Court of Appeal Case No.

ACIAS 1400019 / CIVDS 1201227

SUPERIOR C O U R T OF CALIFORNIA
C O U N T Y OF SAN BERNARDINO

APPELLATE DIVISION
247 W E S T THIRD STREET
SAN BERNARDINO, CA 92415-0063
(909) 521-3574

BANKERS A U T O ACCEPTANCE CORP.

Appellant

v.

CLARISSA PEREZ

Respondent

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

WILLIAM N . ELDER JR. (SBN 114063)

FOELL & ELDER
3818 E. LA P A L M A A V E N U E
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA 92807
TELEPHONE (714) 999-1100
TELEFAX (714) 630-3300
E-MAIL: [email protected]

Attorney for Appellant, BANKERS AUTO ACCEPTANCE CORP.

I. INTRODUCTION

The case at bar is a case offirstimpression. The California Legislature enacted

Vehicle Code section 10652.5 and California Civil Code section 3068 et seq. to address

towing, repair, storage liens, and the various remedies available to the legal owner and

the garageman. Application of these rules, according to their plain terms and the manifest

legislative intent, resolves this case. Respondent failed to provide adequate notice to the

legal owner Appellant within the time period prescribed by Vehicle C o d e section

10652.5. California Civil Code section 3070 lists the consequences for lack of

compliance. A s will be shown below, Respondent "improperly caused a vehicle to be

towed" resulting in the forfeiture of Respondent's lien for towing and storage, and

therefore, the Trial Court's decision should be overturned as a matter of law.

The legislature placed strict, specific requirements on the manner of service of the

written notice that must be given to the legal owner of the vehicle in order to have an

enforceable lien for towing, repairs, and/or storage. Vehicle Code section 10652.5

subdivision (a) requires service of a notice for towing and storage "by certified mail,

return receipt requested" while California Civil Code section 3072 subdivision (b)

requires a different notice of lien sale "by certified mail with return receipt requested or

by United States Postal Certificate of Mailing."

In addition, on January 30, 2012, the Complaint w a s filed. Defendant Clarissa

Perez was served on February 27, 2012 and failed to respond. O n July 3 1 , default was

entered (C.T. 27-28.) involving Defendant Clarissa Perez. Testimony w a s given ( R . T . 11-

12.) and the ledger (C.T. 160-162.) was admitted into evidence. However, the Trial

Court's judgment failed to address Defendant Clarissa Perez. Given California's adoption
of the one final judgment rule, the Trial Court erred by failing to enter default judgment

against Defendant Clarissa Perez. A s such, the Trial Court's decision should also be

overturned.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

Appellant is a finance company which specializes in the purchase of retail

installment contracts from California used car dealers.

O n August 22, 2010 Defendant Clarissa Perez entered into a retail installment

contract for the purchase of a used 2001 H o n d a Civic L X which subsequently was

assigned by the used car dealer to Appellant. Defendant Clarissa Perez was notified of the

assignment (R.T. 5.) (C.T. 138-143.). Subsequent to the assignment, title was perfected in

Appellant (R.T. 5-6.) (C.T. 145.).

A s a result of the assignment of the retail installment contract and the perfection

of title, Appellant at all times relevant hereto was the legal owner pursuant to Vehicle

Code section 370.

Respondent Big Z Auto Works, Inc. is a tow company w h o pursuant to the record

took possession of the subject 2001 Honda Civic L X on December 25, 2011 and

subsequently sent a Notice of Pending Lien Sale to Appellant pursuant to California Civil

Code section 3072 on December 27, 2011 (R.T. 59.) (C.T. 152.).

The Notice of Pending Lien Sale was the first written notice received by

Appellant from Respondent (R.T. 7.). Appellant timely opposed the attempted lien sale

(R.T. 23.).

Respondent's only written notice informing Appellant of towing and storage fees,

sent by certified mail, return receipt requested on January 26, 2012, was sent after
Appellant had opposed the attempted lien sale (R.T. 59-60.).

III. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS DEFENDANT

CLARISSA PEREZ IN ITS JUDGMENT.

According to California C o d e of Civil Procedure section 585 subdivision (a), a

plaintiff m a y apply to the clerk of the court for entry of default w h e n defendant fails to

answer the complaint in "an action arising upon contract or judgment for the recovery of

m o n e y or damages." Entry of default is the clerk's certification that process w a s properly

served and no response was filed. (Cal. C o d e Civ. Proc., section 585 subd.(a)). In a

typical case, a "no-answer default," the plaintiff m a y seek entry of default after the

defendant fails to answer within 30 days. See id. Further, the clerk's entry of default is an

interlocutory order. California C o d e of Civil Procedure section 585 also provides that the

court m a y set aside an entry of default "for good cause shown.'" G o o d cause is generally

established by examining three criteria: "(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether

the moving party has presented a meritorious defense; and (3) whether setting aside the

default would prejudice the party w h o secured the entry of default.'" If the entry of

default is not set aside, the complaint is deemed admitted. A s a result, defendant

confesses truth of all material allegations in complaint. See, Fitzgerald v. Herzer (1947)

78 Cal App 2d 127.

A . T h e Entry of Default Terminates Defendant Clarissa Perez's Right to Participate

in This Litigation.

Because default was entered against Defendant Clarissa Perez on July 31, 2014,

the Trial Court erred in rendering judgment in favor of defendant on the evidence before

the court, consisting of the complaint in the original action, the proof of service, and the

default of defendant. B y permitting her default to be entered, Defendant Clarissa Perez

confessed the truth of all the material allegations in the complaint See, Wilshire Mortgage

Corp. v. O. A. Graybeal Co., 41 Cal.App. 1, 5 [105 P.2d 996]; Strong v. Shatto, 201 Cal.

555, 558. Further, a judgment by default is as conclusive as to the issues tendered by the

complaint as if it had been rendered after answerfiledand trial had on allegations denied

by the answer. (Maddux v. County Bank, 129 Cal. 665, 667 [62 P . 264, 79 [*132]

Am.St.Rep. 143]; Morenhut v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 289, 295.) Such a judgment is res

judicata as to all issues aptly pleaded in the complaint and defendant is estopped from

denying in a subsequent action any allegations contained in the former complaint.

(Horton v. Horton, 18 Cal.2d 579, 585). Consequently, judgment should have been

rendered in favor of plaintiff on the evidence introduced. Because Defendant Clarissa

Perez has not set aside the default, default judgment should be entered.

B . O n e Final Judgment Rule Mandates All Actions M u s t be Disposed of with the

Judgment in Order for the Judgment to be Final.

According to California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 subdivision (a), an

appeal m a y be taken from a judgment. Generally, "[t]here can be but onefinaljudgment

in an action, and that is one which in effect ends the suit in the court in which it is

entered, and finally determines the rights of the parties in relation to the matter in

controversy." (San Joaquin County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Winn (2008) 163

Cal.App.4th 296, 300, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 470, 472.) Under the "onefinaljudgment" rule, an

appeal will only lie from thefinaljudgment; not from intermediate rulings. (Kinsmith

Financial Corp. v. Gilroy (2003) 105 Cal.App.4 th 447, 452; Maier Brewing Co. v. Pacific

Nat. Fire Ins. Co. (1961) 194. The California Supreme Court's ruling in Morehart v.

County of Santa Barbara, (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, ended the practice of deeming causes of

action "severed" from the rest of the case. Also, the California Supreme Court recently
handed d o w n its opinion in Kurwa v. Kislinger, 204 Cal. A p p . 4 t h 21, confirming that

under settled California practice, as codified in California Code of Civil Procedure

section 904.1 subdivision (a), to be appealable a judgment must dispose of all causes of

action pending between the parties.

Moreover, the Court in Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara enumerated the rationale

underlying the one final judgment rule. The Court stated:

the sound reasons for the one final judgment rule is the obvious fact that
piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals tend to be oppressive and
costly. Interlocutory appeals burden the courts and impede the judicial
process in a number of ways: (1) they tend to clog the appellate courts
with a multiplicity of appeals; (2) early resort to the appellate courts tends
to produce uncertainty and delay in the trial court; (3) until a final
judgment is rendered the trial court m a y completely obviate an appeal by
altering the rulings from which an appeal would otherwise have been
taken; (4) later actions by the trial court m a y provide a more complete
record which dispels the appearance of error or establishes that it w a s
harmless; and (5) having the benefit of a complete adjudication will assist
the reviewing court to remedy error (if any) by giving specific directions
rather than remanding for another round of open-ended proceedings. See
id. at 813.

In the instant case, the entry of default terminates the Defendant Clarissa Perez's

right to participate in this litigation. In addition, she admits all facts well pleaded and m a y

not object to default judgment awarding damages that evidence will support. Beall v.

Munson (1962) 204 Cal A p p 2d 396. B y failing to address one of the defendants in its

judgment, the Trial Court failed to "dispose of all the causes of action pending between

the parties." (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., section 904.1, subd. (a); Morehart v. County of Santa

Barbara, 7 Cal.4th at 740-741.) Such error is prejudicial to Appellant and consequential

costs were incurred. Given California's strict adoption of the onefinaljudgment rule,

Appellant respectfully requests that the Trial Court's decision be reversed and default

judgment entered against Defendant Clarissa Perez.

IV. RELEVANT STATUTES

With regard to the issue of statutory interpretation, Vehicle C o d e 10652.5

provides in pertinent part:

(a) Whenever the n a m e and address of the legal owner of a motor vehicle
is k n o w n , or m a y be ascertained from the registration records in the
vehicle or from the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, no fee or
service charge m a y be imposed upon the legal owner for the parking and
storage of the motor vehicle except as follows: (1) T h e first 15 days of
possession and (2) following that 15-day period, the period commencing
three days after written notice is sent by the person in possession to the
legal owner by certified mail, return receipt requested, and continuing for
a period not to exceed any applicable time limit set forth in section 3068
or 3068.1 of the California Civil C o d e .
(b) The costs of notifying the legal owner m a y be charged as part of the
storage fee w h e n the motor vehicle has been stored for an indefinite period
of time and notice is given no sooner than the third day of possession. This
subdivision also applies if the legal owner refuses to claim possession of
the motor vehicle.
(c) In any action brought by, or on behalf of, a legal owner of a motor
vehicle to which subdivision (a) applies, to recover a motor vehicle
alleged to be withheld by the person in possession of the motor vehicle by
demanding storage fees or charges for any number of days in excess of
that permitted pursuant to subdivision (a), the prevailing party shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, not to exceed one thousand seven
hundred fifty dollars ($1,750). The recovery of those fees is in addition to
any other right, remedy, or cause of action of that party. [emphasis added]

Moreover, California Civil C o d e section 3068.1 states in pertinent part:

(a) (1) Every person has a lien dependent upon possession for the compensation
to which the person is legally entitled for towing, storage, or labor associated with
recovery or load salvage of any vehicle subject to registration that has been
authorized to be removed by a public agency, a private property owner pursuant
to Section 22658 of the Vehicle C o d e , or a lessee, operator, or registered owner of
the vehicle. The lien is deemed to arise on the date of possession of the vehicle.
Possession is deemed to arise w h e n the vehicle is removed and is in transit, or
w h e n vehicle recovery operations or load salvage operations have begun.

California Civil C o d e section 3070 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Whenever the possessory lien upon any vehicle is lost through trick,
fraud, or device, the repossession of the vehicle by the lienholder revives
the possessory lien but any lien so revived is subordinate to any right, title,
 or interest of any person under any sale, transfer, encumbrance, lien, or
other interest acquired or secured in good faith and for value between the
time of the loss of possession and the time of repossession.

(b) It is a misdemeanor for any person to obtain possession of any vehicle

or any part thereof subject to a lien pursuant to this chapter by trick, fraud,
or device.
(c) It is a misdemeanor for any person claiming a lien o n a vehicle to
knowingly violate this chapter.
(d) (1) Any person who improperly causes a vehicle to be towed or
removed in order to create or acquire a lienhold interest enforceable under
this chapter, or w h o violates subdivision (c), shall forfeit all claims for
towing, removal, or storage, and shall be liable to the o w n e r or lessee of
the vehicle for the cost of removal, transportation, and storage, damages
resulting from the towing, removal, transportation, or storage of the
vehicle, attorney's fees, and court costs.(2) For purposes of this
subdivision, "improperly causes a vehicle to be towed or removed"
includes, but is not limited to, engaging in any of the following acts, the
consequence of which is the towing or removal of a vehicle:
(A) Failure to comply with section 10650, 10652.5, or 10655 of the
Vehicle C o d e . [emphasis added]

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The interpretation of statutes is a question of law and subject to de novo review

on appeal. (Hill v. City of Clovis (2000) 80 Cal. A p p . 4th 438)

According to the "plain meaning" rule, Courts look to the terms of the statute for

construction. "It is said that w h e n the meaning of the language is plain w e are not to

resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than

rule of law." See Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U S 87 (1959). A s a result, in interpreting

the terms of Vehicle C o d e section 10652.5 and California Civil C o d e section 3070,

Courts must utilize the "plain meaning" of such terms.

In the instant case, there are express limits o n the duration of storage that can be

charged by lien holders. Specifically, California Civil C o d e 3068.1 limits public agency

and private tows to a certain n u m b e r of days chargeable for storage. A vehicle under
$4000 in value shall not accrue storage charges beyond the 15th day unless lien sale

proceedings have commenced. If the lien isfiledby the 15th day of possession, the

storage is limited to 60 days. This would include a required notice to be signed by the

legal owner before the 15th day of possession. See Vehicle C o d e section 10652.5.

Importantly, there is an express requirement to notify the legal owner by the 16 th

day of possession if storage fees are charged, and if the legal owner is not timely and

properly notified, no additional storage m a y be charged the legal owner (Veh. Code,

§10652.5 subd.(a).).

Further, if the tow company fails to properly notify the legal owner within the

statutorily requiredfifteen(15) day period contained in Vehicle Code section 10652.5

subdivision (a), then under California Civil Code section 3070 subdivision (2)(A), the

tow company is guilty per se of "improperly causing a vehicle to be towed." A s such, the

"plain meaning" of the terms of Vehicle Code section 10652.5 and California Civil Code

sections 3068.1 and 3070, coupled with the purpose and legislative background noted in

A B 1 5 7 5 adequately represents the California legislature's intent to set forth the specific

requirements for the creation of towing and storage liens, revival of lost liens, and the

forfeiture of liens.

VI. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY UNDERLYING REVISIONS TO

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 3068 EVIDENCE THE DESIRE TO
LIMIT GARAGEMEN'S LIENS AND IS CONSISTENT WITH FORFEITURE
OF FEES FOR TOWING AND STORAGE CHARGED BY A T O W
YARD/GARAGEMAN.

In 1974 the California Supreme Court abrogated the garageman's right to

extrajudicially enforce his lien on a vehicle for which repair charges had not been paid.

See Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 146. The court, however,
condoned the garageman's temporary retention of the vehicle pending judicial resolution

of the underlying dispute concerning the repair bill. See id. The California Legislature

responded to the Supreme Court's ruling with legislation aimed at expediting the lien

enforcement procedure in specified situations.

Prior to 1969, creditors enjoyed both legislative and judicial approval of summary

prejudgment remedies. However, in that year the United States Supreme Court

established in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp, 395 U . S . 337 (1969), that a debtor must

be afforded, with limited exceptions, the procedural due process requisites of notice and

hearing before his property m a y be seized. Prior to its holding in Sniadach, the Supreme

Court had consistently sustained the constitutionality of ex parte judgment property

seizures, viewing the opportunity for a later decision on the merits as sufficient protection

of debtor's rights. See, Stephen C . Skubel. Mechanics' Liens Subject to Fourteenth

Amendment Guarantees, 26 Cath. U . L . Rev. 129, 131 (1977).

In 1974, the California Supreme Court applied the Sniadach principles in Adams

v. Department of Motor Vehicles to invalidate a garageman's right to enforce his statutory

lien extrajudicially. Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 146. In

Adams, petitioner, vehicle owners, sought a writ of m a n d a m u s in the state supreme court

and contended that the garageman's labor and materials lien provided by California Civil

Code sections 3068 subdivision (a), 3071-3074 violated their due process rights. Id. at

149 The court noted that unlike the statutorily created garageman's lien, a possessory

lienholder had no power of sale under the c o m m o n law. See id. at 151. Furthermore, the

sale process was administered, in part, by the Department of Motor Vehicles. The Court

also noted the lack of the availability of an accelerated hearing process to resolved
contested lien claims and concluded that the lien statutes violated petitioners' due process

rights. See id. at 151.

Moreover, in m a n d a m u s proceeding, the Supreme Court issued a writ order

Department of Motor Vehicles not to process or otherwise act on application for transfer

of registration pursuant to any lien sale conducted under those statutes. Id. Preliminarily,

the court decides that the state's involvement in the imposition and enforcement of a

garage m a n ' s lien through the Department of Motor Vehicles constitutes state action and

no extraordinary circumstances such as would justify exceptions to notice and hearing

requirements were found. Id. at 157. Accordingly, the Supreme Court voided the cited

civil sections o n the grounds that part of the garage m a n ' s lien law deprives owners of

due process of law in that they permit involuntary sale and transfer of a vehicle without

affording the owner an opportunity for hearing. Id. at 157. Notably, the California

Supreme Court stated "[i]f the owner remains unwilling or unable to pay the amount

claimed, the parties are relegated to such remedies as are provided by c o m m o n law or

statute, consonant with requirements of due process." Id.

Similarly, here, in order to protect the rights of the legal owner, the California

Legislature has imposed specific strict notice requirements on tow companies. California

Civil Code section 3070 specifically enumerates the legal consequences for failure to

comply with Vehicle Code 10652.5. Respondent's failure to properly and timely serve its

notice o n Appellant within 15 days of storage constitutes a violation of California Civil

C o d e section 3070 subdivision (d)(2)(A) ( R . T . 59-60.). Additionally, Respondent's

demand for storage fees covering a period of time in excess of that permitted pursuant to

Vehicle C o d e section 10652.5 further constitutes a violation of California Civil C o d e

section 3070. In such event, California Civil Code section 3070 states "in any action

brought by a legal owner of a motor vehicle to recover a motor vehicle alleged to be

withheld by the person in possession of the motor vehicle by demanding storage fees or

charges for any number of days in excess of that permitted pursuant to subdivision (a),

the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, not to exceed one

thousand seven hundredfiftydollars ($1,750). The recovery of those fees is in addition to

any other right, remedy, or cause of action of that party." A s such, given the legislative

intent to limit and at times extinguish garagemen's liens can be divined from the Senate

Judiciary Committee's report titled "Vehicle Liens," the Trial Court erred in finding for

Respondent.

VII. THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT TO LIMIT GARAGEMEN'S LIENS AND

UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES EXTINGUISHES THE LIEN
COMPLETELY CAN BE DIVINED F R O M THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE'S BILL ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 1575

The Senate Judiciary Committee's Bill Analysis of Assembly Bill 1575 evinces

the California Legislature's intent in enacting California Civil C o d e section 3070. The

bill is aptly titled "Vehicle Liens." Furthermore, in the description of Assembly Bill

1575's analysis, the Senate Judiciary Committee states "[t]his bill would list vehicle

mechanics liens to persons registered with the Bureau Automotive Repair prevent a

lienholder from removing parts after work or services have been completed; require a lien

to be exhausted upon failure of the lienholder to provide a work order and authorization

for service or repairs; and clarify limitations on storage liens." (emphasis added). ( A B

1575- Bill Analysis, Senate Judiciary Committee (2007-2008)).

Additionally, "California has long guaranteed the right of mechanics and other

laborers to have a lien on the property upon which they have labored or furnished
material towards." Id. "The state's original mechanics lien law w a s enacted by the state's

first legislative session in 1850. Adopted in 1879, Article X I V , section 3 of the California

Constitution further stated:

Mechanics, persons furnishing materials, artisans, and laborers of every

class, shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have bestowed
labor or furnished material for the value of such labor and material
furnished; and the Legislature shall provide, by law, for the speedy
enforcement of such liens. (Cal. Const., Art. X I V 3)." Id.

Furthermore, "[t]he Legislature subsequently enacted procedures for the

enforcement of those liens, including those pertaining to vehicles." ( A B 1575- Bill

Analysis, citing Cal. Civ. Code, §3067 et seq.) "Those provisions confer the right to

alien, dependent upon possession, for compensation to which the person is legally

entitled, subject to certain limitations and procedures for the sale of vehicles subject to

liens. Specific to this bill, lienholders are specifically prohibited from charging legal

owners in excess of certain amounts for the release of vehicles absent notice and written

consent by that owner prior to commencing any work, services, storage, safekeeping, or

rental of a parking space for that vehicle." Id.

In addition, under the section titled "Changes to Existing L a w " , N u m b e r 4

identifies the existing law and the effects of A B 1575. Specifically, "[t]his bill would

specifically subject lien provisions for the care, storage or safekeeping of a vehicle, or

rental of a parking space to the above restrictions, limiting charges for parking or storage

that m a y be charged absent notice to the legal owner." See id.

The bill analysis of A B 1575 emphasizes the fact that the California Legislature

was concerned about lienholders charging legal owners in excess of certain amounts for

the release of vehicles absent notice and written consent by that owner prior to
commencing storage of that vehicle. Furthermore, by noting that the bill would limit the

charges for storage that m a y be charged absent notice to legal owner, the California

Legislature appreciated that such notice is necessary to protect legal owner's procedural

due process rights. See Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles. supra, 11 Cal. 3d at 157.

Because the legislative intent in amending the California Civil C o d e section can be

divined from A B 1575, any failure to send proper and timely notice directly conflicts

with the terms, legislative history, and legislative intent of such amendments. A s such,

the Trial Court's failure to find that Respondent has "improperly caused" a vehicle to be

towed resulting in the "forfeiture" of any towing and storage lien is an appropriate ground

for overturning the Trial Court's decision.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Changing the interpretation of key statutory terms "amounts to an amendment of

the statute itself rather than simply a change in the thinking of the judiciary with respect

to c o m m o n law concepts which are properly under its control."" Froud v. Celotex Corp.,

456 N . E . 2 d 131, 137 (Ill. 1983). A s a result, courts have been reluctant to preempt the

legislature's prerogative to modify its o w n enactments, particularly in matters involving

contract or property rights where "stare decisis concerns are at their acme." Khan, 118

S.Ct. at 284. In these circumstances, stare decisis acts as a policy of judicial restraint in

areas traditionally reserved for legislative action. A s such, the principles of stare decisis

and "plain meaning" underscore the Trial Court's error in failing to find that

Respondent's conduct by failing to comply with Vehicle C o d e section 10652.5

subdivision (a) constituted a violation of California Civil C o d e section 3070 resulting in

the forfeiture of Respondent's towing and storage lien. Accordingly, Appellant

respectfully requests that this Court overturn the Trial Court's ruling as a matter of law.

IX. CERTIFICATE OF W O R D COUNT

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.240(c)(1), attorney William N .

Elder Jr., counsel for Appellant hereby certifies and represents that I assisted in the

preparation of this Opening Brief using Microsoft W o r d 2010, which contains a word

count function. I used that word count function to calculate the number of words used in

said Brief to be 4,174, excluding this certification, tables, and proof of service.

D A T E D : August 19, 2014 Respectfully submitted,

FOELL & ELDER

WILLIAM N. ELDER JR,

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT,

BANKERS AUTO ACCEPTANCE
CORP.
 P R O O F O F SERVICE
(CCP 1013)

I a m a citizen of the United States and an employee in the County of Orange, State of California.

I a m over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action: m y Business address is 3818 E .

La Palma Avenue, Anaheim, California, 92807. O n August 28, 2014, I served upon the following parties

in this action:

L A W OFFICE OF J. PATRICK R A G A N , APLC

1881 SOUTH BUSINESS CENTER DRIVE, SUITE 7B
SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA 92408
ATTN: J. PATRICK R A G A N

SUPERIOR C O U R T OF SAN BERNARDINO

247 W . THIRD STREET
SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA 92415-0210
ATTN: THE HONORABLE DONALD ALVAREZ

SUPREME C O U R T OF CALIFORNIA
350 MCALLISTER STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102-4797
www.courts.ca.gov/24590.htm
Copies of the document(s) described as: APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

[X] B y Mail I placed a true copy of each documents listed herein in a sealed envelope, addressed as
indicated herein, and caused each such envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, to be placed in the
United States Mail at Anaheim, California.

[ ] B y Facsimile Transmission I caused a copy of each of the documents listed herein to be

delivered by Facsimile Transmission to the interested parties by the Fax Numbers listed above.

[XX] B y Electronic Service by electronically mailing a true and correct copy through F O E L L &
E L D E R ' S electronic mail system from [email protected] to the email addresses listed above.

[ ] B y Federal Express I caused such documents to be delivered by FedEx Priority Overnight

Service for delivery by next business morning to each of the interested parties listed above.

I declare, under penalty of perjury, under the L a w s of the State of California that the foregoing is

true and correct.

Executed this 28 th day of August, 2014, at Anaheim, California.

ERIN O. OLSCHEWSKE