indirect effect ab = 0.1473, SE = .0780, 95% CI[-.0056,
.2996]. Completely standardized indirect effect de = -0.1673, SE =.0670, 95% CI[-.3020,
-.0382]
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

122
Figure 9
Simple Mediation Model: Unstandardized Coefficients in the Indirect Effect of Avoidant
Attachment on Emotion Regulation Through Mentalizing
Mentalizing
a = -0.46*** b = -0.39
Avoidant Direct effect c’ = 0.56 Emotion

Attachment Indirect effect ab = -0.18, 95% C.I. [-.19, .56] Regulation
Note. Completely standardized indirect effect ab = 0.0285, SE = .0299, 95% CI [-.0298,
.0909]
***p < .001

123
decreased. The direct effect of avoidant attachment on uncertainty was positive and
significant (b = 0.14, p < .001), indicating that as avoidant attachment increased,
uncertainty increased. The direct effect of Certainty on difficulty with emotion
regulation was negative and significant (b = -2.81, p < .001), suggesting that higher
certainty was associated with lower emotion regulation difficulty. The direct effect of
Uncertainty on difficulty with emotion regulation was negative and significant (b = -3.42,
p < .01). The direct effect of avoidant attachment on emotion regulation difficulty after
controlling for both Certainty and Uncertainty was positive but non-significant (b = 0.31,
p = .53). The indirect effect of avoidant attachment on emotion regulation difficulty via
Certainty was positive and significant, ab = 0.91, 95% C.I. [0.25, 1.84]. The effect size,
based on the completely standardized indirect effect, was .14, considered a small effect.
This meant that for every one standard deviation increase in avoidant attachment, there
was a .14 standard deviation increase in emotion regulation difficulty accounted for by
certainty. The indirect effect of avoidant attachment on emotion regulation difficulty via
Uncertainty was negative and significant, de = -0.47, 95% C.I. [-1.08, -0.04]. The
completely standardized indirect effect was -.074, with a small effect. This meant that
for every one standard deviation increase in avoidant attachment, there was a .074
standard deviation decrease in emotion regulation difficulty accounted for by uncertainty
(see Figure 10).
Overall, the results did not support the hypothesis that dispositional mentalizing
capacities, as measured by the total RFQ, would mediate the relationship between
attachment styles and emotion regulation. However, post hoc analyses showed that
uncertainty mediated the relationship between both attachment styles and emotion
124
Figure 10
Parallel Mediation Model: Unstandardized Coefficients in the Indirect Effect of Avoidant
Attachment on Emotion Regulation Through Certainty and Uncertainty
Mentalizing,
Certainty
a = -0.32*** b = -2.81**
Indirect effect ab = 0.91, 95% C.I. [.25, 1.84] Emotion

Avoidant
Direct effect c’ = 0.31 Regulation
Attachment Indirect effect de = -0.47, 95% C.I. [-1.08, -.043]
d = 0.14*** e = -3.42**
Mentalizing,
Uncertainty
Note. Completely standardized indirect effect ab = 0.1428, SE = .0550, 95% CI [.0434,
.2569]. Completely standardized indirect effect de = -0.0743, SE = .0380, 95% CI [-
.1545, -.0065]
**p < .01, ***p < .001

125
regulation difficulties with small effects. Certainty also mediated the relationship
between avoidant attachment and emotion regulation difficulty with small effect.
Hypothesis 5a. Uncertainty on the RFQ would mediate the relationship
between attachment avoidance and deactivating/emotionally disengaging responses
(change in Clarity and Aware scores).
To test this hypothesis 5a, two bootstrapping mediation analyses were conducted
(Preacher & Hayes, 2022, PROCESS v4.0 Model 4). In the first analysis, the
independent variable was avoidant attachment, the mediator was Uncertainty, and the
dependent variable was the change in Clarity subscale scores from the S-DERS, as
measured by the difference between the pre and post-Cyberball Clarity scores. The direct
effect of avoidant attachment on uncertainty was positive and significant (b = 0.14, p =
.001). The direct effect of uncertainty on lack of clarity was negative and non-significant
(b = -0.19, p = .23). The direct effect of avoidant attachment on lack of clarity while
controlling for uncertainty was positive and non-significant (b = 0.0008, p = .99). The
indirect effect of avoidant attachment on lack of clarity via uncertainty was non-
significant since the confidence interval included zero, ab = -0.026, 95% C.I. [-0.09,
0.02]. The effect size, measured by the completely standardized indirect effect was .025,
with a small effect (see Figure 11).
In the second mediation analysis, the independent variable was avoidant
attachment, the mediator was Uncertainty, and the dependent variable was change in lack
of awareness subscale scores from the S-DERS, as measured by the difference between
the pre and post-Cyberball Aware scores. As previously seen, the direct effect of
avoidant attachment on uncertainty was positive and significant (b = 0.14, p < .001). The
126
Figure 11
Attachment on Lack of Clarity Through Uncertainty
Mentalizing,
Uncertainty
a = 0.14*** b = -0.19
Avoidant Direct effect c’ = 0.0008 Lack of

Attachment Indirect effect ab = -0.026, 95% C.I. [-.092, .023] Clarity
Note. Completely standardized indirect effect ab = -0.0250, SE = .0277, 95% CI [-.0856,
.0213]
***p < .001

127
direct effect of uncertainty on lack of awareness was positive and non-significant (b =
0.43, p = .19). The direct effect of avoidant attachment on lack of awareness was
negative and non-significant (b = -0.055, p = .74). The indirect effect of avoidant
attachment on lack of awareness of current emotions via uncertainty was non-significant
since the confidence interval included zero, ab = 0.06, 95% C.I. [-0.02, 0.16]. The
completely standardized indirect effect was .027, with a small effect size (see Figure 12).
The results did not support hypothesis 5a, which stated that uncertainty on the RFQ
would mediate the relationship between attachment avoidance and
deactivating/emotionally disengaging responses (as measured by the change in Clarity
and Aware scores).
Hypothesis 5b. Certainty on the RFQ would mediate the relationship between
attachment anxiety and hyperactivating/emotionally reactive responses (change in
Modulate score).
To test hypothesis 5b, a simple bootstrapping mediation analysis was conducted.
The independent variable was anxious attachment, the mediator was Certainty, and the
dependent variable was the change in modulate subscale score from the S-DERS, as
measured by the difference between the pre and post-Cyberball Modulate scores. The
direct effect of anxious attachment on Certainty was negative and significant (b = -0.42,
p<.001). The direct effect of Certainty on limited ability to modulate was negative and
non-significant (b = -0.38, p = .30). The direct effect of anxious attachment on limited
ability to modulate after controlling for Certainty was positive and non-significant (b =
0.36, p = .11). The indirect effect of anxious attachment on limited ability to modulate
current emotional and behavioral responses via certainty was not significant since the
128
Figure 12
Attachment on Lack of Awareness through Uncertainty
Mentalizing,
Uncertainty
a = 0.14*** b = 0.43
Avoidant Lack of
Attachment Direct effect c’ = -0.055 Awarenes
Indirect effect ab = 0.060, 95% C.I. [-.020, .15] s
.0719]
***p < .001

129
95% confidence interval included zero, ab = 0.16, 95% C.I. [-0.13, 0.46]. The
completely standardized indirect effect was .065, with a small effect size. See Figure 13.
Thus, the results did not support hypothesis 5b, which stated that certainty would mediate
the relationship between anxious attachment and hyperactivating/emotionally reactive
responses (as measured by the change in the Modulate score).
Summary of Exploratory Testing Results
In summary, results revealed that dispositional mentalizing, as measured by the
total score on the RFQ, did not mediate the relationship between both attachment styles
(anxious and avoidant) and emotion regulation difficulties and resulted in small effect
sizes. Post-hoc analyses using instead the two dimensions of dispositional mentalizing
(Certainty and Uncertainty) as mediators revealed that Uncertainty significantly mediated
the relationship between both attachment styles and emotion regulation difficulties, such
that high anxious and avoidant attachment were associated with decreased emotion
regulation difficulties via uncertainty about mental states. Certainty significantly
mediated the relationship between avoidant attachment and emotion regulation
difficulties, such that high avoidant attachment was associated with low certainty, which
in turn was associated with higher emotion regulation difficulties. Though these findings
were significant, the effect sizes remained small. Certainty was not a significant
mediator of anxious attachment and emotion regulation difficulty.
Results also showed that uncertainty did not significantly mediate the
relationships between avoidant attachment and problems with clarity and awareness.
Certainty did not significantly mediate the relationship between anxious avoidant and
problems with modulating emotions/behaviors.

130
Figure 13
Simple Mediation Model: Unstandardized Coefficients in the Indirect Effect of Anxious
Attachment on Limited Ability to Modulate Through Certainty
Mentalizing,
Certainty
a = -0.42*** b = -0.38
Anxious Limited Ability

Direct effect c’ = 0.36 to Modulate
Attachment Indirect effect ab = 0.16, 95% C.I. [-.12, .46]
.1953]
***p < .001

131
CHAPTER VI
Discussion
This section begins with a review of the purpose of the study and is followed by
an explanation of the findings from the main and exploratory studies. Limitations of the
study are discussed along with possible future directions for research.
Purpose of the Study
The main goal of the study was to investigate how the interaction of different
social participation conditions (ostracism, overinclusion) and attachment styles impact
two regulatory mechanisms, specifically, mentalizing capacities and emotion regulation.
Prior research on social participation and attachment have mostly focused on the impact
of their interaction on a sense of belonging, self-esteem, control, meaningful existence,
and distress (Arriaga et al., 2014; Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006; Yaakobi & Williams, 2016)
and not on the specific regulatory mechanisms that have to do with reflecting on mental
states or with managing emotions. This study, therefore aimed at addressing this existing
gap, first as it relates to the differential impact of ostracism on the relationship between
attachment styles and two regulatory mechanisms, namely, 1) state and online
mentalizing, and 2) state emotion regulation. Thus, it was expected that both anxious and
avoidant attachment would relate to lower state and online mentalizing in the ostracism
condition. It was also expected that both anxious and avoidant attachment would relate
to greater state emotion regulation difficulties in the ostracism condition.
Since a preferential status can provide a sense of social value and satisfy
relational needs, this study also examined the impact of overinclusion on attachment and
regulatory mechanisms. Not only has overinclusion been associated with a greater
132
satisfaction of fundamental needs (Niedeggen et al., 2014; Simard & Dandeneau, 2018),
it has also been associated with decreased negative mood (De Panfilis et al., 2015),
particularly in insecurely attached individuals with emotion regulation problems and
mentalizing difficulties. This suggests overinclusion may contribute to a change in the
ability to reflect on emotions and regulate them. Whereas previous studies (De Panfilis et
al., 2015; Weinbrecht et al., 2018) have examined the effect of the interaction between
overinclusion and specific psychological disorders on mood and fundamental needs, the
current study investigated the impact of the interaction between overinclusion and
attachment style on state emotion regulation and state and online mentalizing. Thus, it
was expected that both anxious and avoidant attachment would relate to better state and
online mentalizing in the overinclusion condition. It was also expected that both
attachment styles would related to less state emotion regulation difficulties in the
overinclusion condition.
Since regulatory capacities are not merely stable traits that remain unchanged
across time, but instead, can fluctuate depending on the situation and the level of
emotional arousal occasioned by the context, state-based measures were used. Previous
studies (Baumeister et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2019; Gross, 1998) have either used
trait-based emotion regulation measures, physiological markers, or in-person behavior-
based measures to examine the relationships between attachment and emotion regulation
and between ostracism and emotion regulation. Trait-based measures provide
information only about an individual's overall tendency and do not capture variability
over time and the potential impact of situational factors. Since physiological indicators
and in-person behavior-based methods require special equipment or observation, they are
133
impractical for larger scale online studies. Furthermore, behavior or task-based measures
do not capture the internal psychological processes involved in emotion regulation.
Therefore, unlike previous studies, the current study used a state-based self-report
measure, the State Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS; Lavender et al.,
2017) to assess momentary changes in emotion regulation difficulties in the context of
different social participation conditions.
To further address the main research question, the current study used
performance-based measures, such as the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET;
Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001) to assess state mentalizing, and the Movie for the Assessment
of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006) to assess online (in-vivo) mentalizing.
Performance-based measures tend to be less susceptible to manipulation in the form of
self-deception and faking, unlike self-reporting measures, such as the Reflective
Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ; Fonagy et al., 2016) and introspective assessments,
such as the Reflective Functioning Scale (RFQ; Fonagy et al., 1998). State mentalizing
was measured by calculating the change in performance on the RMET, a test of mental
state attribution and complex facial recognition. Online mentalizing was measured by
calculating the total score on the MASC, a video-based test of mental state recognition in
complex situations close to everyday real context, primarily related to friendships and
close romantic relationships.
Finally, a secondary goal of this study was to explore whether dispositional
mentalizing mediated the relationship between attachment and state emotion regulation in
the context of an aversive social condition. Mentalizing involves the ability to reflect on,
contextualize and attribute meaning to mental states, while emotion regulation involves
134
the ability to effectively respond to emotional experiences in order to achieve an end.
Studies (Hudson & Jacques, 2014; Meyebovsky et al., 2019; Schwarzer et al., 2021)
indicate mentalizing capacities predict emotion regulation, and this is consistent with the
neurodevelopmental model (Decety, 2010) and theoretical position that mentalizing
capacities are preconditions to adaptive emotion regulation (Fonagy & Allison, 2012;
Fonagy et al., 2002; Schipper & Peterman, 2013). As previously discussed, attachment is
associated with mentalizing capacity (Fonagy & Target, 1997; Meins, 1997; Nazarro et
al., 2017). Given these relationships, it was expected that dispositional mentalizing
would mediate the relationship between attachment and state emotion regulation. It was
also expected that distinct impairments in dispositional mentalizing would mediate the
relationship between different insecure attachment styles and distinct emotion regulation
difficulties.
Explanation of the Findings from the Main Study
This was the first study to explore how attachment and social participation
impacted self-regulatory mechanisms, namely, emotion regulation and mentalizing. As
expected, this study found that anxious attachment was associated with greater state
emotion regulation difficulties in the ostracism condition. This is not only consistent
with previous studies that have found positive associations between ostracism and self-
regulation difficulties (Baumeister et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2019) and positive
associations between anxious attachment and emotion regulation difficulties (Gillath et
al., 2005; Marganska et al., 2013; Stevens, 2014), it is also consistent with research that
demonstrated anxious attachment was associated with difficulty in effectively solving
problems when given a rejection prime (Miller, 1996). In other words, aversive social
135
interactions interfere with using effective strategies for completing a goal and regulating
oneself. Furthermore, the current results are consistent with the negative outcomes (e.g.,
lower sense of meaningful existence, lower self-esteem, lower positive mood) in studies
that examined the impact of the interaction of attachment and social participation on
fundamental needs satisfaction and mood (Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006; Shaver &
Mikulincer, 2013; Yaakobi & Williams, 2016). At the same time, this study was the first
to demonstrate that when ostracized, anxious attachment predicted greater state emotion
dysregulation. Additionally, unique to this current study was the use of a self-report
measure to assess the change in internal psychological processes involved in emotion
regulation (S-DERS). How emotion regulation capacities adjust or are changed in
aversive contexts is important for recovery from such conditions and should be
considered as a mechanism that is impacting fundamental needs satisfaction, mood, and
overall psychological well-being. This is suggested by studies that have demonstrated
that effective emotion regulation is related to a global sense of well-being and life
satisfaction (Jiang et al., 2022).
To further explore what specific state emotion regulation domains that ostracism
affected in those with anxious attachment, post hoc analyses were conducted and
identified two dimensions, namely, limited ability to modulate current emotional and
behavioral responses (Modulate subscale) and lack of clarity about current emotions
(Clarity subscale). This indicates that individuals with anxious attachment tend to not
only have difficulty engaging in goal-directed behaviors when emotionally distressed, but
they also experience difficulty with accessing flexible use of adaptive strategies to
modulate the intensity and temporal features of their emotional responses. Furthermore,
136
their lack of emotional clarity (i.e., their ability to understand and clearly distinguish
between the different emotions they are experiencing) may contribute to their
dysregulation. The lack of awareness dimension did not appear to be significantly
affected by the ostracism condition for those with anxious attachment. This is consistent
with their tendency towards hypervigilance (Fraley et al., 2006; Mikulincer & Shaver,
2016) and rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 1996). This outcome is consistent
with previous studies that have demonstrated anxious attachment was positively
correlated with difficulty with controlling impulse, pursuing goals, clarifying emotions,
accepting negative emotions, and accessing effective regulation strategies (Marganska,
Gallagher, & Miranda, 2013). In sum, these results not only support the association
between anxious attachment and the disposition for emotion dysregulation, but they also
demonstrate the specific dimensions of emotion regulation that change and become even
more problematic when in the context of attachment-related stressors, such as ostracism
or social rejection.
In contrast to what was hypothesized, avoidant attachment was not associated
with increased emotion regulation difficulties in the ostracism condition compared to
overinclusion and inclusion. This outcome appears more aligned with the studies
conducted by Yaakobi and Williams (2016a, 2016b) which found that avoidant
individuals, in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures, reported less ostracism
distress than more securely attached individuals. This may be because avoidant
individuals typically implement denial and suppression mechanisms to protect against
interpersonal distress and therefore have a higher threshold for aversive social
experiences (Yaakobi & Williams, 2016a). This appears to be consistent with the
137
findings by Izaki, Wang, and Kawamoto (2022), which demonstrated that individuals
with high avoidant attachment felt less distress, as measured by self-esteem threat, than
those with low avoidant attachment in the ostracism condition.
Reports of being less affected by ostracism distress, however, may not represent
the avoidant individual's inner experience, since avoidant individuals still have the
general attachment needs of all human beings, albeit denied or suppressed in order to
protect against social pain (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2016). Thus, those with avoidant
attachment do not trust others. Instead, they tend to value their own independence and
self-reliance. They are reluctant to get close in relationships and can even be dismissive
of interpersonal relationships. Those who are of the dismissive avoidant type can hold
themselves in a more positive light through an adaptive disengagement (Leitner et al.,
2014) and defensive self-enhancement (Arriaga & Kumisharo, 2019; Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2016) and view others negatively (Collins et al., 2006; Pereg & Mikulincer,
2004), and this can result in less anxiety in social situations. (The current study did not
differentiate between individuals with dismissive and fearful avoidant styles.) So,
compared to individuals with anxious attachment, those with avoidant attachment would
appear to be less sensitive to social rejection. In this study, individuals with avoidant
attachment may have also approached the Cyberball game in an already defensive
manner with the expectation that others are rejecting. The ostracism condition may have
reinforced their expectations of others, and in doing so, added to their sense of control
and self-importance in being correct. This can further reinforce the view that they are
unaffected by ostracism, therefore, the ostracism condition was not associated with an
increased rate of difficulty in emotion regulation. The interaction between ostracism and
138
avoidant attachment carried a negligible effect size, and therefore, indicates that the lack
of significant findings was likely not related to inadequate power but rather to minimal
impact that ostracism has on increasing emotion dysregulation in those with avoidant
attachment.
The third finding of the study was that anxious attachment and avoidant
attachment did not significantly relate to less state emotion regulation difficulties in the
overinclusion condition compared to inclusion, and this was in contrast to what was
hypothesized. The finding that overinclusion did not moderate the relationship between
both attachment styles and state emotion regulation may, in part, have been a function of
the way the Cyberball parameters were set in the current study. In the current study, the
number of throws to the participant in each Cyberball condition was determined by the
Cyberball software and was not modified by the current investigator to a specific number
or percentage. Participants in the Overinclusion condition received the ball six times
(40% of the throws). The Ostracism condition received the ball only twice early in the
game (13% of the throws), and the Inclusion condition received the ball five times (33%
of the throws). While the number of throws or percentage in the Ostracism and Inclusion
conditions were consistent with the way that the Ostracism and Inclusion conditions were
defined in the Cyberball literature, the Overinclusion condition varied from the defined
range of 45% to 80% received throws in the literature (De Panfilis et al., 2015; Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 2014; Izaki et al., 2022; Kawamoto et al., 2012; Simard & Dandenaeu,
2018).
Although participants reported in the manipulation check feeling overincluded
during the Cyberball game, the lower percentage (40%) of throws in the overinclusion
139
condition may not have been sufficient enough to make an impact on state emotion
regulation. A possible explanation for this discrepancy may be that individuals with
anxious attachment can perceive and report subtle changes in their environmental
conditions, given their tendency towards hypervigilance. So, they can detect the slight
increase in the number of throws that made them stand out, even if it was not a drastic
difference compared to the other players. However, this difference may not have been an
"extreme" enough form of inclusion to satisfy their adjusted threshold and expectation of
preferential inclusion and therefore, lacked the strength to improve emotion regulation.
Similarly, individuals with avoidant attachment were still able to attend to/perceive cues
of a slightly higher level of social inclusion, but the cues may not have been large enough
for the avoidant individuals to register it as a change in their social value, so they may
have been responding to it as if they were in the Cyberball inclusion condition. Even so,
previous studies (Yaakobi & Williams, 2016) have indicated that Cyberball inclusion has
not been significantly associated with improved outcomes (i.e., mood, need satisfaction)
for individuals with avoidant attachment, whereas, explicit, verbal feedback that has
made participants aware of their inclusion status has been related to improved outcomes
(Arriaga et al., 2014; Carvalo & Gabriel, 2006). This suggests that impersonal, online
Cyberball avatars are less effective agents of change for avoidant individuals given their
inability to verbally communicate and convince avoidant individuals they are socially
valued.
Additionally, this study's outcome appears to be in contrast to the findings
suggested by De Panfilis and colleagues (2015) and Weinbrecht and colleagues (2018),
which demonstrated decreased negative mood by individuals with anxious or avoidant

140
tendencies who were assigned to the overinclusion condition compared to those in the
inclusion condition. The results of the current study were also in contrast to another
study (Izaki et al., 2022) which found that individuals high on avoidant attachment
reported greater maladaptive subjective responses to overincluded experiences (50% of
throws) compared to inclusion experiences (33% of throws). More specifically, high
avoidant individuals felt more threats to belonging and self-esteem than low avoidant
individuals in the overincluded group. Izaki et al. (2022) offer possible explanations for
why avoidantly attached individuals may experience overinclusion as threatening and
dysregulating and why inclusion may be a sufficient condition for decreasing needs threat
and regulatory problems.
As established in the attachment literature, avoidant individuals are not convinced
of others' availability for emotional support, so they tend to keep away from others to
maintain their self-esteem (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2016). Brain research has
demonstrated that greater activity in brain regions involved in social exclusion was
associated with lower self-esteem (Eisenberger et al., 2011). However, these regions for
excluded conditions were negatively correlated with avoidant attachment (DeWall et al.,
2012), which suggests that avoidant individuals only suppress the threat to the need
related to the belief in oneself (i.e., self-esteem) by reducing activity of exclusion-related
brain regions during exclusion experiences. However, avoidant individuals still have
relational and belonging needs like secure individuals, so some inclusion experiences are
still necessary (Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006). Receiving the ball more often in the
overinclusion condition may have drawn the avoidant individuals' attention to positive
characteristics, intentions, and related behaviors of other players, which then activated
141
awareness of attachment-related themes, including the awareness of suppressed threats,
whereas inclusion or fair play was still an unobtrusive condition to the mind and its
defenses. Therefore, overinclusion can be more dysregulating for individuals with
avoidant attachment because they are not able to distance themselves from others'
attention and engagement and are forced to confront their fear that others may become
unavailable. In addition to these findings, Izaki et al. (2022) found that anxious
attachment did not result in decreased distress or need threat in the inclusion (33%
percent of throws) or overinclusion (50% of throws) conditions.
Finally, in contrast to what was hypothesized, the current the study found that
anxious and avoidant attachment did not relate to lower state mentalizing (as measured
by the RMET) and online mentalizing (as measured by the MASC) in the ostracism
condition compared to overinclusion and inclusion. Interestingly instead, avoidant
attachment was associated with lower online mentalizing (as measured by the MASC) in
the inclusion condition. This finding is important because to this author's knowledge, this
is the first to empirically demonstrate that fair play, or inclusive experiences, can
negatively impact the capacity to reflect in an interpersonal context, particularly, for
those with avoidant attachment.
As previously mentioned, avoidantly attached individuals mistrust others and aim
to assert their own autonomy. They deny attachment needs, and therefore, hold a
generally low interest in close social connections. Inclusion conditions can be perceived
as an invitation to social connection. A meta-analytic review found that avoidant
attachment was negatively related to connectedness with others and negatively related to
constructive interaction (Li & Chan, 2012), which includes behaviors that enhance
142
mutual understanding and help resolve conflicts through constructive communication,
cooperation, acceptance, and compromise. These are conditions or interactions that
promote the exchange/sharing of mental states between individuals. However, for people
with avoidant attachment, epistemic mistrust disrupts their ability to discern trustworthy
information that can be helpful, productive, promote social learning, connection, and
change (Choi-Kain, Simonsen, & Euler, 2022). This epistemic disregard has been
reinforced by a pattern of attachment deactivation that values the protection of self-
esteem and dismissal of others, which leaves them stuck in a self-focused isolated "me-
mode" to cope with emotional distress rather than seek proximity and empathic support
from others.
Since individuals with avoidant attachment rely on deactivation or distancing
strategies, they tend to experience decreased general support, and therefore, receive
limited feedback and support from others. Choi-Kain et al. (2022) has further added that
the repeated presentation of a cool, unaffected exterior gives the impression of self-
sufficiency and influences others to mostly reflect back an understanding and
overemphasis of abilities or strengths rather than an empathic mirroring that
acknowledges and expresses the patient's most vulnerable emotions. This perpetuates the
cycle of self-protection via attachment deactivation, unmetabolized subjective emotional
experiences, non-contingent mirroring, and underdeveloped empathic skills. This limits
their opportunity to learn about multiple perspectives and expand their social cognition.
As such, they are prone to make more errors in understanding and interpreting others’
mental states and what motivates behavior. This is consistent with the finding that
attachment-related avoidance was associated with decreased empathy (Mikulincer et al.,

143
2001). This has implications for their relationship satisfaction. Avoidantly attached
individuals can suffer more dissatisfaction in their relationships because of their
deactivating and distancing responses, whereas individuals with anxious attachment can
feel joy in their relationship when they are sure of others’ availability despite their
sensitivity to rejection cues.
Explanation of the Findings from the Exploratory Study
In contrast to what was hypothesized, dispositional mentalizing capacity, as
measured by total RFQ score, did not mediate the relationship between attachment styles
and state emotion regulation difficulties. Interestingly, however, post-hoc analyses using
the two dimensions of mentalizing found that both Certainty and Uncertainty mediated
the relationship between avoidant attachment and emotion regulation difficulties in
different directions. To review, avoidant attachment was positively associated with
Uncertainty, which in turn was associated with lower state emotion regulation
difficulties. In addition, avoidant attachment was negatively associated with Certainty,
which in turn was associated with high state emotion regulation difficulties. These two
significant paths may suggest that different forms of adult avoidance (i.e., dismissive-
avoidance and fearful avoidance) related to two distinct mentalizing dimensions which
impacted emotion regulation. Furthermore, these two paths and the associations within
the path models suggest a need to revisit the validity of the RFQ, clarify the underlying
constructs measured by the two RFQ subscales, and reconsider the position that the RFQ
is a unidimensional measure of dispositional mentalizing.
In the first path, avoidant attachment was positively associated with dispositional
Uncertainty, which then was associated with lower state emotion regulation difficulties.
144
One possible explanation may be that in reaction to rejection, separation, or loss,
dismissive avoidant individuals suppressed the covert activation of their attachment
system by focusing their attention away from thoughts and feelings that activate
attachment-related concerns. That can involve limiting attentiveness or exploration of
mental states of others. Therefore, this mentalizing uncertainty may not necessarily
indicate a lack of ability, per se, to understand mental states of others but rather is a
pragmatic, or functional uncertainty – an adequate level of not knowing or purposely
suppressing that then results in less emotion regulation problems and therefore, low
distress. This would likely occur in response specifically to negative stimuli, but not
positive. Thus, this tendency towards undermentalizing can be construed as form of
adaptive disengagement (Leitner, Hehman, Deegan, & Jones, 2014), a process used by
individuals, such as those with dismissive-avoidant attachment, who are motivated to
maintain self-esteem, particularly in the face of negative feedback.
A series of studies (Leitner et al., 2014) have not only shown that this tendency
for adaptive disengagement correlated with increased positive mental states and
decreased negative mental states, but they also found that the tendency for adaptive
disengagement was related to greater ability to regulate emotions. Additionally, in those
studies, the negative effect of an aversive social experience in the form of Cyberball
ostracism was attenuated and self-esteem was higher in those participants with greater
proclivity for adaptive disengagement. Lastly, those studies indicated that the processes
underlying adaptive disengagement are implicit, such that an individual may be aware of
this tendency but may not be cognizant of when the disengagement is occurring. This
might influence other unconscious process that mitigate perceived threat. In support of
145
this view, it has been shown that individuals who report self-protective strategies respond
to stress with decreased physiological response to stress, including decreased blood
pressure activity (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). This appears
consistent with the study (Fraley & Shaver, 1997) that found that dismissive-avoidant
participants, who were instructed to avoid thinking about and discussing what it would be
like if their partners were to leave them for someone else, experienced low distress as
indicated by their decrease in physiological arousal compared to the control condition.
This indicates that the defensive strategy of suppression and decreased exploration of
mental states may have emotion regulation benefits for those with dismissive avoidant
attachment. Furthermore, this regulatory mechanism may be relatively easy for those
whose view of others is negative but whose internalized sense of self-worth is high and
therefore they would want to defend against any negative information that would threaten
that.
A possible explanation for the second path (i.e., avoidant attachment was
negatively associated with Certainty, which then was associated with high state emotion
regulation difficulties) is that it may be representative of what happens with individuals
with fearful avoidance. The current study, however, did not distinguish between
dismissive and fearful avoidance. Although fearfully avoidant individuals are motivated
to inhibit attachment related distress, they lack the regulatory mechanisms to do so
successfully. This parallels those observations in research on avoidant infants showing
that avoidant infants exhibited increased heart rate even though they did not overtly
express distress (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Unlike those with a dismissive avoidant style,
those with fearful avoidance may be unable to limit or inhibit their internal preoccupation
146
or attentiveness to mental states. Because of high anxiety, like those with anxious
attachment, fearful avoidant individuals would experience greater social cognitive
distortions and less accuracy in mentalizing (less adaptive certainty), which would result
in greater emotion regulation difficulties and would further the cycle of emotional
distress. This explanation, however, remains hypothetical, as the current study did not
examine fearful avoidance.
Alternatively, the second path may just broadly represent both dismissive and
fearful individuals subsumed under the category of avoidant attachment. In either case,
avoidant attachment was associated with greater emotion regulation difficulties, and this
relationship was mediated by the Certainty dimension of dispositional mentalizing (more
specifically, it was mediated by low mentalizing Certainty). This relationship appears
consistent if, as recent studies are suggesting (Wozniak-Prus, Gambin, Cudo, & Sharp,
2022), the Certainty scale is more representative of adaptive or optimal mentalizing and
not hypermentalizing, as originally conceptualized by Fonagy et al. (2016).
Furthermore, it has been observed even in studies that have confirmed the original
two-factor structure (Badoud et al., 2015; Bizzi et al., 2021; Morandotti et al., 2018) that
the Certainty scale was negatively associated with various negative outcomes that are in
contradiction to the theoretical assumptions that form the basis of a hypermentalizing
scale. This trend was observed in a recent study (Wozniak-Prus et al., 2022) in which the
Certainty scale was negatively correlated with Borderline Personality traits, mental health
problems, emotion regulation difficulties and attachment related anxiety with mother,
father, partner, and friend. In contrast to Fonagy's conceptualization of the Certainty
scale, correlation analyses conducted in this current study support the view that Certainty
147
represents adequate or optimal mentalizing (refer back to Table 3). For example,
Certainty was negatively correlated with state emotion regulation difficulties and lack of
emotional awareness.
Post-hoc analyses of the exploratory hypothesis also showed that Uncertainty
mediated the relationship between anxious attachment and state emotion regulation
difficulties. More specifically, anxious attachment was positively associated with
uncertainty, which in turn was negatively associated with emotion regulation difficulties.
This was an interesting finding. This suggests that the mechanism for experiencing less
emotion dysregulation in this sample in those with anxious attachment was not
necessarily by doing more accurate mentalizing but rather by an adaptive degree of not
knowing or limiting deep exploration of mental states. Individuals with attachment
anxiety already tend towards hypervigilance, a sensitivity to interpersonal cues of
rejection, and tend to have strong emotional and behavioral reactions to rejection or
separation. These hyperactivating strategies result in dysregulation, but adopting a
deactivating strategy, in terms of mentalizing, could be more self-regulating.
Overall, the exploratory study demonstrated how different aspects of dispositional
mentalizing mediate the relationship between attachment and state emotion regulation in
adults. These findings are important as they are the first to empirically demonstrate in
what ways the different dimensions act as underlying mechanisms between attachment
and state emotion regulation in the context of interpersonal stress. For example, the
findings that dispositional Uncertainty was an underlying mechanism in the relationship
between the insecure attachment styles and less emotion regulation difficulties may
indicate that the Uncertainty scale on the RFQ may be tapping into an adaptive defensive
148
mechanism, although this scale has generally been construed as an impairment in
mentalizing characterized by concrete thinking, "psychic equivalence," and an inability to
perceive the complex mental states of self and others. Interpreting the Uncertainty scale
as an adaptive defense does not necessarily stand in contradiction to the general
consensus in the mentalizing literature that Uncertainty captures hypomentalizing and has
been associated with negative outcomes, including personality dysfunction, emotion
regulation difficulties, and insecure attachment (Wozniak-Prus et al., 2022).
Relatedly, the finding that low dispositional Certainty was an underlying
mechanism in the relationship between avoidant attachment and emotion regulation
difficulties was in contradiction to the conceptualization that Certainty assessed
hypermentalizing, characterized by the excessive conviction in the accuracy of their
beliefs about mental states. As highlighted by studies that have evaluated the RFQ
(Muller et al., 2021; Wozniak-Prus et al., 2022), the Certainty scale was often positively
related to mental health, and therefore, better represents adaptive characteristics. Muller
et al. (2021) also pointed out that item content development and scoring procedures of the
Certainty scale have likely added to this outcome. Specifically, most of the items on
which the Certainty scale was based were formulated on uncertainty statements. So,
calculation and interpretation of the scale was based on a denial of Uncertainty rather
than statements that reflected an excessive belief in their attribution about mental states.
As previously mentioned, the inverse correlations between dispositional Certainty and
personality dysfunction (i.e., anxious and avoidant attachment) and state emotion
regulation difficulties support the view that the Certainty scale measures adaptive,
accurate mentalizing rather than hypermentalizing.

149
Clarification about what the two dimensions on the RFQ actually measure has
simultaneously generated suggestions to use a unidimensional scoring of the RFQ
because it assesses a unidimensional construct. Critics of the factor structure of the RFQ-
8 (Muller et al., 2021; Wozniak-Prus et al., 2022) suggest that the measure captures
hypomentalizing (i.e., having too little certainty about mental states). Wozniak-Prus et
al. (2022) has demonstrated that the unidimensional RFQ has nearly identical patterns of
correlations that the Uncertainty scale has with personality traits, mental health problems,
emotion regulation difficulties and attachment styles. While the correlations in the
current study lend support for the view that the RFQ is unidimensional, the interpretation
of what construct the unidimensional RFQ measures differs from Muller et al. (2021) and
Woznkiak-Prus et al. (2022). In the current study, the unidimensional RFQ (i.e., total
RFQ score) appears to capture adequate or optimal mentalizing instead of an uncertainty
about mental states. Both the total RFQ and Certainty scale were correlated with online
mentalizing (total score on MASC) and the strength of those relationships were
moderately strong. Additionally, both the total RFQ and Certainty scale were positively
correlated with state mentalizing (RMET), although the strength of those relationships
was small (see Table 3). Lastly, both the total RFQ and the Uncertainty scale had inverse
relationships to emotion regulation difficulties and attachment insecurities. The
interpretation of the unidimensional RFQ as representing adequate or optimal mentalizing
may be a function of the scoring suggestion which was taken from Badoud et al. (2018)
and Gambin et al., (2020) and which appears to be different from that suggested by
Muller et al. (2021).

150
Finally, other the exploratory hypotheses that a) uncertainty on the RFQ would
mediate the relationship between attachment avoidance and deactivating/distancing
responses and b) certainty on the RFQ would mediate the relationship between
attachment anxiety and hyperactivating/emotionally reactive responses were not
supported. Specifically, uncertainty did not mediate the relationships between avoidant
attachment and problems with clarity and awareness; Certainty did not mediate the
relationship between anxious avoidant and problems with modulating
emotions/behaviors.
Limitations
The current study had several limitations unique to conducting research on
MTurk. First, although MTurk enables the collection of a more diverse sample, the
current sample still lacked wider ethnic/racial representation and consisted mostly of
White, highly educated participants, which could warrant concerns about generalizability
of the findings. Other ethnicities/races and people of varied education levels may have
different norms, expectations, or assumptions regarding different types of social
participation experiences and ways of viewing the self and others; this could impact their
reflective processes and how they regulate emotions. As a consequence of this selection
bias, the responses to the social participation conditions, scores and measured means in
the current study (e.g., anxious attachment or avoidant attachment) mostly reflect those
from White, highly educated participants.
Second, the context in which participants completed the present study was not
controlled and may have impacted the results. Environmental influences (e.g.,
distractions, other people helping the participant complete the surveys) that are unknown
151
or beyond the control of the researcher can add systematic measurement error and
potentially impact reliability and validity. These uncontrolled variables have been cited
by researchers as potential limitations/concerns over MTurk participants (Chandler et al.,
2014; Clifford & Jerit, 2016; Necka et al., 2016). Although experimental studies on
MTurk similar to the current study using online confederates/avatars and knowledge
tasks have shown similar results as controlled studies in the lab (Horton et al., 2011;
Rand et al., 2012; Summerville & Chartier, 2012), researchers still recommend using
novel screeners to control for attention and comprehension, and monitoring MTurk
forums to control for possible sharing of information regarding studies (Peer et al., 2017;
Thomas & Clifford, 2017). While the current study implemented the former, the
investigator did not monitor MTurk forums for any study leaks.
Third, MTurk participants, or workers, who have completed a large number of
human-intelligence tasks ("HITs") may no longer be "naive" respondents but instead have
become professional test-takers. As they may be familiar with the same measures from
other tasks, they may become bored, pay less attention to completing the surveys, answer
the way they believe the researcher wants them to, and may have become skilled at by-
passing criteria. Therefore, their responses may not accurately reflect their thinking,
feelings, and experiences, and this threatens the validity of the results. Indeed, some
studies have shown that MTurk participants with previous exposure to the same tests
perform better than naive workers (Bialek & Pennycook, 2017) and even obtain the
maximum scores possible on measures (Haigh, 2016). Previous MTurk exposure to the
current study's measures may have impacted the non-significant results; however, there is
no way of knowing whether that was a contributor since the current researcher did not
152
ask if participants had previously encountered the measures. To mitigate this in future
research, setting up the new naivete feature on MTurk allows researchers to exclude the
most active "superworkers" so they can recruit less experienced workers who are less
likely to have participated in similar research.
A fourth limitation to the current study was the operationalization of the
Cyberball overinclusion condition, which was defined as a condition in which the
participants received 40% of the throws. Operationalizing overinclusion outside of the
typical range of 45% to 80% of throws found in the Cyberball literature presents a threat
to construct validity, and therefore, may have impacted its effect on regulatory
mechanisms. An overinclusion condition of 40% throws may only be a mild form of
preferential inclusion status, whereas 45% and above more clearly conveys "extreme"
inclusion. In contrast to the current study, other studies (De Panfilis et al., 2015;
Weinbrecht et al., 2018) demonstrated improved outcomes in individuals with insecure
attachment tendencies who were assigned to the Cyberball overinclusion condition (45%
of throws).
With regards to measures, a limitation of the main study was its reliance on a self-
report measure to assess change in state-based emotion regulation difficulties. Self-report
measures are susceptible to social desirability bias, particularly for individuals who are
less willing to report or acknowledge negative emotional reactions due to an interest in
maintaining a positive self-image, such as avoidantly attached individuals with a
dismissive tendency. Future studies could include an online, implicit task-based emotion
regulation measure, such as the Emotional Conflict Adaptation task that combines the
Stroop paradigm and a variant of the congruency sequence effects originally reported in a
153
study on non-emotional conflict tasks (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). This task
assesses the participants' ability to manage emotional conflict by measuring their ability
to exert control in order to make adjustment to variations between trials. Implicit
emotion regulation is measured by comparing their response times across different trials
as a result of to those variations.
Another limitation of the main study was the failure of the mentalizing measures
to fully capture the multidimensional nature of the construct of mentalizing, including the
polarities within those dimensions. The two measures used to assess state-based
mentalizing (RMET) and online mentalizing (MASC) primarily captured other-focused
mentalizing and not self-focused mentalizing. Although the format of the MASC is
better suited to capture more dimensions and their polarities (i.e., cognitive-affective,
implicit-explicit, external-internal), it does not calculate scores for those polarities but
still only calculates a global/total score and three impairment scores. Future studies
should consider developing state-based mentalizing measures that specifically assess for
the components of the four dimensions. Such a measure may aid in better understanding
to what degree the specific components within the different dimensions are affected by
different social participation conditions. This can have practical implications and can
inform therapeutic interventions and lead to more nuanced approaches for how to
improve specific aspects or impairments in mentalizing.
A related limitation regarding the mentalizing measures was the reliance on the
RMET to capture state based mentalizing. Some have argued that the RMET relates to a
different aspect of social cognition, namely, the cognitive-perceptual aspect, and
therefore, mainly deals with cognitive functioning, particularly emotion recognition and
154
reasoning about cognitive and/or affective mental states (Davidsen & Fosgerau, 2015).
As such, it can be considered more of a theory of mind (ToM) task. Furthermore, some
studies have indicated a limited relationship between ToM and attachment (Fossati et al.,
2018; Laranjo, Bernier, Meins, & Carlson, 2014; Meins et al., 2002), so this may have
accounted for the non-significant and small effect findings. In contrast, the MASC
relates to the relational emotional aspect of social cognition and appears to be more
consistent with the theoretical model of Fonagy and his team (Fossati et al., 2018) since it
is intended to measure the ability to recognize mental states in complex situations close to
everyday real context, particularly those related to close romantic relationships and
friendships. Furthermore, because the measure (along with an attachment-related
stressor, such as ostracism) unconsciously activates the participants' IWM and
emotionally engages them in the performance of the task, the results more closely
resemble those obtained by using interview-based methods (Janczak, 2018). The MASC
may potentially be a better measure of state-based mentalizing compared to the RMET,
as indicated by emerging studies (Fuchs & Taubner, 2019) that have explored the
interaction of attachment style and attachment-related mood on short term change in
mentalizing by splitting the MASC in two parts and measuring the difference between
MASC scores from pre and post experimental condition.
Lastly, although the current study found two significant findings related to the
principal research question and three significant findings related to the exploratory study,
their effect sizes remained small. This phenomenon may be an artifact of the large
sample size that was collected and it is, therefore, more meaningful to interpret the effect
sizes of these relationships.

155
Future Directions
The main study's aim was to examine whether interaction effects between
attachment styles and participation conditions impacted regulatory mechanisms. This
study showed that the interaction between anxious attachment and ostracism resulted in
greater difficulties in emotion regulation. Future studies can bridge this current finding
with previous studies that have found that the interaction between anxious attachment and
ostracism resulted in decreased needs satisfaction and increased negative mood. Emotion
regulation may be a potential underlying mechanism in the relationship between these
variables, given regulatory capacities contribute to psychological well-being. The
direction of the relationship between needs satisfaction and emotion regulation may also
be in reverse, such that threats to basic psychological needs would predict emotion
regulation difficulties. In a study examining the impact of family functioning,
satisfaction of basic psychological needs, and emotion regulation on depression, emotion
regulation was inversely related to satisfaction of basic psychological needs (Shalchi &
Shahna, 2018). However, the direction of the path indicated that positive needs
satisfaction predicted negative emotion regulation difficulties, which then predicted lower
depression. Hence, future research can examine whether emotion regulation mediates the
relationship between anxious attachment and needs satisfaction/psychological distress (or
whether needs satisfaction mediates the relationship between anxious attachment emotion
regulation), and whether that mediating effect depends on ostracism, a moderated
mediation model.
Similarly, future studies can also build on the other significant finding of this
study that showed the interaction between avoidant attachment and inclusion resulted in
156
decreased online mentalizing. Future research can investigate whether mentalizing
mediates the relationship between avoidant attachment and needs
satisfaction/psychological distress, and whether a mediating effect depends on inclusion.
A more modest future study could also simply be the addition of a categorical attachment
measure (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) or the categorical assignment of participants
to groups based on Fraley’s scoring recommendations (Fraley, 2012) to explore whether
dismissive avoidant and fearful avoidant interact differently with inclusion and impact
mentalizing.
In addition, future studies examining the impact of overinclusion using the
Cyberball paradigm should not only clearly define what overinclusion means to improve
construct validity, but they should also investigate if there are different overinclusion
conditions that yield optimal outcomes for different attachment styles. For example,
when defining overinclusion, 40% of throws may be defined as the mildest form of
overinclusion, whereas 45% may be sufficient to be considered an "extreme" form of
inclusion, given it appears to be the minimum percentage of throws associated with
improved outcomes with participants who have insecure attachment tendencies (De
Panfilis et al., 2015; Weinbrecht et al., 2018). Furthermore, overinclusion studies can
investigate if there is a significant difference in improved outcomes between 45%, 50%,
and 80% throws. For investigating if different overinclusion conditions differentially
impact attachment and outcome variables, such as regulatory mechanisms, those with
more anxious tendencies may need blatant signs of overinclusion to yield positive self-
regulatory outcomes, given their mistrust of others' availability. In contrast, those with
more avoidant tendencies may benefit from a mild form of Cyberball overinclusion
157
which still feels like an inclusion condition and which is followed by clear feedback of
their mild overinclusive status. This is because those with avoidant attachment,
particularly the dismissive type, appear to respond positively to explicit feedback
indicating their inclusive status and social value among other participants (Arriaga et al.,
2014; Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006). However, very drastic overinclusive conditions may be
experienced as more threatening and dysregulating for those with avoidant attachment, as
demonstrated by the study conducted by Izaki et al. (2002; 50% throws). Future studies
could, therefore, compare the impact of different degrees of overinclusion on avoidant
attachment and regulatory mechanisms.
The aim of the exploratory study was to examine if dispositional mentalizing
mediated the relationship between attachment styles and state emotion regulation in the
context of an aversive social condition. Future studies could also replicate the
exploratory study and instead measure state mentalizing as the mediating variable. This
can be done by administering a state-based mentalizing measure and state-based emotion
regulation in a counterbalanced way before and after the experimental. This would allow
us to measure how the variability in mentalizing then impacts variability in emotion
regulation in the context of an emotionally arousing interpersonal context.
Lastly, future studies on mentalizing should extend beyond its relation to human
attachment systems and explore its functioning within a broader social environment,
including other "thinking" systems that appear to simulate an understanding of mental
states (i.e., artificial intelligence, algorithms). Researchers can examine how increasing
interaction with and reliance on machine and deep learning alter our mentalizing
capacities, given that these non-human systems are increasingly organizing and
158
anticipating our behaviors, tendencies, and desires. In investigating those ideas,
researchers can also explore mentalizing from three perspectives: mentalizing others
from the perspective of the self, mentalizing the self from the perspective of the self, and
mentalizing the self from the perspective of the others (Wu, Fung, & Mobbs, 2022).
Conclusions and Clinical Recommendations
In conclusion, the current study made several important contributions to the
literature. First, this was the first study to examine how social participation conditions
differentially interacted with attachment styles and impacted two self-regulatory
mechanisms that are important for recovery from psychological distress and the
maintenance of psychological well-being: state emotion regulation and state/online
mentalizing.
As hypothesized, anxious attachment was related to greater state emotion
regulation difficulties in the ostracism condition. This was consistent with previous
studies that have shown a positive association between anxious attachment and
dispositional emotion dysregulation (Marganska et al., 2013), and has also added to the
literature by demonstrating that in the context of momentary attachment related stressors
(i.e., ostracism/social exclusion), emotional modulation, behavioral control, and clarity
about current emotional experience were the specific dimensions of emotion regulation
that were momentarily and most negatively affected. This has important clinical
implications when working with individuals with anxious attachment who struggle with
social acceptance and rejection. Such individuals would benefit from interventions that
not only decrease their momentary confusion about their current emotions but also
increase understanding and clarity about the emotions they are experiencing.
159
Furthermore, they would benefit from skills that modulate the intensity of their emotions
in the moment and also benefit from effective coping strategies that enable them to
accomplish their goals despite negative emotions.
Second, the finding that avoidant attachment related to lower online mentalizing
in the inclusion condition contributes to the existing literature. Just as previous studies
have shown that inclusive experiences for individuals with avoidant attachment
negatively impact states related to psychological well-being (i.e., positive mood and
satisfactory levels of fundamental needs), the current study demonstrated that inclusion
negatively affects a key regulatory mechanism - i.e., online mentalizing - that also plays a
crucial role in psychological well-being. In clinical work, therefore, it is important to
keep in mind that not all inclusive or collaborative experiences enhance reflective
capacities, particularly, the capacity to reflect on others' mental states (as demonstrated
by performance on the MASC). In the case of the current study, participating in an
online ball tossing game does not necessarily entail an understanding of complex mental
states and, therefore, is different from mentalizing. Joint attention that focuses primarily
on skills, behavior (as in Cyberball), resilience, or even prematurely on trying to
understand others' perspectives before exploring the most vulnerable aspects of a patient's
experience can hinder emotional self-awareness and empathy for others. This can
perpetuate the cycle of attachment deactivation, unrecognized mental states, non-
contingent mirroring, epistemic disregard, and impaired perspective taking. Treatment
with individuals with avoidant attachment should, therefore, prioritize the exploration of
the individual's perspective ("I-mode" or "me-mode") before initiating efforts to change

160
the patient's perspective, introduce them to others' point of view, or engage them in social
collaboration and learning ("we-mode").
The exploratory study contributed to our understanding of the intermediary role of
aspects of dispositional mentalizing in the relationship between insecure attachment and
state emotion regulation in the context of social stress. The finding that avoidant and
anxious attachment were negatively related to state emotion regulation difficulties via
dispositional Uncertainty has important theoretical and clinical implications. While the
Uncertainty scale was originally conceptualized as an impairment in mentalizing, the
current study suggested an adaptive aspect and less pathologized view of
hypomentalizing. As an underlying mechanism that accounts for the relationship
between insecure attachment and less emotion regulation difficulties, it functions as an
adaptive strategy that facilitates self-regulation. This may be particularly applicable to
individuals with insecure attachment who do not experience severe emotional or
personality dysfunction. For individuals with avoidant attachment, this tendency can be
reconceptualized as a strength or advantageous defense that maintains survival and
functioning within a threatening or stressful context. Overreliance on this tendency in
less threatening situations is when it becomes maladaptive. Clinical work should not
only help avoidant individuals to appreciate the benefits and function of the uncertain
(hypomentalizing) tendency but it should also help them to become aware of its
disadvantages and develop a curious disposition that eventually promotes an optimal
level of certainty (adequate mentalizing). For individuals with anxious attachment, the
mechanism for improving emotion regulation is not necessarily to try mentalizing more
accurately via more certainty because that continues an overreliance on a strategy they
161
already engage in excessively. Rather, clinical work should promote an openness to a
tentative knowing, not knowing, and the possibility of being mistaken when it comes to
understanding others and their own mental states.
Lastly, the current study has implications for using the RFQ in future research.
The current study found that both dispositional Certainty and the unidimensional RFQ
represented adaptive or optimal mentalizing. The latter finding, however, was in contrast
to previous reviews (Muller et al., 2021; Wozniak -Prus et al., 2022) which suggested that
the unidimensional RFQ represented uncertainty. When using the unidimensional
approach in future studies, researchers need to state which scoring system the total score
is based on (Badoud et al., 2018; Gambin et al., 2020; Muller et al., 2021) as that will
determine if the total score represents uncertainty about mental states or adequate
mentalizing. Alternatively, if Fonagy and colleagues (2016) want to maintain a two-
factor measure of mentalizing, they should consider revising aspects of the RFQ,
particularly the items on the Certainty scale. To improve construct validity, they should
reword the items so that they represent more closely the construct of hypermentalizing.
162
References
Agrawal, H.R., Gunderson, J., Holmes, B.M., & Lyons-Ruth, K. (2004). Attachment
Studies with Borderline Patients: A review, Harvard Review of
Psychiatry, 12(2), 94-104, DOI: 10.1080/10673220490447218.
Ainsworth, M., Blehar, M., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A
psychological study of the strange situation. Lawrence Erlbaum.
Andreou, M., Skrimpa, V. (2020). Theory of Mind Deficits and Neurophysiological
Operations in Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Review. Brain Sciences, 10, 393-
405, https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci10060393.
Aron, A., Aron, E.N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the
structure of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 63, 596-612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596.
Arriaga, X.B., Capezza, N.M., Reed, J.T., Wesselman, E.D., & Williams, K.D. (2014).
With partners like you, who needs strangers? Ostracism involving a romantic
partner. Personal Relationships, 21, 557-569. Doi: 10.1111.pere.12048.
Arriaga, X.B., & Kumashiro, M. (2019). Walking a security tightrope: Relationship
induced changes in attachment security. Current Opinion in Psychology, 25, 121-
126.
Aviram, R.B. (2005). The social object and the pathology of prejudice. In
J.S. Scharff, & D.E. Scharff, (Eds.), The Legacy of Fairbairn and Sutherland
(pp. 227-236). Routledge.
Aviram, R.B. (2007). Object relations and prejudice: From in-group favoritism to out
group hatred. International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 4(1), 4-14.

163
Badoud, D., Luyten, P., Fonseca-Pedrero, E., Eliez, S., Fonagy, P., & Debbané, M.
(2015). The French Version of the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire: Validity
Data for Adolescents and Adults and Its Association with Non-Suicidal Self-
Injury. PLOS ONE, 10(12): e0145892.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0145892.
Badoud, D., Prada, P., Nicastro, R., Germond, C., Luyten, P., Perroud, N., & Debbane,
M. (2018). Attachment and reflective functioning in women with personality
disorder. Journal of Personality Disorders, 32(1), 17-30.
Ballespi, S., Vives, J., Sharp, C., Tobar, A., & Barrantes-Vidal, N. (2019).
Hypermentalizing in social anxiety: Evidence for a context-dependent
relationship. Frontiers in Psychology, 10: 1501-1512. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01501.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2001). Theory of mind in normal development and autism. Prisme, 34,
174-183.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2005). The empathizing system: a revision on the 1994 model of the
mindreading system. In B.J. Ellis & D.F. Bjorklund (Eds.), Origins of the Social
Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development. (pp. 468-492). Guilford.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A.M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory
of mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37-46.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The “Reading
the Mind in the Eyes” test revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults
with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. The Journal of Child

164
Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 42(2), 241-251. doi:
10.1017/S002196001006643.
Bartels, A., & Zeki, S. (2004). The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love.
NeuroImage, 21 (3), 1155-1166.
Bartholomew, K., & Horowitz, L.M. (1991). Attachment styles among young adults: A
test of the four-category model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
61(2), 226-244.
Bauman, Z. (1992). Mortality, immortality, and other life strategies. Stanford University
Press.
Baumeister, R.F., Brewer, L.E., Tice, D.M., & Twenge, J.M. (2007). Thwarting the need
to belong: Understanding the interpersonal and inner effects of social exclusion.
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1(1), 506-520.
Baumeister, R.F., DeWall, C.N., Ciarocco, N.L., & Twenge, J.M. (2005). Social
exclusion impairs self-regulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
88(4), 589-604.
Baumeister, R.F., & Leary, M.R. (1995). The need to belong: desire for interpersonal
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117(3),
497-529.
Baumeister, R. F., & Twenge, J. M. (2003). The social self. In T. Millon & M. J. Lerner
(Eds.), Handbook of psychology: Personality and social psychology (Vol. 5, pp.
327-352). John Wiley.
Beck, A.T., Davis, D.D., Freeman, A. (2015). Cognitive therapy of personality
disorder (3rd ed.). Guilford Press.

165
Berant, E., Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2008). Mothers' attachment style, their
mental health, and their children's emotional vulnerabilities: A 7-year study of
children with congenital heart disease. Journal of Personality, 76(1), 31-66.
Bernstein, M.J., & Claypool, H.M. (2012). Not all social exclusions are created equal:
Emotional distress following social exclusion is moderated by exclusion
paradigm. Social Influence, 7(2), 113-130.
Bernstein, M. J., Young, S. G., Brown, C. M., Sacco, D. F., & Claypool, H. M. (2008).
Adaptive responses to social exclusion: Social rejection improves detection of real
and fake smiles. Psychological Science, 19(10), 981–
983. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02187.x
Bialek, M., & Pennycook, G. (2017). The cognition reflection test is robust to multiple
exposures. Behavior Research Methods, 50, 1953-1959.
Bizzi, F., Riva, A., Borelli, J.L, Charpentier-Mora, S., Bomba, M., Cavanna, D., &
Nacinovich, R. (2021). The Italian version of the Reflective Functioning
Questionnaire: Validity within a sample of adolescents and associations with
psychological problems and alexithymia. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 78(4),
503-516.
Blackhart, G.C., Nelson, B.C., Knowles, M.L., & Baumeister, R.F. (2009). Rejection
elicits emotional reactions but neither causes immediate distress nor lowers self-
esteem: A meta-analytic review of 192 studies on social exclusion. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 13(4), 269-309.
Bosquet, M., & Egeland, B. (2006). The development and maintenance of anxiety
166
symptoms from infancy through adolescence in a longitudinal sample.
Development and Psychopathology, 18, 517-550.
Bouchard, M.A., Target, M., Lecours, S., Fonagy, P., Trembly, L.M., Schachter, A., &
Stein, H. (2008). Mentalization in adult attachment narratives: Reflective
functioning, mental states, and affect elaboration compared. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 25(1), 47-66.
Bowlby, J. (1969) Attachment and loss. Basic Books.
Bowlby, J. (1977). The making and breaking of affectional bonds: Aetiology and
psychopathology in the light of attachment theory. British Journal of Psychiatry,
130, 201-210. doi:10.1192/bjp.130.3.201.
Brennan, K., Clark, C., Shaver, P. (1988). Self-report measures of adult romantic
attachment. In J. Simpson and W. Rholes (Eds.), Attachment theory and close
relationships. Guilford Press.
Brennan, K.A., Wu, S., & Loev, J. (1998). Adult romantic attachment and individual
differences in attitudes towards physical contact in the context of adult romantic
relationships. In J. Cassidy & P.R. Shaver (Eds.) Handbook of attachment:
Theory, research and clinical applications (pp. 394-428). Guilford Press.
Buckley, K.E., Winkel, R.E., & Leary, M.R. (2004). Reactions to acceptance and
rejection: Effects of levels and sequence of relational evaluation. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 14-28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-
1031(03)00064-7.
Bzdok, D., Langner, R., Schilbach, L., Engemann, D. A., Laird, A. R., Fox, P. T., &
167
Eickhoff, S. (2013). Segregation of the human medial prefrontal cortex in social
cognition. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 1-17.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00232.
Cacioppo, J.T., & Patrick, W. (2008). Loneliness: Human nature and the need for social
connection. W.W. Norton & Company.
Cai, R. Y., Richdale, A. L., Uljarević,M., Dissanayake, C.,& Samson, A.C. (2018).
Emotion regulation in autism spectrum disorder: Where we are and where we
need to go. Autism Research, 11(7), 962–978. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.1968.
Caldwell, J.G., & Shaver, P.R. (2012). Exploring the cognitive-emotional pathways
between adult attachment and ego-resiliency. Individual Differences Research,
10, 141-152.
Campbell, L., Simpson, J. A., Boldry, J., & Kashy, D. A. (2005). Perceptions of conflict
and support in romantic relationships: The role of attachment anxiety. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 510–531. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.88.3.510.
Carter-Sowell, A.R., Chen, Z., & Williams, K.D. (2008). Ostracism increases social
susceptibility. Social Influence, 3(3), 143-153.
Carvallo, M., & Gabriel, S. (2006). No man is an island: The need to belong and
dismissing avoidant attachment style. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 32(5), 697–709. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205285451.
Cassidy, J. (1994) Emotion regulation: Influences of attachment relationships.
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 59(2), 228-249.
Cassidy, J., Lichtenstein-Phelps, J., Sibrava, N.J., Thomas Jr., C.L, Borkovec, T.D.
168
(2009). Generalized anxiety disorder: Connections with self-reported attachment.
Behavior Therapy, 40(1), 23-38.
Chandler, J., Mueller, P., & Paolacci, G. (2014). Nonnaivete among Amazon Mechanical
Turk workers: Consequences and solutions for behavioral researchers. Behavior
Research Methods, 46(1), 112-130.
Choi-Kain, L.W., & Gunderson, J.G. (2008). Mentalization: Ontogeny, assessment, and
application in the treatment of borderline personality disorder. American Journal
of Psychiatry, 165(9), 1127-1135.
Choi-Kain, L.W., Simonsen, S., & Euler, S. (2022). A mentalizing approach for
narcissistic personality disorder: Moving from "Me-mode" to "We-mode."
American Journal of Psychotherapy, 75(1), 38-43.
Chun, D.S., Shaver, P.R., Gillath, O., Mathews, A., & Jorgensen, T.D. (2015). Testing a
dual process model of avoidant responses. Journal of Research in Personality, 55,
75-83.
Claypool, H.M., & Bernstein, M.J. (2019). Exclusion and its impact on social information
processing. In S.C. Rudert, R. Greifeneder, & K.D. Williams, (Eds.) Current
directions in ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection research. Routledge.
Clifford, S., & Jerit, J. (2016). Cheating on political knowledge questions in online
surveys: An assessment of the problem and solutions. Public Opinion Quarterly,
80(4), 858-887.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences, (2nd ed.).
Erlbaum.
Collins, N.L., Ford, M.B., Guichard, A.C., & Allard, L.M. (2006). Working models of
169
attachment and attribution processes in intimate relationships. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(2), 201-219.
Colonnesi, C., Draijer, E.M., Stams, G.J.J.M., van der Bruggen, C.O., Bögels, S.M., &
Noom, M.J. (2011) The relation between insecure attachment and child anxiety:
A meta-analytic review, Journal of Clinical Child & Adolescent
Psychology, 40(4), 630-645, DOI: 10.1080/15374416.2011.581623.
Contardi, A., Imperatori, C., Penzo, I., Del Gatto, C.,& Farina, B. (2016). The association
among difficulties in emotion regulation, hostility, and empathy in a sample of
young Italian adults. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1068-1077.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01068.
Cutrona, C.E., & Russell, D.W. (1987). The provisions of social relationships and
adaptation to stress. Advances in Personal Relationships, 1, 37-67.
Davidsen, A.S., & Fosgerau, C.F. (2015). Grasping the process of implicit mentalization.
Theory & Psychology, 25(4), 434-454.
Davidson, C.A., Willner, C.J., van Noordt, S.J.R., Banz, B.C., Wu, J., Kenney, J.G.,
Johannesen, J.K., & Crowley, M.J. (2019). One-month stability of cyberball post
exclusion ostracism distress in adolescents. Journal of Psychopathology and
Behavioral Assessment, 41(3), 400–408. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10862-019-
09723-4.
Decety, J. (2010). The neurodevelopment of empathy in humans. Developmental
Neuroscience,32, 257–267. https://doi.org/10.1159/000317771.
De Panfilis, C., Riva, P., Preti, E., Cabrino, C., & Marchesi, C. (2015). When social
170
inclusion is not enough: Implicit expectations of extreme inclusion in borderline
personality disorder. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment,
6(4), 301-309.
DeWall, C. N., & Baumeister, R. F. (2006). Alone but feeling no pain: Effects of social
exclusion on physical pain tolerance and pain threshold, affective forecasting, and
interpersonal empathy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(1), 1-
15. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.1.1.
DeWall, C. N., MacDonald, G., Webster, G. D., Masten, C., Baumeister, R. F., Powell,
C., …Eisenberger, N. I. (2010). Acetaminophen reduces social pain: Behavioral
and neural evidence. Psychological Science, 21, 931–937.
DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., & Rouby, D. A. (2009). Social exclusion and early-stage
interpersonal perception: Selective attention to signs of acceptance. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 96(4), 729–
741. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014634
DeWall, C. N., Twenge, J. M., Gitter, S. A., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). It’s the thought
that counts: The role of hostile cognition in shaping aggressive responses to social
exclusion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 45–59.
DeWall, C.N., Twenge, J.M., Koole, S.L., Baumeister, R.F., Marquez, A., & Reid, M.W.
(2011). Automatic emotion regulation after social exclusion: Tuning to positivity.
Emotion, 11, 623–636.
Dotan-Eliaz, O., Sommer, K.L., & Rubin, Y.S. (2009). Multilingual groups: Effects of
171
linguistic ostracism on felt rejection and anger, coworker attraction, perceived
team potency, and creative performance. Basic and Applied Social Psychology,
31, 363-375.
Downey, G., & Feldman, S.I. (1996). Implications of rejection sensitivity for intimate
relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 1327-1343.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1327.
Duval, J., Ensink, K., Normandin, L., Sharp, C., & Fonagy, P. (2018). Measuring
reflective functioning in adolescents: Relations to personality disorders and
psychological difficulties. Adolescent Psychiatry, 8(1), 5-20.
Dvash, J., & Shamay-Tsoory, S. (2014). Theory of mind and empathy as
multidimensional constructs: Neurological foundations. Topics in Language
Disorders, 34(4), 282–295. https://doi.org/10.1097/TLD.0000000000000040.
Dziobek, I., Fleck, S., Kalbe, E., Rogers, K, Hassenstab, J., Brand, M., Kessler, J,
Woike, J.K, Oliver, W., & Convit, A. (2006). Introducing MASC: A movie for
the assessment of social cognition. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 36, 623-636. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-006-0107-0
Edelstein, R. S., & Gillath, O. (2008). Avoiding interference: Adult attachment and
emotional processing biases. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(2),
171-181. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207310024.
Eisenberger, N.I., Lieberman, M.D., & Williams, K.D. (2003). Does rejection hurt? An
fMRI study of social exclusion. Science, 302, 290-292.
Eisenberger, N.I, Inagaki, T.K., Muscatell, K.A., Byrne Halton, K.E., & Leary, M.R.
172
(2011). The neural sociometer: Brain mechanisms underlying state self-esteem.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 3448-3455.
Eisenberg, NI., & Spinrad, T.L. (2004). Emotion-related regulation: Sharpening the
definition. Child Development, 75(2), 334-339.
Ellmers, N., & Haslam, S.A. (2012). Social identity theory. In P.A.M. van Lange, A.W.
Kruglanski, & E.T. Higgins (Eds.) Handbook of theories of social psychology (pp.
379-399). Sage.
Erikson, E.H. (1959). Identity and the life cycle. Norton.
Fabiansson, E.C., & Denson, T.F. (2012). The effects of intrapersonal anger and its
regulation in economic bargaining. PLOS ONE, 7, Article e51595.
Fairbairn, W.R.D. (1952). Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality. Routledge.
Fairchild, A.J., & Finney, S.J. (2006). Investigating validity evidence for the Experiences
in Close Relationships-Revised Questionnaire. Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 66, 116-135.
Fayant, M.P., Muller, D., Hartgerink, C.H.J., & Lantian, A. (2014). Is ostracism by a
despised outgroup really hurtful? Social Psychology, 45, 489-494.
Fernández-Abascal, E.G., Cabello, R., Fernández-Berrocal, P. et al. (2013). Test-retest
reliability of the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test: A one-year follow-up
study. Molecular Autism 4, 33. https://doi.org/10.1186/2040-2392-4-33.
Ferris, L.J. (2019). Hurt feelings: Physical pain, social exclusion, and the psychology of
pain overlap In S.C. Rudert, R. Greifeneder, & K.D. Williams (Eds.). Current
directions in ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection research (pp. 100-119).
Routledge.
173
Fonagy, P. (2008). The mentalization-focused approach to social development. In F.N.
Busch (Ed.), Mentalization (pp. 3-56). Analytic Press.
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E.L., & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation,
mentalization, and the development of the self. Other Press.
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Moulten-Perkins, A., Lee, Y., Warren, F., Howard, S., Ghinai, R.,
Fearon, P., & Lowyck, B. (2016). Development and validation of a self-report
measure of mentalizing: The reflective functioning questionnaire. PLOS ONE,
11(7), 1-28. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158678.
Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Moran, G.S., Higgit, A.C. (1991). The capacity for
understanding mental states: The reflective self in parent and child and its
significance for security of attachment. Infant Mental Health Journal, 12(3), 2-7.
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1997). Attachment and reflective function: Their role in self
organization. Developmental Psychopathology, 9(4), 679-700
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2006). The mentalization-focused approach to self pathology.
Journal of Personality Disorders, 20(6), 544-576.
Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J.G., & Bateman, A.W. (2008). The
developmental roots of borderline personality disorder in early attachment
relationships: A theory and some evidence. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 23(3), 412-
459.
Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, H., & Steele, M. (1998). Reflective functioning manual
version 5 for application to adult attachment interviews.
Fossati, A., Borroni, S., Dziobek, I., Fonagy, P., & Somma, A. (2018). Thinking about
assessment: Further evidence of the validity of the Movie for the Assessment of
174
Social Cognition as a measure of mentalistic abilities. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 35(1), 127-141.
Fraley, R.C. (2012, November). Information on the Experiences in Close Relationships
Revised (ECR-R) Adult Attachment Questionnaire.
http://labs.psychology.illinois.edu/~rcfraley/measures/ecrr.htm.
Chris Fraley, R., Niedenthal, P. M., Marks, M., Brumbaugh, C., & Vicary, A. (2006).
Adult attachment and the perception of emotional expressions: Probing the
hyperactivating strategies underlying anxious attachment. Journal of
personality, 74(4), 1163-1190.
Fraley, R.C., & Shaver, P.R. (1997). Adult attachment and the suppression of unwanted
thoughts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 1080-1091.
Fraley, R. C., & Shaver, P. R. (2000). Adult romantic Attachment: Theoretical
developments, emerging controversies, and unanswered questions. Review of
General Psychology, 4(2), 132–154. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.4.2.132.
Fraley, R.C., Waller, N.G., Brennan, K.A. (2000). An item response theory analysis of
self-report measures of adult attachment. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 78(2), 350-365.
Frei, J.R., & Shaver, P.R. (2002). Respect in close relationships: Prototype definition,
self-report assessment, and initial correlates. Personal Relationships, 9(2), 121-
139.
Frith, C., & Frith, U. (2005). Theory of mind. Current Biology, 15(17), 44-45.
Fuchs, N.F., & Taubner, S. (2019). Exploring the interplay of attachment style and
175
attachment-related mood on short term change in mentalization: A pilot study.
Personality and Individual Difference, 144, 94-99.
Galinsky, A. D., Ku, G., & Wang, C. S. (2005). Perspective-taking and self-other
overlap: Fostering social bonds and facilitating social coordination. Group
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8(2), 109–
124. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430205051060
Gambin, M., Woźniak-Prus, M., Konecka, A., & Sharp, S. (2020). Relations between
attachment to mother and father, mentalizing abilities and emotion regulation in
adolescents, European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 18(1), 18-37. DOI:
10.1080/17405629.2020.1736030.
George, C., Kaplan, N., & Main, M. (1985). Adult Attachment Interview [Unpublished
manuscript]. Department of Psychology, University of California.
Gerber, J., &Wheeler, I. (2009). On being rejected: A meta-analysis of experimental
research on rejection. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 469-488.
Gilboa-Schechtman, E., Galili, L., Sahar, Y., & Amir, O. (2014). Being "in" or "out" of
the game: Subjective and acoustic reactions to exclusion and popularity in social
anxiety. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 147.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00147.
Gillath, O., Bunge, S.A., Shaver, P.R., Wendelken, C., Mikulincer, M. (2005).
Attachment-style differences in the ability to suppress negative thoughts:
Exploring the neural correlates. NeuroImage, 28(4), 835-847.
Gillath, O., Karantzas, G.C., & Fraley, R.C. (2016). Adult attachment: A concise
introduction to theory and research. Elsevier.

176
Goffman, E. (2014). Stigma and social identity. In Understanding deviance (pp. 256-
265). Routledge.
Gonsalkorale, K., & Williams, K.D. (2007). The KKK won’t let me play: Ostracism even
by a despised outgroup hurts. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 1176-
1186.
Goodman, J.K., Cryder, C.E., & Cheema, A. (2013). Data collection in a flat world: The
strengths and weaknesses of Mechanical Turk samples. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 26, 213-224.
Goodcase, E.T., Nalbone, D.P., Hecker, L.L., & Latty, C. (2018). The role of attachment
anxiety and avoidance in communication modality and relationship quality of
romantic relationships initiated online. The American Journal of Family Therapy,
46(2), 168-183.
Gratton, G., Coles, M.G., Donchin, E. (1992). Optimizing the use of information:
Strategic control of activation of responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
121(4), 480-506.
Gratz, K.L., Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion regulation and
dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the
difficulties in emotion regulation scale. Journal of Psychopathology and
Behavioral Assessment, 26, 41–54.
Greenberg, D.M., Kolasi, J., Hegsted, C.P., Berkowitz, Y., & Jurist, E.L. (2017).
Mentalized affectivity: A new model and assessment of emotion regulation. PLOS
ONE, 12(10): Article e0185264. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.
Greifeneder, R., & Rudert, S.C. (2019). About flames and boogeymen. In S.C. Rudert, R.
177
Greifeneder, & K.D. Williams (Eds.), Current direction in ostracism, social
exclusion, and rejection research (pp. 32-48). Taylor & Francis.
Gross, J.J. (1988). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review.
Review of General Psychology, 2(3), 271-299.
Gunnar, M.R., Sebanc, A.M., Tout, K., Donzella, B., & van Dulmen, M.M.H. (2003).
Peer rejection, temperament, and cortisol activity in preschoolers. Developmental
Psychology, 43, 346-368.
Gyurak, A., Gross, J.J., & Etkin, A. (2011). Explicit and implicit emotion regulation: A
dual-process framework. Cognition and Emotion, 25(3), 400-412.
Ha, C., Sharp, C., Ensink, K., Fonagy, P., Cirino, P. (2013). The measurement of
reflective function in adolescents with and without borderline traits. Journal of
Adolescence, 36,1215-1223. Doi: 10.1016/j.adolescence.2013.09.008.
Haggerty, G., Hilsenroth, M. J., & Vala-Stewart, R. (2009). Attachment and interpersonal
distress: Examining the relationship between attachment styles and interpersonal
problems in a clinical population. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 16(1), 1-
9.
Haigh, M. (2016). Has the standard cognition reflection test become a victim of its own
success? Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 12(3), 145-149.
Hales, A. H., Williams, K. D., & Eckhardt, C. I. (2015). A participant walks into a bar…
Subjective intoxication buffers ostracism’s negative effects. Social Psychology,
46, 157-166.
Hamilton, N.A., Karoly, P., Gallagher, M., Stevens, N., Karlson, C., McCurdy, D.
178
(2009). The assessment of emotion regulation in cognitive context: The Emotion
Amplification and Reduction Scales. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 33, 225-
263.
Hankin, B. L., Kassel, J. D., & Abela, J. R. Z. (2005). Adult attachment styles and
specificity of emotional distress: Prospective investigations of cognitive risk and
interpersonal stress generation as mediating mechanisms. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 31, 136–151. doi: 10.1177/0146167204271324
Hartgerink, C.H.J., van Beest, I., Wicherts, J.M., & Williams, K.D. (2015). The ordinal
effects of ostracism: A meta-analysis of 120 cyberball studies. PLOS ONE, 10(5):
Article e0127002. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0127002.
Hayes, S.C., Strosahl, K.D., Wilson, K.G., Bissett, R.T., Pistorello, J., Toarmino, D.,
McCurry, S.M. (2004). Measuring experiential avoidance: A preliminary test of a
working model. The Psychological Record, 54, 553-578.
Heatherton, T. F. (2011). Neuroscience of self and self-regulation. Annual Review of
Psychology,62, 363–390. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131616.
Hess, Y.D., & Pickett, C.L. (2010). Social rejection and self-versus other-awareness.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 453-456.
Hogg, M.A. (2005). All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others:
Social identity and marginal membership. In K.D. Williams, J.P. Forgas, & W.
Von Hippel (Eds.). The social outcast: Ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and
bullying (pp. 243-262). Psychology Press.
Holmberg, D., Lomore, C.D., Takacs, T.A., & Price, E.L. (2011). Adult attachment styles
179
and stressor severity as moderators of the coping sequence. Personal
Relationships, 18, 502-517.
Holt-Lunstad, J., Smith, T.B., & Layton, J.B. (2010) Social Relationships and Mortality
Risk: A Meta-analytic Review. PLOS Med 7(7): Article e1000316.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000316.
Horton, J.J., Rand, D.G., & Zeckhauser, R.J. (2011). The online laboratory: Conducting
experiments in a real labor market. Experimental Economics, 14(3), 399-425.
http://dx.doi.org/10.10007/s10683-011-9273-9.
Hudson, A., & Jacques, S. (2014). Put on a happy face! Inhibitory control and
socioemotional knowledge predict emotion regulation in 5 to 7-year-olds. Journal
of Experimental Child Psychology, 123, 36–52.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2014.01.012.
Iannone, N.E., Kelly, J.R., & Williams, K.D. (2016). “Who’s that?”: The negative
consequences of being out of the loop on pop culture. Psychology of Popular
Media Culture, 7, 113-129.
Izaki, T., Wang, W., & Kawamoto, T. (2022). Avoidant attachment attenuates the need
threat for social exclusion but induces the threat for over-inclusion. Frontiers in
Psychology, 13: Article 881863. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.881863.
Jamieson, J.P., Harkins, S.G., & Williams, K.D. (2010). Need threat can motivate
performance after ostracism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(5),
690-702.
Janczak, M.O. (2021). What's on your mind? A guide for mentalization assessment in
adults. Wydawnictwo Rys.

180
Jiang, X., Moreno, J., Ng, Z. (2022). Examining the interplay of emotion regulation
strategies, social stress and gender in predicting life satisfaction of emerging
adults. Personality and Individual Differences, 185, Article 111255.
Jones, E.E., Carter-Sowell, A.R., Kelly, J.R., & Williams, K.D. (2009). “I’m out of the
loop: Ostracism through information exclusion. Group Processes and Intergroup
Relations, 12, 157-174.
Joormann, J. (2006). Differential effects of rumination and dysphoria on the inhibition of
irrelevant emotional material: Evidence from a negative priming task. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 30, 149–160.
Jurist E. L. (2005). Mentalized affectivity. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 22(3), 426.
Kahya, Y., & Munguldar, K. (2022). Difficulties in emotion regulation mediated the
relationship between reflective functioning in borderline personality symptoms
among non-clinical adolescents. Psychological Reports, 0(0), 1-20.
Kawamoto, T., Onoda, K., Nakashima, K.I., Nittono, H., Yamaguchi, S., & Ura, M.
(2012). Is dorsal anterior cingulate cortex activation in response to social
exclusion due to expectancy violation? An fMRI study. Frontiers in Evolutionary
Neuroscience, 4, 11. https://doi.rog/10.3389/fnevo.2012.00011.
Kernberg, O.F. (1984). Severe personality disorders. Yale University Press.
Kerr, N.L., Levine, J.M. (2008). The detection of social exclusion: Evolution and beyond.
Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 12, 39-52.
Kline, R.B. (2011). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling. (3rd ed.)
Guildford Press.
Kimhi, Y. (2014). Theory of mind abilities and deficits in autism spectrum disorders.
181
Topics in Language Disorders, 34(4), 329-343. doi:
10.1097/TLD.0000000000000033.
King-Casas, B., Sharp, C., Lomax-Bream, L., Lohrenz, T., Fonagy, P., & Montague, P.R.
(2008). The rupture and repair of cooperation in borderline personality disorder.
Science, 321, 806-810.
Kisley, M.A., Caudle, C.S., & Harvey, A.M. (2019). Affect intolerance is associated with
insecure attachment and reduced self-esteem in adults. Archives of Psychology,
3(8), 1-21.
Knowles, M.L. (2014). Social rejection increases perspective taking. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 55, 126-132.
Kohn, J.L., Rholes, W.S., & Schmeichel, B.J. (2012). Self-regulatory depletion and
attachment avoidance: Increasing the accessibility of negative attachment-related
memories. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1), 375-378.
Kross, E., Berman, M.G., Mischel, W., Smith, E.E., & Wager, T.D. (2011). Social
rejection shares somatosensory representations with physical pain. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 6270-6275.
Kurzban, R., & Leary, M.R. (2001). Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: The functions
of social exclusion. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 187-208.
Kushlev, K. & Heintzelman, S.J. (2018). Put the phone down: Testing a complement
interfere model of computer-mediated communication in the context of face to
face interactions. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 9, 702-710.
Laible, D.J., Carlo, G. & Raffaelli, M. (2000). The differential relations of parent and
182
peer attachment to adolescent adjustment. Journal of Youth and
Adolescence 29, 45–59. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005169004882.
Laranjo, J., Bernier, A., Meins, E., & Carlson, S.M. (2014). The roles of maternal mind
mindedness and infant security of attachment in predicting preschoolers'
understanding of visual perspective taking and false belief. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 125, 48-62.
Larsen, R.J., & Diener, E. (1987). Affect intensity as an individual difference
characteristic: A review. Journal of Research in Personality, 21, 1-39.
Lavender, J. M., Tull, M. T., DiLillo, D., Messman-Moore, T., & Gratz, K. L. (2017).
Development and validation of a state-based measure of emotion dysregulation:
The State Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS). Assessment, 24(2),
197–209. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191115601218.
Leary, M.R. (2005). Sociometer theory and the pursuit of relational value: Getting to the
root of self-esteem. European Review of Social Psychology, 16, 75-111.
Leary, M.R. (2021). The need to belong, the sociometer, and the pursuit of relational
value: Unfinished business. Self and Identity, 20(1), 126-143.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2020.1779120.
Leary, M.R., & Baumeister, R.F. (2000). The nature and function of self-esteem:
Sociometer theory. In M.P Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology, (Vol. 32, pp. 1-62). Academic Press.
Leary, M. R., Cottrell, C. A., & Phillips, M. (2001). Deconfounding the effects of
dominance and social acceptance on self-esteem. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 81(5), 898–909. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.898.

183
Leary, M.R., & Leder, S. (2009). The Nature of hurt feelings: Emotional experience and
cognitive appraisals. In A.L Vangelisti (Ed.) Feeling hurt in close relationships,
(pp. 15-33). Cambridge University Press.
Leitner, J.B., Hehman, E., Deegan, M.P., & Jones, J.M. (2014). Adaptive disengagement
buffers self-esteem from negative social feedback. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 40(11), 1435-1450.
Liddell, B.J., & Courtney, B.S. (2018). Attachment buffers the physiological impact of
social exclusion. PLOS ONE, 13(9): Article e0203287.
Luyten, P., & Fonagy, P. (2015). The neurobiology of mentalizing. Personality
Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 6(4), 366-379.
Marganska, A., Gallagher, M., & Miranda, R. (2013). Adult attachment, emotion
dysregulation, and symptoms of depression and generalized anxiety disorder.
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 83(1), 131-141.
McAdams, D. P. (1986). Motivation and friendship. In S. Duck & D. Perlman (Eds.),
Understanding personal relationships: An interdisciplinary approach (pp. 85-
105). Sage.
McDonald, M.M., & Donnellan, M.B. (2012). Is ostracism a strong situation? The
influence of personality in reactions to rejection. Journal of Research in
Personality, 46, 614-618.
McRae, K., Gross, J., Weber, J., Robertson, E., Sokol-Hessner, P., Ray, R., Gabrieli, J.
184
D., & Ochsner, K. (2012). Development of emotion regulation: An fMRI study of
cognitive reappraisal in children, adolescents and young adults. Social Cognitive
and Affective Neuroscience, 7(1), 11–22. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr093.
Mead, N. L., Baumeister, R. F., Stillman, T. F., Rawn, C. D., & Vohs, K. D. (2011).
Social exclusion causes people to spend and consume strategically in the service
of affiliation. Journal of Consumer Research, 37, 902–919.
Meins, E. (1997). Essays in developmental psychology. Security of attachment and the
social development of cognition. Psychology Press/Erlbaum (UK) Taylor &
Francis.
Meins, E., Fernyhough, C., Wainwright, R., Das Gupta, M., Fradley, E., & Tuckey, M.
(2002). Maternal mind-mindedness and attachment security as predictors of
theory of mind understanding. Child Development, 73(6), 1715-1726.
Messman-Moore, T.L., & Brown, A.L. (2006). Risk perception, rape, and sexual
revictimization: A prospective study of college women. Psychology Women
Quarterly, 30, 159-172.
Meyebovsky, M.M., Tabullo, A.J., & Garcia, C.S. (2019). Associations between theory
of mind and emotion regulation in Argentinian adults. Current Psychology,
40(12), 6118-6131. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-019-00539-9.
Meyer, T.J., Miller, M.L., Metzeger, R.L., & Borkovec, T.D. (1990). Development and
validation of the Penn State worry questionnaire. Behavior Research and
Therapy, 28, 487-495.
Mikulincer, M., Dolev, T., & Shaver, P. R. (2004). Attachment-related strategies during
185
thought suppression: Ironic rebounds and vulnerable self-representations. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(6), 940–
956. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.6.940.
Mikulincer, M., Gillath, O., Halevy, V., Avihou, N., Avidan, S., & Eshkoli, N. (2001).
Attachment theory and reaction to others’ needs: Evidence that activation of the
sense of attachment security promotes empathic responses. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology,81(6), 1205-1224.
Mikulincer, M., & Orbach, I. (1995). Attachment styles and repressive defensiveness:
The accessibility and architecture of affective memories. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 68, 917-925.
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2016). Attachment in adulthood: Structure, dynamics,
and change (2nd ed). Guilford Press.
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P.R. (2019). Attachment orientation and emotion regulation.
Current Opinion in Psychology, 25, 6-10.
Miller, J.B. (1996). Social flexibility and anxious attachment. Personal Relationships, 3,
241-256.
Morandotti, N., Brondino, N., Merelli, A., Boldrini, A., De Vidovich, G.Z., Ricciardo, S.,
et al. (2018). The Italian version of the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire:
Validity data for adults and its association with severity of borderline personality
disorder. PLOS ONE, 13(11): Article e0206433.
Muris, P., Meesters, C., van Melick, M., Zwambag, L. (2001). Self-reported attachment
186
style, attachment quality, and symptoms of anxiety and depression in young
adults. Personality and Individual Differences, 30(5), 809-818.
Nakao, T., Takezawa, T., Miyatani, M., & Ohira, H. (2009). Medial prefrontal cortex and
cognitive regulation. Psychologia, 52(2), 93–109.
https://doi.org/10.2117/psysoc.2009.93.
Nazzaro, M.P., Boldrini, T., Tanzilli, A., Muzi, L., Giovanardi, G., & Lingiardi, V.
(2017). Does reflective functioning mediate the relationship between attachment
and personality? Psychiatry Research, 256, 169-175.
Necka, E.A., Cacioppo, S., Norman, G.J., & Cacioppo, J.T. (2016). Measuring the
prevalence of problematic respondent behaviors among MTurk, campus, and
community participants. PLOS ONE, 11(6), e0157732.
Niedeggen, M., Sarauli, N., Cacciola, S., & Weschke, S. (2014). Are there benefits of
social overinclusion? Behavioral and ERP effects in the Cyberball paradigm.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8(935), 1-8. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00935.
Nordgren, L. F., Banas, K., & MacDonald, G. (2011). Empathy gaps for social pain: Why
people underestimate the pain of social suffering. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology,100(1), 120–128. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020938
Oaten, M., Stevenson, R.J., & Case, T.I. (2009). Disgust as a disease-avoidance
mechanism. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 303-321.
Oaten, M., Williams, K.D., Jones, A., & Zadro. L. (2008). The effects of ostracism on
self-regulation in the socially anxious. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology,
27, 471-504.
Olderbak, S., Wilhelm, O., Olaru, G., Geiger, M., Brenneman, M.W., & Roberts, R.D.
187
(2015). A psychometric analysis of the Reading of the Mind in the Eyes test:
Toward a brief form for research and applied settings. Frontiers in Psychology,
6: Article 1503. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01503.
Oschner, K.N., Bunge, S.A., Gross, J.J., & Gabrieli, J.D.E. (2002). Rethinking feelings:
An fMRI study of the cognitive regulation of emotion. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 14(8), 1215-1229.
Paolacci, G., & Chandler, J. (2014). Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as
a participant pool. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(3), 184-188.
Parada-Fernandez, P., Herrero-Fernandez, D., Olivia-Macias, M., & Rohwer, H. (2021).
Analysis of the mediating effect of mentalization on the relationship between
attachment styles and emotion dysregulation. Scandinavian Journal of
Park, J.H., Faulkner, J., & Schaller, M. (2003). Evolved disease-avoidance processes and
contemporary anti-social behavior: Prejudicial attitudes and avoidance of people
with disabilities. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 27, 65-87.
Park, M.K., & Song, H. (2018). Validity of primary screening reflective function
questionnaire for youth in Korean adolescents. Journal of Emotional and
Behavioral Disorders, 32(2), 115-131.
Pascuzzo, K., Cyr, C., & Moss, E. (2013). Longitudinal association between adolescent
attachment, adult romantic attachment, and emotion regulation strategies.
Attachment & Human Development, 15(1), 83-
103, DOI: 10.1080/14616734.2013.745713
Penninx, B.W.J.H., van Tilburg, T., Kriegsman, D.M.W., Deeg, D.J.H., Boeke, A.J.P., &
188
van Eijk, J.T.M. (1997). Effects of social support and personal coping resources
on mortality in older age: The longitudinal aging study Amsterdam. American
Journal of Epidemiology, 146,(6), 510-
519, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a009305.
Pepping, C.A., Davis, P.J., & O’Donovan, A. (2013). Individual differences in
attachment and dispositional mindfulness: The mediating role of emotion
regulation. Personality and Individual Differences, 54, 453-456.
Pereg, D., & Mikulincer, M. (2004). Attachment style and the regulation of negative
affect: Exploring individual differences in mood congruency effects on memory
and judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(1), 67-80.
Pickett, C. L., & Gardner, W. L. (2005). The Social Monitoring System: Enhanced
Sensitivity to Social Cues as an Adaptive Response to Social Exclusion. In K. D.
Williams, J. P.Forgas, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), Sydney symposium of social
psychology series. The social outcast: Ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and
bullying (pp. 213–226). Psychology Press.
Pickett, C. L., Gardner, W. L., & Knowles, M. (2004). Getting a cue: The need to
belong and enhanced sensitivity to social cues. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 30(9), 1095–1107. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203262085
Pietromonaco, P. R., & Barrett, L. F. (2000). The internal working models concept:
What do we really know about the self in relation to others? Review of General
Psychology, 4(2), 155–175. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.4.2.155
Poulsen, J.R., & Carmon, A.F. (2015). Who would do that? A theory-based analysis of
189
narratives of source of family ostracism. The Journal of Social Psychology, 155,
452-470.
Powers, K.E., Wagner, D.D., Norris, C.J., & Heatherton, T.F. (2013). Socially excluded
individuals fail to recruit medial prefrontal cortex for negative social
scenes, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 8(2), 151-
157, https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr079.
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515-526.
doi:10.1017/S0140525X00076512.
Prevost, M., Carrier, M.E., Chowne, G., Zellkowitz, P., Joseph, L., & Gold, I. (2014).
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test: Validation of a French version and
exploration of cultural variations in a multi-ethnic city. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 19, 189-204. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2013.823859.
Rand, D.G., Greene, J.D., & Nowak, M.A. (2012). Spontaneous giving and calculated
greed. Nature, 489, 427-430. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature11467.
Reynolds, K.J., Turner, J.C., Haslam, A., & Ryan, M.K. (2001). The role of personality
and group factors in explaining prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 37, 427–434.
Riva, P. (2016). Emotion regulation following social exclusion: Psychological and
behavioral strategies In P. Riva & J. Eck (Eds.), Social exclusion. (pp. 199-
225). Springer International.
Riva, P., Montali, L., Wirth, J. H., Curioni, S., & Williams, K. D. (2016). Chronic social
190
exclusion and evidence for the resignation stage: An empirical investigation.
Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 34(4), 541-564.
doi:10.1177/0265407516644348.
Romero-Canyas, R., Downey, G., Reddy, K.S., Rodriguez, S., Cavanaugh, T.J., &
Peleyo, R. (2010). Paying to belong: When does rejection trigger ingratiation?
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(5), 802-823.
Rudert, S.C., Hales, A.H., Greifeneder, R., & Williams, K.D. (2017). When silence is not
golden: Why acknowledgement matters even when being excluded. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43, 678-692.
Russell, D.W. (1996). UCLA Loneliness Scale (Version 3): Reliability, validity, and
factor structure. Journal of Personality Assessment, 66, 20-40.
Sacco, D.F., Wirth, J.H., Hugenberg, K., Chen, Z., & Williams, K.D. (2011). The world
in black and white: Ostracism enhances the categorical perception of social
information. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(4), 836-842.
Samson, A. C., Huber, O., & Gross, J. J. (2012). Emotion regulation in Asperger’s
syndrome and high functioning autism. Emotion, 12(4), 659–665.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027975.
Sato, M., Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2018). Effects of social exclusion on effortful control
and mentalizing in relation to borderline personality features. Scientific Reports,
8: Article 14400, doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-32775-7.
Schipper, M., & Petermann, F. (2013). Relating empathy and emotion regulation: Do
deficits in empathy trigger emotion dysregulation? Social Neuroscience, 8(1),
101–107. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2012.761650.
191
Schwarzer, N., Nolte, T., Fonagy, P., & Gingelmaier, S. (2021). Mentalizing and emotion
regulation: Evidence from a nonclinical sample. International Forum of
Psychoanalysis, 30(1), 34-45. https://doi.org/10.1080/0803706X.2021.1873418.
Sethi, N., Moulds, M.L., & Richardson, R. (2013). The role of focus on attention and
reappraisal in prolonging the negative effects of ostracism. Group Dynamics:
Theory, Research, and Practice, 17, 110-123.
Shalchi, B., & Esmaeili, S.M. (2018). Relationship of family functioning, satisfaction of
basic psychological needs and depression considering the mediatory role of
emotion regulation difficulty, Hormozgan Medical Journal, 22(1), 52-61.
Sharp, C., Pane, H., Ha, C., Venta, A., Patel, A., Sturek, J., & Fonagy, P. (2011). Theory
of mind and emotion regulation difficulties in adolescents with borderline traits.
Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 50(6),
563–573. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2011.01.017.
Sharp, C., Ha, C., Carbone, C., Kim, S., Perry, K., Williams, L, & Fonagy, P.
(2013). Hypermentalizing in adolescent inpatients: Treatment effects and
association with borderline traits. Journal of Personality Disorders, 27, 3-18.
https://doi.org/10.1521/pedi.2013.27.1.3
Shaver, P.R., & Mikulincer. M. (2013). Attachment orientations and reactions to
ostracism in close relationships and groups. In N. DeWall (Ed), The Oxford
handbook of social exclusion, (pp. 238-247). Oxford University Press.
Sibley, C.G., Fischer, R. & Liu, J.H. (2005). Reliability and validity of the Revised
Experiences in Close Relationships (ECR-R) Self-Report Measure of Adult
Romantic Attachment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1524-

192
1536.
Silva, C., Soares, I., & Esteves, F. (2012). Attachment insecurity and strategies for
regulation: When emotion triggers attention. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology,
53, 9-16.
Simard, V., & Dandeneau, S. (2018). Revisiting the Cyberball inclusion condition:
Fortifying fundamental needs by making participants the target of specific
inclusion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 74, 38-42.
Skowron, E.A., & Friedlander, M.L. (1998). The differentiation of self-inventory:
Development and initial validation. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 45(3),
235-246.
Skowron, E. A., & Schmitt, T. A. (2003). Assessing interpersonal fusion: Reliability and
validity of a new DSI fusion with others subscale. Journal of Marital and Family
Therapy, 29(2), 209-222.
Slade, A. (2007). Parental reflective functioning: An introduction. Attachment and
Human Development, 7(3), 269-281.
Smart Richman, L., & Leary, M.R. (2009). Reactions to discrimination, stigmatization,
ostracism, and other forms of interpersonal rejection: A multimotive model.
Psychological Review, 116, 365-383.
Smith, E.R., & Semin, G.R. (2004). Socially situated cognition: In its social context.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 53-117.
Spielmann, S. S., Maxwell, J. A., MacDonald, G., & Baratta, P. L. (2013). Don’t get your
193
hopes up: Avoidantly attached individuals perceive lower social reward when
there is potential for intimacy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39,
91–107.
Steele, C., Kidd, D.C., & Castano, E. (2015). On social death: Ostracism and the
accessibility of death thoughts. Death Studies, 39, 19-23.
Stenseng, F., Belsky, J., Skalicka, V., & Wichstrom, L. (2015). Social exclusion predicts
impaired self-regulation: A 2-year longitudinal panel study including the
transition from preschool to school. Journal of Personality, 83, 212-220.
Stevens, F.L. (2014). Affect regulation styles in avoidant and anxious attachment.
Individual Differences Research, 12(3), 123-130.
Stroud, L.R., Tanofsky-Kraff, M.,Wilfley, D.E., & Salovey. P. (2000). The Yale
Interpersonal Stressor (YIPS): affective, physiological, and behavioral responses
to a novel interpersonal rejection paradigm. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 22,
204–13.
Summerville, A., & Chartier, C.R. (2013). Pseudo-dyadic "interaction" on Amazon's
Mechanical Turk. Behavioral Research Methods, 45(1), 116-124.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13428-012-0250-9.
Tabachnick, B.G., & Fidell, L.S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics. (5th ed.). Allyn
and Bacon.
Tajfel, H., Turner, J.C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W.G.
Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social psychology of intergroup
relations. (pp. 33-47). Brooks-Cole.
Taylor, S.E., Lerner, J.S., Sherman, D.K., Sage, R.M, & McDowell, N.K. (2003). Are
194
self-enhancing cognitions associated with healthy or unhealthy biological
profiles? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 605-615.
Thompson, R.A. (1994). Emotion regulation: A them in search of definition. Monographs
of the Society for Research in Child Development, 59(2-3), 25-52.
Tomko, R.L., Solhan, M.B., Carpenter, R. W., Brown, W.C., Jahng, S., & Wood, P.K, &
Trull, T.J. (2014). Measuring impulsivity in daily life: The momentary
impulsivity scale. Psychological Assessment, 26, 339-349.
Twenge, J. M., Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., & Stucke, T. S. (2001). If you can’t join
them, beat them: Effects of social exclusion on aggressive behavior. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1058–1069.
Tyler, J. M. (2008). In the eyes of others: Monitoring for relational value cues. Human
Communication Research, 34, 521–549. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2958.2008. 00331.x.
van Bavel, J.J., Swencionis, J.K., O’Connor, R.C., & Cunningham, W.A. (2012).
Motivational social memory: Belonging needs moderate the own-group bias in
face recognition. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(3), 707-713.
van Beest, I., & Williams, K.D. (2006). When inclusion costs and ostracism pays,
ostracism still hurts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 918-928.
van Beest, I., Williams, K.D., & van Dijk, E. (2011). Cyberbomb: Effects of being
ostracized from a death game. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 14,
581-596.
van Dellen, M., Knowles, M. L., Krusemark, E., Sabet, R. F., Campbell, W., McDowell,
195
J. E., et al. (2012). Trait self-esteem moderates decreases in self-control following
rejection: An information-processing account. European Journal of Personality,
26, 123–132. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.1845.
Vangelisti, A. L., Young, S. L., Carpenter-Theune, K. E., & Alexander, A. L. (2005).
Why does it hurt?: The perceived causes of hurt feelings. Communication
Research, 32(4), 443-477. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650205277319.
van Orden, K. A., Witte, T. K., Gordon, K. H., Bender, T. W., & Joiner, T. E., Jr. (2008).
Suicidal desire and the capability for suicide: Tests of the interpersonal
psychological theory of suicidal behavior among adults. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 76(1), 72–83. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
006X.76.1.72
Vellante, M., Baron-Cohen, S., Melis, M., Marrone, M., Petretto, D.R., Masala, C., &
Preti, A. (2013). The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test: Systematic review of
psychometric properties and a validation study in Italy, Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 18(4), 326-354, DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2012.721728.
Velotti, P., D’Aguanno, M., de Campora, G., Di Francescantonio, S., Garofalo, C.,
Giromini, L., Petrocchi, C., Terrasi, M., & Zavattini, G. C. (2016). Gender
moderates the relationship between attachment insecurities and emotion
dysregulation. South African Journal of Psychology, 46(2), 191–
202. https://doi.org/10.1177/0081246315604582
Waldrip, A. M. (2007). The power of ostracism: Can personality influence reactions to
social exclusion? [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Texas,
Arlington, TX.
196
Wang, H., Braun, C., & Enck, P. (2017). How the brain reacts to social stress (exclusion)
- A scoping review. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 80, 80-88.
Warren, S.L., Huston, L., Egeland, B., Sroufe, L.A. (1997). Child and adolescent anxiety
disorders and early attachment. Journal of the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, 36(5), 637-644.
Wei, M., Vogel, D.L., Ku, T., & Zakalik, R.A. (2005). Adult attachment, affect
regulation, negative mood, and interpersonal problems: The mediating roles of
emotional reactivity and emotional cutoff. Journal of Counseling Psychology,
52(1), 14-24.
Weinbrecht, A., Niedeggen, M., Roepke, S., & Renneberg, B. (2018). Feeling excluded
no matter what? Bias in the processing of social participation in borderline
personality disorder. NeuroImage: Clinical, 19, 343-350.
Wesselmann, E.D., Bagg, D., & Williams, K.D. (2009). “I Feel Your Pain”: The effects
of observing ostracism on the ostracism detection system. Journal of
Wesselmann, E.D., Nairne, J.S. & Williams, K.D. (2012). An evolutionary social
psychological approach to studying the effects of ostracism. Journal of Social,
Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 6, 309-328.
Wesselmann, E.D., Ren, D., Swim, E., & Williams, K.D. (2013). Rumination hinders
recovery from ostracism. International Journal of Developmental Science, 7, 33–
39.
Wharburton, W.A., Williams, K.D., Cairns, D.R. (2006). When ostracism leads to
197
aggression: The moderating effects of control deprivation. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 42(2), 213-220.
White, L.O., Klein, A.M., von Klitzing, K., Graneist, A., Otto, Y., Hill, J., Over, H.,
Fonagy, P., & Crowley, M.J. (2016). Putting ostracism into perspective: Young
children tell more mentalistic stories after exclusion, but not when anxious.
Frontiers in Psychology, 7: Article 1926. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01926.
Wilkowski, B. M., Robinson, M. D., & Friesen, C. K. (2009). Gaze-triggered orienting as
a tool of the belongingness self-regulation system. Psychological Science, 20(4),
495-501. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02321.x.
Williams, K.D. (2001). Ostracism: The power of silence. Guildford Press.
Williams, K.D. (2007). Ostracism. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 425-452.
Williams, K.D. (2009). Ostracism: A temporal need-threat model. Advances in
Williams, K.D., Cheung, C.K.T., Choi, W. (2000). CyberOstracism: Effects of being
ignored over the internet. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 748-
762.
Williams, K.D., Hales, A.H., Michels, C. (2019). Social ostracism as a factor motivating
interest in extreme groups. In S.C. Rudert, R. Greifeneder, & K.D., Williams
(Eds.) Current directions in ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection research.
(pp. 18-31). Routledge.
Williams, K.D., & Nida, S.A. (2011). Ostracism: Consequences and coping. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 20(2), 71-75.
Wirth, J.H., Bernstein, M.J., Wesselman, E.D., & LeRoy, A. (2017). Social cues establish
198
expectations of rejection and affect the response to being rejected. Group
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 20, 32-51.
Wozniak-Prus, M., Gambin, M., Cudo, A., & Sharp, C. (2022). Investigation of the factor
structure of the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ-8): One or two
dimensions? Journal of Personality Assessment, 104(6), 736-746.
Wu, H., Fung, B.J., & Mobbs, D. (2022). Mentalizing during social interaction: The
development and validation of the Interactive Mentalizing Questionnaire.
Frontiers in Psychology, 12: Article 791835.
Yaakobi, E., &Williams, K.D. (2016a). Ostracism and attachment orientation: avoidants
are less affected in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures. British Journal
of Social Psychology, 55, 162-181.
Yaakobi, E., & Williams, K.D. (2016b). Recalling an attachment event moderates distress
after ostracism. European Journal of Personality, 30(3), 258-2783.
Zadro, L., Boland, C., & Richardson, R. (2006). How long does it last? The persistence of
the effects of ostracism in the socially anxious. Journal of Experimental Social
Zadro, L., Williams, K.D., & Richardson, R. (2004). How long can you go? Ostracism by
a computer is sufficient to lower self-reported levels of belonging, control, self-
esteem, and meaningful existence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
40, 560-567.
Zadro, L., Williams, K.D., & Richardson, R. (2005). Riding the “O” train: Comparing the
effects of ostracism and verbal dispute on targets and sources. Group Processes
and Intergroup Relations, 8, 125-143.

199
Appendices
Appendix A
Informed Consent Form
LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY – BROOKLYN
Informed Consent Form for Human Research Subjects
You are being asked to volunteer in a research study called “Social Participation,
Relationships, Thoughts and Feelings about the Self and Others,” conducted by Maria
Poston, M.A. This project will be supervised by Nicholas Papouchis, Ph.D., at Long
Island University in the Brooklyn Campus Psychology Department. The purpose of the
research is to better understand how different social experiences and close relationships
impact our functioning.
As a participant, you will be asked to complete a number of online surveys, participate in

a brief computer game, watch a short movie, and provide some demographic information.
This should take approximately from one to one and a half hours to complete the study.
You are asked to complete this in one sitting. While there are no risks, you may
experience a range of feelings, such as interest, curiosity, anxiety, or frustration, while
responding to the questions in this study. While there is no direct benefit for your
participation in the study, it is reasonable to expect that the results may provide
information of value for the field of psychology. Upon completion of the study, you will
receive $5.00 as compensation for your participation.
Your identity as a participant will remain confidential. Your name will not be included in
any forms, questionnaires, etc. This consent form is the only document identifying you
as a participant in this study; it will be stored in a secure database that is available only to
the investigators. Data collected will be destroyed five years after completion of the
study. Results will be reported only in the aggregate.
Although your IP Address will not be stored in the survey results, there is always the
possibility of tampering from an outside source when using the Internet for collecting
information. While the confidentiality of your responses will be protected once the data is
downloaded from the Internet, there is always the possibility of hacking or other security
breaches that could threaten the confidentiality of your responses.
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You will only be identified by your
Amazon Worker ID#. We will not collect any personally identifiable information. Only
Amazon maintains information on your personal identity and does not share that
information with us. For this work you will receive $5.00.
You understand that you may stop participation at any time. However, you also
understand that consistent with MTurk’s policy you only receive payment if you
200
complete the survey, AND if your participation is deemed adequate (i.e. nonrandom
responding in an appropriate time frame).
You can withdraw from the study at any time by navigating away from the online survey.
By entering my age, I am certifying that I am over 18 years old
MTurk Worker ID#
If you have questions about the research you may contact the student investigator, Maria
Poston, at [email protected], the faculty advisor, Nicholas
Papouchis, Ph.D., at 718-488-1164, or the department chair, Elizabeth Kudadjie-Gyamfi,
Ph.D., at 718-488-1068. If you have questions concerning your rights as a subject, you
may contact the Institutional Review Board Administrator Dr. Lacey Sischo at (516) 299-
3591.
Your participation in this research is voluntary. Refusal to participate (or discontinue

participation) will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled.
By clicking the “Agree to Participate” button below, you are indicating that you have
fully read the above text and have had the opportunity to print the consent form and ask
questions about the purposes and procedures of this study. Clicking this button serves as
your electronic signature agreeing to participate in this study. If you choose not to
participate, please click the “Decline to Participate” button below or simply close your
browser.
I agree to participate ____ /____/____ Date

I decline to participate
201
Appendix B
Debriefing Forms
Long Island University - Brooklyn
Social Participation, Relationships, Thoughts and Feelings about the Self and
Others
Thank you for taking part in this study. The aim of this project is to better understand
how different social experiences and close relationships impact our ability to reflect on
ourselves and others and manage our emotions. You were first asked to provide
demographic information about yourself. Next, you were asked to complete
questionnaires about your understanding of yourself and others, your experiences of close
relationships, and how you manage your emotions. You were then asked to participate in
a ball tossing game. You were told that you will be playing with other participants who
were also logged on at the same time; however, this was not true. Instead, a computer
program controlled the other participants. We did not disclose all relevant information to
you during the study because we were trying to simulate different kinds of social
participation experiences – i.e., exclusion, inclusion, overinclusion. You may have
received the ball the least amount of times, an equal amount of times, or a greater amount
of times than the other players. You were then asked about your experience of the ball
tossing game. Next, you were asked to again complete a questionnaire about how you
manage emotions. Finally, you watched a short film and were asked about what the
characters in the film were thinking and feeling. This type of research relies on your
participation and we thank you for your efforts. To ensure that each participant has the
same amount of information about the study when they participate, we ask that you not
share details of this study with others. Your cooperation in this matter is necessary for
quality results and is greatly appreciated. We hope this experience has helped you to
develop an understanding of one way that psychologists conduct research.
Any questions about this study can be addressed to Maria Poston at

[email protected]. Also, in answering these questions, individuals
sometimes have an emotional reaction to the themes discussed, gain a better
understanding of themselves, and develop insight into their own behavior, which
sometimes prompts people to seek therapy. To find mental health resources and/or crisis
services in your area, we suggest the following
website: http://www.iasp.info/resources/index.php/Crisis_Centres/
Thank you again for taking part in this study!

The Impact of Social Participation and Attachment Styles On Menta

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Impact of Social Participation and Attachment Styles On Menta

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Impact of Social Participation and Attachment Styles On Menta

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Long Island University

Digital Commons @ LIU

Selected Full-Text Dissertations 2020- LIU Brooklyn

The impact of social participation and attachment styles on

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liu.edu/brooklyn_fulltext_dis

Part of the Psychology Commons

MENTALIZING AND EMOTION REGULATION IN ADULTS LIVING IN THE

MARIA POSTON, M.A.

A DOCTORAL DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY OF

THE SCHOOL OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS OF LONG ISLAND UNIVERISTY IN

PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY SPONSORING COMMITTEE:

________________________________ Nicholas Papouchis, Ph.D., ABPP

Philip S. Wong, Ph.D.

Professor and Director _____________________________

Ph.D. Program in Clinical Psychology Kevin B. Meehan, Ph.D.

DATE Lisa Wallner Samstag, Ph.D.

investigate how the interaction of different social participation conditions (ostracism,

overinclusion, inclusion) and attachment styles impact two regulatory mechanisms,

specifically, mentalizing capacities and emotion regulation. Adult participants were

regulatory mechanisms. Specifically, in the ostracism condition, anxious attachment was

modulate emotional/behavioral responses and lack of emotional clarity. In the inclusion

exploratory study demonstrated how different aspects of dispositional mentalizing

mediate the relationship between attachment and emotion regulation. Specifically,

difficulties, and this was mediated by dispositional uncertainty of mental states.

the importance of improving construct validity in the self-report measure of dispositional

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the members of my committee,

curiosity about me as a person on interview day. You have continued to model a

me on to the finish line!

identity and style as a clinician.

Last, but most certainly not least, I am immensely grateful to my family,

and inspire me to live fully!

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... iii

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ v

List of Tables .............................................................................................................. viii

List of Figures ................................................................................................................ix

Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 5

Temporal Framework ............................................................................................ 12

Attachment and Social Participation ...................................................................... 18

Attachment and Mentalization ............................................................................... 23

Ostracism and Mentalization .................................................................................. 25

Mentalization Measures ......................................................................................... 30

Emotion Regulation ................................................................................................... 36

Ostracism and Emotion Regulation ........................................................................ 36

Overinclusion and Regulatory Mechanisms ........................................................... 39

Attachment and Emotion Regulation...................................................................... 44

Emotion Regulation Measures ............................................................................... 49

Mentalization and Emotion Regulation .................................................................. 51

CHAPTER III ............................................................................................................... 57

Statement of the Problem............................................................................................... 57

Main Study Variable List ........................................................................................... 63

Independent Variable ............................................................................................. 63

Moderating Variable .............................................................................................. 64

Dependent Variable ............................................................................................... 64

Main Hypotheses ....................................................................................................... 66

Exploratory Study Variable List ................................................................................ 67

Independent Variable ............................................................................................. 67

Mediating Variable ................................................................................................ 67

Dependent Variable ............................................................................................... 67