Andonova, Et Al. (2010) The Rescaling of Global Environmental Politics

The Rescaling of Global
Environmental Politics
Liliana B. Andonova1 and Ronald B. Mitchell2
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resourc. 2010.35:255-282. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
1
Department of Political Science, Graduate Institute of International and Development
by University of Geneva - Observatoire on 11/09/10. For personal use only.
Studies, Geneva 21, 1211, Switzerland; email: [email protected]

2
Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403-1284;
email: [email protected]
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2010. 35:255–82 Key Words

First published online as a Review in Advance on governance, international, linked issues, networks, scale
July 12, 2010
The Annual Review of Environment and Resources Abstract

is online at environ.annualreviews.org
In the past half-century, the practice and study of global environmental
This article’s doi: politics and governance have been dramatically rescaled. They have be-
10.1146/annurev-environ-100809-125346
come increasingly complex and interconnected with respect to the level
Copyright c 2010 by Annual Reviews. (between local and global) at which they take place, the range of actors
All rights reserved
engaged in them, and the linkages between them and nominally nonen-
1543-5938/10/1121-0255$20.00 vironmental issues. Global environmental politics and governance have
been rescaled vertically down toward provincial and municipal gov-
ernments and up toward supranational regimes. They have also been
rescaled horizontally across regional and sectoral organizations and net-
works and across new issues, such as development, security, and trade
among others. This rescaling reflects shifts in the magnitude, com-
plexity, and interconnectedness of the global environmental problems
humans face as well as epistemological shifts in how humans understand
and respond to these problems, and rescaling has implications for both
the practice and study of global environmental politics.
255
connections both among ecological compo-
Contents nents and between the ecosphere and the
anthroposphere, in coupled human-natural
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
systems (3). Environmental problems previ-
RESCALING THE
ously seen as independent of each other are
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
increasingly seen by practitioners and scholars
REALM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
alike as having multiple interdependent causes
RESCALING THE
and needing coordinated and integrated forms
TRANSNATIONAL REALM . . . . . 261
of social organization and institutions for
Nongovernmental Organizations
effective resolution. An international sphere
and Transnational Advocacy
dominated by interactions among nation-states
Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
has been replaced by one in which international
Multinational Corporations and
organizations, substate governments, scientists,

Transnational Business
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
multinational corporations play major roles.
Individual Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

We seek to describe and explain this “rescaling”
Localizing and Regionalizing
of global environmental politics as an ever more
Global Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
complex and interconnected phenomenon.
RESCALING ACROSS
The literature on environmental gover-
ISSUE AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
nance has increasingly emphasized the impor-
Environment and Development. . . . . 265
tance of scale, with particular attention to the
Environment and Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
ecological and institutional linkages across the
Environment and Security . . . . . . . . . . 268
scales at which environmental problems occur
EXPLAINING THE RESCALING
and are addressed (4–11). Humans address
OF GLOBAL
environmental challenges at local and global
ENVIRONMENTAL
scales with nested systems of environmental
POLITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
governance institutions that must address the
Magnitude and Complexity of
vertical and horizontal interplay across scales
Environmental Problems . . . . . . . . 270
and processes of governance (5, 12). Given the
Globalization and
spatial and temporal complexity of human-
Interconnectedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
environment interactions that affect earth
Denser Institutionalization . . . . . . . . . 272
systems, the appropriate scale and locus for en-
Rescaling of Scholarship. . . . . . . . . . . . 273
vironmental governance are subject to political
CONCLUSION: A NEW GLOBAL
contestation, social construction, variable ge-
ENVIRONMENTAL
ography, and institutional adaptation (4, 7, 8).
PLURALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Studies of globalization have highlighted
that global governance has been rescaled away
from the nation-state in multiple directions:
vertically down toward provincial and munici-
Global INTRODUCTION pal governments, vertically up toward suprana-
environmental
The practice and study of global environmental tional regimes, and horizontally across regional
politics: realm where
actors pursue their politics and global environmental governance and sectoral organizations and networks (13,
interests through have expanded dramatically in numerous 14). The complexity of human-environment
contestation, dimensions since the 1960s. Hundreds of systems has been recognized as both an essen-
collaboration, and environmental problems have been identified tial facet of the contemporary thickening of
discourse using power,
and addressed at the international level (1, 2). globalization and a factor that necessitates re-
authority, and
organizational abilities International environmental problems are considering the nature of governance responses
increasingly understood as entailing numerous (7, 15). The multiscale nature of environmental
256 Andonova · Mitchell

governance has been reinforced both by the creasing the number of environmental issues re-
nature of environmental problems and by ceiving attention (20–22).
efforts at global environmental governance by Figure 1 highlights in bold lines the tradi-
Global
transgovernmental networks of NGOs and tional focus of international relations on the in- environmental
community organizations, by private corpo- teractions among states and intergovernmental governance: the
rations and foundations, and by increasing organizations (IGOs). norms, rules, laws,
numbers of transnational partnerships between We distinguish politics and governance as expectations, and
structures established
state and nonstate actors (16–19). separate analytical categories to disentangle the
to guide behavior
Recognizing the multilevel nature of global dynamics of continuity and change within each, according to a set of
environmental governance, this article shifts despite their intimate connection in practice. public purposes
the analytic focus toward the rescaling of We view global environmental politics as the NGO:
the political processes that shape institutional realm in which actors engage in contestation, nongovernmental
structures. We analyze the rescaling of environ- collaboration, and discourse, using the power, organization
mental politics to highlight substantial changes authority, and organizational abilities at their Scales: the levels at
in the practice and scholarship of global envi- disposal to pursue their interests with respect which phenomena and
ronmental politics over the past several decades, to environmental issues. Defined thus, politics societal organization
occur
including the rise of transnational activism, the is distinct from global governance and institu-
emergence of green business interests, the con- tions defined as the norms, rules, laws, expec- Regime: a governance
system, affecting more
testation and reconciliation between environ- tations, and structures established to guide be-
than one country, for a
mental and economic policies, and the increas- havior with respect to specified public purposes specific issue area
ing efforts at coordination among international (see Reference 23).
Horizontal rescaling:
organizations. We examine three dimensions of this rescal- increasing linkages
Building on Young (5, p. 27), we define ing of global environmental politics. We first between actors and
rescaling as a shift in the locus, agency, and review the intergovernmental realm of environ- environmental issues
scope of global environmental politics and gov- mental politics and international cooperation that cross traditional
boundaries between
ernance across scales, with scales understood as and their rescaling to reflect the interplay of
jurisdictions,
the various ecological and social levels at which domestic and international politics; the role of institutions, sectors,
environmental problems and societal efforts to epistemic communities and nonstate actors on and actor groups
address them occur. We examine both vertical the intergovernmental arena; and the vertical Vertical rescaling:
and horizontal rescaling. Vertical rescaling in- interactions between subnational, national, shifting or linking of
volves the shifting or linking of political action and supranational arenas of environmental political action across
across geographical space or jurisdictions from politics. We then focus on the transnational geographical space
and/or jurisdictions
the local to the global. Horizontal rescaling in- realm of environmental politics, examining the
from the local to the
volves increases in the number and types of horizontal rescaling triggered by the explosion global level
(a) actors and networks engaged in political ac- in the number and type of nonstate actors
tivity on a given issue, (b) linkages actors make involved in global environmental politics—
among environmental issue areas, and (c) con- and the transnational networks among such
nections and coordination among actors that actors—as well as the vertical rescaling that
bridge traditional boundaries between jurisdic- these actors and networks generate by linking
tions, institutions, sectors, and actor groups. local and global concerns, interests, and strate-
Although analytically distinct, vertical and hor- gies. We follow this section by examining the
izontal rescalings often overlap and interact. interplay between environmental degradation
For example, the rise of transnational advocacy and the politics of international development,
movements has generated an increased linkage free trade, and security, which exemplify
of politics vertically across geographical and the horizontal rescaling that is taking place
jurisdictional levels as well as horizontally by across numerous issues, including agriculture,
populating global environmental politics with consumption, gender, health, migration,
denser networks of more diverse actors and in- and social justice. We then argue that the
www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 257

Vertical scale
IGO 1 IGO n
Multinational Multinational Supranational

com pan y 1 c omp any n level
International International
NGO 1 NGO n
State 1 State n
National business National business National

company 1 company n level
National NGO 1 National NGO n
Local government 1 Local government n

Subnational
Local NGO 1 Local NGO n level
Local business Local business

organization 1 organization n
Individual 1 Individual n
Horizontal scale
Figure 1
Dimensions of global environmental politics rescaling. Bold lines show the traditional focus of international relations. Dotted arrows
identify interactions across the multiple scales at which environmental action occurs and the rescaling of global environmental politics
away from interactions among states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to encompass the myriad of political actors that
operate across vertical and horizontal scales of jurisdictions, space, issues, and organizational domains. The notations 1 to n seek to
capture the multiplicity of actors interplaying horizontally and vertically. NGO, nongovernmental organization.
rescaling of environmental politics reflects rescaling for the practice and study of global
both an ontological shift driven by increasingly environmental politics.
interdependent countries facing increasingly
complex and interconnected environmental
problems and an epistemological shift driven RESCALING THE
by scholars studying global environmental INTERGOVERNMENTAL REALM
politics with increasingly interdisciplinary and Diplomats were conducting global environ-
diverse theoretical frameworks. We conclude mental politics and diplomacy long before re-
by briefly examining the implications of this searchers started studying it. Contrary to the

conventional wisdom that international envi- wasteland” (28). Several people, including the
ronmental governance began with the 1972 Sprouts, Falk, Caldwell, and others, analyzed
United Nations Conference on the Human the issues raised at UNCHE (29–32). UNCHE
UNCHE: United
Environment (UNCHE), antecedents to what itself became a watershed for rescaling environ- Nations’ Conference
we now call environmental problems were on mental politics upward to the global level and on the Human
the international agenda as early as the four- intellectually toward greater academic interest Environment
teenth century. Scores of bilateral fisheries in the global and human dimensions of environ- Rescaling
treaties existed before 1800, and starting in mental change (33). The small group of scholars environmental
1900, countries were signing treaties to estab- that began focusing on international environ- politics: shifts in the
locus, agency, and
lish nature preserves and protect endangered mental politics in the 1970s expanded in the
scope of global
species, to address excessive sealing in the Arctic 1980s (34–38). environmental politics
and North Pacific, to contain invasive species in The end of the Cold War and the 1992 UN and governance across
the form of contagious animal diseases and wine Conference on Environment and Development different scales
parasites, and to reduce conflicts over the diver- (UNCED) enhanced the political and intellec- UNCED: UN
sion and distribution of river water (24, p. 608; tual importance of international environmental Conference on
25, 26). By 1950, governments had signed ad- issues. Articles on international environmental Environment and
Development
ditional conventions that, inter alia, addressed politics became more common in mainstream
endangered species, threats to migratory birds, international relations journals, journals ded-
transboundary river pollution, the use of lead in icated to the issues were launched, and sev-
paint, whaling, and many international fisheries eral presses began concerted efforts to publish
(2, 27). sole-authored and edited books dedicated to
Since 1950, international environmental the issues (39–43). A new cohort of researchers
problems and intergovernmental attempts to sought to identify the conditions under which
resolve them have continued to increase. international environmental problems arise and
Fisheries, river management, and endangered intergovernmental regimes are formed and are
species remain important problems. Interna- effective in responding to them (44–47).
tional cooperation to protect individual species Most early literature on international
gradually rescaled to address both a wider range environmental regimes focused on intergov-
of species and the importance of habitat pro- ernmental politics, reflecting the dominant
tection. Numerous forms of ocean, river, and role of the state in the international arena and
lake pollution were taken up in global and re- in the epistemology of international relations
gional frameworks. Countries took up nuclear theories. Pathbreaking work by Young (37,
energy, radioactive pollution from nuclear test- 41) emphasized the role of states’ structural
ing, and nuclear accidents in the early 1960s and bargaining power in shaping collaborative
and again in the 1980s. The intergovernmen- outcomes, as well as the role of ideas and
tal environmental agenda continued to expand knowledge as sources of influence in regime
to include air pollution in the 1970s, strato- formation. Scholars in the neoliberal institu-
spheric ozone depletion in the 1980s, and cli- tionalist tradition examined the interactions
mate change, biodiversity loss, and desertifica- between environmental leader and laggard
tion in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By the states and the role of institutionalized commit-
late twentieth century, countries were negoti- ments, information, and issue linkages between
ating an average of 80 multilateral and bilat- environmental problems and “high politics”
eral environmental agreements, protocols, and concerns, such as the U.S.-Soviet détente, or
amendments per year (2). between the environment, democratization,
Scholars began studying such global envi- and development (39, 44, 46, 48). Con-
ronmental politics in the 1970s, in the wake structivist analyses identified how discourse,
of growing environmental concern. Kennan knowledge diffusion, and consensus building
called in 1970 for the prevention of a “world influence how people and institutions frame,

understand, and respond to environmental China and India at the December 2009 Copen-
problems (38, 45). Despite their differences, hagen negotiations reemphasized the need to
however, most researchers focused on the take account of material power, interests, and
power, interactions, institutions, knowledge normative claims for fairness of developing
diffusion, and discourse among nation-states. countries, factors that had often been ignored
More recently, however, the study of envi- by prior researchers.
ronmental politics has evolved. Scholars began The study of international environmental
to examine how various substate and nonstate politics has also been rescaled to pay greater
actors—including scientists, the media, NGOs, attention to the influence of domestic polit-
and subnational governments—influence in- ical factors on institutional effectiveness and
ternational negotiations (38, 49–51). The field change, with evidence from the problems of
began paying greater attention to methodolog- acid rain in Europe, whaling, species protec-
ical issues (52, 53). Databases allowing quan- tion, and climate change (49, 50, 54, 70, 71).
titative studies were developed to complement Analyses of the politics of global climate and
the extensive case studies that had dominated water governance illuminated significant down-
the subfield (2, 54, 55), and critical debates ward vertical rescaling, with the recognition of
among scholars began to emerge (56, 57). subnational entities (e.g., provinces and cities)
Analyses of regime implementation and ef- as both loci of and actors in global environmen-
fectiveness opened the box of domestic politics tal politics (8, 21, 51).
to explain variation in regime performance Upward vertical rescaling to supranational
across countries and over time. Investigators institutions has been foregrounded by the lit-
began seeing and capturing the interplay erature on regional integration, particularly
between the domestic and international levels. with respect to the European Union where
Contrary to game theoretic and rational choice multiscale political processes have produced
predictions, countries often complied with a dense web of environmental policies and
environmental treaties, and noncompliance regulations. Intergovernmental bargaining be-
frequently reflected lack of capacity rather than tween European states and changes in domes-
intention (58–60). Some compliance was rec- tic concerns have resulted in the export, con-
ognized as potentially attributable to nontreaty vergence, and rescaling of national regulatory
factors, including least-common-denominator norms and practices to the European Union
commitments requiring no meaningful policy level (72). Transnational coalitions of states, ex-
change, exogenous policy or economic changes perts, and corporate and nongovernmental ac-
that generated unintended environmental tors and their interactions with supranational
benefits, and the treaty-independent mobiliza- institutions, such as the European Commission
tion of domestic environmental concern (39, and the European Court of Justice, have in-
48, 60–62). But researchers also recognized fluenced regional regulatory processes substan-
that institutional rules and mechanisms could tially, as seen in the diffusion of stronger chemi-
prompt key domestic actors to act in ways cal safety and climate policies (70, 73, 74). Over
that prompted national compliance with time, the European Union has become an im-
international regulations (44, 63, 64). portant actor in its own right, reflecting the col-
Scholars have highlighted that developing lective preferences and normative leadership of
countries, as well as industrialized countries, its member states.
play an important role in international environ- An important debate also emerged over the
mental affairs (65–67). Research and scholarly virtues of scaling up and integrating the organic
debates have highlighted the variation in and distributed structure of international envi-
environmental impacts across developing and ronmental problems and institutions toward a
industrialized states and increasingly among more unified and centralized World Environ-
developing states (67–69). The central role of ment Organization (WEO). Advocates have

argued that a WEO would reduce redundancy of a greater diversity of actors. The next section
and overlap; would more efficiently use the lim- discusses the transnationalization of environ-
ited financial, administrative, and institutional mental politics as a mode of horizontal rescal-
WTO: World Trade
resources available for international environ- ing that cuts across state jurisdictions and blurs Organization
mental protection; and would more effectively traditional distinctions between domestic and
counterbalance the World Trade Organization international politics.
(WTO) (16, 75). Others have argued that a
centralized and state-centric WEO would un-
dermine the benefits that the rescaling of global RESCALING THE
environmental governance has generated by TRANSNATIONAL REALM
creating “a new complex, decentralized inter- The horizontal rescaling of global environmen-
national governance system [in which] more ac- tal politics has been most obvious in the grow-
tors now engage in more governance functions ing density and influence of transnational orga-
at multiple levels of governance” (76, p. 13). nizations and networks of NGOs, multinational
Interest in the influence of science and sci- corporations, individuals, scientists, and others
entists on international environmental cooper- whose political activities transcend the state.
ation prompted another form of rescaling. A Transnational relations—cross-border political
dynamic and interactive process exists between interactions that skirt the foreign policy appa-
scientists and policy makers: Policy makers may ratus of the state—are not new phenomena,
turn to scientists and epistemic communities to but growth in trade, communication, trans-
identify the nature of the problem and to ad- portation, and other forms of interdependence
dress whether, when, and what type of action to have amplified their influence (83). This sec-
take but may also seek them out to support pre- tion examines how recent trends in democra-
existing positions, as an instrument of policy- tization, globalization, communication, and in-
making strategy (38, 49, 50). Scientists and the ternational cooperation have prompted efforts
global environmental assessments they produce to better understand the role that transnational
can keep attention focused on an issue and re- actors play in global environmental politics.
inforce an existing framing of that issue or, al-
ternatively, can change the framing of an issue
when current frames are seen “as barriers to ef- Nongovernmental Organizations and
fectively addressing problems on their agendas” Transnational Advocacy Networks
(77, p. 190; see also 45, 63, 78). International NGOs and networks of NGOs
Finally, the international environmental now occupy “center stage” in the study of
politics literature gradually reflected the impor- transnational politics. The 1970s saw a shift
tant role nongovernmental actors play in iden- in the level of international engagement by
tifying and drawing attention to environmen- environmental NGOs, marked most notably
tal problems, pressing for intergovernmental with respect to the whaling issue where vari-
action, and promoting intergovernmental ous NGOs adopted a range of tactics—lobbying
agreement (51, 79–81). That literature also in- powerful governments, staffing delegations of
creasingly focused on how multinational cor- less powerful ones, engaging the news me-
porations can circumvent or undermine efforts dia, mobilizing politically, and, on a few oc-
at environmental protection among, and some- casions, taking direct action such as scuttling
times even within, states (82). whaling ships—to reframe whales as sentient
The recognition of the role of nonstate ac- mammals rather than a source of protein (84,
tors in intergovernmental politics, institutions, 85). Transnational NGOs’ campaigns in many
and domestic implementation proved to be only other arenas built on and developed these tac-
the tip of the iceberg in the rescaling of environ- tics to influence the agenda and the framing
mental politics to acknowledge the importance of the problems of acid rain, biodiversity, large

dams, hazardous waste, marine pollution, and developing certification systems for fish and
ozone depletion (21, 39, 63). forest products (18). Environmental groups
As NGOs have increased in number and in have brought transnational legal cases in var-
the sophistication of their strategies, they have ious countries to halt corporate environmental
also received more concerted analytic and pub- harms in other countries. And NGO pressures
lic attention. The 3,000 extant international on multinational corporations have led to adop-
NGOs in 1970 had become 20,000 by 2005 tion of more environmentally friendly policies
(86). And these groups were increasingly ac- at home but also to multiplier effects when those
tive in global environmental governance, with corporations enforce those policies in their for-
the 170 NGOs at the UNCHE (1972) becom- eign offices and throughout their supply and
ing 1,400 at UNCED (1992) and 8,000 at the investment chains (18, 93–97).
World Summit on Sustainable Development
(2002). NGOs are often quite adept at mo-

bilizing vertically (from local to global) and Multinational Corporations and
horizontally (across countries). A proposal by Transnational Business Associations
Conservation International’s Lovejoy in 1984 Although NGOs rarely deserve exclusive

prompted numerous debt-for-nature swaps in credit for corporate adoption of environmental
which developing country governments pro- behaviors, NGO norm entrepreneurship and
tected natural habitats in exchange for NGOs— diffusion have been an important factor in the
and later foreign governments—purchasing or rescaling of corporate environmental politics.
writing off their international debt obliga- Corporate policy changes reflect the interac-
tions (87, 88). Other initiatives of transnational tion of NGO pressures with other concerns
NGOs have included government-private sec- (98). Although corporations may only adopt
tor collaborations in bioprospecting, payment environmental policies that are economically
for ecological services, and, most recently, car- beneficial, they often do so only after NGO
bon offset initiatives. pressures lead them to reevaluate, in new ways,
Scholars also highlighted the influence of the benefits of improved environmental prac-
“global civil society” as a source of pressure tices. Many business sectors face various pres-
within countries, across borders, and inter- sures to become “greener,” including consumer
nationally (89, 90). NGOs based in a single demand, environmental regulations, manage-
country and international NGOs can foster rial ethics, and aesthetic concerns (97, 99,
environmental protection by providing critical 100).
resources, e.g., information, legal analyses, and NGOs also can induce companies to adopt
financing, not available to local activists (67). a logic of appropriateness in which proenvi-
Transnational networks allow local NGOs ronmental behavior becomes the “right thing
to pressure international institutions in ways to do” even when economically costly (101).
that can lead national governments to improve During a norm emergence stage, NGOs try to
local environmental conditions in a boomerang convince companies to become leaders who are
effect, as illustrated in efforts to halt large greener than their corporate competitors, with
infrastructure projects that would have gener- potential first mover economic advantages (102,
ated pollution or endangered biodiversity or p. 895). In a second norm cascade stage, com-
indigenous rights (20, 91, 92). panies face “a combination of pressure for con-
Nongovernmental actors and networks have formity, a desire to enhance international le-
also targeted corporations, using strategies such gitimation, and the desire . . . to enhance their
as naming and shaming to respond to en- self-esteem” (102, p. 895). This “don’t be a
vironmental accidents, such as oil spills; us- laggard” stage arises when enough companies
ing consumer boycotts and labeling campaigns, have adopted environmental behaviors that it
such as those involving dolphin-safe tuna; and becomes socially costly not to engage in that

behavior (103, 104). This logic explains, at least practices across industrialized, developing, and
in part, the politics of differential uptake and transition countries (70, 93).
diffusion of corporate social responsibility prac- The climate change arena highlights the
WBCSD: World
tices as well as voluntary environmental targets multifaceted and multiscale nature of corporate Business Council of
and management standards (17, 93, 95, 99, 105– environmental politics. The disbanding of the Sustainable
107). Global Climate Coalition symbolized the end Development
Even without NGO pressure, multinational of business politics en bloc and was followed
corporations have helped rescale environmen- by unprecedented splits in the climate change
tal politics across borders because of their sen- strategies of different sectors and companies.
sitivity to consumer concerns in a context of Although some companies continue to lobby
increasing integration into and dependency on against climate regulation, others have adopted
global markets (99, 108). Environmental regu- and achieved voluntary carbon reductions, pro-
lation in large markets, particularly the United moted the transfer of renewable technologies,
States and the European Union, creates incen- organized national and regional carbon off-
tives for multinationals either to oppose regu- set initiatives, and called for governments to
lation or to have such regulations adopted in- take more concerted action on climate change
ternationally to level the playing field (109). (96, 111).
“Trading up” can occur when companies, oper- Multiple analytical perspectives have been
ating in countries with lax environmental reg- used to shed light on the implications of the
ulations, produce to the standards required for rescaling of corporate strategies for the envi-
access to the markets of countries with demand- ronment. Some analyses emphasize the abil-
ing regulations (70, 110). ity of corporate interests to use voluntarism,
Even in the absence of regulation, many green marketing, and similar strategies to con-
major corporations have altered their environ- solidate their influence and shape the future
mental management, energy profiles, and po- direction of environmental policies (111–113).
litical strategies, including establishing corpo- The greening business literature has illumi-
rate carbon-neutral goals, packaging carbon nated economic arguments for environmental
offsets with products to attract customers, and sustainability and transnational engagement to
purchasing large amounts of renewable en- explain differences in environmental business
ergy. Such initiatives reflect the influence of strategies within sectors, across sectors, and
increasingly dense networks of business asso- across countries (97, 99, 105, 106). And other
ciations and initiatives promoting renewable scholars have highlighted the political econ-
technologies, offsets, and other climate miti- omy of transnational corporate organizations
gation practices, rather than isolated company and its implications for global, regional, and
strategies. Business associations, such as the national environmental regulation and for the
World Business Council of Sustainable Devel- diffusion of voluntary environmental practices
opment (WBCSD), the International Chamber across scales and markets (17, 70, 106, 110).
of Commerce, the International Business Lead-
ers Forum, and the World Economic Forum,
have developed and promoted green business Individual Action
ideologies and collective guidelines whose im- Transnational environmental politics also have
pacts can be wide-ranging because they often been rescaled by the growing visibility and
involve commitments to altering practices at all significance of the actions of individuals. Many
points in a company’s supply chain. Often cor- movements that have developed into transna-
porations that see proenvironment actions as tional networks began through individuals’
worthwhile but costly support such collective efforts to organize locally against socially de-
efforts as mechanisms for mitigating compar- structive environmental abuses. Chico Mendes,
ative disadvantage by spreading environmental Wangari Maathai, Ken Saro Wiwa, and many

less famous activists in developing countries try, and by governments all over the globe”
have sought to increase awareness of local (117, p. 184) that contribute to environmental
environmental problems with global sources degradation but also can promote environmen-
and to prompt action to avert them. The efforts tal protection.
and ideas of such individuals have been scaled
up through transnational networks, profoundly
influencing the normative and organizational Localizing and Regionalizing
context of global environmental politics. Savvy Global Politics
individual leadership at the international The proliferation of transnational networks has
level—such as former UN Environmental Pro- helped localize global issues, globalize local is-
gramme (UNEP) Director Mostafa Tolba’s sues, and organize collective action across levels
skill at offering initiatives at critical political of politics. This tendency is visible with respect
junctures—has fostered both the pace and rigor to issues such as fresh water, forestry, biodi-
with which countries pursued environmental versity, and climate change. Each of these are-
treaties (114). Maurice Strong, chair of the nas has a significant global dimension, and yet
UNCED, and Stephan Schmidheiny, founder their exploitation is often local or regional in
of the WBCSD, played powerful roles in nature and highly dependent on the interplay
bringing business into global environmental of local and global factors. Failures to address
politics and promoting green business ideolo- crises associated with localized global resources
gies. The granting of the Nobel Peace Prize are due, at least in part, to a political and aca-
to Wangari Matthai, Muhammad Yunus, and demic preoccupation with intergovernmental
Albert Gore celebrates the difference a single politics that, until recently, has inadequately
individual can make in scaling up innovative understood the multiscale nature and inter-
ideas and environmental concern across space, dependencies of various resources and their
jurisdictions, cultures, and generations. exploitation (6, 8, 10).
Individuals also play a role as the targets of The literature on water, for example, has
transnational networks, whether as consumers clarified the importance of multiple actors and
and citizens or as members of households, networks, including local communities; pri-
communities, or professional groups. NGOs vate actors; subnational governments (8, 118);
inform individuals of the environmental conse- transnational epistemic communities (119); re-
quences of their behaviors to prompt changes in gional organizations (120); and crosscutting
those behaviors. NGO Web sites provide car- processes of conflict, deliberation, and cooper-
bon footprint calculators and try to motivate ation. Supranational and transnational regional
action with lists of actions to reduce your foot- politics have also influenced the protection of
print. Individual demand for carbon offsets and river basins, regional seas, and other water re-
individual entrepreneurship, driven by a com- sources (38, 120, 121).
bination of personal beliefs, NGO campaigns, Urban management is another local issue
and corporate advertising, have grown carbon that is affected by global environmental prob-
offset markets more quickly than institutional lems and, increasingly, has impacts on global
and investment incentives alone would predict political action. Many cities have programs
(115, 116). These campaigns take advantage of to reduce their waste disposal streams, to re-
the fact that people’s incentives and normative duce water usage and improve water quality,
commitments differ in ways that lead some to to reduce air pollutants, and to manage urban
take actions that others consider as counter to growth. Such programs can be motivated by
their self-interest (11). Thus, it is not only the economic concerns, environmental concerns,
individual environmental actions of prominent or both. In the realm of climate change, the
activists but also the “uncountable, independent International Council for Local Environmen-
decisions in daily life by individuals, by indus- tal Initiatives (ICLEI) has coordinated such

efforts, getting many municipal governments acknowledged that environmental problems
to adopt greenhouse gas emission reduction have crucial implications for other issue ar-
strategies even though such actions are often eas and that developments in other areas have
costly, have miniscule effects on greenhouse important implications for the environment.
gas concentrations, and exceed national regu- Here, we examine connections with develop-
latory requirements (122). Developing a dense ment, trade, and security as examples of the in-
transnational network of municipalities already terconnections between environmental politics
committed to addressing climate change has al- and an increasingly wide range of issues, such
lowed ICLEI and other networks of cities to as agriculture, gender, health, migration, social
extend their influence for climate change by justice, indigenous peoples, and population.
consolidating political legitimacy and author-
ity and leveraging financial and informational
Environment and Development
resources (123, 124).

Transnational networks linking public offi- The World Commission on Environment and
cials and subnational units of government also Development (the Brundtland Commission)
have been central to regional and global ini- visibly and explicitly rescaled global environ-
tiatives for environmental problems. Especially mental issues by reframing economic develop-
in countries with national governments reluc- ment and environmental protection as neces-
tant to take action, subnational governmental sarily interconnected (126). The Commission
units have organized transnationally to take ac- developed and popularized the view that de-
tion, as evident in American and Russian sub- velopment and environmental protection are
national and regional initiatives to promote and “complementary goods,” arguing that tradi-
coordinate climate mitigation and adaptation tional forms of development degrade the en-
strategies (64, 125). Nor is such transnational vironment but also that environmental degra-
coordination of subnational governments new: dation threatens economic development (126,
Provinces, states, länder, cantons, and other p. 37). But much of their report is a normative
governmental units have signed transborder argument that economic development should
agreements to address shared environmental take account of environmental quality and that
problems for decades (2). certain “strategic imperatives” exist with re-
Transnational actors, associations, markets, spect to environment and development poli-
networks, and even individuals are, in sum, es- cies (126, p. 49). Indeed, the Commission and
sential elements of the rescaling of environ- Agenda 21, the main programmatic document
mental politics into a multiactor, multidimen- adopted by states at the UNCED, sought to fos-
sional domain. They are, in many respects, the ter extensive rescaling across issue areas, linking
political “transmission belts” connecting local, environmental protection, inter alia, to devel-
regional, and global scales and creating new opment, poverty, the plight of indigenous peo-
transnational domains of political action. ples, energy policy, and urbanization (126, 127).
Such broad rescaling has been paralleled
by institution-specific rescaling with respect
RESCALING ACROSS to the World Bank and other multilateral
ISSUE AREAS development institutions. By the late 1980s,
The political and scholarly recognition of the environmental activists had already prompted
linkages between international environmental environmental reform within various multi-
degradation and other issues is a third dimen- lateral development banks, and scholars were
sion of the rescaling of environmental politics. beginning to analyze that process (128). Multi-
Until the 1980s, environmental issues tended ple political factors influenced the greening of
to be treated as distinct from other issues. But the World Bank. Advocacy campaigns, ampli-
policy makers and scholars increasingly have fied by calls for organizational change by Bank

staff and pressure from key donor countries, led to environmental protection being ignored or
to several waves of reform and organizational worse (91, 128, 137). Collaborative partner-
adjustment to accommodate environmental ships between the World Bank, NGOs, and
and social accountability objectives (91, 129). the private sector have also been challenged
In 1992, the World Bank signaled a by activists for promoting donor country
paradigmatic and rhetorical shift toward priorities, rapidly emerging economies, and
the greater prioritization of environmental low-cost solutions rather than green tech-
issues by focusing the World Development nology development and the resilience of the
Report on Development and the Environment least-developed countries. The recent readjust-
(130). World Bank client countries were ment of World Bank strategies toward greater
encouraged to prepare national environmental attention to climate vulnerability, livelihoods,
plans and strategies, environmental and social and poverty reduction illustrates the dynamic,
assessments of Bank projects were better contested, and ongoing nature of cross-issue
institutionalized, and greater internal ac- rescaling within sustainable development (19).
countability was demanded (91). The share of
World Bank projects with significant negative

externalities on the environment diminished, Environment and Trade
and more lending was made available for green The relationship of international trade to en-
projects (91). The Bank’s reports subsequently vironmental protection has also been a central
took up sustainable development in 2003 and, concern for a quarter century. The early de-
in 2010, highlighted the pervasive implications bate over the negative versus positive impacts of
of climate change for the development, vul- trade on the environment (138, 139) has been
nerability, and sustainability of the economies extended to include the influence of interna-
of the least-developed countries (131, 132). tional trade on the diffusion of voluntary en-
The rescaling of environment and develop- vironmental standards and certification and on
ment politics toward sustainable development environmental justice (17, 93, 106). These de-
has affected other international institutions, bates have identified both economic and polit-
including the United Nations Development ical paths of interplay between trade and the
Programme, regional financial institutions, environment.
and international development assistance more Economically, international trade has both
broadly (129, 133–135). And collaborative negative and positive environmental impacts
partnerships between international institutions (see References 138 and 139). Reducing trade
and nonstate actors have introduced an ad- barriers generates a competition effect that
ditional layer of cross-scale interactions with leads to fewer resources being used in each unit
respect to sustainable development (19, 136). of a good produced, assuming those resources
Although many scholars and activists saw are priced. But lower prices generate a counter-
value in the greening of development poli- vailing “scale effect” by leading to production
tics, skepticism remains. Some characterize of more goods, with corresponding increases in
the rhetoric of sustainable development as natural resources used and pollution produced.
green-washing free-market capitalism and Trade has a “composition effect,” altering the
maintaining power imbalances, thus avoiding balance among the manufacturing, agriculture,
more fundamental changes that true eco- and service sectors as each country develops dis-
logical sustainability would require (112). proportionately in those sectors in which it has a
Studies of the greening of the World Bank comparative advantage. Trade has a “technique
highlighted the public relations character effect” in which consumers’ choices of certain
of many early initiatives and reported that products over others determine where prod-
the delegation of environmental authority to ucts are produced, which, in turn, influences
development-oriented institutions could lead the production processes used and, hence, the

environmental effects incurred. Finally, there ronmental standards and others reducing—or
has been considerable interest in, and contro- delaying increases in—theirs (148).
versy over, whether an environmental Kuznets These theories generate numerous com-
curve exists, i.e., that greater trade fosters peting predictions, both individually and
growth in personal income and, thereby, gen- collectively. Put simply, increased trade is held
erates a shift toward environmentally friendly to improve environmental quality and policy,
consumer and policy choices (140–143). degrade them, change them, or leave them
Politically, there has been a vigorous de- unaffected. None of these competing views can
bate about whether freer trade fosters “pollu- be discounted on theoretical grounds and, so,
tion havens” and/or a regulatory race to the accurately judging the trade-environment rela-
bottom, top, or middle (138, 139, 144–148). tionship requires empirically evaluating the net
The pollution haven hypothesis suggests that effect of both positive and negative linkages. A
economic situations and political preferences rich empirical literature has emerged to assess
may lead developing state governments to es- these competing hypotheses, revealing that the
tablish weaker environmental regulations to at- direction and magnitude of the impacts depends
tract industrial development (149). The related, on various factors, including the type of envi-
but distinct, race to the bottom hypothesis sug- ronmental problem in question, national factor
gests that trade liberalization will reduce envi- endowments and politics, and the interplay
ronmental standards, even in developed states, between international economic openness and
if domestic interest groups succeed in getting domestic politics (139). Race to the top dynam-
governments with strong environmental stan- ics have been demonstrated for industrialized
dards to repeal those standards because they will countries, for trade dyads, and for a global sam-
make the country less economically competitive ple of countries using relatively weak indicators
(106, 150). of environmental sustainability (106, 110, 138,
But international trade may cause a race to 145). By contrast, trade’s impacts on developing
the top in which environmental policies con- countries remains contested, and the diffusion
verge upward. Upward convergence can reflect of voluntary standards remains skewed toward
either powerful leader states making trade ex- large industrialized markets (17). The theo-
pansion contingent on tougher environmental retical simplicity sought by many—that trade
standards in laggard states or less conscious either helps or harms environmental quality—
policy diffusion in which governments mimic is usually frustrated by a complicated economic
other countries’ policies, learning from others’ and political world in which most theorized
successes and trying to avoid being considered influences of trade on the environment appear
an environmental laggard (72). Although theo- to operate, but their net effects depend on par-
retically possible, most developed country gov- ticularities regarding the countries involved,
ernments have found it politically impossible the environmental indicators of concern, their
to roll back strong environmental standards. measurement, and the background context.
And the desire to access markets in these The cross-issue rescaling of trade and the
countries—and the need to meet the importing environment also has an institutional dimen-
country’s environmental standards—presses sion (151). The WTO, like the World Bank, has
corporations and, eventually, governments in been a target of intense advocacy action and a
developing countries to match those higher forum for the resolution of trade and environ-
standards (70, 106, 110). Between these ex- ment disputes (152). Unlike the World Bank,
tremes is the notion that there is a race to the however, advocacy pressure has not led to major
middle resulting from self-conscious intergov- WTO reforms, reflecting, in large part, the lim-
ernmental coordination and less-coordinated ited political interest of developed and develop-
action by governments and nongovernmental ing member states in such changes. Although
actors, with some states increasing their envi- some studies have explored the relationship

between climate change mitigation measures weaken the countries in which they occur and
and trade, this cross-issue linkage is only can generate acute conflict within and across
now beginning to emerge on the international borders (161).
agenda (153–155). That this has begun to Research in this area has expanded consid-
change is evident in the U.S. House of Rep- erably over the past decade. Scholarship has
resentatives passing energy and greenhouse gas focused on violent conflict arising from both
emissions legislation in 2009 that reflected do- environmental degradation and from environ-
mestic interest groups pressing for tariffs on mental abundance (the “resource curse”) but
goods from countries that lacked binding car- has expanded to include how environmental co-
bon emission targets. In reaction to such pres- operation promotes peace, how war affects the
sures, and in an effort to preempt the risks of environment, and how environmental protec-
linking protectionist measures to climate pol- tion promotes human (as opposed to national)
icy, the WTO and UNEP collaborated on a security (157). This wealth of scholarship has
joint report on trade and climate change (156). resonated with policy makers. Scholars have
This episode exemplifies the multiscale dynam- become sought-after advisors to national se-
ics in the politics of trade and climate and the curity and intelligence agencies. Many coun-
activation of cross-issue rescaling through pol- tries’ national security assessments and strategy
itics, discourse, and institutional practice. documents now treat environmental issues, and
particularly climate change, as central security
threats (162–164).
Environment and Security Yet, both the empirical and normative
Both scholarship and practice began to recog- claims of this literature have been questioned.
nize the important and inherent relationship of Deudney (165) argued that the linkage was
environmental degradation to national security analytically misleading, empirically inaccurate,
in the 1980s (for a review, see Reference 157). and normatively counterproductive. Linking
Scholars highlighted the inconsistency in treat- environment and security misleads because it
ing threats to important national resources and focuses attention on the influence of environ-
values as national security threats if they came mental scarcity on war rather than vice versa;
from the military apparatus of foreign govern- because environmental degradation threatens
ments but not if they came from environmental individual security, not national security; be-
degradation (158–160). These arguments cou- cause the sources and impacts of, and solutions
pled a normative claim that those concerned to, environmental damage occur above or
about national security should be concerned below but not at the national level; and because
about environmental protection with an em- national security entails protection from
pirical claim that environmental degradation intentional acts of aggression, whereas envi-
did increase national security risks. During the ronmental degradation reflects an unintended
1990s, Homer-Dixon (161) spearheaded a ma- by-product of other activities (165). Empirical
jor research program focused on evaluating studies investigating the environment-security
whether environmental degradation increased link have been critiqued for problems in defin-
the likelihood of acute conflict. Declines in ing their variables, for developing excessively
the amount and quality of renewable resources complex and untestable models, for failing to
lead to resource scarcity, which can be exac- develop appropriate counterfactuals, and for
erbated by population growth and unequal ac- applying theories of interstate conflict to in-
cess to those resources (161). Resource scarcity, trastate civil wars (166). Deudney (165) also ar-
in turn, can decrease economic productivity gues that framing the environment as a national
and prompt internal conflicts that lead national security problem prompts the wrong response
subgroups to migrate, or be expelled, from by suggesting that we can leave environmental
their home countries. These dynamics, in turn, protection to government in general, and the

military establishment in particular, and by and has pushed those developing conservation
reinforcing an “us versus them” nationalism strategies to give greater consideration to lo-
that undermines development of the sense cal livelihoods (20, 91). Conservation practices
of world community, global citizenship, and such as regional “peace parks” and other ini-
individual responsibility necessary to address tiatives are increasingly recognized as potential
our environmental problems effectively. bases for fostering regional security.
This debate has generated a mature dialogue Climate change and vulnerability have fur-
in which scholars have critically engaged and ther amplified the cross-issue rescaling of po-
evaluated each other’s claims in ways that have litical and academic discourse to link environ-
fostered methodological, theoretical, and em- mental change, migration, and security. The
pirical progression (see, for example, Reference first UN Security Council debate on climate
166). It has generated greater policy attention change held in 2007 was prompted by concerns
to dimensions in the environment and security that “climate change threatens international
nexus that were relatively overlooked, including peace and security through its effects on border
the influence of armed conflict on the environ- disputes, migration, resource shortages, social
ment; the role of environmental assessment and stress, and humanitarian crises” (170, p. 303).
collaboration in postconflict reconstruction and In 2009, the International Organization for
peace building; and the linkages between global Migration estimated that between 25 million
environmental change, migration, and human and 1 billion people may be affected or displaced
security (157, 167, 168). as a consequence of climate change, helping to
UNEP’s Post-Conflict and Disaster Man- place the issue of climate-induced migration in
agement Branch, created in 2001, and its the spotlight of political debates (171). Many re-
activities in postconflict reconstruction in cent scholarly and policy reports frame climate
the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and change in national and international security
Afghanistan exemplify the rescaling of the prac- terms, in line with a larger trend to “securitize”
tice of environmental politics to foster human nonmilitary concerns, “such as HIV/ AIDS, hu-
security and peace. UNEP’s work has engaged man rights, transnational crime, and the en-
the academic community and has been reflected vironment” (see 170, p. 303). Environmental
in analyses of the pathways through which war justice has also emerged as a recurring theme
affects the environment and the implications of across these arenas, with respect to indigenous
environmental postconflict assessments, capac- rights and displacement, with respect to the
ity, and rehabilitation for human security and rights to development and a clean environment,
peace building in fragile societies (167). and with respect to climate justice in response
An increasingly salient dimension of the to a growing awareness of the uneven impacts
environment-security nexus has been the actual that climate change is likely to have on human
and potential impact of environmental factors vulnerability across and within states (71, 172).
on human displacement, livelihoods, and cross- The cross-issue rescaling we have just dis-
border tensions. Researchers have become con- cussed has not occurred in all areas, however.
cerned not only with migration in response Agricultural subsidies have received relatively
to unintended environmental damage but also little attention from activists, policy makers, or
with “coercive conservation” in which efforts at environmental politics scholars despite their
protecting wildlife have led to the intentional obvious role in hindering sustainable devel-
displacement of people from their traditional opment and sustainable agriculture. Similarly,
lands (169). At the same time, the growing the rescaling of urban politics with respect to
recognition among the conservation commu- climate change has received much attention,
nity of the interdependence of the rights of in- whereas the linkages among urban plan-
digenous people and their natural environment ning, environmental protection, poverty, and
has strengthened the voice of local populations other social problems associated with urban

life have received relatively little attention. Magnitude and Complexity of
Cross-issue rescaling in promoting a serious Environmental Problems
and wide-ranging debate on consumerism and
People have been transforming the earth at
environmental degradation also remains under-
least since development of the ability to con-
developed (173, 174). Such differences in the
trol fire (176). The development of tools, the
direction and extent of the rescaling of environ-
agricultural revolution, the industrial revolu-
mental politics raise questions about what gets
tion, and human population growth have led
on the international environmental agenda and
to a situation in which more human impacts ex-
what have been the driving forces of this rescal-
ceed nature’s ability to absorb and recover from
ing, questions we address in the next section.
them and a greater share have transnational
or global impacts that require transnational or
EXPLAINING THE RESCALING global responses. In some arenas, human en-
OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL vironmental impacts may reflect exponential

POLITICS rather than arithmetic growth rates, generat-
Global environmental problems reflect a range ing impacts that are not greater in proportional
of ecological, scientific, social, economic, and terms but are dramatically larger in absolute
political complexities and interdependencies. terms. An invasive plant whose population dou-
They manifest themselves in different ways bles every year may take 13 years to cover half
across political spaces and jurisdictions from the of a lake but will require only one additional
local to the international, engaging diverse ac- year to cover the whole lake. So too, we may be
tors at each level (5, 6, 10). Given the inherently experiencing only the last in a sequence of im-
multidimensional nature of environmental is- pacts from environmentally damaging behav-
sues, what explains the significant rescaling of iors that exhibit exponential growth, including
both the scholarship and practice of global en- pollution of the atmosphere, rivers, lakes, and
vironmental politics over the past two decades? oceans; losses of wetlands, tropical rainforest,
Does this rescaled treatment reflect an onto- and other habitats; species extinction; and var-
logical change driven by changes in the ecolog- ious indicators of climate change.
ical, economic, social, political, and technologi- The combined effects of various human be-
cal realities of these problems? Or is it primarily haviors also create ecologically more complex
an epistemological change in which the reeval- problems. Global fish populations are in decline
uation, if not wholesale rejection, of a focus on not only because of overfishing but also because
the nation-state and intergovernmental interac- of marine pollution, fish farm escapement,
tions has allowed the emergence of an increas- warming ocean temperatures, and ocean acid-
ingly accurate recognition of the more complex ification (177, 178). Biodiversity loss increas-
and realistic ontology of multiple actors inter- ingly reflects the cumulative and interactive ef-
acting on multiple levels that was always there? fects of hunting, habitat loss, invasive species,
We posit that the rescaling of environmental pollutants, pesticides, and air and water qual-
politics reflects both influences, an interplay ity. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
that has resulted in a closer fit between subject Change’s climate models recognize and model
matter and analytic tools (175). Real changes in the multitude of economic, technological, de-
the magnitude and complexity of environmen- mographic, and cultural factors that contribute
tal problems, globalization, and institutional to climate change and the complex ecological
density have generated changes in the character response of the natural system to such forcings.
of global environmental politics that, in turn, Environmental changes, in turn, affect human
have influenced and been illuminated by the societies in ways that vary considerably across
increasingly sophisticated and multidisciplinary localities, socioeconomic groups, regions, and
theoretical toolbox of the study of politics. countries, with some effects better understood

than others. The concept of “coupled natural that they generate (78). Generating a better
and human systems” (3) captures the complex- fit also dictates a recognition that framing
ity of many modern environmental problems environmental problems as global involves
in which relevant human causes, nature’s re- accounting for the ways those problems affect
sponses to those causes, and the human impacts and are affected by actors, ideas, and processes
of those responses are multiple and interacting of contestation at multiple spatial scales and
and involve complex positive and negative feed- in various jurisdictions (8, 11). The linkages
back loops. This recognition has been forced between the complexity of environmental
upon us by the increasing strength of nature’s problems and the multiscale nature of environ-
feedback signal but also by changes in human mental politics have shown up over the past two
understanding of the environment, not least the decades both in the practices of political actors
increasing acknowledgment of the human di- and the environmental politics literature. Re-
mensions of environmental change (179). ports of international environmental NGOs,

If environmental problems have become such as Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund,
more complex over time, our concern and for example, point to the close correlation
recognition of their complexity have increased between commoditized market prices and
yet more rapidly. Growth in international rates of deforestation, local incentives, and
attention to environmental problems after national institutional capacity, and these in-
World War II, and particularly after the 1970s, sights, in turn, motivate efforts to identify new
reflected a combination of both greater under- conservation strategies that involve multiple
standing of human impacts on the environment stakeholders operating at local, national, and
as well as growing environmental awareness transnational scales. In many cases, actors mo-
about those impacts and their interdependen- bilize politically after learning how particular
cies. In the 1970s and 1980s, international environmental problems harm their economic,
diplomats sought to address a growing list of social, or political interests. In other cases,
distinct and separable environmental prob- those concerned about problems realize that
lems with neatly compartmentalized treaties they must engage other actors who either are
addressing particular species, particular pol- those whose behaviors must change or are
lutants, particular rivers or lakes, or particular “veto players,” who will block policy progress
sources of a problem. Experience and scientific if their interests are not taken into account.
research demonstrated, however, that acid These political realities that dictate engag-
rain and heavy metal pollution cannot be ing a wider range of actors across multiple
resolved by tackling one pollutant at a time scales of politics and governance have been
and that biodiversity loss cannot be resolved reinforced by arguments that engaging all
one species at a time without taking complex affected parties in participatory, democratic,
ecological and socioeconomic conditions and and transparent processes is both effective in an
multiscale interactions into account (169). empirical sense and preferable in a normative
Both the inadequate results of prior policies sense (180). Ignoring the localized nature and
and advances in scientific understanding have contested politics of global problems, such as
clarified the need for a better fit between policy water, climate, land degradation, and biodi-
and the problem being addressed (5). versity, is a major pitfall of an international
Generating such a fit dictates building on environmental politics literature and practice
improved scientific understandings of complex that focused almost exclusively on the nation-
Earth systems, as evident in the increasing state as a political actor (8). Elinor Ostrom (11)
frequency with which policy makers look for has reintroduced the concept of “polycentric”
insight and recommendations from scientists, governance to illuminate the challenges and
the epistemic communities of which they are a opportunities related to coordinating political
part, and the global environmental assessments action and policy at the global level in ways

that engage the incentives and knowledge p. 303, see also 165). State and nonstate actors
of actors at other levels that are better at- explicitly seek to construct and frame discourses
tuned to the context-specific characteristics to promote understandings, perceptions, and
of human-environment interactions. In short, responses that are alternatives to conventional
the rescaling of environmental politics arises taken-for-granted framings (102). In short, the
from an increasingly complex understanding of rescaling of global environmental politics is due
increasingly complex environmental problems. to greater interdependence among places, peo-
ples, and issues but also to different groups
Globalization and Interconnectedness seeking to construct the social world in ways
that foster their preferred political and policy
We can explain the rescaling of global environ-
outcomes.
mental politics across issue areas by references
The incentives and ability of such actors to
to processes of economic and cultural global-
mobilize politically, in turn, has been fostered

ization as well as secular technological and so-
by the increased number and complexity of
cial changes, which have influenced both the
communications, interactions, and intercon-
types of environmental problems we face and

nections that globalization and technological
our understanding of those problems. Growth
change have made possible. Globalization
in international trade, capital, and investment
has fostered cultural communication, often
flows has generated concern about their envi-
improving understandings of the linkages
ronmental effects and stimulated waves of po-
between global environmental problems and
litical opposition to the policies and institutions
the protection of local resources and human
that promote them. The persistence and spread
rights, issues that were previously treated
of deadly civil wars across the globe and their
as separate and even in conflict (183). The
close relationship to commodity markets and
thickening of global interdependence thus not
the exploitation of natural resources have re-
only increases the scale, salience, and intercon-
newed academic interest in the resource curse
nection between global problems but also helps
and the environment-security nexus, leading to
actors organize across borders, link causes, and
a reconsideration of what constitute global and
apply political pressure at multiple levels (184).
local threats to security and environmental sus-
tainability and of the interplay among secu-
rity, resource management, and human devel- Denser Institutionalization
opment (181, 182). But, rescaling across issue Finally, the greater density of intergovernmen-
areas also reflects quite self-conscious political tal institutionalization and NGOs has itself
strategies to draw greater attention to environ- contributed to the rescaling of politics, illustrat-
mental problems within nonenvironmental is- ing the interdependence between institutional
sue areas (e.g., with respect to security, trade, context and political action. Whether referred
and development) or to couple environmental to as interaction, interplay, overlap, cogover-
concerns to migration, the plight of indigenous nance, or something else, scholars pay increas-
people, and related social issues to ensure that ing attention to the fact that “the effectiveness
the latter do not go unaddressed. of specific institutions often depends not only
Whether in efforts to green the World Bank, on their own features but also on their interac-
to get ministries of defense to focus on environ- tions with other institutions” (179, p. 60). Insti-
mental degradation, or to bring environmen- tutional interactions occur among international
tal suits before WTO dispute panels, activists environmental institutions and also between
have sought to frame environmental protection these institutions and those addressing trade,
as empirically and normatively linked to other security, human rights, and other nonenviron-
higher-priority concerns of governments “as a mental issues. These interactions can involve
way of gaining attention from high-level de- conscious efforts at coordination or organic,
cision makers and mobilizing resources” (170, unrecognized, and unexpected side effects of
independent actions by institutions. Such inter- linking local and global domains. The complex-
actions sometimes foster the goals of the insti- ity and multilevel nature of global politics is
tutions involved but, at other times, undermine more broadly recognized as a pervasive feature
the efforts of some or all of those institutions. of globalization and the new global public do-
Rarely, however, do such interactions lead to main (13, 189). At the same time, the emphasis
the same outcomes that we would expect in their on multiscale interactions regarding the envi-
absence (5, 185–187). ronment reflects an earlier epistemological ne-
Denser and closer linkages among in- glect of these dimensions and interactions. The
ternational institutions have increased the dialogue among those studying local resources
possibilities for synergistic cross-issue linkages and those studying global environmental prob-
while highlighting the conflicts and power lems and institutions was a critical step in es-
imbalances between institutions established tablishing common questions, epistemologies,
to promote environmental protection and and methods to examine the multiscale nature
those established to promote security, trade, or of environmental politics (5, 6, 10, 12, 118).
intellectual property rights (5, 16). Institutional Scholars seeking to understand nonstate ac-
density has thus fostered the rescaling of en- tors in environmental and other realms also
vironmental politics by creating opportunities helped focus attention on political processes be-
for actors to pursue new strategies and linkages yond the state. Such studies challenged tradi-
across issue areas and political scales. The tional conceptions of international politics by
campaigns against World Bank infrastructure illuminating the dynamics of global civil so-
projects linked and institutionalized multiple ciety and contestation, transnational activism,
international norms—including biodiversity private authority, and collaborative networks
protection, human rights, and indigenous across the private and the public spheres (17,
rights—contributing to substantial vertical and 19, 79, 83, 89, 93, 111). Finally, the develop-
horizontal rescaling of politics and institutional ment of the field of environmental studies and
reforms. Such combinations of vertical and efforts to better address the fundamentally in-
horizontal rescaling are also evident in the terdisciplinary nature of that field’s primary ob-
coupling of trade and climate change issues, jects of study have provided the most radical
as in the coordinated effort by the WTO and significant contributions to the refocusing
and UNEP to reframe the linkage away from of analysis on the multiscale nature of environ-
protectionism and toward a more synergistic mental politics. The scholarly rescaling of the
approach. The institutionalization of dispute study of global environmental politics has de-
settlement, adjudication, and expert opinion veloped through a process that has drawn crit-
procedures within the WTO and the parallel ical insights from disciplines as diverse as law,
institutionalization of the principles of precau- economics, anthropology, sociology, and geog-
tion and multilateral action in other regimes raphy but also from biology, ecology, and inte-
have altered what strategies states, companies, grated assessment modeling.
NGOs, and judges see as the preferred and
appropriate means for addressing trade and CONCLUSION: A NEW GLOBAL
environment disputes (152, 188). ENVIRONMENTAL PLURALISM
Global environmental politics shape the pro-
Rescaling of Scholarship cesses by which and extent to which societies
The complex, dynamic, and multilevel na- deal with environmental problems. This ar-
ture of global environmental problems partially ticle has explored important dynamics in
explains why scholars of environmental pol- environmental politics, emphasizing the in-
itics have emphasized the contemporary rel- creasing extent of vertical and horizontal rescal-
evance of nonstate actors, transnational net- ing across political arenas, actors, and issues.
works, epistemic communities, and the politics Rescaling along all three dimensions that we
have identified has contributed to an increasing develop and, at times, inadequate to address
pluralism in environmental politics, populating the prompting environmental problem. The
the global arena with a greater diversity of ac- rescaling of global environmental politics to
tors; facilitating action across boundaries to dif- engage multiple actors operating at multi-
fuse ideas, norms, and practices; and generating ple levels of jurisdiction may foster quicker
tighter linkages between the local and global identification of such problems but may
levels of environmental problems and environ- make identifying the sources of authority and
mental governance. These changes have altered channels of accountability for resolving these
and will continue to alter both the practice and problems more difficult for citizens. The credi-
study of global environmental problems and bility of information and the relative benefits of
global environmental governance. alternative solutions for environmental protec-
The rescaling of global environmental pol- tion may become more difficult to judge as the
itics is likely to foster a greater diversity of, number and density of voices, organizations,
and more innovation in, environmental pol- instruments, and strategies proliferate. In an
icy and management. The rescaling discussed increasingly rescaled context, multiple, com-
above increases contestation but also increases peting, and sometimes contradictory sources
the exchange of ideas, practices, and strate- of information and claims of authority can
gies across different problems, localities, issues, coexist, and new social mechanisms for evalu-
and sectors. These processes have already con- ating information and exercising control over
tributed to the emergence and diffusion of new various actors may become more challenging.
ideas, policies, and practices for tackling envi- Thus, despite significant advances in the
ronmental problems. The rescaling of politics literature to capture the distinct dynamics of
has also led to efforts to find better fits between what we call the rescaling of global environ-
the scales of problems being addressed and the mental politics, more effort is needed to un-
solutions devised to address them. Problems derstand the causes of this rescaling, the likely
are tackled in more complex and more disag- effects of such rescaling, and the best strate-
gregated manners; local projects, policies, and gies for mitigating whatever risks such rescal-
instruments are more readily embedded and ing may entail. To date, the literature has iden-
nested in a variety of networks, with linkages to tified trends and illuminated their relevance,
more global institutions and other problems; including vertical rescaling from the global to
and local lessons are now more likely to be the local (and vice versa); horizontal rescal-
showcased and diffused through transnational ing across regional and sectoral organizations
networks to the global level and to other locales and networks of NGOs, multinational corpora-
and sectors. tions, and individuals; and cross-issue rescaling
Yet, the disaggregation of environmental linking environmental issues to other important
politics also carries risks for political account- human concerns. Recognizing the significance
ability and may influence the effectiveness of these trends creates both new demands and
of the governance solutions adopted. To the new opportunities to examine how such rescal-
extent that traditional global environmental ing influences the processes of politics and pol-
politics primarily involved interactions among icy formation and the accountability and effec-
nation-state governments, it tended to generate tiveness of all efforts at global environmental
relatively rigid solutions that were slower to governance.
SUMMARY POINTS
1. Global environmental politics and governance have rescaled significantly in past 50 years.

2. A range of actors other than nation-states (including supranational actors, subnational
actors, nongovernmental actors, and multinational corporations) now engage in global
environmental politics.
3. Global environmental politics are played out at many levels, with interactions occurring
at the local, national, and global levels as well as across these levels.
4. Global environmental problems and governance are now recognized as having inherent
and intricate connections to other nominally nonenvironmental issues.
5. The scholarly literature has increasingly recognized this expansion in what global envi-
ronmental politics and governance entail.
FUTURE ISSUES
1. To what extent does the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of global en-
vironmental problems reflect changes in the nature of these problems (i.e., change in
the ontology of environmental politics) and to what extent does it reflect changes in
human perceptions and analysis of those problems (i.e., change in the epistemology of
environmental politics)?
2. What factors explain the emergence of the different types of rescaling delineated above?
3. What other types of rescaling are emerging in global environmental politics?
4. Why has rescaling involving linkages to environmental problems occurred for some
nonenvironmental problems but not others?
5. What are the likely effects of the rescaling of politics for environmental policy and
governance? And what strategies are available to mitigate whatever risks rescaling may
entail?
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are grateful to William C. Clark, Diana Liverman, and Isha Ray for helpful comments
and suggestions, to Jesslyn Holombo for editorial assistance, and to Stephanie Dornschneider for
research assistance.
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Annual Review of
Environment
and Resources
Volume 35, 2010

Contents
Preface ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣v
Who Should Read This Series? ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣vii
I. Earth’s Life Support Systems

Human Involvement in Food Webs
Donald R. Strong and Kenneth T. Frank ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 1
Invasive Species, Environmental Change and Management, and Health
Petr Pyšek and David M. Richardson ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣25
Pharmaceuticals in the Environment
Klaus Kümmerer ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣57
II. Human Use of Environment and Resources

Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An International
Perspective
Benjamin K. Sovacool and Marilyn A. Brown ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣77
Global Water Pollution and Human Health
René P. Schwarzenbach, Thomas Egli, Thomas B. Hofstetter, Urs von Gunten,
and Bernhard Wehrli ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 109
Biological Diversity in Agriculture and Global Change
Karl S. Zimmerer ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 137
The New Geography of Contemporary Urbanization and the
Environment
Karen C. Seto, Roberto Sánchez-Rodrı́guez, and Michail Fragkias ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 167
Green Consumption: Behavior and Norms
Ken Peattie ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 195
viii
III. Management, Guidance, and Governance of Resources and Environment
Cities and the Governing of Climate Change
Harriet Bulkeley ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 229
The Rescaling of Global Environmental Politics
Liliana B. Andonova and Ronald B. Mitchell ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 255
Climate Risk
Nathan E. Hultman, David M. Hassenzahl, and Steve Rayner ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 283
Evaluating Energy Efficiency Policies with Energy-Economy Models
Luis Mundaca, Lena Neij, Ernst Worrell, and Michael McNeil ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 305
The State of the Field of Environmental History
J.R. McNeill ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 345
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 26–35 ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 375

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 26–35 ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 379
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Environment and Resources articles may
be found at http://environ.annualreviews.org
Contents ix

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The Rescaling of Global

Studies, Geneva 21, 1211, Switzerland; email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2010. 35:255–82 Key Words

The Annual Review of Environment and Resources Abstract

organizations, substate governments, scientists,

Individual Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

256 Andonova · Mitchell

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 257

Multinational Multinational Supranational

National business National business National

National NGO 1 National NGO n

Local government 1 Local government n

Local business Local business

258 Andonova · Mitchell

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 259

260 Andonova · Mitchell

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 261

(2002). NGOs are often quite adept at mo-

Conservation International’s Lovejoy in 1984 Although NGOs rarely deserve exclusive

262 Andonova · Mitchell

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 263

264 Andonova · Mitchell

resources (123, 124).

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 265

World Bank projects with significant negative

266 Andonova · Mitchell

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 267

268 Andonova · Mitchell

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 269

OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL vironmental impacts may reflect exponential

270 Andonova · Mitchell

mensions of environmental change (179). ports of international environmental NGOs,

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 271

mobilize politically, in turn, has been fostered

types of environmental problems we face and

274 Andonova · Mitchell

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 275

276 Andonova · Mitchell

Environmental Protection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 277

Glob. Secur. Program, Univ. of Cambridge

278 Andonova · Mitchell

Environ. Resour. 32:295–316

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 279

280 Andonova · Mitchell

158. Ullman R. 1983. Redefining security. Int. Secur. 8:129–53

www.annualreviews.org • Global Environmental Politics 281

282 Andonova · Mitchell

Volume 35, 2010

I. Earth’s Life Support Systems

II. Human Use of Environment and Resources

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 26–35 ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 375

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